The National Unity Government's Elusive Cabinet
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The National Unity Government's Elusive Cabinet Author : Martine van Bijlert Published: 9 December 2014 Downloaded: 4 September 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-national-unity-governments-elusive-cabinet/?format=pdf On day seventy-two of Afghanistan’s national unity government, the new cabinet still looks to be weeks away, with the country’s President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) locked in protracted discussions over who to appoint and how that should be decided. The composition of the cabinet will be a first, crucial test of what Afghanistan’s new government will look like, beyond its two leaders and their entourages, and whether it will be able to carry out any of its intended reforms. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look at what might be holding up the discussions, where they may be going and how the government has fared so far. Delaying the cabinet announcement The Afghan government attended the London conference without a new cabinet in place. Expectations had risen as the conference date approached and persistent rumours indicated that a list of names had (almost) been agreed. Instead, in a televised press conference on 30 November, President Ashraf Ghani, flanked by CEO Abdullah Abdullah, announced a delay in the announcement of the cabinet. They said they expected to “gradually introduce the new cabinet in the coming two to four weeks.” Almost a week later, during his closing remarks at the 1 / 10 London conference, it became clear that the clock had yet to start ticking; Ghani said he and Abdullah intended to form the cabinet within two to four weeks of returning to Kabul. The decision not to rush the introduction of the ministers and to attend the London conference without even the symbolic introduction of a few names, came as somewhat of a surprise – and a disappointment, particularly for donor governments who had been encouraging both leaders to push on with their discussions. The introduction of new faces ahead of the conference would have been a tangible sign of progress easily understood at home and in donor capitals. It would have been particularly welcome given the contentious and drawn-out election, the lingering uneasiness about whether a dual-headed government will actually work and the morphing of the ISAF mission into the new Mission Resolute Support. There had been an expectation that, as so often in the past, the approach of a high-level conference would inspire a last-minute flurry of decisiveness. Instead, the new government used the London conference as a platform to introduce its vision and present an image of a cordial Ghani-Abdullah partnership – both easier to produce than a cabinet. Many Afghans, initially impressed by Ghani’s presentation of himself as a decisive leader, had expected him to keep his promise to introduce the new cabinet within 45-days – a promise made before the establishment of the National Unity Government, but repeatedly reiterated after its inauguration (see for instance here). On 30 November the deadline had already been missed by more than two weeks, so when all MPs were invited to the Palace for an unscheduled meeting, and a televised press conference was announced for later that evening, the moment seemed to have come. Instead, President Ghani, accompanied by CEO Abdullah, signed two laws and ratified two agreements, not related to the cabinet formation. (1) He briefly explained their importance to the public, and then announced the delay. The few journalists present were not given a chance to ask questions. Cabinet negotiations Ghani and Abdullah have, so far, taken great pains to present the image of a united leadership, particularly as they took the international stage together during the NATO summit in Brussels and the donor conference in London. In practice, however, they have not yet hashed out the details of how authorities should be divided between them. The delay in presenting a cabinet illustrates how the ambiguity over who gets to decide what, and based on which criteria, is likely to complicate any joint decision. It also means we still do not know how this government will work – or indeed whether it will work. According to the National Unity Government deal signed on 21 September 2014 (full text can be found in the annex here), the authorities of the CEO, and his deputies, are to be specified by 2 / 10 presidential decree – which has not yet been issued. One of the sticking points now appears to be that Abdullah wants his authorities clarified before he and Ghani finalise the choice of cabinet ministers. The text of the NUG agreement itself is ambiguous on how the authorities to nominate, select and appoint should be shared, which is a reflection of the differing views both sides held on how the NUG should function (see reporting here). To ensure that an agreement was reached at all, language was chosen that could cover both interpretations. The agreement, for instance, refers to “parity in the selection of personnel between the President and the CEO at the level of head of key security and economic institutions and independent directorates.” This can be read as both sides having an equal say in the selection or, alternatively, as a division of the mentioned key posts between the two sides. For other positions, the National Unity Government agreement describes a hierarchy in which the CEO provides “advice and proposals to the President for appointment and dismissal of senior government officials and other government affairs.” The text also describes a “specific merit-based mechanism … with the full participation of the CEO … [that] can lead to equitable (barabarguna) representation from both parties.” The differing views have led to drawn-out discussions on the meaning of ‘parity’ and the trade- off between the potentially conflicting demands of merit and power sharing - with the talks now largely boiled down to a hashing out of the relative weight of the various posts, whether they are political or technical (and what that means for who has the last say) and – ultimately – how the posts should be divided between the two sides. Before London, the two sides settled on a 50-50 division for all ministerial posts (instead of for a limited set of political positions) with 13 ministries going to Ghani and 12 to Abdullah. Agreement on who gets which ministry was said to have been reached for 17 of the 25, but it looks like some of this may still change as the negotiations progress. Obviously, not all agreements arrived at during the private wranglings between Ghani and Abdullah will go down well with their supporters. Some of the agreements will, as a consequence, probably need to be revisited and tweaked several times before they can be upheld. Any change will, in turn, shift the carefully negotiated balance and will probably need to be compensated, as the two sides take into account: the weight of the various ministries and the division of posts between the two sides (as well as among the main personalities within the camps); the ethnic, factional and gender composition of the cabinet (both have stressed the intention to include four women); the promise to introduce ‘fresh faces’, but also the pressure to reward old friends and placate grumbling supporters; as well as the score of compromises that both sides are likely to have diligently kept. Not to mention the discussions about the deputy ministerships (if one side gets the minister, should the other side get the first deputy? How to ensure that they can work together). It is a complex, multi-layered process, which makes it easy to understand why the negotiations are taking so long - and may continue to do so. 3 / 10 All in all, the cabinet negotiations will provide the first important litmus test of how well the two men will be able to negotiate the pitfalls and complexities of this combined government. And of how far they will get in their ambitions to start a new chapter for governance in Afghanistan, while faced with the patterns of entrenched patronage. In the meantime: appointments and resignations At the same time that Ghani and Abdullah confirmed the delay in forming the cabinet, they also announced the mass replacement of all ministers by their deputies. The ministers of the Karzai cabinet had been serving in an acting capacity since the president's 1 October decree, which in particular stipulated they were no longer allowed to hire or fire until the new ministers were appointed (similar decrees were also given for governors and the head of the Supreme Court ). The only acting ministers who were not replaced by their deputies were those whose presence was needed at the London conference - which were Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade and Women’s Affairs - although it was said they would be replaced immediately after. The decision to replace all acting ministers by their deputies was based on the Law of Acting Ministers, which limits the period that a ministry can be run by an acting minister to a maximum of two months. The move was clearly intended to signal a break with the Karzai government that had been severely criticised for regularly misusing the authority to appoint acting ministers as a way to bypass parliament and to keep allies in place who had been voted off or would probably not have received the parliamentary vote of confidence. (2) The replacement of the sitting ministers by their deputies also signals the likely end of the ministerial careers of heavyweights such as Bismillah Khan, Omar Daudzai, Ismail Khan, Omar Zakhilwal and Faruq Wardak – unless the president changes his mind on appointing “all fresh faces.” The list of new acting ministers and heads of independent organs can be found below, in Annex 1.