Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective Author(S): Said Amir Arjomand Source: World Politics, Vol
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Trustees of Princeton University Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective Author(s): Said Amir Arjomand Source: World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Apr., 1986), pp. 383-414 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010199 . Accessed: 21/07/2011 19:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. 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Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to World Politics. http://www.jstor.org IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND* THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoreticalsignificance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusingon the political dy- namics of the radical change in Iran's societal structureof domination and the moral dynamics of reintegrationand collectiveaction that ac- company it. The political dynamicsof revolutionprimarily explain the collapse of the structureof domination,while the moral dynamics of revolutionunderlie its teleology-i.e., its directionand consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution,revo- lutionaryideology assumes primaryimportance. Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutionsoccur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structureof domination" to referto the prevalentsystem of authority.It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern revolutions,but it also includes other institutionsand corporateentities that have some measure of autonomous authorityin the religious, ju- diciary,or economic spheres. The most importantof these other insti- tutionsis usually the hierocracy i.e., the church or its equivalent. Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance.The dislocated groups and in- dividuals need to be reintegratedinto societal communityand may also demand inclusionin politicalsociety. The integrativesocial and political movementsthat arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributingfactor to the occurrenceof revolutions. The collapse of the societal structureof domination in revolutionsis caused by two sets of factors:the structure'sinternal weaknesses and vulnerabilities,and the concertedaction of the social groups and indi- viduals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the contextof the power struggle set in motion by the centralizationof the state. They * This paperwas completedat the Institutefor Advanced Study, Princeton, and has benefitedfrom the commentsof the fellowmembers of the Social SciencesSeminar for 1984-85.Of thecolleagues and friendswho have commented on earlierdrafts of this paper, I especiallywish to thankLewis Coser, Jack Goldstone, Juan Linz, and JamesRule. 384 WORLD POLITICS may also have moralmotives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocationand normativedisturbance. In addition,there may be othermotives, such as class interest.The degreeof cohesionand solidaritywithin each social groupis a primarydeterminant of its ca- pacityfor collectiveaction; the possibilityof successfulrevolutionary actionusually depends on the formationof coalitionsamong opposing socialgroups. All of the above factorsprovide important points of ref- erence for comparisonsregarding the causesand preconditionsof the IslamicRevolution in Iran. Revolutionscan and shouldbe comparedin termsnot onlyof their causes and preconditions,but also of theirconsequences. Those inte- grativesocial movements which successfully build on thepreconditions of social dislocationand moraldisorder to createrevolutionary move- mentsdo so byusing ideology as an instrument.The ideologiesthat set therevolutionary struggle in motionand are shapedin itscourse bridge the gap betweenthe causesand theconsequences of revolutions.They cannotaccount for the collapseof the societalstructure of domination to any significantdegree. On theother hand, the value-ideas that form theirnormative foundation, and are oftenprogressively defined and formulatedduring the revolutionary process, do shapethe political order installedby the revolutionto a significantextent. A comparativeanalysis of theteleology of theIslamic Revolution thus requiresa seriousand systematicanalysis of revolutionary ideologies. The modernpolitical myth of revolutionand the variousideologies onto whichit has been graftedin the past two centurieshave constituteda causal factorin motivatingrevolutionary opposition to the statusquo, but it would be a seriousmistake to stopthe analysis there. Ideologies are of primarytheoretical interest in thattheir constitutive value-ideas determinethe teleologies of therespective revolutions.' The natureand specificcontent of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologiestherefore supply the basic points of referencefor comparison withthe teleologyof the IslamicRevolution. These lattercomparisons enableus to assessthe distinctsignificance of Iran'sIslamic Revolution in worldhistory. I. THE CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY The emphasisof recentscholarship on the role of the state,its re- pressivecapacity, and its abilityto weatherserious crises has brought X The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintendedconsequences of rev- IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 385 out thefact that revolutions often owe theirsuccess more to theinternal breakdownand paralysisof thestate than to thepower of revolutionary groups.2It has beenargued that the decisive factor in theoccurrence of a revolutionis thefragility of the existing political system.3 Centralization of monarchicalstates reduces the degreeof pluralismin societyand increasesits political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world,monarchies are especiallyfragile and vulnerableto revolution becausepopular discontent can be focusedon a singleperson. De Tocque- ville,who consideredthat hatred of the Old Regimedominated all other passionsthroughout the French Revolution, also showedhow that hatred becamefatally focused on a singleperson, the king: "To see in him the commonenemy was the passionateagreement that grew."4 The same can be said aboutthe Shah, whose ouster was theone commondemand that broughttogether almost all of the disparatesections of Iranian society.Furthermore, the same propertyof the monarchicalsystem in Iran goes a long way towardexplaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarchand the Shah's counter-image. The typeof politicalregime we mightcall "neopatrimonial"is also characterizedby its fragility. In contrastto theideal-type of the absolutist statein whichthe king is the firstservant of the state,government is extremelypersonal in patrimonialstates. The chiefexecutive encourages divisionswithin the armyand the politicalelite in orderto rule. Such neopatrimonialstates are particularlysubject to collapseand ensuing revolutiononce the rulerbreaks down.5 The MexicanRevolution that was set in motionby the deathof PorfirioDiaz in I9II, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguanrevolutions, can be citedin supportof this proposition.In his regime,the Shah combinedthe weaknessesof the neopatrimonialstates with the old vulnerabilitiesof monarchy.6He had painstakinglyconstructed the machinery of thestate around his person; therecan be no doubtthat the collapse of theman precededthe collapse of the machine.This collapsewas evidentin the Shah's pervasivewa- olutionsand confinethe pointsof comparisonto those consequences thatare prefiguredin the goals of the historicalactors who eventuallyappropriate the revolution. 2 Charles Tilly, From Mobilizationto Revolution(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,I978); Theda Skocpol,States and Social Revolution(London and New York: Cambridge University Press, I979); Ekkart Zimmermann,Political Violence,Crises and Revolution(Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, i983), 309-14. 3 Jean Baechler,Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, I975). 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, The EuropeanRevolution and Correspondencewith Gobineanu, ed. and trans.by JohnLukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, I959), 82, I09. 5 S. N. Eisenstadt,Revolution and the Transformationof Societies(New York: Free Press, I978); JackA. Goldstone,"The Comparativeand HistoricalStudy of Revolutions,"Annual