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Memorandum on Assistance to Iraqi Democratic Opposition Administration of William J. Clinton, 1999 / Feb. 5 199 As I said, I'm working hard within my own NOTE: The President spoke at 11:45 a.m. in Impe- party to build a consensus on this, and at rial Ballroom A at the Grand Hyatt Hotel. In his the same time I'm trying to reach out to Re- remarks, he referred to foundation president publicans to build a consensus with them. Roger G. Ackerman, chairman and chief executive But I do not believe we can continue to grow officer, Corning, Inc.; former Secretary of Com- the American economy and raise American merce Malcolm Baldrige's sister, Letitia Baldrige; foundation chairpersons Barry K. Rogstad, presi- incomes and reach into America's distressed dent, American Business Conference, and Rob- neighborhoods unless we continue, also, to erts T. Jones, president and chief executive offi- reach out to the rest of the world. cer, National Alliance of Business; and foundation Furthermore, I believe we can minimize trustee Earnest W. Deavenport, Jr., chairman and the likelihood that we will ever have to send chief executive officer, Eastman Chemical Co. our men and women in uniform into a big conflict if we have economic and other co- operation with countries that show that there Memorandum on Assistance to Iraqi are other ways to solve your difficulties than Democratic Opposition taking up arms and robbing children of their future. Organizations So that's what I think we ought to do. I'm February 4, 1999 glad we're doing well. I am grateful for hav- ing had the chance to serve. I am very mind- Presidential Determination No. 99±13 ful of the fact that a lot of the credit for America's success goes to companies and the Memorandum for the Secretary of State people who work for them, like those we honor today. But I am absolutely certain that Subject: Designations Under the Iraq this is not the time to sort of sit back on Liberation Act of 1998 our laurels and say, ``Isn't this nice. We've Pursuant to the authority vested in me as waited for 40 years for a time like this. I think President of the United States, including I'll take a vacation.'' under section 5 of the Iraq Liberation Act This is a time to take this prosperity we of 1998 (Public Law 105±338) (the ``Act''), have and this confidence we have and expand I hereby determine that each of the following our efforts. We can meet the long-term chal- groups is a democratic opposition organiza- lenges of the 21st century. We can alleviate tion and that each satisfies the criteria set the looming specter that the baby boom forth in section 5(c) of the Act: the Iraqi Na- might bankrupt our children and our grand- tional Accord, the Iraqi National Congress, children to pay for our retirement. We can the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, the guarantee a secure retirement, a compact Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Movement within the generations, and we can pay down for Constitutional Monarchy, the Patriotic the national debt and guarantee low interest Union of Kurdistan, and the Supreme Coun- rates and a stable situation and more capital cil for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. I here- to invest in the private sector for 15 years. by designate each of these organizations as We can improve our education and training eligible to receive assistance under section systems. We can invest in our inner cities. 4 of the Act. We can expand trade. That is an economic agenda that will set a framework within You are authorized and directed to report which more companies who follow your lead this determination and designation to the will find the same kind of success that you Congress and arrange for its publication in have. the Federal Register. And remember what I said when I started. America wouldn't have nearly the problems William J. Clinton we have today if everybody was as happy on the job as you are. NOTE: This message was released by the Office Thank you, and good luck. of the Press Secretary on February 5. VerDate 12-JAN-99 09:06 Feb 10, 1999 Jkt 010199 PO 00001 Frm 00043 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P05FE4.004 atx006 PsN: atx006 200 Feb. 5 / Administration of William J. Clinton, 1999 Message to the Congress Reporting At the same time, NATO agreed that we do on Efforts To Achieve a Sustainable not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina current levels indefinitely, and in fact agreed February 4, 1999 on initial reductions, which I will describe later in this report. Below is a benchmark- To the Congress of the United States: by-benchmark evaluation of the state-of-play Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105± in BiH based on analysis of input from mul- 174, I am providing this report to inform the tiple sources. Congress of ongoing efforts to achieve sus- 1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Day- tainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina ton cease-fire. Considerable progress has (BiH). This is the first semiannual report that been made toward military stabilization in evaluates progress in BiH against the ten BiH. Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) are in benchmarks (``aims'') outlined in my certifi- compliance with Dayton, and there have cation to the Congress of March 3, 1998. been no incidents affecting the cease-fire. NATO adopted these benchmarks on May EAFs remain substantially divided along eth- 28, 1998, as part of its approval of the Sta- nic lines. Integration of the Federation Army bilization Force (SFOR) military operations does not reach down to corps-level units and plan (OPLAN 10407). The Steering Board below. However, progress has been made of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) through the Train and Equip Program to in- subsequently adopted corresponding bench- tegrate the Ministry of Defense and to pro- marks in its Luxembourg Declaration of June vide the Federation with a credible deterrent 9, 1998. capability. Although it is unlikely to meet its NATO, the Office of the High Representa- target of full integration by August 1999, the tive (OHR) and my Administration have co- Federation Ministry of Defense has begun ordinated closely in evaluating progress on staff planning for integration. The Bosnian Dayton implementation based on these Serb Army (VRS) continues its relationship benchmarks. There is general agreement that with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia there has been considerable progress in the (FRY) Army. Similarly, the Bosnian Croat past year. The basic institutions of the state, element of the Federation Army maintains both political and economic, have been es- ties with Croatia. In both cases, however, tablished. Key laws regarding foreign invest- limited resources impinge on what either ment, privatization, and property are now in Croatia or the FRY can provide financially place. Freedom of movement across the or materially; the overall trend in support is country has substantially improved. Fun- downward. In some areas, the VRS continues damental reform of the media is underway. to have certain qualitative and quantitative Elections have demonstrated a continuing advantages over the Federation Army, but trend towards growing pluralism. Neverthe- the Train and Equip Program has helped less, there is still much to be done, in particu- narrow the gap in some key areas. The arms lar on interethnic tolerance and reconcili- control regimes established under Articles II ation, the development of effective common (confidence and security-building measures) institutions with powers clearly delineated and IV (arms reduction and limitations) of from those of the Entities, and an open and Annex 1±B of the Dayton Peace Accords are pluralistic political life. The growth of orga- functioning. In October 1997, BiH and the nized crime also represents a serious threat. other parties were recognized as being in With specific reference to SFOR, the Sec- compliance with the limitations on five major retaries of State and Defense, in meetings types of armaments (battle tanks, armored in December 1998 with their NATO coun- combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, terparts, agreed that SFOR continues to play and attack helicopters) set forth in the Article an essential role in the maintenance of peace IV agreement, which were derived from the and stability and the provision of a secure Annex 1B 5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic environment in BiH, thus contributing sig- of Croatia, and BiH respectively. The parties nificantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as have since maintained armament levels con- a single, democratic, and multiethnic state. sistent with the limitations and are expected VerDate 12-JAN-99 09:06 Feb 10, 1999 Jkt 010199 PO 00001 Frm 00044 Fmt 1244 Sfmt 1244 W:\DISC\P05FE4.005 atx006 PsN: atx006.
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