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The Royal Navy, Intelligence and Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1936-1939 by Trevor Checkley Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia December 2009 © Copyright by Trevor Checkley, 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63563-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-63563-6 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1+1 Canada DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY '.[.-•'' To comply with the Canadian Privacy Act the National Library of Canada has requested that the following pages be removed from this copy of the thesis: Preliminary Pages / Examiners Signature Page (pii) Dalhousie Library Copyright Agreement (piii) Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) For My Parents IV Table of Contents List of Tables vi Abstract vii List of Abbreviations viii Acknowledgements ix Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: The Navy, Intelligence and Italy, 1936-1939 8 Chapter Three: Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1935-1938 39 Chapter Four: Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1938-1939 61 Chapter Five: Conclusion 83 Bibliography 94 V List of Tables Table 1.1 Italian Trade in 1937 35 Table 2.1 Comparative Naval Strength Estimated for 1 January 1938 42 VI Abstract British intelligence presented a consistent view of Italy's capabilities: its economy would collapse under pressure, while the armed services could not secure a decision. Ideas that Italians were 'naturally' ill-suited to war shaped how intelligence was interpreted. The influence of intelligence on strategy is more complex. Britain planned for war against various combinations of Germany, Italy and Japan. Strategy was the result of a sophisticated exercise of evaluating intelligence alongside Britain's capabilities, commitments and objectives. Intelligence informed but did not determine strategy and mattered most when policymakers expected the Navy to have sufficient resources in the Mediterranean, which was not always the case. Intelligence, and the perceptions that shaped it, led to a revision of grand strategy in 1939. The Mediterranean replaced the Far East as Britain's second defence priority and although the revision initially appeared temporary, its underlying ideas, the intelligence and perceptions, lasted well into the Second World War. vn List of Abbreviations AGNA Anglo-German Naval Agreement ATB Advisory Committee for Trade Questions in Time of War C-in-C Commander in Chief CID Committee of Imperial Defence COS Chiefs of Staff DRC Defence Requirements Committee FCI Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Committee FO Foreign Office FPC Foreign Police Committee IIC Industrial Intelligence Centre UN Imperial Japanese Navy JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JPC Joint Planning Subcommittee NID Naval Intelligence Division RAF Royal Air Force Vlll Acknowledgements I would first like to thank the Dalhousie Faculty of Graduate Studies, the Dalhousie History Department and the Peter Fraser Fund for making research for this thesis financially possible. I am especially indebted to Dr. Christopher Bell for his continuous advice and supervision and his assistance in passing along numerous and invaluable documents. Dr. Michael Ramsay provided me with much support and a much needed background in the history of military thought. The History Department's secretaries, Tina Jones and Valerie Peck, were an invaluable and unending source of help. A special thanks to Dr. John Ferris and Dr. Bruce Strang for their patience, advice and assistance while I was at the National Archives in Kew. Christopher Matthews and Chantelle Bellrichard reviewed various drafts and offered helpful insight and suggestions. I would like to thank Blair Bodnar and Roger Checkley for their consistent encouragement and, most importantly, my parents, whose unwavering support, financial and otherwise, made this possible. IX Chapter One: Introduction The Navy's primary objective during the interwar period was to defend the British Empire. Writing to the permanent secretary to the Treasury in 1934, Admiral Ernie Chatfield, First Sea Lord from 1933 to 1938, outlined Britain's position: "We are in the remarkable position of not wanting to quarrel with anybody because we have got most of the world already, or the best parts of it, and we only want to keep what we have got and prevent others from taking it away from us." However, defending an Empire that spanned the globe was not an easy task. By the late 1930s, the British Empire was threatened on three fronts - in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. More importantly, as the Navy and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) recognized, a war against Germany, Italy and Japan was beyond Britain's capabilities. The Navy had become responsible for defending an Empire that could not be defended - or, at the very least, could not be defended without considerable American assistance. Consequently, British naval strategy became a matter of balancing risks and priorities. The Navy had to choose its battles carefully. Historians have generally devoted little attention to Italy's place in the development of British strategy and policy in the late 1930s. The British government's responses to Nazi Germany - appeasement and rearmament, air deterrence and a continental commitment - have received exhaustive attention. More recent studies of the Second World War's origins have integrated the relationship between the demands of defending a global Empire and British policies towards Germany, namely appeasement.2 1 Christopher Bell, The Royal Navy Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 126. 2 See P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe 3ld ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), Richard Overy, The Road to War (London: Penguin, 1999), Chapter 2 and The Origins of the 1 However, Japan and Italy are usually left out of the resulting narrative. The natures of the Japanese and Italian threats, how these contributed to Britain's security dilemmas, and in turn how Britain planned to deal with Italy and Japan are often glossed over. Studies of the Navy, strategy and intelligence have similarly reflected historians' tendency to focus on Germany.3 Consequently, Britain's global defence problems are taken for granted and the global, integrated nature of Britain's policies has been underemphasised. Recent studies on Japan have begun to redress this problem, but only a few comparable studies exist for Italy.4 The major political events in the history of Anglo-Italian relations between the wars have received substantial attention.5 British strategy and intelligence on Italy, Second World War, (New York: Longman, 1998). For an assessment of appeasement see R.A.C. Parker Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). 3 For British naval policy see Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the War Vol 2. (London: Collins, 1976) and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Naval Mastery (London, Allen Lane, 1976), Chapter 10. Exceptions to the Germano-centric trend is Norman Gibbs Grand Strategy Vol. 1 (London: H.M, Stationery Office, 1976) and Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy. For overviews of British intelligence between the wars, and examples of historians' German focus, see Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (New York: Viking, 1986), Chapters 13 and 14 and The Defence of the Realm: the Authorized History of M15 (Toronto: Penguin, 2009), 186-216 , F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations Vol. 1 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1979), D.C. Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War,'