Towards an Effective Class Action Model for European Consumers: Lessons Learnt from Israel
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Towards an Effective Class Action Model for European Consumers: Lessons Learnt from Israel A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Ariel Flavian Brunel University School of Law September 2012 Towards an Effective Class Action Model for European Consumers: Lessons Learnt from Israel Ariel Flavian The class action is an important instrument for the enforcement of consumers' rights, particularly in personal actions for low sums known as Negative Expected Value (NEV) suits. Collective redress actions transform NEV suits into Positive Expected Value suits using economies of scale by the aggregation of smaller actions into a single legal action which is economically worthwhile pursuing. Collective redress promotes adherence to the law, deters illegal actions and furthers public interests. Collective redress also helps in the management of multiple cases in court. The introduction of a new class action model in Israel has proven to be very workable in the sense that it has improved access to justice, albeit that this system currently suffers from over-use, referred to in this work as the "flood problem". The purpose of this research is to introduce a class action model which brings with it the advantages of the Israeli model, as well as improvements upon it so as to promote consumer confidence in low figure transactions by individuals with large, powerful companies. The new model suggested in this work relies on the opt-out mechanism, monitored by regulatory bodies through public regulation or by private regulators. The reliance on the supremacy of public enforcement and follow-on actions over private stand-alone actions should make the system of collective redress more efficient than the current Israeli model, reducing the risk of a flood of actions whilst at the same time improving access to justice for large groups of claimants. Thus far, no unified European class action mechanism has been developed, and only some member states have developed their own systems. The model discussed in this work may be implemented as a unified set of rules in Europe, with some additional adjustments, such as those covering cross-border trade, to promote confidence in trade within the European Union. Acknowledgements I would like to take this opportunity to thank my tutor, Dr. Christine Riefa, who showed me the way through all these developments and helped me to transform the wealth of information gathered from different jurisdictions into a single body of research work which is aimed to assist in the enforcement of consumer rights through collective redress. Dr. Riefa also assisted me in presenting parts of my research during a presentation held at Brunel University in June 2011.1 I would like to thank my second tutor, Dr. Federico Ferretti, for advising me to write a reply to the European consultation paper on collective redress.2 This exercise proved to be very helpful in shaping my research structure.3 I also thank Dr. Ilanah Simon Fhima, my second tutor in the first year of my studies. I thank my beloved family, my wife Rina and my two children Gai and Noam, for their support and patience throughout this period of study. Thanks also to my brother, Dany Flavian, who has been my technical and moral assistant, and my sister in law, Dr. Heidy Flavian, for providing me with useful advice based on her experience with PhD studies abroad. No acknowledgement could ever be complete without thanking my much loved and very special parents, Mati and Michaela Flavian, who stand behind any of my success and have done so since the day I was born. Ariel Flavian September 2012 1 "Protecting Consumers in Economic Recessions", 13th International Conference of the IACL, available at <http://www.brunel.ac.uk/law/news-and-events/events/ne_41734> accessed 23 September 2012. 2 "Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress – consultation paper", available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/collective_redress_consultation_ en.htm> accessed 2 September 2012. 3 See Ariel Flavian, "Response to the consultation paper on coherent European approach", available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html> accessed 2 September 2012. Table of Contents Introduction: Learning Lessons from the Israeli Class 14 Action Model ahead of Shaping a New European Model A. The Purpose of this Research 15 B. Methodology 16 C. Terminology 17 D. The Need for Collective Redress in Europe 17 E. The Israeli Collective Redress Mechanism: A Basis for a 23 New European Model? F. Structure 24 Chapter One: Considering the Benefits of Collective 27 Action Models for European Consumers A. The Importance of Class Actions in the Field of Consumer 28 Protection B. The Advantages of a Collective Procedure 33 1. The Role of Collective Actions in Improving Access 33 to Justice 2. The Role of Collective Actions in Improving Law 35 Enforcement and in the Deterrence of Violations 3. The Combination of Private and Public Enforcers in 39 Collective Actions 4. The Relationship Between Collective Actions and 42 Remedies A. Fluid Class Recovery under Israel's Class Action 43 Regime B. Price Reduction and Cy-pres Distributions in 49 Europe 5. Collective Actions as the Promoter of Fair and 50 Effective Claim Management C. The Problematic Aspects of Collective Proceedings 52 D. The Need for Proper Safeguards in Building a European 55 Collective Action Model E. Introducing a Collective Action Model for European 58 Consumers 1. The Position of European Consumers vis à vis 58 Enforcing their Rights 2. The Potential Role of a Collective Procedure in 59 Assisting European Consumers to Enforce their Rights 3. The Search for a European Collective Proceedings 60 Model 4. The Relevance of Israel’s Class Action Law in the 63 Search for a European Model Chapter Two: The Significance of the Israeli Class Action 65 Model Introduction 65 A. The Importance of the Israeli Class Action System to the 66 European Debate on Collective Proceedings B. Historical Development of the Class Action Framework in 67 Israel 1. Foundations in English Law 67 2. The Beginning of Representative Proceedings in Israel 68 3. Introduction of Class Action Provisions in Specified 70 Areas C. Introduction of the Class Actions Law (CAL) 2006 77 1. The Number of Class Action Claims Brought in Israel 78 Compared to Individual European Member States 2. The Markets Subject to Class Action Claims in Israel 84 3. High Value Damage Claims under the CAL 88 4. Settlement Rates in Israeli Collective Actions 89 Chapter Three: The Pillars of a Workable Model for 93 Collective Actions Introduction 93 A. The Opt-Out Mechanism as the Basis for a Workable 94 Model 1. The Debate over the Opt-Out versus the Opt-In 94 Mechanism 2. Theoretical Background: Interest v. Consent Theories 96 3. The Hybrid Opt-Out Solution in Israel 97 4. Gathering Evidence from the U.S. on the Importance 100 of the Opt-Out Mechanism 5. Empirical Examination on Participation Rates in Opt- 103 In and Opt-Out Cases A. Opt-In Rates 103 B. Opt-Out Rates 106 6. The Opt-In Mechanism is Expensive and Has More 108 Administrative Requirements 7. Under-Compensation in Opt-In Proceedings 109 8. Better Treatment of the "Free Riding" Problem in the 111 Opt-Out Mechanism 9. Objections to the 'Opt-Out' Mechanism on the Basis 112 that it Contradicts the Tradition of Litigation 10. Existing Mechanisms Currently Operating in Europe 116 A. The "Complete" Opt-Out Model 117 B. Mixed Models 120 C. Quasi Opt-In Opt-Out Models 122 D. The Strict Opt-In Models 125 11. Conclusions on the Opt-Out Mechanism - The Most 128 Appropriate Provision: A Mixed Opt-Out Mechanism B. The Question of Standing - Who Should Act as Class 130 Representatives 1. The Israeli Emphasis on Private Enforcers 131 A. The Requirement from Organisations and Public 132 Bodies to Show that Private Individual Action is Difficult B. The Requirement to Show Personal Interest 133 C. The Lawyer who Represents the Class 135 2. The European Emphasis on Organisational and Public 137 Actions A. Why is Organisational Enforcement Preferred in 139 Europe? B. Which Organisational Enforcement Should be 142 Permitted? 3. Promoting Public Enforcement Combined with 154 Private Individual Actions for Damages A. Enforcement of Consumer Law by Public 155 Bodies in some Major European Jurisdictions B. The Advantages of Public Enforcement 158 C. Combining Private and Public Enforcement 162 C. Should a Class Action Model Include Financial Incentives? 166 1. Positive Incentives and Negative Expenditure 167 2. Imposing Positive Financial Incentives in order to Gear 173 Collective Actions 3. Lawyers' Fees as Incentives for Collective Actions 174 A. The Problems with Lawyers’ Fees 175 B. Structuring Lawyers’ Fees 178 C. Contingency Fees in European Member States 182 D. Lodestar v. Percentage Fees 185 E. Possible Models of Financing the Action 187 D. The Scope of the Action 192 1. The European Implications on the Scope of Areas of 197 Collective Redress 2. Should Collective Actions Comply with a List of 202 Consumer Protection Legislation? 3. Claims Against the State 205 E. Conclusions on the Pillars of a Workable Model 208 Chapter Four: Safeguarding the Collective Redress 210 Procedure from Abuse A. General View on Safeguards 211 B. Safeguards Operating in Israel 215 1. The Certification Procedure as a Barrier to 215 Unmeritorious Claims A. The Decision of whether to Certify a Class 216 Action B. Different European Views on Certification 220 C. Creating a New Certification Procedure – Pre- 222 Legal Action D. Appeals on Certification 226 2. Representative Replacement 228 A. The Auction Mechanism to Select a Lead 232 Lawyer B. The Sale of the Action in an Auction Procedure 237 3.