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Home , Pamiris, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Tajiks, United Tajik Opposition

September 2012 NOREF Report

Turf on the roof of the world

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

Executive summary

Towards the end of July 2012, the government who had once been included in the government of responded to the stabbing of the through the 1997 Peace Accord but were now head of the National Security Committee in the commanding too much autonomy and control in Mountainous Autonomous Province, competition with the centre; (2) turf war over the on the border with , with a particularly distribution of profits from legal and illicit trade heavy Special Operation. In response to a murder, that had been allowed to go on unrestrained in why was it necessary to send an entire battalion border regions; (3) gaining sympathy for efforts and risk alienating an important minority group, to contain instability in Afghanistan and sending the , during the month of Ramadan, a a warning sign against the potential trespassing, month after the country celebrated unity 15 years not of Afghan per se, but of Central Asian after the signing of the Peace Accord, and a year jihadists and control over any future profits from before presidential elections? transit over the Northern Distribution Network route, legal or otherwise; and finally (4) to portray This paper analyses four ulterior objectives that control in order to up the ante in negotiations over authorities may have sought directly or indirectly the territory of the country in base arrangements in launching a brief but forceful but assault on anticipated after the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. the province: (1) forced recentralisation and and NATO troops from Afghanistan and any the sidelining of renegade field commanders advantages that could befall from the exit.

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh directs and teaches a programme on Human Security as part of the Master’s in Public Affairs at (l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques) in Paris and is a research associate with the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) working on regional security complexes around Afghanistan. She is the editor of Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives (Routledge, 2011) and the author, with Anuradha Chenoy, of Human Security: Concepts and Implications (Routledge, 2007,) and various journal articles. She has worked as a consultant with the on counter-terrorism in and has contributed to the preparation of the National Human Development Reports in a number of countries. She has taught at as an adjunct professor and has been a visiting professor or researcher at universities in New Delhi, Pretoria, and . She previously worked for seven years for the UN Development Programme in New York and Central Asia. Turf on the roof of the world

The Special Operation in the Badakshan Dunya) in eastern Tajikistan. In the Mountainous Autonomous Province was a gamble, as it Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO in its counted on perceptions of the local populations, usual Russian-derived abbreviation), for a few tired of the experience of civil war in the 1990s, tense days at the end of July, the government as being passive, organised opposition as being of President seemed to feeble, and order and a show of force in tacking be antagonising the population of the capital, corruption and organised crime as commanding Khorog, with a disproportionate response to the respect. However, even though social order was murder of a government official. In this age of restored, indiscriminate use of force added to the connectivity and mobility, it was hard to suppress alienation and grievances of the Pamiri people, information: while Internet, mobile and landline which could in turn decrease the authority and connections were cut intermittently, Pamiris (i.e. credibility of the government in Dushanbe. Badakhshanis) inside used satellite phones and Afghan SIM cards to communicate with Ultimately, the incident in Badakhshan is their large community of expatriates outside, symptomatic of the rocky centre–periphery who in turn mobilised around social networks, relations between a post-war central government particularly Facebook.1 A month after government and neglected and desolate autonomous regions, troops entered the autonomous province on as well as turf wars over economic and political July 24th, thousands of inhabitants of Khorog interests that plague the vulnerable countries began a vigil in the main square in protest of the of the region. As such, it is a cautionary tale ceasefire violation following the killing of a local for Afghanistan about a number of challenges leader, Imomnazar Imomnazarov. Protesters ahead. Neglect of underdeveloped sub-regions demanded the withdrawal of troops, the dismissal courts control by local informal leaders, both of the provincial head and amendment to the benevolent and corrupt, as well as dissatisfaction Constitution to allow a direct appointment of among populations, which decreases possibilities their leaders. Flash back to April 1992: the public of cooperation. When there is intrusion of armed criticism of the then Minister for Internal Affairs, forces from outside, especially as a substitute for Mahamadaez Navdjuvonov, for corruption had police and security forces and without coordination prompted young Pamiris in Dushanbe to start with local authorities, there is the risk of apathy a 24-hour picket in front of the President’s at best and, at worst, backlash from perceived palace in defence of their fellow Badakhshani violation of the sanctuary of local communities. in the government. The protest grew into a 50- The challenge ahead for both states is to find the day sit-in and became inflated with the larger right balance between (1) projecting strength and grievances of democratic and Islamic opposition capability to control territory and gain legitimacy parties. Protests against the sending of federal from protecting and cooperating with local troops for security actions in violation of GBAO’s populations instead of antagonising them, and autonomy, rising food prices and discontentment (2) providing incentives for wealth creation in with centrally appointed local officials had also border regions and redistribution at the national been staged in June 2008. Could this latest levels. In the final analysis, the real test is that of protest, prompted by a heavy-handed military implementing a just and efficient decentralisation operation, become the start of a new revolution system in the midst of imperatives for consolidating in this impoverished Central Asian country, 15 the nation; the two post-war countries on the two years after the conclusion of the Peace Accord in sides of the Panj river are grappling with this Tajikistan that brought the civil war (1992–1997) major challenge by different methods. to a halt?

If one lesson can be drawn from the Arab world, Introduction it is that this question is hard to answer. Protests can mutate, grievances can be manipulated and Observers waiting to spot the spark that could provocations can change the course of events. ignite an Arab-style Central Asian Spring were busy recently with what was unfolding in the , the Roof of the World (Bam-i 1 See in particular the Facebook pages “Peace in Khorog” and “Stop the military action in Khorog”.

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What people go out to protest for can turn out to be A very special operation different from what they ultimately get. In the case of Badakhshan, the protest eventually led to the Nestled between , and withdrawal of the troops by the end of August. Yet Afghanistan, GBAO represents 45% of the the seeds of mistrust had been sown. The unrest territory of Tajikistan but only 3% of its population. started with a Special Operation initiated by the It is home to 250,000 Ismaili Shiites who speak government, a fact that by itself raised a number one of seven Pamiri languages of the Eastern of discomforting questions: Why was it necessary Iranian language family. In this they differ from to send an entire battalion and risk alienating an the majority ethnic of Tajikistan, Sunni important minority group in Tajikistan, during the Muslims who speak Tajik Persian. A stone’s throw month of Ramadan, a month after the country away across the river Panj, which since 1895 celebrated its vahdat (unity) 15 years after the has marked the border, lies the Afghan province signing of the Peace Accord, and a year before of Badakhshan, with a population of 890,000, presidential elections? What did the authorities the majority of them Sunnis, most of them ethnic seek to achieve, directly or indirectly, and what Tajiks and /Persian speakers, although ethnic could be the consequences, intended or not? Pamiris also reside in the southern and eastern This paper seeks to understand the potential districts. While both provinces have rich deposits motivations behind this risky move from the of precious stones, i.e. pink rubies (La’l) on the point of view of those who initiated it, and frame Tajik side, lapis lazuli and emeralds on the Afghan them in the regional context. It will argue that the one, both feature as the least developed regions government may have had four ulterior motives of their respective countries. One side is more for launching the operation in Badakhshan, blessed, however: the Tajik province received in addition to the officially stated objective to heavy subsidies during Soviet times, has a highly catch the murderers. It may have needed the educated population and belongs to a country confrontation at this particular time, not only in which takes centrally controlled law and order order to consolidate its authority internally, but extremely seriously. GBAO also has access to also to portray strength to counter perceptions major regional trade routes: the Pamir highway of vulnerability by those fearing the worst after linking to in Kyrgyzstan and a newer road the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops connecting to Karakoram Highway in China. While from neighbouring Afghanistan. The move was, it has more land to cultivate, Afghan Badakhshan however, a gamble as it counted on perceptions depends heavily on its namesake for shipment of of the passivity of the locals, feebleness of food aid, products and materials. When borders organised opposition and respect for order among between Tajikistan and Afghanistan closed during populations tired of war. The article will distil some the unrest in GBAO in late July, the mountainous lessons learned for Afghanistan, another post- regions in the north of the Afghan side fell under war country seeking reconciliation with opposition a de facto blockade. commanders. Between July 24th and 29th, the Tajik government Ultimately, the incident in Badakhshan is launched a Special Operation on GBAO which symptomatic of a number of tangible challenges involved expeditionary forces from the Ministries in terms of development, security and governance of Interior and Defence and the National Security that plague the countries of the wider region: Committee, including (special weapons rocky centre–periphery relations between a post- and tactics) teams (Alpha Unit). The official war central government and neglected, desolate reason for the operation was to disarm illegal and renegade “‘autonomous”’ regions; close armed groups and arrest the murderers of the association – and turf wars – between economic Head of the National Security Committee in and political interests; challenge to authorities by GBAO, Major-General Abdullo Nazarov, stabbed “informal leaders”; confrontation with mobilised to death on July 21st in a row with alleged masses; the tendency to use the army instead smugglers. The response to the murder took the of police forces to curb criminal activities; and form of a heavy military assault with helicopter the interplay between domestic motivations and gunships and heavy weapons, which had been, external opportunities. according to officials, taken to GBAO at the

- 3 - Turf on the roof of the world beginning of the month for a military manoeuvre. this context refers to respected local tough guys) During the initial stage of the assault, official data wounded and paralysed during the civil war, the pointed to 42 people killed: 30 so-called rebels figure of Imomnazarov – and his legacy – sat and 12 members of the Tajik security forces. somewhere between field commander, , By the time this paper went to press, the exact drug baron, trusted “informal leader”, negotiator, number of victims among the civilian population hero and, ultimately, martyr. His murder deepened was still not known. Government sources cited his followers’ mistrust of the authorities, but may only one civilian killed, a surprising number given also have been the start of a manipulation by the very urban setting and heavy nature of the “third parties”, domestic or foreign, no one could assault. Local residents – and foreign witnesses tell. By the end of August, government troops had – claimed anywhere between 22 and 200 people. withdrawn from the province after a truce signed with a 20-member group of locals. The operation, brief but forceful as it was, was officially targeted at four field commanders: Tolib If the original and official motivation was catching Ayombekov, Mahmadbokir Mahmadbokirov, the killers of General Nazarov, the murder Yodgor Mamadaslamov and Imomnazar remained unsolved while discontentment among Imomnazarov, who were accused by the Pamiris grew exponentially. What could have Prosecutor General’s Office of having engaged been the four ulterior objectives of the government in murder, drug trafficking, smuggling, banditry, for initiating the risky Special Operation? Two of kidnapping and trafficking in persons (read of them could be domestic considerations, the rest women to Afghanistan). Until these charges were regional and global. formally filed, Tolib Ayombekov, the main instigator, had been wearing a government uniform as a result of a bargain for pacification: an opposition War as continuation of politics: field commander during the civil war, Ayombekov initially became a battalion commander with the forced recentralization Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan in Khorog One unofficial motive was probably the opportunity on the basis of the quota of 30% of government to sideline renegade field commanders who no posts for the opposition negotiated through the longer served the purposes of the government, 1997 Peace Accord. Soon removed from that and that too in time for presidential elections in post, he was unemployed for a while before 2013. As part of the General Agreement on the becoming commander of a border guards unit Establishment of Peace and National Accord in at Ishkashim after the 2008 demonstrations in Tajikistan signed in 1997, local commanders of Khorog, of which he was thought to be one of the the then United Tajik Opposition (UTO) were organisers. given positions in their home regions, positions that undoubtedly gave them substantial political A ceasefire and the beginning of disarmament and economic clout among local constituencies. were announced at the end of July after Officially allowed to remain armed and in control negotiations involving a 20-member mediation of power structures, these local commanders team and an appeal by Prince IV, wielded more power than the centrally appointed the spiritual leader of the Ismailis, urging his head of provincial government (Rais-I Hukumat), followers to refrain from violence, work for peace whom local populations considered highly and uphold the law. By mid-August, Ayombekov ineffective. Field commanders turned informal had voluntarily surrendered and remained under leaders may have had authority by default, but house arrest in Khorog. Imomnazarov, who had were not much respected, as local populations also disarmed, was killed, however, in mysterious considered them as corrupt as formal officials. circumstances on the night of August 21st in They mostly presented a challenge to central his home. Although the government denied authorities with their command and control of not responsibility, the killing prompted another round only security operations in the region but also of demonstrations with calls for the withdrawal trade, local politics etc. of troops from Badakhshan. Once a “pahlavon” (literally meaning hero/champion, the term in

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The Badakhshan assault was thus part of a Politics as continuation series of moves to marginalise, or remove by force, local commanders and former civil war of economics: turf wars leaders in different regions. Similar operations A second congruent hypothesis that could had previously taken place in the , explain the forceful Special Operations has in the northern province of Soghd and in eastern to do with a turf war between local and central Tavildara. For the recentralisation of power, the mafias, a connection hinted at in the charges government had often used the pretext of hunting of the Prosecutor General against the four down terrorists or Islamist extremists, justifying commanders. The violent chastisement could the use of the army and security forces. have been motivated by settling of scores and control over legal and illegal trade that had been In September 2010, a military convoy had allowed to go on unrestrained in border regions. similarly been sent to the Kamarob gorge in the Officially positioned field commanders, in control Rasht (formerly Gharm) District to track down of the local cross-border trade, are supposed to the 25 inmates who had escaped from prison share part of their booty with central authorities – in Dushanbe. An attack on the convoy, which both through the national budget and under the resulted in the death of 28 soldiers, was blamed table. By launching an operation against them, the on Ali Bedaki and Abdullo Rahimov (also known central government sought to diminish the power as Mullah Abdullo), prominent former opposition base and authority of local commanders while commanders in the 1990s. Three days after putting on display its capacity to control distant the assault, a massive security operation was regions. This show of force was especially deemed launched in the region to capture what the Ministry necessary in preparation for the activation of the of Defence claimed were UTO field commanders Northern Distribution Network (NDN) route, which and their new allies among terrorists and radical would see the transit of NATO supplies and, with Islamists. The terrorist group Islamic Movement them, a host of other possible economic dividends of (IMU) did in fact claim responsibility through GBAO and Khatlon province. As it is, for the attack on the convoy, although the exact large amounts of narcotics and other contrabands connections between former UTO commanders from Afghanistan go through official crossings on and the IMU have never been clarified beyond Tajikistan’s 835-mile border with Afghanistan, with speculations. estimates of up to 80 tons of heroin and 20 tons of opium smuggled.3 Although GBAO is no longer One by one, former commanders were deposed by the main road for drug traffickers, with the trade force or intimidation, the continuation of a process now using less geographically challenging routes that had already seen the marginalisation of political through Khatlon, control over all trade, legal or leaders and neutralisation of entrepreneurs of illicit, is the prerogative of officials in Dushanbe. war that started in the late 1990s.2 The taming of former and opposition figures may Apparently, the Pamiri Mafiosi no longer sent the have eroded the political space and eradicated appropriate cut to the centre. Tolib Ayombekov competition, but the strategy was pursued to had supposedly received permission to engage in ensure that the Tajik government could obtain its business at will in exchange for non-interference unity (vahdat), stability and unopposed longevity. in politics. He used this prerogative to set up a lucrative trade in cross-border smuggling of narcotics, tobacco and precious stones. The murder of General Nazarov, who by some accounts was himself running a competing tobacco trade or claiming a bigger cut of local trade for himself, may have been used by rival criminal networks backed by the government to curb in this privilege.

2 See Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “International peacemaking in 3 UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), Opiate Flows through Tajikistan and Afghanistan compared: lessons learned and un- Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment, May learned”, Les Etudes du CERI, No. 143, Paris, CERI, April 2008, 2012, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/ http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/etude/etude143.pdf. Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf. - 5 - Turf on the roof of the world

It was not the first time that economics featured While GBAO may not be the primary route for in the calculations of show of force in the region. trafficking, the drug economy and smuggling were During the September/October 2010 operation in more prominent causes for the assault than the the Kamarob gorge in Rasht, rumours had it that presence of the Taliban or bleeding out of Afghan a new coal field had been found at the top of the insurgents across the river. Ever since the Tajik valley and local commanders refused to share it civil war, when a large number of Pamiri men with the centre. moved to Afghanistan to join the UTO, affinities have existed between fighters on both side of the river. However, with them belonging to different The inevitable Afghan branches of , Pamiris and other UTO fighters were united in their common struggle against connection the government rather than religious affinities. A third potential motive for the Special Operation Consequently very little, if any, cooperation exists could be sought across the river. The government between the Pamiris, Ismaili Shiites with their had an interest in associating the criminal networks demands for autonomy, and the Afghan Taliban, in GBAO with “insurgency” in Afghanistan so that it Sunnis who consider Ismailis heretics and have could derive a number of advantages: it could boast limited interest in extending their struggle across of cooperation and coordination with the Afghan borders. If there is convergence among fighters government in defending border areas; it could north and south of the river Panj, it is most likely justify the heavy-handed tactics as a preventative over business interests rather than religious or measure and create sympathy for its efforts to political goals. contain instability in Afghanistan; ultimately, it would send the message that local deals and localised The Afghan province of Badakhshan has until linkages between communities/commanders now been considered to be one of the more across borders could not be tolerated if they did secure areas, although Taliban infiltration has not go through the centre. Furthermore, tagging increased as has the concentration of Central the operation in GBAO to the wider insecurities in Asian jihadists such as the IMU and the Islamic the region was a strategic move to highlight the Jihad Union (IJU), who are often identified loosely importance of Tajikistan as a transit route between – and perhaps incorrectly – as al-Qaeda militants the two hot spots of the region: Afghanistan as the in the mainstream press. The heavy-handed source of instability, and the Ferghana Valley as response by the government of Tajikistan to the the desired destination of Central Asian militants murder of General Nazarov can be seen as a currently engaged in the jihad against Western warning against any potential trespassing, not troops in Afghanistan. of Afghan Taliban per se, but of Central Asian jihadists in the future. During the Operation in GBAO, rumours flew of a significant build-up of fighters on the Afghan side of the river ready to provide support to their The global recipients brothers in arms. According to officials, eight Afghan nationals were among the rebels killed, of the message and Presidents Emomali Rahmon and Hamid If the Tajik government considered playing the Karzai had a phone conversation during which the Afghan card as a way to draw attention to its former passed on a list of 10 Afghan commanders importance in the region, the main message was supposedly cooperating with militias in Tajikistan. meant for two extra-regional actors. This was followed by the arrest of Qari Wadud, certainly was one intended recipient. The commander of the security forces in the Shuhada show of force in Badakhshan happened at a time district in Afghan , and the when the Tajik and Russian governments were further arrest of three security force commanders involved in uncertain negotiations over the future in the Baharak district.4 of the 6,000-plus Russian troops stationed at the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan. Initially leasing 4 Thomas Ruttig, Afghan Politicking after the Rebellion in Tajik it until 2014, Russia had exempted itself from Badakhshan, Afghan Analysts Network, August 16th 2012, http:// www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2933. payment in exchange for rendering military and - 6 - Turf on the roof of the world technical assistance. During negotiations over the NATO supplies would transit, in order to gain extension of the lease, the Tajik government had support and legitimacy for his regime, much as allegedly demanded a number of modifications, Uzbekistan had done in recent negotiations over including the payment of around $250–300 million the NATO exit from Afghanistan. This was largely per year and reduction of the new lease term from because of the impression left after the start of the 49 years requested by Russia to an initial 10 the War on Terror that support from the largest years with option to renew. A week before the funder of the region, the , may be Special Operation began, the Tajik Ministry of contingent upon strength in security operations Foreign Affairs had officially rejected the claim of and ability to show control rather than on soft the Russian Ground Forces commander Vladimir power and democratic values. President Rahmon Chirkin that the two sides had concluded a 49-year may have needed to present himself as the agreement. Throughout late June and early July, strong leader, the saviour of unity, fighter against accusations had been flying between diplomats organised crime, separatism and terrorism in and the military of the two countries, with pundits order to garner international support, especially at chiming in, of threats of abandonment, blackmail a time when his country’s position was weakened etc. Russian commentators in the press reminded by allegations, among many Western analysts, the Tajiks of the help that the 201st Division had that it was a state on the brink of failure. rendered to prop up President Rahmon’s rule in the 1990s and of the danger that awaited them after 2014 and the inevitable, as they saw it, Potential unintended take-over of the Taliban in Afghanistan. While negotiations were ongoing, the Tajik government consequences may have wanted to manifest its capability to The government may have thus calculated that respond swiftly to disturbances on the border with by conducting a brief, surgical assault, it could its own army. intimidate and rein in renegade commanders, deflate their influence, punish delinquency in The government’s strategy to up the ante for not sharing booty with the centre, rehearse for negotiations over the Russian bases was no an eventual post-2014 cooperation with the doubt facilitated by the potential for a U.S. Afghan government, show capacity and signal rapprochement. In early July, a Congressional control to external courtiers. All this may explain delegation had visited Tajikistan where apparently why authorities launched an intimidating Special (though officially denied by the Ministry of Foreign Operation using the army instead of a simple Affairs) the question of establishing a military base investigation to find and punish the murderers of on Tajik soil after 2014 was raised as a potential General Nazarov. However, indiscriminate use replacement for the Manas Transit Centre in of force would undoubtedly alienate and add Kyrgyzstan. By the end of the month, the Obama to the grievances of the Pamiri people, already government had asked Congress for an increase feeling under-represented in central government in military assistance for Central Asia, including institutions and excluded from the economy. Did doubling of funding for Tajikistan in 2013. Tajiks the government take into account the potential risk knew that they had not been winners in the NDN of alienation, the loss of legitimacy or the possible deal, with only 10% of the NATO cargo poised ramifications of the conflict and its manipulation? to pass through their territory and the remainder On the one hand, the operation could have been through their rival Uzbekistan. A show of force by seen as an ethnic assault on Pamiri minorities, the Tajik government would ease fears of Western which would then reinforce feelings of separatism politicians, who may have mistrusted the state’s and demands for autonomy. Indeed, in ability to protect the region against a potential spontaneous demonstrations in front of embassies surge north by militants after 2014. in Moscow and Bishkek, in inflated speeches by opposition figures and on some social networks, President Rahmon needed to convince Western the cry of stopping “ethnic genocide” was heard. politicians that he would be able to secure borders This, however, was mostly voiced by activists against potential terrorist/extremist incursions and anxious expatriates outside the province. and control the territory of GBAO, from where From within, demonstrations focused more on - 7 - Turf on the roof of the world

the withdrawal of troops, direct mediation by the distrust of authorities, central or local, increased: President and more autonomy for the province, the central government for encroaching on the such as election of the head of province. province and threatening its autonomy, and their local representatives for being corrupt, The government may have counted on the second nepotistic, indifferent and ineffective. In the possible option: that Tajikistanis, whether Pamiri meantime, opposition political parties decried the or not, having experienced a bitter civil war in the raid as unconstitutional and the government as 1990s, had no more taste for another one; that the reproachable for not clarifying the objectives of elimination of corrupt organised criminal activity the operation and seeking a peaceful resolution. would bring respect for a government that is seen The National Social Democratic Party went as protecting the security of its population; that as far as threatening civil disobedience. The Pamiris know that the province cannot manage full Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IPRT) independence and would strangle if blockaded; blamed the government for the killing of Sabzali that they do not have leaders, such as Davlat Mahmadrizoev, the GBAO party head, after he Khodonazarov, or organised political parties, like spoke at a rally in Khorog on July 23rd. the civil war-era La’le Badakhshan, which could mobilise them politically; that the remaining 97% Despite the absence of ethnic mobilisation, the of the population of Tajikistan would not support government’s calculation may not have taken an uprising by the Pamiris; and so on. into consideration the alienation that would in turn decrease the authority and credibility of the Ethnic identity may not have turned out to be a head of state a year before elections; that further mobilising force for a spontaneous rise against violence instigated in the future could elicit a authorities this time, and social order “reigned reaction; or the possibility that, in the security supreme by default”, while, as one eye-witness vacuum that would be created after 2014, forces from Ishkashim claimed, “self-styled nascent and external to the province could be interested in old fighters continued to sit on the fences and stirring the muddy waters and create instability, if exchange rumors of war”.5 One important factor not encourage separatist tendencies. is the absence of men of a certain age in GBAO. Despite the high proportion of people with higher education, a large number of men have migrated A cautionary tale abroad, given the very few opportunities for employment in the province. Russia is said to for Afghanistan have more than a million workers from Tajikistan. In order to restore order and confidence, it is The remaining inhabitants are dependent on clear the government has to launch an open and remittances from relatives, handouts from the transparent dialogue following the withdrawal of state and more immediately the support of the forces from the province. Instead of predicting Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN). The scenarios in prospect for Tajikistan, however, it may Agha Khan himself wields moral authority among be useful to decipher in the case of Badakhshan the inhabitants, more than any political figure, five rudimentary and interrelated lessons, among but for everyday income and dispute settlement others, for managing vulnerability in other conflict- many people revert to “informal leaders” who, as ridden countries, such as Afghanistan. explained above, can wear multiple hats. The first lesson is that using the army as Yet, if they are not willing to engage in the war of substitute for police and security forces could local commanders, whom many consider corrupt undermine long-term confidence, which is the narco barons, it does not mean that Pamiris cornerstone of nation building. Indiscriminate trust authorities. As a result of an operation that use of force does not necessarily gain the trust of involved the army as opposed to law and order local populations, even in pursuit of militants and forces appropriate for a criminal investigation, their terrorists, let alone of criminals. When there is intrusion of armed forces from outside, especially 5 Navruz Nekbakhtshoev, “The view from Ishkashim”, Registan.net, as substitute for police and security forces and August 6th 2012, http://registan.net/index.php/2012/08/06/the-view- without coordination with local authorities, there is from-ishkashim/. - 8 - Turf on the roof of the world the risk of apathy at best and, at worst, backlash may have a bigger challenge given its overall from perceived violation of the sanctuary of local weakness, over-dependence on foreign military, communities. political and development aid, and the formidable military strength of its insurgency. Dissatisfaction of neglected and marginalized populations decreases prospects for cooperation Fourth is the challenge of ensuring a fair distribution with the state. This raises the importance of of wealth in the country as a whole. Border regions not leaving some sub-regions underdeveloped, stand to benefit from cross-border trade, both relegated to low priority for infrastructure legal and illicit. Where some local leaders would development. Underdevelopment by itself may seek to increase their authority locally and use not be a cause of insecurity, but it increases the profits for their constituencies, competition disappointment and mistrust for authorities. with the centre is inevitable, but at least wealth is In regions like GBAO, where families heavily distributed locally. The state has a responsibility depend on remittances from labour migration to provide incentives for redistribution at the and handouts, social mobilisation can happen national level, by, for example, devising a under the influence of mafia groups. In the case proper decentralisation scheme, supporting the of Badakhshan, while most men of working age provision of social infrastructure to needy areas, have emigrated, the remaining youth could more facilitating barter between regions etc. It could easily lend support to power brokers and radical also happen, as in the case of the narcotics trade leaders when disenfranchised of their rights. on both sides of the Panj river, that very little profit Relegated regions are also where conservative, stays for regional development and that much of superstition-laden Islam can take root, with it becomes concentrated in a few hands. In cases networks controlling the social mores of society for such as this, central authorities would have the their own interests, far from centres of orthodoxy responsibility to intervene to curb corruption, and education. but in a way that does not violate the rights of local populations. In all cases, zero tolerance for Third is the challenge of projecting strength corruption and setting the right example is the and capacity. An ideal state must neither show state’s most important obligation. weakness, which could be interpreted as lack of control and capacity, nor throw its weight around In the final analysis, the real test is that of through security and police forces, for it would decentralisation, the degree to which local be seen as too authoritarian. The most important governance is allowed to flourish while being prerogative of the state should be protection of supported from the centre and checked to ensure populations. The fine balance is to define what that it abides by laws, regulations and the ethic of can be considered a “strong” state, whether from fairness. In Tajikistan, a de facto decentralisation a realist point of view, which emphasises military had taken place as a result of the power-sharing capability, territorial control and monopoly over agreement of the peace accords to include the legitimate use of force, or from the liberal one, local commanders in the government. In times which puts value on soft power and limits the role of insecurity, when the future stability in the of the state to that of an enabler. The government region was in question, the government chose of President Rahmon, which has experienced recentralisation for better control. It remains to be civil war, sought to consolidate peace through a seen whether the Afghan government could, or show of authority and control. This is its gamble, should, adopt the same strategy in its eventual its sustainability strategy, despite what analysts power-sharing agreement, if there is one, with its repeatedly stress as threatening to the fragile opposition and insurgents. peace. The Afghan government, after 2014,

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