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term to distinguish this form of behaviorism from other An Introduction to forms of behaviorism such as Watson’s original behavior- ism (Watson, ), methodological behaviorism, interbe- the Philosophy Called haviorism, or paradigmatic behaviorism (Ulman, a). The distinction is necessary because the criticisms com- Radical Behaviorism monly leveled at behaviorism are not applicable to all forms. Those criticisms have become appropriate only for the other forms of behaviorism because radical behavior- Stephen F. Ledoux ism developed partly as a corrective response to some le- gitimate concerns raised in the criticisms. Skinner SUNY–Canton provides a comprehensive discussion of these issues in his book About Behaviorism. [This paper was originally prepared as a basis for discus- Simply as a name originating in an historical context, sions in a graduate Behaviorology and Education class at the name radical behaviorism has little problem itself as Xi’an Foreign Languages University, China.—Ed.] an acceptable name for the philosophical position in- forming the behavior science Skinner started, at least to practitioners of that science. However, some authors have he work of B.F. Skinner simply did not follow the expressed legitimate concerns over misunderstandings majority views of his time. In this he was not the first. He caused outside that science and historical context by the stood, as the saying goes, on the shoulders of giants. He terms used in this name. Schneider and Morris () try advanced another major step in a trend whose continuity to reduce the misunderstandings by providing a thorough in the West began nearly years ago. That trend is one history of the use and evolution of the terms radical and of replacing what could be characterized as humanity’s behaviorism. Meanwhile Vargas () argues for avoid- self–centeredness with an increasingly more effective ing the misunderstandings by using a different term, such natural science perspective about people’s place in the or- as selectionism, to replace the older terms in naming this der of things. This trend got a big push when Copernicus philosophy of science. Ulman (b), while not insisting reiterated what Aristarchus of Samos and the ancient Ion- that a change was unnecessary, questioned selectionism as ian Greeks had discovered much earlier but which had a good choice for an appropriate name. He pointed out a been lost in the intervening centuries: the Earth, and thus particular problem with selectionism: one can be a selec- humanity, were not the center of everything. Later, Dar- tionist without holding to a radical behaviorist philoso- win showed that our bodies (our physical forms, struc- phy (for example, Hegel or Tielhard de Chardin). Since tures, and functions) are also products of the same no alternative name is as yet generally accepted, this pa- natural laws that apply to all other living and non–living per continues to use the name radical behaviorism. things. Then Skinner, through the behaviorology disci- This philosophy of science, radical behaviorism, has pline arising from his work, demonstrated that our very many components. These components are at the core of being, our consciousness, our conduct, our behavior, is the science and movement that became the natural sci- also necessarily and properly within the reach of natural ence behaviorology discipline (several applicable compo- science. From that demonstration, and its associated ap- nents are shared by other natural sciences). As radical plied technologies, arises an increased opportunity for behaviorists and natural scientists, behaviorologists re- humanity to solve its problems: from day–to–day per- spect these components. Four of these components arise sonal difficulties, through challenges such as the crisis in regularly in discussions of radical behaviorism and were education, to the global problems threatening survival it- especially important in the emergence of behaviorology. self. To benefit from that opportunity, people must ex- Rather than saying “radical behaviorism does this or pand their behavior repertoires with respect to that,” certain behaviors of radical behaviorists represent behaviorology, the discipline responsible for the relevant these components: (a) Radical behaviorists respect behav- science and technology. An appropriate starting point is ior as a natural phenomenon as part of respecting the the philosophy of science that informs that discipline. This continuity of events in space and time which, in natural paper introduces that philosophy. sciences, accumulates as a natural history. (b) Radical be- Skinner gave the name radical behaviorism to the phi- haviorists emphasize experimental control over depen- losophy of science under which he operated. That phi- dent variables and the application of that control in losophy now informs the behaviorology discipline, a culturally beneficial ways. (c) Radical behaviorists recog- continuing extension of Skinner’s work. The term, radi- nize private events, such as thinking or emotions, as co- cal, in radical behaviorism, means thoroughgoing or fun- vert behaviors involved in the same lawful relationships damental (Ulman, ). Radical behaviorists use this that involve overt behavior. (d) Radical behaviorists ac- Page 38 (issn 1536–6669) ehaviorology oday Volume 7, Number 2, Fall 2004 knowledge that scientists are also behaving organisms imply agency; see Baum, ). So radical behaviorists in- whose behavior, scientific or not, is affected by the same vest scientific consideration also in events detectable by variables that affect other people’s behavior, and that only one person. They do not restrict scientific consider- those variables include scientists’ philosophy of science. ation to events detectable only by more than one person. Other concerns are inseparably intertwined with these And they are willing to work with the resulting increase components of radical behaviorism. Some of these con- in technology required to manage the greater inaccessibil- cerns include the preference for single–subject experi- ity of such events. mental designs rather than group statistical designs, the Radical behaviorists find that the most effective way refusal to allow metaphysical events to enter explanatory to handle private events is to recognize them as covert accounts, and the question of parsimony in accounts of behaviors under the same laws affecting overt, public be- human behavior (see Chiesa, ). haviors. Private events are lawful in the same way that Any and all of these components might be covered in one would regard public events. Radical behaviorists can- discussions of radical behaviorism. Some authors take not grant scientific status to private events invented to be (a) and (b) for granted and mainly cover (c) and (d) in causes of behavior. Nor do they use real private events as descriptions of this philosophy (e.g., Hake, ). Simi- primary causes of behavior. They do not need to, because larly, this brief introduction concentrates on (c) and (d), they analytically pursue any causal chain to other, outside only mentioning (a) and (b) in passing. But this is partly events. They do this for the sake of control in their sub- because (a) and (b), and their implications, are exten- ject matter. They do not treat private behavioral events as sively covered in a paper by Fraley and Ledoux (; indicators of internal hypothetical constructs conjured also, see Ledoux, a). up, or conveniently given just the right characteristics, to explain those events. Instead, radical behaviorists see behavior, on the overt Private Events: Covert Behaviors level, as neurologically based actions of the glands and muscles (both smooth and striped). They see private Radical behaviorism has been misunderstood and mis- events as covert behaviors, under the same laws as overt represented concerning private events, their evaluation, behaviors. These covert behaviors are usually less acces- and their place in a science of behavior (e.g., Mahoney, sible than overt behaviors, often being observable and re- ). Radical behaviorists do not deny that such events portable only by a public–of–one (see Ledoux, ). occur inside the skin. They ungrudgingly accept the real- And sometimes these covert behaviors involve only the ity of the physiological events occurring within the body, neurological–level events; the behavior of “seeing in the some as behavior. They take private events into account. absence of the thing seen” is one example (see Ledoux, But in so doing, they also insist that, in any serious a; also see Skinner, , Ch. ). scientific endeavor, private events be considered in ways respectful of the natural science continuity of events that accumulates as a natural history. That is, they insist that The Behavior and Philosophy private events be considered without appeal to meta- of Scientists physical causality or metaphysical implications. Since this precludes mentalistic and cognitive explanations, those When considering the behavior and philosophy of scientists, who court such explanations resist radical behaviorism. perhaps radical behaviorism has been more overlooked than Skinner () addressed this issue in About Behaviorism: misunderstood, as well as confused with other behavior- But if a behavioristic interpretation…is not isms. That is unfortunate, because the practice of science all we should like to have, it must be remem- itself, and philosophy of science, are both effectively ad- bered that mental or cognitive explanations dressed by the principles of radical behaviorism. are not explanations at all. (p. ) Adherents of radical behaviorism assume that the The Behavior of Scientists same natural laws prevail on both sides of the skin. This, The work of scientists is twofold. It is (a) to be ex- of course, does not change the nature of either the per- posed to precise and controlled contingencies that are son, the events inside the skin, the events’ effects, or the unlikely to have affected others in this controlled way. It events’ independent variables. The skin is not any special is also (b) to pass along descriptions and applications of sort of boundary to the laws of the universe. Further- those contingencies to others. more, radical behaviorists recognize that a person may at Scientific work is initially the behavior of the scientist times be the only observer in a position to detect or dis- under direct control of the contingency relations (that is, criminate the occurrence of certain events within his or under the direct control of the complex of multiple stimuli, her skin (words like “detect” and “discriminate” need not behaviors, and consequences) experienced in research. ehaviorology oday Volume 7, Number 2, Fall 2004 (issn 1536–6669) Page 39
This is the point of science. After extensive study and engineering and cultural design (Skinner, ; Ulman, preparation, scientists are exposed to the contingencies of ; West & Hamerlynck, ). Indeed, the radical the unknowns in their disciplines. Due to their study and behaviorist and behaviorological perspectives encompass preparation, they derive the maximum benefit from that a far wider domain than that denoted traditionally as exposure. And that is what doing science is all about. “respondent and operant conditioning in the learning of The rare and precise arrangement of contingencies new behavior.” experienced in research generally limits the availability of these particular contingencies to scientific contexts. The Philosophy of Scientists Hence only people operating in those contexts have their Scientists, like everyone else (including radical behavior- behaviors effectively shaped by those contingencies. The ists), are behaving organisms whose behaviors, scientific subsequent steps a scientist takes are largely determined or not, are affected by the same laws that affect other be- by the consequences of the previous steps. The result is a haviors. Those laws essentially reflect the functional rela- unique, contingency–shaped expansion of the scientist’s tions between behavior and the variables inherent in an scientific behavior repertoire. Due to this expansion, sci- organism’s (a) species history (e.g., genetics), (b) personal entists can behave more effectively with respect to the history, (c) current situation and, for people, (d) cultural subject under their study than others who lack that expo- setting. These contain the variables which a behavior- sure to those contingencies. ologist addresses when trying to analyze, understand, pre- The disciplinary behaviors of scientists also include dict, control, and interpret the behavior of organisms. the behavior repertoires of summarizing, reporting, and A scientist’s philosophy of science is itself among the applying their expanded scientific repertoires. These dis- variables affecting his or her work. The philosophical rep- ciplinary repertoires involve verbal stimuli. And these ertoire derives partly from the history and setting vari- verbal stimuli provide rules. The rules are statements of ables. This repertoire later affects the scientist’s work as a the contingencies the scientists have experienced. These part of those variables. The philosophical repertoire in- rules affect the behaviors of others. Colleagues, disci- cludes various underlying assumptions. Comprised plines, fields, and the public benefit from using these mostly of verbal behaviors, a discipline’s philosophy of rules because when their behavior is affected by these science is usually learned at advanced stages in disciplin- rules (that is, when their behavior comes to be rule–gov- ary training, although precursors are present long before erned—i.e., verbally mediated) their behavior often be- that (parts of the personal history variables). This reper- comes more effective than it would be without the rules. toire is behavior, and as such continues to be subject to As a result the rules become responsible for much of the the laws of behavior. But, through the scientist’s col- behavior of these groups. In essence, such benefits accrue leagues and discipline which share it, the philosophy it- by expanding the repertoires of those people without self becomes one of the variables affecting the scientist’s each of them having to await the unlikely experience of subsequent work (part of the cultural setting variables). the research contingencies themselves. In this way they A scientist’s philosophy of science affects her or his work benefit from scientists’ work. While much of scientists’ in several ways. One way involves the philosophy evoking scientific behavior is contingency–shaped in vital ways, investigations of certain variables and not others. Cooper, the behaviors of these other groups is to a large extent Heron, and Heward (, p. ) provide some examples: rule–governed (see Skinner, , about this distinction). …the philosophical decisions to ignore all Vargas () has recently recast the distinction be- private events or to use explanatory fictions tween contingency–shaped and rule–governed behavior as the causes of behavior may both produce a as the distinction between event–governed and verbally– similar effect on research and practice. Both governed (or mediated) behavior. This distinction and its positions restrict practice and research even implications, and several other advances, provide the cur- though for different reasons. Methodological rent state of the art for the scientific comprehension and behaviorism is restrictive because it ignores handling of complex human behaviors. Some of the areas of major importance for an understand- other advances include (a) the analysis of verbal behavior ing of behavior. Mentalistic positions are also (Skinner, ), (b) recombined repertoires (Epstein, restrictive, for as noted by Skinner (), ), (c) establishing operations (Michael, ), “Mentalistic explanations allay curiosity and (d) multi–term (n–term) contingencies (Sidman, a, bring inquiry to a stop. It is so easy to observe b), (e) the function–altering effects of contingency– feelings and states of mind at a time and in a specifying stimuli (Schlinger & Blakely, ), (f) stimu- place which make them seem like causes that lus equivalence relations (Sidman, ; Sidman, Wynne, we are not inclined to inquire further.” Maguire, & Barnes, ; Stromer, ), (g) the general A philosophy of science can also affect a scientist’s level of reinforcement (Cautela, ), and (h) behavioral work by playing a role in the conditioning of a scientist Page 40 (issn 1536–6669) ehaviorology oday Volume 7, Number 2, Fall 2004
to be reinforced by certain classes of events and not oth- the scope of either that paper or this one. (For compre- ers. Hake (, p. ) provides some examples: hensive coverage, see Skinner, , . For more recent The issue here is what the radical behaviorist comprehensive coverage, see Chiesa, .) believes the reinforcement contingencies for the scientist should be. The most common view and that of the methodological behav- Endnotes iorist is that inclusion of a finding in the body of knowledge or theory is based on accept- The author thanks the members of the graduate Behav- ability to the scientific community in the iorology and Education class in Xi’an, China (see Ledoux, terms of () the research procedures used b), for whom this paper was originally prepared, for (e.g., agreement among observers, replicable their discussions which provided a good foundation for individual data, precise measurement and subsequent improvements. The author uses this material control) and () the relation of the content to to help students and colleagues begin to understand the the existing theory (e.g., related to a produc- philosophical basis of behaviorology in a way that encour- tive content area but an extension of it). The ages them to seek details from more extensive sources (e.g., radical behaviorist would not believe those Skinner, , ; Chiesa, ). The paper was revised contingencies alone to be totally desirable, for publication () in Behaviorological Commentaries, because they include insufficient reinforcement Serial No. , pp. –. Then, before receiving further mi- for innovative content and procedures, and nor revisions for inclusion in Origins and Components of thereby delimit the growth of science… The Behaviorology (Ledoux, S.F. [/—Second Edi- radical behaviorist would suggest workability, tion]. Canton, : ABCs.), it received minor revisions for stimulation, and contribution to society as inclusion in the edition of this book of readings. additional worthwhile contingencies that The author also thanks John Eshleman, Lawrence would encourage innovation of content and Fraley, and Jerome Ulman for providing helpful com- method. The major contention is that scien- ments on various drafts of this material. Address corre- tists should recognize that all aspects of their spondence regarding this paper to the author at scientific behavior are shaped by the reinforcers –, Canton – . of some scientific community and that this control of their behavior affects the science. References
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