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The Now Not-So-Forgotten Union General

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Brian C. Melton. Sherman's Forgotten General: Henry W. Slocum. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007. xi + 292 pp. $44.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8262-1739-4. Reviewed by Gerald Prokopowicz Published on H-CivWar (May, 2008) In their quest to fnd something new to write to the state legislature, and was sufficiently prom‐ about the battle of Gettysburg, Civil War authors inent to receive a commission as colonel of the have curiously overlooked the men commanding 27th N.Y. when war broke out in 1861. He received the seven infantry corps that comprised the bulk a wound at First Bull Run, was promoted to of the Army of the Potomac. Winfield Scott Han‐ brigadier general, and subsequently led a brigade, cock (II Corps) and Dan Sickles (III Corps) have division, corps, and wing of the Army of the Po‐ been the subjects of excellent modern biogra‐ tomac. Two months after leading his troops on the phies, but John Reynolds (I Corps), George Sykes field at Gettysburg, Slocum was transferred west (V Corps), John Sedgwick (VI Corps), Oliver O. with the XII Corps, to serve at Chattanooga under Howard (XI Corps), and until now Henry W. William T. Sherman and eventually in the march Slocum (XII Corps) have not received serious bio‐ to the sea. graphical treatment in the last forty or ffty years, How could someone who participated at a if ever. With Brian Melton's solid biography of high level of command in so many important Henry Slocum now on the shelves, it's three campaigns be accurately described as a "forgotten down, four to go. general?" One reason is that Slocum left few docu‐ Civil War aficionados best remember Slocum, mentary traces of his career. The author takes the when he is remembered at all, for his role at Get‐ reader into his confidence in a forthright intro‐ tysburg, but Melton indicates in his title that there duction that reveals the difficulty of fnding is more to the story. He begins by briefly tracing source material. There are no substantial collec‐ Slocum's prewar career, including graduation tions of Slocum's papers, and historians have writ‐ from West Point in 1852, resignation from the ten little about him, with the exception of his role stagnant prewar army in 1856, and success as a at Gettysburg. businessman and investor in Syracuse. In 1858 A second reason Slocum has been forgotten is Slocum was elected as an antislavery Republican that he was something of a military chameleon, H-Net Reviews taking on the characteristics of whichever officer explanation of Slocum's performance verges on he happened to be serving under. In the Peninsu‐ the kind of Monday morning quarterbacking that la Campaign, he displayed a McClellan-like devo‐ fills the pages of too many traditional Civil War tion to drill and pessimism about victory, as well military histories, but does effectively exonerate as a tendency to overestimate the size of Confed‐ him by showing both that he was following erate forces opposing him. He nonetheless did Meade's orders, and that by the end of the day he well enough in command of a division to earn a had returned to Culp's Hill and stabilized the situ‐ promotion to major general, and in the Antietam ation. campaign his small but significant victory at When the XI and XII Corps received orders to Crampton's Gap brought him command of XII transfer to Tennessee in September 1863 under Corps. When McClellan was replaced by Ambrose the command of Joe Hooker, the move put Slocum Burnside, who was in turn replaced by Joe Hook‐ once again under his old enemy. Both generals er, Slocum tended to emulate his new leaders, in complained to Lincoln, until Slocum was fnally particular showing some of Hooker's battlefield given a new assignment as the military adminis‐ aggressiveness as well as much of his penchant trator of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Not until Hooker for army politics. Slocum considered Hooker a resigned in a ft of pique at the height of the At‐ "worthless loafer" (p. 94) and a "braggadocio and lanta campaign was Slocum recalled to his old drunkard," (p. 95) and after the battle of Chancel‐ corps. Serving under Sherman, Slocum again lorsville he devoted himself to getting Hooker re‐ adapted to his environment and became a propo‐ moved from command of the Army of the Po‐ nent of a hard war against Southern property. He tomac, just as Hooker had maneuvered to remove led the left wing of Sherman's army on the March Burnside. Slocum's effort, like Hooker's, was suc‐ to the Sea, by far the largest force he had com‐ cessful; the army replaced Hooker with George manded. Meade just before the battle of Gettysburg. After the war, Slocum again served as a mili‐ Slocum's performance at Gettysburg is the tary administrator in Mississippi, where he zeal‐ one moment in his career that has attracted sub‐ ously enforced the rights of the recently freed for‐ stantial attention from historians, little of it favor‐ mer slaves, but his political sympathies were able. In the late afternoon of July 1, 1863, he led evolving toward his former foes. He resigned the XII Corps onto the battlefield, too late to pre‐ from the army in September 1865 and joined the vent the defeat of I and XI Corps. Melton argues Democratic Party, effectively committing what that an acoustic shadow prevented Slocum from Melton describes as "political suicide." He spent hearing the sounds of battle clearly, and that in the rest of his life in Brooklyn, where he was in‐ any case he delayed his march at Two Taverns volved with the construction of the famous bridge only for a few hours, not a whole day as some de‐ named after the city, and served a term in Con‐ tractors of "General Slow-come" have written. gress, but for the most part he simply faded away, Melton convincingly defends Slocum against overlooked by Republican historians and journal‐ charges of sloth or cowardice, but acknowledges ists who wrote him out of their accounts of the that his cautious advance reflected the continuing war because of his political defection afterward. influence of McClellan's command style. On July 2, Melton's sturdy biography may not be enough Slocum executed Meade's ill-judged order to rein‐ alone to rescue Henry Slocum from the fate of be‐ force the Union left wing by moving almost all of ing "Sherman's forgotten general," but in taking XII Corps away from the army's right fank, leav‐ the focus away from Slocum's moment at Gettys‐ ing it dangerously exposed, another move for which historians have blamed Slocum. Melton's 2 H-Net Reviews burg, it at least reminds the reader that there was much more to his career. If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-civwar Citation: Gerald Prokopowicz. Review of Melton, Brian C. Sherman's Forgotten General: Henry W. Slocum. H-CivWar, H-Net Reviews. May, 2008. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14491 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 3.
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