Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

THE END OF THE LOCAL SCHOOL? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SCHOOL CHOICE POLITICS IN AND FRANCE1

Anne Lachance, Queen’s University

This article examines the politics of school choice in Sweden and . It seeks to explain why Swedish reformers succeeded in abolishing the residentially-based school system, while equally motivated French politicians could only implement a modest relaxation of residence-based admission criteria. To understand this variation in policy outcomes, I take a two-fold institutional and coalitional approach. First, I argue that Swedish institutions were more open to change than French institutions, especially at the implementation stage. Second, Swedish reformers attracted a broader support for their policies. Even after the right-wing government lost power, the Social Democrats could not find enough support in Parliament to reform the new system as much as they wanted. In France, the government was unable to build a coalition that was broad enough to fully implement its policy agenda. The collaboration with local governments was difficult, and unions protested strongly against the reform.

During the last 25 years, the spread of school choice policies has been the most important trend in the evolution of education systems in advanced democracies (Musset, 2012). School choice reforms share the objective of breaking the traditional link between public schooling and neighbourhood (Berry Cullen, 2005). In choice-based education systems, there no longer is a ‘local public school’ frequented by all the children who live nearby. Residence-based admission criteria are weakened, and families are empowered to select from several school options. As a result, public schools must compete to attract students. By positing parents as consumers and schools as competing service providers, school choice policies create ‘educational markets’ (Feinberg and Lubienski, 2008: 2). In 1994, only a handful of countries had implemented school choice arrangements (OECD, 1994). However, by 2010, nearly two-thirds of OECD countries had followed their lead (Musset, 2012). One of the countries that moved the furthest in this direction is Sweden. After the 1991 election, center-right parties formed a coalition government, thereby ending nine years of social democratic rule. The government undertook reforms that radically transformed the way education was delivered. It replaced the residentially-based system with a universal school voucher system, in which families were given a tuition voucher that they could use in any school (Proposition 1992/93:230).2 The voucher system not only included public schools, but also schools run by private groups (called “free schools” in Sweden). Vouchers used in free schools were worth 85% of the value of vouchers used in public schools (Proposition 1991/92:95). That percentage was lowered to 75% in 1994, after the Social Democrats came back to power. However, they reversed their decision in 1996, and free schools began to receive the same amount per student as public schools (Proposition 1995/96:200). The transition towards a choice-based education system, therefore, was accepted by all the major political parties by the middle of the 1990s. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the French government failed to abolish its residentially-based school system, even though the main candidates in the 2007 election supported school choice reforms. In fact, one of Nicolas Sarkozy’s core electoral promises was to abolish the ‘school map,’3 which had been used to organize the attribution of students to public schools since

1 This project is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 2 The “Proposition” is the bill passed in Parliament. It is listed under Sveriges Regeringen in the bibliography. 3 The school map divides French departments in small zones. All students who reside in a zone are expected to attend the same public school (Van Zanten and Obin 2010). 1

Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

1963. After the abolition of the school map, Sarkozy argued, families would be able to choose any public school that fitted their needs better than the neighbourhood school (Soulé, 2007). His main opponent in the election, the socialist Ségolène Royal, also said she supported the abolition of the school map, before she reconsidered her position and argued for a relaxation of residence-based admission criteria (Soulé, 2006a). After Sarkozy’s election, the new Education Minister, , was asked to launch the education reforms. In the spring of 2007, residence-based admission criteria were relaxed (Education nationale, 2007a). This was supposed to be the first step in the progressive abolition of the school map, which Darcos expected to complete by 2010 (Education nationale, 2007b). However, he never took a second step in that direction. Instead, the commitment to abolish the school map was abandoned. This article seeks to explain why Swedish politicians succeeded in abolishing the residentially-based school system while equally motivated French politicians were unable to do so. To understand this variation in policy outcomes, I will take a twofold ‘institutional’ and ‘coalitional’ approach. First, I argue that Swedish institutions were more open to change than French institutions, especially at the implementation stage. Indeed, Swedish policy makers faced few obstacles after winning the support of Parliament, and previous education reforms facilitated the introduction of school choice. In contrast, the French government had many challenges to overcome at the implementation stage. In particular, it had to negotiate with local authorities with which it shared authority over the school map. Second, I argue that the Swedish actors succeeded at building a broader coalition in favour of school choice policies than their French counterparts. In Sweden, the left was divided over school choice policies: the Social Democrats and the small Left Party were against the reforms, while the Green Party supported the changes. Furthermore, teachers’ unions did not strongly oppose the reforms. In France, while the Socialists were divided over this issue during the electoral campaign, the left parties and their allies ultimately opposed a united front against the reforms after the election. The article is organized in four sections. The first focuses on the theoretical approach used in the paper. In the second section, the methods used to collect data are presented. The third and fourth sections of the article respectively examine the Swedish and French cases.

Historical Institutionalism, the Power Resources Theory, and Policy Change

To understand why Swedish policymakers succeeded in abolishing the residentially-based school system while their French counterparts could not, this article takes a twofold approach which combines historical institutionalism and the power resources theory. Historical institutionalism provides tools to understand the way institutional change unfolds, and emphasizes the importance of timing and sequencing in explaining political outcomes. However, this approach lacks a theory of action when it comes to explaining policy change. Therefore, it will be supplemented with the power resources theory, an approach which clearly identifies the driving forces behind institutional reforms.

Historical institutionalism Like other variants of new institutionalism, historical institutionalism seeks to elucidate the role that institutions play in determining political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936). Historical institutionalists argue that the existing institutions of a polity constrain the political process, since the forces driving change are mediated by contextual features inherited from the past (Hall and

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

Taylor, 1996: 941). Political institutions, state structure, and state-interest groups relations therefore all shape politics (Immergut, 1998: 17). The most distinctive feature of historical institutionalism is its understanding of historical development, which it considers to be ‘path-dependent.’ Path-dependency refers to the way the initial steps taken in a direction conditions further movement on the same path (Pierson 2000, 74). Pierson (2000: 76) argued that institutions go through three phases: first, an initial critical juncture begins a movement towards a certain path; second, the institution enters its 'phase of reproduction,' in which positive feedback reinforces the trajectory that was initiated earlier; and third, the path ends when new events transform the previous equilibrium. In between these critical junctures, therefore, institutions are relatively stable. As Pierson puts it, during the reproduction phase, “change continues, but it is bounded change.” (Pierson, 2000: 76). Many scholars have used some form of the path-dependency argument over the last decades (e.g. Mahoney, 2001; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007), while other authors have developed tools to understand bounded change that occur in between crises (e.g. Hacker, 2004; Thelen, 2004; Streek and Thelen, 2005). While historical institutionalism is helpful to explain how institutions constrain the political process and how they change through time, it does have an important weakness: it lacks a clear theory of action. In other words, it is unclear why change happens and what forces drive it in particular directions. As Peter, Pierre, and King (2005: 1285) observe: “It is not sufficient to say that patterns persist; to be effective a theory should be capable of linking outcomes with actors and with the process that produced the outcomes.” These authors suggest that this problem could be solved with the willingness to clearly identify agency within the theory (Peter, Pierre, and King, 2005: 1286). Other scholars have begun to move in that direction in recent years (e.g. Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In this article, I will supplement historical institutionalism with a theory that clearly identifies the driving forces of change in institutional reforms: the power resources theory.

The Power Resources Theory The power resources theory is an actor-centered approach which has often been used by scholars of comparative welfare states to explain the creation of social policies. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that modern welfare states are the result of the alliance of different social classes. The success of the working class in the creation of a comprehensive welfare state largely depends on levels of trade-union organizations, share of vote, parliamentary and cabinet seats held by left parties as well as on the power resources of contending forces (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 16). However, since it never formed a clear majority, the working class had to build a successful coalition with other groups, such as farmers organizations, to be able to implement its policy agenda (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 18). Therefore, the distributional outcomes observed in one society are determined by the balance of class power, and by the pattern of class-coalitions (Esping- Andersen, 1990: 16). Following Esping-Andersen, other scholars have used the power resources theory to explain the creation of education systems. Busemeyer (2015), for instance, argues that education systems have been built by various coalitions of political parties in a way that mirrors the development of other welfare policies: “despite relatively similar starting points in the postwar decades, education systems in Western welfare states developed along distinct historical pathways, displaying obvious institutional similarities to well-known worlds of welfare capitalism (Busemeyer, 2015: 5-6).” He concludes that education is clearly influenced by partisan politics, and that school systems are supported by the same political coalitions as other social policies.

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

While the power resources theory has generally been used to explain the development of new institutions, some scholars argued that partisan politics also matters in times of austerity. Korpi and Palme (2003: 441) observed that policy outcomes depend on which parties are represented in government: the risks of major cuts are significantly lower with a left party representation, while the opposite is true for conservative governments. Similarly, Huber and Stephens argue that partisan politics is the most important factor that shapes welfare states. According to them, this is true not only for the development of the welfare state in the three decades after the Second World War, but also for the twenty years of austerity that followed (2001: 3). The power resources theory clearly identifies the forces that drive policy and institutional change: coalitions of groups or classes which compete to influence policy decisions. Furthermore, it provides an explanation for the divergence in outcomes between countries. Indeed, coalition- building efforts differ from a country to the other, and institutions vary accordingly. Combined with historical institutionalism, which explains how institutions mediate the driving forces of change, the power resources theory provides a good explanation of policy change.

Methods

The data used in this analysis has been gathered using two methods: documentary analysis and elite interviews. Government and legislative documents, such as parliamentary proceedings, legislation, committee reports, policy reviews and cabinet decisions have been analyzed. Local media articles, party platforms, and electoral manifestos, as well as think-tank and OECD publications have also been examined. Second, 34 elite interviews have been conducted in Sweden and France. The interviewees were senior civil servants, former Members of Parliament, former Education Ministers (3 in Sweden, 1 in France), union representatives, and business association representatives. In addition to those national interviews, one interview was conducted at the OECD. The interviews were 45 minutes long on average and took place in the fall 2016 in , and in the winter 2017 in Paris. The next two sections will focus on the analysis of the Swedish and the French reform processes.

Sweden

Between 1991 and 1994, a center-right government implemented reforms that completely transformed the way education was delivered in Sweden. A universal voucher system was introduced, and instead of blocked grants, schools began to receive funding on a per capita basis (Proposition 1992/93:230). Free schools were allowed to compete against public schools to attract students in the voucher system. The value of the voucher free schools received varied from 85% of the amount given to public schools in 1992 (Proposition 1991/92:95), to 75% in 1994, and finally 100% in 1996. By 1996, the structure of the Swedish education system was completely transformed from what it had been before 1990. How did this change happen? First, I argue that Swedish institutions were open to large- scale changes, as policymakers faced few obstacles apart from gathering sufficient support in Parliament. The timing of the reforms, which were enacted one year after the Social Democrats decentralized education and closed the National Board of Education, also influenced the reform

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author process. Second, reformers succeeded in gathering a broad support for school choice, which not only included center and right-wing parties, but also the Green Party. As a result, the Social Democrats could not reform school choice policies as much as they wanted after their return in 1994.

Institutions The main challenge that Swedish policymakers face when trying to introduce policy changes is gathering sufficient support in Parliament. While Sweden has historically had stable and strong majority governments, this has been less frequent since the 1969 reform of the electoral system and parliamentary institutions (Immergut, 2002: 233). In this reform, the indirectly-elected upper chamber of the Parliament was abolished and the rules governing the attribution of seats in the lower chamber were modified to increase proportionality.4 As a result, the frequency of single- party governments has declined, the majorities enjoyed by Swedish governments have significantly narrowed, and minority governments have become common (Immergut, 2002: 233). To win votes in Parliament, therefore, governments increasingly need to elaborate proposals that gather support from opposition parties. The interparty negotiations generally occur in Parliamentary committees in which all parties are represented based on the percentage of the vote they earned in the previous election. There are also instances in which these discussions occur behind closed doors between two or more parties (Interviewees 1, 2, 3).5 Compromise needs to be reached about a policy innovation before the bill is brought to the entire house for the vote, the outcome of which is already known by all actors (Interviewee 4). The Members of Parliament I interviewed all highlighted the importance of interparty negotiations in determining policy outcomes, and spoke of education reforms in terms of failed and successful compromises between parties. The parliamentary process is generally understood to be the biggest challenge a government face when it seeks to implement a reform. After sufficient support is won in Parliament, macro reforms can be implemented very quickly in the education sector, and without many consultations of the local actors and school professionals. This is facilitated by the fact that unions are more divided in education than in other areas (Interviewee 5). The speed of reform processes led to many unintended consequences, as a former head of the National Board of Education explained: It is very easy to change the formal structure and to take the decisions, but what we have seen is that you cannot change the reality with the same speed as you can change the formal conditions. That’s one of the problems. […] If the municipalities are not ready, and if the teachers feel they are left alone, or left aside, there will be negative effects. These effects could be handled with political measures, but we are not enforcing those because of the speed of the process (Interviewee 6).6 Therefore, due to the speed of reform processes, unintended consequences of new policies are often not discussed at the proper level, that is, in Parliament (Interviewee 6 and 7). The reforms carried out by the Social Democrats right before the 1991 election had several unintended consequences, one of which was setting the stage for the introduction of market

4 Since 1969, all parties which win more than 4% of the vote countrywide (or 12% in any one of Sweden’s constituencies) are represented in Parliament (Sveriges 2016). 5 See Appendix I for the list of cited interviewees. 6 The Swedish interviews were conducted in English. All the other quotes have been translated from Swedish or French by the author.

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author mechanisms in education. The Minister for Schools, Göran Persson, launched a series of controversial education reforms in 1989-1990. He first asked his civil servants to draft a proposal to decentralize the responsibility over education to the municipalities (Interviewee 6). The objective of the reform was both to increase school diversity, and to cut spending for the central government (Protokoll 1989/90:42).7 From then on, municipalities could manage state funding, hire their own teachers, and influence the organization of schools (Andersson and Nilsson, 2000: 158). The bill also outlined the responsibilities of municipalities and school teachers (Interviewee 6, 7). Since the state transferred many of its powers to the municipalities, the role of the centralized organization in charge of implementing education policy, the National Board of Education, had to change: “The new role of the state would be to evaluate the system, and make macro reforms. But that meant another direction for the National Board of Education towards inspection and evaluation. […] we had to change 25% of the mandate of the Board” (Interviewee 7). Instead of reforming the National Board of Education, Persson unilaterally decided to close it in 1991, getting rid of two-thirds of its civil servants in the process (Interviewee 7, 8, also Hudson and Lidström, 2002: 185). A smaller organization, the National Agency of Education was created to perform the State’s new duties. These reforms had important consequences that set the stage for the school choice reforms. The first was that many of the civil servants who had been working in the education sector for decades had lost their positions. Some of them were hired by the municipalities, which had just received the responsibility over education. However, local authorities were not ready to manage schools and were still disorganized a year after the decentralization (Interviewee 6). In short, the old education experts, who presided over the implementation of education policy for several decades, had lost considerable power, while municipalities did not have time to form new education experts (Interviewee 5, 6). The second consequence of the decentralization of education was to divide the teachers’ unions. In general, the new reforms were unpopular with teachers, first because decentralization could increase the difference in treatment of teachers across the country, and second because they would become municipal employees rather than state employees, in effect, moving to a level seen as having lower status (Interviewee 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). Both unions protested against the reforms. However, the government offered compulsory school teachers, represented by Lärarförbundet, salary increases that would put them at the same level as gymnasium teachers, represented by Lärarnas Riksförbundet. Lärarförbundet therefore opted to negotiate an agreement with the Swedish government and accepted the bill (Ringarp, 2012: 332). By contrast, Lärarnas Riksförbundet declared a strike that lasted for over a month in December 1989 without concessions from the government being made (Yttergren, 2009: 6). As a result of the Social Democrats’ divide- and-rule strategy, the two teachers’ unions were at a low point in their relationship in the early 1990s and were not ready to collaborate with one another (Interviewee 9). Therefore, not only is the Swedish polity open to change due to its particular set of institutions, but reforms enacted by the Social Democrats also made the system more open for market-oriented reforms. If politicians in favour of school choice were successful in finding sufficient support in Parliament, change would thus be relatively easy to implement.

7 The ‘Protokoll’ are the Parliament’s minutes. They are listed under ‘Sveriges Riksdag’ in the bibliography. 6

Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

Political Coalitions In Sweden, school choice was absent from the public debate until the end of the 1970s, when members of the youth league of the Moderate Party8 became interested in those policies through the reading of Milton Friedman’s writings about school vouchers (Interviewee 2). Even though a centre-right coalition in which the Moderates were represented was in power (1976-1982), school choice had little echo in the Education Ministry at that time (Interviewee 10). By 1984, however, the idea had progressed enough in the that it was included in its political platform (Moderata Samlingspartiet, 1984). In the second half of the 1980s, all Swedish parties had to position themselves around that issue as the idea became more prominent in the public discourse (Blomqvist, 2004). In particular, the right-wing think-tank Timbro, funded by SAF, the association representing business interests, promoted school choice in the written press (Interviewee 7). The Moderates quickly found an ally in the Liberal Party, as the idea of choice was consistent with its emphasis on individual freedom. In their 1985 electoral platform, the Liberals promised to increase public funding for free schools in order to enhance parental choice in the education sector (Folkpartiet liberalerna, 1985). They went further in the 1988 electoral platform, which began with a full support for freedom of choice: “Freedom of choice should be one of the values that guide political decisions in our society (Folkpartiet liberalerna, 1988).” This commitment to free choice in general was followed with strong support for alternatives to the public system in all areas of the welfare state: “Independent elderly care, childcare, and free schools are an important complement to the government’s public programs. These alternatives contribute to more freedom, innovation, and diversity (Folkpartiet liberalerna, 1988).” Of the three large non-socialists parties, the Centre Party was the hardest to convince that school choice was a good innovation (Interviewee 2). The Centrists had indeed collaborated with the Social Democratic government when it introduced comprehensive schools in the 1960s (Strom and Bergman, 1992: 125). In the party platforms and electoral manifestos published between 1981 and 1990, references to free schools or school choice are absent. The main education proposals of the party focused on equality of opportunity for small rural communities (Centerpartiet, 1981; 1982; 1985). The issue of freedom of choice appears in the 1989 party program, in which the Centrists suggest that it could be achieved through further decentralization in the public system (Centerpartiet, 1989). Right before the 1991 election, therefore, it was unknown whether the Centre Party would support the introduction of market mechanisms in education. Furthermore, the Centrists had other disagreements with the Liberals and the Moderates. In the 1991 electoral campaign, the Moderates and the Liberals ran together on a common economic platform, and were critical of the Centre Party’s commitment to state intervention. It was unclear whether the Centrists would participate in a coalition government with the other two non-socialist parties at that point (Sainsbury, 1992). The electoral campaign focused mostly on the deteriorating economic situation of the country, and the results gave the non-socialist parties a plurality of seats, but not a majority. Two new small parties entered Parliament for the first time – the Christian Democrats, and New Democracy – while the Green Party lost all its seats (Sainsbury, 1992).

8 In the 1990s, there were four non-socialist parties in Sweden: the Moderate Party (secular conservative), the Liberal Party, the Centre Party (formerly the Agrarian Party), and the Christian Democratic Party. The Greens, the Social Democrats, and the Left Party (formerly the Communist Party) were the main left-wing alternatives. A short-lived populist party, New Democracy, also existed between 1991 and 1994.

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

After the election, the Moderates, the Liberals, the Centrists, and the Christian Democrats created a non-socialist government. Due to their populist and anti-immigration orientation, the fifth non-, New Democracy, was not welcomed in the coalition, which remained short of a majority (Sainsbury, 1992). The Moderate Party, which had received the largest share of votes of all non-socialists parties, provided the Prime Minister, and the largest number of cabinet ministers, including the Minister for Education, Per Unckel, and the junior Minister for schools, . Ask had to find a compromise between the parties represented in government about school reforms (Interviewee 2). The Liberal Party was already in favour of the funding of free schools and was a strong supporter of the school voucher system (Interviewee 11). The Christian Democrats also supported the Moderates’ proposal, because it would allow churches and Christians teachers to run their own schools (Interviewee 2, Interviewee 12). The negotiations with the Centre Party were more difficult. The Centrists ultimately supported school choice policies when free schools were presented as a means to keep small rural schools in operation. They however stressed very strongly that free schools should not be allowed to raise tuition fees (Interviewee 2, Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 1992a). The coalition government faced strong opposition from the Social Democrats and the small Left Party in Parliament. The Social Democrats rejected the government’s proposal because of its consequences for disabled students and rural students, and were skeptical of the benefits that private alternatives would bring to the system, as illustrated by this quote from the party’s spokesperson in matters of education, Lena Hjelm-Wallén: The government has a strong belief in the attribution of financial resources to school through a school voucher system. This policy however raises a number of questions. Will all students receive the same amount of funding, regardless of where they live in the country? How can we support disabled students in such a system? […] What is worrying is not the government’s ambition to improve the system. The problem is that this government thinks that improvement necessarily requires the creation of private alternatives (Riksdagens protokoll, 1991/92:13). The Left Party was even more opposed to the reforms, especially when the possibility of free schools raising tuitions fees was discussed in Parliament: I am wondering what will happen when the school voucher system will be implemented and schools from different quality levels will be in operation. I want to ask the School Minister directly what benefits students with difficulties and poor students will derive from the possibility to buy their education? […] These students know that whatever happens, even if they make considerable efforts, they will always be in inferior schools (Björn Samuelson, leader of the Left Party, Riksdagens protokoll, 1991/92:13). Despite the concerns of the two left-wing parties, the voucher program and funding of free schools were approved due to the support of New Democracy, which sided with the government on all public-sector reforms during its time in Parliament. Outside Parliament, the reform was criticized by some actors, but its implementation took place without problems. Indeed, the government had retained the sole responsibility over the implementation of macro reforms. Furthermore, as we have seen, local authorities, which has just received some power over education policy were still unexperienced and disorganized (Interviewee 5 and 6). Interestingly, the two teachers’ unions did not strongly oppose the reforms either. Lärarförbundet, which was closer to the Social Democrats, voiced its opposition to the new policies at its 1992 Congress, but did not go further (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 1992b). Lärarnas Riksförbundet, which had struck against the Social-Democratic reforms, remained silent on the school choice issue.

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

After the 1994 election, the Social-Democrats formed a minority government, and the Green Party re-entered Parliament. All the non-socialists parties except for the Moderates lost voters, and New Democracy fell below the 4% threshold and lost all its seats. The Social Democrats had promised to “fight segregation in the school system at all costs” in their electoral manifesto (SAP, 1994), and had opposed the school reforms during their time in the opposition (e.g. Protokoll 1991/92:13; Protokoll 1993/94:3). However, they opted not to reverse the reforms enacted by the previous government after the election, since school choice was a popular measure among middle class voters. Furthermore, in the early years after the reforms, politicians of all ideological families believed the effects of the changes would be small (Interviewee 1, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14). The Social Democrats therefore decided to adapt the choice-based system rather than remove it. In the new Minister of Schools’ words, they intended “to reconcile freedom of choice with fairness and equality” (Protokoll 1994/95:10). However, to modify education policies, the Social Democrats needed to gather the support of at least one non-socialist party. In 1994, the Centre Party agreed to lower the percentage of the voucher received by free schools to 75% because of the difficult economic situation. However, when the Social Democrats proposed to reform the requirements that free schools needed to fulfill to receive public funding, they could not find an agreement with the Centrists (Interviewee 3). They therefore turned to the Green Party, which strongly supported free schools, but were more willing to negotiate (Interviewee 14). The agreement the two parties reached was that free schools would begin to receive the same amount per head as public schools, but would also need to fulfill the same admission criteria: they could no longer choose their students on the basis of considerations other than geographical proximity of the residence, the presence of a sibling in the school, or a first-come-first-served principle. All other means of student selection were strictly forbidden (Proposition 1995/96:200). By this adaptation of the school voucher system, the Social Democrats accepted school choice as a characteristic of the school system. Swedish reformers therefore succeeded in abolishing the residence-based school system for two reasons. First, apart from the interparty negotiations in Parliament, the center-right government encountered few obstacles during the reform process. Second, the centre-right parties found an agreement on the school voucher program and the funding of free schools, while the Social Democrats could not find enough support to limit the expansion of free schools. The next section of the article focuses on the French case.

France

Like the Swedish center-right parties, the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP), the main right-wing party in France in the mid-2000s, intended to abolish the residentially-based school system. However, French politicians were less successful than their Swedish counterparts in achieving this objective. After the 2007 election, the government created a set of criteria that allowed students to ask for an exemption from the residence-based admission criteria. This was supposed to be the first step towards the abolition of the school map. Moving further in that direction was difficult, however, and the project was abandoned in 2010. In this section, I will argue that the French institutions were much less open to change than the Swedish ones, especially in the education sector. Even though the adoption of policy innovations at the National Assembly and the Senate generally requires fewer negotiations than in Sweden, the French government face greater challenges at the implementation stage. My second

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author argument is about political coalitions. In contrast to Sweden, the left was united against the reforms in France, and its traditional allies, the unions, mobilized strongly against the implementation of further school choice reforms.

Institutions By contrast with the Swedish government, which must adapt its policy proposals through the negotiations with other parties, the French government has had no problem pushing forward ambitious reform agenda in Parliament with only slim majorities during the last 50 years (Keeler, 1990; Knapp and Wright, 2006). Indeed, the constitution of the Fifth Republic was introduced to strengthen the powers of the President and the government, since the weak executives of the Third and Fourth Republics were often reduced to inaction by Parliament. Under the Fifth Republic, French policymakers could use many constitutional provisions that facilitated the passing of bills in the National Assembly and the Senate, which they used regularly to be able to advance their preferred reform agenda (Keeler, 1990). Being able to pass legislation, however, does not necessarily result in meaningful change. Due to the internal divisions in governments, the resistance to reforms from below, or the lack of resources, French reforms have often failed to produce the promised changes (Keeler, 1990). Furthermore, there often is a gap between legislation and implementation, as some laws are implemented years after they are enacted, or not at all (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 150). This is particularly true for the education system which is often referred to as the ‘mammoth’ in the French press (Obin and Van Zanten, 2010). The difficulty of creating change in the education system has been documented many times (e.g. Cole, 1997), and was highlighted by French politicians and civil servants in interviews: “Changing education in France is exceptionally difficult, this is an institution that is very resistant to change. And paradoxically, that Ministry is always under reform, every two years or so” (Interviewee 32). A former Socialist Education Minister suggested that “In many ways, legislation is fine right now. But the system is very slow to follow” (Interviewee 16). This does not mean that the education sector never changes, and there have been instances of large- scale reforms in the past, such as the establishment of the common middle schools (Haim, 1989). However, the obstacles that governments face are greater in education than they are in other policy areas for several reasons. First, the structure of the education system is complex. Earlier attempts at decentralization and deconcentration (1983 and 1985, under the Mitterrand Presidency) multiplied the number of government levels involved in that field. The state transferred responsibility over the day-to-day management of schools to municipalities, departments, and academic regions (Haim, 1989; Van Zanten and Robert, 2000). In particular, the Conseils généraux (now Conseils départmentaux), which are responsible for the middle schools, are elected bodies that can be governed by parties from different ideological families than the central government. When many actors with different responsibilities participate in the implementation of a reform, several compromises must be made, which can be challenging (Haim, 1989; Barrault, 2010). When it comes to the school map, three levels of government are actively involved in the drafting of school zones. The school zones for elementary schools are drawn by the municipalities, while the school zones for the upper secondary schools are decided by the central state. Finally, as a result of an institutional reform implemented in 2004, the responsibility over the attribution of children to middle schools had been decentralized to the Conseils généraux. This means that any change that affect the school map must be done in collaboration with these organizations, therefore

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author increasing the level of consensus that the central government must build to make important changes in that field (Barrault, 2010). The second reason why change is particularly difficult to implement in the education sector is the nature of the state-interest group relationship. Depending on the region of France, teachers have the choice to adhere to up to seventeen different unions. These unions do not always advocate for the same policies, as some are more open to compromise with the government than others (Interviewee 17). Although the unionization rate is quite low in France and unions are divided, these organizations take very strong positions and have highly mobilized members. There have been many instances in which high school students have joined their teachers’ protests, which politicians want to avoid as much as possible (Interviewee 18 and 19). Like unions, parents’ associations are strong but divided. There are two associations for parents with children in the public system, and one for parents with children in private schools (Education nationale, 2015). They mobilize their members and advocate for or against policy proposals at all government levels involved in a reform process (Education nationale, 2015; Interviewee 20 and 21). In short, the French system is much less open to change than the Swedish one, especially in the education field. Indeed, while French governments might have an easier time passing reforms in Parliament due to their extensive executive powers, they have a harder time implementing their decisions. The education system is complex, with several levels of government engaged in the implementation of policies. Furthermore, even if they are often divided over educational policy proposals, teachers’ unions can block the implementation of reforms. Parents’ associations are similarly mobilized and seek to influence policy at all levels of government. Building consensus between these groups and the government is a challenge. French governments must proceed very cautiously to conciliate as many of these interests as possible.

Political Coalitions In France, school choice had been on the agenda for decades before the 2007 reforms. Indeed, ever since the late 19th century, anti-clerical and religious forces had fought over the funding attributed to private schools, the overwhelming majority of which were Catholic schools (Glenn, 1989). In 1959, the Debré Law partly settled the debate, and generous funding was attributed to private schools which followed the strict curriculum imposed by the state (Education nationale 2012). The share of students attending private schools has stayed relatively stable since, around 20% (Ben Ayed, 2015). By contrast with the choice available in the private system, the possibility of choosing a school was severely restricted in the public system. To cope with the changing demographics, the State introduced the school map in 1963, which assigned students to local schools (Obin and Van Zanten, 2010). The school map underwent a first set of liberalizations in the early 1980s, under the Mitterrand Presidency. The objective of the relaxation of the school map was to offer more choice in the public system, so that fewer students would opt for private schools. Indeed, French private schools, which are heavily funded by the state, operate outside the residence-based system, and had become the only alternative to the local public school for the middle class (Interviewee 22). The liberalization experiment took place in three departments starting 1983, followed by six others in 1984. In 1987, the newly-elected right-wing government extended those measures to 74 departments (Fack and Grenet, 2012: 25). However, after the arrival of the centrist François Bayrou at the head of the Education Ministry in 1993, these liberalizations were gradually abolished due

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author to the dissatisfaction of parents who were not able to get an exemption from the local school for their children (Fack and Grenet, 2012: 27). In the middle of the 2000s, the school map debate became salient again, and President tasked his Education Minister, Gilles de Robien, to hold a consultation in the fall 2006 with the actors of education about potential liberalizations of the school map (Soulé 2006b). At the same time, Nicolas Sarkozy, just elected as the UMP candidate for the 2007 election spoke in favour of abolishing the map. Sarkozy argued that the reform would enhance equality of opportunity, and claimed that the school map had failed to create social diversity in schools (Van Zanten and Obin, 2010). Ségolène Royal, Sarkozy’s main opponent in the election also spoke in favour of the abolition of the school map, before she changed her mind due to the strong reactions in her party (Soulé, 2006a).9 After the election, in the mission letter to his Education Minister, Sarkozy clarified his position about the school map and social diversity in schools: We know that social diversity is a factor that contributes to the success of an education system, and we intend to cultivate it. But the school map, which has been the instrument to enhance social diversity since 1963, has now become a tool that worsens social segregation and precludes equality of chances. It promotes the regrouping of certain categories of the population in some neighbourhoods, and forces some deserving students, who do not have parents who have the means to go around the school map, to stay in schools that do not provide them with the same chances to succeed as privileged students (Sarkozy, 2007). In keeping with this argument, the Education Minister drafted and hierarchized the criteria that made students eligible to be exempted from the neighbourhood school. In the list of seven criteria, students with scholarships attributed on a merit and social criteria basis came second and third, just after students with a disability, but before the choice of a school with a ‘special profile’ (Education Nationale, 2007a). These criteria were partly applied to increase the exemptions granted for the 2007-2008 school year, but came into full application for 2008-2009. In the spring of 2007, when Minister Darcos confirmed his objective of abolishing the school map, unions began to voice their opposition to the governmental project. Their position was that the complete abolition of the school map would be detrimental to social diversity in schools, as illustrated in this letter addressed to Darcos by the UNSA-SNPden, which represents school principals: But abolishing the school map without thinking it through and without introducing new regulations, and starting that right away with a new ‘relaxation’ of the map without taking any precaution, would be the worst of all solutions. We see that inequalities between schools, just like the inequality in the assignment of students to schools due to their social background, are one of the most obvious consequence of earlier attempts to add flexibility to the school map. Social diversity in schools is even more in danger than the social diversity of the neighbourhoods where they are established (Unsa-SNPden, 2007). The discourse was similar at the largest teachers’ union for the middle school teachers (FSU- SNES): […] the relaxation of the school map, which gives the possibility to ‘deserving’ students from priority schools10 to choose their lycée, will contribute to the flight of the best students from

9 The UMP and the Socialist Party were the two largest parties in the 2007 presidential and legislative elections. In Parliament, the UMP and the Socialists allied with smaller parties and formed respectively the ‘parliamentary right’ and the ‘parliamentary left.’ 10 ‘Priority school’ is the term used in France to designate schools in impoverished neighbourhoods. 12

Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author

the priority education zones and will cause further ghettoization for the others. […] SNES cannot be satisfied with a policy that aims to mix the elites together and does not try to find ways to make all students from the priority education zones succeed (FSU-SNES, 2007). Even the Sgen-CFDT, one of the unions that was generally the most conciliant with the government, was very strongly opposed to the project, and argued that the school map should remain in place (Interviewee 17). The mobilization of unions against the government’s education policy escalated during the winter 2007-2008, and in October 2008, 47 union leaders called for a demonstration in Paris against cuts in school funding and the relaxation of the school map. Several demonstrations would follow in the rest of the fall, and high school students also took the streets (Le Monde, 2008a; Le Monde, 2008b). Inside and outside Parliament, left-wing parties also strongly voiced their opposition to the liberalization of the school map. In Parliament, the Socialists frequently inquired about the consequences of the policy in urban settings: Some schools were particularly affected by the relaxation of the school map. Social diversity in middle schools is undermined by these measures. In Paris, the number of exemptions rose from 1400 in 2007, to 1700 in 2008. The exemptions are emptying some schools of their students, which also impacts the attribution of state subsides. Far from resolving the inequity problems in education, this policy increases inequalities, and creates a serious imbalance between middle schools (Assemblée nationale, Question 559, February 2010). Outside Parliament, departmental authorities, which had been in majority governed by the Socialists since the local elections in 2004, did not all comply with the government policy (Barrault, 2010). After the local elections of 2008, left-wing parties won another eight departments (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2008), which made the Education Minister’s task even more difficult. With Darcos’ transfer to another ministry in 2009, the abolition of the school map was abandoned. To sum up, the French government was unable to abolish the school map for two reasons. First, the French school system is particularly difficult to change, as many levels of government are involved in policymaking and unions have a lot of weight in the implementation of education policy. Given the structure of the system, French politicians had to build a larger consensus than their Swedish counterparts, and they failed to attract the support of local authorities, dominated by the opposition parties, and of unions, which were very much opposed to the reforms. As a result, the government opted not to move its agenda further than the relaxation of residence-based admission criteria in public schools.

Conclusion

Why did Swedish politicians succeed in abolishing the residentially-based school system while equally-motivated French politicians could not? My answer to that question is two-fold. First, Swedish institutions were more open to change than French institutions. Apart from the inter- party negotiations in Parliament, the centre-right government faced few obstacles during the reform process in Sweden. By contrast, the implementation of education reforms in France was difficult because of the complexity of the decentralized school system. Second, Swedish reformers attracted a broad support for their policies. Even after the right-wing government lost power, the Social Democrats could not find enough support in Parliament to reform the new system as much as they wanted. In France, the government was unable to build a coalition that was broad enough to fully

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Paper prepared for the CPSA Annual Conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 30 – June 2, 2017 Do not cite or quote without permission of the author implement its policy agenda. The collaboration with local governments was difficult, and unions protested strongly against the reform. The French and Swedish reform processes are therefore consistent with historical institutionalism, which posits that change is less likely to occur in systems with many veto points. However, when attention shifts to the political coalitions shaping the outcomes, the patterns are only partially consistent with power resource theory. In both countries, the pressure for change did come from the political right, although strikingly business interests played a minor role at best. Overall, the French case more closely aligns with the power resources theory, but Sweden diverges from the model: the resistance from the left and unions did not emerge as clearly as the theory would have predicted. The analysis of the Swedish reform processes revealed a cleavage between left-wing parties, with the traditional, working-class left (Social Democratic Party and Left Party) opposing the changes, and the new left (Green Party, mostly supported by middle-class voters) supporting them. The ambiguous position of the Socialists on school choice policies before the 2007 election could be an illustration that a muted version of this cleavage also existed in France. The muted role of business also contrasts with the academic literature on the politics of training and skills (e.g. Thelen 2004), in which firms are central actors in the design of education policy. In the Swedish reforms, the business association voiced support for free schools through its think-tank’s publications, but its influence was minor. In France, businesses were not involved in the reform process.

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References

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Appendix I: List of Cited Interviews Sweden Interview Name Job title 1 Ann-Cathrin Haglund MP, Moderate Party 1979-1993. Chair of the Education Committee in Parliament 1991-1993. 2 Odd Eiken President of the Youth League of the Moderate Party 1975-1976. State Secretary, Education Ministry 1991-1994. 3 Lena Hjelm-Wallén MP, Social Democratic Party 1969-2002. School Minister 1973-1976. Education Minister 1982-1985. Vice-Chair of the Education Committee 1991- 1994. 4 Erik Bengtzboe MP, Moderate Party 2010-2018. 5 Leif Lewin University Professor, led the inquiry on the decentralization of education. 6 Erland Ringborg State Secretary, Education Ministry 1982-1986. Head of the National Board of Education 1986- 1991. 7 Ulf P. Lundgren Head of the National Agency of Education 1991-1999. 8 Mats Ekholm Head of the National Agency of Education 1999-2003. 9 Anonymous Senior Official, Lärarförbundet. 10 Mac Murray Senior civil servant, Education Ministry 1969- 2000. 11 Anonymous Former MP, Liberal Party. 12 Tuve Skanberg MP, Christian Democratic Party. Member of the Education Committee 1991- 2000. 13 Anonymous Former MP, Social Democratic Party. 14 Anonymous Former MP, Green Party.

France 15 Annie Genevard MP, Republican Party (UMP), spokesperson in matters of education. 16 George Pau-Langevin MP, Socialist Party. Former Junior Education Minister. 17 Anonymous Senior Offical at the SGEN-CFDT. 18 Françoise Cartron Senator, Socialist Party. 19 Jean-Louis Nembrini Head of the largest direction of the Education Ministry 2005-2009. Advisor to three education ministers.

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20 Anonymous FCPE representative 21 Anonymous APEL representative 22 Bernard Toulemonde Senior civil servant, Education Ministry 1982- 1987. Head of the largest direction of the Education Ministry 1998-2000. General Inspector of Education.

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