DOCSLIB.ORG

885 Roisman, J. 2012. Alexander's Veterans and the Early Wars of The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
885 Roisman, J. 2012. Alexander's Veterans and the Early Wars of The De novis libris iudicia / J. Atkinson / Mnemosyne 66 (2013) 885-888 885 Roisman, J. 2012. Alexander’s Veterans and the Early Wars of the Successors. Austin, University of Texas Press. xiv, 264 pp. Pr. $55.00. ISBN 9780292735965. The story of the development of the Macedonian army is highly complicated, and Joseph Roisman duly starts in the introduction with a sketch of its organisation at the time of Alexander’s death in terms of structures and weapons. Roisman’s record of publications in the field attests his qualification to tackle the subject of what happened to Alexander’s veterans in the power struggle after his death. The first substantive chapter, Motives and Bias in the History of Hieronymus of Cardia, is an extended version of the paper which Roisman published in Carney, E., Ogden, D. (eds.) 2010. Philip II and Alexander the Great (Oxford), 135-48 and 285-6. It sets the tone for Roisman’s critical approach to the source material, and espe- cially to Diodorus who, it is argued, reflected the bias and elitism of his main source for this period, Hieronymus. He cites Badian as an example of the regrettable ten- dency to take “Hieronymus’ name as a guarantee of good faith and reliable report- ing” (p. 10, quoting Badian, E. 1968. A King’s Notebooks, HSCP 72, 183-204, at 190). In the second chapter, Alexander and Discontent, Roisman switches to a focus on the veterans themselves and their experience of military life in the last four years of Alexander’s life. This takes in the ‘mutinies’ at the Hyphasis and at Opis. They come across as basically very decent chaps, able to give free expression to their emotions, and indeed the sources allow the presentation of some rather maudlin crowd scenes. But realities of modern warfare (and indeed of policing in violent situations) might justify the hypothesis that Alexander’s army produced its fair share of psychological casualties. Shell shock, war neurosis, Gulf War syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder presumably have an ancestry. After the stand- off at the Hyphasis Alexander had his men engage in a series of massacres (Arrian 6.6.3-6; 7.6; 8.3; 11.1), and again after the clash at Opis (Arr. 7.15.3). This was surely devised to brutalise the men again and re-establish a competitive model of the honour code and so counter the drift towards a more democratic group identity, where the men were more concerned to assert their own entitlement to respect as a mark of honour.1) Of course there are factors that would distinguish the experience of modern soldiers from the situation of troops in Alexander’s army: these would include dif- ferent models of conscription, training, and discipline, the distance between the men in action and those directing the hostilities, the alienation of society from the military action initiated by the government, and the problems of reintegrating into civil society after demobilisation. Nevertheless, as Roisman shows, following 1) I have developed this point in Honour in the Ranks of Alexander the Great’s Army, Acta Classica 53 (2010), 1-20. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2013 DOI: 10.1163/1568525X-12341457 886 De novis libris iudicia / J. Atkinson / Mnemosyne 66 (2013) 885-888 the sources, the Macedonians were not just being wilfully unruly: they were alien- ated from Alexander’s leadership style and orientalising policies. Furthermore, if we consider the situation from the viewpoint of the ordinary soldiers, we should assume that they were perfectly capable of doing their own risk calculations. Pressure against further advance increased from the time of Darius’ death, and was made clear at the Hyphasis. And most significantly after Alexan- der’s death his plans for further campaigns were quickly abandoned. Then the veterans’ perception of the futility of carrying on with Alexander’s expanded war aims might reasonably imply that they had already become disenchanted with Alexander’s open-ended plans. Again after the murder of Perdiccas they made it clear that they were opposed to continuing the invasion of Egypt. Thus I think a stronger case could be made for the line that the Macedonian veterans had become perfectly capable of weighing up the odds, and at Babylon had every good reason for communicating their opposition to more of the same. Indeed Roisman fairly comments that one should not deny the veterans “the motivation and the ability to think on behalf of the kingdom, beyond their basic needs.” (p. 83).2) On the period after Alexander’s death Roisman makes a good job of tracing the political history while analysing the shifting dynamics in the interplay between the different groups of Macedonian veterans. Thus, insofar as the slender source material allows, his book complements studies on the political history which focus more on the major role players (such as Bosworth, A.B. 2002. The Legacy of Alexander (Oxford)). So on the political contest between Eumenes and Peucestas in the period before the battle of Paraetacene Roisman necessarily covers the ground in simpler terms than does Bosworth, and on the banquet organised by Peucestas at Persepolis while Bosworth highlights Eumenes’ fury at being upstaged by Peucestas, Roisman stresses Peucestas’ care to symbolise by organising the Silver Shields in a circle that all were of equal honour, which again means a con- trast between the competitive, vertical concept of honour and in the case of the troops honour on the horizontal plane. In the non-material field Roisman finds as the key to this history the veterans’ attachment to the Macedonian tradition of monarchy, and their allegiance to the Argead royal house even if this meant pledging allegiance to the somehow chal- lenged Philip Arrhidaeus and Rhoxane’s infant son, which is implied in the odd references to Antipater and Antigonus in 320 having “the backing of the two kings” (146), and to Ptolemy as “securing the friendship of the kings” (106), and to Eumenes’ 2) Others have put it that the Macedonians had increasingly begun to act like mercenaries, as Anson put it (Anson, E.M. 1991. The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330-315 B.C.), Historia 40, 230-247, at 230). Roisman here duly notes Badian 1968, 200..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Royal Power, Law and Justice in Ancient Macedonia Joseph Roisman
    Royal Power, Law and Justice in Ancient Macedonia Joseph Roisman In his speech On the Crown Demosthenes often lionizes himself by suggesting that his actions and policy required him to overcome insurmountable obstacles. Thus he contrasts Athens’ weakness around 346 B.C.E. with Macedonia’s strength, and Philip’s II unlimited power with the more constrained and cumbersome decision-making process at home, before asserting that in spite of these difficulties he succeeded in forging later a large Greek coalition to confront Philip in the battle of Chaeronea (Dem.18.234–37). [F]irst, he (Philip) ruled in his own person as full sovereign over subservient people, which is the most important factor of all in waging war . he was flush with money, and he did whatever he wished. He did not announce his intentions in official decrees, did not deliberate in public, was not hauled into the courts by sycophants, was not prosecuted for moving illegal proposals, was not accountable to anyone. In short, he was ruler, commander, in control of everything.1 For his depiction of Philip’s authority Demosthenes looks less to Macedonia than to Athens, because what makes the king powerful in his speech is his freedom from democratic checks. Nevertheless, his observations on the Macedonian royal power is more informative and helpful than Aristotle’s references to it in his Politics, though modern historians tend to privilege the philosopher for what he says or even does not say on the subject. Aristotle’s seldom mentions Macedonian kings, and when he does it is for limited, exemplary purposes, lumping them with other kings who came to power through benefaction and public service, or who were assassinated by men they had insulted.2 Moreover, according to Aristotle, the extreme of tyranny is distinguished from ideal kingship (pambasilea) by the fact that tyranny is a government that is not called to account.
    [Show full text]
  • Alexander and the 'Defeat' of the Sogdianian Revolt
    Alexander the Great and the “Defeat” of the Sogdianian Revolt* Salvatore Vacante “A victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers” (W. Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing, Act I, Scene I) (i) At the beginning of 329,1 the flight of the satrap Bessus towards the northeastern borders of the former Persian Empire gave Alexander the Great the timely opportunity for the invasion of Sogdiana.2 This ancient region was located between the Oxus (present Amu-Darya) and Iaxartes (Syr-Darya) Rivers, where we now find the modern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, bordering on the South with ancient Bactria (present Afghanistan). According to literary sources, the Macedonians rapidly occupied this large area with its “capital” Maracanda3 and also built, along the Iaxartes, the famous Alexandria Eschate, “the Farthermost.”4 However, during the same year, the Sogdianian nobles Spitamenes and Catanes5 were able to create a coalition of Sogdianians, Bactrians and Scythians, who created serious problems for Macedonian power in the region, forcing Alexander to return for the winter of 329/8 to the largest city of Bactria, Zariaspa-Bactra.6 The chiefs of the revolt were those who had *An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conflict Archaeology Postgraduate Conference organized by the Centre for Battlefield Archaeology of the University of Glasgow on October 7th – 9th 2011. 1 Except where differently indicated, all the dates are BCE. 2 Arr. 3.28.10-29.6. 3 Arr. 3.30.6; Curt. 7.6.10: modern Samarkand. According to Curtius, the city was surrounded by long walls (70 stades, i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • The Antigonids and the Ruler Cult. Global and Local Perspectives?
    The Antigonids and the Ruler Cult Global and Local Perspectives? 1 Franca Landucci DOI – 10.7358/erga-2016-002-land AbsTRACT – Demetrius Poliorketes is considered by modern scholars the true founder of ruler cult. In particular the Athenians attributed him several divine honors between 307 and 290 BC. The ancient authors in general consider these honors in a negative perspec- tive, while offering words of appreciation about an ideal sovereignty intended as a glorious form of servitude and embodied in Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius Poliorketes’ son and heir. An analysis of the epigraphic evidences referring to this king leads to the conclusion that Antigonus Gonatas did not officially encourage the worship towards himself. KEYWORDS – Antigonids, Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius Poliorketes, Hellenism, ruler cult. Antigonidi, Antigono Gonata, culto del sovrano, Demetrio Poliorcete, ellenismo. Modern scholars consider Demetrius Poliorketes the true founder of ruler cult due to the impressively vast literary tradition on the divine honours bestowed upon this historical figure, especially by Athens, between the late fourth and the early third century BC 2. As evidenced also in modern bib- liography, these honours seem to climax in the celebration of Poliorketes as deus praesens in the well-known ithyphallus dedicated to him by the Athenians around 290 3. Documentation is however pervaded by a tone that is strongly hostile to the granting of such honours. Furthermore, despite the fact that it has been handed down to us through Roman Imperial writers like Diodorus, Plutarch and Athenaeus, the tradition reflects a tendency contemporary to the age of the Diadochi, since these same authors refer, often explicitly, to a 1 All dates are BC, unless otherwise stated.
    [Show full text]
  • The Successors: Alexander's Legacy
    The Successors: Alexander’s Legacy November 20-22, 2015 Committee Background Guide The Successors: Alexander’s Legacy 1 Table of Contents Committee Director Welcome Letter ...........................................................................................2 Summons to the Babylon Council ................................................................................................3 The History of Macedon and Alexander ......................................................................................4 The Rise of Macedon and the Reign of Philip II ..........................................................................4 The Persian Empire ......................................................................................................................5 The Wars of Alexander ................................................................................................................5 Alexander’s Plans and Death .......................................................................................................7 Key Topics ......................................................................................................................................8 Succession of the Throne .............................................................................................................8 Partition of the Satrapies ............................................................................................................10 Continuity and Governance ........................................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Imitation of Greatness: Alexander of Macedon and His Influence on Leading Romans
    Imitation of Greatness: Alexander of Macedon and His Influence on Leading Romans Thomas W Foster II, McNair Scholar The Pennsylvania State University Mark Munn, Ph.D Head, Department of Classics and Ancient Mediterranean Studies College of Liberal Arts The Pennsylvania State University Abstract This paper seeks to examine the relationship between greatness and imitation in antiquity. To do so, Alexander the Great will be compared with Romans Julius Caesar and Marcus Aurelius. The question this paper tries to answer concerns leading Romans and the idea of imitating Alexander the Great and how this affected their actions. It draws upon both ancient sources and modern scholarship. It differs from both ancient and modern attempts at comparison in distinct ways, however. This paper contains elements of the following: historiography, biography, military history, political science, character study, religion and socio-cultural traditions. Special attention has been given to the socio-cultural differences of the Greco-Roman world. Comparing multiple eras allows for the establishment of credible commonalities. These commonalities can then be applied to different eras up to and including the modern. Practically, these traits allow us to link these men of antiquity, both explicitly and implicitly. Beginning with Plutarch in the 1st/2nd century CE1, a long historical tradition of comparing great men was established. Plutarch chose to compare Alexander the Great to Julius Caesar. The reasons for such a comparison are quite obvious. Both men conquered swaths of land, changed the balance of power in the Mediterranean and caused many to either love them or plot to kill them. Scholars have assessed this comparison continuously.
    [Show full text]
  • Alexander the Not So Great William Baran Bill Ba
    ______________________________________________________________________________ Alexander the Not So Great William Baran Bill Baran, from Crystal Lake, Illinois, wrote "Alexander the Not So Great" during his senior year for Dr. Lee Patterson's Alexander the Great course in Fall 2015. He is currently a senior, majoring in history, and expects to graduate in May 2016. ______________________________________________________________________________ “It is perhaps Ptolemy who first coined the title ‘Great’ to describe Alexander, an epithet that has stayed with him to this day.”1 Whether or not this is true, somewhere along the way Alexander inherited the title “Great,” but is it one that he deserves? Alexander is responsible for expanding Macedonian territory significantly and it is something that he could not have accomplished alone. Since the backing of the army was crucial, why did some of Alexander’s generals not live past the life of Alexander? Although some of the generals and other army personnel inevitably died while in battle, others did not receive such a glorified death. Under Alexander’s rule numerous people in his army were murdered or died under suspicious circumstances. The death witnessed while Alexander ruled did not end there, because the army as a whole often suffered due to poor decision making on Alexander’s part. Whether direct or indirect Alexander ordered or caused the deaths of many because of anger, suspicion, or by poor choices. Alexander does not deserve the title “Great,” because of the deliberate killing under his command of both individuals and his army. Before embarking on the journey of tearing down Alexander’s title, it is important to understand the transition from Philip II to Alexander.
    [Show full text]
  • The Demise of Alexander Death of Alexander
    4/10/2012 21. The Successors of Alexander’s Empire Diadochoi Seleucus I (Nikator) Ptolemy I (Soter) Perdiccas Antigonus Monophthalmus Partition at Triparadeisos (320) Battle of Ipsus (301) First Syrian War 275 BCE (5 all together) Ptolemaic Kingdom Seleucia (before and after Ipsus) Antigonid Kingdom Kingdom of Pergamon Parthia The Demise of Alexander Death of Alexander "... the motive in almost every heart was grief and a sort of helpless bewilderment at the thought of losing their king. Lying speechless as the men filed by, he yet struggled to raise his head, and in his eyes there was a look of recognition for each individual as he passed... Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, VII. 27. 1 4/10/2012 The Death of Alexander 11 June 323 BCE Over next week Alexander’s health rapidly declined • At one moment, he was so desperate that he gave his ring to Perdiccas and when asked to whom the ring should be given, some believe he replied: – “tôi Kraterôi” (To Krateros) or – “tôi kratistôi” (to the strongest). Difficulty in choosing a Successor Macedonian army command leant itself to selecting a leader—but … Many potential top candidates were dead or incapable: • Clitus-killed in drunken rage • Parmenion-executed • Hephaestion-died of fever (malaria) • Philip III (younger brother)-mentally deficient • Alexander IV (son with Roxanne)-too young Perdiccas took overall command and came to agreement with other generals – would act as regent for Philip III and Alex IV 2 4/10/2012 Alexander’s Generals Seleucus I Ptolemy page under helped
    [Show full text]
  • Death of Cleitus
    Death of Cleitus 1993 (iii) (a) Give a brief account of the circumstances leading to the death of Cleitus in 328 B.C What was Alexander's reaction to the killing? (50) 1999 (a) Briefly describe how Cleitus met his death at the hands of Alexander, and how Alexander behaved afterwards. (b) What does this event tell us of the atmosphere among the officers of Alexander’s inner circle at that time? (c) Whom would you consider more to blame: Alexander or Cleitus? (50) 2003 In the space of a few years Alexander was responsible for the deaths of a number of senior figures including Parmenio, Philotas, Cleitus and Callisthenses. What do these deaths tell us about Alexander, and also about the atmosphere in the Macedonian camp at this time? Candidates should treat these events in a general sense and should not give detailed accounts of the deaths. (50) 2008 1 (iv) (a) Outline the sequence of events which led to the death of Cleitus. (30) (b) How did the philosopher Anaxarchus help to relieve Alexander’s feeling of remorse after Cleitus’s death? (5) (c) Both Arrian and Plutarch make excuses for Alexander’s killing of Cleitus. What is your opinion of their attempts to excuse him? Support your answer with reference to the texts. (15) Arrian begins his account of the death of Cleitus, son of Dropides, and the effect it had on Alexander as follows: • The Macedonians held one day sacred to Dionysus and Alexander’s sacrificed to Dionysus on that day every year. • On this occasion Alexander was neglectful of Dionysus, but did offer sacrifice to the Dioscuri.
    [Show full text]
  • Tales of Philip II Under the Roman Empire
    Tales of Philip II under the Roman Empire: Aspects of Monarchy and Leadership in the Anecdotes, Apophthegmata , and Exempla of Philip II Michael Thomas James Welch BA (Hons. Class 1) M.Phil. A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Queensland in 2016 School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry P a g e 1 | 270 Abstract This thesis examines the role anecdotes, apophthegmata , and exempla play in the historiography of the Macedonian king Philip II in the Roman world - from the first century BCE to the fourth century CE. Most of the material examined comes from moral treatises, collections of tales and sayings, and military works by Greek and Latin authors such as Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Aelian, Polyaenus, Frontinus, and Stobaeus (supplemented with pertinent material from other authors). This approach will show that while many of the tales surely originate from the earlier Greek world and Hellenistic times, the use and manipulation of the majority of them and the presentation of Philip are the product of a world living under Roman political and cultural domination. This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one defines and discusses anecdotal material in the ancient world. Chapter two examines two emblematic ancient authors (Plutarch and Valerius Maximus) as case studies to demonstrate in detail the type of analysis required by all the authors of this study. Following this, the thesis then divides the material of our authors into four main areas of interest, particularly concerning Philip as a king and statesman. Therefore, chapter three examines Philip and justice.
    [Show full text]
  • Causes of the Rise in Violence in the Eastern Campaigns of Alexander the Great
    “Just Rage”: Causes of the Rise in Violence in the Eastern Campaigns of Alexander the Great _______________________________________ A Thesis presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _____________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts _____________________________________________________ by Jenna Rice MAY 2014 The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the thesis entitled “JUST RAGE”: CAUSES OF THE RISE IN VIOLENCE IN THE EASTERN CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT presented by Jenna Rice, a candidate for the degree of master of history, and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. Professor Ian Worthington Professor Lawrence Okamura Professor LeeAnn Whites Professor Michael Barnes τῷ πατρί, ὅς ἐμοί τ'ἐπίστευε καὶ ἐπεκέλευε ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee, Professors Worthington, Okamura, Whites, and Barnes, for the time they spent reading and considering my thesis during such a busy part of the semester. I received a number of thoughtful questions and suggestions of new methodologies which will prompt further research of my topic in the future. I am especially grateful to my advisor, Professor Worthington, for reading through and assessing many drafts of many chapters and for his willingness to discuss and debate the topic at length. I know that the advice I received throughout the editing process will serve me well in future research endeavors. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ iv INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 Chapter 1. THE GREEK RULES OF WAR ..............................................................................5 2. ALEXANDER IN PERSIA ...................................................................................22 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Immunogenicity of Capsid-Like Particle Vaccines in Combination with Different Adjuvants Using Different Routes of Administration
    Article The Immunogenicity of Capsid-Like Particle Vaccines in Combination with Different Adjuvants Using Different Routes of Administration Christoph M. Janitzek 1,2, Philip H. R. Carlsen 1,2, Susan Thrane 1,2, Vijansh M. Khanna 1,2, Virginie Jakob 3, Christophe Barnier-Quer 4, Nicolas Collin 4, Thor G. Theander 1,2, Ali Salanti 1,2, Morten A. Nielsen 1,2 and Adam F. Sander 1,2,* 1 Centre for Medical Parasitology, Department of Immunology and Microbiology, University of Copenhagen, 1165 København, Denmark; [email protected] (C.M.J.); [email protected] (P.H.R.C.); [email protected] (S.T.); [email protected] (V.M.K.); [email protected] (T.G.T.); [email protected] (A.S.); [email protected] (M.A.N.) 2 Department of Infectious Diseases, Copenhagen University Hospital, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark 3 Vaccine Formulation Institute, Plan-Les-Ouates, 1228 Geneva, Switzerland; [email protected] 4 Vaccine Formulation Laboratory, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; [email protected] (C.B.-Q.); [email protected] (N.C.) * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +45-30111529 Abstract: Capsid-like particle (CLP) displays can be used to enhance the immunogenicity of vaccine antigens, but a better understanding of how CLP vaccines are best formulated and delivered is needed. Citation: Janitzek, C.M.; Carlsen, This study compared the humoral immune responses in mice elicited against two different vaccine P.H.R.; Thrane, S.; Khanna, V.M.; antigens (a bacterial protein and a viral peptide) delivered on an AP205 CLP platform using six differ- Jakob, V.; Barnier-Quer, C.; Collin, N.; ent adjuvant formulations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Macedonian Patriot: the Diadoch Craterus Edward M
    The Macedonian Patriot: The Diadoch Craterus Edward M. Anson Much has been written concerning the man whom Alexander “honored most” (Plut. Alex. 47. 10) who was described as the king’s “most loyal follower” (Arr. Anab. 7. 12. 3), generally recognized as his closest companion after Hephaestion (Diod. 17. 114. 1-2), and among Alexander’s commanders “arguably the best” (Heckel 1992: 107), but who in the final analysis failed to become one of the major players in the aftermath of Alexander’s death. He has been termed “the right man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time” (Ashton 1993: 131); proclaimed that he “lacked that fine edge of ruthlessness necessary for supreme power” (Green 1990: 8). This paper will suggest that Craterus was not the victim of being in the wrong place at the critical time, caught between Macedonia and Babylon, nor did he lack the ability to be ruthless, but was in the final analysis a Macedonian patriot (as noted by Heckel 1992: 107), who was content to serve the royal family and his kingdom. As Plutarch (Alex. 47. 10) comments, Craterus was “king loving.” It was in defense of his king and country that Craterus could be quite ruthless. While Waldemar Heckel’s claim that the oft termed “Philotas Plot” against the life of Alexander was in reality a plot against the life of Philotas orchestrated by Craterus and others in part due to their personal ambitions (Heckel 1977: 9-21; 1992: 115-118; 2006: 27-33, 218-19), this is too strong an indictment of Craterus’ personal ruthlessness, but it is a clear example that the friend and Somaphylax was capable of savagery in defense of the crown.
    [Show full text]