Building Democracy: De Jure and De Facto Autonomy In
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BUILDING DEMOCRACY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO AUTONOMY IN ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA by Luis Alejandro Trelles Yarza B.A. in Political Science (with Honors), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), México City, 2007 M.A. in Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2013 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2018 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Luis Alejandro Trelles Yarza It was defended on October 30, 2018 and approved by Dissertation Chairperson: Scott Morgenstern, Professor, University of Pittsburgh Barry Ames, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh B. Guy Peters, Maurice Falk Professor of American Government, University of Pittsburgh Louis Picard, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh Staffan I. Lindberg, Professor of Political Science, Director of the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg Joshua M. Kivuva, Associate Professor, University of Nairobi ii Copyright © by Luis Alejandro Trelles Yarza 2018 iii BUILDING DEMOCRACY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO AUTONOMY IN ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA Luis Alejandro Telles Yarza, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2018 This work studies the autonomy in electoral management bodies (EMBs) in Latin America and Africa. Specifically, my research aims to answer the two following two questions: a) When are de jure independent electoral institutions able to aid in building democracy? And b) Under what circumstances are de jure autonomous EMBs able to develop and maintain de facto independence? Using a mixed methods approach, I examine the effect of EMBs’ de facto independence on the quality of elections and the mechanisms that allow de jure autonomous EMBs to become de facto independent in third-wave countries. Based on fieldwork in Mexico, Venezuela, Ghana, Kenya, and Egypt, I find that formal independence is insufficient to guarantee de facto autonomy. My investigation confirms that EMBs de facto independence is positively associated to the credibility of elections. I conclude that internal consultative mechanisms (ICMs) embedded within EMBs offer an alternative path –to institutional insulation– for these institutions to build a positive reputation over time. My research contributes to the literature on electoral governance by showing that electoral bureaucracies that effectively channel external political pressures through internal consultative mechanisms are more likely to positively impact the quality of elections. Contrary to previous studies focusing solely on formal rules promoting EMBs institutional insulation, I contend that EMBs in third-wave countries are more likely to achieve higher levels of de facto iv autonomy by adopting mechanisms that allow the main stakeholders –political actors– to participate in key stages of electoral management. This theoretical refinement shows that ICMs are key for administrative procedures within EMBs to become more transparent, accessible, and accountable to political actors competing for power. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... XIII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................... XXII 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH PUZZLE ................................................... 4 1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................... 14 1.3 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION ................................................................... 18 2.0 COMPARING DE JURE AND DE FACTO ELECTORAL AUTONOMY ............ 22 2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 22 2.2 DE JURE AND DE FACTO ELECTORAL AUTONOMY ........................... 22 2.2.1 De Jure Autonomy in Electoral Management Bodies .............................. 23 2.2.2 De Facto Autonomy in Electoral Management Bodies ............................ 33 2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 43 3.0 THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL AUTONOMY ................................. 47 3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 47 3.2 MEASUREING INDEPENDENCE IN ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT .. 47 3.3 INTRODUCING A NEW MEASURE OF DE FACTO AUTONOMY ........ 57 3.3.1 Measuring de facto autonomy .................................................................... 57 3.3.2 Replicating Hartlyn et al., (2008)............................................................... 59 3.3.3 Replicating Birch (2008) ............................................................................. 68 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 73 4.0 DE FACTO AUTONOMY AND THE QUALITY OF ELECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA ......................................................................................................... 77 vi 4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 77 4.2 DIFFERENT PATHWAYS FOR ACHIEVING DE FACTO ELECTORAL AUTONOMY ...................................................................................................................... 81 4.3 INSULATION, ICMS AND DE FACTO AUTONOMY ............................... 91 4.3.1 Chile, Argentina, and Brazil ...................................................................... 92 4.3.2 Benin, South Africa, Colombia, and Uruguay ....................................... 100 4.3.2.1 Benin .................................................................................................. 100 4.3.2.2 South Africa ...................................................................................... 105 4.3.2.3 Colombia ............................................................................................ 116 4.3.2.4 Uruguay ............................................................................................. 124 4.4 A NOTE ON ENDOGENEITY ................................................................... 135 4.4.1 The Underlying Conditions for Democracy ........................................... 135 4.4.2 Party System Institutionalization (PSI) .................................................. 146 4.4.3 The Level of Bureaucratic Professionalization ...................................... 153 4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 157 5.0 INTERNAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS (ICMS) AND DE FACTO INDEPENDENCE..................................................................................................................... 161 5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 161 5.2 EXPLAINING DE FACTO AUTONOMY IN THIRD-WAVE COUNTRIES …………………………………………………………………………………163 5.2.1 Internal Consultative Mechanisms (ICMs) ............................................ 163 5.2.2 Alternative Explanations .......................................................................... 177 5.2.3 Case Selection ............................................................................................ 187 vii 5.2.4 Comparative Case Study Analysis .......................................................... 190 5.2.5 Process Tracing and Qualitative Analysis .............................................. 201 5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS .......................................................................... 206 6.0 INTERNAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION .................................................................................................................. 208 6.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 208 6.2 MEXICO: THE INTERNAL PARTISAN CHECK AND BALANCE SYSTEM …………………………………………………………………………………210 6.2.1 Emergence and Development of Electoral Management in Mexico .... 211 6.2.2 Formal and Informal Internal Consultative Mechanisms Under CFE 221 6.2.3 Formal and Informal Internal Consultative Mechanisms After IFE .. 230 6.2.4 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................ 253 6.3 GHANA: TRUST BUILDNG AND INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS ................................................................................................................ 258 6.3.1 Emergence and Development of Electoral Autonomy in Ghana .......... 262 6.3.2 Formal Independence and the Adoption of Informal ICMs ................. 276 6.3.3 Concluding Remarks ................................................................................ 307 6.4 FINAL THOUGHTS ....................................................................................... 312 7.0 INSULATIOON, POLITICAL UNREST AND DEMOCRATIC INESTABILITY ……………………………………………………………………………………….315 7.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 315 7.2 VENEZUELA: THE GAP BETWEEN DE JURE AND DE FACTO ELECTORAL AUTONOMY .........................................................................................