The Royal Navy, Intelligence and Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1936-1939

by

Trevor Checkley

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia December 2009

© Copyright by Trevor Checkley, 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63563-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63563-6

NOTICE: AVIS:

The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.

1+1 Canada DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

'.[.-•''

To comply with the Canadian Privacy Act the National Library of Canada has requested that the following pages be removed from this copy of the thesis:

Preliminary Pages / Examiners Signature Page (pii) Dalhousie Library Copyright Agreement (piii)

Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) For My Parents

IV Table of Contents

List of Tables vi Abstract vii List of Abbreviations viii Acknowledgements ix Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: The Navy, Intelligence and Italy, 1936-1939 8 Chapter Three: Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1935-1938 39 Chapter Four: Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1938-1939 61 Chapter Five: Conclusion 83 Bibliography 94

V List of Tables

Table 1.1 Italian Trade in 1937 35 Table 2.1 Comparative Naval Strength Estimated for 1 January 1938 42

VI Abstract

British intelligence presented a consistent view of Italy's capabilities: its economy would collapse under pressure, while the armed services could not secure a decision. Ideas that

Italians were 'naturally' ill-suited to war shaped how intelligence was interpreted. The influence of intelligence on strategy is more complex. Britain planned for war against various combinations of Germany, Italy and Japan. Strategy was the result of a sophisticated exercise of evaluating intelligence alongside Britain's capabilities, commitments and objectives. Intelligence informed but did not determine strategy and mattered most when policymakers expected the Navy to have sufficient resources in the

Mediterranean, which was not always the case. Intelligence, and the perceptions that shaped it, led to a revision of grand strategy in 1939. The Mediterranean replaced the Far

East as Britain's second defence priority and although the revision initially appeared temporary, its underlying ideas, the intelligence and perceptions, lasted well into the

Second World War.

vn List of Abbreviations

AGNA Anglo-German Naval Agreement ATB Advisory Committee for Trade Questions in Time of War C-in-C Commander in Chief CID Committee of Imperial Defence COS Chiefs of Staff DRC Defence Requirements Committee FCI Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Committee FO Foreign Office FPC Foreign Police Committee IIC Industrial Intelligence Centre UN Imperial Japanese Navy JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JPC Joint Planning Subcommittee NID Naval Intelligence Division RAF Royal Air Force

Vlll Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank the Dalhousie Faculty of Graduate Studies, the Dalhousie

History Department and the Peter Fraser Fund for making research for this thesis financially possible. I am especially indebted to Dr. Christopher Bell for his continuous advice and supervision and his assistance in passing along numerous and invaluable documents. Dr. Michael Ramsay provided me with much support and a much needed background in the history of military thought. The History Department's secretaries, Tina

Jones and Valerie Peck, were an invaluable and unending source of help. A special thanks to Dr. John Ferris and Dr. Bruce Strang for their patience, advice and assistance while I was at the National Archives in Kew. Christopher Matthews and Chantelle

Bellrichard reviewed various drafts and offered helpful insight and suggestions. I would like to thank Blair Bodnar and Roger Checkley for their consistent encouragement and, most importantly, my parents, whose unwavering support, financial and otherwise, made this possible.

IX Chapter One: Introduction

The Navy's primary objective during the interwar period was to defend the British

Empire. Writing to the permanent secretary to the Treasury in 1934, Admiral Ernie

Chatfield, First Sea Lord from 1933 to 1938, outlined Britain's position: "We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with anybody because we have got most of the world already, or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us." However, defending an Empire that spanned the globe was not an easy task. By the late 1930s, the British Empire was threatened on three fronts - in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. More importantly, as the Navy and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) recognized, a war against

Germany, Italy and Japan was beyond Britain's capabilities. The Navy had become responsible for defending an Empire that could not be defended - or, at the very least, could not be defended without considerable American assistance. Consequently, British naval strategy became a matter of balancing risks and priorities. The Navy had to choose its battles carefully.

Historians have generally devoted little attention to Italy's place in the development of British strategy and policy in the late 1930s. The British government's responses to Nazi Germany - appeasement and rearmament, air deterrence and a continental commitment - have received exhaustive attention. More recent studies of the

Second World War's origins have integrated the relationship between the demands of defending a global Empire and British policies towards Germany, namely appeasement.2

1 Christopher Bell, The Royal Navy Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 126. 2 See P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe 3ld ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), Richard Overy, The Road to War (London: Penguin, 1999), Chapter 2 and The Origins of the

1 However, Japan and Italy are usually left out of the resulting narrative. The natures of the

Japanese and Italian threats, how these contributed to Britain's security dilemmas, and in turn how Britain planned to deal with Italy and Japan are often glossed over. Studies of the Navy, strategy and intelligence have similarly reflected historians' tendency to focus on Germany.3 Consequently, Britain's global defence problems are taken for granted and the global, integrated nature of Britain's policies has been underemphasised. Recent studies on Japan have begun to redress this problem, but only a few comparable studies exist for Italy.4

The major political events in the history of Anglo-Italian relations between the wars have received substantial attention.5 British strategy and intelligence on Italy,

Second World War, (New York: Longman, 1998). For an assessment of appeasement see R.A.C. Parker Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). 3 For British naval policy see Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the War Vol 2. (London: Collins, 1976) and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Naval Mastery (London, Allen Lane, 1976), Chapter 10. Exceptions to the Germano-centric trend is Norman Gibbs Grand Strategy Vol. 1 (London: H.M, Stationery Office, 1976) and Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy. For overviews of British intelligence between the wars, and examples of historians' German focus, see Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (New York: Viking, 1986), Chapters 13 and 14 and The Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of M15 (Toronto: Penguin, 2009), 186-216 , F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations Vol. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1979), D.C. Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War,' in Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the two World Wars, ed. Ernest May (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Wesley Wark, The Ultimate Enemy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 4 See Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy and 'The Royal Navy, War Planning and Intelligence Assessments of Japan, 1921-1941' in Intelligence and. Statecraft: the Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, ed. Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel (New York: Praeger, 2005). 5 The major political events being the Abyssinian crisis and the death of collective security, the Spanish Civil War, Chamberlain's meetings with Mussolini in April 1938 and January 1939, Anthony Eden's resignation, and Italy's invasion of Albania in April 1939. See Reynolds Salerno, Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). Robert Mallet's Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2003) is an account Italian foreign policy, but provides insight into the British side of Anglo-Italian relations. See also R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement and Lawrence Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

2 however, have not. Historians dealing with strategy in the Mediterranean rightly stress

the influence of the Navy's world-wide commitments and the limitations they imposed.

The Mediterranean was a vital link in Britain's imperial communications network. The

Suez Canal was the quickest, most efficient link between Britain and its Far Eastern

Empire, the Pacific Dominions and India. Moreover, Britain maintained colonies,

mandates and interests throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East. Until early winter

1939, however, the Mediterranean was third among the Britain's security priorities and,

as a result, requirements at home and in the Far East often shaped naval strategy in the

Mediterranean. In a war against Germany, Italy and Japan, the Navy would all but

abandon the Mediterranean for the Far East and Singapore, leaving only a few small vessels to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal. In the first half of 1939, Britain's strategic priorities temporarily shifted and the Mediterranean took centre stage. Ideas of a

Mediterranean-first strategy in the event of a three-front war gained credibility and official approval within the Admiralty and among policymakers. Adherents reasoned that an early victory over Italy, presumed to take from between two to six months, provided

Britain (and France) with the best chance for victory against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Forces otherwise intended to defend the Mediterranean and Middle East would be released and the Suez route would be secured once Italy was defeated. This would, however, require the Navy to temporarily denude the Far East and renege on commitments given to Australia and New Zealand. In June 1939, the pendulum began to

6 Lawrence Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez, Gibbs, Grand Strategy, David Omissi, 'The Mediterranean and the Middle East in British global strategy, 1935-1939,' in Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-1939,' eds. Michael Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 3-20 and M.A. Simpson, 'Superhighway to the World Wide Web : The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strategy, 1900-45,' in Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean : Past, Present and Future, ed. John Hattendorf (London: Cass, 2000), 51-77.

3 swing back towards the Far East. Because of personnel changes within the Navy and new developments in the international situation, the 'knock-out blow' was no longer considered as strategically attractive.

Most historians of British naval strategy in the Mediterranean overlook the underlying assumptions upon which the Navy's Mediterranean strategy was based, suggesting strategy was determined by Britain's global position alone. While British views of Italians' questionable resolve, the Italian armed forces and Italy's poor strategic position - its weak economy and dependency on sea-borne trade - have been touched on by Lawrence Pratt and Christopher Bell, the intelligence record has not been addressed in detail. Conversely, works on British intelligence on Italy have not addressed strategy, how intelligence was used or why it mattered to the Navy.7

The second chapter examines British intelligence assessments of Italy as they related to the Navy and naval strategy. In this context, intelligence should be seen, as

John Ferris argues, as "the collection and analysis of information in order to let one use one's resources in the most effective way possible"; intelligence was "not a form of power but a means to guide its use". Throughout the late 1930s, British assessments of

7 Recent works on intelligence on Italy have recently appeared and mainly address specific political events and counter-intelligence. See David Dilks, 'Flashes of Intelligence,' in The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Centuty, ed. Christopher M. Andrew and David Dilks, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), Manuela Williams 'Mussolini's Secret War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: Italian Intelligence and the British Response,' Intelligence and National Security, 22:6 (2007), 881-904, Dawn M. Miller '"Raising the tribes": British policy in Italian East Africa, 1938-41,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 22:1 (1999), 96-123 and 'Dark Waters : Britain and Italy's Invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939,' International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, 16:2 (2003), 290-323 and William C. Mills, 'Sir Joseph Ball, Adrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's "secret channel" to Italy, 1937-1940,' International History Review, 24:2 (2002), 278-317. 8 John Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 99. Intelligence has a number of definitions. These include intelligence as both a process, in which the focus is the machinery of intelligence and intelligence organizations, and a product, the resulting information. Scholars also focus on intelligence as action, namely covert operations and counter intelligence. For a review of how historians have seen and defined intelligence see Peter Jackson and Len Scott, 'The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice,' Intelligence and National Security 19:2 (2004), 139-69.

4 Italy consistently and effectively conveyed Italy's fundamental weaknesses and inability

to sustain a major war effort. These conclusions were based primarily on the notion that

Italians were collectively unsuited for war and assessments of the Italian economy, which

detailed Italy's systemic economic problems. Heavily reliant on imported goods and vital

commodities, most of which were carried by sea, Italy was close to being an ideal target

for naval warfare. The Navy was concerned with the Italian Navy and Air Force. While

the former did not pose any significant problems if Britain possessed similar numbers, the

Italian Air Force could potentially affect naval operations by bombing shore-based

installations. The air threat remained a serious but unknown factor and was questioned

throughout the 1930s.

The influence of intelligence is less clear. The third chapter addresses naval

strategy in the Mediterranean from the Abyssinian crisis to the Munich crisis in

September 1938. During this period, Britain's global naval position directly influenced,

and often decided, its role in the Mediterranean, especially in the event of a three-front

war. A global war, however, was only one of three contingencies the COS and the Navy

addressed. Although detailed naval plans were not prepared between 1936 and 1938, the

Navy and the COS established broad strategic policies for a single-handed war against

Italy and a European war, in which Britain and France would be allied against Italy and

Germany. In both scenarios the Navy expected to have sufficient resources to defeat

Italy. Here, intelligence provided the framework for how planners believed Italy should be fought and defeated. The broad strategic principles laid down between 1935 and 1938

formed the foundation for British strategy in 1939, including the knock-out blow.

5 The final chapter addresses the development of the 'knock-out blow.' Intelligence encouraged the Mediterranean-first strategy's central assumption that Italy could be defeated in a short amount of time. Moreover, the knock-out blow presented a new and theoretically viable strategy for the Navy to fight Germany, Italy and Japan. For its opponents, the knock-out blow rested on questionable assumptions, which overestimated

Italy's vulnerabilities and the Navy's ability to exploit them. The question of a knock-out blow was left unresolved in 1939. Because of a change in the international situation and a shift in personnel within the Admiralty, the Far East once again became the Navy's second priority. However, the Mediterranean ultimately won out because during 1940 and 1941, in large part because France had fallen and Japan remained neutral until

December 1941 and Winston Churchill's insistence that the Mediterranean was Europe's

"under-belly." Churchill had been strong supporter of the knock-out blow in 1939 and held on to many of its ideas and assumptions during the early years of the Second World

War.

Intelligence was often shaped by perceptions of 'national character' and assumptions about the nature modern warfare; the next war would be a total war in which resources would be mobilized and consumed to the greatest extent and at the greatest rate possible. For policymakers and intelligence officials, perceptions and assumptions served as a starting point and interpreted assessments of Italy through the various lenses their assumptions and perceptions created. Intelligence was in turn one of many considerations in the development of strategy and its uses were often governed by the strategic and political contexts to which it was applied. The conclusions reached from assessments of

Italy did not decide British naval strategy in the Mediterranean and globally, but it

6 undoubtedly guided planners' ideas of how the Navy would ultimately fight and defeat

Italy if given the resources to do so. And for a period in 1939, intelligence assessments

that emphasized Italy's weaknesses led some strategic planners to argue that because

Italy was strategically vulnerable, Britain, with French assistance, should seek a quick

decision in the Mediterranean before committing to a significant effort in the Far East.

This was the only opportunity for Britain to secure a quick victory. The knock-out blow would also reduce the number of Britain's enemies and create a more manageable two-

front war against Germany and Japan. However, the knock-out blow and thus the intelligence that supported it were only viable if a number of best-case scenarios proved

true. Not only would Britain and France have to be capable of defeating Italy quickly, but the Far East would have to remain secure while a decision in the Mediterranean was reached. The latter scenario depended on Japan being deterred or adopting a cautious

strategy that did not threaten Britain's vital interests. Intelligence had to be - and was - evaluated in light of Britain's capabilities, objectives and strategic situation. The role and value of intelligence thus depending on the conditions and war planners and policymakers expected.

7 Chapter Two: The Navy, Intelligence and Italy, 1936-1939

The relationship between intelligence and naval planning against Italy in the late 1930s

was shaped by two underlying assumptions. First, throughout the interwar period

Britain's strategic planners, including those within the Navy, adhered to ideas of total warfare. As the Chiefs of Staff (COS) outlined in 1939,

The capacity which a country possesses to wage war depends not only upon the

strength and efficiency of the fighting forces, but also upon the organisation of the

whole of the industrial and financial resources and of the available man power of

the nation and on the maintenance of civil morale.9

Economies and civilians had become legitimate military objectives. By 1939 economic warfare had become, as Norton Medlicott describes it, "Britain's secret weapon."10 Naval action and blockade would limit or prevent an enemy's seaborne trade while air strikes against industrial targets, storage facilities and communications would undermine an enemy's economic output. Diplomatically, coercion or incentives would lead neutral countries to restrict or cease economic ties with enemy belligerents. Conversely British planners were confident the British Empire's economic power was greater than Britain's potential enemies'. In short, Britain would exhaust and outlast its opponents.

The aim of economic warfare was "to [so] disorganize the enemy's economy as to prevent him from carrying on the war" and "deprive the enemy of the material means of resistance."12 For the Navy, economic pressure would create material hardships on the

9 COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45. 10 Norton Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1952), vol. I, xi. 11 Medlicott, 1-3. 12 CID 1568-B 'Handbook for Economic Warfare', July 12 1939, CAB 4/30, Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 17 and Robert J. Young, 'Spokesman for Economic Warfare: the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s,' European Studies Review 6 (1976), 480.

8 battlefields as well as the home front, undermining civilian morale. Italy fulfilled much of the Navy's criteria for an ideal target of economic warfare. Although not as vulnerable as

1 n an island state, like Britain or Japan, Italy was not far off. As a result, British naval strategy within the Mediterranean revolved around economic pressure. Whether Britain was able to exploit Italy's economic weakness was another question and varied, dependent on whether the Navy had enough forces available for the task.

Second, British assessments were heavily influenced by ideas of 'national character.' These were not simply expressions of racism nor were they merely implied.

Whether they were physical, social or psychological characteristics, British policymakers and members of the armed forces believed that peoples and nations possessed certain qualities that would determine their behaviour, particularly during war. The Admiralty's guidelines for its attaches' intelligence reports stressed

Each nation has certain special characteristics which will tend to appear in its

methods of making war. A general idea of a nation's war-like qualities is

required. Are they good all-round fighters? Are their discipline, morale and

leadership of a high order? Are they quick-witted and excitable, or slow and

thorough?

Knowing and understanding an enemy's inherent qualities and thus their likely behaviour could guide decisions on the ground and during the planning process. The Admiralty's instructions noted "Nelson's advice to close with a Frenchman and out-manoeuvre a

Russian, [was] based as it was on an appreciation of Latin quickness and Slav passivity".14 Although these were crude and highly generalized, they were an important

13 Bell, The Royal Navy Seapower and Strategy, 121. 14 Hodge to Howard, 9 September 1937, W 17211/531/50, FO 371/21225.

9 aspect in Britain's estimates of foreign powers' military capabilities and the development

of strategic policy.15 They created a lens through which British intelligence and planners

saw foreign countries' capabilities.

The prevailing view of Italians among the armed services and policymakers was

that Italians were fair-weather fighters and lacked the mental, emotional and

psychological qualities required by war.1 Under pressure, Italian morale was expected to

diminish rapidly. Captain Herbert Richmond's observation during the First World War

that the Italians "had better sell their Fleet & take up their organs & monkeys again, for, by Heaven, that seems more their profession than sea fighting" reflected the Admiralty's

views in 1935 and 1939 as much as it did in 1915.17 Those closest to the Italian armed

forces and its civilian population, namely the British consular staff and service attaches,

held more sophisticated views, but the underlying idea that Italians lacked the moral

qualities for war persisted.

British intelligence conceded that Fascism's attempts to militarize Italian society

following its rise to power in 1922 had some success. In the early 1930s, the War Office

acknowledged the regime's militarism was "directed to the sole purpose of breathing into

the Italian that virility and military ardour which he so conspicuously lacks". As a result

of the state's efforts, "the moral[e] of the nation has greatly improved and they would

15 John Ferris, '"Now that the Milk is Spilt": Appeasement and the Archive on Intelligence,' Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 19, no. 3 (2009), 560-561. For examples of the role of national characteristics in estimates of Japan see John Ferris, '"Worthy of Some Better Enemy?": the British Estimates of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Fall of Singapore.' Canadian Journal of History 28 (1993), 223-256 and Christopher Bell, 'The Royal Navy, War Planning and Intelligence Assessments of Japan, 1921-1941,' 135-156. 16 Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in 'Italian Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810. There were a few exceptions to this. In September 1937 an Air Force Officer circulated a report warning against underestimating Italian pilots. However, the predominant view the officer sought to change ultimately held sway over intelligence officials and planners, including the COS. See R.H.R. Atcherly, Memorandum on the Italian Air Force, September 1937, AIR 9/35. 17 Bell, The Royal Navy Seapower and Strategy, 119.

10 probably fight bravely in the early stages of a war." Fascism's ability to overcome

Italians' perceived natural disposition was, however, limited. In spite of Fascism's

militarism, pomp and rhetoric, Italians remained a "Latin race", emotional and

temperamental. During the Abyssinian crisis, the COS saw "no reason to suppose that

even Mussolini has been able greatly to increase the fighting value of the Italian or the

staying power of the nation."19 Although Italians may fight well in the initial stages of

war, they were still expected to lose morale in the face of adversity.20 This idea informed

assessments not only of the Italian armed forces but also of civilians.

The Naval Intelligence Division's (NID) Italian section during the late 1930s was

small, consisting of two officers and one civilian staff. Its responsibilities and activities

often had no relationship to Italy and much of its time was spent entertaining foreign

naval representatives. And when the section was able to address the Mediterranean and

Middle East it was often in response to various crises - Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War,

Albania and the Palestinian uprisings. As a consequence, the NID's strategic and long-

term assessments of Italy suffered. Writing a history of the section after the Second

World War, one NID officer remarked that during the late 1930s "the whole division was

snowed under and hopelessly unprepared for war." However, the NID was not the Navy

or the COS's only source of information on Italy. Britain's service attaches, unlike their colleagues in Japan and elsewhere, enjoyed remarkably open access to Italian military

18 C.P. 96 (31) 'Military Appreciation of the Situation in Europe, March 1931,' 31 March 1931, CAB 24/220. This view was also popular in the United States and persisted through the interwar period. It seems that until Italian entry into the Second World War, American views of Italians were much more positive than the British. See John Ferris, Intelligence and Strategy, 116. 19 COS 397 'Italo-Abyssinian Dispute: Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff on a Single-Handed War with Italy,' 16 September 1935, CAB 53/25. See COS Minutes 150th Meeting, 13 September 1935, CAB 53/5. 20 See Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 119; COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37; COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939- 1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45. 21 Charles Morgan, NID Memorandum 'NID Section 3,' ADM 223/488.

11 information, institutions and facilities and naval officers regularly produced reports based

on their observations of the Italian Navy. The IIC provided extensive economic

intelligence and the Foreign Office passed along considerable amounts of information

received through its diplomatic service or from concerned British citizens with personal

knowledge of Italy. The quantity and quality of secret intelligence is less clear due to restrictions imposed on the Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) records, but it appears

99

secret intelligence had a limited presence in Italy.

Intelligence entered strategic debates by filtering up from the armed services and other government departments, notably the Foreign Office, Industrial Intelligence Centre

(IIC) and Treasury, into the armed service's planning divisions, staff organizations and the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) system. Most important among the Cabinet's

advisory committees was the CID, which included the Prime Minister and the political and professional heads of the armed services, the Foreign Office and Treasury. Much of what reached the CID arrived through the Chiefs of Staff (COS) subcommittee and the

COS's Joint Planning Committee (JPC). The former included the professional heads of the armed forces, while the latter was composed of the armed services' planning directors and was responsible for drafting the COS's strategic appreciations. The CID's Joint

Intelligence Committee included the armed services' intelligence heads, members of the

Foreign Office and Treasury. Its role was to collate and communicate certain issues of intelligence, although it had a limited role in producing assessments of Italy. Trade committees, such as the Advisory Committee for Trade Questions in Time of War (ATB) and the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries (FCI) committee worked to address issues of economic intelligence and economic warfare. A number of ad hoc committees

22 'The Secret Intelligence Service', undated NID History, ADM 223/851. 12 consisting of members of civilian and military departments were also formed to address

specific problems, such as rearmament (the Defence Requirements Committee) and

specific strategic questions, including the knock-out blow (the Strategical Appreciation

Committee). Intelligence which had strategic implications, and, as a result, influenced

strategy, is found in the records of the armed services and in strategic discussions and

appreciations by the COS and JPC. The latter show not only how intelligence was

interpreted and used but also why intelligence mattered to strategy.

The Italian Navy possessed few secrets and its dispositions and construction programs were well-known and widely publicized. Britain's naval attaches also enjoyed reasonably good access to personnel, dockyards and facilities. More importantly, as long

as Italy adhered to naval standards set down by international treaties, the Navy knew the parameters within which Italian ships were built. Italy signed the 1922 Washington Naval

Treaty, which limited the tonnage of British, American, Japanese, French and Italian capital ships to a ratio of 5:5:3:1.67. Britain and the US were allowed parity in capital

ships at 525,000 tons, Japan was allowed 325,000 and France and Italy were both able to build to 175,000 tons. Capital ships were also limited to a 35,000 ton displacement and

16-inch guns. Aircraft carriers were to be governed by the 5:5:3 ratio and limited to

27,000 tons, while cruisers were limited to a maximum of 10,000 tons. Finally, a 10-year capital ship building holiday was imposed. Italy was involved in the 1930 and 1936

London naval conferences but did not sign the first agreement and waited until December

1938 to sign the 1936 London Naval Treaty. The second London naval conference took place while Italy was subject to League sanctions over Abyssinia. Despite Italy's

13 abstention from the treaty, the British naval attache reported between 1936 and 1938 that

Italy was planning to build to the treaty's standards.23

Italy was, however, known to break naval agreements. The Admiralty had evidence that Italy's new battleships, the Vittorio Veneto and Littorio, both laid down in

1934, exceeded the tonnage limit by up to 3000 tons. Similarly, in the summer of 1936, a storm forced the Italian cruiser Gorizia to dock at Gibraltar for repairs. At Gibraltar, the

Royal Navy discovered the vessel exceeded the cruiser limit by over 1000 tons. No action was taken in either instance. The Admiralty's information about Italian capital ships was not strong enough and the discrepancy, the Admiralty suggested, was probably the result of poor design or construction. Italy was not alone and German and French ships were also known to exceed treaty limits. With regards to the Gorizia, the Admiralty believed that if Britain confronted the Italian government about its infractions, Italy might not sign the 1936 London Naval Treaty.25

More importantly, these transgressions were not considered a cause for concern.

As Joseph Maiolo has demonstrated, the Admiralty steadfastly believed that ship for ship

- assuming ships of comparable size - the Royal Navy's vessels possessed superior

'fighting power.' In a 1937 memorandum, the Admiralty dismissed the Foreign Office's concerns that the two Littorio-class battleships then under construction would outmatch

li Perth to Foreign Office, 14 January 1938, R 454/293/22, FO 371/22431. The 1936 London Naval Treaty maintained qualitative limitations: capital ships continued to be limited to 35,000 tons and the treaty reduced the calibre of guns to 14-inches; submarines were limited to 2000 tons; aircraft carriers were limited to 23,000 tons; and light cruisers were limited to 8000 tons. The treaty also included an escalation clause which allowed for 16-inch guns. 24 When they were launched in 1940 Italy's Littorio class battleships, and a third, Roma, laid down in 1937, all had displacements over 40,000 tons. 25 Joseph A. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Bassingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 89, 94-98. CID 1348, 'Displacement of the Italian Cruiser Gorizia, 18 August 1937, CAB 4/26, CID Minutes, 299* Meeting, 14 October 1937. See also Admiralty to Foreign Office, 7 August 1937, A 5648/6/45, FO 371/20649, Admiralty to Foreign Office, 7 September 1937, A 6568/6/45, FO 371/20649.

14 the Royal Navy's new King George Vbattleships. The Italian ships, the Foreign Office pointed out, possessed 15-inch guns and a speed of 30-knots compared to the King

George V's 14-inch guns and 28-knot speed. In response, the Admiralty argued that, because all signs suggested the Littorios were being built near the 35,000 ton limit, their larger guns and higher speed came at the expense of armour. Although potentially faster and more heavily armed, the Italian ships would be vulnerable to the King George Vs' smaller guns, while the British ships would be protected against the Littorios'. For the

Admiralty, the balance between firepower, armour, speed and tonnage would determine a ship's effectiveness. Because of the Navy's "immense experience", the Admiralty argued, "the ships we build are fully the equal in fighting power of those built by other nations." And even if Italy exceeded qualitative limitations, it was still unlikely their ships would possess greater 'fighting power' than Britain's. Because Italian surface vessels were built to - or close to - treaty limits, the Royal Navy had little to worry about regarding Italian ships and could rely on assumptions that Britain's vessels, officers and sailors were superior.

In the late 1930s, Italy possessed the world's largest submarine fleet. Along with the Air Force, Italian submarines were one of only two weapons that the Navy feared, in large part because the Royal Navy consistently lacked submarines and destroyers in the

Mediterranean. However, two factors reduced this threat. First, because British shipping would be diverted around Africa, Italian submarines could not threaten British trade. In

1938 the Italian Navy began building submarines suitable for the Atlantic, but their numbers were few and they were unlikely to escape the Mediterranean at Gibraltar or

26 Seal to Nicholls, 15 October 1937, R 8381/1932/22, FO 371/21181 and Maiolo, 95-7. 27 Backhouse to Pound, 11 October 1938, ADM 205/3.

15 Suez. Second, the Admiralty was confident in its anti-submarine defences, especially in

the Mediterranean. Preparations were not complete by September 1939, but the Navy

anticipated improvements in anti-submarine tactics and ASDIC, a sonar system that could

detect submerged submarines, would effectively reduce the dangers of submarine

attacks.29 The Navy's experience with Italian submarines supported its confidence. When

mistakenly attacked by the Italian submarine hide off the coast of Spain in late August

1937, the destroyer Havock's wake reportedly disrupted its ASDIC system, causing it to

lose contact with the hide. Initially this was believed to have deprived Havock of an

effective counter-attack. Subsequent naval intelligence, however, suggested the hide

suffered damage from depth charges, despite the temporary loss of ASDIC. This reaffirmed the Royal Navy's confidence in its anti-submarine capabilities.30

The Royal Navy was particularly curious about Italy's midget submarines.31

Development began during the Abyssinian crisis, stopped when the crisis passed, and resumed in 1938 once war appeared likely. The vessels measured around fifteen metres long, carried two torpedoes and could be launched from capital ships. Captain Bowyer-

Smith, the British naval attache in Rome, was "tempted to make fun of the five metre submarine." Although Bowyer-Smith conceded the vessels were "presumably a mechanical possibility" and that "the Italians are good at individual acts of courage and might conceivably want to exploit that quality," the vessels would ultimately lack

"fighting power."32 It was also known the Italian Navy questioned their usefulness

28 Perth to Foreign Office, 14 January 1938, R 454/295/22, FO 371/22431. 29Maiolo, 123-125, Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 113-114 and CID 1318-B, 'Defence Against Submarine Attack,' 24 March 1937, CAB 4/26. 30Maiolo, 123-124. 31 Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935-1940, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 116. These were also known as Frogmen or maiali. 32 Perth to Foreign Office, 23 February 1939, FO 371/23816.

16 because they did not fit in with the Italian Navy's emphasis on the battle-fleet. It was only after midget submarines achieved success during the war that their value became apparent; in December 1941 the ships Bowyer-Smith was tempted to mock were responsible for sinking the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant off the coast of

Alexandria.33

Assessments of Italian naval personnel were ultimately more important than those of Italian Navy's vessels. Italian naval officers were respectable, but timid and "thought to lack sea-faring experience." They handled ships "without dash or confidence" and their command lacked discipline. Italian ratings were in turn noticeably unenthusiastic and discontented with life at sea. In September 1938, the Naval Intelligence Division

(NID) circulated an account of an Italian squadron's visit to Malta:

the junior officers gave the impression of neither knowing nor being interested in

their men... many of the younger and conscripted men seemed vacant, ignorant

and disinterested, their ambition being to fulfill their engagement with as little

effort as possible and avoid the punishments, which are reported to be severe.

The officer concluded that "the visit from this point of view was the best propaganda which could have been devised." 4 Rumours that senior Italian Naval officers were apprehensive about facing the Royal Navy were also widespread after Abyssinia. These were not without substance and throughout the late 1930s Italian naval officers were reluctant to fight Britain and France. This was, however, because they recognized Italy's

Macgregor Knox, Hiter's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime and the War of 1940-1943 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 61 and Mallet, The Italian Navy and. Fascist Expansionism, 116. 34 Perth, 'Annual Report on Italy for 1939,' 31 January 1939, R 1189/1189/22, FO 371/23824 and NID Monthly Intelligence Report, 15 September 1938, ADM 223/826.

17 strategic position as hopeless and not because they lacked courage as British assessments

assumed.35

British assessments of Italian sailors were often based on little more than

presumptions of the Italian 'national character.' In April 1939, Bowyer-Smith circulated

a memorandum on the Italian Navy's "fighting qualities." Emphasising the Italians'

supposed moral frailty, he advocated an aggressive strategy because "a few set-backs

would leave them [Italians] a far less formidable foe. For this reason an initial blow at the

outbreak of war might have a greater effect on the ultimate issue than its strategic value."

Admitting he had "no personal experience to check it by," Bowyer-Smith reached this conclusion on nothing more than the predominant view of Italians obtained from "people

who knew Italy well" and the Embassy staff "who have been here many years and understand the Italian temperament thoroughly."36 The Italian 'national character' was accepted without hesitation and, because qualitative assessments of the Italian Navy had

shown its ships were likely inferior to Britain's, naval planners were able to rely on the fighting deficiencies of Italian sailors to dismiss the Italian Navy. As long as the Royal

Navy was able to maintain a fleet at least equal to Italy's in the Mediterranean, the Italian

Navy was expected to remain in the central Mediterranean and limit its operations to securing communications with Libya, Albania and the Black Sea. The Italian Navy would

Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in 'Italian Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810. See Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 72- 73, Mallett The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 213-214, Macgregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 20-22, Alan Cassels, 'Reluctant Neutral: Italy and the Strategic Balance in 1939,' in Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe edited by B.J.C. McKercher and Roch Legault (Westport: Praeger, 2001), 39-40 and Brian R. Sullivan 'A Fleet in Being: Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861-1943,' International History Review 10(1988), 119-120. 36 Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810.

18 neither seek an engagement nor, it was implied, be able to sufficiently defend Italian

trade.37

From the Abyssinian crisis to the outbreak of war in 1939, naval planners and the

COS believed the Italian Air Force presented the greatest threat to naval operations in the

Mediterranean. Throughout the interwar period the Royal Navy questioned the

effectiveness of air power against ships at sea. Although vessels would be more

vulnerable in harbour, the Royal Navy maintained that sufficient armour and anti-aircraft

guns could defend naval vessels from air attacks.38 With regards to Italy, the Admiralty's

official view of Italian air power was that its effectiveness was unknown and could only be determined during war.

During the Abyssinian crisis, the Navy conceded that Italian air strikes might be

successful against British bases and ships in harbour. The Navy's concern was two-fold.

First, the fleet lacked sufficient anti-aircraft ammunition while the anti-air defences at

Malta, Alexandria and the potential base at Navarino, Greece, codenamed 'Port X', were nearly non-existent. Second, British assessments of the Italian Air Force and, in particular, Italy's new long-range bomber, the Savoia Marchetti 81, showed British air forces were not only greatly outnumbered but also outmatched in the Mediterranean. The

Italian Air Force could strike Malta and Port X from Italy and Sicily and attack Egypt

COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. 38 Greg Kennedy, 'The Royal Navy, Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936- 1939,' Intelligence and National Security June 2005, 240-241. 39 COS 419 'Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Appreciation of the Situation Which Would Arise in the Middle East in the Event of War with Italy,' 6 December 1935, CAB 53/26, COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37 and COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45.

19 from airfields beyond Britain's reach. Italian air power, as well as the vulnerability of

British bases, led the COS, naval planners and the C-in-C Mediterranean to agree to abandon both Malta and the proposed base at Port X if war broke out. The Fleet would instead operate from Alexandria, which was still vulnerable to air attacks but was at least out of range of older bombers.41

Following Abyssinia, British assessments maintained the Italian Air Force possessed equivalent and often better equipment than the RAF's forces in the Middle

East.42 More importantly for British planners, Italy possessed a considerable numerical superiority. The COS's 1937 Mediterranean Appreciation, for example, noted that Italy outnumbered the RAF in the Mediterranean more than six to one.43 The pre-eminent and widespread fears of the German air threat and the possibility of a global war determined that British air forces in the Mediterranean could not expect reinforcements.44 Because the Italian Air Force appeared to subscribe to Guilio Douhet's ideas of air power, which stressed strategic bombing campaigns, British planners expected intense air strikes.45

Similar to the Navy's position during the Abyssinian crisis, Italian air power would continue to preclude the Navy's use of Malta and threaten its ability to operate. For the

40 COS 419 'Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Appreciation of the Situation Which Would Arise in the Middle East in the Event of War with Italy,' 6 December 1935, CAB 53/26. 41 Ibid and COS 421 (JP) "Defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East," 19 December 1935, CAB 53/26. 42 DPP 10 The Italian Air Force,' 21 July 1937, CAB 16/182; COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. 43 COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. 44 British air forces in the Middle East and Mediterranean consisted of 214 aircraft. The Italian air force's first-line strength was estimated at 1770. COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. See also Chatfield to Pound, 23 November, 1937, CHT 4/10. 45 RAF Intelligence Summary January 1939, AIR 8/252, RAF Memorandum 'Scale of Attack Which the Metropolitan Air Force can Deliver to Malta,' undated, AIR 9/35.

20 COS, the disparity between British and Italian air power in the Mediterranean created "a

situation which cannot fail to be a source of the gravest anxiety."

By late 1938, however, the quality of the Italian Air Force had precipitously

declined. Although the Italian Air Force had greatly expanded and improved in 1935, it

failed to maintain production and improve its aircraft designs. In 1938, the air attache

wrote, Italy "appears to have lagged behind once again.. .her aircraft will shortly be out­ classed by those already in production in other countries."47 This was a symptom of a

larger problem. As the IIC had shown, the Italian aircraft industry had serious problems,

and was incapable of producing enough engines to support sufficient reserves.48 The

Italian Air Force also had a poor maintenance record and suffered significant losses in

Spain. The Italian Air Force was "in no position to enter a war of the first magnitude with any hope of successfully pursuing it once the initial blow has spent itself."49 The Royal

Air Force and Royal Navy were also aware that the Italian Air Force devoted few resources to developing a naval capability. Responsibility for aerial operations belonged to the Italian Air Force; the Italian Navy did not have its own Fleet Air Arm and, as a result, naval air operations were neglected. According to British intelligence, the Italian

Air Force did not possess any torpedo carrying aircraft, while its training for naval operations was considered "backwards" and ineffective.50

COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. 47 Air Attache Memorandum, 'Italian Air Force,' enclosed in Perth to Foreign Office, 17 December 1938, R 10066/494/22, FO 371/22435. 48 CID 1388-B 'Italian Aircraft Industry,' 11 lanuary 1938 CAB 4/27 and CID 1502-B 'Italian Aircraft Industry,' 5 January 1939, CAB 4/29. 49 Perth to Foreign Office, 17 December 1938, R 10066/494/22, FO 371/22435. 50 Perth, 'Annual Report on Italy for 1939,' 31 January 1939, R 1189/1189/22, FO 371/23824 and COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45.

21 Both naval and air force intelligence acknowledged Italians were "good at

individual acts of courage."51 Italians were believed to be well-suited to air combat and

particularly fighter aircraft. However, Italian pilots were still Italian. In "deliberate

operations" requiring considerable discipline, resolve and stamina, Italians were expected

to perform poorly. Faced with anti-aircraft fire and fighters, British assessments predicted

Italian bomber crews would fail to persevere and likely abandon their targets.52 By 1938

and 1939 the IAF was seen as much less of a threat than it had been in 1935. The IAF's

ability to undertake a major war effort was questionable, its equipment was outdated and its personnel were reportedly of low quality. However, as a 1937 Air Staff paper recognized,

it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to Italy's inability to provide

for heavy wastage in war, and to the temperamental disabilities of her people in

the face of strong opposition... having regard to our preoccupations nearer home,

it is unlikely for financial reasons that we shall ever be able to maintain air forces

in the Mediterranean and Middle East in any way comparable in strength to the

Italian Metropolitan and Colonial Air Forces combined.53

British air force and anti-aircraft requirements in the Mediterranean were overshadowed by the potential German air threat to Britain. The Italian air threat, though downgraded, remained serious.

Given the importance of economic warfare and the conditions for its success, defence planners found it necessary to know and understand their enemies' economic

51 Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810. 52 DPP 10 'The Italian Air Force,' 21 July 1937, CAB 16/182 and Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810. 53 DPP 10 The Italian Air Force,' 21 July 1937, CAB 16/182.

22 capabilities. Headed by a former SIS officer, Desmond Morton, the IIC's primary responsibilities were to collect, analyze and communicate "any information regarding the industrial or economic development of a designated foreign country which may throw light upon the extent of its readiness for war from an industrial point of view." The IIC produced periodic "General Surveys of Material Resources & Industry in their Bearing

Upon National War Potential," which outlined the salient points about a specific country's economic ability to wage war. Although Morton later dismissed these as a

"child's guide to knowledge," the Admiralty copied and inserted these verbatim into its

Confidential Books. The IIC also completed ad hoc memoranda on specific aspects of a foreign country's economy, usually requested by the service departments,57 produced estimates for the COS and JPC's strategic appreciations and addressed day-to-day enquiries from the armed services, the Foreign Office and other government departments.58 In addition to its advisory role, the IIC was actively involved in the formulation of policy and had representatives on the Industrial Intelligence in Foreign

Countries (FCI) sub-committee, Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War

(ATB) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). IIC personnel also formed the nucleus of the ATB's Economic Pressure on Germany sub-committee, which considered economic warfare plans against Germany, and regularly attended meetings of COS and

JPC.

M Young, 479-480. 55CID 1139-B 'Sub-Committee on Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Report', 14 May 1934, CAB 4/22 56 Morton to Prof. P.M.S. Blackett, 24 May 1945, PREM 7/14. 57 Young, 479 and ICF 464 'Petroleum Supply in Italy in Time of War', 3 March 1939, FO 371/23824/ R 4551/4551/22. 58 Morton to Director of Naval Intelligence, 30 June 1939, CAB 21/2553.

23 As a strictly analytical agency, the IIC did not actively engage in espionage and depended on other government departments, the press and publications for information.59

IIC assessments of Italy were predominately based on open-source information: Italian trade figures, government reports, and speeches by government officials.60 Compared to other dictatorships, Italy was relatively open and, except for a brief time after the

Abyssinian crisis, records were widely available and, more importantly, useful. Richard

Nosworthy, the commercial counsellor in Rome, for example, reported that although

Italian government records often resided "economically speaking, in the Land of

Makebelieve," they still "represented the situation in its truth."61 The IIC had access to a wide range of confidential and secret information through the Foreign Office, the

Treasury, and the armed services. Nosworthy claimed to have an extensive network of confidential informants used "to supplement such figures that are issued in the official statements and present them in their true relation to the whole picture." Confidential and secret information provided insight into sensitive areas of the Italian economy, including the armaments' industry, the extent of Italy's petroleum production, imports and storage capacities, and Mussolini's drive for autarchy. Evaluated in the context of the

w Young, 477-8 and Wark, 163-4. 60 For example see ICF 447 1938 and Perth to Foreign Office, May 1938 FO 371/22441/ R 4551/4551/22.. Most of the IIC's figures reflect those in the Annual Report, which were in turn based on figures published by the Italian government and state institutions like the Bank of Italy. Also, Perth to Foreign Office, 20 April 1939, FO 371/23811/R 3228/83/22. 61 Picton Bagge (DOT) to Sir Orme Sargent, 31 March 1937, R 2232/64/22, FO 371/21166 62 These sources included prominent Italian, British and foreign businessmen: Dr. Alberto Pirelli, an industrialist and chairman of the state-owned company responsible for producing synthetic rubber; managers for Shell and Standard Oil; Francis Rodd, then a partner at the bank Morgan, Grenfell & Co; and Roy Feddon, an engineer at the Bristol Aeronautical Company and important source of intelligence on the German Air Force, provided technical information about Italian air production. Picton Bagge (DOT) to Sir Orme Sargent, 31 March 1937, R 2232/64/22, FO 371/21166, Perth to Foreign Office, 29 October 1937, R 7276/64/22, FO 371/21167, Perth to Foreign Office, 9 February 1938, R1320/44/22, FO 371/22420 and Waley to Foreign Office, 28 September 1937, R6462/64/22, FO 371/21167, Morton to Gwatkin, 27 October 1937, R 7273/64/22, FO 371/21167, Wark, 163 and Medhurst to Morton, 5 October 1935, AIR 5/1154.

24 open source information available and what was already known, the IIC's confidential

information helped produce a more accurate picture of the Italian economy.63

Two fundamental assumptions about the nature of modern warfare shaped the

IIC's conclusions about Italy's economic ability to fight. First, the IIC consistently

assumed a war of 'national effort' in which a nation's resources, people and economy

would be fully mobilized for war. 4 For Morton, "the economic front will be of more

importance than the front line, in so far as the latter can only be maintained by a constant

stream of highly-mechanised weapons and large quantities of relatively precision-made

material."65 When assessing Germany, this assumption led the IIC to a worst-case

conclusion about German intentions and capabilities. Supported by its immense industrial

and economic power, and, in the view of British intelligence, the Germans predisposition

for efficiency, Germany's preparations for total war would be formidable and

dangerous.66 Although the IIC assumed Italy had similar intentions for total war, the

resulting conclusion was quite different and a war of 'national effort' represented a

substantial risk for Italy. The IIC assumed Italy would expend more resources than it was

capable of acquiring or producing.

The IIC's second assumption was that economic pressure, particularly through

naval action, would be decisive. The IIC did not address how economic pressure would be applied, what forces would be required and how they would operate. Instead, the IIC

laid out the potential and ideal results of effective economic pressure. If Britain

completely severed Italy's vital imports and exports, which were carried primarily by sea,

63 Drummond to Foreign Office, 28 May 1937 R 3814/64/22, FO 371/21166. 64Wark„ 155. 65 Quoted from Wark, 160. 66Wark, 155-7, 174-6, 184.

25 or physically destroyed its industry, Italy would have no choice but to concede. The result

was that the IIC consistently implied best-case scenarios that underlined Italy's

fundamental weaknesses and assumed a significant naval effort in the Mediterranean.

Prior to Abyssinia, the Admiralty was well aware of Italy's economic problems.

In 1931 the Admiralty's Plans Division produced a memorandum examining Italy's

vulnerability to economic pressure. Although Italy was an industrial power, it was heavily dependent on imports. Receiving as much as 75 percent of its raw materials overseas, Italy was highly susceptible to economic pressure. Effective attacks on Italian trade and air strikes against industrial areas and the power grid would destroy the economy, reduce morale, and "paralyse the national existence". British views about

Italy's fundamental economic weaknesses did not change during the Abyssinian crisis.

Italy was still dependent on sea-borne trade, faced "a grave shortage of nearly all the raw materials required for her industries, and she is nearly entirely dependent on imports for her coal and petroleum." Moreover, a successful blockade would have a considerable effect. Although Italy possessed enough food, it "would be deprived of some 20 million tons of imports per year. Unless material stocks had been accumulated, the loss of these imports would very speedily bring her industries to a standstill". However, Britain and the League of Nations would be unlikely to prevent the conquest of Abyssinia with economic sanctions alone. Italy could still trade with non-League members and secure resources affected by sanctions. In order for sanctions to be effective, and the Italian economy to suffer, Britain and the League of Nations would have to fight.68

67 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 118 and Plans Division Memorandum, The Possibilities of the Exercise of Maritime Economic Pressure Upon Italy,' March 1931, ADM 1/8739/47. 68 CID 1188-B Economic Pressure on Italy, 30 September 1935, CAB 4/23 and COS Minutes, 147th Meeting, 30 July 1935, CAB 53/5.

26 From 1936 to 1939, the IIC maintained that Mussolini and his government were preparing the Italian economy for total war: "The Fascist Government has made the planning of mobilisation of national resources and industry for war its chief task."

Industrial mobilization during Abyssinia, direct intervention in industry through the corporatist system, which organised branches of industry under government direction, and autarchic policies made Italian intentions clear. However, the IIC believed Italian economic policies - particularly stockpiling and import substitution - could do little to reduce Italy's fundamental deficiencies or allow it to fight anything but a short war.

Assessments of Italy's economic intentions reaffirmed the IIC's broader assumption that, despite its deficiencies, Italy would pursue a maximum war effort. The IIC, however, overestimated the Italian government's willingness and capability to mobilize its economy. During the Second World War, Italian industry maintained peacetime working conditions until January 1943, two and a half years after Italy entered the War.71 The

IIC's assumption of total war distorted its estimates and, consequently, the IIC made no accommodation for Italy adapting to a long war, undertaking a limited effort or effectively rationing its available resources.

Italian agriculture was the only major industry that was not dependent on imports and the only industry that could be maintained during a major war. The Italian government's attempt to become agriculturally self-sufficient had paid dividends and annual food imports throughout the late 1930s were estimated at no more than one million tons. Agricultural products were also Italy's second largest export. The IIC's

1936 General Survey estimated Italy would be able to feed itself for at least a year during

69ICF447 1936 70ICF447 1938 71 Macgregor Knox, Hiter's Italian Allies, 33-34.

27 war. The report did not address the period after this but the implication was that serious

deficiencies would eventually set in. By 1939 the agricultural position was seen to have improved. Although Italy suffered from shortages in coffee, cereals and oleaginous seeds, the IIC estimated in 1939 that "Italy should be able to provide herself with her minimum foodstuff requirements for a long period in war, even if denied sea-borne imports." This position was tenuous and contingent upon a good harvest, sufficient reserves and wise rationing. Should a harvest fail, as it did in 1936, Italy could require up to four million tons of imported food products. The IIC concluded Britain would not be able to starve the

Italian population into submission.72

Italy's "chief industrial disability" was its dependence on imports for vital resources, particularly coal, petroleum, timber and iron.73 Italy had sufficient amounts of certain non-ferrous metals - aluminum, zinc and quicksilver, the latter two dependent on communications with Sardinia - but lacked others, notably copper, lead, tin and nickel.

Italy had few sources of timber and its rubber industry could only provide for peace time needs since most of its raw materials came from the British Empire. And although Italian mines produced 70 percent of its raw iron ore, the Italian steel industry depended on iron and steel scraps, the imports of which were greater than the amount of raw iron Italian mines produced. Italy was also highly dependent on imported coal. However, whether this could be exploited was not clear. The IIC estimated in 1936 and onwards that Italy would require upwards of 12 million tons of coal per year during war. Italian coal reserves were never estimated to last more than six months while domestic annual production never rose above one million tons. In 1936 the IIC declared that failing to

72 COS 603 JP 'Mediterranean Appreciation', 24 July 1937, CAB 53/32. 73ICF 447 1936 and ICF 447 1938

28 secure the requisite imports "must involve industrial collapse." In 1934 Britain supplied

40 percent of Italian coal imports. However, during the Abyssinian crisis Germany

replaced Britain as Italy's leading source of coal and by 1939 provided approximately

two-thirds of Italy's requirement. As German-Italian relations became closer from 1936

onwards the IIC presciently concluded in 1939 that Germany would not only be able to

7S

meet Italy's imported coke and coal requirements but that they would do so by rail.

That Italy was heavily dependent on coal and would greatly suffer if its supplies were cut-off became irrelevant.

Of Italy's imports, petroleum was the most important to the IIC and British planners. The IIC estimated in 1939 that Italy would require at least six million tons of petroleum per year during wartime. Italian domestic production hovered at approximately

15,000 tons per year in the late 1930s and Albania supplied no more than 100,000 tons per year prior to Italy's occupation in April 1939. Following the conquest this only increased to 200,000 tons per year. Although Italy was successful in producing small amounts of benzine and adapting vegetable oil, olive oil and castor oil to use as machine lubricants, these efforts did little to relieve Italy's dependence on imported petroleum.

Despite increasing from one to two and a half million tons by 1939, Italy's storage capacity for liquid fuels was also insufficient. The IIC predicted Italian reserves would last no more than four or five months during a major war. Once exhausted, Italy's lack of fuel would have an "immediate decisive effect in war."7

/4ICF447 1936 75 COS 603 JP 'Mediterranean Appreciation', 24 July 1937, CAB 53/32. 16ICF 464 'Petroleum Supply in Italy in Time of War', 3 March 1939, R 4551/4551/22, FO 371/23824, ICF 447 1936 and ICF 447 1938.

29 The IIC anticipated the Royal Navy would be able to interdict Italian petroleum

imports. Most of Italy's petroleum came from the United States, the Middle East and the

Dutch East and West Indies. During a European or global war, oil from the Middle East

would be cut off at Suez while supplies from the United States and Dutch possessions

would be unavailable due to American neutrality laws and likely Dutch belligerency.

Italy's only potential sources would be Albania, the Soviet Union and Romania. Oil from

all three would have to be transported by sea and could be subject to naval pressure.

Production in Albania was also limited and Soviet exports in 1939 were expected to be

less than one million tons per year.77 Romanian oil would also fail to meet Italian needs

should communication lines remain open. Of Romania's annual production of 6.5 million

tons, one quarter and likely more in wartime would go to Germany. Romania was unlikely to supply Italy with more than two million tons per year, four million tons short of its annual requirement.78

Irrespective of material and labour shortages, the IIC argued Italian industry was incapable of sustaining a major war effort. While many branches of industry could satisfy peace-time demands, others could not and had to rely on imported products to make up for domestic shortfalls. This was particularly important for armaments and manufacturing firms which relied on imported tools and manufactured and semi-manufactured products.79 Italy's steel industry reflected as well as contributed to the broader problems.

Although Italy could theoretically produce four million tons of steel, it only managed to

77 This was due to falling production and increasing domestic consumption 78ICF 464 'Petroleum Supply in Italy in Time of War', 3 March 1939, R 4551/4551/22, FO 371/23824, COS 691 Mediterranean, Middle East and North East Africa Appreciation', 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37 and COS 843 Appendix II 'Economic situation in Germany, Italy and Japan on April 1 1939', 20 February 1939 CAB 53/45. 79 COS 843 Appendix II 'Economic situation in Germany, Italy and Japan on April 1 1939', 20 February 1939 CAB 53/45. See alsoCID 1199-B Italian Air Industry, 10 December 1935, CAB 4/24 and CID 1502- B Italian Aircraft Industry, January 1939, CAB 4/29.

30 produce an annual average of 2.5 million tons during the late 1930s. This compared

unfavourably with Germany's 21 million tons and France's seven, and underlined Italy's

status among the great powers:

This is extremely low for a country of the size of Italy, aiming at being a first-

class Power... and betrays the general low capacity of the Italian engineering

industry, which could not, unaided, maintain in active operations anything like the

forces Italy could apparently mobilse.80

And of those industries capable of supplying peace-time demands, such as the rubber industry, few could hope to expand during war. Throughout the late 1930s the IIC maintained that although Italy would be able to pursue a naval and air war, Italian industry could not support all three services.81

Italy's armaments' industries had respectable capacities, but suffered from periodic and sometimes widespread labour and resource shortages. Kept alive with heavy state

subsidies during the interwar period, Italian shipbuilders competed with British firms for foreign orders. By 1939 Italy's major shipyards had the slip capacity to produce 200,000 tons per year and simultaneously construct three capital ships, three cruisers, three light cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and at least twenty submarines. Although Italy continually had ships under construction during the late 1930s, including two sets of two modern battleships, a lack of raw materials, skilled labour shortages and general industrial weakness determined that a maximum building programme, or one close to it, was impossible. Military industries fared less well and Italian industry's ability to re-

80ICF447 1938 8IICF447 1936 and ICF 447 1938 82 ICF 447 1936 and ICF 447 1938. The Vittorio Veneto and Littorio were laid down in 1934, launched in 1937 and completed in 1940. The lmpero and Roma were laid down in 1938 and launched in 1939 and

31 supply the army during war was severely limited: "To maintain the whole mobilisable

forces of Italy in active operations in modern war would be well outside the capacity of

Italian industry, even if kept fully supplied with raw materials and adequate skilled labour."83 In June 1938, the IIC concluded Italian industry, without significant assistance, could only field an army of ten to fifteen divisions for an extended period of time and could support fifty-four divisions for up to three months. The Deputy Director of Military

Intelligence argued the IIC figures were exaggerated and requested the JIC to disregard the IIC's estimation for strategic planning. Morton agreed but also noted the essential point of the report still held true - that Italy could not survive a long war.84

The IIC and Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) paid particular attention to other states' air industries, Italy being no exception. This was a direct response to British fears of strategic bombing.85 Consistent with the IIC's views on Italian industry, the IIC believed the Italian aircraft industry would be incapable of supporting a major war effort.

Beginning in 1935 the Italian government undertook efforts to expand production by building new factories, upgrading existing facilities and establishing apprenticeship programs. Between 1934 and 1939, the aircraft industry's capacity expanded from 200 aircraft per year to 500 per month - half of Germany's expected capacity. However, the IIC believed that regardless of Italian needs and priorities the fundamental problems within Italian industry would preclude aircraft production from reaching its maximum

1940 respectively. The Roma was completed in 1942 while the Impero was scrapped before construction finished. 83ICF447 1938. 84 JPC 305, 'The Number of Divisions Italian Industry Might Maintain in the Field, 19 Aug 1938, CAB 55/13 and JIC 19th Meeting, 21 July 1938, CAB 56/1. 85 See Uri Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber (London: Royal Historical Society, 1980). 86 CID 1199-B 'Italian Aircraft Industry,' 10 December 1935, CAB 4/24 . During the fall 1935 Italian monthly production reached approximately 200 planes per month, matching 1934's annual output

32 output. Italy was more likely to produce 300 aircraft per month. The aircraft industry

not only had to deal with material and labour shortages but also the government's poor

financial position, which led to a decline in government orders in 1938 and 1939.88

In addition to Italy's systemic economic deficiencies, Italy's economy was highly

vulnerable to pressure by air and naval action. The IIC never addressed whether or how

such operations would be carried out, nor was this part of its responsibilities. However,

the IIC presented the possibility of bringing Italy quickly to its knees: economic pressure,

if properly applied, would not only produce a decision but would do so quickly,

OQ

potentially in a matter of months. Three-quarters of Italian industry and half its

population was concentrated in the north and open to air strikes from French airfields.

The IIC argued that effective strikes against Italy's railways, ports and factories would

create considerable difficulties and "could not fail eventually to prove decisive in a war

of national effort unless it were possible for Germany to meet from her own industrial

resources all.. .the demands of the Italian nation." Because of its natural lack of coal

and petroleum, Italy was highly dependent on hydro-electric power; the IIC's 1939

'General Survey' projected that upwards of 90 percent of Italian manufacturing depended

on hydro-electricity.91 In lune 1938 an FCI Air Targets subcommittee report on Italy,

completed with heavy IIC involvement, claimed a loss of hydro-electrical power would

have a "paralysing effect on industry and transport" and if "kept out of action, the effects

8/ ICF 439 'View on the Aircraft Industry in Countries in 1941', 10 November 1938, FO 371/21639. 88 CID 1388-B 'Italian Aircraft Industry,' 11 January 1938 CAB 4/27 and CID 1502-B 'Italian Aircraft Industry,' 5 January 1939, CAB 4/29. 89 COS 843 Appendix II 'Economic situation in Germany, Italy and Japan on April 1 1939', 20 February 1939 CAB 53/45. 90 Ibid. 91 ICF 447 1938.

33 might rapidly prove decisive after reserves of armaments and certain industrial products had been expended."92

Most of Italy's trade was - and would continue to be during war - carried by sea.

The IIC estimated Italy's annual wartime import requirements would be between 23 and

26 million tons. Italy's rail system could theoretically carry this, but it was unlikely and required Italy's neighbours to base their rail operations around Italian needs. Rather, the

IIC estimated, less than half of Italy's trade would be carried over land. Italy, as a result, would remain "specially vulnerable to economic pressure by naval action." In 1937, 61 percent of Italian imports and 45 percent of its exports passed through Gibraltar or the

Suez Canal. The Royal Navy could sever much of Italy's trade by closing Gibraltar and

Suez. Although Italy would have difficulty securing resources predominately produced outside the Mediterranean, such as rubber and nickel, the IIC expected that Italy would be able to access alternative sources for many essential imports; this was especially true for coal, which would arrive over land from Germany.94 Containing Italian trade within the

Mediterranean would undoubtedly affect Italy's wartime economy, particularly in a long war. For the IIC, Italy's wartime economy, and a quick British victory, would ultimately depend on Italian trade within the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and access to its only source of petroleum, Romania. Not long after these communications were severed the

Italian war effort was expected to collapse.

n FCI (A.T.) 18 'Italy. Report on Air Targets', 21 June 1938, CAB 48/8. 93 ICF447 1936. 94ICF 447 1936, ICF 447 1938 and COS 843 Appendix II 'Economic situation in Germany, Italy and Japan on April 1 1939', 20 February 1939 CAB 53/45.

34 Table 1.1. Italian Trade in 1937 Imports Exports Routes '000 tons % of total by '000 tons % of total by all routes all routes By Rail 6,630 35 2,564 37 Med. and Black Sea 3,598 14 1,232 18 Suez 1,699 6 1,175 17 Gibraltar 14,634 55 1,921 28 Total 26,561 100 6,892 100 (Source: ICF 447 1939 T 160/860)

Because of its tenuous financial position throughout the late 1930s, Italy relied overwhelmingly on its exports to acquire foreign exchange and gold to purchase essential imports. A consistent adverse balance of trade, the conquest and occupation of Abyssinia, and involvement in the Spanish Civil War strained an already-weak economy. By 1939

Italy's financial position had worsened. Tourism, a mainstay of the Italian economy, had deteriorated; Italy's gold and foreign exchange reserves remained depleted, the latter the

IIC estimated was close to exhaustion; and the government continuously struggled to generate revenue.95 Italy's access to imports was closely connected to its ability to export.

Upwards of 80 percent of its exports were agricultural, textiles and manufactured goods.

Although agricultural exports could be maintained during war, textiles and manufactured products required imported raw materials, most of which would be cut-off at Suez and

Gibraltar. This would severely limit Italian exports during war. Italian industry was incapable of producing enough manufactured goods to meet domestic wartime requirements, leaving little available for export. Italian export trade would be subject to considerable pressure if its imports were severed. And if exports seriously diminished,

ICF 447 1938.

35 "Italy would rapidly become unable to pay for imports of essential raw materials." For

the IIC, Italy's financial weakness represented another vulnerable point in the Italian

economy.

Between 1936 and 1939 certain aspects of the Italian economy worsened while

others improved, but Italy's fundamental economic weaknesses and the IIC's overarching conclusion remained - Italy was incapable of maintaining a total war effort without considerable, and unlikely, outside assistance. Italy was deficient in vital resources, possessed a limited industrial capacity and was in a poor financial position throughout the late 1930s. Italy was furthermore susceptible to economic pressure. The IIC did not explicitly outline when and how a decision against Italy would be reached, but once its reserves were exhausted, it predicted that Italy's situation would quickly become

"serious" and "critical." For these reasons, Morton argued Italian hostility would be more valuable than its neutrality. A neutral Italy would act as a supply point for German trade and allow Germany to bypass a British naval blockade, while if Italy was a

go belligerent it would become an economic liability for the Axis.

The IIC clearly established that Italy was vulnerable to economic pressure. The effectiveness of economic pressure, however, would be greatly increased if it simultaneously exhausted Italian morale." Following the Abyssinian crisis, Italians continued to harbour anti-British feelings. These eventually subsided. Between 1936 to 9 ICF 447 1936. See also COS 843 Appendix II 'Economic situation in Germany, Italy and Japan on April 1 1939', 20 February 1939 CAB 53/45. 97 ICF 447 'Italy General Survey of Material Resources & Industry In Their Bearing Upon National War Potential', 9 November 1936 (hereafter referred to at ICF 447 1936) and ICF 447 'Italy. General Survey of Material Resources & Industry In Their Bearing Upon National War Potential', 31 Dec 1938 ICF 447 (hereafter referred to at ICF 447 1938), T160/860. The latter report was first drafted in 1938 but its final version appeared in January 1939. 98 Morton to Earl of Drogheda, 2 May 1945, PREM 7/14. 99 COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37.

36 1938 consular officials in Italy regularly reported on Italians' discontent with Mussolini's

regime, Italy's involvement in Spain, increasing poverty and closer relations with Nazi

Germany.100 After the Munich war scare in September 1938, the Italian public's perceived attitudes and fears became more pronounced. After touring Northern Italy in

October 1938, Richard Nosworthy reported the Foreign Office his assessment of the

Italian public's general attitude towards war with Britain. Aware of Italians' discontent over closer Italian-German relations, Nosworthy "had no idea how strong these feelings were in the industrial north."101 Mussolini's foreign policy was unpopular and when it

appeared the Dace would commit Italy to Germany's cause in Czechoslovakia, people in

Italy's northern centres "were shaken to the core....Such a conclusion, to thinking people in northern cities, was nothing less than madness, and he [Mussolini] only heard a chorus

109 of condemnation, particularly in Genoa, Turin and Milan." Nosworthy reported much of the indignation among northern Italians was because they recognized that their cities 101 would become targets. Group-Captain Medhurst confirmed Nosworthy's conclusions during his tours of northern Italy in September and October. Medhurst further suggested northern Italians recognized their own national character, that they were "incapable of taking hard knocks."104 Because upwards of 90 percent of Italian war production would be located in the north, Medhurst believed northern Italians' opposition to and fear of war 100 Drummond, 'Annual Report on Italy for 1936,' 10 May 1937, R 3171/3171/22, FO 371/21183, Perth to Foreign Office, 9 February 1938, R 1320/44/22, FO 371/22420 and Foreign Office Minute, 'Internal Situation in Italy,' 21 December 1938, R 10240/261/22. 101 Perth to Foreign Office, 22 October 1938, R 8491/899/22, FO 371/22438. Nosworthy's report was edited and re-printed in the Admiralty's Monthly Intelligence Summary in November. See NID Monthly Intelligence Report, 15 November 1938, ADM 223/826. Fascism was similarly reported unpopular in southern Italy and Sicily Discontent in southern Italy, however, was not considered as strong or important as discontent in the industrial north. See Perth to Foreign Office, 28 October 1938, R 8545/899/22, FO 371/22438. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Perth to Foreign Office, 22 October 1938, R 8491/899/22, FO 371/22438.

37 "may be a deciding factor in Government policy" and lead the Italian government to

secure an early peace. Britain, as a result, should take advantage of Italy's moral

weaknesses and, Medhurst argued, apply direct pressure through strategic bombing

strikes against northern Italian cities.105

Ideas of the Italian population's vulnerability persisted throughout the remainder

of 1938 and 1939.106 The Foreign Office, the Embassy in Rome and the JPC, however,

recognized that a significant drop in civilian morale did not guarantee Fascism would

collapse or force Mussolini to the peace table. Mussolini was not directly accountable

to the Italian public and could ignore popular opinion. Moreover, he did not face any

organized opposition. Civilian discontent was nevertheless encouraging for proponents of

a knock-out blow against Italy. Commenting on one of Perth's correspondence about

Italian discontent, Andrew Noble of the Foreign Office's Southern Department

summarized the British view: "It would be tempting to deduce that Fascism is tottering

to its fall, but I do not believe this to be so... [but] What is reasonably certain is that

Italian morale in a war against us would be bad and likely to break fairly soon."108 For the

IIC, the Navy and strategic planners, the successful exploitation of Italian morale as well

as its economic problems would guarantee that Noble's prediction would be realized.

105 Perth to Foreign Office, 22 October 1938, R 8491/899/22, FO 371/22438. 106 Perth, 'Annual Report on Italy for 1939,' 31 January 1939, R 1189/1189/22, FO 371/23824, Naval Attache Memorandum enclosed in Noel Charles to Foreign Office, 1 May 1939, R 3639/70/22, FO 371/23810. See also, SAC Minutes 4th Meeting, 6 April 1939, CAB 16/209, CID Minutes 360th Meeting, 22 June 1939, CAB 2/9. For the influence of civilian morale see Plans Division, 'An Appreciation on an Offensive Operation by Naval Forces in the Gulf of Genoa,' 23 February 1939, ADM 1/9900. 107 Perth to Foreign Office, 28 October 1938, R 8645/899/22, FO 371/22438 and COS 942 (JP), 'The Attitude of Italy in War and the Problem of Anglo-French Support to Poland,' 12 July 1939, CAB 53/52. 108 Minute by Andrew Noble, 28 October 1938, R 8645/899/22, FO 371/22438.

38 Chapter Two: The Development of British Naval Strategy, 1935-1938

After reviewing the Joint Planners' 1937 Mediterranean Appreciation, Chatfield remarked that "Supposing that the necessity for the defence of Egypt did not exist, the problem of war with Italy would be a comparatively simple one and could be confined mainly to naval action."1 Chatfield acknowledged the need to defend Egypt complicated war with Italy. Britain's land and air forces in the Middle East were small and, like the

Navy, spread thin.2 The Army and Royal Air Force's main role in a war with Italy was to defend Egypt. Responsibility for defeating Italy fell to the Navy.3

Chatfield's assessment that "war with Italy would be a comparatively simple one" reflects the underlying assumptions that shaped British naval strategy in the

Mediterranean. First, IIC assessments of the Italian economy found a receptive audience amongst the COS and the Navy. As early as 1931, ideas of economic warfare dominated the Navy's strategic thinking towards Italy.4 Italy was highly dependent on sea-borne trade and, as a result, highly vulnerable to naval pressure. More importantly, the Navy and the COS maintained that economic pressure against Italy would not only be effective but decisive. Italy's poor financial position and dependence on imported manufactured goods and raw materials ensured that it could not sustain a significant war effort once its overseas trade was severely disrupted. Second, the Navy was confident in its ability to apply decisive pressure, although this was only under certain conditions and when adequate forces were available. The Italian Navy was rated poorly compared to the other

1 COS Minutes, 214th Meeting, 28 July 1937, CAB 53/8. " For an account of British defence policy in Egypt see Steven Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940 (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). 3 Employing an aerial bombing strategy was periodically discussed, but was never seriously considered because of a lack of resources and fears of German air power. 4 Admiralty Memorandum, 'The Possibilities of the Exercise of Maritime Economic Pressure upon Italy.' March 1931 ADM 1/8739/47.

39 powers and was considered incapable of effectively defending Italian trade let alone securing a decision or command of the Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force posed a greater danger than the Italian Navy but the air threat was manageable and would not affect the eventual outcome. Italy's only hope for victory was its potential allies,

Germany and Japan. Throughout the late 1930s, British planners argued they could not adequately fight Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously and between 1935 and 1938

Germany and Japan had priority over Italy. As a result, in a war against Germany, Italy and Japan, the Royal Navy would have to abandon any significant effort in the

Mediterranean. Because the Navy would not have the capabilities to exploit Italy's vulnerabilities, intelligence assessments highlighting Italy's vulnerabilities would become irrelevant.

In the decade following the end of the First World War, the Navy faced consistent financial and political obstacles to meeting its obligations. An effort to limit government spending saw the armed forces' funds reduced while the government agreed to international naval limitations. Under the Washington Naval Treaty, Britain accepted parity with the United States in capital ships and aircraft carriers. Japan was allowed 60 percent of British and American capital ship tonnage and Italy and France 35 percent.

The treaty also imposed qualitative limitations and, at American insistence, a 10-year capital ship building holiday. The Admiralty opposed the agreement, especially the building holiday which threatened the future of Britain's shipyards, and because it tied the Navy's size to political wants rather than strategic needs.5 Despite these setbacks,

Britain continued to possess the world's most powerful navy. As John Ferris has noted, in

5 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 275.

40 the 1920s "Britain alone could project naval power across the globe."6 The early 1930s

were less forgiving. The Great Depression resulted in further funding cuts, while the

1930 London Naval Treaty reduced cruiser and destroyer strength, required Britain to

scrap a number of old capital ships and extended the capital ship building holiday.

Britain's naval strength relative to other powers declined.7

As the international situation deteriorated in the early 1930s with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Hitler's rise to power in 1933, the Cabinet established the

Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) to address the armed forces' worst deficiencies.8 The DRC's first report, while naming Germany Britain's "ultimate potential enemy," recognized the immediacy of the Japanese threat and the importance of naval power to Imperial security. When the Cabinet reviewed the DRC's report the following spring, however, it downgraded the Japanese threat while emphasizing the air threat from Germany. Resources for the Navy were cut while those for the RAF were increased.9 The DRC re-formed in late 1935 and, by emphasizing the German threat, the

Admiralty secured a building program that would maintain capital ship strength and eventually allow the Navy to simultaneously deal with Germany and Japan. The

Admiralty also attempted to quietly expand its building program by accelerating DRC construction. However, the DRC scheme and the Admiralty's attempt to augment it did

6 John Ferris, "It is our business in the Navy to Command the Seas" The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929' in Fa?--Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman ed. Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson (London: Cass. 1997), 124. See also Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 25. 7 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 25 and Gibbs, 27-31. 8 The committee consisted of the COS, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, and the permanent under-secretaries of the Treasury and Foreign Office, Sir Warren Fisher and Sir Robert Vansittart. 9 Maiolo, 18- 19 and Keith Neilson, 'The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement,' English Historical Review (June 2003), 673- 684.

41 not take Italy into account.10 Throughout the 1930s, the Royal Navy, even with French assistance, was unable to adequately defend the Empire and its communications against all three revisionist powers.

Table 2.1 Comparative Naval Strength Estimated for 1 January 1938 Britain France Germany Italy Japan Battleships 15 7 3 4 10 Cruisers 59 47 6 22 32 Destroyers 101 33 28 111 63 Submarine 53 76 36 80 60 (Source: COS 639 'Comparison of the Strength of Great Britain with that of Certain Other Nations as at January 1938,' 12 November 1937, CAB 53/34)

From the 1920s to the early 1930s, war against Japan dominated British naval planning. Assuming an unlimited and unilateral war, British planners would rely on sea- power. The Navy's strategies revolved around despatching a superior fleet to its base at

Singapore. After securing Singapore, the fleet would then proceed to Hong Kong and possibly another base farther north to pursue offensive operations against Japanese trade and tempt the Imperial Japanese Navy (UN) to engage. If the latter obliged and was defeated, the subsequent pressure would quickly result in British victory. If the UN avoided a fleet engagement, the Navy would be forced rely on gradual pressure to slowly exhaust Japan. In both scenarios, naval planners expected Britain to possess a force capable of commanding the Far Eastern seas.11

Until 1939, British strategy against Germany relied on Britain's economic, naval and air power to wear Germany down. The Royal Air Force would launch a strategic

Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 27-31. Although a new standard was never officially approved, the Admiralty was able to accelerate its building program under the 'DRC Fleet' to reflect a two- power standard. " Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 65-82.

42 bombing offensive while the French Army was expected to defeat German land forces.

In contrast to Japan and Italy, the Admiralty cautiously maintained that Germany could not be defeated through naval pressure alone. Germany produced many of the resources it required and, because Germany could access markets from within the continent, was not dependent on sea-borne trade. The need to defend British trade and contain the

Germany Navy would prove more important. As the First World War had shown, British overseas trade was susceptible to naval action. The German Navy remained relatively small until 1939 and suffered limitations under the Versailles Treaty and the 1935 Anglo-

German Naval Agreement (AGNA). The latter imposed quantitative and, more importantly, qualitative limitations in line with the Washington and London naval treaties. Under AGNA, Germany could not build a surface fleet larger than 35 percent of the Royal Navy's tonnage and was forced to build a balanced fleet based on capital ships.

This prevented Germany from building a navy of commerce-raiders and submarines and ensured that the Royal Navy would have a clear superiority in capital ships.

British strategy in the Far East was modified to account for the emerging German threat and the possibility of two-front war against Germany and Japan. Plans for an offensive strategy in the Far East were scaled back, but naval planners believed a two- front war was still manageable.15 With the AGNA in place, the British Navy believed it could adequately protect its home waters against Germany and concurrently despatch a sufficient fleet to the Far East to combat Japan. The Navy's two-front war framework,

12 Maiolo, 112-115, Talbot Imlay, Facing the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76-80 and Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Temple Smith, 1971), 103-20. 1 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 112-13. 14 For a discussion of negotiations and the Admiralty's approach to AGNA see Maiolo, Chapter 1 and Bell The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 105-6. 15 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 78-80.

43 however, offered little room to manoeuvre. Following the Abyssinian crisis and the

deterioration of Anglo-Italian relations, planners not only had to add Italy to its list of

potential enemies but also had to address how it would fight Germany, Italy and Japan

simultaneously. The Admiralty and the COS had to plan for a war it believed it could not

win.

During the interwar period the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal were integral to

the British Empire and its defence. Following the First World War, Britain secured

mandates over Palestine and Iraq and maintained its influence over Egypt, despite that

country's nominal independence in 1922. Colonial rule over Malta and Gibraltar and

expanding oil production in the Middle East added to the region's value. In the wider

Imperial context, the Mediterranean was vital to the Empire's communications and

significantly shortened the distance trade and armed forces would travel from Britain to

the Far East and India. Emphasizing the Mediterranean's significance, the COS's 1928

Review of Imperial Defence stated "the consequences which any diminution in the

security of this link [the Mediterranean] will entail... will be spread over a very wide area

and will affect almost every portion of the Empire."17 The Mediterranean's role within

the Empire was clear. However, the extent to which Britain should devote resources for

its defence, in light of its other priorities, was not.

Prior to the Abyssinian crisis, friendly relations with France and Italy guaranteed

British communications and interests in the Mediterranean against external threats. The

Mediterranean's relative security combined with Britain's greater priorities of Japan and

Germany precluded the development, upgrade and expansion of Britain's Mediterranean

16 Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt, 22-3 and Simpson , 51,56. 17 CID 900-B "Imperial Defence Policy", 25 June 1928, CAB 4/17.

44 defences. Although the Navy maintained a formidable presence, this was primarily for training and to assist the Army and Air Force in maintaining internal security in Egypt and Palestine. The Navy was not oblivious to the state of Britain's Mediterranean defences, but had more pressing concerns in the Far East and at home. In 1933, the

Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Mediterranean fleet, Admiral Sir William Fisher, requested that the Admiralty review defences at the Navy's Mediterranean bases and, in particular, Malta, which Fisher argued was open to French and Italian air attacks.

Although the Admiralty agreed with Fisher's assessment, they did nothing to improve the situation.18 When Britain found itself facing war with Italy over Abyssinia in the summer of 1935, British defences in the Mediterranean and, in particular its anti-aircraft defences, remained inadequate.19

Although there were minor tensions between Britain and Italy in the Middle East and East Africa before Abyssinia, Italy under Mussolini appeared a responsible power committed to the international status quo. This changed 2 October 1935 as Italian forces crossed into Abyssinia, an independent East African state and League of Nations member. The British government's response to the crisis sought to calm the British public's anger over Italy's actions while maintaining international peace. The government publicly supported Abyssinia's cause and economic sanctions against Italy, but concurrently made numerous attempts to secure a compromise with Italy behind

IB Roskill, 248. 19 Pratt, 8-21. 20 Mallet, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 5-9. The Abyssinian crisis marked a shift in Italian policy. As Robert Mallet has demonstrated, Mussolini had dreamed of a new Roman Empire before he achieved power and from 1922 until 1935 Mussolini slowly but consistently steered Italy towards this end. Abyssinia was the beginning of a more aggressive expansionist effort.

45 closed doors.21 The proposed settlements involved transferring Abyssinian territory to

Italy and establishing an Italian sphere of influence over the rump. In return Abyssinia would receive a long-coveted port from British Somaliland.22 These attempts ultimately failed and the last, the Hoare-Laval Pact of December 1935, led to public outrage and the

Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare's resignation.

Shortly after the Italian invasion began, the League approved an embargo against loans and munitions to Italy. Italian exports and imports of certain metals and rubber were added in November. The League's sanctions, however, did not include vital commodities. An oil sanction was discussed and agreed upon in principle at the League of Nations, which the British Cabinet nominally approved, but was never implemented.

Sanctions continued until June 1936, one month after Italy occupied the Abyssinian capital, Addis Ababa, and ultimately had little effect on Italian operations. Although the

British government supported the League's sanctions throughout the crisis, it was unwilling to take any position that risked war.23 Moreover, many questioned whether sanctions would be effective. Non-League of Nation's countries could still trade with

Italy, including the United States, and there were few enforcement mechanisms to ensure

League members adhered to sanctions.

21 On 11 September Hoare emphatically, if unintentionally committed Britain to a pro-League position, declaring "The League stands and my country stands with it for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." Quoted from R.A.C. Parker, 'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936,' English Historical Review (April 1974), 306. And in November Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin fought and won an election on a collective security platform. 22 Norton Medlicott, 'The Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered' in Retreat from Power ed. David Dilks (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981), 118-138 and Parker, 'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936,' 293-324. These compromises involved the transfer of Abyssinian territory to Italy in return for British Somaliland ceding a port to Abyssinia, something the latter had long coveted. 23 Gibbs, 214-5.

46 Many in government and the COS had no desire to fight for either Abyssinia or

the League's integrity. Chatfield did "not want to go to extreme measures and hope[d] the

Geneva pacifists will fail to get unanimity and the League will break up."24 Britain had little stake in Abyssinia's independence while a commitment to the League and collective

security would become an additional burden on British forces. War with Italy, Chatfield contended, would only compromise Britain's vital interests and the Empire's security.25

In July 1935, upon the request of the Cabinet and its secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, the

COS examined the military implications of sanctions. Their conclusion was grim and framed British policy throughout the crisis - sanctions that would undermine Italian efforts in Abyssinia "would almost inevitably lead to war." The government was reluctant to pursue effective economic or military sanctions. Britain's support of limited sanctions and public opposition to the conquest, however, created the possibility that

97

Mussolini would undertake a 'mad-dog' act and force war upon Britain. Mussolini could be irrational and encouraged Britain's concern, intimating on numerous occasions 98 that Italy would take action if sanctions affected the Italian war effort.

Throughout the crisis the COS and the Navy had no reservations that if war broke out over Abyssinia Britain would ultimately defeat Italy whether Britain fought alone or as a member of a League coalition.29 Both commanders on the ground and within the

Admiralty had longstanding and unshakable faith in the Royal Navy's fighting ability, which contrasted sharply with derisive and enduring views that Italians inherently lacked 24 Chatfield to Fisher, 25 August 1935, CHT/4/5 Chatfield Papers, National Maritime Museum (NMM). 25 Arthur Marder, 'The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis,' American History Review 75 (1970), 1341-2. 26 COS Minutes 147* Meeting, 30 July 1935, CAB 53/5. 27 Mallett, 42-44. 28 Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World, 42-44. 29 Chatfield Memorandum, DPR 15 Ttalo-Abyssinian Dispute: the Naval Strategical Position in the Mediterranean,' 3 September 1935, CAB 16/138.

47 a fighting spirit. If the Italian Navy chose to engage, the Navy "had no fear whatever of the result of an encounter." Reservations about the risks of war, however, overrode the

COS's belief that a British victory was certain. The COS were, as a result, keen to avoid war at any cost. Their reluctance to fight led Admiral Fisher, still C-in-C Mediterranean, to declare the COS held a "very pessimistic, not to say defeatist, view of the

Mediterranean Fleet's capacity to deal with the Italians."32 The COS clearly shared his faith in the Navy's ability, but, unlike Fisher, they had responsibilities beyond the

Mediterranean.

At first glance it would appear that, despite encouraging assessments of the

Italian economy, the COS had little confidence in the Navy's ability to apply effective economic pressure in a war against Italy. In September, they concluded that in war "we cannot rely on economic pressure and naval action alone to bring Italy to her knees in a reasonable period".33 Italy had been preparing for war against Abyssinia for a long time, had amassed stocks of armaments and supplies and had mobilized its industry on a war- footing. More importantly, overseas trade with Italy's neighbours would be difficult for the Royal Navy to interdict. Belligerent rights would be difficult to exercise, while Italian railways could relieve some of the pressure on its sea-borne trade. Although Italian trade from outside the Mediterranean would be severed at Gibraltar and Suez, trade from

Europe, the United States and within the Mediterranean was expected to keep Italy afloat.

The COS's pessimism, however, represented the worst-case scenario and rested on the

Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 119 and COS 397 'Italo-Abyssinian Dispute: Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff on a Single-Handed War with Italy,' 16 September 1935, CAB 53/25. 31 Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, A Sailor's Odyssey, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1951), 173. 32 Quoted from Marder, 1339. 33 COS 397 'Italo-Abyssinian Dispute: Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff on a Single-Handed War with Italy.' 16 September 1935, CAB 53/25 and Gibbs, 193.

48 unrealistic assumption that every country in Europe and the Mediterranean, including

France, as well as the United States would remain neutral, continue to trade with Italy

and assist Italy with transportation. This political assumption was not the result of a new

view of Italy's situation, but was more an expression of the COS's opposition to an

unnecessary and potentially risky war. By heightening the risks and problems Britain

would face, the Admiralty and COS hoped to dissuade the government from war and,

especially, a war without allies.34

Under more favourable political conditions, the Admiralty and COS were in fact

optimistic about Italy's susceptibility to wartime economic and moral pressure. By

closing the Suez Canal to Italian ships, the Navy would isolate Italian forces already in

East Africa, put an end to Italy's conquest and potentially overthrow Italian rule in

Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The moral effects resulting from this would be serious and

lead Italy to seek terms.35 And since three-quarters of Italy's imports came via the sea and

of these 63 percent came through Gibraltar, 3.5 percent through the Suez Canal and 11.5

percent from within the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Chatfield argued the majority

of Italian overseas trade could be cut-off "with comparatively little effort." However, as

the COS noted, this would only produce results if Italian communications with North

Africa, the Black Sea and within the Mediterranean were also cut. The disruption of

34 DPR Minutes, 8th Meeting, 17 September 1935, CAB 16/136. 35 There were legal concerns since the canal could not be closed in either war or peace. The COS and the Navy, however, expected they would be able to bypass or ignore this in a war with Italy. See Steven Morewood, 'Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal and British Defence Strategy, 1919- 1941'. War & Society, 10:1 (1992), 81-108. 36 Chatfield Memorandum, DPR 15 Ttalo-Abyssinian Dispute: the Naval Strategical Position in the Mediterranean,' 3 September 1935, CAB 16/138.

49 Italian trade within the Mediterranean in turn depended on the attitudes of neutrals,

possible British allies and the Navy being able to command the central Mediterranean.

Britain had a clear advantage in surface vessels and would neutralize those of the

Italian Navy. Italy, however, enjoyed superiority in submarines and aircraft. The latter, based in Sicily and southern Italy, were within range of British bases. Initial

appreciations accepted that Britain would be able to operate in the central Mediterranean

from either Malta or 'Port X,' Navarino, Greece. Although Italian air power was

considered an "unknown quantity," the effectiveness of which could only be determined

in war, the Admiralty accepted the Italian Air Force posed a considerable risk to British

shipping and bases. This was particularly true since, as the Admiralty argued, British

bases and the Fleet possessed inadequate anti-aircraft defences and insufficient amounts

of ammunition.38 By December the Navy and the COS agreed that shipping would have

to be diverted around Africa and the Fleet would abandon Malta for Alexandria.

Although farther from Italian air bases than Malta, Alexandria lacked adequate anti­

aircraft and submarine defences and, unlike Malta, did not possess sufficient docking or

repair facilities for larger vessels.39 Operations in the central Mediterranean would also become more difficult. At the 13 December COS meeting, Chatfield outlined the Navy's

remaining two options. The first was to conduct a blockade by patrol which, Chatfield

argued, would be ineffective. The second was to sail the entire fleet into Italian waters, enforce a temporary blockade and withdraw to Alexandria when vessels required re-

37 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 118-119. 38 COS 419 'Combined Naval, Military and Air Force Appreciation of the Situation Which Would Arise in the Middle East in the Event of War with Italy,' 6 December 1935, CAB 53/26, COS 421 (JP) 'Defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East,' 19 December 1935 CAB 53/26, COS 426 'Defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East,' 22 January 1936, CAB 53/27 and Marder, 1331-1333, 1343- 1345 and Roskill, 257- 260, 268. 39 Marder, 1346.

50 fitting. This was not ideal but given Italy's dependency on imports would produce results.40

Throughout the crisis the COS warned against Britain fighting alone. In a League- based coalition, British allies would cease trading with Italy and significantly increase the effectiveness of economic pressure. The COS also wanted Greece, Yugoslavia and

Turkey to allow the Navy use of their habours, while Turkey was to have an additional role in closing the Dardanelles to Italian shipping. Most important, however, would be active military support from France. The COS hoped the French Navy would commit to commanding the western Mediterranean. This would be particularly helpful if Japan or

Germany chose to take advantage of Britain's preoccupation. The availability of French bases and repair facilities in southern France and North Africa would also offset some of the difficulties of operating from Alexandria. Securing French co-operation, however, proved difficult. Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Minister, assured military support on

October 18th and opened the door for later staff talks. Despite providing assurances once more in December, French officials routinely avoided committing to specific military measures and never officially approved arrangements agreed upon between the British and French Navies.41 Although Britain did not secure French assurances, it was clear that

French support would be highly advantageous in a Mediterranean war and necessary if

Germany, Japan or both became involved.

Foremost among the COS's and the government's concerns during the Abyssinian crisis were the potential global implications of war with Italy. Losses in the

Mediterranean, particularly in capital ships, would adversely affect Britain's ability to

40 COS Minutes 159th Meeting 13 December 1935, CAB 53/5. 41 See Marder, 1347-51 and Gibbs, 202-12.

51 deter or fight Japan and Germany. Capital ships took roughly four years to construct.

Although the Cabinet approved an additional building program if war broke out, the vessels resulting from this would not be operational for some time.42 In the long term, the

Navy wished to avoid additional responsibilities that would complicate the already fragile system of imperial defence.

The Abyssinian crisis raised the issues and problems that would dominate British naval and defence policy in the Mediterranean throughout the late 1930s. The Navy and the COS established a clear strategy for defeating Italy, based primarily on assessments of the Italian economy. The broad ideas surround this strategy would also last throughout the late 1930s. However, in so doing planners also uncovered potential obstacles to a quick victory and global implications of a Mediterranean war. It is easy to criticize the

COS and government for being overly cautious.43 War with Italy in 1935 would have likely remained confined to the Mediterranean and, as the COS recognized at the time, there was no question as to the eventual outcome. There were, however, questions about the extent of losses the Navy would suffer against Italy and whether Germany or Japan would attempt to take advantage of Britain's involvement in a war against Italy. War over

Abyssinia became a question of Britain's global security and whether Italy had the ability to compromise Britain's global position. The loss of even one capital ship would adversely affect Britain's position not only in the Mediterranean but also in Europe and the Far East. For the COS, war with Italy was also unnecessary none of Britain's vital interests were under direct threat. As a result, any risks were unacceptable.

11 Gibbs, 213-5, Marder, 1343 and COS Minutes 15(f Meeting, 13 September 1935, CAB 53/5. 13 See Steven Morewood, The British defence of Egypt, 1935-1940, Chapters 3 and 4.

52 Following the Abyssinian crisis, the Navy and the COS feared the crisis had

created a third potential enemy. Britain was unlikely to win a three-front global war and

the addition of a hostile Italy would multiply "the embarrassments and dangers to which

we should [already] be exposed, in the event of war with either Germany or Japan".44 The

armed services and the COS nevertheless had to consider the possibility, particularly as

the international situation continued to deteriorate and Italian-German relations

improved. In Europe, Germany re-militarized the Rhineland in March 1936 and two years

later annexed Austria, both of which were explicitly forbidden under the Treaty of

Versailles. Spain descended into civil war in July 1936 during which Germany and Italy provided support for the nationalist cause and threatened to carry the war outside of

Spain. The Far East was no less quiet as Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China in

July 1937.

For the Admiralty, Britain had only two options to meet the threat of war with

Germany, Japan and Italy. The first was to dramatically increase the scale and speed of rearmament. The second was to reduce the number of potential enemies. Rearmament would take time, and since co-operation from Cabinet and the Treasury was not readily forthcoming, the Admiralty and COS actively supported efforts to improve relations with

Britain's potential adversaries.45 This was particularly the case with Italy. The Admiralty

and the COS were under no illusions as to Mussolini ambitions for a renewed Roman

Empire nor would they support measures that would compromise British security, including naval limitations in the Mediterranean. The JPC and the COS recognized that

Mussolini's imperial ambitions, if and when they were pursued, would eventually clash

44 COS 608 'Anglo-Italian Relations,' 12 August 1937, CAB 53/32. 45 COS 560 'Review of Imperial Defence,' 22 February 1937, CAB 53/30. 46 COS 608 'Anglo-Italian Relations,' 12 August 1937, CAB 53/32. See also Roskill, 273.

53 with British interests. Britain could no longer "count automatically on a friendly and

submissive Italy. From henceforward we will have to look to a rival." Whether

Mussolini would risk war with Britain to pursue an expanded empire or would ultimately

be satisfied with the status quo was less clear. Although Italian belligerency was

considered possible in a European or global war, it was not yet guaranteed. Italy was

economically weak and not in a strong position to fight. As the CID concluded in July

1937, Italy would only fight if Britain was also at war with Germany or Japan.48

The Admiralty and the COS believed friendly relations with Italy were possible -

more so than with Germany and Japan - and, more importantly, strategically necessary.

Because the Mediterranean remained third among Britain's defence priorities, and in a

global war the security of British interests would depend on Italian actions, the COS

argued "Better relations with Italy must be our constant aim."49 As a result, the Admiralty consistently supported measures to appease Mussolini, who was rightly recognized as

Italy's decision maker but misjudged as a responsible and trustworthy statesman. The

January 1937 Gentleman's Agreement whereby the two powers acknowledged a common interest in the status quo, offered stability without adding further commitments or

weakening Britain's position.50 In April 1938, Britain and Italy concluded another

agreement, the Easter Accords, under which Britain agreed to recognize Italy's conquest of Abyssinia in return for Italian promises to withdraw troops from Spain and Libya. The

47 COS 560 'Review of Imperial Defence,' 22 February 1937, CAB 53/30. See also COS 497 (JP) 'Strategical Review by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee,' 3 July 1936 CAB 53/28 and COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37. 48 CID Minutes, 296th Meeting, 5 July 1937, CAB 2/6. 49 COS 560 'Review of Imperial Defence,' 22 February 1937, CAB 53/30 and COS 608 "Anglo-Italian Relations," 12 August 1937, CAB 53/32. See also Chatfield to Pound, 23 November 1937, CHT 4/10, NMM. 50 Director of Plans, 'Proposal for Gentleman's Agreement with Italy,' 11 November 1936, ADM 116/3302 and Pratt, 47-8.

54 Easter Accords also included a renewed pledge to the status quo, an exchange of military information in the Mediterranean and resolutions to border disputes in East Africa.

Although the COS were initially apprehensive about the exchanges of military information, they supported the agreement. As Chatfield told the other COS, the negotiations offered a foundation for "a permanent restoration of friendly relations."51

British efforts to appease Italy, however, amounted to little and failed to secure a permanent detente. Mussolini had no intention of fulfilling Italy's obligations.

Britain's strategic priorities, as outlined by the DRC and reaffirmed in the COS's

1937 Imperial Defence Review and Far Eastern Appreciation, continued to define British naval strategy in a global war. The Navy's priorities remained home defence, Germany and the Far East. At the 1937 Imperial Conference Britain assured Australia and New

Zealand that it would defend the Dominions and, as a result, committed to sending a fleet to the Far East. Britain's responsibilities in the Far East, the COS argued, "demands recognition of the principle that no anxieties or risks connected with our interests in the

Mediterranean can be allowed to interfere with the despatch of a fleet to he Far East."52

The Mediterranean would be abandoned save for a few of small vessels at Suez and

Gibraltar and whatever forces France was willing supply. This reflected Britain's political commitments to Australia and New Zealand as well as the Admiralty's firmly held belief that it was better to temporarily lose the Mediterranean than permanently lose the Far

51 COS Minutes 231s1 Meeting, 7 March 1938, CAB 53/9. The agreement was supposed come into effect with the Italian withdrawal from Spain, but this did not happen until the Civil War ended in April 1939. The British parliament nevertheless ratified the agreement in October 1938. 52 COS 560 'Review of Imperial Defence,' 22 February 1937, CAB 53/30. This echoed an earlier Admiralty position stating "An obligation to undertake operations in the Mediterranean would be a restriction on our strategic freedom which might have far reaching effects upon the upshot of the war." Admiralty to Air Ministry and War Office, 21 November 1936, ADM 116/3302.

55 East. Britain's Mediterranean interests were close enough for Britain to eventually stage

offensive operations if these were lost. If Singapore was lost, however, Britain would not

have a base and, as a result, a capability to undertake offensive operations against Japan.

In January 1937, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) began work on the first

appreciation for war with Italy since the Abyssinian crisis. Consisting of the armed

services' planning directors, the JPC drafted strategic appreciations for the COS. Their

1937 Mediterranean Appreciation addressed three scenarios: Britain in a single-handed

war against Italy; Britain, France and Belgium allied against Germany and Italy; and a

global war between Britain, France and Belgium and Germany, Italy and Japan. The JPC

assumed Italy's objective in all scenarios was to expand its African Empire at Britain's

expense. Given Italy's weak economy and its initial superiority in land and air forces in

North Africa, Italy depended on a short war and an immediate attack the Suez Canal to

secure communications with its East African colonies. Britain's strategic objective was to

maintain its prestige and possessions. In all three scenarios British Army and RAF would remain on the defensive until sufficient reinforcements were available for a counter-

offensive, or until the Navy had defeated Italy.

Early in the planning process the JPC established that "the economic aspect.. .was of the greatest importance and that a more detailed exposition of the economic factors

would be necessary."54 The result was an IIC assessment of the Italian economy completed with the co-operation of the Navy's Plans and Trade departments. Consistent with the IIC's earlier views, the assessment stressed Italy's economic vulnerability - its dependence on sea-borne trade for vital commodities, namely petroleum and industrial

53 COS 560 'Review of Imperial Defence,' 22 February 1937, CAB 53/30 and COS 506 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Far East, 1937,' 14 June 1937, CAB 53/32. 54 JPC Minutes 159th Meeting, 30 June 1937, CAB 55/2.

56 goods, its poor financial position and weak industrial capacity. This shaped the appreciation's economic content and reaffirmed planners' conviction that economic pressure, if successfully applied, would produce a decision. Failing to procure the requisite materials, the Italian war effort would last only as long as its reserves. Italian industry was deemed incapable of maintaining the armed services or producing

"sufficient goods for the civilian population to preserve an adequate standard of national life in modern war."55 This reflected reports of Italians' discontent in their worsening poverty and although an "adequate standard of national life" was never defined, economic pressure was expected to lead to "internal trouble." If popular unrest did not materialize, inevitable shortages of armaments and supplies would eventually overcome the Italian armed forces. Although it was unclear exactly how economic pressure would be decisive or how long it would take, it would eventually undermine Italy's will and ability to fight.

The JPC still had to address how economic pressure would be applied. Here, they were much more conservative. Although the JPC assumed British naval superiority and that the Italian Air Force would not endanger vessels at sea, the Royal Navy faced considerable obstacles. As it had during the Abyssinian crisis, the Italian air threat precluded the use of Malta's naval base. British forces would have to operate from

Gibraltar and Alexandria, both at a great distance from the central Mediterranean and

Italian communications with the Black Sea, from which Italy "could obtain sufficient raw materials for air and naval war for a considerable time." Operating from Alexandria, the

JPC proposed the main fleet should establish temporary command in the central

55 COS 603 (JP) 'Mediterranean and Middle East Appreciation, 1937,' 26 July 1937, CAB 53/32.

57 Mediterranean, withdrawing for resupplying. This was not ideal, but would nevertheless

disrupt Italian trade. In a single-handed war, decisive economic pressure would ultimately

depend on the attitude of neutral countries. Without their co-operation, compliance or

submission in restricting Italian trade, a naval blockade would be unable to cripple the

Italian economy: "Our naval action against Italian sea-borne trade would have little result

unless and until an effective system had been introduced for rationing neutral States

enjoying ready means of communication with Italy in wartime." Italy's neighbours, most

importantly Germany, could supply Italy via overland and by short sea-routes,

minimizing the effects of blockade applied at Suez, Gibraltar and on longer sea-routes

within the Mediterranean. Moreover, continued trade with Romania would provide Italy

with a reliable source of petroleum.

In February 1938, the JPC completed the second and third scenarios. In a war

against Germany and Italy with French assistance, British naval operations would be

similar to a single-handed war with the exceptions that France would command the

western Mediterranean, leaving Britain responsible for the eastern basin, and the size of

Britain's Mediterranean Fleet would depend on naval requirements against Germany. The

Navy's objective remained the Italian economy. However, the economic aspect of a broader European war, as opposed to a single-handed war, would simplify British naval

strategy. French involvement would sever Franco-Italian trade. More importantly, the

JPC and the COS, who enthusiastically approved the appreciation, endorsed the IIC's conclusion that an Italian-German alliance would adversely affect both states' economic

staying power. Germany and Italy depended on the same sources for vital resources,

57 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, 19-22. Pre-war British planning for economic warfare employed three methods: legislative, diplomatic and military.

58 namely iron and petroleum. Although they were allied, Germany and Italy would be forced to compete for a limited pool of resources. For Italy, trade with Germany would also "practically cease", cutting off Italy's largest export market and supplier of imported industrial goods while access to German railways would significantly diminish. Italy's dependence on sea-borne trade, and therefore its vulnerability to naval action, would increase as a result. For Germany, the JPC concluded a neutral Italy would be more valuable than a hostile Italy since it could act as a supply point and allow Germany to

CO bypass a naval blockade.

The effects of Italian intervention in a global war were limited. Italy undoubtedly added to Britain's strategic problem of how to defend a worldwide Empire with limited resources. British interests in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa were now directly threatened, while the Navy and British shipping would have to travel a much greater distance around Africa to reach the Middle East, India and the Far East. However, between 1935 and 1938, the Navy's global strategy did not see considerable changes because of Italy. Except for the small vessels remaining in the Mediterranean, the Navy would continue to fight a two-front war against Germany and Japan. Assessments both during and after Abyssinia of a single-handed and European war made clear that Italy's economic weakness provided not only a means to victory but one which was viable and attractive. Aside from the defence of Egypt and British naval bases, the army did not have a significant role. Strategic planners never discussed an invasion of Italy or securing a decision through a military victory. Unlike Germany, Italy could be defeated through naval pressure alone. In a global war, however, Italy's vulnerability became a moot point.

58 COS 747 (JP) 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany in April 1939,' 15 July 1938, CAB 53/40.

59 Its economy would only collapse under direct pressure over time and the forces required to do this were simply unavailable.

60 Chapter Three: The Knock-Out Blow: Naval Strategy, 1938-1939

The Munich crisis marked the beginning of a re-evaluation of Britain's grand strategy. In spring 1938, Germany began threatening Czechoslovakia, ostensibly to defend the rights of a German minority in western Czechoslovakia. After a series of war scares beginning in May 1938, the crisis reached a breaking point in September. After two meetings between Hitler and Chamberlain failed to resolve the issues, they met for a third time in

Munich on 29 September 1938, along with Mussolini and Edouard Daladier, Prime

Minister of France. Without Czechoslovakian involvement, the four leaders agreed to transfer the Sudeten areas in western Czechoslovakia to Germany. In return, Britain and

France avoided war.1 Fears of a two or three-front war dominated British strategy during the Munich crisis. As planners had earlier recognized, Britain would face difficulties in a

European war, while "war against Japan, Germany and Italy simultaneously in 1938 is a commitment which neither the present nor the projected strength of our defence forces is designed to meet.. .and which would, therefore, place a dangerous strain on the resources of the Empire."2 Although it was clear Italy had not fully mobilized, British intelligence believed the Italian forces were reasonably well-prepared to fight.3 For the COS, Italy posed a serious military threat to Egypt, particularly in the first few months of war, and could "considerably embarrass France and Great Britain in their problem of combating

Germany." On 23 September 1939, Lord Halifax inquired whether Italy should be forced

1 For a detailed account of Munich see R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, , 156-81. 2 COS 765 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Event of War Against Germany,' 4 October 1938, CAB 53/41. 3 The Italian armed forces were in a permanent state of partial mobilisation, while the attaches and defence intelligence assumed Italy had remedied the deficiencies apparent during Abyssinia. See Perth to Foreign Office, 19 November 1938, C 14257/5302/18, FO 371/21779, Morton to Ingram, 25 November 1938, R 9633/399/22 and Perth to Foreign Office, 3 December 1938, R 9701/899/22, FO 371/22439.

61 into war if it remained neutral. Although the COS and the IIC believed Italy would be an

economic liability for Germany, they concluded Italy must remain on the sidelines.

Italy's position during the crisis was unclear.5 Initial assessments expected

Mussolini to pursue Italy's traditional, opportunistic policies. From the May 1938 war

scares until September, planners believed an Italian decision to fight would be delayed until the war's course was clear and would be determined by whichever side had the most to offer.6 The views of the Admiralty and many within the Foreign Office shifted by the time the crisis had passed. Italy was no longer expected to sit on the fence or delay its decision. Having "heard various stories about the probability of Italian intervention on the side of Germany", the newly appointed First Sea Lord, Admiral Backhouse, had "no doubt that Mussolini intended to support Hitler at once."7 The JPC and the COS shared

Backhouse's view and in November agreed to recast their European appreciations to assume war with Italy and Germany from the outset. The JIC and the Foreign Office in turn drafted a revised political appreciation for the JPC. The appreciation concluded that, although Italy had no desire to fight Britain, Italian belligerency must be taken for granted:

Germany is in a position to influence Italian policy by threats or promises or both

to such an extent that her eventual participation in the war could not in any case

well be excluded. It is accordingly recommended that our strategy should be

based on the assumption that, although Italy is anxious to keep out of a general

4 COS Minutes, 252nd Meeting, 23 September 1938, CAB 53/9. 5 See Morewood, The Defence of Egypt, 112. 6 COS 747 (JP) 'Appreciation of the Situation in the Event ofWar Against Germany in April, 1939,' 15 July 1938, CAB 53/40. 7 Admiral Backhouse to Admiral Pound, 11 October 1938, ADM 205/3.

62 European conflagration, her entry into war on the side of Germany must be

regarded as the most likely hypothesis.8

This marked a small but significant shift in planners' assumptions. Earlier appreciations

addressed the possibilities of a European and global war, but Italian intentions were

unknown and its participation on either side was uncertain. Now that Britain expected to

fight Germany and Italy simultaneously at the outbreak of war, the expectation of a

European war was, for planning purposes, guaranteed while the prospect of a global war

had become more likely.

Steps taken towards a revised naval strategy in the Mediterranean began in

November 1938 when the C-in-C Mediterranean, Admiral Dudley Pound, circulated a

memorandum to the Admiralty calling for a reassessment of the Navy's Mediterranean

strategy. Upon analyzing the Navy's position in the Mediterranean during the Munich crisis, Pound argued "a considerable revision of our strategical policy in the

Mediterranean has become essential." British strategy during the crisis, inherited from the

COS's 1937 Appreciations, saw the Army and Air Force defending Egypt while the Navy would attempt to sever Italian communications by conducting patrols in the central

Mediterranean. Pound argued that attempting to cut Italian communications, especially when the Navy would be operating from Alexandria, would not only be difficult but would subject naval forces to "steady attrition." Losses in the Mediterranean would be difficult to "make good" because of Alexandria's limited repair facilities and would weaken future operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Because of Italy's position in the central Mediterranean and its preponderance in long-range aircraft and submarines,

8 COS 843, Appendix 1, 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45 and JIC 78, 'Appreciation for a European War. Political Setting.' 16 November 1938, CAB 56/4.

63 British naval forces, shipping and transports would have to be diverted around Africa.

Consequently, Britain would be unable to effectively and quickly reinforce the

Mediterranean theatre after war had begun. For Pound, the eastern Mediterranean had

become, "though seemingly one of the nearest of the foreign stations... the most distant

of all".9

To remedy Britain's strategic position, Pound called for an immediate offensive.

The main fleet would concentrate on severing Italian communications to Libya and on

supporting army and air operations in North Africa. A destroyer division, supported by a

cruiser, would attack Italy's Black Sea trade with sweeps from Cape Matapan into the

Aegean Sea. The key to Pound's plan, however, was an allied joint service offensive

against Libya. Relying on economic pressure alone carried long-term risks, including

significant naval losses, and would take a long time to be effective. A victory in North

Africa would not only release the army and air forces that would have otherwise been

used to defend Egypt, but would allow British and French air and naval forces to contest

and command the central Mediterranean. Malta would become secure and viable as a

naval base, while shipping and reinforcements could pass through the Mediterranean

more safely. An early offensive would also encourage neutral Mediterranean states,

namely Greece and Turkey, to ally with Britain and France rather than submit to pressure

from Italy and Germany.10

Pound met with senior Admiralty officials to discuss his appreciation at the end of

November 1938. The Admiralty officials present informed Pound that Britain could not

spare land and air forces for such an offensive. British land and air forces in Egypt would

9 Admiral Pound, 'The Strategical Aspect of the Situation in the Mediterranean on 1st October 1938,' and 'Situation in the Mediterranean - 1st October, 1938,' 14 November 1938, ADM 116/3900. 10 Ibid; Bell, 120-2.

64 be able to do little more than hold off an Italian invasion. Pound's November appreciation, however, was not completely rejected. The Navy's Plans Division looked into many of Pound's defensive recommendations: improved submarine and anti-aircraft defenses at British bases, additional naval personnel and increased supply stockpiles.11

And although offensive operations on land and in the air were not possible, Pound's ideas for a naval offensive found support among senior officials in the Admiralty.

Admiral Roger Backhouse arrived at the Admiralty in August to replace Chatfield as First Sea Lord. Backhouse in turn appointed Admiral Reginald Drax to serve as a strategic advisor and establish an office for formulating offensive plans that would be

1 9 separate from the Navy's Plans Division. In their short time at the Admiralty,

Backhouse and Drax recalibrated naval strategy towards the offensive. The effects of this were felt most in the Navy's strategic thinking towards the Mediterranean and the Far

East. For Backhouse and Drax, Italy's vulnerable economy and perceived moral flaws should be exploited to ensure a quick decision in the Mediterranean. This would, however, require a greater effort than previously considered and risked Britain denuding the Far East. If the Navy were to commit to a quick decision over Italy, the Navy would be unable to send a battle-fleet to the Far East until a decision in the Mediterranean was reached. This entailed a dramatic revision of Britain's imperial priorities and commitments. Home defence remained Britain's first security concern, but the

Mediterranean had replaced the Far East as Britain's second priority.

From December 1938 to February 1939, the JPC and COS drafted a revised

European Appreciation. Assuming war in April 1939, the appreciation placed Britain and 11 Plans Division, 'Strategical Situation in the Mediterranean,' 7 December 1938, ADM 116/3900. l2Maiolo 160-161. 1 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 119.

65 France against Germany and Italy, while Japan would remain neutral at the outset though could enter the war at any moment. On 5 January 1939, the COS pointed out to members of the JPC that previous strategic appreciations focussed on the opening phases of war during which Germany and Italy (and possibly Japan) would have a military preponderance, and, as a result, emphasized a defensive strategy. To redress this and provide a long-term strategy for victory, the COS agreed "the time had now come to devote more attention to the preparation of offensive plans" and instructed the services

"to give a high degree of priority to the preparation of offensive plans."1 The JPC circulated its European Appreciation in late February and, as per the COS's instructions, emphasised offensive action. Because of their limited economic strength and initial superiority on land and in the air, the JPC maintained Italy and Germany required a rapid decision. Britain's immediate priority was to survive the expected initial onslaught, while naval forces would undertake offensive operations. Because the effects of economic pressure would take time, planners recommended the British and French navies apply pressure "as rigorously and rapidly as possible." Against Germany the Royal Navy was to command the seas surrounding Britain and northern Europe. This would not only prevent a German invasion and protect British trade, but would interrupt Germany's Atlantic and

North Sea trade. A close blockade, however, was not possible and Germany's communications in the Baltic would remain untouched.

The European Appreciation's proposed Mediterranean naval strategy was not a dramatic departure from the COS's 1937 Mediterranean Appreciation or the Navy's strategy during the Abyssinian crisis: although the Italian Air Force would not affect operations at sea, Malta would remain too dangerous to use; superior British and French

14 COS Minutes, 266th Meeting, 5 January 1939, CAB 53/10.

66 forces in the eastern and western Mediterranean would contain the Italian Navy in the central Mediterranean; Italy's large submarine fleet would seek to reduce the Allies'

naval preponderance through attrition; the British Army and Royal Air Force would remain on the defensive in Egypt; and a small naval and air force would be detached to protect British shipping in the Red Sea. The Navy continued to rely on closing Gibraltar

and the Suez Canal to Italian trade, disrupting Italy's Mediterranean and Black Sea trade

and detaching Italy from its African colonies to create decisive economic and moral pressure.15 However, the emphasis on offensive operations was a new development. The

Navy was to attack Italian communications and naval forces more aggressively than before. And unlike the strategy outlined in the COS's 1937 Mediterranean Appreciation, the Navy would attack bases and targets along the Italian and Libyan coasts.16

If Japan became involved the COS adhered to Britain's traditional policy and recommended the immediate despatch of a fleet to the Far East. However, the COS's position was not as clear as in previous appreciations. Although they stood by Britain's guarantee to send "an adequate fleet to Eastern waters irrespective of the situation elsewhere," the COS attached the condition that "The strength of that fleet must depend upon our resources and the state of the War in the European theatre." Previously, the

COS and naval planners established that the size of any fleet sent to the Far East would depend on requirements against the German Navy. However, because the German Navy was small and the Navy expected to vacate the Mediterranean, a powerful fleet was available for the Far East. The 1939 European Appreciation expanded the COS's

15 See COS 691 'Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Appreciation,' 21 February 1938, CAB 53/37 and COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45. 16 COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45.

67 qualification regarding Germany to include Italy, opening the door to a revision of

Britain's grand strategy.17

Shortly after the CID approved the COS's 1939 European Appreciation in late

February, the Admiralty's Plans Division circulated a series of detailed plans for offensive operations against Italy. As the European Appreciation recommended, these included not only plans to attack Italian trade but also undertake direct strikes against

shore-based installations. In their plans for attacking trade, the Navy embraced the IIC's

assessments. Once the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar were closed to Italian trade, many vital resources - most importantly Romanian oil - would have to arrive via the

Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This would restrict Italian exports and create competition with Germany for resources, to Germany's "embarrassment." The Navy proposed two operations to sever Italian trade with the Black Sea. First, a destroyer force would conduct patrols either in the Dardanelles, the Aegean or waters just west of Crete.

Britain would have to control all three areas to completely sever Italian trade. A patrol in any one area "would, however, be a considerable embarrassment to the Italians, particularly if the area were frequently changed." The main fleet would remain near

Alexandria and deter Italy from despatching its larger ships to disrupt British patrols. The second operation would see the Navy detach a small cruiser and supporting ships to operate in the Black Sea. However, this patrol would have to be in the Black Sea before war broke out and could only operate there for twenty-one days after war began, if

Britain wished to comply with international law governing use of the straits and avoid

17 Salerno, 100-1.

68 1 8

upsetting Turkey. A Black Sea patrol would nevertheless produce results that "would

undoubtedly be very considerable."19

The Navy's plans for direct attacks against shore-based targets included the

Italian naval bases at Leros and Massawa, iron works in Elba and Savona and the

shipyards in Genoa where Italy's Littorio-class battleships were under construction.

These plans had military, economic and moral objectives. By denying Italy use of Leros

and Massawa, the Navy would improve its position in the eastern Mediterranean and Red

Sea. The iron works at Elba and Savona provided upwards of 60 percent of Italy's iron,

the loss of which would strain Italian industry. Likewise, the loss of two modern

battleships nearing completion in Genoa would cripple the Italian Navy. Moral factors

were also explicitly considered and were of equal if not greater importance. For naval

planners, a show of British force would reveal Italy's vulnerability to the Italian armed

forces and public, seriously reducing Italian morale."

A Mediterranean-first strategy was not explicitly discussed when the Committee

of Imperial Defence reviewed the European Appreciation on 24 February 1939.

However, it was becoming clear that Britain's traditional policy of immediately sending a

fleet to the Far East was coming under question. An early proponent of the knock-out blow, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Stanhope "was disturbed at the prospect of

the Mediterranean being denuded of capital ships in the event of Japanese intervention."

Lord Chatfield, now Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, led opposition to a revised strategy, arguing Britain could not abandon its Far Eastern commitments or the strategy the COS had established and carefully studied since 1937. Pre-empting a debate 1 Use of the Dardenelles were governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention. See Pratt, 141-5. 19 Plans Division, 'Operations against Italy in Event of War,' March 1939, ADM 1/9900. 20 Ibid.

69 on the knock-out blow at the CID, Chatfield proposed, and the CID approved, to establish a subcommittee to examine the European Appreciation.21 Consisting of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence and the civilian and professional heads of the armed forces, the Strategical Appreciation Committee met six times between March 1st and April 17th and became the main forum for debate over British grand strategy.

The most vocal and influential support for the knock-out blow came from senior

Admiralty officials, Backhouse, Drax and Lord Stanhope. For Backhouse and Drax, a

Mediterranean-first strategy appealed to their offensive spirit and, in their view, would strengthen British morale. Backhouse argued that defensive strategies inherently weaken morale, while active, offensive operations were conducive to strong morale. In either instance, the state of the Navy's morale could have potentially far reaching consequences on operations and the Navy's fighting abilities.22 More importantly, the knock-out blow offered a solution to the problem of fighting Germany, Italy and Japan at one time, a situation which the Navy had long considered beyond its capabilities. By undertaking a committed effort against Italy, the emerging Mediterranean school hoped to defeat Italy within six months. This would be done by severing Italian trade and communications, attacking shore-based targets and a land-based offensive against Libya by the French from Tunisia.23 British and French forces in the Mediterranean would be available for other theatres, including the Far East, once Italy was defeated.

The knock-out blow revolved around two underlying assumptions about Britain's enemies. The first was that Italy could be defeated in a short amount of time. The second was that Japan would either stay out of the war long enough for Britain and France to

21 CID Minutes, 348,h Meeting, 24 February 1939, CAB 2/8. 22 SAC Minutes, 1st Meeting, 1 March 1939, CAB 16/209 23 Drax Memorandum, 'Major Strategy,' 1 February 1939, DRAX 2/11, Churchill College Archive Centre.

70 defeat Italy or would pursue a cautious strategy that did not immediately threaten

Singapore or the Dominions. With Japan neutral and Italy having only two capital ships operational, Britain and France would enjoy a marked superiority in capital ships over

Italy and Germany in the early stages of a war beginning in 1939. For Drax, this represented a "golden opportunity" to pursue offensive operations and, in particular, bombard the Italian and Libyan coasts.24 If these operations were pursued with a

"maximum" effort they would be decisive. In March, Drax wrote it was "obvious that smashing Italy, with the aid of France, should be much easier and quicker than smashing

Germany.. .against Germany our Navy cannot do very much, but against Italy it can do a great deal, mainly in the way of coastal bombardment."25 At the SAC's second meeting,

Backhouse reiterated the knock-out blow's central point: "if we struck Italy a series of hard blows at the start of hostilities she might be counted out and the whole course of the war turn in our favour."26 Many Politicians, most notably Lord Stanhope, Leslie Hore-

Belisha and Winston Churchill, became enthusiastic supporters of the knock-out blow.

Whereas supporters within the armed services were vague about timelines and only sometimes suggested six months may be possible, the strategy's political supporters declared with confidence Italy could be defeated within a matter of months. For example,

Churchill suggested in March 1939 that Britain could secure the Mediterranean in as little as two months. Both the Admiralty's and the politician's case that Italy could be

" Drax Memorandum, 'Mediterranean Strategy,' 25 January 1939, DRAX 2/11, Churchill College Archives Centre. 25 Drax Memorandum, 'Major Strategy,' 1 February 1939, DRAX 2/11, Churchill College Archives Centre and Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 122. 26 SAC Minutes, V' Meeting, 1 March 1939, CAB 16/209 27 Winston Churchill, 'Memorandum on Sea Power,' 27 March 1939, PREM 1/345 and W 5721/108/50, FO 371/23982.

71 knocked out early on rested on little more than optimistic assessments of Italy's

98 economic vulnerability and an unqualified acceptance of the Italian 'national character.'

The greatest obstacle to a revised strategy was Japan and the security of the

Empire in the Far East. For Stanhope, Backhouse and their supporters, including

Churchill, however, the Japanese threat was not as serious as previously thought. By sending a small naval force to Singapore and having the United States move a battle-fleet to Honolulu it was argued Japan would be successfully deterred. This was based on their assessment of Japan's strategic position in the Far East as well as a widespread view that the Japanese were a "cautious race." As such, the SAC suggested the government should notify the United States that Britain and France may not be able to hold Japan if they 9Q were also at war in Europe. In the short term, it appeared the American government under Present Roosevelt was likely to assist Britain. In March the American government notified the British government that it would announce a fleet movement to Honolulu in mid-April.30 However, as members of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department pointed out, while the United States may fight for Britain in Europe, there was little public or political support in the United States to fight for the British Empire. American -i i assistance could not be guaranteed.

If not deterred, the Mediterranean school suggested Japan would neither risk operations as far south as Singapore nor employ its entire capital ship force against

Britain. In March 1939, Drax suggested the Navy despatch a "flying squadron."

Consisting of two fast battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers and nine large 2 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 123. 29 SAC Minutes, 1st Meeting, 1 March 1939, CAB 16/209. 30 Pratt, 176-7. 31 Fitzmaurice Minute, 8 March 1939, W 3764/108/50 and Cavendish-Bentinck Minute, 17 March 1939, W 4677/108/50, FO 371/23981.

72 destroyers, Drax argued the flying squadron would be able to defend Singapore, prevent

Japan from operating in the Indian Ocean and deter an invasion of the Dominions.

Singapore was considered too great a distance from Japan's docking and repair facilities

for the UN to risk an attack, while the flying squadron's speed would allow it to harass

Japanese communications.32 By reducing the immediacy of the Japanese threat, the

Mediterranean school suggested the Navy would have enough time and forces to quickly

defeat Italy without suffering significant setbacks in the Far East. The Mediterranean

school also argued that Britain did not possess enough capital ships to pursue anything

but a defensive strategy in the Far East and thus resources would be better used

offensively in the Mediterranean.

For much of 1939 only ten of the Royal Navy's fifteen capital ships would be

operational as five were undergoing refits. By August this would increase to twelve, but

the Navy was still unable to simultaneously fight Germany, Italy and Japan. After

allotting five ships to Europe and assuming France aided in the Atlantic, Britain could

afford to send five or six capital ships to the Far East. Against Japan's nine capital ships,

such a fleet could not secure a decision. Whereas a fleet of five or six capital ships

could do little against Japan, the same fleet would be able to bombard targets along the

Italian and Libyan coasts and effectively sever Italian trade.34 Capital ships would prove

more valuable fighting in the Mediterranean.

Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 86-87. 33 SAC 4 'The Despatch of a Fleet to the Far East,' 26 February 1939, CAB 16/209. 34 Drax Memorandum, 'Major Strategy,' 1 February 1939, DRAX 2/11, OPC 10, 'An Outline of the Principles Affecting the Use and Distribution of Warships,' 3 March 1939, OPC 11, 'Composition of the Far Eastern Fleet in War,' 15 March 1939, DRAX 2/9, Churchill College Archive Centre, SAC 4 'The Despatch of a Fleet to the Far East,' 26 February 1939, CAB 16/209. See also Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 123.

73 As the Italian threat became more immediate, Britain's political interests in the

Mediterranean began to compete with its interests in the Far East. Chatfield and

opponents of the knock-out blow pointed to Britain's 1937 guarantees to Australia and

New Zealand. However, as Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, and Lord

Stanhope suggested in the second SAC meeting, these assurances were given before Italy

was assumed to be hostile. Because Britain's position in the Mediterranean had changed

since 1937, and the underlying assumption that Britain would be at war with only

Germany and Japan was no longer accurate or relevant, the guarantees were open to

revision.35 Moreover, the British provided guarantees to Greece, Romania and Turkey in

spring 1939, following Hitler's seizure of Czechoslovakia in March and Mussolini's

invasion of Albania on 7 April 1939. These were intended to limit Axis influence in the

region and further bound Britain to the Mediterranean.36 Britain had additional

obligations in Egypt and Iraq, while a rebellion in Palestine remained intense throughout

1939. Italy and Germany were known to have strong interests in the Middle East and

were expected to exploit any British naval withdrawal, potentially with invasion.

More importantly, an early Mediterranean offensive would encourage and

appease France. Following Munich, the British government's reluctance to commit its

army to France began to change as German intentions were perceived to have shifted

"lO

westward and French capabilities and willpower came under question. Although Britain committed to sending a Field Force to France in spring 1939, the government was still

35 SAC Minutes, 2nd Meeting , 13 March 1939, CAB 16/209. 36 For the political background of the guarantees, see Pratt, Chapter 5 and Gibbs, 425. 37 See also Manuela Williams, 'Mussolini's Secret War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: Italian Intelligence and the British Response,' 881-904. 38 COS 843 'European Appreciation, 1939-1940,' 20 February 1939, CAB 53/45 and SAC Minutes, 2nd Meeting , 13 March 1939, CAB 16/209.

74 reluctant to send a sizable army, and Britain's main contributions to the Allied war effort

remained in the air and on the seas. Although the Navy relied heavily on the expectation

of French assistance in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, Anglo-French staff talks, at

British insistence, had yet to include the Mediterranean. A new round of talks was set for

March 1939 and the COS's European Appreciation and the SAC's recommendations

provided the strategic basis Britain's representatives. French dissatisfaction with Britain's

preoccupation with the Far East was well-known and in April rumours circulated that

France would seek terms with Germany and Italy if Britain withdrew from the

Mediterranean.39 During the spring 1939 talks, it was clear British global defence policy

was placing greater emphasis on the Mediterranean. However, Britain was reluctant to

commit unreservedly to the Mediterranean over the Far East and the talks resulted in compromise. Whether Britain would send a fleet would be decided by the British

government at the time, while British and French planners would co-operate in planning

for both a commitment to the Mediterranean and its withdrawal.40

Among those who opposed the knock-out blow, Chatfield was the most vocal and influential. Chatfield never doubted that Britain would be able to send a sufficient fleet to the Far East. Britain and France would be able to balance Germany and Italy's combined

seven capital ships if Britain devoted four capital ships to Europe alongside France's five.

This left seven to nine capital ships for the Far East once modernisation and construction programs were completed in September 1939.41 Although British naval strategy in the

Far East would remain defensive and Japan would still enjoy preponderance in capital ships, the Royal Navy's superior fighting power would compensate and allow for the

39 Washington Telegram, 11 April 1939, W 5922/108/50, FO 371/23982. 40 COS 931, Annex II AFC (J) 53, 'Intervention of Japan,' May 4 1939, CAB 53/50. 41 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 89.

75 establishment of a distant blockade. Chatfield's opposition was motivated primarily for political and imperial reasons. He feared that Britain would not only lose the Far East permanently, but that the political fallout of abandoning Australia and New Zealand would lead the Dominions to turn to the United States for their security. By abandoning the Far East, Chatfield envisioned nothing less than the decline of the British Empire.

Chatfield was not alone in his opposition. The Foreign Office's Far Eastern

Department and the Navy's Director of Plans, Captain Danckwerts, also opposed a

Mediterranean-first approach, while the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Cyrill Newall, rejected the idea that Britain and France could defeat Italy quickly without significant losses.42 The JPC accepted the principle that Britain should pursue offensive naval operations against Italy from the outset, but also argued these would not be decisive in the initial stages of a European or global war. Naval bombardments may speed Italy's demise "but we [the Joint Planners] have no reason to believe that such measures would have the moral effect of knocking her out of the war." Because of their superiority on land and in the air, Germany and Italy would enjoy the initiative. France and Britain's first priority was then to defend their vital interests, while mobilising their superior resources for an eventual counter-offensive. Italy could not be knocked out quickly and an attempt to do so would undermine British and French defensive efforts. Britain and

France's best chance for victory was to pursue a long war that would ultimately exhaust its enemies. The JPC's criticisms were, however, ignored.

42 See SAC Minutes, 4'" meeting, 6 April 1939, CAB 16/209, FO Minute, 'European Appreciation,' 1 March 1939, W 3784/108/50, FO 371/23981, COS 863 (JP), 'Allied Plans Against Italy,' 27 March 1939, CAB 53/46 and Salerno, 120. 43 COS 863 (JP), 'Allied Plans Against Italy,' 27 March 1939, CAB 53/46. 44 COS Minutes, 284th Meeting, 27 March 1939, CAB 53/10.

76 Throughout March and April debate over the Mediterranean-first strategy played

out at the SAC and within the Admiralty. By May, the Mediterranean school had swayed the SAC and CID and the knock-out blow became official policy. However, the despatch of a fleet to the Far East was not completely discarded and it remained an option. In early

April, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, circulated an

appreciation of Britain's naval situation. Compared with Backhouse, Drax and the

Mediterranean school, Cunningham's approach was cautious and his conclusion

ambiguous:

from the foregoing considerations is that there are so many variable factors which

cannot at present be assessed, that it is not possible to state definitely how soon

after Japanese intervention a Fleet could be despatched to the Far East. Neither is

it possible to enumerate precisely the size of the Fleet that we could afford to

send.

If Japan intervened, Cunningham had no doubt Britain would have to send ships to the

Far East. However, the composition and size of the force to be sent would depend on the number of capital ships available, the situation in Europe and the Mediterranean,

Japanese strategy and the attitudes of the Soviet Union and United States.45

The SAC duly approved Cunningham's memorandum with minor revisions at their 17 April 1939 meeting. The Far East was not abandoned, but it was clear the

Mediterranean had priority. Focussing on Italy "offered the best prospects for speedy results and should not, therefore, be lightly broken off." And if Japan's entry was delayed, the SAC expected Britain and France could either defeat Italy or establish sufficient command of the Mediterranean to allow for the despatch of a fleet to the Far

45 SAC 16, 'Despatch of a Fleet to the Far East,' 5 April 1939, CAB 16/209.

77 East by the time Japan became involved. In the worst-case scenario, in which Britain

would have to choose between the Mediterranean and the Far East, "it would be for the

Government of the day... to decide on the re-distribution of Naval forces required to

meet the situation." Two weeks later the CID approved Cunningham's appreciation and

the SAC's conclusions.46 The SAC's conclusions were in turn approved during the

Anglo-French staff talks, confirming the Mediterranean's position in allied grand

strategy.47

Not long after the CID approved a Mediterranean-first strategy, strategic thinking

within the Admiralty began to shift back to the Far East. Backhouse, who had become

fatally ill, resigned on June 15th and was replaced by Admiral Dudley Pound. With

Backhouse's departure, Drax's influence and tenure as a strategic advisor were over.

Before arriving at the Admiralty in June, Pound accepted Italy could only be attacked by

sea and, to a lesser extent, from the air. And although he agreed economic pressure and

attacks on the Italian Navy and shore-based targets would contribute to a decision, Pound

was unsure how long this would take.48 When Pound arrived at the Admiralty in June, he

emphatically rejected his predecessor's faith that a knock-out blow against Italy was

possible:

I do not know who gave the politicians the idea that it could be done but it

seems that they expect it and they are now undergoing the rather painful process

of being undeceived. Italy can only be 'knocked out' either by her armies being

defeated, or by Italy being laid waste by air. We cannot do either of these things at

the beginning of the war and it is left to the Navy to do the 'knocking out.' I can

46 CID Minutes, 355th Meeting, 2 May 1939, CAB 2/8. 47 COS 931, Annex II AFC (J) 53, 'Intervention of Japan,' May 4 1939, CAB 53/50. 48 Pound, 'Strategy in the Mediterranean,' 10 May 1939, ADM 116/3900.

78 only imagine they thought the Fleet would steam slowly along the Italian coast

and blow it to bits, which, even were it possible would not 'knock Italy out'...

Whilst on the topic of the Fleet 'knocking out Italy' there is one aspect

which must be borne in mind. If there were no 'Far Eastern' question the loss of a

battleship or two in the so called 'knocking out' of Italy would not matter much,

but it would matter a great deal if Japan was wobbling as to whether she would

come in or not....

To my mind cutting off their supplies, interfering with their

communications, bombarding their ports, killing their submarines and later on the

capture of Libya and some of the Dodecanese Islands are all part of 'throttling'

them, not knocking them out. If they are as gutless as we imagine them, in time

the throttling may kill them without their being given a knock out blow.49

Pound was not opposed to offensive operations in the Mediterranean, but rejected the idea that Italy could be defeated quickly through naval action. This was not because

Pound reinterpreted the strategic situation in the Mediterranean, but because he recognized there were limits to naval warfare. Economic pressure was slow to produce results, while moral pressure depended on the extent of "material damage." Pound was concerned attacks on the Italian coasts were too risky. The Navy should focus on targets in North Africa instead and only if these proved successful, safe and viable should the

Navy look into direct attacks against Italy and Sicily. The destruction of colonial targets was also unlikely to affect Italian morale and in any case would be hidden from the

Pound to Cunningham, 24 July 1939, Cunningham Papers, Add. 52560, British Library.

79 Italian people. For Pound, there was not a compelling strategic argument for devoting naval forces in the Mediterranean rather than the Far East. The knock-out blow was all but discredited and discarded at the Admiralty.

In early June, Japanese forces blockaded the British concession at Tientsin,

China.51 The resulting crisis brought Britain and Japan close to war and reopened the debate over Britain's imperial and defence priorities. Chatfied asked the COS whether

Britain could despatch a fleet to the Far East if hostilities broke out and assess the effects this would have on Britain's position in Europe. In their initial assessments the JPC and

COS were reluctant to commit a large fleet to the Far East. War with Japan would require a fleet of at least eight capital ships capable of engaging the Imperial Japanese Navy's main fleet, including all of Japan's nine capital ships. This would leave only three ships available for home waters and the Mediterranean, well below the minimum dispositions considered necessary for those theatres. Thus, the COS concluded sending a powerful fleet to the Far East, "from a military point of view, would be quite unjustifiable."

American support would dramatically improve Britain's position, but this was an

CO unknown factor and could not be counted upon.

Chatfield questioned the COS's conclusions at the June 20'1 Foreign Policy

Committee (FPC) meeting. Two capital ships would complete their refits and become available by September. If the Mediterranean were abandoned and six ships were devoted to home waters, Chatfield argued the number of ships available to the Far East was in fact

Pound to Cunningham, 24 July 1939, Cunningham Papers, Add. 52560, British Library and Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 121-122. 51 See Antony Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding war in East Asia, 1936-1941 (London: Routledge, 1995), 71-86. 52 COS 927 (JP), 'The Situation in the Far East,' 16 June 1939, and COS 928, 'The Situation in the Far East,' 18 June 1939, CAB 53/50.

80 seven. The COS were swayed and changed their view in a revised assessment. The

defence of Britain and its trade remained the Navy's first priority and at least six capital

ships, the minimum considered necessary, would be devoted to this task. With the

remaining seven being despatched to the Far East, the Mediterranean would be left

without capital ships. This was not a reaffirmation of Britain's commitment to send an

adequate fleet regardless of the situation in Europe, but rather opened the door for the

despatch of a fleet to the Far East if the circumstances required this; if, for instance, war

broke out in the Far East before it broke out in Europe.

In July and August 1939, the question of whether to bring Italy into a war with

Germany, if Italy remained neutral, resurfaced. Those lobbying for Britain to force Italy

to fight, mainly politicians, members of the Foreign Office and the IIC, argued a hostile

Italy would be strategically preferable to a neutral Italy. This rested on assessments of

both the Italian and German economies and Italians' reported disdain for war. The

German economy was believed to have peaked in 1939 and would become susceptible to

naval blockade. A neutral, but still friendly Italy, was expected to serve as a German

supply point and undermine any British attempt to blockade. Moreover, because of Italy's

weak economy and poor morale, Italian hostility was not considered particularly

dangerous. However, the COS succeeded in dissuading the government from provoking

Italy. Although strategically weak, Italy still possessed sizable armed forces and was in a

strong position to threaten Egypt on land. Britain and France would be better off facing

Germany alone.54 By the outbreak of war in September 1939, all that was certain was that Britain would have to maintain enough capital ships in home waters to contain the

53 Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy, 88-89. 54 COS 965 'Attitude of Italy in War,' 24 August 1939, CAB 53/54 and COS 939 'The Attitude of Italy in War and the Problem of Anglo-French Support to Poland,' 18 July 1939, CAB 53/51.

81 German Navy and protect British trade. Whether war would also break out in the Far East or Mediterranean was uncertain. Nevertheless strategic planners had avoided a firm commitment to either the Mediterranean or the Far East. The Navy's global strategy, and its priorities, would be determined by the conditions of the war already being fought rather than the war that could potentially break out.

82 Chapter Five: Conclusion

Intelligence often guided planners and policymakers in deciding how Italy would be fought and defeated, as well as the resources required for this. British intelligence possessed accurate information about the Italian armed forces, economy and home front.

However, intelligence was not a one-way process, nor was it simply the passing along of raw information. Intelligence was often shaped by assumptions about the nature of modern warfare and perceptions of Italian capabilities, most notably of 'national characteristics.'

For British intelligence, the Italian Navy was second-rate and deemed incapable of successfully defending Italian trade and communications. Because the Italian Navy generally adhered to limitations laid down by naval agreements, details of Italian naval vessels were well-known. In at least two instances Italy was known to have breached tonnage limitations, but the transgressions were relatively minor and, for the Navy, were likely evidence of nothing more than poor design and construction. The Navy's steadfast faith that its shipbuilders were superior to those of any other countries' led to the conclusion that even if Italian ships were larger, they likely possessed less 'fighting power.' Advances in anti-submarine tactics and sonar also suggested the Italian submarine threat was manageable. Ship for ship the Royal Navy had a clear, and permanent, superiority.

From 1935 to 1938, Italy possessed some of the world's best aircraft and maintained one it its largest air forces. As a result, the Italian Air Force was routinely seen as the greatest threat to the Royal Navy and its bases. However, by 1938 it was clear to British intelligence the Italian Air Force and air industry were in sharp decline. Labour

83 and material shortages coupled with falling government orders, due to the state's

financial problems, led to a decline in production and a failure to update aircraft designs.

The Italian air threat was further reduced by two factors. First, British intelligence knew

the Italian Air Force paid little attention to developing capabilities and training for

operations against naval targets; dive-bombing and torpedoes were ignored. Second, and

in connection to the first factor, the Royal Navy doubted the efficacy of air power against

navies throughout the interwar period. Although conceding the Italian Air Force could effectively bomb its bases, the Royal Navy maintained that its operations at sea would be

unaffected. By 1939 it was clear to British intelligence and planners that the Italian Air

Force had few reserves and limited productive capacity while its planes had become

outdated relative to the aircraft Britain was then producing.

More important than technical intelligence on the Italian Navy and Air Force was intelligence on the Italian people and members of its armed forces. Here, perceptions of

'national character' prevailed and significantly shaped intelligence. British ideas of the

Italian 'national character' held that while Italians could be individually courageous, they were apathetic towards war and were ultimately fair-weather fighters; Italian morale would collapse when faced with adversity. This applied across the board and evidence was readily interpreted to support this. Intelligence, for instance, routinely reported the institutional problems within the Italian Navy. Naval personnel suffered from poor discipline and had questionable deportment while Italian officers lacked qualities of leadership, judgment and confidence. These reflected problems within the Italian Navy, but were also seen as confirmation of the 'national character.' Italian pilots were sometimes reported to be of high quality. But this was often attributed to Italians'

84 supposed predisposition for individual acts courage and bravado, and thus Italians'

'natural' suitability for air warfare and in particular fighter aircraft. In operations

demanding stamina, co-operation and collective bravery, such as naval or bombing

operations, Italians were expected to perform poorly. Finally, civilians' widespread

disapproval of Italian-German relations and their distaste for war, especially after the

Munich crisis, was consistently reported. Italian service personnel and civilians were

rightly perceived to be unenthusiastic about the prospect of war. However, the reasons for

this were lumped together and attributed to longstanding and vague assumptions of the

Italian 'national character.' As a 1943 British estimate of the Italian Army suggested, the

Italians' 'national character' could not be overcome, it was simply in their blood.

Mussolini's attempt to militarize Italy with soaring rhetoric and the grandeur of empire

"failed to rouse enthusiasm or even interest [for war] in the majority of Italians. It is one

of the impressive failures of history."

Similar to assessments of the Italian armed forces, the IIC had accurate

information, but reached erroneous conclusions about how long the Italian economy

could support a major war effort. The IIC operated on the assumption that the next war

would be a total war in which economic power would be mobilized to the greatest extent

possible. The IIC accurately reported Italy was economically vulnerable and incapable of

sustaining a major war effort. Italy was highly dependent on sea-borne trade for vital raw materials; had little financial power with which to purchase imports; would have problems exporting during war; had limited industrial capacity; and consistently suffered material and labour shortages. Because of its economic deficiencies, Italy was expected

1 Lieut. Richard Bennett, 'The Trouble with Italians: Summary and Estimate of the Italian Army,' 9 January 1943, ADM 223/488.

85 to pursue a short war and expend resources at an unsustainable rate. As a result, the IIC consistently suggested economic pressure would not only be decisive but also had the potential to be decisive within a short period of time. If Italian trade was severed, the IIC predicted Italy could be defeated in as little as six months. The IIC was, however, overly optimistic about the effects of economic pressure and never accounted for Italy adapting to a long war or implementing effective rationing. During the Second World War, after

Italy's entry in June 1940, the Italian economy performed much better than the IIC predicted.

Perceptions of the Italian 'national character' and assessments of its economy suggested Italy's vulnerabilities were permanent and unchanging. Both were also conducive to naval pressure - many vital resources travelled overseas while Italian morale, particularly civilian morale, would crumble under material hardships resulting from economic pressure. The challenge for strategic planners and policymakers was to decide how, when and to what extent the Navy could cripple the Italians' morale and economy. Assessments of Italy had to be considered in light of what that Navy believed it was able to do. The use of intelligence and its influence on strategic policy thus depended on its relationship to the situation, notably Britain's imperial commitments, and the

Navy's expected capabilities within the Mediterranean and globally.

Throughout the late 1930s, the COS and the Navy addressed three scenarios for war against Italy: a war between Britain and Italy; a war between Britain, allied with

France, against Germany and Italy; and Britain, again allied with France, against

Germany, Italy and Japan. Until 1938/1939, the COS's proposed strategy in the

Mediterranean was to withdraw the Navy's main forces so they could fight Germany and

86 Japan - victory over Italy would have to wait. However, in the first two scenarios, a single-handed war and a European war, the COS expected the Navy would have enough resources to adequately fight Italy. The Navy would face obstacles. Malta would have to be abandoned because of its proximity to Italian shore-based aircraft, forcing the Navy to operate from Alexandria, far from Italian communication lines with Libya and its trade networks within the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Alexandria was also without adequate repair and docking facilities. Particularly in a single-handed war, the Navy would have difficulty establishing blockade or an effective system of contraband control because neutral countries would be able to continue trading with Italy. Britain's situation would be simplified in a European war, in which it expected to have France as an ally, and if

Mediterranean countries, namely Greece and Turkey, offered their support.

The outcome was nevertheless certain: Italy would be defeated. British intelligence, and the ideas which shaped it, played a vital role in planners' appreciations for war in the Mediterranean. As British intelligence established, Italy was economically vulnerable and its people susceptible to losses of morale, while the Italian Navy could be overcome or discounted entirely. The Italian Air Force could affect naval operations by bombing British bases, but this would only make operations more difficult, not affect the outcome. As a result, a British decision would be reached by subjecting the Italian economy and Italian morale to steady and vigorous pressure. The majority of Italian trade arrived through Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and Britain's control of these channels ensured this trade would be completely severed. This would be a severe blow, but Italy was likely able to survive on over land and Mediterranean trade. The successful application of economic pressure was thus contingent upon Britain commanding the

87 Mediterranean. Complete command was unlikely since the Navy would be operating from Alexandria, a considerable distance from Italy and Italian communications with

Libya and its neighbours. However, various patrol schemes, while not completely cutting

Italian trade, would sufficiently pressure the Italian economy. The Admiralty and the

COS held that sea-power and economic pressure were slow-moving weapons, even against an exposed Italian economy, and did not establish a timeline for how long it would take to defeat Italy. All that was certain was that the Italian armed forces and home front would be deprived of necessary resources and morale would precipitously fall.

Enough pressure would be applied over time to compel Italy to surrender.

A global war against Germany, Italy and Japan complicated Britain's situation.

Even if Britain was allied with France, the COS maintained that a war against Germany,

Italy and Japan was beyond Britain's means. Until 1938/1939, the Navy's proposed response to the third scenario was to essentially fight a two-front war against Germany and Japan while withdrawing from the Mediterranean. Defending Britain and British trade was clearly the most pressing concern; for if Britain fell so too would the Empire.

In the Far East, Japan threatened Britain's colonies, communications and dominions. If the Far Eastern Empire was lost, planners believed they would be lost for good while a failure to offer protection to Australia and New Zealand would compel the dominions into American arms. Withdrawing from the Mediterranean offered the best chance to preserve the Empire. While interests in the Mediterranean, most importantly Egypt, may be lost, the COS consistently argued this would only be temporary. Any losses could be regained once Germany and Japan were dealt with. Between 1935 and 1938 intelligence had little bearing on the Navy's strategy for a global war, with the exception that

88 intelligence reaffirmed British losses could be made good once Britain's situation

improved.

In the winter of 1938/1939, the Navy's proposed global strategy was dramatically

revised. With the arrival of Backhouse and Drax to the Admiralty in 1938 and 1939,

naval strategy shifted towards the offensive. As the COS recognized in their 1939

European appreciation, the only viable option for the rapid defeat of one of Britain's enemies was an offensive was in the Mediterranean. Assessments of Italy's economy and

'national character' appealed to offensive-minded policymakers and led decision-makers to reach a logical, though specious, conclusion about war with Italy. Because Italy was perceived to be highly vulnerable, they reasoned the greater Britain's effort the quicker

Italy would be defeated. Britain's overall strategic position had not changed. Rather perceptions of Italy's vulnerability and, more importantly, the Navy's ability to exploit them were given more influence. Strategic appreciations prepared in 1939 by the Admiral

Drax and the SAC, and arguments made by planners and politicians within the CID and

SAC, leaned heavily on the expectation that if Italy was subjected to severe economic pressure and direct attacks Italians' would lose heart, perhaps within a matter of months.

A parallel process was also going on concerning the Far East, with important implications for the knock-out blow. For Admirals Backhouse and Drax, and their political supporters, Britain's interests in the Far East could be defended long enough for

Britain to defeat Italy, should Britain be at war simultaneously with Germany, Italy and

Japan. Much of this depended on the assumption that Japan would undertake a cautious strategy and that Britain's Far Eastern interests could be secured long enough for Italy to be defeated. Supporters of the knock-out blow reasoned that Singapore was too far from

89 Japan for the Imperial Japanese Navy to risk operations to overcome the British naval

base. The Japanese Navy would be unable to concentrate against British forces,

Singapore would not fall and a small, fast naval force along the lines of Drax's 'flying

squadron' would be sufficient to defend Singapore, protect the Pacific Dominions and prevent the Imperial Japanese Navy from breaking out into the Indian Ocean. Moreover,

a quick fleet would also be able to harass Japanese trade. Finally, supporters of the knock-out blow argued that war in the Far East would likely bring in the United States

against Japan and, as a result, Japan would be unlikely to join a war already underway in

Europe or provoke a war with Britain.

Supporters of the knock-out blow within the Admiralty and among politicians believed a quick victory over Italy was well-within Britain and the Navy's capabilities.

The notion that economic pressure was slow to produce results was rejected while it was believed the Navy could bring the war to Italy's home front with direct strikes against

shore-based targets. The implication, supported by intelligence on the Italian armed

services, was that the Italian Air Force was not a significant threat and the Italian Navy was incompetent, unable to protect Italian communications. The Royal Navy would

secure complete command of the Mediterranean, allowing it to impose an effective blockade and come within range of shore-based targets. The risks of a Mediterranean offensive were minimal. The Mediterranean-first strategy was also attractive, especially to politicians, because it presented a solution to Britain's grand strategic problem of fighting Germany, Italy and Japan at the same time. Britain would be faced with a more manageable two-front war once Italy was defeated. This was considerably more

90 optimistic than the COS's earlier declarations that a global war could not be won and that at least some part of the Empire would be lost.

The knock-out blow and Mediterranean-first approach looked good on paper. The strategy created an opportunity for Britain to manage a global war and, as a result, policymakers were highly receptive to its underlying ideas. Intelligence and the perceptions which shaped its uses allowed decision-makers to argue Italy could be knocked-out quickly. However, the knock-out blow was only viable if war first broke out in Europe, if the Japanese threat was negligible and if assumptions about Italy's vulnerability proved true. It depended upon senior Admiralty officials and policymakers with a strong preference for offensive operations and who, as a result, overestimated the

Navy's abilities and exaggerated Italian weaknesses. Intelligence was distorted and moulded to conform to the wishful thinking of policymakers.

The knock-out blow led to a temporary re-ordering of Britain's imperial priorities, with potentially far-reaching implications. Had war broke out in winter or spring 1939 rather than September, and if Italy was involved from the outset, British naval strategy would have undoubtedly been dramatically different. Whether this would have been beneficial or detrimental to Britain's war effort is a matter of conjecture. The knock-out blow was rejected in June 1939 with Admiral Pound's arrival at the Admiralty.

Its opponents argued a knock-out blow was not feasible and its underlying assumptions about Italian vulnerabilities were misplaced. As Pound suggested in 1939, Italy could not be defeated quickly by naval pressure alone. At best, the Navy could 'throttle' Italy slowly, while a decision would have to be reached by overthrowing Mussolini's armies and unleashing devastating air strikes.

91 Nevertheless certain elements of the strategy and its underlying ideas reappeared during the Second World War. A vocal supporter of the knock-out blow in 1939, Winston

Churchill gave priority to the Mediterranean over the Far East throughout the first few years of war. For Churchill, Europe was the decisive theatre and the Mediterranean offered the best prospects for early successes. Italy was Europe's "under-belly," the Axis' weakest point, and still vulnerable to a knock-out blow. Churchill's position on the

Mediterranean was also contingent upon the Far East remaining relatively secure. Like other proponents of the knock-out blow, Churchill maintained throughout the 1930s and early 1940s that Japan would act with caution, could be easily deterred and would not attack Britain's vital interests in the Far East. Churchill considered Singapore, India and the Pacific Dominions to be too far from Japan for the Japanese to risk operations against them. Moreover, Churchill was particularly confident that the United States to either deter Japan or defeat Japan if war broke out. For Churchill, many of the conditions that made the knock-out blow theoretically attractive in 1939 were still present by 1941 and shortly thereafter. However, it was the conditions of war, especially after the Fall of

France and Germany's entry into the Mediterranean in 1942, which ultimately secured a

British commitment to the Mediterranean over the Far East. As Churchill told his senior military advisor in May 1941, Britain could not afford to reinforce the Far East at the

2 See for example Churchill, W.P. (42) 543, 'Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Near East,' 25 November 1942, CAB 66/31/23. See also Christopher Bell, "The "Singapore strategy" and the deterrence of Japan : Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the dispatch of Force Z,' English Historical Review, 116:467 (2001), 620, Tuvia Ben-Moshe, 'Winston Churchill and the "Second Front": A Reappraisal,' The Journal of Modern History 3 (1990), 503-507, Douglas Delaney, 'Churchill and the Mediterranean Strategy: December 1941 to January 1943,' Defence Studies 3 (2002), 1-26 and Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1968).

92 Mediterranean's expense; he could not permit "the surrender or ruin of the army of half a

million we have concentrated there [in North Africa]".3

Throughout the late 1930s the Navy was the only service in a position to defeat

Italy, albeit only under specific conditions. The war the Navy was planning to fight often determined the uses of intelligence. As planners recognized early on during the

Abyssinian crisis, Italy would not collapse on its own. As a result, British intelligence on

Italy became nearly irrelevant when the Navy believed it would have to denude the

Mediterranean. Intelligence did not determine strategic policy alone, but it was

significant and necessary to the development of strategy. The knock-out blow relied heavily on intelligence and perceptions of Italy that consistently emphasized Italy's fundamentally weaknesses. Without creating the necessary conditions and assuming best- case scenarios - that Italy could actually be knocked out while the Far East remained relatively secure - the knock-out blow was not a viable option. How intelligence assessments of Italy were used in the winter of 1939 reflected a broader trend of wishful thinking among some senior strategic policymakers.4 This in turn reflected not only an unorthodox and relatively creative solution to Britain's strategic problem but also the immensity of the problem policymakers within the Navy and government faced - how to defend an Empire they believed could not be defended.

" Quoted from Christopher Bell, 'Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British Power, 1921-41,' in Churchill and strategic dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, ed. John Mauer (London: Cass, 2003), 74. 4 This also included estimates of Germany, particularly the German economy which by summer of 1939 the Foreign Office, and to a lesser extent the IIC, believed had reached its maximum capacity. See Wark, 180-4.

93 Bibliography

Primary Sources

Churchill College Archive Centre, Cambridge Admiral Reginald Drax Papers

British Library, London Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope Papers

National Maritime Museum, Greenwich Admiral Ernie Chatfield Papers

National Archives, Kew ADM 1 Admiralty Correspondence and Papers ADM 116 Admiralty and Secretariat Cases ADM 205 First Sea Lord Papers ADM 223 Naval Intelligence Division Papers AIR 5 Air Ministry Historical Branch Papers AIR 8 Chief of the Air Staff Registered Files AIR 9 Air Ministry Directorate of Operations and Intelligence CAB 2 Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes CAB 4 Committee of Imperial Defence, Memoranda CAB 16 Committee of Imperial Defence, Ad Hoc Sub-Committees CAB 21 Cabinet Office Registered Files CAB 23 Cabinet Minutes CAB 24 Cabinet Memoranda CAB 53 Chiefs of Staff Committee CAB 55 Joint Planning Committee CAB 56 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee CAB 66 War Cabinet Memoranda FO 371 Foreign Office General Correspondence PREM 7 Prime Minister's Office, Sir Desmond Morton's Correspondence and Minutes T 160 Treasury Registered Files

Secondary Sources

Andrew, Christopher. Her Majesty's Secret Service; the Making of the British Intelligence Community. New York: Viking, 1986.

The Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History ofMI5. Toronto: Penguin, 2009.

Barnett, Corelli. Engage the Enemy More Closely. New York: Norton, 1991.

94 Bell, Christopher. The Royal Navy Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

'The Royal Navy, War Planning and Intelligence Assessments of Japan, 1921-1941' in Intelligence and Statecraft: the Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, edited by Peter J. Jackson and Jennifer Siegel. New York: Praeger, 2005.

'The "Singapore strategy" and the deterrence of Japan : Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the dispatch of Force Z.' English Historical Review 116:467 (2001): 604.

'Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British Power, 1921-41,' in Churchill and strategic dilemmas before the World Wars : essays in honor of Michael I. Handel, edited by John Mauer. London: Cass, 2003.

Bell, P.M.H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe.New York: Pearson Longman, 2007.

Ben-Moshe, Tuvia. 'Winston Churchill and the "Second Front": A Reappraisal.' The Journal of Modern History 3 (1990): 503.

Bennett, Gill. Churchill's Man of Mystery: Desmond Morton and the World of Intelligence. London: Routledge, 2007.

Best, Antony. Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor: Avoiding war in East Asia, 1936-1941. London: Routledge, 1995.

British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Bialer, Uri. The Shadow of the Bomber. London: Royal Historical Society, 1980.

Cunningham of Hyndhope. A Sailor's Odyssey. London: Hutchinson, 1951.

Delaney, Douglas. 'Churchill and the Mediterranean Strategy: December 1941 to January 1943.' Defence Studies 3 (2002): 1.

Dilks, David. 'Flashes of Intelligence.' In The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984.

Ferris, John. '"Now that the Milk is Spilt": Appeasement and the Archive on Intelligence,' Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 19, no. 3 (2009), 527-565.

Intelligence and Strategy. New York: Routledge, 2005.

95 '"Worthy of Some Better Enemy?": the British Estimates of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Fall of Singapore.' Canadian Journal of History 28 (1993), 223-256.

'"It is our business in the Navy to Command the Seas" The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929.' In Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman edited by Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson. London: Cass, 1997.

Gibbs, Norman. Grand Strategy Volume I. London. H.M. Stationery Office, 1976.

Grove, Eric. The Royal Navy Since 1815: a new short history.

Hinsley, F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World War: its Influence on Strategy and Operations Volume I. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1979.

Howard, Michael. The Continental Commitment. London: Temple Smith, 1971.

The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Imlay, Talbot. Facing the Second World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Jackson, Peter and Len Scott, 'The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice.' Intelligence and National Security 19 (2004): 139.

Iriye, Akira. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific. London: Longman, 1987.

Kennedy, Greg. 'The Royal Navy, Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in Air Power, 1936-1939,' Intelligence and National Security 20:2 (2005), 238-263.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. London: Allen Lane, 1976.

Knox, Macgregor. Hiter's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime and the War of 1940-1943. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941 .Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Maiolo, Joseph A. The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939. Bassingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.

Mallett, Robert. Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935-1940. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War. New York: Pal grave MacMillan, 2003.

96 Marder, Arthur. 'The Royal Navy and the Ethiopian Crisis of 1935-6.' American Historical Review, 75 (1970): 1327.

McKercher, B.J.C.and Legault, Roch eds. Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe. Westport: Praeger, 2001.

Medlicott, Norton. The Economic Blockade Volume I. London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1952.

'The Hoare-Laval Pact Reconsidered.' In Retreat from Power edited by David Dilks. London: Macmillan, 1981.

Miller, Dawn M. '"Raising the tribes": British policy in Italian East Africa, 1938-41.' Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999): 96-.

'Dark Waters : Britain and Italy's Invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939.' International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, 16 (2003): 290.

Mills, William C. 'Sir Joseph Ball, Adrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's "secret channel" to Italy, 1937-1940.' International History Review, 24 (2002): 278.

Morewood, Steven. The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940: Conflict and crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. London: Frank Cass, 2005.

'Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-40.' In ., Paths to war : new essays on the origins of the Second World War edited by Robert Boyce and Esmonde Robertson. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.

'Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal and British Defence Strategy, 1919-1941.' War & Society, 10 (1992), 81.

Omissi, David. 'The Mediterranean and the Middle East in British Global Strategy, 1935- 1939.' In Britain the Middle East in the 1930s: Security Problems, 1935-1939, edited by Michael Cohen and Martin Kolinsky. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992.

Parker, R.A.C. Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War.Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993.

'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-1936.' English Historical Review (April 1974): 306.

Pratt, Lawrence. East of Malta, West of Suez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Overy, Richard. The Road to War.London: Penguin, 1999

97 The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Longman, 1998.

Roskill, Stephen. Naval Policy Between the War, Volume II. London: Collins, 1976.

Sadkovick, James. 'Re-evaluating Who Won the Italo-British Naval Conflict, 1940- 1942.' European History Quarterly 18 (1988): 455.

Salerno, Reynolds, Vital Crossroads: Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.

Simpson, M.A.. 'Superhighway to the World Wide Web : The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strategy, 1900-45.' In Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean : Past, Present and Future, edited by John Hattendorf. London: Cass, 2000.

Sullivan, Brian R. 'A Fleet in Being: Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861-1943,' International History Review 10(1988), 106-124.

'A Fleet in Being: Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861-1943.' International History Review 10(1988): 119.

Young, Robert J. 'Spokesman for Economic Warfare: the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s,' European Studies Review 6 (1976), 473-489.

Wark, Wesley. The Ultimate Enemy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Watt, D.C. 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War.' In Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessments Before the Two World Wars, edited by Ernest May. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Williams, Manuela. 'Mussolini's Secret War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: Italian Intelligence and the British Response.' Intelligence and National Security, 22 (2007): 881.

Zamagni, Vera. 'Italy: how to lose the war and win the peace.' In The Economics of World War II: Six great powers in comparison, edited by Mark Harrison. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

98