ABSTRACT Nicholas Wolterstorff’s Reformed Epistemology and its Challenge to Lockean and Rawlsian Liberalism Douglas L. Coyle Advisor: Francis J. Beckwith, Ph.D. This dissertation charts the thought of Nicholas Wolterstorff as it regards his epistemology and political philosophy. It seeks to unfold his theory of democracy, which he calls the consocial position. It begins by introducing the reader to Wolterstorff by relating events and experiences of his life. This background information is important as it has played a vital role in shaping his thought. Next, it moves to explaining basic terms and ideas employed throughout. The basic issue, as Wolterstorff addresses it, is the question of whether citizens of a liberal democracy have a moral duty of religious-reason restraint in their public deliberations. Two basic strands of political theory are proposed as talking partners for Wolterstorff. The first is an Enlightenment public epistemology liberalism that argues for religious-reason restraint on the basis of a foundationalist epistemology. Wolterstorff develops this view through the work of John Locke. He criticizes this position and offers an alternative epistemology to that of foundationalism, which I call innocence epistemology. The second is a Post-Enlightenment public epistemology liberalism that argues for religious-reason restraint on the basis of a political doctrine. Wolterstorff develops this position through the work of John Rawls. He criticizes this position, and in its places offers his consocial position. His consocial position argues for a version of liberal democracy that does not require religious-reason restraint. The consocial position has three theses, none of which require a religious-reason restraint. The first thesis proposes three restraints on public deliberation, namely civility, respect for the law, and justice as the goal of deliberation. The second thesis proposes a particular understanding of the First Amendment as it regards government and religion. It calls for a position of impartiality, not neutrality. The third thesis proposes justice in shalom. This conception of justice has two primary components, namely a notion of rights, and a notion of prioritizing the evil of violating personhood. Copyright © 2006 by Douglas L. Coyle All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………..…………………… v Chapter 1. The Life and Thought of Nicholas Wolterstorff ……………………..… 1 Introduction Life of Nicholas Wolterstorff Justification of Study Outline of Dissertation 2. Liberal Democracy, the Liberal Position and the Consocial Position….. 25 Introduction The Liberal Position Public Epistemology Liberalism A Theory of Political Structure Liberal Democracy Wolterstorff on the Liberal Position 3. Enlightenment Public Epistemology Liberalism: John Locke………..... 57 Introduction Skepticism and the Structure of Knowledge The Context of Locke’s Thought Locke’s Epistemology Locke’s Doxastic Practice Critique of Lockean Foundationalist-Evidentialism 4. Wolterstorff’s Innocence Epistemology………………………………. 116 Introduction Scholarship as Paradigm Wolterstorff: Anti-foundationalist and Realist Innocence Epistemology Criticism of Innocence Epistemology Conclusion iii 5. Post-Enlightenment Public Epistemology Liberalism: John Rawls…… 169 Introduction Justice as Fairness Rawls’s Political Turn Proposed Independent Source Critique of Political Liberalism Conclusion 6. Wolterstorff’s Consocial Position…………………………………….... 227 Introduction Three Types of Society The Consocial Position: Three Theses First Thesis: Three Restraints on Public Reason Second Thesis: Impartiality Third Thesis: Justice in Shalom Summary Conclusion BIBLIOGRAPHY…..……………………………………………………….……... 282 iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project could not have been possible without all those who have contributed to my learning. I thank my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. My expressions of gratitude on paper cannot match that which I feel towards my teachers at Baylor University, and especially each of my committee members. Dr. Francis J. Beckwith, my dissertation advisor, has been a tremendous support for me during the writing of this dissertation. I am truly grateful to you for your willingness to chair my committee. I am thankful for your friendship and look forward to continuing it. Dr. Derek H. Davis, director of the J. M. Dawson Institute for Church-State Studies at Baylor University, has been very gracious to me over the years. Thank you for receiving me into the Church-State Studies program. I appreciate all the help that I have received from you and feel very blessed to have had the opportunity to learn from you. Dr. Michael Beaty is to be credited for the direction of this project. Thank you for extending an extra measure of assistance to me at the beginning of this project and helping me to sharpen its focus. Dr. Elmer Duncan has been very helpful with my understanding of Locke and epistemological issues. Thank you for all the enjoyable discussions that somehow would always lead us to Presbyterianism and Scotland. And thank you to Dr. Perry Glanzer for agreeing to be a reader. I am glad that I have had the opportunity to get to know you better. I would like to thank Dr. Nicholas Wolterstorff for allowing me to interview him over the phone, and for the time he took in answering my emails. I hope that this project is a faithful understanding of your intellectual work. I would also like to express my v appreciation to the staff of the J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Wanda Gilbert, Patricia Cornett, Janice Losak and Suzanne Sellers, who have assisted me in a variety of ways over the years. The support of the congregation of Grace Covenant Church in Las Cruces, New Mexico has been invaluable. Your prayers and graciousness in allowing me to take study leave were vital to my completing this project. I am thankful that you partnered with me in the work of my education, and for the opportunity to allow me to be a partner with you in the gospel. The completion of this project, most importantly, would not have been possible without my family. To my dad, David Coyle, I thank you for your unrelenting encouragement to keep on. I am truly blessed to have you as a father. You have been a godly source of wisdom and guidance. To my mom, Laurel Coyle, I love you and thank you for being a mom who never allows her sons to doubt her love and support for them. To my boys, Hunter, Noah and Connor, our times of fun together were a needed respite from my studies. You are very dear to me and I am thankful to the Lord for each of you. And finally, I wish to express my love and thankfulness to my wife, Jennie Coyle, who has endured the difficulties of this long process with me. You are the impetus behind every good thing that I have accomplished. I cherish and adore you more each year. vi CHAPTER ONE The Life and Thought of Nicholas Wolterstorff Introduction Do religious persons have an obligation to reason to their religious beliefs or religious convictions rather than reason from their religious beliefs? In the modern era this question has received substantial attention in the fields of epistemology and political theory. One of the predominant epistemological theories of the modern era, namely classical foundationalism, has argued that no religious beliefs are in the class of beliefs that are foundational. In other words, religious beliefs must be reasoned to. Similarly, a leading political theory of the last few decades, namely political liberalism, has argued that in political deliberation citizens of a liberal democracy must not reason solely from their religious beliefs. Nicholas Wolterstorff, who will be introduced below, argues that with respect to epistemology and political theory the religious beliefs of religious persons can be prima facie entitled. Not only might religious beliefs be epistemologically entitled to a person, but reasoning from them in political deliberations is not necessarily a violation of the ideals of liberal democracy. According to Wolterstorff’s narrative, classical foundationalism is fundamentally mistaken in its insistence that religious beliefs must be reasoned to, and be justified on the basis of evidence of a certain sort. As well, he maintains that liberal political theory or the liberal position1 is misguided in its search for 1Throughout this project Wolterstorff’s phrase “liberal position” will primarily be used. It refers to any liberal political theory that argues for “religious-reason restraint.” This idea will be developed more below and in the next chapter. 1 2 an equitable (or neutral) independent source for the public deliberations of citizens. His criticisms of the independent source thesis concentrates on the idea that all of the proposed independent sources exclude, to one degree or another, reasoning from religious beliefs. Wolterstorff opposes any notion of “religious-reason restraint” in the public deliberations of citizens in liberal democracy.1 As an alternative to the project of the liberal position, he offers what he calls the consocial position. The greatest opposition to a position such as his, is from those views that attempt to defend the notion of an equitable independent source for public deliberation. Modern liberal political theory is said to have arisen from the cultural crisis of fractured and warring traditions of Western Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Wolterstorff’s narrative on this cultural crisis and its proposed epistemological solution of classical foundationalism begins with John Locke. Locke was the first to seek an epistemological solution to the cultural crisis of a plurality of traditions or comprehensive doctrines.2 Wolterstorff reads Locke as giving directions on how to govern beliefs when a tradition has been fragmented and pluralized. For Locke the fracturing of tradition was not the disease, but only a symptom. The disease was that humans were not rightly conducting their understanding and belief-formations. Fix the 1Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed.