Operación Canguro

OPERACIÓN CANGURO

THE SPANISH MIGRATION SCHEME, 1958-1963

Ignacio García

Spanish Heritage Foundation Ignacio García OPERACIÓN CANGURO The Spanish Migration Scheme, 1958-1963 The Spanish Heritage Foundation Sydney 2002

The Spanish Heritage Foundation P. O. Box 333 Jamison Center ACT 2614 Australia

Cover design by Joseph Coll Printed in Sydney by: Coll Creativity Pty Ltd [email protected]

The publication of this book has been possible thanks to the financial assistance of: Dirección General de Ordenación de las Migraciones, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales y Consejería Laboral y de Asuntos Sociales de la Embajada de España en Australia. CONTENTS

Foreword ...... II List of abreviations ...... VI Acknowledgements ...... VII Introduction...... 1 1. THE AGREEMENT ...... 5 1.1. The migration agents...... 5 1.2. The role of the Australian Catholic Church ...... 20 1.3. The role of the sugar cane industry...... 27 1.4. The migration agreement ...... 36 2. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT ...... 47 2.1. After “Canguro” ...... 48 2.2. The migration scheme at work ...... 54 2.3. The protests of the people ...... 61 2.4. The suspension and its consequences ...... 72 2.4.1. The diplomatic issue ...... 73 2.4.2. Arrangements after March 1963 ...... 80 3. THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY ...... 91 3.1. Operación Canguro ...... 94 3.2. Plan “Marta” ...... 104 3.3. Family migration ...... 114 3.4. Territorial and occupational distribution ...... 122 4. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY...... 127 4.1. Social clubs...... 129 4.1.1. The Spanish Club of Sydney ...... 129 4.1.2. Other clubs and associations ...... 142 4.2. The Spanish press in Australia ...... 150 4.3. Religion and politics ...... 153 4.4. Coping with Australia...... 161 NOTES ...... 171 Appendix 1. Spanish Club’s Committees, 1962-66...... 191 Appendix 2. Statistics ...... 196 Bibliography ...... 201 FOREWORD

Soon after I arrived to Sydney in the mid eighties, I could not help but feeling captivated by the stories of those Spaniards who had preceded me. They had been born around the time of the civil war, had grown up enduring the famine years of the forties, and come into adulthood in the still bleak fifties, ill prepared for what was going to be the most important trip of their lives: the month long journey (ship was then being supersided by plane transportation, but most came still by sea) that brought them to Australia in the early sixties. In those days of still assimilationist policies, they managed to carve a space here overcoming tough barriers, linguistic and cultural. In the broad history of migration they were at the edges. The Spanish-Australian flow took place at the time the big cicle of European transoceanic migration was fading, while the much shorter cicle of intra-European migration had not yet fully developed. Australia was still in his European only intake mood, but soon to move to allow inmigration from other continents. To some extent as a consequence of this, it was to be short lived. Spanish migration to America and to Western Europe had been massive. In contrast, what we will find in Aus- tralia is a small community -in the twenty thousand at its peak- transported to the antipodes with a paid one-way tickect and left here to fend for itself. The resiliance shown was apparent from my first conversations with some of these pioneeer migrants in our still vibrant Spanish Club. When I considered engaging in postgraduate research at The University of Sydney, I knew it had to be on their history, that until then had been completely neglected. III I finished my “The Spanish Migration Scheme, 1958-1963” the- sis, and with it my Master of Arts degree (by research only) in the bicentenial year of 1988, the year after the Spanish Club had celebrated, with not as much display as it deserved, its 25 Anniver- sary. Since then, the work laid dormant, not much interest aroused, known only by a bounch of friends. It was not until a decade later that the community itself, the institutions Spanish and Australian that had shaped this migration flow, and some academic experts started paying attention to this remnant of Spanish-Australian history. On the occasion of the Association of Iberian and latin Ameri- can Studies of Australiasia (AILASA) Conference in Aukland in 1997, the then Counsellor of Embassy of Spain, Agustín Maraver, introduced me to Carmen Castelo, Sergio Rodriguez and John Garcia with whom we were to form in 1999 the Spanish Heritage Foun- dation that now is editing this book. What followed were months, years, of frantic activity that saw an ambitious program of oral history recorded by Carmen Castelo, and the successful Memories of Migration Seminar celebrated on 4 and 5 September 1998 at the University of Western Sydney. The book with a selection of its Proceedings, coedited by Maraver and myself, was launched precisely at the following AILASA Conference, in Melbourne, in 1999. This expansive wave of studies on the Spanish in Australia did not stop there: in 2000, Castelo´s The Spanish Experience saw the light, also edited by The Spanish Heritage Foundation. It is encouraging to know that even in Spain interest in these topics is also being shown: former embassador in Canberra Carlos Fernández Shaw published last year a book on 500 years of Spanish-Australian relations. This that now appears is another Spanish Australian contribution to the now just finished Centenary of a Nation, a Nation that was built also out of Spanish stock. IV Over a decade has passed from the time the writing of this book was finished in 1988 till the moment of its publication in 2002. When I was approached to prepare it for publication, I felt myself in the disyuntive of being faithful to the original or to update it on the light of the new evidence that could had since been uncovered, published. I first tried the updating path, soon to realise that it would not serve well the text. The language itself was enmeshed in the late eighties: I do not write English like that now -updating it would have needed a complete rewriting as well. The story was also enmeshed in the late eighties, with voices that were spoken then, some of them since silent: let us just mention those of Pilar Otaegui, José Luis Goñi, Fernando Largo, just to name a few. I was discouraged as well by the limitations of what was to be gained: whatever new aspects of the Spanish imprint in Australia have been uncovered since, whatever new approaches have been developed did but confirm what here was written. Thus, I felt the reader was best served by the voice of the original. The changes have been kept to a minimum. I should note that emerging in this text from piles of archival material are the voices of a generation that came to Australia in the prime of their life, at the pick of their employability, a generation that is crossing now, forty years later, the line into retirement. Having faced so many challenges in their past, these migrants are now facing a new one: that of making their lives meaningful after having completed their reproductive and working cycles; that of avoiding the risks of social exclusion that, more so that to their peers in Australia or in Spain, stalk them. Uprooted from Spain in the early sixties, uprooted from the routine of their working lives in the late nineties, torn between their large families and old friends in the Peninsula, and the their sons and daughters and V their new friends in Australia, they do need to know that they have a history. Apart from filling an important gap in the academic discipline of Migrations Studies, this book aims at showing to the migrants studied in it that they have reasons to feel proud of themselves; and at showing to the offspring of these migrants the social humus where they come from. This book owns a lot to the Spanish institutions in Australia. How far now seem the days in which the ennemity between the diplomatic personnel and relevant sections of the inmigrants were as explicit as shown in a section on the fourth chapter of this book. Democracy in Spain brought about a reconciliation of the two Spains in Australia, and a reconciliation also between the Spanish representatives and the Spanish migrants. If individual migrants and individual migrant institutions have benefitted much from it, so this research has. I mention in the Acknowledgements section the late Salvador Barberá, Spanish consul general in the eighties, himself an excellent researcher. I have mentioned above Agustín Maraver, to whom the Spanish Heritage Foundation is so much indebted. It must be said now that that this book sees the light owns a lot to the office of Santiago Villalta, Consejero de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales of the Embassy, and to the Dirección General de Ordenación de las Migraciones of the Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales in Madrid. A special word of thanks has to go in Canberra to Jesús Santos, Councellor, and to Teresa Gracia of the Consejería de Educación, both at the Embassy of Spain; and in Madrid, to José Babiano and Ana Fernández Asperilla of the Centro de Documentación de la Emigración Española of the Fundación Primero de Mayo, for their encouragement.

Sydney 26 January 2001 LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

APC Author’s Personal Collection. ASPA Australian Sugar Producers’ Association. AWU Australian Workers’ Union. CCEM Comité Católico Español de Emigración. CDE Centro Democrático Español. CFC Cristina Ferrando Colection. CIME Comite Intergubernamental para las Migraciones Europeas. CSR Colonial Sugar Refinery Co. Lt. DEAS Director de Emigración - Asuntos Sociales. DGAC Director General de Asuntos Consulares - Emigración. FCIC Federal Catholic Immigration Committee. FCICC FCIC Collection. ICEM Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. ICMC International Catholic Migration Committee. IEE Instituto Español de Emigración. IRO International Refugee Organisation. PICMME Provisional International Committee for the Migration Movement in Europe. SCC Sydney Spanish Consulate Collection. SSC Sydney Stott Collection. SSCC Sydney Spanish Club Collection. UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees. WCC World Council of Churches. WWF Waterside Workers’ Federation. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

That this book has reached some for of completion is due to the cooperation, help and support of a number of persons and institutions. I am greatly indebted to a number of people who helped me to find and gain entry to a wide range of sources. My thanks to Salvador Barberá, then in the eighties Consul General of Spain in Sydney, to Monsignor Crennan, Head of the Federal Catholic Im- migration Committee, to Harold Grant, from the Intergovernmen- tal Committee for European Migration office in Canberra, and to Bob Goddard, from the Department of Immigration in the same city. In Madrid, José Ramón Manjon, Jefe del Servicio de Estudios y Planificación, gave me access to the records available in the then Instituto Español de Emigración, and Belén Verastegui to those of the Comité Intergubernamental para las Migraciones Europeas office. The 1986 committees of the Spanish Club in Sydney, and of the Spanish Australian Club of Canberra, kindly allowed me to read their documents. Cristina Ferraro and Sydney Stott shared with me important records they had kept from the early sixties period. My gratitude must also be expressed to Jim Blackie, Chief of the Australian Mission in Madrid during the period studied, and first Consul General of Australia in that capital, and to Al Grassby, the author of the only took that has dealt, if only partially, with the subject of this book; in Madrid, to Juan Rico and Paquita Bretón, both posted by the Comité Católico Español de Emigración to attend to the religious needs of the migrants in Sydney. Their comments on matters they knew well were very helpful. I appreciate the help given to me by the staff of the Fisher Mitchell and VIII New South Wales State Libraries, and the Centre for Migration Stud- ies in Sydney, the National Library in Canberra, the State Library of Victoria, and the Hemeroteca Nacional in Madrid. I would like to thank specially the people I interviewed for this book, who gave unstintingly of their time and their opinions, and who, I hope feel the finished product reflects their thoughts and feelings. I have interviewed the following migrants, who came assisted to Australia under the scheme studied in the book:1 Alonso, Bernardo; Arjonilla, Antonio; Bilbao; Calzada, Moncho; Carrasco, Basi; Corral, Francisca; de las Heras, Honorina; Enguix, Roberto; Esparza, Antonio; Estanillo, Aníbal; Estanillo, Carmina; Fa- rina, Pilar; Garmendia, Pascual; González, Oscar; Goñi, José Luis; Guerra, Violeta; Ingelmo, Manuel. Jiménez, Adolfo; Judak, Valentína; Leiva, Armando; López: Elvira; López, Fermín; Martín, Justo; Martínez, Enrique; Medina, Ernesto; Medina, María Luisa; Moreno (Otaegui), Pilar; Moyano, Ana Victoria; Oreña, Alfonso; Emilia Oreña; Otaegui, Juan; Pérez, Maximiliano; Recio, Elisa; Rincón, Alejandro; Rincón, Maruja; Roch, Emilia; Rojo, Carmen; Rubio, Alfonso; Rubio, Pilar; Ruiz, Alfredo; Sánchez, Julio; Santos, Carmelo; Santos, Sara; Sueiro; Ugarte, María José; Unzueta, Manuel; Uriguen, Jesús; Villegas, Claudio;Vulcano; Zabala, Flori; Zaráuz, Victorino. Interviews have also been made with unassisted migrants who reached Australia either before, during or after the implementation of this migration scheme; their contribution has also been very valuable. These migrants were: Alonso, Manuel; Aranda, Luis; Bastida, Antonio; Bertrand, José Anto- nio; Carceller, Manolo; Córdoba, Paulino; Córdoba, Conchita; Fernández, Concha; Gallego, Frank; Gauter, Amparo; Largo, Fernando; Largo, Mari Carmen; Lasala, Toby; Gamero, Roman; López, Máximo; Marcos, Ricardo; Marcos, Raquel; Monreal, Nieves; Morales, Eusebio; Moreno, Tomas; Orell, Bernardo; Ortega, Francisco; Pérez, Antonio; Roch, Francisco; Rodríguez, Luis; Vázquez, Juan; Vivas, Luis. IX All personal names mentioned in the text are real; however, I assume full responsibility for the final interpretation of the information presented here. INTRODUCTION 1 INTRODUCTION

From 1958 to 1963, the Spanish Assisted Migration Scheme brought to Australia 7,816 migrants, nominated by the Common- wealth, apart from a small number who came under the Family Reunion Programme (see Table 1).

Table 1. Assisted Migrants (Spain) Financial year Workers Dependents Males Females 1958-59 328 328 1959-60 314 133 313 134 1960-61 969 261 774 456 1961-62 638 868 675 874 1962-63 1.621 2.682 2.299 2.027 1963-64 11 67 Total 3,873 3,994 (1) 4,400 3,558 (2)

Sources: (1) Commonwealth Consolidated Statistics, 1968, Table 30, Assisted Migrants Nominated by the Commonwealth, Spanish. (2) Ibidem, Table 14, Arrivals under Assisted Migration Programmes. Spanish.

The starting point for this research was found in the following quotations from The Commonwealth Year Book of the early sixties: Negotiations were completed in 1958 with the Spanish Government and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) under which selected rural workers suitable for sugar-cane cutting were offered assisted passages to Australia. Later, this arrangement 2 OPERACIÓN CANGURO was extended to include other occupational groups. The Common- wealth contributes 44/12/9 pounds ($100) towards the passage costs of each approved migrant, while the Spanish Government, the migrant and the ICEM contribute the balance.2 At the request of the Spanish authorities, these arrangements, so far as workers are concerned, were temporarily suspended in March 1963 . . . negotiations are in course with a view to restoring the previous arrangements.3 The first two chapters focus on the political and diplomatic machinery that created and then cut this migration flow. The time period covered in this part starts in 1955, with the visit of Monsi- gnor Crennan, head of the Federal Catholic Immigration Commit- tee (FCIC) to the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister Martín Artajo. It finishes in 1964, when the diplomatic uproar created by the suspension of the Scheme faded away. It is to be argued that the Scheme was launched in 1958 due to the interest of the FCIC and the North Queensland sugar industry in opening migration from Spain. However, the lack of a formal agreement signed between the Governments, due to their lack of diplomatic relations, caused this migration to be cut when minor problems in the selection and placement of Spaniards occurred, in the global context of a Spanish emigration policy oriented towards Western Europe. The other two deal with the migrants who arrived from August 1958 with the aim to answering the questions who were they, why did they choose to come to Australia, how did they come and what did they do after arrival, both as a part of the work force and in their spare time. Once migrants left the hostel, the barrier between assisted and non-assisted migrants blurred. When convenient, we have inserted “non-assisted” stories into the main frame of the work. The origins of the present day Spanish com- INTRODUCTION 3 munity in Australia can be found in this “vintage” of migrants, and we will consider the role of the forces that shaped this community: social clubs, church, ethnic press, politics and religion. The time period studied in this part is limited to 1968. In that year, a sociologically different “vintage” of assisted migrants from Spain started, thus creating a new social space. This book aims not only to present the main trends during the period, but also to illustrate the epoch, to bring to light remnants of texts, thoughts, images, that belong to a time past, and for that reason may help to understand better why things happened the way they did. With this in mind, the quotations, and the cartoons 4 OPERACIÓN CANGURO THE AGREEMENT 5 1 THE AGREEMENT

1.1 THE MIGRATION AGENTS

Spain has been, traditionally, a land of emigration. Since the end of the last century, tens of thousands of Spaniards each year migrated to Latin America. On the other hand, the history of Aus- tralia has been one of two hundred years of immigration. During the nineteen fifties, the migration patterns of both countries changed. The economic boom of Western Europe caused the classic sources of migrants for Australia, the United Kingdom and the north of Europe, to dry up, and the Australian Government had to scan the map to find other suitable sources. As for Spain, immigration in South America became more selective, with the latter showing a preference for skilled migrants, who faced economic prospects that were not as good as in the decades earlier. Mid century brought yet another important change to migration policies at a world level: spontaneous migration gave way to assisted migration. To implement assisted migration, governmental, inter-governmental and voluntary agencies were set up. While the migration policies of Australia and Spain were objectively converging, they would probably not have coincided had these agencies not intervened. Australia and Spain were still, geographi- 6 OPERACIÓN CANGURO cally and culturally, two worlds apart. The Intergovernmental Com- mittee for European Migration (ICEM ) helped to bridge the geographical distance. The International Catholic Migration Commit- tee (ICMC), through its filial organizations in both countries, did the same at the cultural level. The assisted migration flow from Spain to Australia was created and carried out along the guide- lines established by these governmental, intergovernmental and voluntary bodies. A closer look at them will help us to understand better the working of the migration machinery. Post-war Australia made a gigantic effort in attracting migrants, basically for economic development, though defense figured as well. After the Japanese scare in the Second World War, there was a strong feeling that the country, in its particular geographical position, was very difficult to defend unless its population greatly increased. “Populate or Perish”, become the slogan of the moment. The aim was to reach a population growth of two per cent per annum, one per cent of it to be achieved through immigration. During the Prime Ministership of J. B. Chifley (Labour), Arthur Calwell was charged with setting up the Department of Immigra- tion. This was achieved in July 1945. H. E. Holt took over the portfolio when R. G. Menzies (Liberal) took power in 1949. In October 1956, Athol Townley was appointed Minister for Immi- gration, with Holt keeping the portfolio of the Department of Labour and National Service until December 1958. The latter De- partment retained responsibility in some areas of policy making in the immigration field. Tasman Hayes, Head Secretary of the Department of Immigra- tion, was in charge of the coordination of the immigration machine until November 5, 1961, when he was replaced by Peter THE AGREEMENT 7

Heyden. The Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council and the Commonwealth Immigration Planning Council assisted the Department of Immigration in the task of making its policies. Yearly, an Australian Citizenship Convention was held, to discuss and publicize the most relevant social issues related to immigration. The first, in 1950, set in motion the nation-wide Good Neighbour Movement that was meant to play a leading part in making the newcomers feel welcome in Australia. The legal system that framed this policy, had its foundations in the Immigration Act 1901-1949. Following the trends of the “White Australian Policy” that inspired and maintained it, no person from a non-European race was allowed to settle in Australia. Persons of European race desiring to settle were required to obtain authority for admission from the Department of Immigration or an Australian overseas post. The admission was granted “subject to the compliance of the established requirements in regard to health, character, freedom from security risk and general suitability as settlers”.4 In 1958, a new Migration Act was passed by Parliament, which came into force on June 1, 1959. Amongst other measures, the new Act abolished the “Dictation Test” as a means of excluding or deporting arbitrarily undesirable settlers thus softening the prevalent “White Australian Policy”. Every possible effort was made to attract United Kingdom nationals to Australia. There not being enough to fulfil the yearly quota, Canberra officials started looking for white aliens. They sought North Europeans, through the Empire and Allied Ex-Ser- vicemen Scheme, and later from the General Assisted Passage Scheme and other bilateral agreements with Netherlands and Ger- many. The post war refugee problem provided Immigration offi- 8 OPERACIÓN CANGURO cials with persuasive arguments to encourage Australian population to accept assisted migration from the Eastern European countries. Through the Displaced Persons Scheme, 170,700 people arrived in Australia. An important group of Hungarians came after the 1956 uprising. When the flow of refugees decreased, the Im- migration Department moved to the Southern European countries, making agreements to bring migrants from Italy (1951) and Greece (1952)5 The Spanish Migration Scheme came at a moment in which many of the countries that were previously sending migrants were reversing their migration trends owing to their own extraordinary economic development. On the Spanish side, the fifties were key years in the development of the regime set up by General Franco on September 29, 1936. At the economic level, these years saw the transition from the post-war autarchic system to another in which Spain entered into the network of the Western World economy. At the politico- ideological level, the “national-syndicalist” revolution gave way to a more “technocratic” manner of looking at politics and society. These variations in the economic and ideological spheres, allowed Franco’s regime to survive, by adapting itself to the changing circumstances, without making major political concessions.6 Franco’s regime, internationally outcast during the forties while the issue at stake was democracy versus fascism, gained acceptance during the Cold War years when the enemy was no longer fascism but communism. With the diplomatic boycott ended, the Spanish Government began to join international organizations, amongst them, and of special interest to us, the ICEM, in 1956. More important than the survival of Francoism was the dramatic shift in Spain from a rural, pre-industralized society to a urban, THE AGREEMENT 9

Migration and tourism were key factors in the economic development of Spain in the sixties. Spanish cartoonist Dátile discovered some of the paradoxes of the process: “While some go to Germany to work, others come here to laze about.” Carta de España, December 1963. industrialized one. The strong economic situation of Western Eu- rope allowed Spain to avail herself of international credits and foreign currency brought in by tourists, or remitted by migrants. This accounted for much of the “Spanish miracle” during the sixties.7 In Spain as well as internationally, the fifties were the years in which spontaneous migration gave way to assisted migration. To 10 OPERACIÓN CANGURO make this shift, some legal measures had to be taken, and new institutions were to appear. The first post-war legislative initiative in the field of migration was the bill passed on July 17, 1956, through which the Instituto Español de Emigración (IEE), was created.8 This bill, for the first time in Spain, aimed not only at regulating emigration, but at assisting it as well. Through a decree of May 9, 1956, this Institute, which previously had been assigned to Presidencia del Gobierno, was to be dependent upon the Min- istry of Labour. Another decree of July 23, 1959 developed the 1956 bill, detailing its functions and structures. The Bill 93/1960 of December 22, and the decree 1000/1962 of May 3 which devel- ops it, completed the legal framework on migration during the period covered in this study. The IEE was governed by an Interministerial Council presided over by the Minister for Labour. A Director General was in charge of the operations of the Insti- tute. Prior to 1960, the IEE was involved in various migration schemes. The first was the Family Reunion Programme with Latin America. Then came the Operaciones Bisonte and Aloe with Canada and the emigration scheme with Australia, which we will analyse here. After these, a Family Reunion Programme and also some temporary migration schemes with France for the recollection of rice and beet. The IEE also sent miners to Belgium, arranged employment before departure for workers headed for Brazil, and dis- patched Basques to work as shepherds to the United States.9 From 1960 on, its task grew in importance as a consequence of the big increase in the migration flow to Western Europe. The IEE shared the implementation of the Spanish policies on migration with the Direction General of Employment of the De- THE AGREEMENT 11 partment of Labour. The later was “in charge of the planning and of the control of the execution of the migration policies”, while the former was in charge of “the execution of these policies”.10 Some other responsibilities of the migration policy felt over the ambit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -areas such as presiding over international meetings when negotiating migration agreements, and the welfare action carried out by the consulates. In charge of these areas were a Director General of Asuntos Consulares Emigración, and a Director of Emigración Asistencia Social. These positions were filled at the start of the scheme by Félix Iturriaga and Antonio García de Lahiguera respectively. The consuls also played an important role in the migration plans, particularly in the case of Australia. Santiago Ruiz Tabanera was involved in the negotiations that led to the carrying out of the Canguro scheme. After the arrival of these migrants, he was replaced by José Garay. Ramón de la Riva Gamba arrived at Sydney at the delicate moment in which the migration agreement between Spain and Australia had been suspended. The Delegación Nacional de Sindicatos was charged to assess the migratory trends through its provincial offices of Encuadramiento, and to assist expatriates in their countries of destination through the Agregados Laborales, who acted also as delegates of the IEE. Other institutions, national and international, governmental and non-governmental, collaborated with the IEE in its task of assisting and protecting migrants. Amongst them Caritas, and sections of the Ministries of Education, Information and Tourism, and Home Affairs and, more importantly, as far as the Australian Migration Scheme was concerned, the Comité Catolico Español de Emigración (CCEM) and the ICEM. 12 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

The ICEM had its origins in the Brussels Conference of Decem- ber 1951. This Conference was convened by the US after the one held previously in Naples and organized by the International Labour Office failed to reach conclusions.11 With the obstacles superseded in Brussels, the Conference set up a provisional international Committee for the Migration Movement in Europe (PICMME). In its second meeting, in Geneve, in February 1952, the twenty countries12 that were members of the Committee decided to carry on with their work on a permanent basis, and the PICMME became ICEM. The ICEM was primarily concerned with the movement of national migrants from Europe (economic migration). In January 1951, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was established, to perform some of the functions that were for- merly carried out by the International Refugee Organization. In conjunction with that body, which did not have executive functions, the ICEM assumed as well the responsibility for the resettle- ment of refugees (humanitarian migration). In addition to economic and humanitarian migration, the third function of the ICEM was the de-development of activities and technical cooperation such as language training, vocational and orientation training and, in particular, measures to facilitate the acceptance of European migrants by Latin American countries. The basic function for the ICEM was to make arrangements for the transport of migrants for whom existing facilities were inad- equate, and who could not otherwise be moved. At the request of and in agreement with the governments concerned, the ICEM carried out the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants which other international organizations were THE AGREEMENT 13 not in a position to provide. Each member government was required to contribute an agreed percentage of the Committee’s administrative expenditure. The contributions to its operational expenditure were voluntary, and governments could stipulate the terms and conditions under which they were to be used. The ICEM was governed by a Council that met twice a year and in which all government members were represented, and by an Executive Committee that also met twice a year, and in which sat the representatives of nine governments.13 During the first ten years of its existence, the ICEM moved over a million people, 30 to 40 per cent of them being refugees. The figures in Table 1 relate to the number of migrants transported by the ICEM since its constitution to January 1959, out of a total of 850,000.

Table 1. Migrants transported by teh ICEM until January 1959 Countries of origen Countries of destination Italy 241,000 Australia 230,000 Germany 195,000 US 160,000 Austria 142,000 Canada 143,000 Holland 60,000 Argentina 93,000 Greece 57,000 Brazil 72,000 Spain 20,000 Israel 36,000

Source: M. ROTHVOSS Y GIL, Familia y Emigración. Instituto Balmes de Sociología, Madrid, 1959, p. 22.

During the sixties, most of the demographic tension created in Europe after the Second World War had already been dissipated. The size of overseas migration from Europe decreased, and so did the activities of the ICEM. 14 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Up to the early sixties, nearly one third of national migrants and one fifth of refugees processed by the ICEM were directed to Aus- tralia. Apart from being a foundation member, Australia was elected to all the ICEM’s governing bodies, subcommittees and ad hoc working groups. The Department of Immigration arrangements for receiving migrants were so comprehensive that the task of the ICEM Liaison Mission in Canberra was minimal. However, in rela- tion to the Spanish Scheme, and due to the lack of diplomatic representation between both countries, the ICEM liaison office in Madrid played a major role on the Australian behalf. In 1954, the Italian Edgar Storich contacted Spanish officials with a view to gaining Spanish government membership for the ICEM. It seems that the main difficulty at this stage was the payment of Spain’s contribution to the ICEM in US dollars. Superseded the difficulties, the Spanish Government finally became a member of the ICEM on March 23, 1956.14 Storich was, up to the mid sixties, the Chief of the ICEM Liaison Mission in Madrid, to which we will refer from now on as CIME (Comité Intergubernamental para las Migraciones Europeas, using its Spanish initials, the name by which the organisation was known to the Spanish migrants). The Span- ish Government appointed as a Deputy Chief Antonio Lago Carballo. In 1959, Spain was elected a member of the Executive Committee of the ICEM, and in 1961, the Spanish delegate, José Manuel Ariel Quiroga, was named its President for the following year.15 Also in 1961, Spain was elected to the subcommittee of Budget and Fi- nances, and a meeting of the European countries of emigration was held in Madrid.16 From 1956, CIME intervened in the Family Reunion Programme, in a scheme to send about 400 workers to pre-arranged employ- THE AGREEMENT 15 ment in Brazil, and in the Australian migration programme. CIME did not assist the flow of emigration to Canada and South Africa, or those Basques shepherds to work in the US, or obviously, the emigration to Europe. Until 1962, the CIME had helped in the movement of nearly 60,000 Spanish nationals, as shown in the Table 2: Table 2. Spanish Migrants Transported by CIME. Family Travel Year Australia Reunion Loans MOP Total 1957 10,374 112 10,486 1958 159 10,994 133 108 11,394 1959 571 10,044 647 347 11,609 1960 996 8,727 1,282 604 11,609 1961 822 9,657 1,646 1,099 13,224 MOP: arranged employment before departure (“Mano de Obra Precolocada”). Source: Carta de España, June 1961, p.5, and March 1962, p. 5.

The Catholic Voluntary agencies gathered around the ICMC also played an important role in the migration movements of the fifties and sixties. The Committee was formed following papal instructions by the Vatican Secretary of State Monsignor Montini on April 12, 1951, who outlined the reasons for its existence: It is only clear that this pressing need for migration, particularly in view of the very considerate proportion of Catholics involved amongst refugees, displaced people and surplus populations, calls for a more intensive effort of broadened scope on the part of the Church.17 James J. Norris, a US citizen working for the War Relief Services in Europe was co-opted for the task of directing the Committee. A Deliberation Council and an Executive Committee governed the 16 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

ICMC. To act upon the migration problems at a national level, offices were opened in countries where such organizations did not exist before hand. Pious XII Apostolic Constitution “Exul Fa- milia” of August 1, 1952 regulated the action of the Church in the migration field. Following this Constitution, Diocesan Committees were formed, being the Secretary of this Committee the Director of the filial organization of the ICMC. In Germany, Poland, France, US and Australia, where Catholic Agencies had been already established, these institutions were simply aligned to the directions provided in the “Exul Familia”. The International Catholic Migrant Loan Found acted as a sort of department of finances of the ICMC, its technical organization being handled by a Secretariat General and an Information Centre.18 Triannual international Congresses were held. The first was in Barcelona in 1952, using the opportunity of the International Eucharistic Congress held there for en- larging its scope. In the first ten years of its existence, the ICMC and its filials assisted around 150,000 migrants. Most of this help was channeled through family reunion programmes, as it was an emphasis of the Catholic Church in this aspect of migration. The following table depicts the main countries of origin and destination of migrants helped by the ICMC from 1952 to 1959, as shown in Table 3. The ICMC cooperated with other Voluntary Agencies, Protes- tant, Jewish and non-sectarian, with the UNHCR, and particularly with the ICEM. Harold H. Tittman, Director of ICEM, talking on the relations between the two organizations at the Third Interna- tional Congress of the ICMC, held in Assisi (Italy), and centered on the theme The role and functions of Catholic organizations in the field of migration, could very well say that “if the role of a Catholic THE AGREEMENT 17

Table 3. Countries of origen Countries of destination Italy 19,043 Canada 25,657 Germany 8,153 Australia 3,985 Austria 2,820 Latin America 3,680 Spain 2,623 United States 2,224

Source: F. Bastos de Roa, Immigration in Latin America, Pan Ameri- can Union, Secretariat General of the Organization of American States, Washington D.C., 1964, p. 253.

Organization is spiritual, their function is practical” before paying “tribute to the magnificent, manner in which Catholic organizations have fulfilled their spiritual role, and the devotion with which they have performed their practical function”.19 In November 1954, the recently formed Spanish Episcopal Mi- gration Commission held its first meeting. The Comisión Católica Española de Migración (CCEM), was constituted within it. The Episcopal Commission was presided over by Cardinal Arrieta y Castro, and formed by the bishops of Palencia, Tuy and Calahorra. Monsignor Fernado Ferris was its Secretary and, therefore, the Director of the CCEM, its executive organ.20 By 1961, the CCEM ran 77 field offices, 64 diocesan delegations, three diocesan sub-delegations, a delegation in Tangiers to assist Spanish residents in the area of the former Spanish protec- torate who were fleeing Morocco, and eight assistance offices in the main embarkation points. Also at its disposal was the network of 20,000 parishes throughout the country, and many other voluntary organizations related to the Church such as Caritas, Accion 18 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Católica and Juventud Obrera Católica. It published monthly a Boletín Informativo and a magazine, Emigrantes Transplante de Catolicismo, which had a circulation of 25,000. Within the framework of its concern for the spiritual welfare of migrants it had sent, by 1961, 73 chaplains to Europe, 16 to Latin America and one to Australia, and this number of chaplains increased consid- erably in the following years.21 At the operational level, the CCEM carried out the various programmes referred to above. The most important was the Fam- ily Reunion Programme, established in July 1956 in conjunction with the CIME, the IEE and governmental agencies for eight Latin American countries (Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Argen- tina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Costa Rica). Later it was extended to Australia. Migrants wanting to claim relatives sent letters of nomination through a Spanish consulate to the central offices of the CCEM. From here and through its network of Diocesan Offices and parishes, the CCEM got in touch with the nominees, the IEE and the Direction General of Security provided documentation, and the ICEM arranged travelling.22 The major operation not related to family migration the CCEM was involved in during the early sixties was that of migration of single girls to Australia, known as Plan Marta. At the point of reception there was a kindred organization to oversee intake. In the Australian case, this organization was the Australian Federal Catholic Immigration Committee (FCIC). It had been founded in Sydney in 1948, four years before the ICMC was set up: “The Organization, already well formed, had easily fitted in to the framework of the Apostolic Constitution Exul Familia which it welcomed wholeheartedly”.23 THE AGREEMENT 19

Its objectives were to provide spiritual care for all catholic migrants, to assist in their integration into parochial and community life, and to act in liaison with the Government and other organizations in the interests of Catholic migration. Included in its activities were, apart from the recruitment of immigrants abroad, the distribution of religious publications and leaflets of instruc- tion in various languages, the appointment of ships’ chaplains, and the disposition and support of priests of required nationalities to work with their fellow nationals in camps, hostels and parishes. In the field of operations, the FCIC granted travel loans, did counselling of migrants, carried out processing and documentation tasks, and assisted in the reunion of families and in the placement and integration of migrants.24 20 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

1.2 THE ROLE OF THE AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.

On the morning of October 29, 1955, in Madrid, Monsignor Crennan, head of the Australian FCIC, met Alberto Martín Artajo, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The purpose of his visit was to asses the possibility of a migration programme from Spain to Australia. Acting in a “semiofficial capacity from the Australian Government”, he suggested Australia would assist such migration by paying a percentage of the passage fare. The migrants should be industrial workers, as there had been a great deal of industrial development in the last decades, and Australia could be considered no longer an agrarian country. Martín Artajo was briefed on how the Australian immigration system worked, and Monsignor Crennan signaled that, should Spain wish to start this migration plan, a bilateral agreement, similar to that established with Italy, would be convenient. The lack of diplomatic relations between Spain and Australia was the first obstacle to overcome. Crennan suggested that the Australian representative in Paris or any other neighbouring country could be also accredited in Madrid. He was concerned as well about the pastoral care of the proposed immigrants, for which the FCIC, he said, would count with the help of the Spanish Benedictins already established in the Abbey of New Norcia.25 This meeting was to be the starting point of a six years migration programme between both countries. Since the end of the Second World War, and mainly through immigration, the catholic THE AGREEMENT 21 presence in Australia had increased (see Table 4). The Australian catholic hierarchy was eager, no doubt, to encourage this process. The FCIC was directly helping migration programmes with Italy and Malta. Monsignor Crennan visited Europe yearly with the purpose of determining in which areas the money and influence of this institution could be better directed. Table 4 Census Roman Catholic Church of England 1947 20,90% 30.01% 1954 22.94% 37.93% 1961 24.93% 34.91% In 1955, and after commenting on the matter with some De- partment of Immigration officials including Hayes, Monsignor Crennan decided to include Spain in his agenda. He visited different provinces in which, with the help of the Diocesan Emigra- tion Committees he could observe, first hand, the desires of so many Spaniards to emigrate anywhere, Australia included. Later, through the CCEM, he made his move to the Minister. The timing was right. Spain had joined the United Nations only months before, and negotiations to become a member of the ICEM were under way. The foreign policy mechanisms of the Spanish state, still stiff after so many years of isolation, were gradually receiving the lubrication they needed to perform adequately in international politics. Spanish Foreign Affairs welcomed Crennan’s visit, if not for other reasons, because it allowed the Department to rehearse some of its new functions. As an immediate consequence of this meeting, the Spanish diplomatic machinery started to move. From the Minister of Foreign 22 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Affairs via the Director General of Asuntos Consulares, Director of Emigración Asistencia Social, information was sent to the newly appointed Consul General in Sydney, Santiago Ruiz Tabanera. It was the first of a series of documents headed: “Possibility of emigration to Australia”. It outlined the first and most important mission the Consul was instructed to carry out in his new post, which was to asses the feasibility of the proposition.26 On November. 17, 1955, Tabanera a met the Head Secretary of the Department of Immigration, Tasman Hayes. According to the memorandum drafted after the visit, the Consul told the Austra- lian that Spain would consider seriously the possibility of a bilateral agreement concerning migration, as long as diplomatic representation was first established between the two countries. Hayes showed moderate interest in the project, and indicated that the first step, before proceeding further, was for the Spanish Govern- ment to complete a questionnaire which he would forward to Tabanera. He also pointed out the necessity of the intervention of the ICEM in a project of this kind, and directed the Consul to the ICEM Liaison Mission in Australia which, conveniently, was located in the same building as the Department of Immigration. Mr. Wendling, the head of the Mission, considering that Spain had already asked for membership in the last ICEM General Assembly in Geneve, promised the Consul all the help his office could provide.27 It took more than a month for A. L. Nutt, Acting Secretary in Hayes Absence, to send the Consul the “confidential” questionnaire Hayes had promised. In it, the Spanish officials were informed that nothing could be done for the financial year 1955-56 as the migration programme was already prearranged. The possi- THE AGREEMENT 23 bility of action for the next financial year was delayed by the Australian request for detailed information on eleven points. Canberra officials wanted to know whether Madrid would agree to all the customary conditions on assisted migration: to make a free contribution toward the passage costs on equal basis to Aus- tralia; to provide documentation and carry out the preliminary processing and inland transportation of migrants; to assist the Australian selection team with police and other records, as well as with office accommodation, interpreters and clerical workers. The Department of Immigration was also interested in the number of migrants Spain was prepared to assist, and whether there were any restrictions on the migration of skilled tradesman or single girls. It also asked if migrants could make a contribution to their passage costs and, if not, how the difference could be covered. Consul Tabanera felt constrained to explain a number of clauses to Madrid. Regarding clause (v) which stated that “Spain would agree to ... every migrant signing an undertaking to work in employment approved by the Australian Government for two years”,28 he pointed out it should not be taken too seriously, as there was so much demand of workers that it was not difficult for migrants to change their jobs. However, care should be taken, according to the Consul, to avoid Spanish migrants being sent to inhospi- table areas, and being forced to remain there.29 Tabanera also elaborated on the reasons behind the question in clause (vii), relating to the Spanish Government disposition on the departure of single girls, explaining that the Department of Immigration was anxious to avoid a gross sexual imbalance amongst the new arrivals. 24 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

It seemed that Tabanera was genuinely interested in the project. He signalled that, despite Australian politicians being “cold” and taking a month to answer, they were interested and that, in so far as he knew, the Spanish immigrants living in Australia were happily settled.30 It appears that neither Australian Immigration nor Spanish Foreign Affairs shared the Consul’s enthusiasm. It took a month for the Department of immigration to send the questionnaire; Madrid showed even less hurry, as it seems that the questionnaire was never answered. By the end of January 1956, negotiations had stalled. The movement generated by the meeting of Monsignor Crennan with Martín Artajo had already been halted. If the launching of a migrant scheme from Spain was to succeed, a new “push” would be needed. In April 1956, three different initiatives were taken in an effort to bring this project to reality. Two were directed at shaking up the inertia of the Spanish Government; the third came from within the Australian political system. We do not know whether it was all coincidence, or whether the movements were orchestrated, but it is clear that the Australian catholic church was involved in each of the initiatives. The first of these was taken by Father Eugenio Pérez, a Span- ish missionary at the Benedictine Abbey of New Norcia. He went to Madrid in April 1957 to propose to the Spanish Government a plan to fund a Spanish colony in Australia. The Bishop of Ballarat, he argued, was interested in such a project, land was easily available, and Catholics could be brought either from Italy or from Spain. When the Consul was asked about the project, he answered in a polite tone that, evidently, Father Pérez was “very optimistic” and the idea was interesting; however, he felt such THE AGREEMENT 25 plan could not be put into practice at the moment.31 The second initiative was personally taken by Monsignor Crennan, when on April 18, 1956, he visited the Spanish consulate in Sydney. The items debated at this meeting were similar to those already mentioned in his Madrid visit to Martín Artajo. There was just one important difference: in Madrid, Crennan suggested that industrial workers would be needed; in Sydney, he argued that “it would be an absolute condition for the coming migrants to accept rural employment”.32 He insisted on a Spanish Austra- lian bilateral agreement, in which the major problems like cost of travel, and provision of work and accommodation should be considered. A prerequisite was, of course, an Australian representation in Madrid, and Crennan knew that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs was eager to facilitate it. Spanish membership with the ICEM would help in getting travel loans. Crennan knew also of the willingness of many Spaniards to come to Australia, and concluded by saying that the Australian catholic organizations wanted to benefit the Spanish and the Australian people as much as they could. Tabanera informed Martín Artajo of this meeting, and urged an “interchange of diplomatic missions”. Although he foresaw difficulties because the Australia Minister for External Affairs was “Prot- estant, Mason and furiously anti-Catholic, and no friend of ours at all”, he did not consider them insurmountable.33 This move did not get any apparent response from Madrid; Spanish officials seemed still to be busy with the “colony” affair suggested by Father Pérez. The third initiative was to be the most effective: its consequences can be followed through to the signing of bilateral migration agree- 26 OPERACIÓN CANGURO ment in May 1957, and its materialization when the first expedition of Spanish assisted migrants disembarked in Brisbane in Au- gust 1958. The initiative was taken by Senator John Ignatius Armstrong, member of the Australian Labour Party, fervent Catholic and, as the Consul put it, “the best friend Spain has in Australia”. Through him, an agreement was reached in April 1956 to send two people to Spain in December the same year, to study the feasibility of bringing two hundred labourers to work in the North Queensland cane industry for the 1957 season. The two representatives to be sent were R. Muir, secretary of the Queensland Cane Growers Council and member of the Commonwealth Immi- gration Advisory Committee, and R. E. Armstrong, Australian High Commissioner and head of the Australian Migration Office at Australian House in London.34 In this way, the Queensland sugar cane industry was to join forces with the FCIC in fighting, from within the Australian political system, for the opening of a migration flow from Spain. Why the cane growers were so interested, and how they managed to influence the course of events are the questions to be considered in the following section. THE AGREEMENT 27

1.3 THE ROLE OF THE SUGAR CANE INDUSTRY.

A Spanish presence has been well documented in Australia since the mid nineteen century. J. Lyng wrote in the thirties about early Spanish colonists, amongst them the Parer family, whose first member has been traced to the gold diggings of Victoria around 1856. According to Lyng, the Spanish colony in Victoria consisted of about 136 people in 1873.35 There has been a Span- ish consulate in Sydney since 1853, and the first Consul General was appointed in 1869. Al Grassby’s book mentions J. Merrey Vázquez, Peronella, Gras, Alvaro and other Spaniards settled in Victoria and NSW at the turn of the century.36 Table 5 shows the numbers of the Spanish population in Australia, prior to the enactment of the Spanish migration Scheme. Table 5. Spanish Population in Australian Censuses: 1901 ...... 515 1933 ...... 1,141 1911 ...... 658 1947 ...... 992 1921 ...... 926 1954 ...... 1,354

In the pre First World War years, an important colony of Basques settled in Queensland. The first of these were sailors who jumped ship. Then the Spanish community grew through chain migration. Oddly enough, Basques were at the time migrating to the United States, Argentina and the Philippines to work as shepherds, but when they reached Australia, they turned to the cane industry in preference to shepherding.37 A smaller group of Catalans escaping from the Moroccan War also appeared at this 28 OPERACIÓN CANGURO time. They chose to settle in North Queensland and Victoria. By 1913, three sugar cane gangs made up exclusively of Basques were operating in the Innisfail area. By 1924, eleven farms in the Ingham area were owned by Basque and Catalan settlers. Chain migration increased the Basque population in North Queensland during the twenties; In one remarkable case of chain migration, Teresa Mendiolea, from the Ingham district, helped 700 Basques migrate to Australia, in many cases advancing their travel costs.38 The political upheavals in the late thirties and early forties in Spain and elsewhere, halted this flow of migration, and the numbers of Spaniards settled in the area decreased.39 The post Sec- ond World War migration boom brought a small number of refugees from the Spanish civil war, who found their way to Australia helped by the International Refugee Organization first, and by the ICEM in the fifties. After two years of Commonwealth arranged work, they mostly settled in Sydney and Melbourne. Dur- ing the fifties, chain migration from Spain to North Queensland resumed. The sugar industry press run by the Queensland Cane Growers Council (QCGC) recorded this trend: In all over the past two or three years, the comparatively small number of Ingham’s Spanish origin families have assisted several hundred young men to come out. At present it is estimated, that there would be close to a hundred Spaniards either working in the harvesting or on farms. Others have entered trades . . . Quite a large percentage of the young men are from the Basque country in north west [sic.] Spain.40 Established families of Spanish origin not only assist the migrants to pay their passages here. They make special efforts to ensure that the newcomers are absorbed into the community as a whole. People in the Ingham district believe that the nominations and assistance by the families will have a “snowball” effect. New settlers will, in time, assist other members of their families to migrate.41 THE AGREEMENT 29

Despite the importance of the “snowball” effect, the bulk of the Spanish presence in North Queensland in the following years was to be due to a different scheme that at that time was already under way. The manpower requirements of the industry was far greater than what these individual nominations could achieve. In fact, the opening of assisted migration from Spain was prompted by the sugar growers. A closer look at the Queensland sugar industry in the fifties will give us a better understanding on what were the forces that moved the strings to get the Spanish assisted migration scheme into motion. Queensland produced 95 per cent of the Australian sugar output, both for domestic usage and for export. Its export trade value made the Commonwealth Government to take a keen interest in the fortunes of the industry. Three organizations, the QCGC, the Australian Sugar Producers’ Association (ASPA), and the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR) covered the different aspects of the industry: growing, milling and refining respectively. They depended, to a large extent, of seasonal work. During the fifties and early sixties, the three organizations were engaged in industrial disputes against the restrictive practices of several unions, mainly the Australian Workers Union (AWU), the Federated En- gine Drivers and Firemen’s Association (FEDFA), and the Water- side Workers’ Federation (WWF). The employers’ organizations tried, and finally succeeded, in breaking the unions’ power with the help of the Federal Government by drafting new legislation, by introducing additional labour, including migrants, into the area, and by mechanization. The assisted migration agreement signed with Spain, may well have been one of the by-products of this industrial conflict. 30 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

The conflict in the sugar industry has been best examined in the case of the efforts by the CSR to break the power of the WWF. The WWF was one of the toughest unions in Australia. It exploited the strategic moment to present their grievances to the employers at the end of the crushing season. The Federal Gov- ernment acted on the side of the hapless employers, drafting amendments to the legislation, in an attempt to take away the WWF’s power to recruit waterfront labour. However, the massive upsurge of strikes in November 1954, which has been termed the “Fourteen Day that Shook Menzies”, forced the Government to back down. The CSR realized that mechanical loading and unloading of the ships was the only way of stopping the WWF. The mechanization of the waterfront started at the Pyrmont refinery in Sydney in May 1955, and was then implemented in Mackay in 1957 and Lucinda in 1959. The 3,000,000 pounds spent by the CSR in the effort, soon seemed worthwhile.42 The power of the union dented, legislation was passed trough Parliament that entailed the employers to contract workers others than WWF members. The QCGC passed through a similar process. Mechanization was also seen as a measure to ease industrial problems, but in the cane cutting area this was not a short term solution. As B. Foley, President of the QCGC suggested in 1957, “for a long period, we will require a substantial labour force to assist in the harvest”.43 Meanwhile, to increase the number of canecutters by introducing migrant labour was seen by the growers as the way to cope with the unions restrictive practices. Lack of man power for the harvesting season was a chronic problem of the area. Since the mid fifties, according to M. E. THE AGREEMENT 31

Flaws, Regional Director of the Department of Labour and Na- tional Service in Townsville, the 80 per cent of the canecutters employed were non-British migrants.44 The sugar industry tried to overcome its labour shortages in the mid fifties by arranging with the Department of Immigration to bring to the area Italian migrants specially selected for cane-cutting tasks. As the problem remained, in the late fifties employers in the industry tried a similar scheme, but bringing instead Spaniards from the Basque provinces. A closer study of how the Italian scheme was enacted will reveal two central matters. Firstly, why still more migrant workers were needed in the second half of the decade, thus giving the cane growers reasons to press the Department of Immigration for migrant workers from Spain. Secondly, to appreciate how the negotiations were conducted with the Department of Immigra- tion for that purpose. In fact, we will argue, the Spanish scheme for North Queensland was a small-scale version of the Italian. The Italian migration Agreement of 1951 opened North Queensland cane growers to a new source of migrant labour after the Displaced Persons’ Scheme had terminated. Neverthe- less the QCGC as well as the ASPA, still stressed in their annual meetings, the chronic labour shortages in the area.45 It was suggested “that a pool of migrant labour for cane cutting and field work be established in North Queensland prior to the commencement of the harvesting season”.46 The problem was not only to attract migrants, but to attract the right kind of migrants. As far as labour was concerned, the 1954 season was considered the worst season that sugar producers had endured, not excluding even the war years.47 At the begin- 32 OPERACIÓN CANGURO ning of November, only 300 of nearly 900 migrants sent to the northern canefields were still on the job. As it was pointed out in this year Australian Sugar Producers (ASPA) annual conference: “It was not likely that the right type of rural workers could be recruited from Amsterdam or Rome or Paris in large numbers. Barbers, musicians and bootmakers were being brought out and sent into the cane fields, and they were hopelessly incompetent”.48 Selectors should be required to go into the rural districts of Europe to find suitable land-minded men willing to work well and settle down. A suggestion was made to H. E. Holt, Minister for Labour and Immigration, that “ representatives of the sugar industry should go overseas to choose suitable migrant labour for the industry”.49 They also asked for the migration centre in Cairns to be reopen in order to provide accommodation for some of the dependents of immigrant workers, and for the immigrant ships to proceed directly to Cairns, thereby avoiding some of the wastage that had occurred in moving from the southern States to the north.50 The Minister agreed on these recommendations, after they were examined at the Immigration Advisory Council. Then, Peter Lalli, F. M. Pavetto and A. Lando, “of Italian origin and themselves successful cane farmers” were appointed “as the industry selection committee to be sent abroad” to cooperate with the Austra- lian Migration Office in Rome: “Each selector has been equipped with a movie showing cane cutters at work, and with a pamphlet for distribution to prospective migrants”.51 On May 27, and in what was called “the best planned immigration scheme in Queensland history”,52 the Italian Migrant ship Flaminia, carrying 800 carefully chosen workers for the North Queensland sugar cane districts, arrived at the port of Cairns. THE AGREEMENT 33

Some 400 of the men with their womenfolk and children disembarked, and the remainder landed in Townsville. A second expedition came on the Toscanelli, that arrived at Sydney on July 13, completing the figure of 1,500 migrants the Queensland team had helped in the selection; 350 of them were allotted to the North NSW canefields.53 They came from the South of Italy and Sicily. Peter Lalli, who accompanied the expedition, said on arrival: “The migrants proved to be an excellent type, willing to do hard work, and accustomed to a rural environment”.54 The success of this scheme led to arrangements for similar measures for the 1956 season. The Chief Migration Officer in Rome was instructed to recruit 500 cane cutters plus up to 200 dependents to arrive on or after May 15, 1956. A further 300 cane cutters to complete the industry’s estimated total requirements of 800 were to arrive early in July. But the scarcity of suitable cane cutters was only part of the problem the sugar growers had to face: Of very serious concern to all growers, apart from the shortage of reliable cane cutters was their extortionate demands for over awarded cutting and loading rates, the breaking of contracts, and the unpre- dictable drift of cutters from farm to farm and from district to district.55 Already in 1954 and just prior to the commencement of the crushing season, there was an overtime ban, followed by a general strike by key sugar mill employees. There was also a threat of a general strike amongst cane cutters on the issue of cutting burnt cane, although it had been averted by the decision of the Queensland Industrial Court of increasing wage rates in the industry.56 Industrial unrest mounted in the 1956 season. From May 15, the State Industrial Court was hearing claims by the Australian Workers Union and the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen’s 34 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Association for a ten per cent general wage increase under the Sugar Industry Award, and many other items affecting both the growing and milling side of the industry. A general strike occurred between September 4 and 9. The spread of the trouble was averted by a compulsory conference held at the instigation of the President of the Industrial Court.57 By then, conversations were well under way between the QCGC and the Department of Immigration to bring migrants from the Spain. They were to constitute a labour surplus for the growers, to weaken industrial action. Late in 1956, the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee met in Brisbane and recommended the Government to seek migrants in Spain for sugar- cane cutting in Queensland. From then on, the issue arose regu- larly on the different forums where migration policies were discussed. QCGC Secretary R. A. Muir visited Spain in December at that effect, and “he was impressed with the hard working quali- ties of Spanish workers. On his return he said he thought Austra- lians would get on well with Spanish and that Spanish would like Australia and assimilate easily”.58 The first group of Spanish migrants was expected to arrive for the 1957 season. The growers’ press announced the plan on January 15, 1957: The proposal to introduce Spanish labour into the cane fields was discussed at the recent meeting of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council in Melbourne. If the Spaniards are recruited they probably will come from the Basque provinces. Australia will investi- gate the possibility of arranging to transport the Spaniards in association with the ICEM, of which Spain is now a member. Under such an arrangement ICEM would contribute substantially to the cost of transport..59 THE AGREEMENT 35

All the prerequisites to make possible a migration agreement between Australia and Spain had already set up. The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ interest was triggered by the October 1955 visit and other further contacts by Monsignor Crennan. The Department of Immigration interest, by the QCGC. There is not much data available as to how this contact between the cane growers and the Department of Immigration was made; we only know of the April 1956 intervention of senator Armstrong through the correspondence at the Consulate. It all seems to indicate that arrangements made followed the Italian model, even to the point that some farmers of Spanish origin were also sent to Spain to help the Australian selection team.60 However, the Spanish programme was not going to be so easy to enact. Spain had not yet signed a Migration Agreement with Australia, as Italy had; they did not, maintain diplomatic relations. The reaching of an agreement proved more difficult than expected, and these difficulties accounted for a year’s delay in the plans: the first Spanish assisted migrants arrived in time for the 1958, not the 1957, season. 36 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

1.4 THE MIGRATION AGREEMENT.

The next push towards a migration programme following the visit of Muir and Armstrong to Spain in December 1956 also origi- nated on the Australian side. On April 15, 1957, the Duke Primo de Rivera, Spanish Ambassador in London, received a document sent by R. E. Armstrong, Australian High Commissioner in that city, stating that the migration arrangements had been already established for the 1957-58 financial year. However, for the next financial year, Australia, the ICEM intervening, was prepared to pay 85 American dollars towards the cost of the passage of every migrant recruited for employment in the Australian sugar cane fields.61 Hayes arranged a stop in Madrid for his next visit to Europe, to consult with the IEE and the CIME over the details of a scheme which in the jargon of the IEE was already named Operación Canguro. A meeting was set for June 4, 1957, at 12 noon, on the premises of the IEE. The Australian side was represented by Hayes and Armstrong, the High Commissioner in London; the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was represented by Director of Emigración - Asistencia Social Antonio García de Lahiguera; the IEE by its Director General Rodríguez de Valcárcel; the CIME by its Chief and Deputy Chief Storich and Lago Carballo. The visit of Armstrong and Muir in December 1956, and the document sent by the former to the Spanish Embassy in London constituted the background to the meeting. The object of the discussions were to decide the arrangements for the sending of a group of migrants to work as cane-cutters in Australia, in which would be “a pilot operation to clear the way to reach an agreement”. THE AGREEMENT 37

“Small migrant intake this year, I see.” Beside Rev. McEvoy letter, this Molnar cartoon explained better than a thousand words what the Australian atmosphere towards Spanish migration was. The Sydney Morning Herald, January 18, 1958, p. 2.

This venture was to involve from 300 to 500 migrants. These were to be in equal proportions unmarried, childless couples and families; accommodation problems precluded the possibility of sending a bigger group. Thirteen clauses formed the body of the memorandum drafted after the meeting. They answered most of the questions asked by the Department of Immigration in its letter to Tabanera of December 1955. In fact, they all dealt with standard procedures on Australian assisted migration, similar in their. content to that of the Agreement and the Schedule that followed it which had been signed with ltaly in 1951.62 The major 38 OPERACIÓN CANGURO difference was that the memorandum referred only to a single group of migrants. Spanish migrants eligible for assisted migration under this document were: single men from 18 to 35 years of age; childless married couples up to 35 years; and family units, provided the bread- winner was not over 45. Owing to the shortage of accommodation, married men were to proceed to Australia in advance of their wives and children. The assisted migrants would be Spanish workers that had been recruited by the Spanish authorities on the basis of numerical request lodged by the Government of Austra- lia, and had been finally approved by the appointed Australian representative. The migrants undertook to remain two years in the employment to which the Australian Government allocated them, or to refund the cost of the assistance received towards their passage fare prior to departure, should they not remain in Australia for the agreed period. After this two years period, provided they have no proved unsuitable for. settlement, migrants could remain indefinitely in Australia, and choose any employment and place of residence they desired. The memorandum guaranteed to all migrants the same wages, accommodation and general conditions of employment prevailing for Australian workers in the same occupation. Similarly, they would also be entitled to workers’ compensation and other social service benefits. The Australian Government’s contribution towards the cost of the passages was to be of 85 American dollars, with the Spanish providing 50, and, counting the help of the CIME, the migrants 35.63 It was learned that the group would depart from Barcelona on April 15, 1958, with Cairns being their port of destination. The Australian Government accepted full responsibility for the recep- THE AGREEMENT 39 tion of the migrants at their port of disembarkation, and for their accommodation, placement in employment and aftercare. Family reunion, transfer of funds, and repatriation clauses were also agreed upon. The document concluded that “once Diplomatic relations were established, this document would serve as an exchange of notes”.64 Everything was agreed save for one point. Spain wanted to decide upon the areas from which the migrants would be selected, while Australia put forward the cane industry requirement that these migrants had to be Basques. Unable to reach agreement on this point, negotiations again stalled. On the same day, a “Report on the Areas of Recruitment of Cane Cutters to Migrate to Australia” was prepared for the IEE, stating the Spanish position on the matter. The southern provinces should be chosen as the area of recruitment for two reasons, climatic one, the other demographic. Temperature and climatic conditions in North Queensland were much closer to those on Andalucia and the Canary Islands than that of the Basque Provinces. Moreover, the Spanish sugar cane industry was local- ized in Malaga, Granada and Almería, covering 4,930 hectares and employing 3,300 labourers. The Canary islanders were experts in the use of the machete, and it was from those islands that thousands of migrants had gone to South America and proved themselves to be suitable cane cutters. On the demographic factor, the document pointed out that Andalucians were already emigrating to the Basque provinces, the latter no longer being a rural area of emigration but, on the contrary, a industrial area of immigration. It seemed, thus, illogical and socially expensive to select people from the Basque provinces.65 40 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Valcárcel sent this information to Tabanera, in case the Consu- late could do something to change the minds of the Australian officials. Four days later, he wrote to Amstrong in London, adding a further consideration: the Spanish Government recognized the legal right of its citizens to migrate and this right was not to be restricted only to one particular region of Spain. He ended the letter by pointing out that it was upon this issue that the further collaboration of the IEE with the Australian Government would depend.66 Armstrong insisted on June 26 that, according to Hayes, it was essential for the migrants to be exclusively from the Basque provinces, otherwise, the negotiations could be considered terminated. Valcárcel wrote to the Consul that since “Armstrong an- swers with, stubbornness . . . our decision is to freeze the negotiations until we can establish direct diplomatic relations”.67 Australian reasons for wanting exclusively Basques can be found in the sugar industry’s previous experience with them, and in its obsession with getting the right kind of cane cutters. Sociological ideas may have bolstered this preference as well. A distinction was often made between north and south, the north considered as more suitable for settling in Australia than the south (north Europe vs. south Europe, north Italy vs. south Italy etc.).68 This assumption was quite common amongst Australian’s high level public officials. It often appeared, subtly, in the press, as in the following instance: Most señoritas come from the north of Spain which is proving an excellent recruiting ground for migrants. So far this year we have welcomed 401 assisted Spanish migrants, and they are proving excellent settlers.69 It was Harold Holt, Minister for Labour and National Service, former Minister for Immigration, who unlocked the situation. At THE AGREEMENT 41 the end of a Commonwealth Conference in London, and on his way to Australia, he made a short stop over in Madrid. Valcárcel met the Minister at his hotel, and lately they met, in the IEE with Storich from the CIME and Corley Smith from the United King- dom Embassy in Madrid. They agreed to change the principle of “exclusiveness” on the Basque Provinces selection area, for that of “preference”, a change that seemed to suit both parts. They ended earnestly hoping for “the establishment of diplomatic relations”.70 Despite this breakthrough in the negotiations, other obstacles on the Australian side were to delay and change the arrangement in the months ahead. These obstacles did not have to do with the “exclusive”/”preferential” issue, as Madrid had wrongly guessed but, as Consul Tabanera learned in his meeting on September 11, 1957, with Holt and Athol Townley, ministers for Labour and Immigration respectively, with the need to “sell” the product to the Australian public opinion, and with the situation the Austra- lian economy was passing through at the moment.71 To appreciate better the “image” problems referred to, it may be of interest to know how Spain was seen through the Austra- lian media. Spain appeared in the news in 1957, either in reference to its dictatorial Government (related to episodes of guer- rilla warfare,72 or the repression of workers’ strikes73 ), or to de- scribe its diplomatic advances with the United States.74 Then, larger coverage was dedicated to anecdotal incidents such as that of two English twin showgirls, imprisoned in Spain for swimming where it was not allowed.75 This was not of much concern to the Australian Government. More important was the wave of reaction against the “latinisation” of the country. The Australian public 42 OPERACIÓN CANGURO had not totally come to terms with the presence of Italian and other South European people, and they were not ready yet for the Spaniards. This might have been the reason to explain why the Australia Government proceeded with such secrecy on the first stages of the negotiation with Spain. When the press reported the two month European tour of Hayes, there was a mention of all the countries he visited (Britain, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Italy and Swit- zerland), but not of Spain.76 The first time the Australian press reported the plan, with the exception of the note in the Austra- lian Sugar Journal mentioned earlier, was on July 1957, with the occasion of the Holt visit to Spain: curiously enough, this visit, to which large coverage was given in almost all Australian newspa- pers77 was presented by the Spanish authorities as “top secret”.78 There was some reaction in the press towards this news. Reeves, President of the British Australian Society, complained about the reduction of the percentage of British immigrants, who he estimated comprised only 32.2 per cent of the total79 At the time of the next Australian Citizenship Convention, a letter by Rev. T. P. McEvoy broached the matter of Spanish migration. He pointed out three issues: first he asked whether migrants from a fascist country were more eligible than migrants from a communist country; second, he signalled that fascists, apart from being politically reactionaries, do not allow religious freedom, Protestants being banned; and third, he inquired whether sending Spaniards to North Queensland, already a little Europe in Australia, would justify migration on the grounds of defence reasons. Prime Minister Menzies, who attended for the second time a Citizenship Con- vention, remarked that “migration can not be turned on and off, THE AGREEMENT 43 like a tap”. Dr. Evatt, the Leader of the Opposition, criticised not the plan in itself, but the way in which it was handled: “The fact that Spaniards are coming to Australia as migrants should have been explained and related to the other aspects of their coming, but there was no explanation. Its just being done”.80 It was not only a question of the racial preferences or public opinion. The Australian economy was passing through a period of crisis. Commenting further on the subject of the five hundred Spaniards, Holt had to refer to the unemployment situation, despite his disregarding it as important: “I do not regard the current level of unemployment as in any way serious by comparison with standards in other countries. One third of one per cent of the work force is as close to full employment as you can reasonably get, unless you move into the undesirable position of having an excess demand for labour.”81 More than three months after the successful visit of Holt to Madrid, Townley wrote to Valcárcel setting out the plan approved by Canberra in which only three hundred migrants, with a limited number of dependents would be brought to Australia. Hayes from Canberra, and Amstrong from London were to assist in the operation. Valcárcel suggested to Hayes that the Australian selection team should operate in Bilbao from February 1 to 11, 1958, and from Madrid from 11 to 15, in order to screen out those not of Basque origin. He then wrote to the Consul, congratulating himself and everyone for the success.82 Tabanera, sharing in this eu- phoric mood, wrote to Valcárcel and Townley: “I am only waiting for a cable which I expect to receive at any minute, that will bell me to go to Canberra to set up the Legation . . . [and thus resolve] the other. problem, that of the direct diplomatic relations “.83 A month later, he insisted: “I expect to establish the new Spanish 44 OPERACIÓN CANGURO legation in Canberra at the beginning of December, which will facilitate our contacts in the operation of this venture”. 84 It was too early for euphoria. The cable Tabanera expected did not arrive. As for. the Operación Canguro, Storich from the CIME told Valcárcel on the morning of November 21, 1957, that Canberra had halted it. We do not know what caused this thirteen days’ halt and the consequent rearrangement of plans in Canberra. We know better what happened at the other end. Valcárcel met im- mediately in his office with ICEM and Foreign Affairs representatives, and a cable was sent to Hayes: “Understand some hold up in cane cutters programme At your end stop we are presently preselecting stop can you please cable present situation”. He wrote also to Holt expressing his “surprise and consternation” for the halting of the programme after having already involved the Orga- nization Sindical with the preselection of 300 workers. In a letter. to Tabanera, he inquired whether this “abrupt and unexpected” suspension, apparently caused by the economic crisis, had also affected Italy or only Spain.85 The awaited answer arrived in a Hayes letter dated December 3, 1957. It contained detailed information on what finally was the Australian plan. Hayes had been advised by Harold Holt, the Min- ister for Labour, that the final number of prospective migrants was to be reduced to 150 single men, and their departure postponed until mid July. They were to disembark in Brisbane, and go to work to the Ingham area. In charge of the selection hence- forth would be C. L. Waterman, Chief Migration Officer in Rome, instead of Armstrong. The selection would be made only in Bilbao as the number of migrants now was not so high. Also, the importance of making a good impression in Australia was stressed, as it THE AGREEMENT 45 was the first operation of its kind: “the Australian selection team will set the standards as high as possible”. On economic matters, Australia would contribute 100 American dollars for each migrant (instead of the 85 agreed before). “It will also be necessary for the applicants to be clear from the security point of view. I suggest that this matter be discussed later, on a personal basis, between Spanish official and an Australian officer whom, it is proposed, will visit Spain prior to the commencement of the selection activities.” It added that “a certificate from the Spanish police relating to their civil conduct,” would be necessary. The letter finished by directing Valcárcel to the Rome office when dealing with questions of administrative nature.86 The IEE agreed. On January 16, 1957, Valcárcel met with CIME officials and the Australian selection team headed by Waterman. By March 23, 400 Spaniards had applied for migration from the provinces of Santander, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, Navarra, Huesca y Teruel. Of them, 249 had been preselected.87 In May it was known that the 166 migrants finally selected were to proceed from Irun to Trieste on June 26, and then board the Italian ship Toscana. The 55 year old Father Tomas Ormazábal Ayarbide, who spoke English, was appointed by Monsignor Ferris, head of the CCEM, for the pastoral care of the migrants.88 Enrique López Rodríguez, Médico Inspector de Emigración, also escorted the expedition. Following Vice Consul de Viana suggestion, Alberto Urberuaga, a Spanish long term settler in Queensland, was appointed honorary Vice Consul in Brisbane.89 The Toscana finally berthed Brisbane on August 9, 1958, with 159 migrants. They formed, according to Waterman, “one of the bests groups”.90 Senator J. I. Amstrong visited Spain in June, on his way to 46 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Lourdes and Dublin. After meeting General Franco “he praised the Caudillo”; Valcárcel hoped his praises were genuine. The senator also told Valcárcel that Armstrong, from the Australia House, had been dismissed for his “stubbornness” in dealing with Spain. He suggested an Operación Canguro bis for 1959, including about 500 people, preferably young childless couples.91 Diplomatic contacts such as that of Amstrong helped the cause, but were not enough. There still remained the problem of establishing direct diplomatic relations between both countries. On the Spanish side, Consul Tabanera tried his best. He wrote to Valcárcel: “As you know, I am in Canberra already, but some problems that came up in our Department have delayed my duly accreditation. . . I would like you to let my Minister know of the interest of your Direction in these matters with Australia”.92 Min- ister for External Affairs Castiella did not approve the plan, however, probably due to the lack of interest on the Australian side in reciprocating the process. Soon after the Operación Canguro had arrived in Brisbane, Tabanera was posted to Manila as Ministro Plenipotenciario. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 47 2 THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT

In this chapter we will deal with how the migration Agreement enacted in August 1956 was carried out until Spain unilaterally closed it in March 1963. We will look at the Diplomatic contacts that allowed this Agreement to continue and expand to include the migration of single girls and of skilled workers, as well as family reunion programmes. Then, we will consider the Diplo- matic manoeuvring that put an end to it. Special attention will be given to the two most important issues Spanish and Australian officials faced during this process: those related to the selection and the placement of the migrants. We will focus also on what the migrants knew about Australia before departure, the reasons for their complaints while in the new country, and how these complaints reached the sphere of political decision-making in Spain. Finally, we will examine the consequences of the suspension of this migrant scheme. 48 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

2.1 AFTER CANGURO

Once the first group of Spaniards reached Australia, it was not difficult for the organizations involved (IEE, Australian officials in Rome, ICEM and Catholic voluntary organizations), to arrange a repetition of the same scheme for the following year. The echoes of the success of Canguro and the groups that followed flattered Madrid’s ears enough for it to overlook, at least temporarily, issues such as the diplomatic accreditation between Madrid and Canberra. As an example of this confidence, Edgar Storich, who escorted the Monte Udala voyage that arrived to Melbourne on August 8, 1960, reported to the IEE: The immigration officials were very impressed with the appearance of the emigrants and, in particular, with their character and good humour, and with the way they followed the instructions given to them on disembarkation... The only incident during the voyage was an argument between two emigrants At lunch time, about which of them could speak English better... This is certainly an outstanding group.93 There were periodic contacts between high officials of both governments. In July 1960, Minister for Labour and National Ser- vice MacMahon visited his counterpart in Madrid, Fermín Sanz Orrio. At some of their meetings Valcárcel, Storich and Iturriaga were present. In November of the same year, Valcárcel and García Lahiguera, invited by the Netherlands airline KLM on the occasion of the inauguration of its Amsterdam Sydney service, visited Australia. Through the contacts they held in Canberra, the family reunion theme was tackled. Interviewed by the daily newspaper Arriba before his departure Valcárcel pointed out the excellent THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 49 perspectives of this migration scheme. The selection of the migrants was carefully made, and the Australian authorities seemed contented. The only reserve was the gross exaggerations of the Spanish press on the economic conditions of the workers there: Australian prosperity is evident, although some Spanish publications have grossly exaggerated the wages that are being paid there for manual work… Of all the emigrants sent there by the IEE, not a single one has been repatriated at our Government’s expense, which speaks for the extreme care with which the selection procedures have been conducted... The Australian authorities are very satisfied, despite the high moral, professional and health standards they require from immigrates.94 In July 1961, Manuel Solana, Secretary General of the IEE visited Canberra, and in August, Hayes visited Madrid. Valcárcel again travelled to Australia in November 1961, also accompanied by Lahiguera, and by Rev. Justo Pérez de Urbel, Abbot of the Monas- tery of the Valley of the Fallen. Lahiguera announced in Canberra that Spain was “ready and willing” to increase its quota of Austra- lian migrants to at least 2,500 a year; the Spanish government hoped to send more migrants to Australia to balance a fall in migration to Latin American countries and large increases in the Spanish population. He understood that the Australian Govern- ment had adopted a “go-slow” policy on Spanish migration to allow migrants to become fully assimilated to the Australian way of life. The Spanish Government was very pleased with the treatment and conditions of Spanish migrants in Australia. “The Aus- tralian migration system was a magnificent one”, Lahiguera said.95

The highlight of the diplomatic honeymoon between Australia and Spain for 1962, was the June visit of Downer and Heyden, as a part of their European tour. They held conversations with Min- 50 OPERACIÓN CANGURO ister for Labour Fermín Sanz Orrio, Antonio García Lahiguera, monsignor Ferris, Storich and Clemente Cerdá Gómez, new Di- rector General of the IEE.96 During this period, Australia established a Liaison Mission in Madrid, presided over by Jim Blackie. L. H. Hayes, the son of the Secretary of the Department of immigration who was the Chief of operations in the CIME office in Madrid, was then to cover the Deputy position in the new Austra- lian Mission. The Australian Church assisted in the task of facilitating the relations between both countries. The periodic visits of Monsi- gnor Crennan helped to set the basis for the programme Marta for the migration of single women. The Australian Church also worked in an indirect but equally effective way. A group of seven hundred Australian Catholics, presided over by Sydney’s Cardinal Gilroy, toured Spain in May 1960, after having visited Fatima’s sanctuary in Portugal and on their way to Lourdes in France. In Madrid, Gilroy was received in audience by General Franco, and the “Caudillo” also delivered a speech to the group. The Spanish press gave large coverage to the event, thus enhancing the image of Australia with headlines such as “Very high standard of life”, “Most workers have a car”, “Two million Catholics in the country” etc.97 Despite the numerous diplomatic contacts, and despite the efforts of the Catholic hierarchy, the important issue of the direct diplomatic relations still remained unsolved. The new Spanish Consul-General, José M. Garay reached Australia on June 19, 1959, just in time to receive the second group of migrants. On arrival he declared he hoped to arrange for an exchange of Ambassadors with Spain. He complained about the fact that the British Em- THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 51 bassy represented Australian interests in Madrid, that Spain had only a Consulate instead of a Legation in Australia, and about the lack of an Australian immigration office in Spain: “Australian immigration officers from Rome and Paris select Spanish migrants. Many Spanish people would like to migrate and they would come here if Australia was properly publicized in Spain”.98 For the Australian Department of Immigration, however, there was no hurry to improve these diplomatic channels with Spain. There was no reason either to drastically increase the number of Spanish Migrants. The Spanish Programme was not a top priority for Canberra. In the Australian Citizenship Conventions it only deserved minor mentions: “We are tapping new sources of migration . . . We are experimenting with batches of settlers from Spain”.99 The only voice raised to defend the issue of direct diplomatic relations with Madrid was that of Senator Armstrong: We should extend our representation to countries such as Spain . . . Both the Consul-General and the Spanish Charge d’Affairs have been in consultation with this Government for two years, trying to bring about a measure of reciprocity. They lived in Canberra for some time but they left Canberra when the Government refused to give any guarantee of reciprocity. The department’s excuse is that it lacks suf- ficient manpower...100 Consul Garay’s ambitions of becoming the first Spanish ambassador in Australia vanished. After the Consulate was moved back to Sydney, he kept a low profile, with long periods of absence. After the sudden death of Vice Consul Fernández de Viana, who had faithfully served the Consulate interests under the previous two Consuls, and had followed all the intricacies of the migration arrangements since its very beginning, José Luis Díaz was appointed to fill the vacancy. He was in charge of the Consulate 52 OPERACIÓN CANGURO affairs during the periods Garay was absent, and until the appointment of Consul de la Riva in March 1963. However, the diplomatic contacts allowed the two countries to develop further migration arrangements. During the 1959-60 financial year the migration officials of Spain and Australia agreed to carry out two new initiatives. First, to select another group of single migrants, not to go directly to the Queensland canefields but to work first in the Murray river fruit area; this group was set to arrive to Australia in the 1959-60 summer. The second initiative was the launching of the Plan Marta. In this way, what was just an “informal” Agreement signed by both Governments in 1956-57 for one single expedition, was to regulate the relations between Spain and Australia, without necessitating any more “formal” Treaty. From the automatic application of this Agreement, in 1961, the migration of family units started, and the 1962-63 financial year saw the figure of migrants coming from Spain soar to 4,326. Negotiations to establish Family Reunion programmes started late in 1959. From 1960, Spaniards who were within the eligible categories101 started joining the groups of assisted migrants. Ac- commodation was provided for them by the nominators. The nominees had to pay the full fare, with the help of credits arranged by the CCEM and the CIME. From July 1, 1961, an Assisted Nominated Dependents’ Scheme was set up, and both Govern- ments contributed towards passage money for those who came under it. The eligible categories for sponsored unassisted migrants broadened, including “boyfriends, who are not eligible for an assisted passage, and can only come if they pay for their fare and put down a deposit of 200 pounds, to be returned to them once the marriage takes place”.102 THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 53

Negotiations to bring skilled workers from Spain started in 1960, but it was not until the 1962-63 financial year that the first skilled migrants, whose qualifications were fully recognized by the Aus- tralian authorities, came. It was a slow and difficult negotiation. Hayes pointed out to the Consul in February 1961 the complexity involved in evaluating the Spanish trade training methods in comparison with the Australian, and the need to do this task properly: “it would be most undesirable for any migrant to be selected as a skilled worker unless we were reasonably sure that he would be granted recognition as a skilled man upon his arrival here”.103 One year later, Australian officials had already figured out which were the trades they needed, and the requisites the Spanish workers should fulfil. This information was made public through a hand- out published in Spanish by the CIME.104 It explained the advantages of being selected as a skilled worker: “Assurance of a job in their own profession. A minimum wage stipulated by law of 10,000 pesetas per month”.105 Only a small number of Spaniards arrived qualified as skilled migrants. Unfortunately, Hayes’s fears became real, and the expe- riences of this group of migrants, which will be recounted later in this chapter, bear this out. 54 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

2.2 THE MIGRATION SCHEME AT WORK

Through the interaction of the diplomatic contacts described above, the migration machinery got into motion. We will focus now on how the different procedures for the selection and placement of migrants were conducted. Once both Governments had agreed on the number, qualifications and geographical origin of the migrants, the selection process started. The different sections of the Spanish Department of Labour, with the help of CIME, and on occasion of the CCEM, carried out the preliminary stages; the Australian officials in Madrid, took the final decision. The placement of migrants in Australia was almost the exclusive responsibility of the Department of Immigration, except for some areas covered by the FCIC. As for the number and qualifications of the migrants, no major problems arose. Spain could afford to send any number of migrants Australia might suggest. Spanish emigration to South America was limited to Family Reunion Programmes and a few skilled people. As Lahiguera put it in Sydney, an average of 50,000 to 60,000 were migrating there annually, but this number was fall- ing, while the global Spanish population was increasing by 350,000 a year.106 Spain needed to export part of its workforce, particularly unskilled labourers, as it needed the skilled ones to implement the economic transformations needed for the country. De- spite the success of some migration schemes carried out by the IEE with France and Belgium, the Western Europe migration boom was yet to take off. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 55

Spanish authorities insisted on including in the Operación Canguro twenty six workers from Santander. In the photo, this Santander group with the Delegado Provincial de Sindicatos (front row, fourth from left), the Asesor Eclesiástico de Sindicatos (front row, sixth from left) and the Delegado of the IEE (far right).

However, Australian officials, for their part, adopted a go-slow policy on Spanish migration at the beginning. When problems started arising with Italy107 , and migration from Southern Europe started being diverted north, Australian interest in the Spanish scheme increased. The situation within Spanish government circles was the reverse. On the subject of qualifications, the interests of both countries were complementary. Australia needed mostly unskilled labour; Spain had an excess. One of the drawbacks of the migrant policy with South America had been its demand for skilled workers.108 Certainly, at some time, Spain wanted to send to Australia her surplus of doctors,109 an initiative that did not have much hope for progress, due to the different academic systems of the coun- 56 OPERACIÓN CANGURO tries and the language barrier. Certainly too, many skilled workers found their ways through the selection procedures and arrived in Australia as labourers, as will be explained later. A more conflicting issue was, however, where to select the migrants from. This was precisely the issue that interested the Spanish Government most. Immersed in an almost chaotic wave of internal migration from country to town and from rural to industrial areas, affecting millions of people over which little planning was possible,110 the Spanish Government found that external migration was comparatively much easier to regulate. Spanish officials risked the carrying out of the Operación Canguro on these grounds, and only an agreement on the Basque “exclusive/ preferential” dilemma saved it in the last minute. They included a group of twenty six non Basques in this first expedition so as to make it clear to Canberra that they were not prepared to give in on this issue. The 1959 and 1960 groups were recruited from the north of Spain, but including Asturias, Valladolid, Burgos and Navarra as well. By the time family migration started it seems that Madrid had already acquired the power to decide where to select the migrants from. An exception to this rule, was, however, the Canary Islands, a region which accounted for the second biggest number of emigrants. Canberra needed only to look at the map to know that Africa was not yet one of the Australian sources of migrant intake. Only as an exception, some Canarian people went to Australia during these years.111 Australian officials decided on the number of migrants, their labour status and the geographical areas in which to place them, according to the requirements the Department of Labour and THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 57

National Service made to the Department of Immigration. Then, the Department of Immigration informed Madrid of its interest in recruiting for that financial year a particular number of migrants, establishing the dates that each group was required to arrive in Australia. It did so through its offices in Rome or Paris, later through its Mission in Madrid, and the CIME. Once the Spanish authorities had given their approval, the selection process began. The Director General of Employment of the Spanish Depart- ment for Labour was in charge of deciding the recruiting areas. These, with no mediating Australian impositions or political exi- gencies, were chosen according to the suggestions of the Oficinas de Encuadramiento y Colocación of the Organización Sindical. As an example of a recruiting area chosen for political reasons, there were groups wholly recruited from La Línea de la Concepción, just after the Spanish Government decided to close the Gibraltar frontier. They all had the advantage of knowing some English already before their arrival in Australia.112 Once the recruiting areas were decided, it was the function of the IEE to announce the vacancies, give the information and preselect the migrants. The selection and the medical examination of the migrants was shared with the Australian officials, who had the last word on the matter, with the mediation of the CIME offices. Then, the IEE would give the migrants the needed documentation and transport them within the national territory to the point of embarkation. It is appropriate here to outline a contradiction in the Francoist perception of migration. While the regime needed emigration to gain economic stability, it disapproved it on ideological grounds.113 The IEE itself was at the center of dilemma. As its Director Gen- 58 OPERACIÓN CANGURO eral, García Trevijano, pointed out, “there are sections of the Span- ish population who do not like emigration”.114 “They place a lot of obstacles in our way. Abroad, we are held responsible for making emigration difficult, and at home they say we encourage it” .115 In the Ley de Ordenación de la Emigración of 1960, and with the aim to “channel” migration rather than to “encourage” it, they banned its advertising. A polemic on whether this ban should be lifted was still going on inside the IEE after the Australian scheme had been closed.116 The provincial migration authorities had no obligation to fill all the migration positions allotted to their provinces. Not that there was any need for advertising, though, as by word of mouth, all the vacancies available were rapidly filled. The IEE transferred most of its functions to the CCEM in the Marta Programme, and the CCEM helped also in the enactment on the Family Reunion schemes arranged with Australia, before as well as after the suspension of the Agreement. This was due, in part, to the lack of adequate infrastructure for the part of the IEE. It was the reason why the IEE tended to transfer to the CIME and the Australian Mission some of its most delicate functions in the selection process, which proved to be a source of conflict, as we will see below. The ICEM, jointly with its CIME office in Spain, was in charge of arranging and supervising the sea or air transportation to Aus- tralia. On the sea voyages, an IEE officer, a doctor and a priest also escorted the Spanish groups. It was also a function of the CIME to translate into Spanish all the information given by Aus- tralian authorities that migrants were supposed to know before arrival. CIME officials also assisted the CCEM in the training courses THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 59 developed in the Marta Plan, and the IEE in the training courses it organized for migrants in general. The CIME edited three booklets in Spanish for the use of Span- ish migrants to Australia. The first one contained specific information on working conditions in the canefields, stating working hours, duties, description of the work, salaries, accommodation etc., and also general notions on history and geography, climate, religion and language.117 There was another edited by the ICEM and used for the Marta training courses, and also for the training of some other single women to be sent to Canada during the same period.118 CIME also edited a training course for the same purpose; its sixteen lessons included topics such as personal hy- giene, ways of doing the washing up or the cleaning of the house, the use of household electrical appliances etc.119 A booklet published also by the CIME before 1962 was distributed to all assisted migrants from mid 1960. In it, apart from the general information about history, climate, religion etc. detailed information was given on holding camps, hostels, Commonwealth Employment Offices, accommodation, education and social security.120 These booklets represented all the written information that migrants received prior their departure. After their arrival at the point of disembarkation, the Australian Department of Immigration arranged for the reception of all assisted migrants. They were temporarily accommodated in holding camps, most of them at Bonegilla, as we will see later. Bread- winners were interviewed by the Commonwealth Employment Officers in the camp and placed in employment. Then, they would proceed either to employer found accommodation, or to a Com- monwealth Hostel. These arrangements continued until each in- 60 OPERACIÓN CANGURO dividual or family could secure its own accommodation, or until vacancies enabled the family to be united in a hostel. An exception to this general trend was the reception and placement of the Marta groups which was arranged by the FCIC through its Dioc- esan Committees. Also, migrants who arrived under the Nomi- nated Dependents’ schemes found work and accommodation through their sponsors in Australia. All assisted migrants had to stay in Australia for a minimum period of two years. Should they wish to leave the country before, they were to pay the return fare and to refund the money that governments and other agencies paid for their assistance. An exception to this rule was when a migrant, for serious reasons, had to be extradited. Then, upon an agreement reached between both governments, the migrant could leave Australia with the full fare paid by the Spanish Government. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 61

2.3 THE PROTESTS OF THE PEOPLE

The relations between the Department of Immigration and the Spanish IEE were cordial, as we have mentioned, until mid 1962. Then some difficulties arose in the placement of migrants from the holding camps of Bonegilla and Northam. The Spanish - Aus- tralian relationship was further strained by the complaints of many migrants who felt they were misled during the selection process. The lack of sound diplomatic channels between both countries, and the rapid change of the Spanish emigration patterns from overseas to Western Europe precipitated the Spanish Government’s unilateral cut of the migration flow to Australia. Bonegilla, a war-time Army camp spread over 600 acres of land near the Victoria and NSW border, was the main staging camp in Australia, with capacity to cater for 10,000 migrants at one time. Migrants were accommodated there after arrival and, usually within a week or two, sent from there to all parts of Australia. In mid 1961, the Australian economy was passing through a period of recession and because of this, migrants had to remain in Bonegilla for longer periods of time, sometimes months. On June 25, 1961, newspapers reported one thousand Germans had marched up and down the main street of the camp demanding “Give us work or send us to Europe”. They also complained that the food was “often too bad they could not eat it”.121 On the second week of July, dozens of placards were erected around huts in the camp bearing the same message.122 The situation exploded on Monday 17, in a repeat performance of the Bonegilla riots of 1952.123 The trouble started when two 62 OPERACIÓN CANGURO hundred Italians, later joined by a big group of Yugoslavs, began another protest march in the camp. They also shouted claims that German migrants were being favoured whenever. jobs were available. Finally, a group of about one thousand of many nationalities stormed the employment office. They smashed windows, hurled stones and chanted repeatedly “We want work”. In the course of the incident, a police car was damaged and a police- man ended up in hospital after having tried to grab one of the ringleaders. A fresh demonstration broke out again at 8 p.m. when six hundred migrants gathered in front of the main canteen: The men smashed every window in the canteen with stones, then began hurling rocks at a group of twenty policemen. The police said they were forced to draw batons and move en masse against the main group of demonstrators to make them disperse. The night demonstration lasted nearly an hour.124 The incidents were caused by “a hundred young men who have been here since about March without getting jobs”. Colonel H. G. Guinn, the camp’s executive officer, said that some men, whom he thought to be Australian Communists visited the camp the previous weekend and held discussion groups in one of the huts. Italians denied the demonstration was Communist inspired, the real problem being that they worried as they needed money to send to Italy. The Italian Vice-Consul in Melbourne, Dr. Carra Cagni, addressed a gathering of about two hundred Italians on the following afternoon, most of whom booed him and walked away; those remaining signalled that they felt misled by migrant officials in Italy.125 Minister Downer declared that that sort of behaviour would not be accepted, and that firm action would be taken against riot leaders, who he believed to be “about twenty migrants, obviously THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 63

“And in our drive for migrants emphasise the leisure angle.” An ironic commentary by Molnar on the situation that led to the Bonegilla rioting of 1961. The Sydney Morning Herald, July 19, 1961, p.2. prepared to create trouble”.126 Twelve migrants were finally re- manded to appear in Court on August 15. According to Labour MP Dr. J. F. Cairns, the camp riot was a revolt in the Eureka tradition, and not migrants but the Menzies Government should be punished.127 The rioting charges against the five Italians and six Germans and Austrians were finally withdrawn.128 Of the 4,700 migrants in the camp at the time these incidents occurred, there were about 150 Spaniards, who had arrived on the Roma on June 21, the first group of family units to reach Australia. They did not take, as a group, an active part in the riot: “no a single Spanish name come up, on the contrary, they acted as Red Cross”.129 When the next group arrived on the Aurelia, 64 OPERACIÓN CANGURO with over five hundred migrants, only about twelve Spanish families remained in the camp. They told the new arrivals what had happened and, as a consequence, some Spaniards went to the employment office, warning they would create a disturbance if there was not work for them.130 Vice Consul José Luis Díaz was then called by the Australian authorities, and held a meeting with his countrymen in the cinema, in which he asked them to be “prudent”.131 The consequences of the Bonegilla riots for the Spanish migration scheme went, however, much further than that, in no a small part due to Díaz’s sensationalist approach to the problem, which we shall discuss later. Moreover, Spanish diplomacy at the migration level seemed to follow the trends of its Italian counterpart, and Italy, as a consequence of the revolt, was passing through a delicate moment in its relations with Australia. Italian Deputy Min- ister for Migration, Ferdinando Storchi, visited Australia, and Bonegilla in September 1961. Although he stated that “the relations between the two countries are very cordial indeed”,132 he also expressed his concern with the system of recruiting and se- lecting migrants in Italy, the recognition of tradesmen’s qualifications, and their initial settling in Australia, all in the light of a pending “Agreement to be revised in Rome early next year, to align it with the present situation in the two countries”.133 Through the Sydney Consulate, Spanish diplomats followed the difficulties, in 1962, with the revision of the Italian Agreement.134 The reasons for the Spanish discomfort with the migration scheme did not de- rive solely from these observations. By the end of the year, Madrid officials had reasons of their own to be unhappy with the way the Department of Immigration was handling Spanish migration. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 65

In Western Australia, both Commonwealth and State Govern- ments had carefully prepared a plan, starting from the end of September 1962, to bring a thousand Spanish migrants to work on the standard gauge railway project. Changes in the route of the railway were made when it was too late to alter this plan, thus eliminating many anticipated jobs. By November 10, three groups had already arrived by plane, to the Holden Migrant Accommo- dation Centre at Northam. Five days later, the Aurelia disembarked another load in Fremantle. During the following months, over a hundred breadwinners, more than four hundred people in total, stayed in the camp, unable to find work. The only jobs available, and these were scarce, were in the Avon Valley area, and many did not want to go, as the conditions were harsh and the migrants could not take their. families along. On November 3, Rafael Arias, father of three children, summed up the general feeling of Spaniards: “Everyone at the centre has been wonderful to us. We have been very well treated. We are not worried yet, only impatient for work”.135 From then on, tension began to build up in the camp. To add to the problem of lack of employment, those who worked claimed they were promised between 15 and 20 pounds, and they were earning less than 13 a week. Some of this tension was released in a demonstration, in which about a hundred men and women marched on the township to dramatize their pleas for more work and more pay.136 This event, a second “Bonegilla” on a smaller scale, was the most serious disturbance led by Spanish migrants in the early sixties. The Vice Consul wrote to Madrid in a long report about a demonstration by Spaniards in Perth, in a new camp they are 66 OPERACIÓN CANGURO being sent to, who claimed that they were not being paid the wages they had been promised . . . I fear that things will not stop here: migrants of other nationalities destroyed the camps last year, during ten months of total stoppage. I have written to the Director of the camp, asking him for further information.137 Echoes of this event filtered into the Spanish press in Austra- lia138 , and in the correspondence between Madrid and the Consu- late in August 1963, when García Trevijano, Director General of the IEE, asked the Consul for detailed information on the matter: “I hope that this report will be followed up by others, particularly from the western part of the country, which is the one that worries us the most”.139 In the report on Western Australia sent by Consul de la Riva in February 1964, he summarized his views on the incident: The Northam camp was established for the reception of immigrants, as it was understood that they would easily find employment in Western Australia, which is now in process of industrial development; but things did not go as planned, and it became necessary to transfer the workers to other regions. Some of our fellow countrymen were victims of this misjudgment. At present, this camp is closed.140 The difficulties in speedily placing into work the migrants at Bonegilla, and the more flawed Western Australia Scheme, were only part of the problems that induced Madrid to suspend the Agreement. Apart from the placement related difficulties, there were also selection related issues that played a part in the decision. One aspect of the problem was the immigration of white collar workers sometimes with tertiary qualifications, who managed through lies or “wirepulling” to pass the selection screens. Gaspar Gómez de la Serna, CIME Chief of Operations, put this very clearly: THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 67

Many have concealed their real professions, with the purpose of being included in any of the groups, and these are the ones who create the biggest problems. Within this class, most are people who have got some sort of baking from Spanish authorities in very high, high or medium positions . . . We have had a lot of pressure, as may have been the case with the IEE, to include them in the expeditions.141 If de la Serna emphasized the selection flaws in wirepulling, Felipe Vázquez Mateo, IEE official who escorted the last Aurelia group, in his “Memoria del Viaje” focused on the deceiving ver- sions given by the migrants to the selection teams, and on the need to provide prospective migrants with accurate information on working conditions in Australia: Flawed selection, based on professional reports made by the applicants, which are untrue in eighty percent of the cases . . . many came from office work, and are doomed to fail; others have money in Spain, which hinders their success . . . Solution: a fair selection. No wirepulling in this matter. Objective and accurate information. (Fill- ing out the questionnaire: “About illegal matters concerning emigration”:) The emigrant to Australia ought to be well informed”.142 Vice Consul Díaz recognized the arrival of such quantity of office workers, but he put all the blame on CIME. When he in- spected Bonegilla after the arrival of the Aurelia in January 1963, there were over six hundred Spaniards . . . most of them white collar workers, nurses, draughtsmen etc. [to whom CIME had said that] they would find employment and that language would not be a problem in finding work . . . They are sorry they came. They also regret not having asked at the CIME for a written document stating what was promised to them orally.143 Soon after they had managed to enter Australia, these white collar workers realized that Australia was not the place to “hacer las Américas”144 as they had though. Only by working on the 68 OPERACIÓN CANGURO heaviest and most dangerous jobs, and by doing as much overtime as they could, may have them been able to save good money. They were not used to hard work, and they soon realized they had made a mistake when coming. Then, they complained against the CIME and the Australian Mission in Madrid, and if they were game enough, against the IEE as well. Coming from the guild recommended by very high authorities, as la Serna put it, their voice surely was heard in the right places. However, the group whose complaints were taken more seriously was that of skilled workers that had arrived since mid 1962. It was a very small group, less than ninety, but their claims were echoed by many other migrants that considered themselves skilled and equally misled, although they did not arrived to Australia as such. Skilled migrants expected to find in Australia “a house”, work in their speciality, and minimum monthly salary of 10,000 pesetas, over 70 pounds. They based their claims on a document issued by CIME on January 30, 1962, which they referred to as “el contrato del CIME”, containing a list of specialities in demand, the prerequisites to apply for them, fares to pay and other details, including those the migrants alleged were not forthcoming, signed by Chief of Operations B. H. Hayes.145 As had happened with migrants from other nationalities, Span- iards who felt they were misled by the selection teams in Spain voiced their anger wherever they could, and one of the most effective ways for doing so was the Spanish press. In the tightly controlled Francoist press, complaints had to pass through a se- vere political screening before publication, but once printed, their echoes could easily reach the higher ranks of the regime. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 69

An article sent by Marta Pilar Moreno to Juventud Obrera in Madrid had already caused some upheaval back in 1961.146 A letter to the editor. was published in May 1962 by the daily Alerta, from Santander; the sender complained about the lack of information given in Spain, and the lack of support migrants received from the Sydney’s consulate. It was signed by an unemployed migrant who said he was spending in Australia the savings he had made in Spain.147 The letter that caused the greatest stir was, however, the one Miguel Fernández sent to a daily newspaper in Madrid in December. 1962. Fernández claimed he was selected as a skilled migrant and promised work in his speciality and a house on arrival; this promise was not fulfilled, and despite his mechanic’s qualifications he had to work as a labourer. Lahiguera promptly asked for explanations, and Vice Consul Díaz was happy to provide them. While in the Santander case Díaz simply defended himself: “no one has ever complained in the consulate . . . I would like to know the names of the com- plainants”,148 he gave more details on the Fernández affair and, as requested by Madrid, he asked the Spaniards in the same situation to send to the Consulate “los contratos del CIME”. Australian police visited Mr. Fernández about the letter, and, he later told the Vice Consul, they were “polite but sarcastic”. While Fernández was not afraid and was willing to testify the truth if necessary, no other Spaniard dared to send their documentation to the consulate, fearing reprisals from either the Australian or the Spanish side. “I have tried to convince them without success”, said the Consul; “they say they will suffer for two years, saving as much as possible to be able to pay for their return fare”.149 Mr. Fernández indignation grew further when a relative of his who 70 OPERACIÓN CANGURO inquired in the CIME offices was told that “Mr. Fernández is perfectly all right, and what was published in the letter is a lie”, and he prepared a new letter of complaint. Following instructions from Madrid, Díaz arranged to repatriate him, as soon as the Department of Immigration gave its authorization, as he had not finished his two year period in Australia. The placement problems at Bonegilla and Northam, the selection of unsuitable migrants to work as labourers in Australia, and the lack of immediate validity of the working qualifications given by the Australian Mission in Madrid to nearly a hundred Spanish skilled tradesmen were not the only caused of the Spanish Gov- ernment concern with its Australian emigration. To add up, two small incidents were still to occur. Although of not much importance, their timing had some bearing on the final outcome of this migration plan. Fernando Beltran, the IEE officer who escorted the Spanish group, noticed that the ANZ Bank office operating on the Aurelia voyage that berthed in Melbourne on January 28, 1963 had altered the exchange rate from 165 pesetas to the pound to 140 pts. as it should have been. The mistake was redressed in Bonegilla, but echoes of it reached Madrid. On Sunday March 3, 1963, the Australian press gave quite large coverage to the news that five young Spanish women had been working in the nude at a vineyard near Mildura: Quite a few Spaniards came to this district this season, but they were split into groups. All the Spanish women are accompanied by their husbands. The five nudists are working together at one vineyard and their husbands on a neighbouring farm. The couples live together in one or other of the vineyards150 . THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 71

“Naked women picking grapes . . . Spanish, I guess. Foreign-looking gents . . . husbands, I hope . . .”

The “naked women” incident seen through the eyes of Molnar in The Sydney Morning Herald, March 6, 1963, p. 2.

There were heated discussions about it after Spanish chaplain Father Benigno Martín gave mass in Albion St., Sydney. Vice Con- sul Díaz went to Mildura and, after. proving that there was no basis in the published report, he asked the newspapers to retract the story. On this occasion he passed his report directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, rather than to the Director of Emigración Asistencia Social as usual.151 72 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

2.4 THE MIGRATION CUT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

In a long interview for Carta de España, José Antonio García Trevijano, Director General of the IEE, emphasized the fact that “the Spanish emigration is now directed towards the European countries”. Asked whether “there is any plan to increase migration to Australia”, he answered simply that, on that matter, “we have to count with CIME’s intervention”. By December 1962, Australian migration was not one of the priorities of the IEE.152 We have already defined some of the causes of Spanish uneasi- ness with the Australian migration scheme: difficulties over the placement of migrants from the camps of Bonegilla and Northam; flawed selection procedures that allowed in white collar and skilled workers without reasonable guarantees of success; unpleasant anecdotes such as the “money change” in the Aurelia, and the “naked women” incident in Mildura. However, for a better grasp of why Madrid decided unilaterally to cut the migrant flow to Australia, we have to examine these problems within the framework of two macro-considerations: the European trend of Span- ish emigration in the sixties, and the lack of proper diplomatic channels between Spain and Australia. The statistical information in Table 1 indicates this European trend. As for diplomacy, we refer back to chapter one to recall how, at the beginning of the process, it was as important for Madrid to open new diplomatic doors as it was to find a new place to export its labour surplus. While Madrid succeeded in the latter, it failed in the former Spanish officials were never able to THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 73 get a “formal” Agreement signed, like that for Italy, let alone to have a consulate or embassy representing Australian interests in Madrid. In normal reciprocity, Spain not only abstained from creating an embassy in Canberra, but it neglected its Consular representation. Once the most delicate diplomatic deal had been done, Madrid thought it was just a matter of letting the bureaucratic machine move at its own slow pace. Table 1. Spanish emigration Year to Lat. America to Australia to Europe 1960 33,242 799 19,610 1961 34,370 837 59,243 1962 32,295 4,230 65,336 1963 23,024 1,436 83,728

Source: IEE, Datos Básicos de la Emigración Española Madrid, 1975, pp. 13 and 30; L.A. Martínez Cachero, Emigración Española ante el Desarrollo Económico y Social, Madrid, 1965, p. 32.

2.4.1 THE DIPLOMATIC ISSUE During the most critical periods, José Luis Díaz was in charge of Consular affairs. A curious character, Vice Consul Díaz sought without success to lead Sydney’s Spanish community, as we will see when we refer to the foundation of the Spanish Club; he was, on the other hand, quite capable of influencing Madrid policy- makers. Perhaps his lack of diplomatic education allowed him a more daring attitude towards his duty. 74 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

He painted a bleak picture of the Spanish immigrants for whom he organized campaigns with people of “well-known moral and economic wealth” to raise money to buy toys for their children. In the populist line of Falangism, Díaz stood for what he believed was a heroic defense of his countrymen, unprepared by the pro- tective Catholic Spanish regime to cope with the aggressive capitalist, Protestant and Anglo-Saxon society. In contrast with the level-headed reports on the Australian situation written by the Consuls Tabanera and de la Riva, that preceded and followed him, Díaz reports were sensationalist and biased. He exaggerated the difficulties of the migrants. Obviously, migration is never an entirely happy venture, and all migrants missed their families, friends and culture. But many accepted the hardships and were quite contented with their migration decision. Díaz was partial, seeing only the version of the white collar migrants, and blaming only the CIME and the Australian Mission in Madrid. Office workers were sorry they came, but they were also responsible for the decision of coming; had they followed the normal channels, they would have not passed the screening tests of the selection teams. As on the lack of adequate information, surely the IEE was as responsible as the other agencies involved in the selection. Relaying too much on the misadventures of the small group of the “upper class migrants” that surrounded him, Díaz was unable to understand the situation of the thousands of labourers that had found in Australia a hope they lacked in Spain. Much exceeding his functions, he wrote to his Government distressing reports, which were the immediate cause for Madrid to cut the scheme. In doing so, he did not favour thousands of Spaniards who could THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 75 have contentedly joined the actual community of Spanish settlers in Australia. As an example of his overzeal, taking attributions which were not part of his function, he wrote to Madrid after the Bonegilla incidents: “In my opinion, no migrant ship should come for the time being, until the consulate advises you on the actual situation in the country”.153 Díaz reports also contained, on occasion, gross inaccuracies, such as: “if all other. countries have stopped sending migrants to Australia [sic.], it has been as a consequence of unfulfilled promises, which is exactly what has happened with our fellow nationals”.154 On December 30, 1962, Díaz sent a “most important and urgent” report to Asuntos Consulares Emigración on “Spanish migration to Australia”. The immediate reason for writing it was the Spanish demonstration which had previously occurred in Perth. In this report, he stated the Spaniards complaint that, unlike other migrant groups, no one went to receive them on disembarkation, noting that the Consulate never knew when the Spanish groups were to arrive. He described the indignation of the latest groups of migrants “for having been misled, when in Spain they lived well”. The situation in the holding camps was “dishonest”, according to him: migrants were charged for food that they could not eat, because it was cooked with “suet”. Despite the Common- wealth Employment Services in the camps, they often had to find jobs individually, borrowing money from friends or from their own Consul. The jobs they found were not in their professions, because of not knowing English, “and they were not told of that, in Spain”. The economic situation in Australia was “disastrous”: A single person earns, including overtime, 20 pounds per week. He has to spend: 4 in accommodation, 10 in food, 4 in locomotion, ciga- 76 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

rettes, toothpaste, soap etc. They have only 2 left to pay taxes. After two years work, they do not have enough to pay the return fare if they wanted to return. If they earn less, they can not live decently nor save. . . They can be made redundant at eight days notice, and the employment benefits, 3.5 pounds for a male single, does not cover even for accommodation. The Consul lend them money, on human- ity grounds, and so as not to allow them to insult Spain, and he invites bosses for dinner out of his own pocket, asking them to employ Spaniards . . . Spanish refugees and renegades tell them that the difficulties are only at the beginning, but migrants know better. Some lead almost a monastic life, they would have been millionaires in Spain . . . others become mad, and have to be repatriated . . . CIME, Catholic Emigration and the Australian Mission say this is the earthly paradise when it is exactly the opposite.155 The dormant Spanish bureaucratic machine was shaken up by this report. As a consequence of it, the Department of External Affairs again took the initiative on the matter, initiative that had been handed over. to the IEE for the past four years. Asuntos Consulares - Emigración asked the consulate, CIME, CCEM, IEE and Australian Mission in Madrid for “proof” of whether CIME or the Australian Mission had handed out documents promising over 70 pounds a month, and the nominal roll of migrants to whom this unfulfilled promise was made. Lahiguera also asked Díaz for maximum information on Spanish or Australian institutions or persons responsible for not receiving the migrants, on repatriations, and on whether there was some discrimination in the application of social legislation between Spaniards and migrants of other nationalities: “As you will understand, it is not possible to enforce the measures towards the mentioned migration institutions that the content of your report seems to make necessary unless we have these minimum data. Which, by order of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I convey to you”.156 This request was THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 77 reformulated on January 29, asking also for: “the number and relative importance of the Spanish communities as well as their internal characteristics . . . in order to adopt, if necessary, the most appropriate political tactics”.157 On March 7, 1963, Díaz sent his last two reports to Madrid. In one, he answered Madrid’s requests. On the key point of “los contratos del CIME”, he related the Miguel Fernández incident mentioned above. As to the responsibility for not greeting the migrants on arrival, he blamed Victoria’s Honorary Vice Consul, Dr. Francisco Xipell, whom he said was “bad-mannered and bearing resentment towards Spain”, and the lack of collaboration of the FCIC: “I have written and telephoned them a thousand times, asking them to notify us of the arrival of the expeditions; they have kept silent, or if they have answered, they have avoided the issue. To corroborate this, I enclose the last letter of Monsignor Crennan, which speaks for itself”.158 In the same document, Díaz told of the number of repatriations, twenty five up to then, all due to mentally related illnesses. He also enclosed some of the letters of complaint received in the Consulate, “many of them chosen at random, in which they blame Spain and its Govern- ment for directly or. indirectly deceiving them”.159 In the other report, Díaz wrote on his impressions of a visit to Bonegilla after the “money change” incident in the Aurelia. He insisted again that immigration from other countries had been halted, which was untrue, and reported to Madrid on his factual activities as an anti-Australian rabble-rouser amongst the Spanish migrants: I visited all the camp premises, and as Spaniards are now the only immigrants who arrive in this country [sic.], the camp authorities did 78 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

all they could to prove to me that everything was going perfectly. They were overfriendly . . ., but respectfully I told them that I wanted to visit all [the Spaniards] but by myself. Discreetly, I told the migrants that they would not be able to take up their. professions because of their lack of knowledge of the English language.160 To give greater weight to his impressions he added the opinions, sometimes very influential, of the Spanish chaplains: “ The Spanish chaplain of Melbourne, Father Eduardo Sánchez, and that of Sydney Father Benigno Martín have visited me, and they have asked me to inform you of the deplorable situation in which the Spanish immigrants in this country find themselves.161 At a meeting with Carmelo Matesanz, new Director of Asuntos Sociales - Emigración, on March 15, 1963, Gaspar Gómez de la Serna, Deputy Chief of the CIME, knew that, finally, the Spanish Government had made up its mind, and the 1956-57 migration Agreement with Australia had been suspended. At this same time, Ramón de la Riva Gamba was appointed Consul General in Sydney. We have already focused on the causes that brought the Span- ish migration scheme to this end: the difficulties in the placement of migrants, particularly in Western Australia; the selection flaws, bringing into the country office workers who were doomed to fail, and skilled tradesmen who were not warned on selection of the impossibility of working in their trades on arrival, because of their lack of knowledge of English. Problems that were presented to Madrid through the distorted lense of Vice Consul José Luis Díaz, who was able to pass on several occasions his personal opinions in official letters directly to the Minister. As already pointed out, for Díaz to bear such power. was just a by-product of the lack of interest on the part of Canberra in the diplomatic side of the migration programme. It is this diplomatic THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 79 issue which should account to a large extent for the drastic and unexpected end of the scheme. The Italian Assisted Migration Programme, much larger in size, survived better. the daily wear and bear. Problems of major importance compared with the Span- ish case often arose, but they were more easily solved. A comparison between the Italian migration treaty, and the Spanish “informal” agreement, may explain why. All the clauses written in the Spanish agreement were also written, often to the letter, in the Italian treaty; the latter. was, however, more complete, covering more possible situations. One clause in the treaty had it been in the Spanish document, might have saved both Governments some embarrassment later: “No official pamphlet explaining the Scheme shall be issued without the con- currence of the two Governments”.162 A major difference was that the Italian treaty was made for a period of five years, and could be continued there after by mutual agreement, not only for one single expedition. In the event that either Italy or Australia wanted to terminate the Scheme beforehand, either party had to give the other six months notice of its intentions. Given the disposition of the Spanish officials to collaborate, no further diplomatic arrangements were considered necessary for the Australian side. Canberra limited itself to creating the Austra- lian Mission in Madrid when the volume of immigrants from Spain necessitated doing so. While the volume of migration was small, the migration procedures ran smoothly. But in 1962, when the Spanish Scheme really started to take off with thousands of migrants being transported, the problems grew. Not having the diplomatic cover, the Scheme lacked the flexibility it needed to cope with them; this caused it to break suddenly, to the surprise of the 80 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Australian Government and sectors of the Spanish Government not directly implicated in the making of that decision.

2.4.2 ARRANGEMENTS AFTER MARCH 1963 It seems that the Spanish Government did not give any official explanation of the reasons behind its decision. The sections of the Spanish Department of Foreign Affairs related to migration simply opted to avoid any radical measure that would close av- enues that could be utilized later.163 The idea was, as José Luis de los Arcos164 put it to de la Riva, “to search for a safety valve, not to block the negotiations permanently . . ., because in the high ranks, the Australian migration is not well looked upon, due to the lack of historical or social ties”.165 For their part, all the agencies involved in the scheme reacted with surprise towards the Madrid decision. The CIME Liaison Mis- sion in Spain thought the main reason for this suspension was the flawed selection procedures, and blamed the Australian Mission in Madrid for them. According to de la Serna, the selection may not have been always adequate, but, from the 3,500 migrants selected by the CIME there was not one complaint. It was later, when the Australian Mission convinced the IEE that the CIME control was not necessary, that the problems started. He pointed out a solution. If migration resumed, de la Serna wrote, the selection should be handled only by the CIME. The IEE did not have “enough prepared staff and would fell again in the hands of the Australian Mission. Only the CIME was in a position to balance the criteria of the two countries involved”.166 THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 81

The FCIC guessed that the difficulties in the placement of migrants were the real cause of the suspension. It thought that the measures taken to deal with the problem were too extreme, and did not hide its disappointment: In April 1963, following the decision of the Spanish authorities, the migrant flow to Australia was cut. It has been explained that this decision was based on domestic grounds; however, the employment difficulties in Australia during the last months of 1962 had also been mentioned. But these were restricted to Western Australia, affected only a limited number of migrants and were of a temporary nature. Certainly, these difficulties were not of such importance as to explain the suspension of this migration. Otherwise, the placement of Span- ish workers in Australia has proceeded without difficulties, and there is a strong demand for Spanish workers on the part of the employers . . . They have created a favourable impression amongst the Catholic community in Australia. The single Spanish women, approximately 800, have gained an excellent reputation, and there is no fear they will lose their moral standards”.167 The Australian Government thought it was then time to up- grade its diplomatic channels with Spain, and established a Con- sulate in Madrid. This measure was announced by Downer in the 1963 Citizenship Convention held in June.168 In August, J. Blackie, the Chief of the Australian Mission in Madrid, became the first Consul General.169 The second Australian move was for saving the family reunion programme. After some negotiations, at a meeting of Secretary of the Department of Immigration Heyden with Consul de la Riva, this was agreed.170 At the initiative of the Australian Government, ministers for External Affairs Castiella and Garfield Barwick met in New York in October and for once, some understanding seemed to appear.171 The discussions were centered on five points, two of which had already been agreed: to establish an Australian Consulate in Madrid and continuity in the 82 OPERACIÓN CANGURO negotiations between the two countries, despite this temporal interruption of the migration flow; the other three were: adequate selection; guarantee of employment in their speciality; and no migration in periods of high unemployment, and only short stays in Hostels.172 It seems that Australian officials did not want to make public the fiasco of the Spanish scheme. In November, the Australian newspapers registered for the first time Downer’s impressions on the matter: “In Spain we have initiated a migrant flow which we must try to maintain without interruption”.173 The Spanish decision to cut the migration flow was announced in the Australian press only one year and three months after it actually happened: Migrant Flow From Spain Cut. Officials in Canberra said today the move was disappointing because the 10,000 Spanish migrants in Aus- tralia were good settlers, and highly regarded . . . discussions were continuing in an attempt to have assisted migration resumed, and in higher numbers . . . it was believed that the Spanish Government stopped assisted migration because of a shortage of a skilled and semiskilled labour in Spain”.174 It was necessary to wait until July 25, 1968 to see the next first group of 168 Spanish migrants nominated by the Commonwealth land at Sydney airport.175 Back in April, 1963, de la Riva was expected to clarify to Madrid what was the real situation in Australia. Paradoxically, the migration authorities of the Spanish Department of Foreign Affairs, who did not pay much attention to the migration scheme when it was functioning, felt compelled to examine it in detail on the months following its suspension. In his reports,176 de la Riva pointed out the three major lessons to learn from the migration fiasco: firstly, that Australia was a long-term, not a two-year migration consider- THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 83 ation, as many Spaniards thought; secondly, that, labourers could easily do well in Australia, while office workers could not; thirdly, that many migrants were contented, although when talking in groups, they tended to stress the difficulties. He did not deny the problems: the guarantees to be taken with the migration of skilled workers, the easiness of becoming redundant that the rigid regi- mentation of industrial relations under the Spanish system would not allow; the Australian officials’ exaggerations of the virtues of their migration system. These were accurate insights and de la Riva tried as well to find solutions. The following quotations summarize his opinions. An- swering Matesanz’s general question “whether it is convenient to resume emigration, and in which conditions”,177 the Consul suggested: This should be a long term migration. . ., previous agreement on the matter of the recognition of qualifications. . ., only one year of compulsory residence. Provisional solution, while the negotiations are taking place: restricted migration based on letters of nomination that take into account more factors than family reunion alone, in such a way that the selection is made by the interested parties themselves.178 Australia is neither paradise nor hell . . . Emigration to this country suffers mainly from flawed selection. Migration can be resumed, provided the selection is properly made: white collar workers, no; labourers, yes; skilled workers, only with guarantees . . . The Span- iards are well thought of here, and the authorities try to increase their quota. . . There is no guarantee of permanent employment in a country of absolute free employment . . . Workers in Spain have benefited a lot during these years from state protection, and this is the reason why their first steps in Australia are harder....179 Many are satisfied, although when talking in group, they will always emphasize the difficulties.180 84 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Immigration officials tend to exaggerate the good aspects; to speak about emigration with emigrants is a difficult task that requires getting used to it and a lot of patience: each migrant will rival with the others exaggerating either his difficulties or successes.181 In his reports, de la Riva often sent to Madrid elaborate statistics, with information in pesetas, on wages, family allowances, expenses etc. In one of them (Table 2) he calculated the possible average monthly savings of a family: Table 2. No. children 5 3 0 (wife works) single Salary 9500 9500 15000 9500 Accommodation 8300 6630 5150 2700 Fa.allowances 1275 700 - - Savings 2475 3570 9850 6800

Source: “Informe...”, August 30, 1963. SCC. (In pesetas, a pound equaling about 140 pesetas).

Contrasting this information with that provided through oral sources, it seems that de la Riva estimates conform much better with the situation than those Vice Consul Díaz made in his report of December 1963. The actual savings were often greater for two reasons. The Spaniards tended to choose low standard, thus cheaper, accommodation, living in rented rooms, in conditions not much worse than those many were already used to in their Spanish cities. As soon as it was practically possible, the wife would work too; having the children attended by other Spanish families, or working in a different shift than the husband, were ways of overcoming child-rearing difficulties. THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 85

There were still two matters to be dealt with after the suspension of the Agreement. Migration authorities of both countries and the other agencies involved addressed them: one concerned the family reunion programmes; the other, repatriations. The Spanish Government had readily allowed by August 1963 first grade family reunion, for assisted as well as for non-assisted migrants, and this agreement was applied with lax criteria. Ap- pendix 2 Table 1 depicts the number of arrivals up to 1966. An- other matter was that of sending for fiancées: in this case, marriage had to precede migration. Blackie pointed out in Madrid that Italians, as well as Australian Catholics including the Spanish migration chaplains, preferred the marriage to be realized in Aus- tralia rather than by proxy. De Viana was of the same idea, having in mind the risks of marrying by proxi (“maintaining a relationship through letters written by a friend of the fiancée”), and that disappointed brides might easily blame the IEE for the failure.182 An interesting polemic took place amongst the Spanish authorities, centred on the ideas about the matter of Monsignor Fernando Ferris, head of the CCEM. He was also against marriages by proxi, “only exceptionally allowed by Canon Law”, and asked the Spanish Government to demand from the fiancées only the requirements the Church requires to celebrate a marriage as listed in the Canon 1017. In this way “the interests of the Church are favoured, without contradicting the regulations on migration of the state”.183 But this would be, according to the IEE, facilitating no family reunion but family constitution. External Affairs did not agree with this policy either: Promises of marriage do not legally fulfil the immigration require- 86 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

ments until the wedding has taken place. If the wedding is the reason for the trip, we must demand marriage by proxy . . . [if not, it may happen] that they would change their mind, and we are left with a helpless single woman on the wharf, with all the problems that such a situation involves.184 Consul de la Riva stated his opinion considering two possibili- ties. In one, the bride claims the groom: not advisable, the groom is bound to fail. In the second, the groom claims the bride: gives a deposit of 350 pounds; if they marry, the deposit is refunded, if not, the bride could fly back to Spain with it.185 Monsignor Ferris did not agree with de la Riva: “my dear friend and most exemplar civil servant is logical but chrematistic in excess”, he argued, asking himself what would happen if the bride is the one who does not want to get married.186 Migrants, the churchman regretted, engaged in civil or mixed religion marriages because of lack of prospective partners, and the Australian Catholic hierarchy worry because so many Catholic marriages are lost. He summed up his views on the problem: “We are dealing with human beings that have a soul, and whose eternal life is at stake; sometimes we deal with these issues with too earthly a criteria”.187 While some migrants wanted people of their kin to join them in Australia, others were eager to return to their families in Spain. At the Consulate, many claimed they were told by the CIME that, should they wish to return to Spain after the two year period, the Spanish Government was to pay for the fare. Again, this was a lax interpretation of point 20 in the booklet CIME distributed to migrants: “Two years after arrival in Australia, the migrant who wishes to return to Spain and lacks the necessary founds to pay for the fare, may apply to the Spanish Consulate in Canberra for his repatriation, at the cost of the Spanish Government”.188 THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 87

In de la Riva’s opinion, the migrants were prepared to abuse the system. They claimed that Germany repatriated all the migrants that wanted to return to their home country. The Consul dismissed this claim after talking to his German counterpart. They realized that the situation on repatriation was similar in all the foreign representations in Sydney. Migrants of other nationalities were also writing to their national Ministers, asking for repatriations that they could easily pay themselves.189 A typical example was that of an unskilled migrant, 50 years old, married, with three children, who arrived in Australia on January 25, 1963. He asked to be repatriated while, to save expenses, the rest of the family remained in Australia until the end of the two year period. The reason was that he had asked for a year’s leave from his factory in Madrid, and did not want to loose his job. The low cost of the trip encouraged migrants to take leave from their jobs, that were not as long as the two year commitment of assisted migration. In the Consul’s opinion, that should not be the concern of the Spanish Government.190 The number of repatriations could have been hundreds or none, depending on how the regulations were interpreted, and de la Riva interpreted them strictly, allowing repatriations only in ex- ceptional cases. De la Riva’s position was too strict, according to the migrant chaplains. They thought that, through their social work, they were in a better position to know which migrants should deserve the help of the Spanish Government, rather than the Consul, isolated in his Sydney Point Piper ivory tower.191 Cer- tainly, except for the 1964 year, not one single Spanish migrant was repatriated from Australia.192 In 1964 itself, it seems that all the selection errors of the previous five years were being re- 88 OPERACIÓN CANGURO dressed. During that year, 103 migrants were repatriated. This might well have been caused by the echoes of Australian life, published in Spanish newspapers during Christmas 1963. If the image of Spain portrayed in Australian media had some bearing on the developments of migration between both countries, as explained in chapter one, the image of Australia in the Spanish press was going to have far more importance.193 While the Australian newspapers’ idea of Spain was similar in 1957 and in 1964, the vision of Australia reported by the Spanish press before 1961 was totally different to that reported after 1962. The former was the “paradise”, where most workers had a car, and wages were the highest in the world, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Only the disposition of banning the advertising of emigration following the emigration law of 1960194 altered this trend. When Australia appeared again on the Spanish press at the end of 1962, the image projected looked more like “hell”. Returned migrants were the makers of this negative vision of Australia, which reached its peak at the end of 1963. One of its best examples is an article published in Diario Regional, in which, the migrant commented: Where I lived, which is where Spaniards abound [Wollongong], we celebrated Christmas the Spanish way. But there were sad days, and we all ended up weeping, yearning for the family and the homeland. Although most of us had a good situation, there were a few who did not. They left good and secured jobs in Spain, and now they find themselves working as mere labourers in Australia, with wages that do not even pay for a roof over their heads. Many would like to return, but they can not; the fares are too dear and, although it is stipulated in the contract that our return journey should be paid for, very few manage this, and many people go insane at the thought of never being able to return to Spain.195 THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 89

A peculiar case was that of the Santander brothers. After some years of “making a killing” in Australia, and saving to the limit, they won the Opera House lottery, and went to Spain in Decem- ber 1962. They landed in Malaga, and went by car to their home- town in the north. The newspapers of many of the cities they were passing through published the accounts of their Australian odyssey, in which everything was portrayed in a negative way: “as a labourer, earning ten shillings weekly, he did very badly . . ., they suffered unemployment and they spent 2,000 pounds, everything that they had managed to save, on their return fare”.196 In fact, they had previously sponsored their parents, and, some months after their return, they had applied again for permission to migrate to Australia to the Consulate in Madrid, permission that was denied.197 This also happened in Christmas 1963, which apparently were sad days for Spaniards who had relatives abroad. Even the Caudillo echoed this sadness -migration was a sensitive political issue- in his traditional end of the year speech: “Particu- larly these days, when families get together. . . my thoughts are with those who, driven by necessity, have sought work outside our frontiers. Our aspiration is that no one should have to leave his native land for economic reasons”.198 These articles caused distress amongst many Spanish families. They worried that their relatives in Australia were writing to Spain saying they were “all right” so as to avoid upsetting them; some families wrote to Australia offering to pay for their return trip. The situation persisted for some time. We conclude this section with an anecdote from February 1965. Aurelia García was one of those mothers who worried. An appeal was made by a very popular programme of Radio Madrid “Ustedes son formidables”, to raise 90 OPERACIÓN CANGURO money to pay for her trip to Australia. Through it, she finally was able to see her son, Miguel, who was happily settled in Melbourne.199 THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 91 3 THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY

In the first chapter we have seen how, through the initiative of the Australian Catholic church, and of the Queensland sugar cane industry, the Governments of Australia and Spain, helped by the ICEM and the Catholic Agencies, arranged the migration plan. In this second part we will see how the words contained in those documents transformed themselves into deeds, slightly changing the human geography of both countries. From August 1958 to March 1963, 7,814 Spaniards came to Australia, nominated by the Commonwealth. In this chapter we will consider, first, the subjec- tive reasons that moved these people to come to Australia, and then, how they came, and what they did here. Firstly, poverty or bare subsistence turned some people into migrants bound for Australia. Clemente Cerdá, Director General of the IEE, confirmed this: “The low living standards. When a man is well off, he does not want to any risk. That is why few skilled men leave the country”.200 In one of the most important books dealing with the Spanish emigration in the sixties, the following indices are used to explain the individual motivations of migrants: to help the family 90% better salaries 91% to save 89.8% not earning enough 78% their children’s future 68.8% to buy a house 65.4% 92 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

having only temporary work 58.6% to gain economic independence 57.6% being unemployed 42.2% 201 In the Australian migration 1958-63, it seems that individuals were moved by economic necessity, the possibility of getting a cheap fare, and the willingness to go almost anywhere and do almost any work available. Most of them came to Australia because it was the only opportunity of going abroad they could find, they would much rather have gone to Venezuela, or to France. Generally speaking, migrants came to Australia because their economic prospects in Spain were bleak. Many migrant families thought that working abroad for some years, they could save enough money to buy a house at home, and with their accommodation problem solved, life in Spain would be improved. Most migrants thought of their trip to Australia as a temporary move with the aim of saving money. This fact was to have an important bearing in their lifestyle abroad in the early sixties, and in the shaping of the Spanish community in Australia. There were other motives. For some, these were “political”, arising from their involvement in anti-Francoist sindical activities. For others the motives were “religious”, for example, a small group of Adventists who migrated to Melbourne. For some Marta women, fleeing spinstership was more relevant than their economic status. Family reunion brought many to Australia, although not to the extent of from other Southern European countries. Some, particularly white collar workers, came for the wrong reasons, leaving comfortably jobs and lifestyles in Spain; we have referred to them in chapter two. During the entire sixties, there were always more Spaniards ready to migrate abroad than assisted passages available for them. Some came by chance, because they THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 93 were given the opportunity and did not want to miss it. A sense of adventure drove many single people to Australia on a sort of two year working holiday. We have found no traces of clandes- tine migration, i. e. operators that brought migrants to Australia outside the regular travel fares or the assisted passages of ICEM and Governments.202 Later in the sixties, the Victorian migrant chaplain Father Eduardo Sánchez, of whom we shall hear more later, wrote: The arrival of Spaniards in Australia began around 1958. Firstly, wood- cutters came, mainly single, from Navarra, the Vascongadas, Santander and Asturias. Then, as a part of Operación Marta, 747 single girls came into the country in several groups. At the same time and afterwards also, couples with children arrived here. About three years ago, Spanish migration to Australia stopped, with the exception of family reunion.203 There are obvious errors in this excerpt ( not many migrants from the first expeditions were, nor were they meant to be, wood- cutters; the migration flow closed on 1963 rather than in 1966 ). However, the three groups suggested by the priest are illuminat- ing. They are utilized in the subsections to follow. In the first section, we will examine the migration of about 1300 single men who, from 1958 to 1961, came for rural work. Then, we will focus on the expeditions that brought about 800 single women to Australia, from 1960 to the end of the scheme; these women were sent with the aim of evening the sex imbalance, and were employed as domestics. Thirdly, we will deal with the migration of family units (approximately two thousand workers with their four thousand dependents) who came from 1961 onwards to undertake industrial work. This chapter will also deal with the migrants on arrival, how they adjusted to the new environment, and what they ended up doing in Australia. 94 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

3.1 OPERACION CANGURO

In this section we are to study the so called Operacion Canguro and four other similar expeditions (see Table 1). Table 1.

OPERATION SHIP FROM DATE TO DATE MIGRANTS Canguro Toscana Trieste 26.6 Brisbane 6.8.58 159 Eucaliptus Montserrat Bilbao 5.5 Freemantle 29.7.59 169 Emu Monte Udela Bilbao 19.12 Melbourne 21.1.60 402 Karry Monte Udela Santander 20.6 Melbourne 23.7.60 372 Torres Monte Udela Santander l8.12 Melbourne 21.1.61 425 All these expeditions had various points in common: they brought single men (although a few childless couples arrived with the expeditions Emu and Torres), from 21 to 35 years of age. They had to have their military service finished and a good behaviour certificate. This migration programme was advertised on radio and in newspapers, and prospective migrants had to present their documents at the Sindicatos offices. Migrants came mostly from the north of Spain, particularly the Basque Country and Santander. They paid fares ranging from zero in Canguro to 3,500 pesetas in Torres, and they needed an extra 10 American dollars cash to cover first expenses. Apart from these shared elements, each expedition had its own colour. The Canguro expedition was recruited from Santander and the Basque Provinces. The cane farming press gave it quite a large coverage: THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 95

A first group of 150 Spanish migrants will leave soon for Australia. Most of them will be Basques, from the north of Spain. An Australian immigration expert who recently visited Spain, expressed the view that Australia could get on well with Spaniards, and that Spaniards would like Australia and assimilate early. He was impressed by the hard working quality of these migrants.204 Some anecdotes: Uriguen came from a large family of farmers, eight brothers and three sisters. An uncle had immigrated to Aus- tralia before the war, and a brother went to the United States to work as a shepherd.205 Esparza tells us how out of 150 applicants from Eibar, only two were chosen; the others did not pass the medical examination; a friend in the secret police may have helped his case.206 Estanillo came from Santander: “We were asked ‘do you know how to drive a tractor?’; if you answered ‘yes’, you would not go. We were asked our profession and we had to say ‘peasants’; but in fact fitters, bakers, even musicians came with us”.207 In Patras, 198 single Greek girls boarded the ship (on board there were also 372 Hungarian, Yugoslav and Polish migrants). Then, through Port Said, and the Torres Strait they reached Brisbane. The ship captain said the Spaniards had been “very well behaved and well disciplined”.208 When the liner Toscana berthed in Brisbane on August 6, 159 immigrants from Spain, chosen as men suitable for canecutting in the Queensland canefields, landed from the vessel and were taken in busses to the Wacol migrant center. The first detachment of them were due to leave for Cairns and Tully on Sunday 10, whilst other groups for Ingham and Innisfail were due to follow soon afterwards.209 The selection procedures of the Montserrat expedition were similar; the voyage was more troubled: When the migrant liner Montserrat reached Fremantle today, allega- tions were made of a near mutiny by passengers in the middle of the 96 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

ocean, and of a fight in which shots were fired. Passenger alleged that armed officers and crew members had patrolled the ship to repel protests groups and to keep order on the 54 day voyage from Eu- rope. Shots were made to halt one melee between Spaniards and Greeks. . . Fight broke between Spanish men over Greek women; Spaniards were all bachelor and women were all Greek.210 Greek passengers complained to their Consul at a stormy wharfside meeting, about the conditions on board which were, they said, worst than a prison.211 A fine of 500 pounds was imposed on the master of the ship. . . only three of the twenty two lifeboats were in conditions. And six of the ship’s ten rafts were unserviceable.212 From Perth, the migrants were brought to Melbourne by train, and from there to Bonegilla. Then, the Spaniards, were sent to Queensland. From then on, most sea borne groups coming from Spain, entered the Australian workforce through this Bonegilla holding camp. The three following expeditions were made in another Spanish ship, Monte Udala, that had been recently adapted for the transport of passengers. The voyages (thirty three days, through Capetown) were uneventful, playing cards, studying English and making friends. The only complain was that the newly weds that joined the Emu and Torres expeditions had to sleep in separate berths. The Emu group included people from Burgos and some from Madrid; after spending some time in Bonegilla, they went to the Mildura area in Victoria. Karri’s passengers went to Queensland, and Torres’ to Mildura again. Some new arrivals joined friends and relatives at the wharf instead of going to Bonegilla. Most of these migrants ended up working as cutters for the North Queensland sugar cane industry, going there after disembarkation or when the fruit season in Victoria finished. Only a few Spaniards settled in the sugar cane area for the whole year. THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 97

Spanish gang on the North Queensland canefields, 1960 season. Alonso and Doval in front.

When the cane season ended, some joined the tobacco season, also in Queensland, while others went to pick fruit at Griffith (NSW), or to work on the Snowy Mountains Scheme or the Port Kembla steel industry. Often, they travelled with the same gang they worked with in the canefields. When the next cane season started, many would move northward again; others would remain in the industrial areas or were drained towards the big cities of Sydney and Melbourne. They lived for some years a sort of nomadic existence, moving in small batches northward and southward, its epicenter being the sugar area of North Queensland. They kept this lifestyle, common to all workers that engaged in rural seasonal jobs, until they settled in one area, forming a family, or until they returned to Spain. The only official information migrants had on cane cutting, and for that matter, on Australia, was what they could get from a 98 OPERACIÓN CANGURO booklet edited in Spanish by the CIME213 and handed to the migrants on selection. There might have been other information, not necessary accurate, gathered from people with acquittances already in Australia. The booklet gave general information about the tasks involved in the work, salaries, working hours, unions, baggage they should bring, and other useful ideas. On the canefields the Spaniards worked at Ingham, Tully, Innisfail, Cairns, Gordon Valley and Babinda, were most of the cutters were Italians. Mr. Zamora, who owned a petrol station in Tully, María Pedrola and few other long term Spanish settlers, gave them the first explanations needed. The new arrivals soon picked up enough Italian to get by. They divided into gangs, according to friendship, family ties and village origins, and started working. The season lasted from June to December, work was from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., and included: burning, cutting and cleaning the cane, bundling and loading it, and laying the portable rails on which it was transported. All in all, “one of the toughest rural jobs in the whole Australia - poisonous snakes including four metre pythoms, and fevers traced later to parasites carried by droves of rats inhabiting the fields...”214 Salaries were of about 15 pounds, but, after a month, each cutter got an average of 22 weekly. They had to deliver, by contract, a minimum daily quota, and it was on the surplus, where the chances of earning more money increased. Another regula- tion was that “the aggregate forthrightly earnings of a gang are shared equally by the members of the gang. Consequently, slack- ers are not encouraged and each member of the gang endeavour to ‘do the right thing by his mates”’.215 While this system seemed to work well for employers, the social relations within the gang THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 99

Mosman, North Queensland, 1959. Standing up, Basque cutters de la Fuente, V. Zarauz, J. L. Goñi, and Arregui; the rest are Hungarians and one Islander.

were often strained: “The same mates would give you the sack if you were not fast enough, or else you have to give them money for allowing you to work with them, as it was in my case ... Fights within the gang were common, unless you had good friendship with all of them”.216 Despite such difficulties, North Queensland attracted numerous Spanish migrants. Even when family migration started, some men left wife and children behind and went northward to work there, at least for one season. La Crónica echoed this attraction: “We loved Queensland from the first moment! They say the trop- ics attract people, that he who comes here once will always return... 217 Some admitted they could earn more elsewhere, but 100 OPERACIÓN CANGURO went back to Queensland, punctually, every season.218 They liked working outside and enjoying the social life centered around Mr. Zamora and Father Ormazábal. Eliseo Zamora was “a Spaniard torn in Australia and a legend amongst the Spaniards in North Queensland. He welcomed every Spanish gang that arrived there, and, during weekends, his time belonged entirely to the Spanish canecutters”.219 Father Ormazábal, who arrived with the Canguro group and lived in Queensland until his death in the early seventies, organized popular social gatherings at the Irish Club at Tully. He also organized and appeal to rise funds for Alejandro Gandarillas who, after being seriously injured, was repatriated in May 1963. The day the plane left Queensland, nearly four hundred Spaniards went to see him off.220 Alejandro pointed out to his countrymen back in Spain, another reality of life in North Queensland: “There are many Spaniards in Australia who earn up to a thousand pesetas daily, but there are also many who do not have a cent. They spend it all”.221 He hinted here at the other side of the Spanish legend in Queensland. It seems that Spaniards worked so hard either to save it all or to spend (mostly drinking) it all. It took three months for Pachica to be able to save enough to pay for the “minimum clothing requirements for cane cutters seeking employment in sugar districts”.222 The Spanish cutters seemed to have fulfilled some of the political expectations behind their immigration. Minister Downer claimed as a success the fist “experimental” group of Spaniards sent to Queensland, and announced in the House of Representa- tives the follow up expeditions.223 In March, the Australian Sugar Journal announced the labour requirements for the industry for THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 101 the 1960 season. The farmers asked for 200 migrants, “preferably Italians suited for cane cutting”, to arrive in June, and a further 400, “preferably Italians and Spaniards from the Basque Prov- inces”, to arrive in July and August.224 This means that, despite their small number, Spanish cane-cutters had some positive impact amongst the farmers. However, immigrant labour, Spaniards included, did not solve the long term problems of the industry as management sow them. Growers sought machinery to overcome restrictive practices: “The cutters in lots of instances do not want to take a cut on now unless you have got a loader, they do not want to hand load cane”.225 The industry was also competing for migrant workers with the tobacco and fruit sectors. It was often thought that these competi- tors had the advantages: The better class of cane cutters is lost to the industry . . . Absorbed into other industries such as tobacco and fruit. Being a good type of worker, he seeks to better himself and in doing so is lost to us, and the less valuable men is left there for years, to become a burden on us.226 We are to be faced with competition particularly from the tobacco industry, towards the end of the season. You know the difficulties of trying to inject new labour into the industry later in the season. Firstly, the weather conditions are not propitious, and secondly, established gangs are by no means anxious by that stage of the season to accept new labour.227 In May 1962, a request was passed again that in view of the continuing deterioration of the quality of migrant labour supplied for the sugar industry, the ASPA executive confer with the QCGC and approach the Federal Government with a view to the appointment of a responsible cane farmer as adviser to the migrant selection team at the original point of selection, when migrants 102 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

are being selected for definite allocation to canecutting.228 For the 1964 season, migrant labour was recruited from Malta and directly flown in to Queensland; most of them deserted their jobs after a week or two to go southward. They did not solve the problems of the industry either.229 Apart from working in the canefields, this group of migrants were employed also in the tobacco area in Queensland, and in the Griffith and Mildura fruit picking areas. Working in the tun- nels of the Snowy Mountains Scheme was the most important non farming related activity this batch of migrants engaged in. Social life in the tobacco area (Mareeba, Dimbulah), was very much similar to life in the canefields: similar working hours, hardships, salaries; similar people. The season lasted from November to March. If they had a car, some gangs could even go and work in the fruit season at Griffith, where there was always, during the early sixties, a steady group of Spanish workers. More likely, though, they would take some time off to see what the conditions were in other parts of Australia, and to enliven for some weeks the social and financial life of the Spanish clubs in Sydney and Melbourne. From 1960 through to the mid sixties, there was an important presence of Spanish migrants in the Mildura grape picking area. Mildura was the first point of destination of the expeditions that arrived during the season. The first Spanish women to work there, who came in small numbers in the Emu and Torres groups, did so as cooks. Later, when family migration started and their number increased, they did picking as well. Many migrants worked in the Snowy Mountains Irrigation THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 103

Scheme, usually for short periods of time. Often they did so for companies that, having finished their jobs there, kept employing them on other mines or dams in the Northern Territory, Queensland and even Tasmania and New Zealand. Work was hard, but restricted to eight hours, and wages were, in general, better than what they could earn in the cane. Despite their mobility, the Span- iards managed to create some social life there, helping each other in finding work, and spending the weekends together making “paellas” and drinking beer. 104 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

3.2 PLAN MARTA

During their travels He entered a certain village, where a woman named Martha welcomed Him to her home. She and a sister named Mary, who took a seat at the Lord’s feet and listened to His teaching. But Martha got worried about much housework; so, approaching Him, she said, “Lord, do you not care that my sister left me to do the work alone? Then tell her to help me.” But the Lord answered her, “Martha, Martha, you are anxious and bothered about many matters, when there is need of but one thing. Mary has selected the good portion which will not be taken away from her. Luke 10, 38-42.

Since the mid fifties, the Australian press had reported on the interest of the Department of Immigration in bringing single women to ease the imbalance of sexes amongst the migrant population. “Every effort is made to encourage male migrants to nominate their single sisters of marriageable age”, said a spokesman, so as to avoid that situation of single migrants who “even kill themselves because of loneliness and failure to obtain a woman”230 Despite the special migration programmes to bring single women from Greece and Italy, the problem had still not diminished by the early sixties. The subject arose in the 1960 Citizenship Con- vention,231 and as usual in the press. The lack of marriageable women was described as one of the worst hardships of young male migrants from Europe . . . A bride ship that brought 300 single girls [from Greece] was greeted at the Woolloomooloo wharf by 4000 Greek bachelors last month. . . They need a good girl, not a beautiful doll type looking for luxury.232 THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 105

Another article titled “Wanted: brides for 20,000 lonely men”, summed up the problem this way:

Migrant difficulties are not always just economic...Three bachelors to every spinster came to Australia on assisted passages in the nine months to March this year... They turn to drink, gamble wackily or literally go mad... The present policy brings out girls mainly as domestic help. There is not after care of them. They are often worked up to fourteen hours a day for 8 pounds a week. Such things get back to Europe. Parents become reluctant to risk their girls coming to Sydney.233

Some Southern European migrants, the article went on, found a way to overcome the problem, relying on their mothers to pick out a suitable bride in hometowns and villages. This solution had its problems; it might well happen either that “the original does not match with mother’s glowing report”, or that “after a month trip, the girl turns up wearing a rival engagement ring”.234

This was the situation in Australia at the time when another programme to bring out single girls, in this case from Spain, was to be launched. We are to look now at the assumptions on the Spanish side, before the programme was put into effect. The concern of the Church about the migration of single women showed in the following words:

There are so many countries that appeal to our girls. Why? A desire to see new things, learn languages, earn money... We would advise you to carry in your luggage, amongst your rosy dreams, a little - or, rather, a lot - of these three: awareness, vigilance, orientation. Evil threatens girls in various disguises. It is very risky to trust unknown people. Girls who go abroad should know the tricks used to take advantage of them. It is true that the tactics change every day, and that the traps that they will encounter are innumerable. That is why we tell you: Beware! Be vigilant!.235 106 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

The Spanish authorities were specially wary in regards to the migration of women under 25: We should emphasize the fact that girls under 25 leaving the country with the excuse of doing domestic or other kind of work is really covering for a white slave trade. The percentage of domestics that are seduced and used for immoral purpOsés deserves special consideration . . . We should call for a favourable report from the Patronato de Proteción a la Mujer before allowing the departure of women under 25 to work abroad.236 Credit has to be given to Monsignor Crennan to have been able to supersede the difficulties that, first within the CCEM and then in the IEE, must have arisen in bringing up the matter, as this was the first scheme of its kind ever implemented in Spain. It was agreed that the preselection task would be made by the CCEM, through its Diocesan Migration Committees and the Parishes’ network throughout Spain. Monsignor Crennan was particularly proud of the way this Marta programme was handled. Despite his involvement in similar but larger schemes with Italy and Malta, or even through the WCC with Greece, he often quoted it in his speeches in international congresses: it is expected that this particular project which goes by the name of Marta, will account for the coming of many more young Spanish women, who, like the hundreds who had preceded them, will reflect credit on their country and their families, and enrich the life and culture of their new country.237 The first group arrived in Melbourne on March 10, 1966. “Seno- ritas will even sexes”, was announced in the Sydney Morning Herald the day before, informing that this group of 18 was the first of a hundred single women to come to Australia by June 30. On the same Qantas plane, seventy four Greek girls joined the THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 107 group. “Happy to be here”, read the headline on the first page of the Sydney Morning Herald, welcoming the first Marta expedition.238 The article included a photo of two girls dancing with some Spaniards clapping in the background. The news of this arrival also reached the IEE press: “About a hundred men, some of whom had travelled more than 1,600 kilometres to be there, threw flowers and shouted greetings when they disembarked from the aircraft. The Australian Minister for Immigration, Alexander Downer, was also there to welcome the girls”.239 The following groups240 also received quite a lot of press coverage, bearing in mind their small numerical importance. Some of this coverage, particularly in Catholic magazines, was advertising for family accommodation: “Placements are still required for some of the fifty girls arriving this month, and any Catholic family interested in taking one of these domestics should contact Rev. Father Eris Tierney, Diocesan Director of Immigration”.241 From the third expedition on, the pattern was to bring groups of sixty women four times a year. They were sent from Melbourne to the different capital cities: Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide, Canberra and of course Melbourne itself. Father Eris Tierney, the Director of the Roman Catholic Immigration Office in Sydney and therefore the person in charge for the placement of most of them, explained why they were not sent to country areas: Most of them ask to be placed in convents, where there is a chapel which they may visit briefly during the day. In their homeland, they are daily communicants, and wish to continue this in Australia. For this reason, they prefer to work in the cities, where they can also meet compatriots and keep in touch with each other. They find the country districts “too lonely” particularly as they can not speak En- glish very well.242 108 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Two kinds of problems soon arose. On occasions, the girls did not want to leave the big group in Melbourne or Sydney to go to other cities. The consul reported one of these cases, asking to take urgent measures to avoid similar situations.243 The other problem concerned the actual placing of the women. After their arrival at the city of destination, they were driven to the Diocesan Immigration Offices where their employers were waiting for them. Then each matron picked a woman; the last in doing so could only choose amongst the least physically appealing girls and on occasion they complained of that, with consequent embarrassment to all parts involved. Some other difficulties arose after having been placed in employment. The most common was that of domestics that wanted to leave their employer after a few days of living in the house, or viceversa. Three measures were taken from 1961 to correct these problems. Firstly, a month long training course was organized in a convent in Madrid that had to be attended by all the women selected. Father Tierney explained the contents of the course: They were being taught the Australia style of cooking, elementary English and the fundamentals of domestic work. Naturally enough all are anxious to learn English, and we think the best way of doing that is in a private home. This is also the easiest way to settle in and get used to Australian customs and home life.244 This course was mentioned in most press releases announcing the arrival of new groups, as if it were an important part of the advertising of the scheme: “Flight Martha from Madrid brings to Australia at regular intervals the product of the training school set up in that city to prepare girls for domestic posts with Catholic families and institutions here”.245 THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 109

These women came with the Marta group which reached Melbourne on February 16, 1963 to join their fiancees already in Australia.

During the course, each person would learn to which city she was going to and to which household. Emphasis was put on the commitment of working for two years as domestics: You have undertaken to go to your new country to work as a domestic for two years. Fulfil this commitment seriously. You are helped with transport and employment. This would cost you so much money that you would not be able to emigrate on your own account. The only way to pay for it is by being the best possible employee, and by fulfilling your work commitment (Australia: two years; Canada: one year).246 They were asked to sign a paper undertaking to work as domestics for two years. This document had no legal validity, as an Immigration official commented on the arrival of the first group: We bring them out here and place them in jobs as domestics. They go their own social ways from there. No condition was placed on the women to remain domestics. They were introduced into their own 110 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

communities soon after arrival and from then on nature usually takes its course.247 This caused tensions with some of the women, and from mid 1962 they were not asked to sign the paper. Their employers were warned that, should they refuse to employ the person placed for them, they would not have the opportunity to apply for another one. In Sydney, two chaplains who spoke some Spanish, Fathers Roch Romac OFM and Leónard Hsu OFM, were appointed to help these migrants and were available to them by phone.248 In Melbourne Father Hallis SJ fulfilled the same task. The Catholic Migration Offices of both countries also agreed to send some Catholic social workers to Australia. Monsignor Ferris contacted Father Cornelio Urtaso, founder of the Secular Institute “Vita et Pax”, who appointed three of its members for the task: Paquita Bretón, nurse, and María Louisa Erro and Carmen Cervero, dress- makers. They landed in Australia with the Marta flight of June 14, 1961, and went to Sydney. As there were misunderstandings on the financial arrangements in the agreement, Louisa and Carmen had to put themselves to work so that Paquita could devote herself full time to her social task. A small group in each expedition came to Australia to marry their boyfriends or to join relatives that had already migrated before. They normally would not engage in domestic work. So, of the group that arrived in December 1960, five girls married “the following week after their arrival”.249 Of the twenty four “mother’s helps” who went to Sydney in March 1961, “eight were married within a few hours of their arrival, four at Port Kembla and four in Sydney suburbs”.250 In some cases, marriage was ar- THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 111

Marta women with the Spanish flag on a 1961 Sunday afternoon. After attending mass at the Cathedral, they bring Spain back to Sydney’s Hyde Park. Third from left, Paquita Bretón. ranged by letter, and they met for the first time at the airport. These immigrants were from all walks of life: “The fact that they begin working as domestics does not mean that they worked as domestics back in Spain. Many have university degrees and some are schoolteachers and nurses”.251 Father Tierney’s words reflect a reality that was often pointed out in the press. The vocational complexion of these women was discussed in the Austra- lian Women’s Weekly through interviews with six girls “working in Adelaide as waitresses and ladies’ companions”. Of them, four were schoolteachers in Spain, one a manicurist and the other: “she is rich, she does not do anything”: [They] explained in broken English: “There is much propaganda in Spain about Australia. Australia, they say, is better country in the world, where people makes money, where live better, where people 112 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

very happy. So we go to Australia. We get help from your Govern- ment, who help pay our air tickets if we agree to work in Australia for two years. So we are here . . . It is hard to say what we think about Australian men, because so far we have not met many Australian men, only what you call New Australian men . . . People here seem to work too hard, rush too much, we have time for other things in Spain, for the siesta”.252 Life for these women was not always as happy as the press articles seemed to paint. Linguistic and cultural misunderstandings were common and, isolated in their working homes, it was not always easy to cope. One of the girls, who came with the last group, was sent to Brisbane, to work with a family with seven children. She spent the days crying. Her matron tried to entertain her, took her to English classes, to the doctor and, finally, back to the Catholic Migration Office. She was offered other jobs but she refused. She was allowed to stay in a residence for senior citizens, helping the nuns to pay for her keep. Eventually, she became a nurse, married and settled happily in Australia. Her de- pression was not uncommon, and the women often referred to it as “el mal de Australia”.253 They were relieved to find that domestic work in Australia did not have the pejorative connotations of “criada” back in Spain at that time. Some girls found their work interesting and enjoyable, and kept doing it until they married.254 Some others were soon dismissed, as in one particular case, after all the electric appliances of the house were broken.255 Most of them did not finish the two years there but either left to join the mainstream workforce, or just worked in a different house where the same job was being better paid. In fact, despite Father Tierney boasting that “the old subsistence and pocket money basis for domestic work had gone, THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 113 and nowadays a wage of 6/10/- and keep was usual”,256 it was apparently easy to find similar work, closer to the city, with a smaller number of children in the family, and earning 9 pounds instead. Realizing this caused some girls to complain to Spanish Catholic and governmental migration bodies. Pilar Moreno wrote an article in Juventud Obrera in Spain entitled “At least, like the oranges”. In it, she pointed out that, if they were to be sent abroad, it should be done, at least, with the same care used for exporting oranges, and criticized the “rosy” picture of Australia they received in the training course. Some girls even mocked the name of the scheme, calling it Operación Petra for “Petra, criada para todo”, a popular character of children’s comics.257 Part of the social life of the Marta group was centred on those who had first quit domestic work and found independent accommodation. Their rented rooms were the usual meeting places on weekends. The Diocesan Migration Offices provided another focus of social life. In Melbourne, its Director Father Rafter, helped by Father Hallis, and by Pilar Casanovas, a Filipino lady who acted as interpreter for the Catholic Office, provided a meeting place for them. On weekends, many joined to hear mass in St. Patrick’s, and then to have a chat, drink tea etc. The same process happened in Sydney. Those who went to Adelaide, Brisbane and Canberra, either were absorbed by Australian society or soon moved to Sydney and Melbourne. A small group of girls married non-Spanish “New Australians”, usually Italians or East European people. Most of them, however, married Spaniards, thus fulfilling the function they were brought here for. Their weddings were social events that lit up the Span- ish community. 114 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

3.3 FAMILY MIGRATION

After the first pilot tests with Spanish migrants in Australia had apparently succeeded, Australian immigration officials began to bring family units from Spain, from mid 1961. Amongst these groups was a small percentage of single and also childless couples, usually married on the day before their departure. All sea voyages (see Table 2) ended in Melbourne, although on occasion, important groups of migrants disembarked in Fremantle. Table 2. Ship From Arrival date Roma Vigo 21-6-61 Aurelia Barcelona 9-8-61 Castel Felice Vigo 3-2-62 Aurelia Barcelona 16-11-62 Fairsea Cadiz 14-12-62 Aurelia Barcelona 28-1-63 Fairsea Vigo 6-2-63 Aurelia Barcelona 10-4-63 The Aurelia, a vessel built in 1938 “at the express wish of Adolf Hitler and for his own use”258 was converted into a passenger ship first in 1955 and then, again, in 1959.259 In her voyage of August 1961, the Aurelia transported Agustin de las Heras, wife Honorina and their eleven children, the biggest Spanish family unit to migrate to Australia. The Aurelia also brought the last group to come under the scheme we are studying, and for that matter, the last sizable group of Spaniards to come to Australia by sea. We are to focus briefly THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 115 on this last trip. The voyage started in Bremerhave on March 8, 1963, left Vigo on March 11, and ended in Sydney on April 12. ICEM escort officer in charge was Ludovic A. Heuvelmans. Felipe Vázquez Mateos, Delegado de Trabajo of Asturias represented the IEE and Cristina Ferrando came from the CIME; a doctor and a priest also escorted the Spanish group. Despite being the biggest group on board, there were no films, books etc. in Spanish, although there were in German.260 Tables 3 and 4 show passengers’ nationality, sex, age, and type of fare, and date and point of disembarkation: Table 3. Sex male fem male fem Age under l 1-3 3-12 3-12 over l2 over l2 TOTAL Nationality Belgium 1 2 3 4 24 11 45 Denmark - - - - 1 - 1 Germany 3 15 21 22 151 127 339 Spanish 10 50 68 72 129 118 441 TOTAL 14 67 85 98 304 225 823 Source: “Memoria del Viaje”, Cristina Ferrando Collection (CFC).

Table 4. Disembarkation Fremantle Melbourne Sydney Date 4-4-63 10-4-63 12-4-63 ICEM 17 716 90 COGEDAR (1) 48 148 111 TOTAL 65 864 201 (1) COGEDAR: ex Germany, 107, ex England, 191, ex Spain,10. Source: Ibid., CFC. 116 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

From 1961, migrants started arriving by air, and in 1963, the number of arrivals by plane totalled 1,348, while only 616 had arrived by sea.261 Migrants travelling by plane were somehow different from the others. Lacking the month of intense contact at sea, and the month long training course most Marta groups had, they had not had enough time to develop in this, the most important trip of their lives, the lasting knots of mateship. The bulk of migrants arrived in Melbourne and were processed to mainstream Australia through the holding camp of Bonegilla, except for one group that went to another camp at Benalla.262 Some found their way through Northam in Western Australia, and a small group of air arrivals started first at Sydney’s Villawood hostel. Migrants arrived at the Reception and Training Centre at Bonegilla by train, from Melbourne to the Centre Siding, and from there, they were conveyed by bus to the Assembly Hall. Then, each person was issued with an identification card, in which allocation to blocks and cubicles was indicated. A hot meal was served within forty five minutes of the time of arrival. After that, migrants were welcomed, in national groups, by the director, by officers in charge, Commonwealth Employment Services, Film and Study Centre (in charge of the teaching of English), and the Minister of Religion concerned.263 The first group of families reached Bonegilla in June 1961. At this time, the Australian economy was passing through a period of recession. For this reason, migrants had to stay at Bonegilla for months, instead of a week or two. Although the Spanish group did not take an active part in the rioting of July 1961, these events did upset the Spanish migration scheme, as explained in chapter THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 117 two. Some Spanish migrants were employed by the camp as interpreters, cleaners and cooks;264 many new arrivals learnt from these the first clues about life in Australia, and they were also often misinformed by them about wages on the cane fields and the utility of the Commonwealth Employment Service.265 Despite its remarkable success in holding and distributing hundred of thousands of migrants during its history, Bonegilla was not enjoyed by most newcomers, and the Spanish group was no an exception. Alejandro Rincón exemplifies what the usual first reactions of the migrants were and how they tried to cope with the new situation: Our first impression was that it looked like a concentration camp: the women started weeping. The food was good, but we could not bear this horrible smell of suet; despite being forbidden, we soon got hold of some portable gas rings, and we used to wash the food they gave us with water and recook it Spanish style”266 The sour reaction to Bonegilla had surely to do with the breaking of the rosy picture the migrants had elaborated in their minds before arrival. As Consul de la Riva put it: “The holding centres had a bad reputation, not ‘per se’, but for the fact of being the end of a fantasy of exaggerated propaganda and immigrants’ imagination, and the first shock of reality”267 Lack of immediate work was not the only cause of distress. The whole change of lifestyles strained family relationships. When sent to rural jobs (grapes in Mildura, tomatoes in Shepparton, tobacco in Myrtleford etc.), it was common for men to go first to see if they liked the job, later bringing their families along; in some cases, it took a month for the husband to contact his family.268 Apart from the unfortunate Western Australian plan, to which we have referred in chapter two, family migration from Spain, 118 OPERACIÓN CANGURO fulfilled its function in the four major areas where it was introduced: rural work in the tobacco area in Victoria, and industrial work in the developing areas of Geelong (Victoria), Whyalla (South Australia) and Wollongong/Port Kembla (NSW). Many Spaniards went, from 1961 on, to the tobacco area of Victoria (Myrtleford, Whitfield, Mount Beauty etc.) to do the seasonal jobs of picking and grading. Some stayed on for the rest of the year, and formed, during the early and mid sixties, an important “colony”, with over a hundred families living there. Women realized that they could help their husbands with the work, taking care of the family at the same time, and this was one of the reasons for their settling down.269 Most of the settlers worked as share-farmers, splitting half the profits with the owner, but having to pay from their share the wages for extra labour needed for the picking season. From February to July work was hard, 16 hours a day seven days a week. Then, during the slack season, work would consist of preparing the seeds, planting, watering, spraying and weeding. At weekends, social life flourished: playing soccer against Italians, celebrating birthdays and christening parties, going picnicking at a local dam, socializing around petrol stations and milk bars serviced by Spaniards. From 1965 on, the Spanish population in the area started to decrease; many returned to Spain, and others to Melbourne, where the study opportunities for children were better. By the end of 1962, there were about a thousand Spaniards residing in Geelong. Most worked on the railways, and in major industries, Ford, International Harvester and Alcoa. Doing overtime and working on weekends they could earn around 33 pounds weekly. However, one of their favourite pastimes was to com- THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 119

A Spanish family working in the tobacco area of Myrtleford, 1963. The tobacco was graded and then put into sticks for drying. plain: “We were misled in Spain, they promised us work in our specialty”.270 The opening of a new BHP factory in Whyalla in 1963 drew many Spaniards from the camps of Northam and Bonegilla. Wages were not particularly high, but the cost of living was comparatively cheap. Education and health services were not very good, and life was boring, despite the possibility for some of hunting and fishing. On summer holidays many joined the grape and tomato season. A 1980 description of the Whyalla BHP factories, and work conditions in the sixties were surely no better, high- lights the hardship they endured: Work in the Shipyard and the Steelworks is often very heavy and physically exhausting. Many workers are forced to take on shiftwork. The hours are long and there are few rest periods. There are no 120 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

decent rest rooms or places to take their meals. The work is monoto- nous, uncreative and unrewarding. The workshops are hot, noisy, dirty and ugly and the air is sometimes saturated with smoke, dust or toxic chemicals. . . Perhaps the group of employees who suffer the greatest hardship in this respect are the newly-arrived immigrants, many of whom speak no English. Silenced by the language barrier, their suspicion of trade unionism, and their unfamiliarity with Austra- lian employment standards and awards, they are found working in the more hostile and forbidding jobs that steel and shipbuilding can offer. They are usually prepared to work long hours at any work that they can get, in order to absorb the inevitable costs of establishing themselves and their families in a new country”.271 This explained also why BHP management always preferred to employ married workmen. Workers with family commitments were deemed “more stable and reliable” than their unmarried counter- parts, and more likely to become long-term employees.272 What applies to Whyalla could apply as well to the BHP Steel- works at Port Kembla, and to all the big metal factories in Geelong. Most of the migrants who arrived in 1961, including many who came with the Torres group, ended up working in the industrial area of Wollongong and Port Kembla, particularly in the BHP Steelworks. They came either directly from Bonegilla, or following the picking season in Mildura. One of them, Adolfo Surjo arrived there in June 1962. Four months later, he wrote a long letter to a CIME employee Cristina Ferrando, who was herself later to come to Australia. His words sum up very well how migrant families felt on issues such as homesickness, the voyage, Bonegilla, work, wages, the English language and Australian lifestyle respectively: It is nice to think that you are right there in the Madrid that I miss so much; we are keeping well, but feeling very nostalgic, because this is not, in the least, the way I figured it. I often remember that book that THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 121 you showed me when I went to the CIME offices, with those beautiful landscapes; of course they exist, but I have never seen them, and I doubt whether I will ever see them . . . The first disappointment was on the ship, because all the other migrants had their movies, their music and their interpreter, whereas we only had a doctor who took no notice of us, and it happened that he was threatened once, but not by me, I did not have any problem during the voyage . . . I have been fortunate enough to escape having to go to Bonegilla, as a friend of mine here sponsored me, but you should hear the way they talk, those who had to go there. Everybody tells me that I have been very lucky . . . I have got a job in a big steel factory in Wollongong, but I work with a pick and shovel, even though I am qualified as a Mechanic Tradesman . . . I do three shifts. I will also tell you that I suffer immensely from the heat when a blast furnace has to be re- paired, because they put me in some galleries to clean out the cin- ders, and they are very hot . . . I earn 34 pounds a fortnight . . . I have been here for four months and I have not got a cent, because I have six mouths to feed . . . I am a trained mechanic, but as I am unlucky enough not to be able to learn a word of English for love or money, in spite of the fact that I go to the school . . ., but as you told me, one has to be patient, and keep working at it . . . it is true that people eat much better here than in Spain, and that here nobody minds other people’s business, and everybody lives his own life, and that is precisely what I wanted, to live quietly and earn everyone’s respect, and in this sense, things are very good here.273 122 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

3.4 TERRITORIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

From the moment of leaving the holding camp and the hostels, differences between assisted and non-assisted migrants practically blurred. Obviously, the former had still to wait for two years before leaving the country, unless they reimbursed the money paid towards their trip by the ICEM and the Spanish and Austra- lian governments. Table 3 in Appendix 2 shows the numbers of assisted and non-assisted migrants who came to Australia during the period studied. Amongst the non-assisted migrants, two small groups of Span- iards arrived in Australia from Latin America and the Philippines respectively. In Latin America, the economic situation of the sub- continent had worsened since the late fifties. Its traditional role as an immigration land was quickly reversed. Many migrants, and some Spanish amongst them, particularly from the Río de la Plata area, opted for a second migration; they could not come assisted, however, as ICEM by-laws did not allow a migrant to receive its assistance twice. In the Philippines, political instability forced many economically affluent Spaniards to leave the country, and some came to Australia. A third small group of Spanish migrants came to Australia in the mid sixties after having first migrated to West- ern Europe (France, Germany, Holland etc.) Some assisted migrants kept coming after the suspension of the Agreement in March 1963. In most cases, they came under Family Reunion Programs sponsored by different voluntary organizations as well as the ICEM. Both assisted and non-assisted Spanish mi- THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 123 grants joined the Australian workforce on equal terms. Their paths met with that of Spaniards who were here before and most sought or approved the creation of a Spanish community. We will refer from this point onwards to the whole Spanish population in Aus- tralia, as it is not possible to maintain the boundaries between these three groups any longer. Table 1 in Appendix 2 shows the territorial distribution of these migrants according to the censuses of 1961 and 1966. For every state, first the data for the capital is given, and then for statistical divisions in order of its numerical importance. It is interesting to observe that, for the 1961 census and in Adelaide and Brisbane females outnumber males, though the all-Australian proportion of women was only 31.8%. This was accentuated by the FCIC which placed Marta women according to the offers for employment available, and demand in Adelaide and Brisbane was high. The number of females was still greater than that of men in the 1966 census in these two cities. In the two major cities there was a trend for migrants to settle where other fellow nationals had settled before; so, in Sydney, the statistical divisions of Sydney, Randwick, Woollahra, Leichhardt and Marrickville, those in which more Spaniards lived in 1961 are also outstanding in 1966; similar concentrations are evident in the metropolitan area of Melbourne, where the Spanish population concentrated in Fitzroy, Melbourne and Richmond. As for the rest of the country, Spaniards concentrated in those areas where they were sent to work, on arrival. In the 1961 census, North Queensland and Wollongong - Port Kembla in NSW, and the tobacco area in Victoria were the most populated areas; the presence of Span- iards in the Riverina (Griffith) in NSW, and Mallee (Mildura) in 124 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Victoria, is not statistically evident as censuses were taken during the slack season. In the 1966 census, new groups appeared in Geelong (Victoria), Whyalla (South Australia), and even in West- ern Australia, despite the migration plan fiasco. North Queensland lost Spanish people quite dramatically, if we look only at the male figure that accounts for most immigrant workers. Popula- tion in the Southern Tableland includes two different areas, that of Queanbeyan (31 in the 1961 census, 87 in 1966) which relates to that of Canberra, and Cooma, relating to the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme. Not only Sydney and Melbourne, but Adelaide, Canberra, Perth and Brisbane, in this order, increased their numbers of Spanish, draining resources from the rural areas. Even minor cities such as Newcastle participated in this trend. While in the 1954 census the Spanish rural population accounted for 32.4% of the total Spanish presence, in the census of 1961 the figure was 28.7%, and only 14.8% in 1966.274 However, we should bear in mind that these figures do not take into account how hundreds of Spaniards would leave the urban areas for seasonal work in the countryside: cane cutting in Queensland; tobacco picking in Queensland and Victoria; grape and fruit picking in Riverina in NSW, and in Mildura and Shepparton in Victoria. Assisted migrants did not always follow migration plan expectations. They went to the capital cities of their own accord. After an initial phase of grinding labour in the countryside, or in an industrial town, they frequently saw in the big cities education opportunities for their children, entertainment and social life for themselves. Spanish migrants came here to provide manpower for some rural and industrial areas, and that is what they first did. THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 125

Later, attracted by the capital cities, they moved there and worked as labourers in the building and other industries, and in the services sector. As for the women, once they quit domestic work they found different jobs, many of them as cleaners. Child rearing permitting, dual income families were the norm. Most migrants were categorized as unskilled on arrival. They joined the work force in similar conditions to other thousands of labourers of South European background that every year entered Australia. They were ready to be recruited straight into the hard- est type of work, and to take as much overtime as possible. The financial attraction of hard and dangerous jobs made them risk work fatigue and industrial injury. They could not find time to learn English. Handicapped by language, and with limited knowledge of local opportunities, many migrants found themselves in work which they would not have accepted in Spain. A large percentage of them were concentrated on the unstable motor and building trades, where they were vulnerable to unemployment. Unions were not of much help. Union officials were mostly Australian or English, and felt that newly arrived migrants would break down working conditions. Nor did they help in establishing recognition of work qualifications that migrants may have had. They shared with the rest of the Australian population all the prejudices about migrants. Non-English speaking migrants rarely involved themselves in union activities, barriers of language and training, and their unfamiliarity with the arbitration system being some of the causes.275 The Spaniards were no exception. Only about ninety migrants arrived from Spain as semiskilled or skilled workers to have their qualifications fully recognized by Australia.276 Some of these also worked for some time at un- 126 OPERACIÓN CANGURO skilled jobs, due to their lack of English. White collar workers, specially those who held tertiary qualifications, returned to Spain as soon as they could. An exception was José Louis Dachary, veterinarian, who in 1967 was able to pass all the exams to practice in Australia.277 Some migrants escaped factory work, being able to establish themselves as independent tradesmen, or to join the services sector, setting up their own businesses: restaurants, milk bars, travel agencies, etc., catering for the needs of the Spanish community and the general public. We will develop this point in the next chapter. There was no big business enterprise amongst this vintage of migrants, but rather family businesses, with half a dozen employees at the most. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 127 4 THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY

Before 1956, and with the possible exception of North Queensland, the Spanish intake into Australia was small in number and geographically dispersed. It was, thus, easily absorbed by mainstream Australia. This situation changed with the implementation of the Assisted Migration Scheme in 1958, leading to a richer and more permanent interaction amongst Spaniards in Australia. The fruit of this interaction was the appearance of stable institutions, which maintained their own rules, language and codes of behaviour within the Australian social fabric. The function of these institutions was two-fold: they allowed some migrants a slower and less traumatic integration into their new country; and, for the others whose target was to get back to Spain as soon as economically practicable, they provided a more enjoyable interval. Also, they showed Australia new ways of living, behaving, cooking and singing, enriching its scope. There is an idea of post-war migrants extending their influence over Australian society from inside the house to the backyard, then to the street and finally to the suburbs, cities and whole nation with its social clubs, press and other institutions.278 The Spanish way of making a community certainly did not follow this pattern. On the contrary, it started at the club level. As the first waves of migrants were single people, it was obviously difficult for family units to be the catalysts of all this social chemistry. Clubs were the first and most important of institutions that the 128 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Spaniards created in Australia. Restaurants, milk bars and other small businesses, including the community press, came later. In the big cities, these first opened around the clubs, and gradually gained more independence. The institutional powers of the Spanish state abroad, through the Consulate General in Sydney, and of the Church through the migrant chaplains, influenced the shaping of this community. In no lesser degree, anti-Francoist Spaniards also left, their mark on it. The life of a community, however, is richer than that of the institutional forces that framed it: anecdotes, legends, and the gamut of day to day experience, all helped in its making too. This chapter deals with these riches. Special attention is given to the foundation and role of the Spanish Club of Sydney, as it was undoubtedly the major achievement of Spaniards during this period, and, to some extent, exemplifies the socialization patterns all over Australia. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 129

4.1 SOCIAL CLUBS.

4.1.1 THE SPANISH CLUB OF SYDNEY Before the establishment of the Club in its present locality, there were two small groups with much the same sort of aim in mind. One on premises provided by the Catholic migration office in Castlereagh St... The other used to meet in a bar in Kings Cross.279 The idea of forming a Spanish club was discussed in different places. Little by little, the project began to take shape: in a bar in Kings Cross, in the Catholic club of the city . . . In whichever place a group of Spaniards met, they talked of the need to do something, to have a place of their own, a corner, something like a second home. 280 These are the oldest records kept in the Club’s archives explaining why and how the Spanish Club was founded. As they show, there were two different groups of Spaniards in the origins of the Club. The first group, chronologically speaking, was that of single men who came in the first wave of migration, to whom we have referred to in the section on Operación Canguro. They were in their twenties, full of life, and with money to spend. It was hard for them to cope with the boredom of Sydney weekends, with hotels closed by six and drinking being one of the favourite pastimes of a typical Spanish male’s weekend. This was, however, partially overcome through some cafes in the Kings Cross area that opened until one or two in the morning and that, although not licensed, served wine in tea cups.281 There, in the retrospective view of the Spanish Club Boletín, “the Spaniards began to be known for the conviviality that emanated from their everlasting 130 OPERACIÓN CANGURO friendly gatherings on Saturday evenings, the sort of thing which until then was unknown in the area”.282 The most popular places frequented by Spaniards by early 1960 were the hotels Rex and Picadilly, and the cafes Brazil, Piccolo and Balalaika; and in the George St. area, the Farouk, open all year around, 24 hours a day, and the Trocadero. The other group connected with the origins of the Club was that of single women. From early l960, the Marta flights were bringing them to Sydney. They were a more homogeneous group and it was easier for them, therefore, to take some initiatives. These women joined together on weekends, to hear mass in St. Mary’s cathedral or at St. Francis in Albion St. They had their meetings in the Cusa House and soon the boyfriend of one (Manuel Escribano), and the brother of another (Valentín Ugarte), started joining them and bringing their friends (José Luis Goñi, Santiñán etc) along. Then, through the women, the League of Catholic Women’s premises were rented and balls were held, to the ac- companiment of a piano played by Bob Reed. Pilar Moreno and Joséfina Fernández were amongst the most influential within the Marta group283 Echoes of this attempt to form a club reached Spaniards who had settled in Sydney some years before, amongst them the Largo family. Fernando Largo arrived in Australia on board the Caledonienne in October 1952. Soon after he started working for John Manners, the shipping company owned by Roberto López de Lasala of whom he was, for many years driver and caretaker of buildings. Lasala was to play a major role in the foundation of the Club. His grandfather was a Spanish Carlist general who found sanctuary in England following the collapse of the Carlists in the THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 131

Roberto Pérez de Lasala, a Spanish-Philippine businessman, first president of the Spanish Club. late 1870’s. His father, a sea captain, married a Portuguese from Macao, and settled in Manila, where Roberto was born. Orphaned at the age of 14, his only inheritance, so the legend goes, was “his father’s advice and a knife”. He went to Hong-Kong where he started his commercial career as an apprentice with John Manners & Co. Ltd., on July 2, 1922. Sacked because of staff retrenchment two years later, he was rehired soon after and, by the age of 27, was the Company’s assistant manager in Canton. In 1949 he became managing director and chairman of directors. On his death, in May, 1967, one journalist claimed that he was the richest man in Australia, probably a gross exaggeration. He did, however, own a fleet of “about 132 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

20 ships”, and real estate and business of almost every kind in Alaska, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Timor and London, apart from Australia and Hong-Kong. Of impressive height and build, he is said to have known by name all the office-boys, the garbage collectors, the street cleaners, the newspaper sellers, and every man who worked for him in any of his ships. Business deals involving hundreds of thousands of dollars were completed by merely shaking hands at his club, Tattersall’s. Horseracing was his favourite hobby. He was part-owner of about eight racehorses in Australia. To win the 1966 AJC Derby, with “El Gordo”, was just one of his numerous achievements in this field.284 It was this colourful character who would allow the founders of the Club to fulfil their aspirations, and to a standard no other migrant Spanish club in Australia or in the world South America excepted may have ever achieved without the involvement of the Spanish Government. Through the Largo family, Lasala and the new arrivals came together: Around July 1961 a meeting was arranged, with Lasala, Largo, Crilly and do Rozario on the one side, and Escribano, Goñi and Santiñán on the other. Goñi’s account of the meeting is as follows: “From the first moment, Lasala’s pro- posals seemed to us very reasonable and everyone agreed to join the efforts. Lasala, through his numerous contacts, would be in charge of the necessary legal and financial arrangements, and the rest of us would devote our free time to increasing the list of foundation members”.285 Lasala owned a building Kent house at 88 Liverpool St. On the seventh floor were John Manners’ offices. On its ground floor there, was a cafeteria, the “Sari Room”, and on the first floor the “Taj Mahal”, an upmarket Indian restaurant. Both were managed by Crilly, Lasala’s son-in-law. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 133

The Spaniards were allowed to use the ground floor, free of charge, on Sundays. On occasions they used the first floor as well, as the restaurant was not open for business. There, some prepared typical Spanish food -”callos”, tortilla, pastry - while others brought wine and beer from the hotel across the road. The cooking, waitressing and cleaning were all done by them on a voluntary basis. Most remember this period before the official opening of Club, as the time when the atmosphere within the Spanish colony was at its best. Pilar Otaegui described this early period. Memories? Lots of them. Lots. For example... the first time that a dinner was prepared. We were all amateurs, the waiters, the cooks, but it was possibly the best dinner we have ever had in our Club, for all those who took part in it . . . The first excursion we made, that was to Katoomba; it was raining that morning, but in spite of that, nobody wanted to stay in Sydney. On this excursion, a Spanish couple got married.286 On September 10, 1961, the first general meeting of foundation members was held on these premises. The fees paid by foundation members were: six pounds men, three single women, and one married women. It was one of the first migrant clubs in Sydney to allow women to pay fees and to give them the right to vote with the same conditions as men.287 One of the first motions passed barred discussion on politics and religion. Two hundred and twenty members were needed in order to apply for a liquor license. It was not easy to get this number amongst the still small Spanish colony in Sydney. The task of recruiting new members was difficult, as not all the Spaniards welcomed the idea wholeheartedly.288 Some did not want to join because they considered the joining fee excessive, or because 134 OPERACIÓN CANGURO they had children and/or lived in the outer suburbs, and did not see the possibility of frequenting it much. On the other hand, many Spaniards who were just passing through Sydney decided that it was worthwhile joining the Club.289 An attempt was made to augment the number with Portuguese but it failed. Underaged people were enrolled and, because it was thought that the chances of obtaining the license were better, some women appeared on the lists with a ‘Mr.’ title.290 On March 4th 1962, with the 220 members secured, a general meeting was held. The Constitution was adopted, and the first committee named, with Lasala as President.291 All the participants in the July meeting, sat on this first committee, with the exception of do Rozario. Some other members were co-opted along the way, amongst them Fernández, Ugarte and Moreno. There were no formal elections, members being chosen on the basis of their capacity and willingness to work, not an easy decision, though, as there were more enthusiastic people than places available on the committee. In April, vice-consul José Luis Díaz, with Lasala, Ugarte and Largo went to Court to register the Club and in June, it obtained its liquor license. After the closing of the “Taj Mahal”, a lease of the ground and first floors was arranged with Lasala. The lease was for five years starting on May lst at 3,260 pounds for the first year and 4,000 for the succeeding years. From March to September, some alterations were made particularly on the ground floor where a coolroom and a bar were constructed; furniture was purchased from Lasala on favourable terms, and some poker-machines were installed. A major reshuffle in the committee was carried out on September 29, just before the opening of the Club. José Fernández was THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 135 appointed as paid Secretary, Alberti, a Spanish businessman who had been residing in Australia for over 40 years, filled the vice- presidency, and Comyn, who was to become a very popular family doctor for the community, joined the committee.292 On October Saturday 6, the dream of an important sector of the Spanish community came true as the doors of the Club opened finally for business. The Club, conceived at the July 1961 meeting, born on March 3rd, was now proudly introduced to social life. Beer was on the house. At 8 p.m. people started dancing on the first floor, to the strings of the Victor Barba orchestra. On February 17, 1963, the first annual general meeting was held. The new committee elected was still to be headed by Lasala, although his position within it was not as strong as before.293 The Club run into financial difficulties, particularly in the February - June 1963 period, as the following Table shows, which further eroded Lasala’s prestige.294 The lack of funds, whether it was due to embezzlement or mismanagement, created numerous conflicts amongst the members. Lasala, the Committee, the Secretary- Manager and the waiters were variously blamed by different people, with more personal animosity than sound reasons. The idyllic vision of 1962’s community spirit quickly vanished. Table 1. Period Withdrawals Deposits Balance Oct.62-Jan.63 £ 9523 £ 10822 £ 1299 Feb.63-Jun.63 £ 11837 £ 11966 £ 129 Jul.63-Nov.63 £ 12233 £ 14659 £ 2426 Dec.63-May.64 £ 14991 £ 19093 £ 4104

Source: Spanish Club, Boletín de Noticias, num. 1, August 1964. SSCC. 136 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Lasala confronted the problem in August 1963, taking three measures. First, he appointed Rafael Martín as a Secretary-Manager, after José Fernández had tendered his resignation. Then, a new position, Assistant-Manager, was created, being filled by José Luis Goñi. The third measure was to grant the lease of the dining room to Grato Álvarez. These changes only partially helped the financial situation of the Club. During the year, the President warned that he would not stand for re-election. He was criticized by some members who argued he was out to make a pile at the migrant expenses.295 His authority, undisputed during the 1961-62 period, was now under attack even within his committee. On October 20, Lasala resigned. The immediate reason was a dispute on that day’s committee meeting as to how to discipline certain members, amongst them Oscar González, who had written an apparently offensive letter against Lasala to the Committee. The new committee, elected after an extraordinary general meeting requested by the members,296 found that the Club had only been able to carry on because Lasala had guaranteed the bank account overdraft. Sydney Stott, an Australian businessman who had joined the Club some months before, was introduced by Lasala to the manager of the ANZ Bank branch where the Club had its account. A satisfactory arrangement was made with the bank, who took a Bill of Sale over the Club’s assets as security.297 The Club was still not able to pay the pokermachine tax, due in December. Stott arranged that he and five others would make personal loans to the Club, and so, that crisis was overcome.298 The financial problems did not end here. In February, all poker machines were broken into and robbed early one morning. Burglar alarms had to be installed. The Committee also THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 137

Spanish Club 1965 Committee. Left to right, standing, Majarrés, Tricio, Salas, Stott; sitting, Contreras, Hickey, Smith, S. Vivas and manager Bertrand. Mrs Smith was the only Australian woman to sit on a Spanish Club committee. had to deal with discipline problems, the most dramatic being the expulsion of Oscar González, a decision taken on its meeting of February 8. He was the fist member expelled, he would argue, for “thought crimes”.299 In the next annual general meeting held on February 23, 1964, that chose a new committee with Rafael Contreras as its president, the Constitution was amended to ensure that 50 members’ signa- tures would be necessary to call a general meeting. During the year, a very large amount of time was spent at committee meetings dealing with matters of discipline, citing members to appear for fighting and various breaches of the Club’s by-laws. A claim was 138 OPERACIÓN CANGURO made from the Boletín de Noticias: “We appeal to all to demon- strate their courtesy, chivalry, brotherhood, good harmony and common sense during the coming celebrations. The Spanish Club belongs to everyone, and we all have the right to enjoy its amenities without anybody upsetting anyone else”.300 Problems of this sort were not restricted to 1964. From the beginning and well into the seventies, the situation was quite similar. Often, members would not understand Australian laws. They, for example, insisted on bringing their children to the bar of the club. This could be normal practice in Spain, but was against the law in Australia and the club risked its liquor license if it did not enforce it. Another typical case was that of members who would not want to leave the club premises at closing time. There were clashes between members and employees of the club which occasionally required police attention. Most often, these incidents were caused by excessive alcohol consumption, the strains and tensions of hard work and language isolation adding to cultural misunderstandings.301 There were more crises in 1965. On January 31 the annual general meeting took place, and the elected committee chose Herminio González as president. On March 14, an extraordinary general meeting was held following the receipt of a letter alleging that there were irregularities in the elections held in January. Al- though a vote of censure was lost, a lot of unrest remained. In April, the decision of the secretary-manager Bertrand to dismiss his assistant-manager began a dramatic chain of events. At a crucial committee meeting held on the 11, the president and four members resigned and Bertrand’s resignation, effective on April 30 was received. To carry on, new office bearers were then appointed, THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 139 including Lancelot Hickey as the only native Australian president in the club’s history to date. Once again, “unrest” and questions of discipline resulted in a major upset. The highlight of his term of office was the visit of the Spanish Davis Cup team to the club in December 1965, on the evening after Manuel Santana defeated Roy Emerson. The club benefited a great deal from the popularity that surrounded the match, being visited by many Australians and also by Spaniards who, until then, had ignored its existence. On February 20, 1966 the annual general meeting named Ángel López president of a committee of directors in which nobody wanted to serve.302 The main issue at stake during this year was whether to rent new premises, or buy Kent House.303 It was a decision that could not be postponed for much longer, as Lasala, who was the owner of the building, was going to sell it soon. On September 14, an extraordinary general meeting was summoned to debate and decide over the issue, and its purchase was approved by 35 votes to 19.304 The negotiated price was: cash, on exchange, 16,650 dollars, thereafter quarterly instalments of 13,690 until August 22nd 1969.305 After the purchase was approved, the ANZ Bank advanced 50,000 dollars, secured by a first mortgage, to allow the club to fire proof and modernize its lift, install fire sprinklers and alter its second floor for the club’s use. The Kent House floors not in use by the club were kept leased by its regular users, the seventh floor, 405 square feet vacated by John Manners to the Spanish Chamber of Commerce.306 After a period of apathy and poor attendance at general meetings, the room again was packed with members for the next annual meeting, held on February 20, 1967 that “had such a formal chilly atmosphere about it that created a certain hostility towards the 140 OPERACIÓN CANGURO outgoing committee”.307 In the sixties, and later, the atmosphere at a meeting would usually be tense yet restrained while the regular items on the agenda were dealt with. When, however, the moment for “Questions and Complaints” arrived, things would deteriorate. Minor problems could take hours to settle.308 Within the committees, the climate was not much better, and that would account for the fact that, from 1965 to 1968, no one president completed his term of office. Despite these problems, the Club was a great help, especially for new settlers. Many left their baggage at the Club when they arrived, until they found accommodation. They were helped to find jobs. On occasion they were also helped to find bail after having been arrested on minor charges.309 Table 2. Date Male Female Total Spanish Australian Others Mar. 62 220 Nov. 63 564 318 882 Apr. 64 394 242 636 Dec. 64 524 312 836 Dec. 65 669 366 1035 Dec. 66 758 400 1155 Jun. 66 1080 490 1570 1060 245 265

Source: Sydney Stott Collection (SSC).

Table 2 shows the evolution of the number of members during these first years. These figures show that, despite the halting of the migration flow in March 1963, and despite mismanagement, personal enmity and other problems, the club was able to fulfil its aim: to give the scattered Spanish population a place of their own, shaped by them, in which they could express themselves at THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 141 ease and both make and keep up contacts. On the weekends, the restaurant and the dance floor were crowded. People came from as far as Wollongong and Canberra to attend its functions. As the number of members and the experience of the club increased, so did the number of activities organized. From the beginning, Spanish lessons for non-Spanish members were given, at first on a voluntary basis. Pedro Matías was the first teacher, later replaced by Luis Vivas. Free English classes were also conducted for Spanish members. Other activities held on the Club premises at the time included: on Thursdays, movie screening or other cultural activities; on Fridays, “Cabaret Night” with flamenco shows or exotic dancers, jugglers, contortionists, puppets, singing or dancing contests etc. On Saturdays and Sundays, ballroom dancing.310 In August 1964, a first order for 175 Spanish books was placed to form a library. Playing cards was one of the favourite men’s pastimes. The first “mus”311 competition was organized in 1964 and won by José Luis Herrera and Guillermo Redondo. They also liked to discuss the governance of the club, or to form regional groups, competing to see who outdid the others in singing and drinking. The Salón de Señoras on the ground floor became, by January 1964, a cafeteria decorated with murals by José Martín. This section of the Club was to become extremely popular for the quality of its coffee. While women were very active in the foundation of the Club, their presence was less noticeable afterwards. From 1966 to the mid seventies, no women were elected to the committees. Their new roles as wives and mothers separated the Marta generation from the politics of the club, although they were still active in those subcommittees related to child rearing and education. A 142 OPERACIÓN CANGURO much needed but yet insufficient baby-sitting service was opened on the ground floor around this time.312 On April 19, 1964, the club’s first football match was held at Moore Park, between “single men”, captained by Víctor Rodríguez and “married men” captained by Julián Oriñuela. Thenceforward, soccer was another of its regular activities. Victor Rodríguez was the captain of the club’s first soccer team to join the Soccer Federation of NSW in April 1966, coached by Pepe Buendía, a former professional footballer in Spain. Cándido García was then on the Sports subcommittee.313 In the 1967-68 period, a choir and a “rondalla” were formed, directed by Víctor Barba. From 1968, a teen-ager club for children from 12 to 18 years of age was set up on the seventh floor, occupied previously by the Spanish Chamber of Commerce. As a result, the teaching of Spanish language and folklore (particularly regional dancing) to the second generation developed much further.

4.1.2 OTHER CLUBS AND SOCIETIES. On October 27, 1960, Australians interested in Spanish culture formed the Sydney Hispanic Society. Its patron was the Philippines Ambassador Mr. Ezpeleta, and the first meeting was held at the Spanish Consulate in Cathona Av., Darling Point.314 Carlos Zalapa, a Mexican businessman who was Consul of Brazil and for some time monopolized the imports from Spain, mainly olive oil, was its president for some years.315 Similar societies appeared in Canberra and Melbourne as well. They preceded the clubs, and then ran a parallel existence with them. Were made up of middle class people who held their meetings in English; migrants who THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 143 approached them soon found that, with some exceptions, they did not fit in. These were in fact Australian societies, and as such they do not fall within the scope of this study. It should be noted, however, that in Sydney, many members of the Hispanic Society joined the Spanish Club, to attend Spanish lessons, and some (Sydney Stott, Lance Hickey) played an important role in its history.316 Two other clubs appeared in Sydney in the early sixties, also founded by the generation of migrants we are studying: the Centro Asturiano de Sydney and the Gure Txoco,317 which were meant to cater for the particular needs of migrants from two Spanish regions, Asturias and the Basque provinces. They were not made to compete with, but rather to complement the main Spanish Club, and their members were often members of it. However, sometimes there were tensions. These clubs were created because their members felt that their identity was not totally preserved or represented in the main club; the latter regretted their appearance as it was seen as creating divisions and draining the effectiveness for the whole community. A similar situation occurred in Melbourne and Whyalla. 318 The Asturian Club held its first general meeting in June 1965, in the Community Center Hall in King St., Newtown.319 Soon over a hundred members joined it. They rented a building in 19 Bound- ary St., Rushcutters Bay,320 and elected a “Junta” presided over by Benjamin Osorio, with Oscar González as its secretary and treasurer. After April 1967, the society dissolved itself, apparently due to lack of “voluntary” effort.321 In 1965, more than half of the nearly 40 Spaniards working on the building of the Opera House were Basques. It was there that 144 OPERACIÓN CANGURO the idea of forming a Basque Club started. They counted on the help of Ramón Peñagaricano, an Argentinian born Basque who had married an Australian woman in Germany. Although he lived in Australia for only a short period, he influenced the shaping of this club a great deal, and was also its first president. A place was found in Liverpool St, Darlinghurst, and the first general meeting was held there in April 1965. Twenty six foundation members registered the club in October the same year. Among its social activities were “mus “ and pelota (they built a pelota court in the backyard), weekend lunch in the club, and the annual celebra- tion of the St. Ignatius festivities in Centennial Park. The socialization patterns of the Spanish colony in Melbourne were similar to those of Sydney. The newly arrived migrants (single men, many of them doing seasonal jobs in the country, and single girls, isolated by their domestic work) wanted to have a place of their own to socialize, and to release the stress of hard work in an alien environment. In November 1960, two years earlier than the club in Sydney, there appeared the Centro Español of Victoria, located on Spring St, Melbourne.322 The following year, its premises moved to Swanston St. in front of the Town Hall. Settled immigrants from the early fifties (Pepe Rosales, Salvador Torres) were of great help. Antonio Saliba, Luis Ordóñez, Daniel Carrasco and Martí were amongst the pioneers. In 1963 they rented a more permanent site in Elizabeth St. on the corner of Lt. Lonsdale St. Ricardo Marcos “Bolita”, a professional boxer who came to Australia in 1954 and won the light-heavy weight championship title of Australia in 1956,323 was its first president, with Antonio Fernández vice- president and Rafael Ramos secretary. At the next annual general meeting on February 26, 1964, Antonio Ros, who came to Australia THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 145

A function in the Centro Español of Victoria in Elisabeth St, 1963. In the middle, A. Gautier. in November 1962, was elected president. At the time, the club had 527 members, and by July this figure rose to 706.324 The financial situation was not good, though. The rent was 173 pounds a year, and the club was often in the red. These difficulties forced them to find new premises on 238-40 La Trobe St. by May 1965. A new Board of Directors elected in April 1965 and presided over by Pedro Jiménez helped the club to survive during this difficult period. The Centro Español opened daily, but it was only on weekends and, particularly, on special occasions such as the festivities of San Isidro, and Santiago, that the club was packed with over two hundred members attending the functions. The Spaniards found it hard to cope with the strict Victorian liquor regulations at that time.325 The Club was allowed to sell alcohol only once a month. 146 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

On that day, a big and financially profitable party was organized. Its social activities were similar to those of the Spanish Club in Sydney, and were often brilliantly portrayed in the articles of Manuel Valera for La Crónica.326 The highlight of this period was the “Gran Velada” organized on the June 12, 1965, counting amongst its attractions, the presence of a Spanish boxer, “Hércules”, who was then fighting in Melbourne. As in Sydney, problems of discipline often arose. M. Valera describes one of them: The most important attraction was never on stage, it was at the bar. It is understandable that after a week of hard work, men look forward to relieving their boredom and problems over a few drinks, but what is unacceptable is that whilst enjoying those drinks, they pay no respect whatsoever to the performers who are doing a real service to the community, even if they are only amateurs.327 Two regional clubs were also founded in Melbourne. A Gure Txoco appeared in 1964 trough the initiative of Juan Ugalde and brothers Tomas and Antonio with Javier Iriondo. It was located in Stable St. Unlike its counterpart in Sydney, it disappeared some years later.328 In 1965, a Club Gallego was founded, with premises next to the Central Market in North Melbourne. José Casal, its first president, who arrived in 1962 explained to M. Valera the reasons for its foundation: to “remember, enjoy and show the dances, music and customs of Galicia” and for “the pride of putting another link on the chain of Gallician centres throughout the world”. Its aims: “a good library, a choral society and a dancing group...” Its realities, according to the journalist: a good “pote gallego”, “pulpo d’a feira”, “ribeiro”329 etc. so that “galleguiños” and other Spaniards too could “curarse la morriña”, living so far away from their “tierriña”.330 In mid 1963, 70 Spanish migrants founded another club in THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 147

Geelong, Victoria. Samuel Nieto, correspondent for La Crónica interviewed Joaquin García Navarro , who came to Australia in the mid fifties, on the first anniversary of the Club: Unity and interaction among us were the principles which prompted its foundation. The idea was my own. I gathered a few Spaniards at my place, and that was the birth of the centre which at present has 130 members, more than one third of the Spanish population in Geelong. It was at my home that I was elected interim president. Later on, at the first general assembly, I was ratified with a majority . . . The main problem [of the club] is not being able to get a liquor license. As you all know, we Spaniards always enjoy a drink. . . This would all be solved by banning drinks but, as that would not be possible, we will just have to wait and see.331 The club opened only on weekends, and occasionally on Fridays. When Jiménez was President, and with the help of Father Eduardo Sánchez from Melbourne, the first classes for the children of Spanish migrants ever organized for a social club in Australia, were set up: In the month of June, in Geelong, a children’s school for Spanish and Religion was opened. The inauguration was celebrated in the presence of some fifty boys and girls. The teacher began the way it should be: with a prayer, that all the children and those present took up in Spanish. Then, the chaplain Father Eduardo, addressed the group...332 Also in 1963, the Casa de España was set up in Whyalla, South Australia. Rafael González, Juan Valero, Ceferino González and Fernando Recuero were amongst the foundation members. Dis- putes between people from Madrid and Andalucians and, later in the sixties, the decreasing number of the Spanish colony, accounted for their inability to buy their own premises, despite “good conditions” offered by BHP.333 Ceferino González, who was its Presi- dent in 1965, told La Crónica: 148 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Fernández’s family with friends. When the photo was taken, in 1962, J. Fernández was vice-president of the Spanish Club. Fernando Largo, front row, left, wrote on the back the following comments in 1965: “1. J. L. Díaz, vice-consul of Spain. 2. Mr and Mrs Fernández. 3. Jorge Jacobi, that goes back to Spain on February 18. 4. Valentín [Ugarte] and girlfriend Barbara. 5. Two sisters from Madrid, one of them married to a Czech philosophy professor. 6. J. L. Navarrete. 7. Aníbal [Estanillo]. 8. Francisco. Isabel will not let him alone. 9. Dulce, niece of Fernández. X. All Fernández’s family. Ester is the ‘madrina’ of El Español en Australia.

We do not have premises of our own. Committee meetings are held weekly, each time in the house of one of its members. Every month a party is held at the Viscount Slim Hall, usually attended by all Spaniards resident in Whyalla. Admission is 30/- per couple, and 20/ - for singles, but I swear that included in this price are all the beer and refreshments you can drink.334 The patterns in Canberra followed a different path. By Christmas 1964, classes for Spanish children were organized in the Ainslie THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 149 hostel. It was not until Christmas 1965 that, sparked by the tragic death in a car accident of Andrés Morejón, the idea of a club was seriously envisaged. Through the initiative of the Villegas brothers, Eduardo Lamadrid, José Ortega, Sanjiau and many others, on October 16, 1966, the Spanish-Australian Club of Canberra Inc was founded. Political problems amongst its members, aggravated by the setting up of a Spanish Embassy in 1967, diverted their efforts, and it was not until 1971 that the land for building the club was bought. Máximo López, a Spanish refugee who came in 1952, through his construction company López & Sons, helped to erect the building. The club finally opened for business in August 1973.335 The other big, stable colony of Spaniards was in Wollongong, NSW. Probably due to the gravitational attraction of the Spanish Club in Sydney, it was not until November 1968 that the creation of a local social club began in earnest.336 150 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

4.2 THE SPANISH PRESS IN AUSTRALIA.

Vice-Consul Díaz, with the help of Frank Gallego, a former Jesuit priest who settled in Sydney, edited a newsletter called El Español. This was the first attempt to give the Spanish community much needed information in their own language about news and current affairs within the community, and in Spain and Australia.337 However, it was not until Saturday July 11, 1964 that the first weekly newspaper in Spanish was launched. La Crónica, eight pages, appeared in Melbourne, published by La Austral Española de Publicidad. Its director was Manuel Perdices and its chief editor Manuel Varela, both having come to Australia on board a KLM flight arriving at Melbourne on December 12, 1962. They received encouragement, technical help and numerous contributions from a Spanish professional journalist, Frank Vázquez de Vivero, who migrated to Australia, unassisted, in the late fifties. Manuel Varela wrote most of the information concerning the community, helped in this task by a network of correspondents, including Alfonso González and later Salvador Vivas from Sydney; José Antonio Velasco from Wollongong; Samuel Nieto and then Pedro Gil from Geelong; and Ceferino Sánchez from Whyalla. E. M. Ordonez, 17, wrote during the first year a chatty “Página femenina”. Spanish clubs and businesses, particularly restaurants, accounted for most of the advertising. La Crónica is the best source of information about the happenings in the community at the time. Its readers would, from the first issues, argue so violently in its columns that the editors THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 151 opted to censor them, arguing that “when one can not make any sense of what is written or read, it is best to discuss it at the pub”.338 Two issues were the main focus of the polemic: the community soccer team, and whether the migrants were misled before their departure. Having financial problems from the beginning, it once warned that “from the first of January we shall stop mailing issues to subscribers who have not paid up, their names and addresses will be published so that everyone knows who they are. At the same time, we will send this list to our solicitor to begin the process of debt collection”.339 The year 1965 brought a paper with two pages less, but a new interesting feature, “Los ripios de la semana”, in which Valera tackled the explosive community issues, this time in verse. The launching of El Español en Australia, a fortnightly publication of the same kind in Sydney, in March 1965, was a serious drawback for La Crónica. It certainly did not greet the appearance of the Sydney paper with enthusiasm; on the contrary, a bitter polemic broke out early in September.340 Despite claiming 568 subscribers in Sydney alone, La Crónica could not compete with El Español, which benefited from a better technical organization. In April 1966, it announced that, due to changing the typographic workshops, the paper would not appear for the next three weeks.341 In fact, this was its last publication. In the first issue of El Español en Australia, “an independent Australian-Spanish newspaper”, José Fernández, its founder and editor during the sixties, stated the aim of the publication as being “to keep our manners and customs for the time we stay in this country”, so that “the next generations do not feel themselves to be foreigners within their own families”.342 John Jakobi, who 152 OPERACIÓN CANGURO published a German newspaper, offered Fernández the use of his technical equipment, in return for a share of the profits. Profits never amounted to much, though, and Fernández always had to work outside the newspaper to support his large family.343 Al- though his community information never got close, in quantity, quality or polemic effect, to that of Varela, he was able to maintain a delicate equilibrium between the different tendencies in the community. However, he did suffer criticism, and on occasions physical and legal threats. Apart from these two newspapers, there were other minor publications in the sixties. Migrant chaplains distributed periodical newsletters through their Missions. The most influential was that of Father Sánchez in Melbourne. Published monthly from June 1963, El Pilar (Santiago Apóstol, Misión Española de Victoria, Australia) publicized the views of Father Sánchez on religion, politics, Australian migration, attitudes to life etc. It also printed information on the activities of the mission, and of interest for the community: how to get married by proxy, claim relatives etc. There was no mention, however, of community activities outside the Mission. In 1969, Father Rico, who was posted to Sydney by the CCEM in 1963, published Excelsior, a bimonthly paper. Carlos Zalapa paid for most of the advertising. It was meant to compete with El Español en Australia. In fact, it was published as a consequence of a row between Rico and Fernández. It failed in this attempt and disappeared the following year, when Rico returned to Spain. THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 153

Father Leonardo Hsu, “Chinito”, presiding at the wedding of María José Ugarte and Manuel Ingelmo, Sydney, 1961.

4.3 RELIGION AND POLITICS.

According to the 1961 census, 80.66% of Spaniards resident in Australia were Catholics.344 Lacking points of reference in their new land (family, entertainment, language), religion was one of the few things some migrants could rely on: there was still the same God, and a similar liturgy. For them, “the Church provided the link between the perplexed individual and the unchanging deity”.345 154 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

The priests in charge of the migration offices at a Diocesan level, where possible, appointed priests with some knowledge of Spanish for these newly arrived migrants. Father Tierney in Sydney appointed Father Leónard Hsu OFM, to this task. Known as “Chinito”, this Franciscan Chinese priest had studied in Onteniente, Valencia, and, knew a little Spanish. Father Rafter in Melbourne appointed the Jesuit Father Hallis, who also spoke some Spanish. Whilst in this way the most urgent religious needs of migrants (marriages, christenings, funerals) were catered for, the Australian Church was not in a position to hold this Catholic community together. The Spanish Government arranged with the CCEM to send, first, Father Ormazábal to Queensland, and then three secular nuns and Father Rico to Sydney. The Franciscan Order, for its part, substituted Father Leónardo with Father Gonzalo Moreno, later replaced by Father Benigno Martín, and then by Father José Osés. It also appointed Father Eduardo Sánchez to Melbourne. Spanish Benedictine priests from the Abbey of New Norcia, particularly Father Eugenio Pérez, visited the Spanish “sub- colonies” in South Australia and Western Australia.346 Father Ormazábal was, until his death in the early seventies, in charge of the Spanish Catholic Mission in Tully, where he was held in high esteem. He travelled all over North Queensland, and wrote numerous articles that appeared in the publications of the CCEM and the IEE. He organized social activities for the Spanish colony at the Irish Club in Tully. Not only Spaniards benefited from his presence: “On Sundays I hold Mass twice in Dimbulah, and a third one in a suburb called Mutchilba. I preach a small sermon in English, and another much the same in Italian, because it so happens that all these Spaniards already speak Italian, and THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 155 the Italians constitute by far the greater part of the audience”.347 Father Moreno was not as popular in Sydney, and was soon replaced by Father Benigno Martín in January 1961. Father Rico, who arrived early in 1963, was the most influential priest in Sydney in the sixties. His pastoral zeal was, however, flawed by the lack of financial support from the CCEM as well as from the FCIC and its Diocesan body.348 He said Mass in St. Francis Church in Albion Street on Sundays and religious holidays, and during the week visited families, hospitals, gaols etc. He spent one week each month in Wollongong. A more colourful character, Father Sánchez arrived in Melbourne in January 1962, and soon managed to gather around his Mission a group of Spaniards that was referred to as “el club del cura”, totally independent from the Centro Español in Victoria. He said Mass in the Cathedral at 5 p.m. on Sundays, and two Sundays a month went to Geelong. Australian institutions acting for the welfare of migrants were not well developed in the early sixties, and in any case the Spanish migrants, isolated by the language barrier, could not make much use of them. Their welfare needs were mostly catered for by the Spanish chaplains, in Sydney with the help of Paquita Bretón and the other two nuns. They visited periodically the Spanish internees in hospitals and gaols. They provided much needed counselling and sympathy when individual migrants passed through psycho- logically depressive periods. They often mediated between husband and wife, and between parents and children, when marital or generational conflicts arose. These family feuds were frequent, with the migrants living between two quite opposite systems of values, the Spanish authoritarian as opposed to the Australian permissive.349 156 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Priests felt that to better fulfil their spiritual mission, they should take care of these welfare tasks. For doing it properly, they needed financial support, and they sought it from the IEE via the Consulate in Sydney. The first letter asking for such help, came from the Spanish Mission in Victoria, and was also signed by Father Benigno. They asked for a Mission Centre in Sydney and another in Melbourne, with a chaplain office, a welfare office, twenty-five beds, a children’s school and a hall to hold parties.350 Without them, the priests argued, migrants would feel no protection and would drift away from their Christian morals and their “Patria”. Soon after his arrival,351 Rico insisted on the idea, arguing that the social club could not fulfil its purpose, and stating that the cost of such a Mission, in Sydney, would be about 5,850,000 pesetas, or 45,000 pounds. Consul de la Riva did not endorse the priests’ demands. He believed that it would solve only a minimal part of the problem. He proposed instead that the chaplains direct people to their respec- tive parishes, and then travel to meet their spiritual needs, rather than ask the migrants to come to the chaplains’ centre. Paradoxically enough, as the Consul himself recalled, he seemed to focus on the spiritual well-being of the community, while the priests’ main concern was at the temporal level.352 The Consulate channelled the help of the Spanish Government, via IEE, to the social clubs and other organizations of the Spaniards in Australia and Consuls used this help as a weapon to gain some control over the them. Whilst the clubs of Geelong and Whyalla maintained cordial relations with the Consulate,353 those in the major cities were always a source of problems. Vice-Consul Díaz, nicknamed “Consulín” within the Spanish community in Sydney, who was in charge of consular affairs prior THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 157 to the arrival of de la Riva in March 1963, tried to gain some leadership over the community by joining in the efforts to found a club in Sydney. As his voice was not very influential, he ceased to attend the meetings and was expelled from the committee.354 After that, Consuls divorced themselves from the club. Not even the temperate de la Riva trusted Lasala or the club.355 The Spanish Club was “organized as a business by an Australian who claims to be of Spanish origins”, wrote de la Riva.356 His successor, Manuel García, treated Lasala as “a mysterious character of uncertain ancestry, who made a fortune trafficking in the ports of the Pacific”. The club was even feared, and, in García’s words, was seen as “a conceited, vociferous and quarrelsome flock that I keep at a respectable distance”, and with an “enmity towards us that grows or diminishes according to the different boards of directors, but that does not change”. Books and school stationery were sometimes given to it “to maintain a precarious and insubstantial contact”.357 This situation did not change until a democratic government sat in Madrid. Relations between the Consulate and the clubs in Melbourne were no better. The Centro Español was “apolitical”; the “club del cura” was loyal to the Franco regime but Father Sánchez was never liked in the Consulate. Not even in 1969, when he managed to attract the mainstream community in Melbourne to his Hogar Español, after buying a building in Johnston St. with money from the IEE that had not been channeled through the Consulate. Consul García accused him of using “short and encouraging correspondence [from the IEE] for his own interest”, and against any control, saying that the funds at his disposal were incorrectly, if not dishonestly, employed.358 158 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

The relationship between the Consulate and the clubs can not be fully understood without considering another social force that operated within the community: that of the militant anti-Francoist Spaniards. Some of these were refugees, who came from Europe through the IRO and the ICEM in the early fifties; others, assisted migrants who filtered through the tight political screening done by the Spanish Government and the Australian Mission in Spain. Anarchists and Socialists predominated in the former group, communists in the latter. Whilst the political refugees tended to remain apart from mainstream assisted migrants, the others, on the contrary, despite their lack of formal organizations, developed a non-sectarian, intelligent approach which had a lot to do with the “apolitical” character (that at the time meant anti-Francoist) of the clubs in Sydney, Melbourne, and later in the sixties, in Canberra. It is to their credit that the Spanish community in Australia was and remained as a whole “apolitical” as well.359 Only a few politically active Franco supporters came to Australia. The leftists had the advantage of being better prepared, if for no other reason than for having had to defend their opinions “against the wave” and with extreme care for so long. On the other hand, the Francoists had an easier task, as they only had to refer to “patria”, “bandera”, and “anti-Communism”, all those stimuli that Spaniards had been so conditioned to, to attract people’s attention. They succeeded only in Melbourne, where Sanjiau and Adolfo Jiménez managed to split the Centro Español and attract some tens of members for their Club Hispano Australiano -”los de la bandera”.360 When Father Sánchez, another Francoist activist, made his second coming to found the Hogar Español, and “los de la bandera” joined him, the Centro Español was left a minority, and referred to as “el club de los comunistas”.361 THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 159

During the sixties, the anti-Francoists were gaining confidence, and Anarchists, Socialists, Communists and others joined together, outside the clubs, with more political aims. Then, the Free Spain Committees appeared. Later, the Centro Democrático Español (CDE) was founded in Sydney. Its aim was: “The union of Spanish democrats or those of any other nationality, for a cultural and social undertaking that allows them to emancipate themselves intellectually and socially, and for the fostering and defense of the democratic spirit”.362 In Sydney, they held monthly meetings on the premises at 531- 533 George St., and, on occasions, conferences and other cultural activities.363 Along the same lines, a Grupo Democrático Español was formed in Canberra. The precarious equilibrium between Anarchists and Communists within these organizations did not last long. From 1968, communists founded Solidaridad con “Comisiones Obreras”364 groups, and later, their own Spanish Communist Party branch in Australia. In the meantime, all anti- Francoists took part jointly in May 1 rallies, and other demonstrations organized to protest against some political situations in Spain. In February 1967, Rafael Guijarro, 23, a student, threw himself out of a window at the University of Madrid, while being sought by the police. Then, on February 18, at noon, about a hundred persons demonstrated in front of the Spanish Consulate, at Rushcutters Bay.365 It was the first time something of this kind had happened in Australia, and caused distress within the community. A polemic arose in El Español en Australia. Those who were against it, argued that “disturbances” would not help to create a good image of Spain in this country, and protested against the 160 OPERACIÓN CANGURO presence of Australians and Spaniards without Spanish nationality in the rally. On the other hand, CDE members stated their right of freedom of expression in a democratic country.366 Also in Sydney, on February 15, 1968, about thirty Spaniards “of scruffy aspect, long hair, grown barb and ragged clothes”367 protested against the state of emergency declared by Franco. Dem- onstrations took place in Canberra, in July 1967, at the opening of the Spanish Embassy. Again in December 1970, there were protests in Canberra and Sydney against death sentences for Basque na- tionalists. In Sydney, about sixty demonstrators scuffled outside the new premises of the Consulate at Darling Point, as police tried to arrest a man who had torn the brass plaque of the Consulate from its door: constables lost their caps during the brawl. One constable battled with four men, and was almost beaten to the ground . . . After fighting had gone on for about five minutes, the man who had been carrying the plaque was taken away by his friends, screaming and clutching his stomach.368 THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 161

4.4 COPING WITH AUSTRALIA

Cultural and linguistic barriers prevented the Spaniards of this generation from quickly assimilating into Australia. From the beginning, the expectations of the Australian people and Gov- ernments and those of the migrants did not match well. This was consequence of the exaggerated propaganda of Australian officials in Spain, and of the exaggerated imagination of migrants who thought that after a few years of hard work they could return wealthy to Spain. When Australian officials scoured Spain for workers, they were looking for settlers rather than for temporary migrants. Migrants were not concerned with Australian economic logistics. They came, generally speaking, because they were not happy with their present or future economic situation in Spain, and they found a cheap way of leaving it behind. Most migrants started their trip with the idea of coming to Australia on a sort of a two year “working holiday”.369 For many, the goal was to save enough money for a flat. There was a serious housing shortage in Spain, with slums areas growing rapidly on the outskirts of the big cities. Others, more ambitious, thought that by working a few more years in Australia they could finance a small business in Spain. Some migrants achieved their goal. Most often, however, their expectations on leaving Spain did not match with the reality they found in Australia, and plans had to be rearranged. It was not as easy to return as it was to come here and that, we have seen, created some distress within the community. Having decided to stay for a longer period, many migrants now started seen certain 162 OPERACIÓN CANGURO problems in a new light. This was the case with language, the major barrier preventing them from fully joining mainstream society. The language problem was shared in Australia with many other migrant groups; however, it was a specific problem of the Spanish emigration. Long distance emigration went traditionally to Latin America, where the language barrier was not as important. As guest workers in Western Europe, Spaniards were surrounded by thousands of compatriots, and they could always spend holidays in their home towns. In the Australia of the early sixties, for the Spaniards the language related problems went together with a deep sense of isolation. 370 Learning the language was considered by most migrants to be an insurmountable task. With thoughts of a return to Spain, they found it more important to make money than to spend time in such unproductive activity as attending classes. English classes were conducted at the Spanish Club of Sydney from the beginning, but they did not prove popular: “One always hears it said that the biggest problem in Australia is the language. Neverthe- less, because of the tiny number of students who attend the English classes it seems that the greater part of our members speak write and understand the English language perfectly”.371 James Jupp wrote in 1966: Until a migrant can cope with the English language, he can not hope to be anything other than a labourer. He may be exploited by his fellow countrymen either as employers, as traders, or as guardians of his interests. He will be unable to apply for hospital benefits . . . or for industrial injury redress. He will only be able to get a driver’s license illegally, through the various “agents” who operate in the capital cities . . . the language barrier is the greatest single factor keeping [migrants] in the lower-paid, heavier jobs.372 THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 163

The Costa Brava was the most popular Spanish restaurant in Sydney during the mid sixties.

This certainly applied to the Spanish group. All migrants suffered from this lack of command in the English language, particularly at work. On many occasions, they had to pretend to know enough English to keep a job; however, they were guessing rather than understanding the instructions given to them by foremen and co- workers. Their relations with supervisors, fellow workers, unions and neighbours were poor, and often nonexistent. They found refuge within their own community. They tended to rely on fellow nationals to find work and accommodation, or to buy a car or a washing machine. Sometimes this led to misunderstandings, or clearly unfair dealings, proving true what Consul de la Riva wrote once: “The worst enemy of the migrant is the migrant that preceded him”.373 164 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

For linguistic reasons, Spaniards tended also to rely on Italians. They formed, in fact, a sub-group within the larger Italian group. The important role of Italians was acknowledged by Manuel Perdices in La Crónica: “In any office, shop or factory, in any town or village, or even in the most distant farm, there would be an Italian. He has always helped us, when we had had problems with English. We have always relied on them, although, on occasion, we have been deceived by them... They create a problem for us: that related to our slow progress in English, as we find Italian easier and more entertaining”. 374 Varela, in his more direct style, pointed out one of the problems with Italian... lawyers: “they manage to half understand us, yet charge us the full fee”.375 During the early sixties, Spaniards were sometimes employed in small businesses of Italian origin (travel agencies, real state offices, driving schools and others). Because of the lack of command of English, the whole community tended to channel their needs through them. In country areas (Myrtleford in Victoria, North Queensland), a petrol station or a milk bar run by Spaniards with some command of English would become the centre of community life. In the cities, apart from the clubs, Spanish restaurants centred this community life. Restaurants were the most noticeable businesses Spanish migrants engaged in. By 1960, there were already two Spanish restaurants in Sydney, “Madrid” in Neutral Bay and “El Patio” in Double Bay. After the opening of the Club, many appeared around it, the “Costa Brava” being the most popular of them. Founded by Amado Pieiga and Grato Álvarez, it was very well-known in Sydney, by Australians as well, and its fame even reached Spain: “In the “Costa Brava” we [the Spanish tennis THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 165 team and entourage for the Davis Cup in 1965] have eaten garlic prawns, we have sung “jotas” and we have talked about bullfighting. Amado has put tourist posters up on the walls, and bullfighting sketches. He serves cider, “escanciándola”376 into the glass from very high up, with style”.377 Closely related to the activities of the restaurants and the clubs were those of the entertainers, who also played an important role in further tightening the bonds that joined together the Spanish community in the early sixties.378 Artists and sportsmen (Luisillo and “Solera de Jerez”, boxer “Hércules” and others) touring Australia also made an impact in the community life. Particularly important was the arrival of tennis player Manolo Santana in December 1965, to play the finals of the Davis Cup in Brisbane. His victory against Roy Emerson, Australia’s number one, gave the Spaniards an awareness of their own bonds as a community and a sense of pride in belonging to it, and gave the Australians an occasion to know and appreciate them.379 However, relations between Australians and Spaniards, were not always as cordial as depicted by the press at the end of 1965. Spanish migrants were still seen as foreigners at the lower ranks of the social ladder and speaking a language Australians could not understand. Out of this, some cases of discrimination against Spaniards arose. This was part of the general trend of discrimination against “New Australians” of Mediterranean background. Spaniards felt this discrimination at work, in the neighbourhood and on the streets. Non English speaking migration was not accepted by the Australian working class on equal terms. As G. Collins explains: Non-British immigration was from the outset “pitchforked” into manual 166 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

labour, dumped in outback concentration camps, and regarded as foreigners and cheap labour. Moreover, because they were working at manual jobs which Australians did not want, the reserve army of immigration workers was seen as separate from, not part of, the Australian working class.380 O’Grady’s They’re a weird mob depicts some of the current attitudes of Australians towards migrants on account of their language problems: All that is needed is the will to learn. Well, don’t be bludgers. Hop in and learn. I’ve heard parents in shops talking to kids in their homeland language, and the kids translating into English and making the purchases. This is disgraceful. Those parents should be bloody ashamed of themselves. It makes me very irritable...381 Many Spaniards can recall such attitudes: the use of the Spanish language in public places was usually the source of conflict. Cultural misunderstandings such as singing outside the clubs lead on occasion to police harassment. There were some cases in which this discrimination against Spaniards bore more dramatic consequences. Manuel Valera wrote one of his famous “Ripios de la Semana”382 as well as an editorial on the problem: Last week, five Spanish young men driving back from visiting friends at Geelong were attacked by a gang of long-haired youngsters. Some months ago it was another Spaniard who died in mysterious circumstances which have not yet been clarified.383 Not long ago, another Spaniard hung between life and dead in a hospital, with massive head injuries. We know of similar cases in Sydney.384 In December 1965, Pilar Herrero, 23, who arrived in Australia in 1962 and was in her fifth month of pregnancy, was “savagely bashed by an unidentified man who followed her for about 200 metres”, when returning from her evening shift work at 11.30 p.m. “I could not clearly understand what my attacker said to me THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 167 as he hit me, but he shouted something about “New Australians””, Pilar declared later to La Crónica. She worked on the evening shift because “I have a little boy, so this way he spends only a very short time alone, before his father comes home”.385 It was, however, the death of José María Bilbao on July 21, 1972, which caused the most distress within the Spanish colony. Bilbao, 45, who had arrived to Australia in 1959, was arrested and charged with unseemly words in the centre of Sydney. On the following morning he briefly appeared before M. Farquhar, CMS, just before being sent to Sydney Hospital where he died on the same day, as a consequence of injuries produced the night before while in police custody. The two police constables charged with the murder, Terry G. Swift, 21, and Peter G. Abel, 20, were acquitted on August 25 because of lack of evidence. The fact that such crime remained unpunished was felt by the Spanish colony as an act of discrimination against them. According to an unverifiable story widely circulated within the Spanish community, the death of Bilbao while in police custody was also due to language misunderstanding; the unfortunate immigrant, while being beaten, screamed repeatedly “basta”, meaning “stop”, but that was interpreted by his guardians as “bastard”..386 If only sporadic, such incidents, which were experienced in a multitude of variations, made the Spanish community feel unwelcome in Australia and this, adding to the language difficulties, reinforced for many the desire to return. Certainly, the Spanish community looked to those who did return with envy. “If we were to write up the first ten years of [the Spanish Club’s] life in detail, we could write many volumes, that would tell of the nostalgia and the hopes of those who arrive, and the joys of those 168 OPERACIÓN CANGURO returning”’,387 wrote at the beginning of the seventies Senén Hurtado, then its president. Eager to return to Spain as soon as possible, “making a killing” was the approach many migrants took towards their Australian sojourn. In an article “The migrants who starve for their families”, this point was acknowledged in the Sydney Morning Herald with reference to all South European migrants. They were the real poor of Sydney, the Herald argued, mentioning how they lived together to save costs in accommodation, worked overtime or had many jobs etc. “One Spanish migrant worked so hard over 18 months that he sent his wife back home 7 pounds a week and still managed to save 1,800 towards a house”.388 Anecdotes from interviews are numerous. One of the best known is that of the “Sastres”389 brothers. They each had two full time jobs, one in Roseberry, the other in Abbotsford; they slept on the train between jobs, and carried an alarm clock to know when the time for leaving the train had arrived.390 Working long hours and depriving themselves of all comfort, many migrants managed to save more than the average local worker, and this was sometimes a source of resentment among Australians.391 It is very difficult to quantify how many migrants returned to Spain. S. L. Thompson has estimated that 33.5 per cent of all the Italians who came to Australia in the sixties went back home; the percentage of Spanish returnees should be similar.392 Nor is it easy to know whether those who returned were more successful than those who stayed. Many migrants managed to go back to Spain in the mid sixties and these were probably amongst the luckiest. Thanks to migration, they could fulfil those objectives -the flat, THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 169 the small business- that brought them to Australia.393 On the other hand, those who stayed in Australia, particularly if skilled or white collar workers, know that had they remained in Spain, their social status would not have been much different. For the migrant from this period still residing in Australia, about forty years have already passed since they first landed in the country. Their language problem is not as important now as it used to be, their “make a killing” approach has given way to a more stable lifestyles, and they generally feel more welcome now in a country where multicultural policies have eased racial tensions, at least for the Southern European people. Spaniards have learned to cope with their new environment and to become a part of it. They still keep their Spanish ways, as much as the rules of good neighbourhood allow, and grow older in the company of a few good friends, sometimes those they first met on the ship that brought them here. A second generation has grown up and has provided these pioneers with roots in Australia which they lacked before. Occasionally, once or twice, they have gone to Spain on holidays, and they have realized that fitting back into their home country would not be easy. They still buy the typical “turrón” and “mazapán” at Christmas, and a ticket in the Spanish national lottery, hoping Luck will strike again in Australia, as it did in December 1986, with José Nunez, 61, who arrived in 1962 and spent most of his hardworking life in the tobacco fields of Myrtleford. Núñez won the “Gordo” (475 million pesetas). The news of this event hit the front pages of all the Spanish daily newspapers. Through the words of José’s sister Concha, one of the most outspoken members of the Nunez’s family in Spain, we can glance, once again, at the way relatives 170 OPERACIÓN CANGURO and friends of the migrants in Spain, shared with them their Australian adventure: He went there looking for a job. Working in Australia he was gored by a bull which tore him to shreds. All those who went came back, except him, because in that jungle there are many animals, and life is very hard. My brother has been through a lot.394 NOTES 171 NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1 On occasion, the maiden name is given. 2 Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Commonwealth Year Book, 1962. 3 Ibid., 1964.

THE AGREEMENT 4 Commonwealth Year Book, num. 44, 1958, p. 348. 5 Excellent overviews on Australian post-war. immigration can be found in G. Sherington, Australia’s Immigrants, George Allen and Unwin, 1980, ch. 5, and J. Wilson and R. Tosworth, Old Worlds, New Australia, Penguin Books Australia, 1984, ch, 1. 6 J. A. Biescas and M. Tunon de Lara, España bajo la Dictadura Franquista, Labour, Barcelona, 1960, ch. II and IV. Also, J. Ros Hombravella, Capitalismo Español: Politica Economica Española (1959 - 1973), Barcelona, 1979. 7 J. A. Biescas, op.cit., pp. 88-91. 8 The earlier basic legal codes were the Emigration Law of December 12, 1907 and the Act of December 20, 1924. 9 Instituto Español de Emigración, Memoria, 1956 and 1959. 10 Decree 1000/1962 of March 3. 11 The point of fiction was that the US Congress only allowed countries that recognized the rights of the people to move freely to join the conference, if the US was to provide financial assistance. 12 US, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Venezuela, Austria, France, Luxembourg, Paraguay, Israel, Costa Rica,, Norway, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Australia, Greece, Chili and Brazil. By the early sixties had also joined it Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Malta, Spain and the United Kingdom. 13 F. Bastos de Roa, Immigration in Latin America, Washington D.C., 1964, pp. 235-240. 14 M. Rothvoss y Gil, op. cit., pp. 20-22. 15 Carta de España, June, 1961 172 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

16 Ibid., November, 1961. 17 Monsignor. Montini, foundational letter, in Migration News, July- August 1961, num. 4, p. l. 18 J. J. Norris, “The Tenth Anniversary of the ICMC”, in ibid., July- August 1961, pp. 1-2. 19 ICMC, Third International Migration Congress, 1957, Geneva, 1957, p. 36. 20 “Spain. CCEM”, in Migration News, num. 5, 1957, p.21. 21 Confederation Católica Española de Emigración, Mensaje del “Dia del Emigrante”, Madrid, 1962. 22 The financial arrangements were most favorable to the migrant. In 1959, for example, the voyage was free for migrants from group A (husband/wife, children under 18, and fiancees married by proxi); group B (parents, sons and daughters over 18, grand parents and grand children) paid 1,800 pesetas; group C (other relatives and co- workers), 3,000 pesetas; the reclaimants paid US $40 in each case. M. Rothvoss y Gil, op. cit.,pp. 20-26. 23 Monsignor P. M. O’Donell in ICMC, International Catholic Migration Congress, 1954, Geneva, 1954, p.83. 24 “Australia. FCIC”, in Migration News, num. 5, 1957, p. 5. Also, G, M Crennan, “The Tasks of Catholic Organizations in Overcoming Opposition to Immigration”, Ibid., num. 6, pp. 1121. 25 Memorandum, November 15, 1955, Sydney Consulate Collection (SCC). The Abbey of New Norcia was founded in 1847 by the Spanish Dom Rosendo Salvado OSB. Spanish monks have been serving in the Abbey since. See, R. Salvado, The Salvado Memoirs, University of Western Australia Press, 1977, and A. Grassby, The Spanish in Australia, A. E. Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 39-43. 26 Direccion de Emigración Asistencia Social (DEAS) to Consul, No- vember 4, 1955. SSC. 27 Consul to DEAS, November 18, 1955. SSC. 28 Acting Secretary Department of Immigration to Consul, December 20, 1955. SCC. 29 This clause was still on the Italian Agreement of 1951, although, as the Consul suggested, it was not in use. It did not appear in the final Agreement signed with Spain in 1957. 30 Consul to, DEAS, January 14, 1956. SCC. 31 Consul to DEAS, April 26, 1956. 32 Monsignor Crennan to Consul, April 19, 1956. Federal Catholic NOTES 173

Immigration Committee Collection (FCICC). 33 Consul to Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, April 23, 1956. 34 Consul to DEAS, April 26, 1956. 35 J. Ling, Non-British’s in Australia, Melbourne University Press, 1935, pp. 132-135. 36 A. Grassby, op. cit., pp. 150-60. 37 On the Basque emigration at the beginning of the Century see McCall, G. E., Basque-Americans and a Sequential Theory of Migra- tion and Adaptation, San Francisco State College, 1968. 38 Grassby, op. cit., p. 52. 39 On the incidence of the Spanish Civil-War. on the Spaniards living in Queensland, see D. Menghetti, The Red North, James Cook Univer- sity of Norbah Queensland Press, Townsville, 1981, pp. 67-75. 40 Ibid., January 15, 1957, p. 770. 41 Australian Sugar Journal, September 15, 1956, p. 492. 42 D. Hull, “Capitalist Technology and -the Division of Labour Towards a Working Class Response”, Third National Political Economy Con- ference, Adelaide, September, 1978, pp.16-30. 43 Australian Sugar Year Book, April 1957-March 1958, p. 97. 44 Australian Sugar Journal, 1956, P. 35. 45 Ibid., num. 43 April5l-March 52 p. 85, Ibid., num.44, April 1952- March 1953 p. 155, Ibid., um 45, April 1953- March 1954, p. 108. 46 Ibid., num. 43, p. 155. 47 Ibid., December. 15, 1954. 48 Ibid., November 15, 1954, p. 507. 49 Australia. Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives, Septem- ber 23, 1954- 50 Australian Sugar Journal, November 1954, p. 507. 51 Ibid., January 1955, p. 649. 52 Australian Sugar Year Book, April 1956-March 1957, p. 24. 53 Australian Sugar Journal, August 1955, p. 405. 54 Australian Sugar Year Book, April 1956-Ma-rch 1957, p. 123. 55 Ibid. , p. 101. 56 Ibid., April 1954-March 1955, p. 99. 57 Ibid., April 1956-March 1957, p. 76. 58 The Times. January 21, 1956, p. 7- 59 Australian sugar Journal, January 1957, p.770. 60 Interview with Jesús Uriguen, July 20, 1966. 61 Australian High Commissioner in London to Spanish Ambassador in 174 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

London, April 15, 1957. SCC. 62 Australia, Treaty Series, 1951, No. 12, Agreement between Australia and Italy for Assisted migration, Department of External Affairs, Canberra. 63 In comparison with the Italian Agreement, of 1951: Australia 25 pounds, Italy 25, migrant 70. 64 Memorandum, June 4, 1957. SCC. 65 Instituto Nacional de Emigración, “Informe sobre las areas de reclubamiento de cortadores de cana para Australia”, June 4, 1957. 66 Director General IEE to High Commissioner in London, June 10,1957. SCC. 67 Director General IEE to Consul, July 10, 1957. SCC. 68 J. Lying, op. cit., pp. 5; 10-111- 22; 94; 107; J. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 5- 6. 69 S-Sydney Morning Herald, March 9, 1960, p. 8. 70 Memorandum, July 15, 1957. SCC. 71 Consul to DEAS, September 12, 1957. SCC. 72 “Facerias ceiught”, Sydney Morning Herald, September, 8, 1957, p. 67. 73 Ibid., March 30, 1957, p. 5. 74 Ibid., December 21, 1957, p. 3. 75 Ibid., September- 21, 1957, p. 34. Also, 20 year old model Judith M. Roberts, arrested for wearing her blue bikini: “the court was packed for the trial . . . there was a lot of discussion and people laughed a great deal”, ibid., November 1, 1959, p. 21, and others. 76 Ibid., May 15, 19.57, p. 3, May 16, 1957, p. 2. 77 “500 Spaniards sought for Australia”, ibid., July 7, 1957 p.1, “Holt ends visit to Spain. Discussed pilot, scheme in Madrid”, Sun Herald, Jul 14, 1957, “Coming home. Holt left Lording via Spain”, Sun Pictorial, July 13, 1957, “Australia seeking Spanish migrants”, Age, Melbourne, July 12, 1957 “Holt to Spain”, Courier Mail, Brisbane, July 13, 1957, 500 Spanish Migrants Plan”, Sun, July 12, 1957, “We ask for Spanish migrants”, Melbourne Herald, July 13, 1957. 78 Director General IEE to Consul, July 15, 1957. SCC. 79 Sydney Morning Herald, July 28, 19.57, p. 11. 80 Consul to Ministro de Asuntos Exteriors, January 29, 1958.SCC. 81 Sydney Morning Herald, August, 4, 1957, p. 9. 82 Director General IEE to Consul, November 30, 1957. SCC. 83 Consul to Director General IEE, October 24, 1957. SCC. NOTES 175

84 Consul to Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, November 25, 1957. SCC. 85 Director General IEE to Consul, November 21, 19.57. SCC. 86 Head secretary of the Department, of Immigration to Director tour General IEE, December 4, 1957. SCC. 87 Director. General IEE to Consul, March 23, 1958. SCC. Applicants from Huesca and Teruel were probably residing in the Basque provinces. 88 The Catholic Weekly, June 12, 1958. 89 Director General IEE to A. Urberuaga, April 16, 1958. SCC. 90 Chief of operations CIME to Consul, June 11, 1958.SCC. 91 Director General IEE to Consul, June 13, 1958. SCC. 92 Consul to Director General IEE, January 30, 1958. SCC.

THE SUSPENSION OF THE AGREEMENT 93 CIME to Director General IEE, August 12, 1960. Comité Intergubernamental para las Migraciones Europeas Collection (CIMEC). 94 Carta de España, December 1960, p.b. 95 Sydney Morning Herald, November 21, 1960, p.8. 96 Carta de España, July 1962, p. 4. 97 Ya, May 13, 1960, pp. 1 and 4, May 14, 1960, pp. 1-2. 98 Sydney Morning Herald, June 20, 1959, p. 4. 99 Digest, 1960, p. 15. 100 Australia. Parliamentary Debates, Senate, November 8, 1960, p. 1414. 101 Wives and dependent children under eighteen, unmarried sisters and fiancees eighteen or over. 102 Consul to DGACE, February 2, 1961. SCC. 103 Secretary Department of Immigration to Consul, February 28, 1961. SCC. 104 The trades in demand were: fitters, machinists, sheet metal workers, welders, toolmakers, tractor mechanics, boilermakers, turners, electrical fitters, panel beaters etc. The Spanish workers required a minimum of three years of school training and five years experience. 105 L.H. Hayes, Jefe de Operaciones CIME, January 30, 1962. APC. 106 Sydney Morning Herald, November 21, 1960, p. 8. 107 The Bonegilla riots of July 1961 and other problems related particu- 176 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

larly to the placement of skilled workers, delayed for some months the signature of a new Migration Treaty between Australia and Italy, and lowered the Italian intake. See J. Wilson and R. Tosworth, op. cit., pp. 72 and 172-173. 108 Serrano Carvajal, J., Montoya Melgar, A., La Emigración a Europa, Madrid, 1965, p. 8. 109 DEAS to Consul, June 6, 1962. SCC. 110 Internal migration affected 3,339,000 people during the sixties, 10 per cent of the total Spanish population. J. A. Biescas, op. cit., p. 77. 111 Interviews with Valentíne Hudak, August 11, 1986, and Cristina Ferrando, April 26, 1987. APC. 112 When closing the frontier, all the Spaniards working in Gitraltar found themselves unemployed. Many of them came to Australia. The Fairsea group that landed in Melbourne in November 1962, and some other groups that arrived by plane at the end of 1962, all came from la Linea de la Concepcion. Interviews with Maximiliano Pérez, April 25, 1986, and Justo Martín, April 16, 1987. APC. 113 On fascists rejecting migration on ideological grounds, Wilton ;and R. Bosworth, op. cit., pp. 69-71. 114 J. A. García Trevijano, Problernatica de la Emigración Española, Madrid, 1963, p. 7. 115 Ibid., p. 47. 116 EE, Memoria, 16:3, g. 94. 117 CIME, Australia, SSC. 118 ICEM, Practical English for domestics, February 1961, 8 119 CIME, Curso de Capacitacion para el servicio domestico, 64 pp. APC. More information on the courses in International Migration, Geneva, vol. II, 1962, num. 1, pp 37-51. 120 CIME, Australia, printed, 19 pp., APC. 121 Sydney Morning Herald, June 25, 1961, p. 35. 122 Ibid. , July 18, 1961, p. 1. 123 On the Bonegilla riots of 1952, see R. Bosworth, “Conspiracy of the Consuls? Official Italy and the Bonegilla riot of 1952”, Historical Studies, vol. 22, no. 89, October 1987, pp. 547-568. 124 Sydney Morning Herald, July 18, 1961, p. 1. 125 Ibid., July 19, 1961, p. 1. 126 Ibid., pp. 2 and 8. 127 Ibid., July 31, 1961, p. 4. 128 Ibid., August 16, 1961, p. 12. NOTES 177

129 Vice Consul to DGACE, November 2, 1961. SCC. 130 Interview with A. Rincón, July 11, 1986. APC. 131 Ibid. 132 Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 1961, p. 4. 133 Ibid., September 12, 1961, p. 10. 134 Vice Consul be DEAS, June 20, 1962. SCC. 135 John McIlwrait, “Spaniards wonder- which way ball will bouce”, Western Australian Weekend News, Nov.3, 1962 p. 10. 136 “No Spaniards in the West”, Bulletin, February 29, 1964. Al Grassby, op. cit., p. 70, sets the date on “one sunny April Saturday afternoon in 1964”, which must be a typing error meaning 1963; in an interview with Francisca Corral, April 25, 1987, APC., she said she was present at a demonstration held in this camp on Christmas Eve, 1962, giving as an immediate cause of the demonstration the bad quality of the food. The report of the consulate that follows agrees with Mrs. Corral in the likely date in which the demonstration took place. 137 “Informe sobre la emigration Española a Australia”, December 30, 1962. SCC. “Ten months of total stoppage” is obviously another of the gross exaggerations of Díaz we are to refer to in the next section. 138 La Crónica. October 3, 1964, p. 3. 139 DGACE to Vice Consul, August 13, 1963. SCC. 140 “Informe...” February 4, 1964. SCC. If Díaz was overly sensationalist, de la Riva tended to fall short of the mark. According to “No Span- iards in the West” and interviews, the Spanish were the only victims of this failure, and this fact should have been emphasized, rather than diminished. 141 CIME to Consul, May 7, 1963. SCC. 142 “Memoria del Viaje”, March 12, 1963. SCC. 143 Vice Consul to DGACE, March 7, 1973. SCC. 144 To make a lot of money. 145 CIME, January 30, 1962. APC. 146 Interview with Pilar Moreno in I. García, “25 Aniversario del Club Español”, El Español en Australia, no. 39, 1987, p. 147 Direction General IEE to Vice Consul, April 13, 1962. SSC. 148 Vice Consul to DEAS, June 5, 1962. SCC. 149 Vice Consul to DEAS, March 7, 1963. SCC. 150 Sun Herald, March 3, 1963, p. 5. 178 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

151 Vice Consul to Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, March 3, 1963. SCC. 152 Carta de España, December. 1962, p.4. 153 “Informe...”, November 6, 1961. SCC. 154 “Informe...”, March 7, 1963. SCC. 155 “Informe...”, December. 30, 1962. SCC. Again, Díaz refers to those migrants “who lived well in Spain”. His “disastrous” view is exaggerated and we will comment on it later in this chapter, when considering Consul de la Riva’s estimates. As for the help Díaz provided “out, of his own pocket”, this point has no been confirmed by interviewees who knew him well, for example E. Roch (July 27, 1986) or F. Largo (July 6, 1986). 156 DGACE to Vice Consul, January 7, 1963. SCC. 157 DGACE to Vice Consul, January 29, 1963. SCC. 158 “ Informe. March, 7, 1963. SCC. 159 Ibid. 160 “Informe...” (2), March 7, 1963. SCC. 161 Ibid. 162 “Agreement between Australia and Italy for Assisted migration”, clause 11, in Department of External Affairs, Treaty Series, 1951, no. 12; for example, major care could have been taken in the wording of point 20 in the printed edition of CIME, Australia, p. 18 mentioned later in this chapter. 163 CIME to Consul, March 28, 1963. SCC. 164 He had replaced Félix de Iturriaga in the Direccion General of Asuntos Consulares - Emigración. 165 DGACE to Consul, May 10, 1963. SCC. 166 CIME to Consul, May 7, 1963. SCC. 167 FCIC, “La migration Española a Australia”, undated, FCICC. 168 Consul to DEAS, June 19, 1963. SCC. 169 Carta de España, August 1963, p. 4. 170 Consul to DEAS, April 4, 1963 and August 1, 1963. 171 Carta de España, November 1963, p. 5. 172 DEAS to Consul, October 11, 1963. SCC. 173 A. R. Downer speech at a Naturalization Ceremony, Murray Bridge, November 21, 1963. 174 The Sydney Morning Herald, June 25, 1964, p. 11. 175 El Español en Australia, July 31, 1968, p. 1. 176 He sent to Madrid four “Informes...” in 1963 (May 31, September 2 and 16, and October 25), and three in 1964 (February 7, and April 6 NOTES 179

and 7). 177 DEAS to Consul, October 21, 1963. SCC. 178 “Informe...”, October 25, 1963. SCC. 179 Consul to DEAS, April 19, 1963. SCC. 180 “Informe...”, October 25, 1963. SCC. 181 Ibid.., February 7, 1964. 182 Consul to DGACE, August 3, 1963. SCC. 183 CCEM to Director General IEE, December 6, 1963. SCC. 184 DEAS to Consul, February 23, 1963. SCC. 185 Consul to DEAS, March 26, 1964. SCC. 186 CCEM to DEAS, undated. SCC. 187 Ibid. 188 CIME, Australia, undated, p.18. APC. 189 “Informe...”, May 31, 1963. SCC. 190 Consul to DEAS, June 20, 1963. SCC. Other reason argued: “he begs ... he wants to educate his children on the Christian ways he was taught by his elders and, above all, God and the Motherland”. 191 Interview with J. Rico, December 28, 1986. APC. 192 IEE, Memoria, 1963, P. 107, 1964, PP.81-84, 1965, p.142, 1966, p. 105, 1967, p. 109. 193 On the importance of a social group views’ of itself or others, and on the ways these views change, see R. White, Invention Australia. Images and Identity 1688-1980, George Allen and Unwin, 1981. 194 J. Serrano Carvajal, op. cit., p. 29. 195 Diario Regional, Valladolid, December 22, 1963, pp. 18-19. 196 From Alerta, Santander, quoted in Consul to DGACE, January 9, 1964. SCC. 197 Interviews with F. Largo (July 6, 1986) and J. Blackie (April 26, 1987). According to Blackie, they were asked to retell their account of Australia to the newspapers that printed it prior to granting them the immigration visa; they did not appear at the Consulate again. 198 Alerta, December 31, 1963, p. 5. 199 La Crónica, February 18, 1965, p. 1. Also, IEE, Memoria, 1965, p. 103.

THE MIGRANT ODYSSEY 200 Carta de España, January 1962, P.5 201 Ángel Barrutieta Saenz, La Emigración Española. Ed. Cuadernos 180 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

para el Dialogo, Edicusa, Madrid, 1976, p. 8 202 Emigration to Western Europe outside the IEE channels was common, however, in the early sixties, and was often reported on the Spanish press. See for example, ATC, December 31, 1964. 203 Eduardo Sánchez in Secretariado de la Comisión Episcopal de Migraciones, Boletín Informativo, num. 127, February 1969, p.11. 204 Australian Sugar Journal, February, 1958, p. 801. 205 Interview with Jesús Uriguen, April 20, 1986. APC. 206 Interview with Antonio Esparza, August 10, 1986. APC. 207 Interview with Aníbal Estanillo in I. García, “25 Aniversario del Club Español”, El Español en Australia, no. 33, 1987. 208 Courier Mail, August 7, 1958. 209 Ibid., August 8, 1958, p. 139. 210 Newcastle Morning Herald, June 30, 1959, P.l. 211 Ibid. July 1, 1959, p.l. 212 Ibid., July 8, 1959, p. 3. 213 CIME, Australia, undated. APC. 214 Grassby, op. cit., P. 51 215 Australian Sugar Year Book, num. 52, April 1960-March 1961 p.1006, giving the reasons why Australian cane-cutting output was the highest in the world; other reason was: “they were conscious workers (only the far north employs migrants)”[sic.] 216 Interview with Robert Enguix, August 8, 1986. APC. 217 “Mr. Zamora in Queensland”, La Crónica, October 3, 1964, p. 3. 218 Interview with Antonio Esparza, August 10, 1986. APC. 219 La Crónica, October 3, 1964, p. 3. 220 “El infortunado emigrante de Noja en Santander”, Alerta, May 16, 1963, p. 2. 221 Ibid. 222 Interview with Manuel Unzueta in I. García, op. cit., no.35, p. 3. 223 Sydney Morning Herald, March 11, 1959, p. 12. 224 Australian Sugar Journal. March 1960, p. 986. p. 157 225 Australian Sugar Year Took, num. 55, March 63 April 64, 226 Ibid., num. 53, April 1961-March 1662, at the ASPA Annual Confer- ence, May 1961. 227 Australian Sugar Journal, May 1963, p. 159. 228 Australian Year Took, num. 54, April 1962-March 1963, p. 164. 229 Australian Sugar Journal, August 1964. NOTES 181

230 “Lonely men’s brides”, Sydney Morning Herald, September 2, 1956, p. 2. See also Ibid. September 7, 1955, June 30, 1955, 231 Department of Immigration, Digest 1960, p. 11. 232 “Migrant Plea for Girls”, Sydney Morning Herald, February 14, 1960, p. 23. 233 Ibid., July 30, 1961, p. 35. 234 Ibid. The same issue in Ibid. Feb 26, 1961, p.11; the proposed solution: to bring them by plane (it cost twice as much the 110 pounds sea fare) or in ships only with women. 235 Juventud Obrera, Suplemento del Boletín de Militantes de la JOC no. 36, December 1959, Madrid, p. 9. 236 Primer Congreso de la Familia Española, Madrid, February 1959. 237 M. G. Crennan, “Voluntary Agencies on a Migration Programme” in International Migrations, vol.2, num.2, 1964, p.133. 238 Sydney Morning Herald. March 11,1960, p.l. 239 Carta de España, April 1960, p. 5. 240 The Marta expeditions came by Qantas, KLM and BOAC, riving usually at Melbourne airport. The first group arrived in Melbourne on March 10, 1960; the last, with sixty Spanish girls on board, on February 2, 1963; other groups arrived on June 10, 1960 (23 girls), Dec. 17, 1960 (65 girls), March 13, 1961 (60 girls), June 14, 1961 (57 girls), June 24, 1961 (64girls) 241 Catholic Weekly, June 23, 1960. 242 Ibid., April 20, 1961, p. 20. 243 Consul to Direction General de Asuntos Consulares Emigración (DGACE), March 19, 1961. 244 Sun Herald, March 19, 1961, p.25. 245 Catholic Weekly, April 20, 1961, p. 20. 246 CIME, Curso de Capacitacion Para el Servicio Domestico, undated, p. 9. APC. 247 Sydney Morning Herald, March 13, 1960, p.22. 248 Catholic Weekly, June 23, 1960. 249 Carta de España, Marzo 196 1. p. 5. 250 Sun Herald, March 19, 1961, p.25. 251 Ibid. 252 Australian Women’s Weekly, August 16, 1961. 253 Interview with Sara Santos, August 13, 1986. APC. 254 Interview with Valentíne Hudak, August 11. 1986. APC. 182 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

255 Interview with María José Ugarte, July 27, 1966. APC. 256 Catholic Weekly, April 20, 1961, p. 20. 257 Interview with Pilar Otaegui in I. García, op. cit., no. 39, 1987. 258 Australian Sugar Year Book, April 1956-March 1957, vol 48, p. 269. 259 “Aurelia News”, undated. APC. 260 Interview with Cristina Ferrando, April 26, 1987. APC. 261 Carta de España, May 64, p. 6. Some dates of arrivals of this plane groups were: 30-1-62, 20-12-62, 26-1-63 and 6-2-63. 262 This was the Aurelia group that arrived in Melbourne on November 16, 1962. Interview with Armando Leiva, April 16, 1987. APC. 263 Department of Immigration, “Reception and Training Centre. Bonegilla”, undated. APC. 264 Twenty Spaniards were employed at the camp in May 1963. Consul “Informe sobre la Emigración Española a Australia”, May 31, 1963. SCC. 265 “They told us the fantastic amounts of money we could earn as cane cutters, and that the CES provided only the jobs that nobody wanted”. Interview with Maxi Pérez, August 25, 1986. 266 Interview with Alejandro Rincón, July 11, 1986. APC. 267 Consul, “Report on Spanish migration to Australia”, February 7, 1964. APC. 268 Interview with Justo Martín, April 16, 1987. APC. Justo Martín was employed during six months at the Bonegilla camp. 269 Interview with María Luisa and Ernesto Medina, April 18, 1987, and with Justo Martín, April 16, 1987. APC. 270 La Crónica, December 3, 1964, p. 3. 271 R. J. Kriegler, Working for the Company. Work and Control in the Whyalla Shipyard, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 263. 272 Ibid., p. 264. 273 A. Surjo to C. Ferrando, October 20, 1962. CFC. 274 Nationality (i.e. Allegiance) of the population: Metropolitan Urban, Other Urban and Rural Divisions of Australia, Censuses of 1954, 1961 and 1966. 275 On union attitudes towards migration see M. Quinlan, “Australian Trade Unions and Post-War Migration: attitudes and Responses”, Journal of Industrial Relations, 21, 1979. These generalizations are surely more appropriate for the sixties. 276 Consul to DEAS, May 31, 1.963. SSC. 277 El Español en Australia, May 31, 1967. p. 4. NOTES 183

THE MAKING OF A COMMUNITY 278 J. Wilton, op. cit., p. 129. 279 Pilar Otaegui, in Spanish Club, Boletín, no. 14 February, l972. Sydney Spanish Club Collection (SSCC), 280 Diego Baron in Ibid. 281 Interview with J. L. Goñi in I. García, op. cit September 22, 1987, p. 3. 282 Spanish Club, Boletín, no.14, February, 1972. SSCC. 283 Interview with Pilar Moreno and J. L. Goñi in I. García, op. cit., September 22 and 29, 1987, p. 3. 284 Hugh Curfew, “Requiem for a gentle tycoon”, Sunday Telegraph, Sydney, May 28, 1967. Also, interview with F. Largo in I. García, op. cit., no. 31, 1987, and interview with R. P. Interview with J. L. Goñi, in Ibid., September 22, 1987, p.3. 285 Op. Cit., September 29, 1987, p. 3, and September 22, 1987, p. 3. 286 Spanish Club, Boletín, num. 14, February, 1972. SSCC. 287 This was remarkable, coming from a country in which male chau- vinism were’ so accentuated. The important role women played in the foundation of the Club may account for it. See interview with P. Otaegui (Moreno) in I. García, Ibid., September 29, 1987, p. 3. 288 Interview with Luis Aranda, August 22, 1986. APC. 289 See interviews with M. Unzueta and A. Estanillo in I. García, Op. cit., nos. 33 and 35, 1987. 290 See details in I. García, op. cit., nos. 27, 31 and 38, 1987. 291 See the list of all the Spanish Club Committees 1962-1968 in Appendix 1. 292 Ibid. 293 Election of Committee, Candidates for election, Year 1963. APC. See also Appendix 1. 294 Spanish Club, Boletín de Noticias, num. 1, August 1964. SSCC. 295 Interview with Fernando Largo, in I. García, op. cit., no. 31, 1987. 296 Spanish Club, “Requisition for a extraordinary general meeting”, October 31, 1963. Sydney Stott Collection (SSC). 297 Lasala, Largo and Rogers ceased as trustees on November 15, 1963, ANZ Bank to F. Largo. APC. 298 The six members were: J. de Blas, A. Carilla, R. López, V. Sánchez and S. Stott. SSC. 299 Interview with Oscar González, July 25, 1986. APC. Oscar, an Asturian of Anarchist background, often challenged Lasala’s authority 184 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

in the Club. 300 Spanish Club, Boletín de Noticias, no. 4, November December, 1964. SSCC. 301 See interview with J. L.Goñi, August 30, 1987. 302 José Fernández, El Español en Australia, March 2, 1966. 303 José Fernández, “Objective ‘Spanish Club”’, in Ibid., May 11, 1966, p. 6. 304 Ibid., September 9, 1966, p. 5. 305 SSC. 306 Spanish Chamber of Commerce to Spanish Club, August 18, 1967, Spanish Club to Dean Forbes Advertising, January 23, 1967, Dean Forbes Advertising to Spanish Club, January 3, 1966. SSCC. 307 J. Fernández, “Jornada de verdadera tension emocional”, in El Español en Australia, February 22, 1967, p.2. 308 Ibid., February 22, 1967, p.2. 309 See, for example, shoplifting cases in interview with Bertrand, July 3, 1986. APC. 310 Spanish Club, “Programme of Future Events”, 1964, and “Floor Shows”, Spanish Club, Boletín de Noticias, no. 4, November-Decem- ber 1964. SSCC. A splendid description of one of the Friday night events is given in M. Varela, in La Crónica, June 25, 1964 p. 2. 311 A typical Spanish card game. 312 Spanish Club, Newsletter, December 12, 1963. On the role of women in the Club, see interview with Pilar Otaegui (Moreno), in I. García, op. cit., September 29, 1987, p. 3. 313 El Español en Australia, April 13, 1966, P.11, and April 27. 1966, p.2. 314 “Sydney Hispanic Society formed”, in Sydney Morning Herald, October 28, 1960, p. 8. 315 La Crónica, October 31, 1964, p. 3. 316 Interview with B. Haneman in I. García, op. cit., no. 29, 317 Basque for “Our corner”. 318 See M. Varela interviews with José Casal, President of the Centro Gallego in Melbourne, and Ceferino Sánchez, President of the Casa de España in Whyalla, in La Crónica, April 29, 1965 p.3, and June 24, 1965, p. 3. 319 El Español en Australia, June 25, 1965. 320 Ibid., August 2, 1966. 321 Interview with Oscar González, July 25, 1986. APC. 322 Interview with Amparo Gauter, April 17, 1987. APC. No written NOTES 185

records of this period are kept, but La Crónica, November 19, 1964 p. 9, refers to celebrations of the fourth anniversary. 323 Sporting Globe, June 12, 1956. 324 Manuel Varela, “El Club de los Españoles”, Ibid., July 11, 1964, p. 3. The number of members of the Club in 1987 was of about 450. 325 M. Varela often complained about it in La Crónica, for example December 8, 1965, p. 4. 326 Ibid., August 22, 1964, October 17, 1964, and June 10, 1965, p. 3. 327 Ibid., November 19, 1964, p.9. 328 Mentioned in La Crónica, September 5, 1964, p. 2. 329 Typical Gallician dishes and wine. 330 So that Gallicians could fight homesickness living away from their homeland, in a dialectal form of Spanish spoken in Galicia. La Crónica, April 29, 1965, p. 3. 331 Ibid., August 1, 1964, p.2. Adolfo Jiménez, who was on the first committee, and then, for two years, president of the Club, says that, on the inauguration day, the police raided its premises and found alcohol. From then on, this was the major problem the club had to face. Fortunately, the owner of the premises had influence in the right places and helped the Spaniards through. Interview with Adolfo Jiménez, April 17, 1987. APC. 332 El Pilar, Melbourne, June 15, 1965, pp.2-3. 333 Interview with Francisca Corral, April 25, 1967. APC. Kriegler, op. cit., pp. 7-8, signals the BHP “paternalistic, sometimes philanthropic, role in its efforts to aid the establishment of clubs”; on the other hand, BHP did not pay rates or taxes on its vast industrial sites, to the City Council. 334 La Crónica, June 24, 1965, p. 3. 335 Spanish Australian Club of Canberra, Boletín Mensual. Interviews with M. López, April 3, 1986, and C. Villegas, September 3, 1986. APC. 336 The first written reference on the Spanish Club at Wollongong in El Espa;ol en Australia, November 11, 1968. 337 No record of this publication has been kept. Interview with Frank Gallego, August 29, 1987. APC. 338 La Crónica, December 3, 1964, p. 3. 339 Ibid., December 17, 1964. 340 Ibid., September 1, 1965, p. 1-3. 341 Ibid., April 13, 1966, p.l. 186 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

342 El Español en Australia, March 3, 1965, P.l. 343 Interview with Concha Fernández in I. García, op. cit July 14, 1987, p. 3. 344 A percentage comparatively lower than that of Italians (91.98%) or Maltese (92.82%), whilst the percentage of Non Reply, including non religion, is higher, 14.23% versus 6.84% Italians and 5.87% Maltese, in M. Gibson, The Foreign Language Press in Australia 1848-1964, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1967, p. 177. 345 L. Benyei, An Integration Study of Migrants in Australia, Melbourne, 1961, p. 48. 346 For more information see Consejo Superior de Misiones, España Misionera, Madrid, 1962 pp. 163-164 and 215-217 and CCEM, Boletín Informativo, num. 115, July 1964, p.4. 347 Emigrantes. Transplante de Catolicismo, March-April, 1967. To this article belongs the only written reference on Aboriginal people recorded from this generation of Spaniards during the early sixties: “ Many Aboriginal families, the primitive settlers of Australia, also live in Dimbulah. As the color barrier do not apply here, blacks and whites get on with each other well”. More information on Father Ormazábal activities is in CCEM, Misiones Católicas Españolas Para la atencion de los emigrantes, Madrid, 1967, p. 210, and Secretariado de la Comisión Episcopal de Migraciones, Boletín Informativo, num.111, July-August 1966, and no. 115, March 1967. 348 Interview with Juan Rico, January 8, 1987. 349 Interviews with Juan Rico, January 8, 1987 and Paquita Bretón, December 27, 1966. APC. 350 Migrant chaplains to Consul, October 8, 1962. SCC. 351 Father Rico to Consul, undated (around May 1963). SCC. 352 Consul to DEAS, November 14, 1963. Also, “Informes...” of October 8, 1963, and April 6, 1964. SSC. 353 “Informe...”, February 2, 1964. SSC. 354 See Appendix 2. Also interview with J. L. Goñi in I.García. op. cit., September 22, 1987, p. 3. 355 Perhaps due to Carlos Zalapa’s influence. Zalapa and Lasala did not get on well, and Zalapa through the Hispanic Society was closer to the Consulate. See interview with B. Haneman in I. García, op. cit., no. 29, 1987, p. 3 356 “Informe...”, February 4, 1964. SCC. 357 “Informe...”, December 12, 1971. SSC. NOTES 187

358 Ibid. 359 A Francoist member of the Committee of the Spanish Club, exemplifies what “apolitical” meant for them when he wrote, to his later embarrassment, in a letter to the editor of a rightist Spanish magazine: “For unknown reasons, migrants arrive to Australia with a hate against Spain that I can not understand . . . indifferents and con- formists [the members] have made possible for a bunch of “reds” to take over the destiny of the club. Because of them, our Consular authorities do not want anything to do with the club”, in Fuerza Nueva, 1970. 360 There was a polemic, all over Australia, about whether to put in the clubs the Francoist bicoloured flag or the Republican tricoloured one. The division was usually averted by putting none. 361 Interviews with A. Leiva, April 16, 1987, and A. Jiménez, April 17, 1987. APC. The most serious act of political violence took place in Melbourne in the early seventies when the new premises of the Centro Español of Victoria were set alight, supposedly by a maverick Francoist. 362 Articulo 1, Estatutos of the Centro Democratico Español, undated. APC. 363 For example, “The Spanish Socialism and the future of Spain”, by Diego García, undated, and “July 16: Remembering the heroic fight of the Spanish people for their freedom, with reading of poems by Lorca and Machado”, undated. APC. 364 “Workers’ Committees”, Spanish anti-Francoist union movement. 365 El Español en Australia, March 1, 1967, p. 1. 366 Ibid., from March 8 to April 12, 1967, Manuel Vivas, Juan Antonio García, Antonio Jiménez, José Baquero and Francisco Villa engaged in a heated polemic in the section Letters to the Editor in page 2. Similar controversies occurred when other demonstrations were organized, or with the polemics within the clubs in Melbourne. 367 Acting Consul to Director General America and Far East, February l6, 1968. SCC. More information in Sun Herald, February 16, 19613. 368 Daily Telegraph, December 31, 1970, P. 3. 369 “Most migrants from Spain originally come to Australia with the idea of making money and returning home, but get hooked”. From “The Spanish speaking people”, Bulletin, September 11, 1976, p. 179. A throughout review of all the journal sources has revealed that virtually no journal coverage on Spanish migration in this period has 188 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

been published. This article is one of the few exceptions. The fact that they considered their coming to Australia only as a temporary move may be one of the specific characteristics of the Spanish, in comparison with the rest of Southern European migration. See L. Benyei, op. cit., p. 11. 370 Of the migrant families of this vintage, none suffered more the consequences of their inability to make themselves understood in English, than that of Felipe Munoz. On April 12, 1963, his eight months old daughter Maríanela died in the hospital of Albury, after incorrect treatment due to a language misunderstanding at Bonegilla. Consul to DEAS, May 29, 1963. SCC. 371 Spanish Club, Boletín de Noticias, no. 3, October, 1964. 372 J. Jupp, Arrivals and Departures, Cheshire-Lansdowne, 1966, pp. 171-2. 373 “Informe February 7, 1964. SCC. 374 La Crónica, April 4, 1965, p. 3. 375 Ibid., January 21, 1965. 376 Pouring it in Asturian style. 377 F. Mellizo, “Hemos descubierto Australia”, in El Español en Australia, April 13, 1966, P. 8. Mellizo was a journalist from the daily Pueblo, from Madrid, who escorted the Spanish tennis team in December 1965. He published a series of articles under that title in Pueblo, which were later reproduced in El Español en Australia. 378 Only a few were professionals in Spain before emigrating, but a bunch of them managed to live for some years from their art, singing, dancing and playing guitar: Juan y Carmen “Dos Maravillas”; Miguel de Triana, who with Veronica Vargas “la Titi” and others formed the group “Los Tarantos”, and later “Sol y Sombra”; Manolo Danza, Barbara Ramos and Andre Levis’ “Trio Español”; guitarists Ángel García “el Brujo” and José Luis González, etc. 379 El Español en Australia, April 27, 1966, P. 8; Sydney Morning Her- ald, December 30, 1965, p. 1. 380 G. Collins, “The political Economy of Post-War Migration”, The Political Economy of Australian Capitalism, vol. 1, Sydney, 1975, p. 110. 381 J. P. O’Grady, They’re a weird mob, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1957, p. 204. 382 La Crónica, May 20, 1965, p.4. 383 Miguel Barbero, 52, died when run over by a car; apparently his house had been broken into earlier, and another attempt had also NOTES 189

been made to kill him with a car. Ibid., August 8, 1964, p. 3. 384 Ibid., July 11, 1965, p. 1. 385 Ibid., December 8, 1965, p. 4. 386 El Español en Australia, August 16 and 21, 1972; Sydney Morning Herald, August 16, 1972, p. 2; August 26, 1972, p.l; November 15, 1972, p. 19; Daily Telegraph, August 11, 1972, p. 13; see also, I. García, “El caso Bilbao”, in El Español en Australia, nos. 30 and 31, 1987. 387 Spanish Club, Boletín, February 14, 1972. SSCC. 388 Sydney Morning Herald, March 26, 1961,p. 68. In the same article, Baltinos, Secretary of the New Settlers Federation, declared: “Many Southern European families save for years to send one of their number to another country. The migrant then is expected to support their parents, provide a dowry for his sisters, and earn passage money so that his brothers can migrate also”. However, this was not a common practice in the Spanish case. 389 Tailors, for their former profession in Spain. 390 Interview with F. Largo, July 6, 1986. Amongst the less lucky was Frutos Gómez, killed in a car crash, apparently because of his tiredness, when driving from his job in a metal factory in Alexandria to his evening shift work in a restaurant in the North Shore. Inter- view with A. Rincón, July 11, 1986. APC. 391 Interview with Volcano, April 20, 1986. 392 S. L. Thompson, Australia through Italian eyes, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1980, p. 231. “Boomerang” migration has also been, from the mid sixties, a common practice. “Spaniards who came back”, El Español en Australia, March 1, 1967, p.2. Chain migration, a major issue for most South European countries, was not so common in the Spanish case. This was due to the comparatively late start of the migration programme, the greater attraction of Western European countries, the improving working conditions in Spain, and the lack of facilities to migrate to Australia after March, 1963. 393 “We should have gone to Spain in 1965, at the end of the tobacco season, with 4000 pounds. We went in 1969 instead, with more money, but we could not buy the same goods.” Interview with Justo Martín, April 16, 1987. APC. 394 El Pais, December 23, 1986, p. 1. 190 OPERACIÓN CANGURO APPENDIX 191 APPENDIX 1

Spanish Club Committees 1962-1967

Surname Name Votes Meetings From Until Notes (1) Foundation Day 4.3.62 R. de Lasala Roberto P Fernández José 30.9.62 VP Ugarte Valentín S Escribano Marcos T Crilly George 23.9.62 Largo Fernando Goñi José Luis Santiñán Jesús 23.9.62 Moreno Pilar Redondo Guillermo 23.9.62

...... Alberti José 23.9.62 (VP) de Lasala (Jnr) Roberto 23.9.62 Matías Pedro 6.1.63 Díez José Luis 5.5.62 6.1.63 Illarramendi Eusebio 23.9.62 Iglesias A. 30.9.62 Comyn F.J. 30.9.62 (2) annual general meeting 17.2.63 Álvarez Grato 95 11.8.63 de la Torre Juan 91 28.7.63 Sánchez T. 87 21.4.63 Pinedo Jesús 81 27.10.63 Rosten-Lee George 79 13.10.63 de Lasala Roberto 71 27.10.63 P Goñi José Luis 69 11.8.63 Alberti José 65 27.10.63 VP Escribano Marcos 64 21.4.63 T Lobo José 61 Moreno Pilar 59 Linares José 581 ?

...... 192 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Surname Name Votes Meetings From Until Notes Sanvicenti Teófilo 21.4.63 27.10.63 Largo Fernando 2.6.63 27.10.63 Rodríguez Josefina 2.6.63 López Rafael 15.9.63 Levy V. 15.9.63 27.10.63 Comyn F.J. 13.10.63 27.10.63 Carilla Arturo 13.10.63 (3) extraordinary general meeting 10.11.6

Stott Sydney 123 9 V P L Smith Lionel 105 8 López Rafael 101 8 31.12.63 p Otaegui Pilar 100 7 Vivas Salvador 95 9 VP2 Iglesias Delfin 93 9 Goñi José Luis 87 3 Oriñuela Julián 78 10 Contreras Rafael 76 9 Parra G. 73 4 Carilla Arturo 69 9 Navarro Francisco 61 8

(4) annual general meeting 23.2.64

Smith Lionel 154 7 Stott Sydney 152 18 T Hickey Lancelot 149 16 VP2 Vivas Salvador 145 12 VPL Tricio Jacinto 144 15 Orvezabala Juan 128 12 Carilla Arturo 123 28.6.64 Contreras Rafael 123 17 P Navarro Francisco 122 26.7.64 Oriñuela Julián 122 13 Mas José 107 15 Salas Manuel 16

...... Majarrés J. 6 16.6.64 Smith Ellen 7 16.8.64 APPENDIX 193

Surname Name Votes Meetings From Until Notes (5) annual general meeting 31.1.65 Stott Sydney 166 4 11.4.65 T Hickey Lancelot 156 20 VP1 (P) Aranda Fernando 151 15 González Herminio 148 4 11.4.65 p Tricio Jacinto 148 17 Smith Ellen 148 4 11.4.65 Gómez Esteban 144 10 25.7.65 Canteli Emilio 141 19 VP2 (T) Orvezabala Juan 140 16 Mas José 121 4 11.4.65 Mas Phyllis 107 4 11.4.65 Fernández Ceferino 104 8

...... Herranz J. 10 9.5.65 De Costa Luis 11 9.5.65 Casas Delfin 8 13.6.65 García Cándido 7 5.9.65 López Ángel 5 5.9.65 Mínguez F. 4 5.9.65 (6) annual general meeting 20.2.66 Vivas Manuel 27 VP2 (P) Comyn J. 24 VPL López Monleón José Luis 27 T2 (VP2) López Ángel 8 16.5.66 P Salas Manuel 24 Tl Arias Jerónimo 16 ? García Cándido 25 López Gómez José Luis 14 Goñi José Luis 7 ? Pinedo Jesús 19 Zaráuz Victorino 26 González Santos 19 ?

...... Sánchez Molla T. 9 5.9.66 Asensi J.A. 11 20.9.66 (T) González S. 19 ? García J.A. 8 ? 194 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Surname Name Votes Meetings From Until Notes (7) annual general meeting 12.2.67 Contreras Rafael 100 6 30.4.67 P Asensi José A. 98 4 2.4.67 Tl Vivas Manuel 98 ? VPL Rodríguez Antonio 93 9 11.6.67 Díaz Gregorio 89 11 10.12.67 León Burgo Antonio 86 13 6.8.67 T2 Rodríguez Helios 85 22 (P) Sánchez Ángel 84 7 6.8.67 López Sánchez Jesús 84 7 7.5.67 Sánchez Molla Tomas 83 21 Salas Manuel 69 6 30.4.67

...... Baron Diego 20 17.4.67 (VP) Madden Allan 21 2.4.67 (T) Arias Jerónimo 16 28.5.67 Alonso Manuel 12 25.6.67 Cancio Eliseo 12 9.7.67 Rubio Jesús 8 3.9.67 Rodríguez Francisco 9 17.9.67 Massina Miguel 3 17.9.67 López Rafael 5 26.11.67 Sánchez Manuel 9 25.6.67 15.10.67 (8) annual general meeting 16.2.68 Scott Sydney 163 22 VP2 Da Costa Luis 148 6 2.6.68 López Rafael 139 17 VP1 Madden Allan 139 17 29.9.68 T Massena Manuel 116 1 23.6.68 Iglesias Delfin 115 16 (T)((P)) López J.A. 112 19 Rodríguez Francisco 111 10 1.9.68 López Ángel 109 12 10.9.68 P Arias Jerónimo 96 12 1.9.68 Sánchez Ángel 94 21 12.1.69 (P) Seisdedos Miguel 92 20

...... APPENDIX 195

Surname Name Votes Meetings From Until Notes Saez Pedro 10 15.9.68 Baron Diego 13 7. 8. 68 19. 1. 69 Escribano Marcos 3 15.9.68 19.1.69 Rodríguez Ángel 10 29.968 ((T)) Llorente Félix 7 15.9.68 Fernández Evaristo 9 13.10.68 19.1.69

Votes: Number of votes had in the elections. Meetings: Number of committee meetings attended. From/Until: Date they sat on the committee for the first/last times Notes: P President, VP Vice-President, S Secretary, T Treasurer, 1 Senior, 2 Junior, ( ) new office bearers chosen within the same committee. 196 OPERACIÓN CANGURO APPENDIX 2

Table 1 Population of Local Government Areas. By Nationality: Spanish.

Census 1961 Census 1966 NSW Total 1109 4034 Sydney Male 319 1078 Female 265 1003 Total 587 2081 Wollongong/South Coast Male 270 805 Female 91 693 Total 361 1498 Southern Tableland Male 26 74 Female 16 43 Total 42 117 Hunter/Manning Male 21 70 Female 2 17 Total 23 87 Riverina Male 4 52 Female 1 34 Total 5 86 VICTORIA Total 790 2805 Melbourne Male 213 862 Female 193 778 Total 406 1640 North Easter Male 182 275 Female 72 195 Total 254 470 APPENDIX 197

Census 1961 Census 1966 Geelong/West Central Male 32 241 Female 14 200 Total 46 441 Northern Male 10 45 Female 1 42 Total 11 87 SOUTH AUSTRALIA Total 72 848 Adelaide Male 10 208 Female 23 234 Total 33 442 WHyalla/Western Male 2 212 Female - 148 Total 2 360 QUEENSLAND Total 783 989 Brisbane Male 26 59 Female 44 66 Total 70 125 Cairns Male 432 355 Female 64 139 Total 496 494 Hinchinbrook Male 218 182 Female 39 67 Total 257 249 Townsville Male 106 140 Female 40 71 Total 146 211 Ayr Male 28 109 Female 15 65 Total 43 174 198 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Census 1961 Census 1966 Jonhstone Male 104 68 Female 14 27 Total 120 95 Cardwell Male 51 63 Female 4 24 Total 55 87 WESTERN AUSTRALIA Total 49 486 Perth Male 9 151 Female 6 127 Total 15 278 Pilbara Male 4 88 Female 1 Total 5 88 ACT Total 36 343 TASMANIA Total 13 49 NTHRN TERRITORY Total 5 18

Sources: Censuses 1961 and 1966, Population and Dwellings in Local Government Areas,, No. 3.- Population of Local Government Areas, BY nationality. Only taken into consideration those statistical divisions in which over eighty Spaniards lived in June 1966. APPENDIX 199

Table 2. Nationality of Permanent and Long Term Arrivals. Spanish Financial Year Assisted Other Total 1956-57 4 132 136 1957-58 - 85 85 1958-59 328 100 428 1959-60 447 125 572 1960-61 1231 248 1479 1961-62 1549 282 1831 1962-63 4317 322 4639 1963-64 105 432 537 1964-65 269 690 986 1965-66 541 814 1355

Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics, Canberra 1968, Table 12, pp. 34- 38. 200 OPERACIÓN CANGURO BIBLIOGRAPHY 201 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Alonso, Bernardo, July 10, 1986. Alonso, Manuel, July 4, 1986. Aranda, Luis, August 22, 1986. Arjonilla, Antonio, April 26, 1987. Bastida, Antonio, April 3, 1986. Bertrand, José Antonio, July 3, 1986. Bilbao, August 10, 1986. Blackie, Jim, April 25, 1987. Bretón, Paquita, December 26, 1986. Carceller, Manolo, October 4, 1986. Carrasco, Basi, April 17, 1987. Córdoba, Paulino, April 17, 1987. Córdoba, Conchita, April 17, 1987. Corral, Francisca, April 25, 1987. Crennan, G., July 14, 1986. de las Heras, Honorina, August 27, 1986. Enguix, Roberto, August 9, 1986. Esparza, Antonio, August 10, 1986. Estanillo, Aníbal, September 3, 1986. Estanillo, Carmina, September 3, 1986. Farina, Pilar, June 15, 1987. Fernández, Concha, May 31, 1987. Ferraro, Cristina, November 25, 1986. Gallego, Frank, August 29, 1987. Gamero, Roman, April 3, 1986. Garmendia, Pascual, August 21, 1986. Gauter, Amparo, April 17, 1987. González, Oscar, July 25, 1986. Goñi, José Luis, August 30, 1987. Grant, Harold, April 25, 1987. Grassby, Al, July 4, 1986. Haneman, Ben, May 31, 1987. 208 OPERACIÓN CANGURO

Ingelmo, Manuel, July 27, 1986. Jiménez, Adolfo, April 17, 1987. Judak, Valentína, August 11, 1986. Largo, Fernando, July 6, 1986. Largo, Mari Carmen, July 6, 1986. Lasala (Perez de), Toby, July 23, 1986. Leiva, Armando, April 16, 1987. López, Elvira, October 5, 1986. López, Fermín, October 5, 1986. López, Máximo, April 5, 1986. Marcos, Raquel, April 20, 1987. Marcos, Ricardo, April 20, 1987. Martín, Justo, April 16, 1987. Martínez, Enrique, April 26, 1987. Medina, Ernesto, April 20, 1987. Medina, Maria Luisa, April 20, 1987. Monreal, Nieves, October 4, 1986. Morales, Eusebio, May 20, 1986. Moreno, Pilar, July 20, 1986. Moreno, Tomás, April 3, 1986. Moyano, Ana Victoria, August 30, 1987. Orell, Bernardo, September 6, 1986. Orena, Alfonso, October 4, 1986. Orena, Emilia, October 4, 1986. Ortega, Francisco, April 20, 1987. Otaegui, Juan, July 20, 1986. Pérez, Antonio, April 3, 1986. Pérez, Maximiliano, September 1, 1986. Recio, Elisa, October 4, 1986. Rico, Juan, January 8. 1987. Rincón, Alejandro, July 11, 1986. Rincón, Maruja, July 11, 1986. Roch, Emilia, July 27, 1986. Roch, Francisco, July 27, 1986. Rodríguez, Luis, , June 17, 1986. INTERVIEWS 209

Rojo, Carmen, July 17, 1986. Rubio, Alfonso, Agust 11, 1986. Rubio, Pilar, August 11. 1986. Ruiz, Alfredo, October 4, 1986. Sánchez, Julio, July 17, 1986. Santos, Carmelo, August 13, 1986. Santos, Sara, August 13, 1986. Stott, Sydney, June 2, 1987. Sueiro, July 3, 1986. Ugarte, Maria José, July 27, 1986. Unzueta, Manuel, August 12, 1986. Urigen, Jesús, July 25, 1986. Vazquez, Juan, May 10, 1986. Verastegui, Belén, December 28, 1986. Villegas, Claudio, September 3, 1986. Vivas, Luis, October 22, 1986. Volcano, April 20, 1986. Zabala, Flori, July 25, 1986. Zaráuz, Victorino, August 12, 1986.