Alvin Carl Plantinga (/ˈplæntɪŋɡə/;[1] born November 1.2 Education 15, 1932) is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Emeritus at the At the end of 11th grade, Plantinga’s father urged University of Notre Dame, and the inaugural holder of Plantinga to skip his last year of high school and im- the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College. mediately enroll in college. Plantinga reluctantly fol- lowed his father’s advice and in 1949, a few months be- Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of fore his 17th birthday, he enrolled in Jamestown Col- religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apolo- lege, in Jamestown, North Dakota.[15][16] During that getics. He is the author of numerous books including same year, his father accepted a teaching job at Calvin God and Other Minds (1967), The Nature of Necessity College, in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In January 1950, (1974), and a trilogy of books on epistemology, culminat- Plantinga moved to Grand Rapids with his family and ing in Warranted Christian Belief (2000). He has deliv- enrolled in Calvin College. During his first semester at ered the Gifford Lectures two times and was described by Calvin, Plantinga was awarded a scholarship to attend TIME magazine as “America’s leading orthodox Protes- Harvard University.[17] Beginning in the fall of 1950, tant philosopher of God”. Plantinga is a fellow of the Plantinga spent two semesters at Harvard. In 1951, dur- American Academy of Arts and Sciences and is widely ing Harvard’s spring recess, Plantinga attended a few regarded as the world’s most important living Christian philosophy classes at Calvin College, and was so im- philosopher.[2] pressed with Calvin philosophy professor William Harry Jellema that he returned in 1951 to study philosophy under him.[18] In 1954, Plantinga began his graduate 1 Biography studies at the University of Michigan where he studied under William Alston, William Frankena, and Richard Cartwright, among others.[19] A year later, in 1955, he 1.1 Family transferred to Yale University where he received his Ph.D. in 1958.[20] Plantinga was born on November 15, 1932, in Ann Ar- bor, Michigan, to Cornelius A. Plantinga (1908–1994) and Lettie G. Bossenbroek (1908–2007). Plantinga’s 1.3 Teaching career father was a first-generation immigrant, born in the Netherlands.[3] His family is from the Dutch province of Friesland. Plantinga’s father earned a Ph.D. in philoso- phy from Duke University and a master’s degree in psy- chology, and taught several academic subjects at differ- ent colleges over the years.[4] One of Plantinga’s brothers, Cornelius “Neal” Plantinga, Jr., is a theologian and the former president of Calvin Theological Seminary. An- other of his brothers, Leon, is an emeritus professor of musicology at Yale University.[4][5] His brother Terrell worked for CBS News.[6] In 1955, Plantinga married Kathleen De Boer.[7] Plantinga and his wife have four children: Carl, Jane, Harry, and Ann.[8][9] Both of his sons are professors at Calvin College, Carl in Film Studies[10][11] and Harry in computer science.[12] Harry is also the director of the Plantinga at the University of Notre Dame in 2004 college’s Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Plantinga’s older daughter, Jane Plantinga Pauw, is a pastor at Plantinga began his career as an instructor in the philos- Rainier Beach Presbyterian Church (PCUSA) in Seattle, ophy department at Yale in 1957, and then in 1958 he Washington,[13] and his younger daughter, Ann Kapteyn, became a professor of philosophy at Wayne State Univer- is a missionary in Cameroon working for Wycliffe Bible sity during its heyday as a major center for analytic phi- Translators.[14] losophy. In 1963, he accepted a teaching job at Calvin

1 2 2 PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

College, where he replaced the retiring Jellema.[21] He 2.1 Problem of evil then spent the next 19 years at Calvin before moving to the University of Notre Dame in 1982. He retired Main article: Plantinga’s free will defense from the University of Notre Dame in 2010 and re- turned to Calvin College, where he serves as the first Plantinga proposed a “free will defense” in a volume holder of the William Harry Jellema Chair in Philoso- edited by Max Black in 1965,[31] which attempts to phy. He has trained many prominent philosophers work- refute the logical problem of evil, the argument that ing in metaphysics and epistemology including Michael the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the Bergmann at Purdue and Michael Rea at Notre Dame, existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good and Trenton Merricks working at University of Virginia. God.[32] Plantinga’s argument (in a truncated form) states that “It is possible that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never 1.4 Awards and honors choose evil. Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world Plantinga served as president of the American Philo- which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral sophical Association, Western Division, 1981–1982.[22] creatures.”[33] and as President of the Society of Christian Philosophers Plantinga’s defense has received wide acceptance among 1983–1986.[16][23] contemporary philosophers when addressing moral He has honorary degrees from Glasgow University evil.[34] However, the argument’s handling of natural evil (1982), Calvin College (1986), North Park College has been more heavily disputed, and its presupposition of (1994), the Free University of Amsterdam (1995), a libertarianist, incompatibilist view of free will has been Brigham Young University (1996), and Valparaiso Uni- seen as problematic as well.[35] According to the Internet versity (1999).[23] Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the argument also “conflicts He was a Guggenheim Fellow, 1971–1972, and elected a with important theistic doctrines”, including the notion of heaven and the idea that God has free will.[36] J.L. Mackie Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in [37] 1975.[23] sees Plantinga’s free-will defense as incoherent. In 2006, the University of Notre Dame's Center for Phi- Plantinga’s well-received book God, Freedom and Evil losophy of Religion renamed its Distinguished Scholar written in 1974 gave his response to what he saw as the Fellowship as the Alvin Plantinga Fellowship.[24] The incomplete and uncritical view of theism’s criticism of fellowship includes an annual lecture by the current theodicy. Plantinga’s contribution stated that when the Plantinga Fellow.[25] issue of a comprehensive doctrine of freedom is added to the discussion of the goodness of God and the omnipo- In 2012, the University of Pittsburgh’s Philosophy De- tence of God then it is not possible to exclude the pres- partment, History and Philosophy of Science Depart- ence of evil in the world after introducing freedom into ment, and the Center for the History and Philosophy of the discussion. Plantinga’s own summary occurs in his Science co-awarded Plantinga the Nicholas Rescher Prize discussion titled “Could God Have Created a World Con- [26] for Systematic Philosophy, which he received with a taining Moral Good but No Moral Evil,” where he states talk titled, “Religion and Science: Where the Conflict Re- his conclusion that, "...the price for creating a world in ally Lies”. which they produce moral good is creating one in which they also produce moral evil.”[38]

2 Philosophical views 2.2 Reformed epistemology

Plantinga has argued that some people can know that God Plantinga’s contributions to epistemology include an ar- exists as a basic belief, requiring no argument. He devel- gument which he dubs "Reformed epistemology". Ac- oped this argument in two different fashions: firstly, in cording to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be God and Other Minds (1967), by drawing an equivalence rational and justified even without arguments or evidence between the teleological argument and the common sense for the existence of God. More specifically, Plantinga ar- view that people have of other minds existing by analogy gues that belief in God is properly basic, and due to a re- with their own minds.[27][28] Plantinga has also developed ligious externalist epistemology, he claims belief in God a more comprehensive epistemological account of the na- could be justified independently of evidence. His exter- ture of warrant which allows for the existence of God as nalist epistemology, called “Proper functionalism”, is a a basic belief.[29] form of epistemological reliabilism.[39] Plantinga has also argued that there is no logical incon- Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology sistency between the existence of evil and the existence and Proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In of an all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good God.[30] the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current De- 2.3 Modal ontological argument 3

bate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th- was published. Plantinga reintroduces his theory of war- century developments in analytic epistemology, particu- rant to ask whether Christian theistic belief can enjoy larly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, warrant. He argues that this is plausible. Notably, the and others.[40][41] In the book, Plantinga argues specifi- book does not address whether or not Christian theism is cally that the theories of what he calls “warrant”- what true. many others have called justification- put forth by these epistemologists have systematically failed to capture in full what is required for knowledge.[42] 2.3 Modal ontological argument In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to Plantinga has expressed a modal logic version of the onto- justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, logical argument in which he uses modal logic to develop, memories, perception, and probability.[43] Plantinga’s in a more rigorous and formal way, Norman Malcolm's “proper function” account argues that as a necessary and Charles Hartshorne's modal ontological arguments. condition of having warrant, one’s “belief-forming and belief-maintaining apparatus of powers” are function- ing properly—"working the way it ought to work”.[44] 2.4 Evolutionary argument against natu- Plantinga explains his argument for proper function with ralism reference to a “design plan”, as well as an environment in which one’s cognitive equipment is optimal for use. In Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, Plantinga asserts that the design plan does not require he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic a designer: “it is perhaps possible that evolution (undi- defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it un- rected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us dermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evo- with our design plans”,[45] but the paradigm case of a de- lution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive fac- sign plan is like a technological product designed by a hu- ulties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value man being (like a radio or a wheel). Ultimately, Plantinga (maximizing one’s success at the four F’s: “feeding, flee- argues that epistemological naturalism- i.e. epistemology ing, fighting, and reproducing”), not necessarily to pro- that holds that warrant is dependent on natural faculties duce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive – is best supported by supernaturalist metaphysics – in faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the this case the belief in a creator God or designer who has naturalism-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the laid out a design plan that includes cognitive faculties con- veracity of the products of those same faculties, including ducive to attaining knowledge.[46] naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, According to Plantinga, a belief, B, is warranted if: if God created man "in his image" by way of an evolution- ary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable. (1) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are functioning properly…; (2) The argument does not assume any necessary correla- your cognitive environment is sufficiently sim- tion (or uncorrelation) between true beliefs and survival. ilar to the one for which your cognitive facul- Making the contrary assumption—that there is in fact a ties are designed; (3) … the design plan gov- relatively strong correlation between truth and survival— erning the production of the belief in question if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a sur- involves, as purpose or function, the produc- vival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true be- tion of true beliefs…; and (4) the design plan liefs confer a survival advantage. Plantinga counters that, is a good one: that is, there is a high statisti- while there may be overlap between true beliefs and be- cal or objective probability that a belief pro- liefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs duced in accordance with the relevant segment are not the same, and he gives the following example with of the design plan in that sort of environment a man named Paul: [47] is true. Although the argument has been criticized by some philosophers, like Elliott Sober, it has received favorable Plantinga seeks to defend this view of proper function notice from Thomas Nagel and others. against alternative views of proper function proposed by other philosophers which he groups together as “natural- istic”, including the “functional generalization” view of 2.5 Evolution and Christianity John Pollock, the evolutionary/etiological account pro- vided by Ruth Millikan, and a dispositional view held by [48] In the past, Plantinga has lent support to the intelligent John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter. Plantinga also dis- design movement.[51] He was a member of the 'Ad cusses his evolutionary argument against naturalism in the [49] Hoc Origins Committee' that supported Philip E. John- later chapters of Warrant and Proper Function. son's 1991 book Darwin on Trial against palaeontolo- In 2000, the third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, gist Stephen Jay Gould's high-profile scathing review in 4 5 NOTES

Scientific American in 1992.[52][53] Plantinga also pro- • Warrant: the Current Debate. New York: Oxford vided a back-cover endorsement of Johnson’s book.[54] University Press. 1993. ISBN 0-19-507861-6 He was a Fellow of the (now moribund) pro-intelligent • design International Society for Complexity, Information, Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford Uni- and Design,[55] and has presented at a number of intelli- versity Press. 1993. ISBN 0-19-507863-2 [56] gent design conferences. • Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford In a March 2010 article in The Chronicle of Higher Ed- University Press. 2000. ISBN 0-19-513192-4 ucation, philosopher of science Michael Ruse labeled online Plantinga as an “open enthusiast of intelligent design”.[57] • In a letter to the editor, Plantinga made the following re- Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. Matthew sponse: Davidson (ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. ISBN 0-19-510376-9

Like any Christian (and indeed any theist), • Knowledge of God (with Michael Tooley). Oxford: I believe that the world has been created by Blackwell. 2008. ISBN 0-631-19364-2 God, and hence “intelligently designed”. The hallmark of intelligent design, however, is the • Science and Religion (with Daniel Dennett). Oxford: claim that this can be shown scientifically; I'm Oxford University Press. 2010 ISBN 0-19-973842- dubious about that. 4 ...As far as I can see, God certainly could • Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, have used Darwinian processes to create the and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. living world and direct it as he wanted to go; 2011. ISBN 0-19-981209-8 hence evolution as such does not imply that there is no direction in the history of life. What • Knowledge and Christian Belief. Grand Rapids: does have that implication is not evolutionary Eerdmans. 2015. ISBN 0802872042 theory itself, but unguided evolution, the idea that neither God nor any other person has taken a hand in guiding, directing or orchestrating 4 See also the course of evolution. But the scientific the- ory of evolution, sensibly enough, says noth- • ing one way or the other about divine guid- American philosophy ance. It doesn't say that evolution is divinely • List of American philosophers guided; it also doesn't say that it isn't. Like almost any theist, I reject unguided evolution; but the contemporary scientific theory of evo- lution just as such—apart from philosophical 5 Notes or theological add-ons—doesn't say that evo- lution is unguided. Like science in general, it [1] “Christian, Evolutionist, or Both?" on YouTube makes no pronouncements on the existence or [2] “Modernizing the Case for God”, Time, April 5, 1980 activity of God.[58] [3] “Self-profile”, p. 3.

3 Selected works by Plantinga [4] “Self-profile”, p. 6. [5] Yale Department of Music – Emeritus Faculty • God and Other Minds. Ithaca: Cornell University [6] “Self-profile”, p. 7. Press. 1967. rev. ed., 1990. ISBN 0-8014-9735-3 [7] “Self-profile”, p. 14. • The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1974. ISBN 0-19-824404-5 [8] “Introduction: Alvin Plantinga, God’s Philosopher” in Alvin Plantinga, Deane-Peter Baker ed., (New York: • God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Cambridge University Press), 2007, p. 5. 1974. ISBN 0-04-100040-4 [9] “Alvin Plantinga”, Well-Known Dutch-Americans at The • Does God Have A Nature? Wisconsin: Marquette New Netherland Institute website. Retrieved November University Press. 1980. ISBN 0-87462-145-3 6, 2007 • Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God [10] “Carl Plantinga Bio” (ed. with Nicholas Wolterstorff). Notre Dame: [11] “Carl Plantinga Bibliography” University of Notre Dame Press. 1983. ISBN 0- 268-00964-3 [12] “CCEL Questions and Answers”. Retrieved 2008-05-23. 5

[13] “Jane Plantinga Pauw” [37] J.L. Mackie wrote: "[H]ow could there be logically con- tingent states of affairs, prior to the creation and existence [14] “REACHING OUT • Missions”. Retrieved 2010-11-18. of any created beings with free will, which an omnipotent god would have to accept and put up with? This sugges- [15] “Self-profile”, pp. 7–8. tion is simply incoherent. Indeed, by bringing in the no- tion of individual essences which determine—presumably [16] Deane-Peter Baker (2007). Alvin Plantinga. Cambridge non-causally—how Curly Smith, Satan, and the rest of us University Press. pp. 2–8. ISBN 978-0-521-85531-0. would choose freely or would act in each hypothetical sit- Retrieved 16 December 2010. uation, Plantinga has not rescued the free will defence but made its weaknesses all too clear”. Mackie 1982, p. 174. [17] “Self-profile”, p. 8. [38] Plantinga, Alvin (1974). God, Freedom and Evil, p. 49. [18] “Self-profile”, pp. 9–16. [39] Compare "L'epistemologia riformata (Plantinga)", article [19] “Self-profile”, p. 16. on Philosophia Reformata. (Italian) Accessed 15 February 2012 [20] “Self-profile”, pp. 21–22. [40] Cf.“La filosofia della religione”, article by C. G. Di Gae- [21] “Self-profile”, p. 30. tano. (Italian) Accessed 15 February 2012

[22] List of APA Presidents [41] Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. [23] New Netherland Institute PLANTINGA, ALVIN [42] Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 1993. 3. [24] Past News and Events, Center for Philosophy of Religion, [43] Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, New York: University of Notre Dame Oxford University Press, 1993.

[25] Plantinga Fellow Lecture [44] WPF, p. 4

[26] Nicholas Rescher Prize for Systematic Philosophy [45] WPF, p. 21

[27] Felder, D. W. (1971). “Disanalogies in Plantinga’s Ar- [46] WPF, 237. gument regarding the Rationality of Theism”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 10 (3): 200–207. [47] Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 1993. 194. doi:10.2307/1384479. [48] WPF, p. 199-211.

[28] Friquegnon, M. L. (1979). “God and Other [49] Fales, E. (1996). “Plantinga’s Case against Naturalistic Programs”. Religious Studies 15 (1): 83–89. Epistemology”. Philosophy of Science 63 (3): 432–451. doi:10.1017/S0034412500011100. doi:10.1086/289920.

[29] Copan, P. (2001). “Warranted Christian Belief”. [50] Plantinga, Alvin Warrant and Proper Function, (New The Review of Metaphysics 54 (4): 939–941. York: Oxford University Press), 1993. pp. 225–226 doi:10.2307/20131647. (ISBN 978-0-19-507864-0).

[30] Quinn, Philip L. “Plantinga, Alvin” in Honderich, Ted [51] • "…design proponents such as Alvin Plantinga…" (ed.). The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford Uni- — We're Not in Kansas Anymore, Nancy Pearcey, versity Press, 1995. Christianity Today, May 22, 2000, cited in Forrest & Gross 2004, p. 18 [31] “Free Will Defense”, in Max Black (ed), Philosophy in • “Alvin Plantinga … lent moral support to the design America. Ithaca: Cornell UP / London: Allen & Unwin, camp” — The Creationists, Expanded Edition, p397 1965 • “a number of others like Alvin Plantinga are long- [32] Beebe 2005 time Wedge allies” — Forrest & Gross 2004, pp. 212–213 [33] Meister 2009, p. 133 • “Alvin Plantinga was also a signatory to this let- ter, early evidence of his continuing support of the [34] “Most philosophers have agreed that the free will defense intelligent design movement” — Intelligent design has defeated the logical problem of evil. [...] Because creationism and its critics, Robert T. Pennock (ed), of [Plantinga’s argument], it is now widely accepted that 2001, p44 the logical problem of evil has been sufficiently rebutted.” Meister 2009, p. 134 [52] Stephen Jay Gould (1992). “Impeaching a Self- Appointed Judge”. Scientific American. [35] Peterson et al. 1991, pp. 130–133 [53] Forrest & Gross 2004, p. 18 [36] “Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy”. Retrieved July 2012. [54] Unintelligent design, Mark Perakh, p144 6 8 EXTERNAL LINKS

[55] ICSD list of Fellows but note that this site appears not to • McLeod, Mark S. Rationality and Theistic Belief: have been updated since 2005 An Essay on Reformed Epistemology (Cornell Stud- ies in the Philosophy of Religion). Ithaca: Cornell [56] Forrest & Gross 2004, pp. 156, 191, 212, 269 University Press. 1993. [57] “Philosophers Rip Darwin”. The Chronicle of Higher Ed- • Zagzebski, Linda (ed), Rational Faith. Notre Dame: ucation. March 7, 2010. Retrieved 2010-04-28. University of Notre Dame Press. 1993. [58] “Evolution, Shibboleths, and Philosophers”. The Chroni- • Sennett, James, Modality, Probability, and Rational- cle of Higher Education. April 11, 2010. Retrieved 2010- ity: A Critical Examination of Alvin Plantinga’s Phi- 04-28. losophy. New York: P. Lang. 1992.

• Hoitenga, Dewey, From Plato to Plantinga: An In- 6 References troduction to Reformed Epistemology. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1991.

• “Self-profile” in Alvin Plantinga, James Tomberlin • Parsons, Keith, God and the Burden of Proof: and ed., (Dordrecht: D. Riedle Plantinga, Swinburne, and the Analytic Defense of Pub. Co.), 1985 Theism. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books. 1989. • Forrest, Barbara; Gross, Paul R. (8 January 2004). Creationism’s Trojan Horse. Oxford University • Tomberlin, James and Peter van Inwagen (eds), Press. ISBN 0-19-515742-7. Alvin Plantinga (Profiles V.5). Dordrecht: D. Rei- del. 1985. • Mackie, J.L (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Argu- ments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-824682-X. 8 External links • Meister, Chad (2009). Introducing Philosophy of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-40327-6. • Alvin Plantinga’s faculty page at the University of Notre Dame • Plantinga’s Curriculum Vitae 7 Further reading • Virtual Library of Christian Philosophy a collection of some of Plantinga’s papers • Baker, Deane-Peter (ed), Alvin Plantinga (Contem- porary Philosophy in Focus Series). New York: • Papers by Plantinga Extensive collection of online Cambridge University Press. 2007. papers.

• Mascrod, Keith, Alvin Plantinga and Christian • Interviews from the PBS program Closer to Truth Apologetics. Wipf & Stock. 2007. • “The Dawkins Confusion”, Plantinga’s review of • Crisp, Thomas, Matthew Davidson, David Vander 's The God Delusion from Books Laan (eds), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor and Culture magazine of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Springer. 2006. • Alvin Plantinga’s spiritual autobiography • Beilby, James, Epistemology as : An Eval- • Warrant: The Current Debate Plantinga’s Gifford uation of Alvin Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology. Lecture, and volume 1 of his trilogy on warrant. Aldershot: Ashgate. 2005 • Warrant and Proper Function Plantinga’s Gifford • Beilby, James (ed), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Lecture, and volume 2 of the warrant trilogy. Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Natural- ism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2002. • Warranted Christian Belief, full electronic text of volume 3 of the Warrant trilogy. • Sennet, James (ed), The Analytic Theist: An Alvin • Plantinga Reader. Grand Rapids: Eeardman. 1998. Daniel C. Dennett and Alvin Plantinga, Science and ISBN 0-8028-4229-1 Religion: Are They Compatible? (Oxford University Press, 2011) • Kvanvig, Jonathan (ed), Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s The- ory of Knowledge. Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 1996. 7

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