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Guantanamo Bay (Also GTMO Or Gitmo) Is a US Naval Base in Cuba Covering 45 Square Miles

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Guantanamo Bay (also GTMO or Gitmo) is a US Naval base in Cuba covering 45 square miles. It contains several prison camps, the first of which was established by the Bush Administration in January 2002 to house enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan. The US Government committed to closing the prison by January 2010 however as of March 2011 there are 172 prisoners still housed with no immediate date for closure. This PDF is a text version of the interactive feature, How To Get Out Of Guantanamo. abc.net.au/innovation/gitmo PAGE 1/11 © ABC 2011 HOW TO GET OUT OF GUANTANAMO abc.net.au/innovation/gitmo 779 DETAINED SINCE 2002 The first 20 prisoners arrived at Guantanamo on Jan 11 2002 from Afghanistan. They were detained under a Military Order issued by President Bush after the 9/11 attacks allowing individuals to be held without charge indefinitely. On Feb 7 2002, Bush signed a memorandum excluding them from prisoner of war status (POW) and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention; Article 3 prohibits unfair trials, torture, cruelty and outrages on human dignity. On March 14, 2008, the last known prisoner arrived at Guantanamo Bay. At its peak capacity Guantanamo has housed about 660 pris- oners (November 2003). 12 of these prisoners have been children under the age of 16. Some inmates were transferred to the prison after being held for months or years in detention at so-called CIA 'black sites'. This included 14 men in 2006 described as 'high value detainees'. REFERENCES: Amnesty International, Guantanamo Timeline (2008) http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/148/2008/en/d620ceca-cde2-11dd-b0c5-1f8db3691f48/amr511482008en.html Miltary Order Nov 13, 2001, Detention of Non Citizens http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html Miami Herald, Jan 2002, First Prisoners arrive in Cuba http://www.miamiherald.com/2002/01/12/279932/prisoners-arrive-in-cuba.html Memorandum, Feb 07, The Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Quaeda Detainees http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/powtorturememos.html The Guardian, April 2003, US detains children at Guantanamo http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/23/usa BBC, Sep 2006, Bush admits to secret CIA prison http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm ABC (US), Sep 2006, ‘High-Value’ Detainees Transferred to Guantanamo http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2400470 New York Times, The Guantanamo Docket http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo 600 TRANSFERRED Of the 779 held at Guantanamo, 600 detainees have been transferred to 50 coun- tries. Some have been repatriated to face trial in their home country and others released pending no further trial. In some cases repatriation resulted in docu- mented human rights abuses. In other cases, where repatriation was not possible due to the threat of torture or death, US authorities have, via diplomatic means, resettled detainees in 16 countries. Two Algerians have been forcibly repatriated against their will, after petitioning to stay at Guantanamo. In the case of three juvenile prisoners released in 2004, they claimed that the conditions (including schooling) in detention were better than those available to them in their native Afghanistan. PAGE 2/11 © ABC 2011 HOW TO GET OUT OF GUANTANAMO abc.net.au/innovation/gitmo 600 TRANSFERRED cont... REFERENCES: Spiegal Online, Jun 2007, Former Detainees abused back Home http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,504237,00.html CCR FAQ, International Protection for Guantánamo Prisoners http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/resettlement-and-refugees-guantanamo Miami Herald, Jan2011, Fearful detainee sent home to Algeria http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/01/07/2004481/fearful-detainee-sent-home-to.html#storylink=mirelated Human Rights Watch, Jan 2011, stop returns of detainees fearing mistreatment http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/01/06/us-stop-returns-guantanamo-detainees-fearing-mistreatment The Guardian, March 2004, Cuba? it was great say boys http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/06/guantanamo.usa Miami Herald, Guantanamo by the Numbers http://www.miamiherald.com/2007/11/27/322461/by-the-numbers.html 7 DIED In June 2006, three detainees were found hanging simultaneously in their cells. Their deaths in custody were pronounced suicides. The US military described them as coordinated Acts of War. In 2009, Seton Hall Law School released a report outlining significant discrepancies in the official documentation of the deaths. Families of the men filed a lawsuit that was dismissed by a Washington Federal court in Feb 2010. In May 2007 a Saudi man was also found dead in his cell, and in June 2009 a Yemeni man was found dead of a suspected suicide in the psychiatric ward. Abdul Razzaq Hekmati died of colon cancer in December 2007 and Awal Gal died of heart attack on Feb 2011 after 9 years in Guantanamo. REFERENCES: BBC, Jun 2006, Guantanamo suicides 'acts of war' http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5068606.stm Seton Hall Law releases, July 2009, Latest GTMO report http://law.shu.edu/about/news_events/releases.cfm?id=79165 Reuters, Feb 2010, U.S. court dismisses suit over Guantanamo suicides http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/17/us-guantanamo-suicides-lawsuit-idUSTRE61G3TK20100217 New York Times, Feb 2008, Time Runs Out for an Afghan Held by the U.S http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/world/asia/05gitmo.html?_r=2 Huffington Post, Jun 2009, Yemeni Gitmo Detainee Allegedly Dies Of Suicide http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/02/yemeni-gitmo-detainee-all_n_210489.html BBC, Feb 2011, Guantanamo Bay terror suspect ’dies after exercising’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12361834 PAGE 3/11 © ABC 2011 HOW TO GET OUT OF GUANTANAMO abc.net.au/innovation/gitmo 172 IN DETENTION As of Feb 2011, 172 of the 240 cases assessed by the 2010 interagency task force (see 4) remain in detention at Guantanamo. They come from 24 countries but the majority are from Yemen. 16 of these men are considered 'High Value Detainees' by the CIA, 78 are detained indefinitely. 13 of them have been declared innocent through habeas corpus petitions but not released due to either the threat of torture or death in their own country or because no third country can be found to resettle them. 36 were recommended for prosecution but the current impasse on Military Commissions versus Federal trials means most of their cases remain on hold. REFERENCES: The Age, Jan 2011, Obama stymied in effort to close Guantanamo Bay http://www.theage.com.au/world/obama-stymied-in-effort-to-close-guantanamo-bay-20110108-19j4l.html?from=watoday_ft New York Times, Feb 2009, For 20 at Guantánamo, Court Victories Fall Short http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/us/26gitmo.html The Guardian, Jan 2011, Comment is free Reneging on Guantanamo http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/22/guantanamo-bay-obama-administration GUANTANAMO TRIALS The legal rights of Guantanamo detainees who are held as 'enemy combatants' have changed several times since the prison opened. The Bush Administration instituted Miltary Trials in a closed court. The Obama Administration has pushed for criminal trials in Civilian Courts but allows for some Military Trials. The legality of both kinds of trials has been challenged. 6 COMPLETED MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS The Military order issued by President Bush on the 13 November 2001, prohibited any detainee held under it from seeking recourse in a US, foreign or international court, and established a tribunals system of Military Commissions. Last used in WW2, Military Commissions (MC) were used to prosecute enemy combatants who violated the laws of war. Bush was criticised internationally for placing detainees beyond due legal process. On 29 June 2006, four months after a UN inquiry into Guantanamo, the US supreme court ruled that MC Trials (as constituted under the 2001 Military order) violated US and International Law (Hamdan vs Rumsfeld). On 17 Oct 2006, Bush signed the Military Commissions Act (MCA) prohibiting all habeas corpus appeals by foreign nationals held as enemy combatants in US custody, and reinstituting Military Commissions. When Obama took office, there were 'charges pending against 13 defendants and an additional nine had been sworn', all proceed- ings were suspended pending review. In May 2009, Obama announced MC's would be used in some instances with revised protections. PAGE 4/11 © ABC 2011 HOW TO GET OUT OF GUANTANAMO abc.net.au/innovation/gitmo 6 COMPLETED MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS cont... REFERENCES: New York Times, Jan 2011, Military Comissions Fact Sheet http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/d/detainees/military_commissions/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier US Department of Defence Military Commissions Act http://www.defense.gov/news/commissionsacts.html" display="US Department of Defence Military Commissions Act Amnesty International, Mar 2008, More Military Commission proceedings at Guantanamo http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/10574/ Washington Post, May 2009, Obama to Revamp Military Tribunals http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/15/AR2009051501771.html 4 CONVICTED AND DETAINED Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al-Bahlul was convicted to life in prison in 2008. Because convicted criminals must be held separately to un-charged war captives under the Geneva Convention al Buahul was held in isolation at Guantanamo. In 2010 under the renewed Military Commission trials al Qaeda cook and driver Ibrahim al-Qosi was given a reduced two year sentence. Al-Qosi may not be able to return to his home county of Sudan at the end of his sentence because it remains on the terror list. Also in 2010 Omar Kahdr, who was 15 years old when he was arrested in 2002, accepted a plea bargain to eight years in custody with the proviso that he be repatriated to Canada to serve after one year.
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