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Iran's Islamic in Comparative Perspective Author(s): Said Amir Arjomand Source: World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Apr., 1986), pp. 383-414 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010199 . Accessed: 21/07/2011 19:10

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http://www.jstor.org IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND*

THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoreticalsignificance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusingon the political dy- namics of the radical change in Iran's societal structureof domination and the moral dynamics of reintegrationand collectiveaction that ac- company it. The political dynamicsof revolutionprimarily explain the collapse of the structureof domination,while the moral dynamics of revolutionunderlie its teleology-i.e., its directionand consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution,revo- lutionaryideology assumes primaryimportance. Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutionsoccur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structureof domination" to referto the prevalentsystem of authority.It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern ,but it also includes other institutionsand corporateentities that have some measure of autonomous authorityin the religious, ju- diciary,or economic spheres. The most importantof these other insti- tutionsis usually the hierocracy i.e., the church or its equivalent. Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance.The dislocated groups and in- dividuals need to be reintegratedinto societal communityand may also demand inclusionin politicalsociety. The integrativesocial and political movementsthat arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributingfactor to the occurrenceof revolutions. The collapse of the societal structureof domination in revolutionsis caused by two sets of factors:the structure'sinternal weaknesses and vulnerabilities,and the concertedaction of the social groups and indi- viduals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the contextof the power struggle set in motion by the centralizationof the state. They

* This paperwas completedat the Institutefor Advanced Study, Princeton, and has benefitedfrom the commentsof the fellowmembers of the Social SciencesSeminar for 1984-85.Of thecolleagues and friendswho have commented on earlierdrafts of this paper, I especiallywish to thankLewis Coser, Jack Goldstone, Juan Linz, and JamesRule. 384 WORLD POLITICS may also have moralmotives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocationand normativedisturbance. In addition,there may be othermotives, such as class interest.The degreeof cohesionand solidaritywithin each social groupis a primarydeterminant of its ca- pacityfor collectiveaction; the possibilityof successfulrevolutionary actionusually depends on the formationof coalitionsamong opposing socialgroups. All of the above factorsprovide important points of ref- erence for comparisonsregarding the causesand preconditionsof the IslamicRevolution in Iran. Revolutionscan and shouldbe comparedin termsnot onlyof their causes and preconditions,but also of theirconsequences. Those inte- grativesocial movements which successfully build on thepreconditions of social dislocationand moraldisorder to createrevolutionary move- mentsdo so byusing ideology as an instrument.The ideologiesthat set therevolutionary struggle in motionand are shapedin itscourse bridge the gap betweenthe causesand theconsequences of revolutions.They cannotaccount for the collapseof the societalstructure of domination to any significantdegree. On theother hand, the value-ideas that form theirnormative foundation, and are oftenprogressively defined and formulatedduring the revolutionary process, do shapethe political order installedby the revolutionto a significantextent. A comparativeanalysis of theteleology of theIslamic Revolution thus requiresa seriousand systematicanalysis of revolutionary ideologies. The modernpolitical myth of revolutionand the variousideologies onto whichit has been graftedin the past two centurieshave constituteda causal factorin motivatingrevolutionary opposition to the statusquo, but it would be a seriousmistake to stopthe analysis there. Ideologies are of primarytheoretical interest in thattheir constitutive value-ideas determinethe teleologies of therespective revolutions.' The natureand specificcontent of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologiestherefore supply the basic points of referencefor comparison withthe teleologyof the IslamicRevolution. These lattercomparisons enableus to assessthe distinct significance of Iran'sIslamic Revolution in worldhistory.

I. THE CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY The emphasisof recentscholarship on the role of the state,its re- pressivecapacity, and its abilityto weatherserious crises has brought

X The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintendedconsequences of rev- IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 385 out thefact that revolutions often owe theirsuccess more to theinternal breakdownand paralysisof thestate than to thepower of revolutionary groups.2It has beenargued that the decisive factor in theoccurrence of a revolutionis thefragility of the existing political system.3 Centralization of monarchicalstates reduces the degreeof pluralismin societyand increasesits political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world,monarchies are especiallyfragile and vulnerableto revolution becausepopular discontent can be focusedon a singleperson. De Tocque- ville,who consideredthat hatred of the Old Regimedominated all other passionsthroughout the French Revolution, also showedhow that hatred becamefatally focused on a singleperson, the king: "To see in him the commonenemy was the passionateagreement that grew."4 The same can be said aboutthe Shah, whose ouster was theone commondemand that broughttogether almost all of the disparatesections of Iranian society.Furthermore, the same propertyof the monarchicalsystem in Iran goes a long way towardexplaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarchand the Shah's counter-image. The typeof politicalregime we mightcall "neopatrimonial"is also characterizedby its fragility. In contrastto theideal-type of the absolutist statein whichthe king is the firstservant of the state,government is extremelypersonal in patrimonialstates. The chiefexecutive encourages divisionswithin the armyand the politicalelite in orderto rule. Such neopatrimonialstates are particularlysubject to collapseand ensuing revolutiononce the rulerbreaks down.5 The MexicanRevolution that was set in motionby thedeath of PorfirioDiaz in I9II, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguanrevolutions, can be citedin supportof this proposition.In his regime,the Shah combinedthe weaknessesof the neopatrimonialstates with the old vulnerabilitiesof monarchy.6He had painstakinglyconstructed the machinery of thestate around his person; therecan be no doubtthat the collapse of theman precededthe collapse of the machine.This collapsewas evidentin the Shah's pervasivewa- olutionsand confinethe pointsof comparisonto those consequences thatare prefiguredin the goals of the historicalactors who eventuallyappropriate the revolution. 2 Charles Tilly, From Mobilizationto Revolution(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,I978); Theda Skocpol,States and Social Revolution(London and New York: Cambridge University Press, I979); Ekkart Zimmermann,Political Violence,Crises and Revolution(Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, i983), 309-14. 3 Jean Baechler,Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, I975). 4 Alexis de Tocqueville, The EuropeanRevolution and Correspondencewith Gobineanu, ed. and trans.by JohnLukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, I959), 82, I09. 5 S. N. Eisenstadt,Revolution and the Transformationof Societies(New York: Free Press, I978); JackA. Goldstone,"The Comparativeand HistoricalStudy of Revolutions,"Annual Review of Sociology8 (i982), i96-97. 6 The Shah was aware of these vulnerabilities,and, in I978, knowing he had cancer, began tryingto make the regimemore "democratic" for the succession of his son. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answerto History(New York: Stein & Day, i980). 386 WORLD POLITICS veringand indecision(for example, he could not make up his mind to appointa primeminister for the liberal,nationalist opposition until it was fartoo late),in hisinconsistent combination of rewardsand threats, and in his highlyinhibited use of force.7 The neopatrimonialcharacter of his statenotwithstanding, the Shah did have a disciplinedand well-equippedarmy and police force.He simplyrefused to use themeffectively to repress the revolutionary move- ment.The Shah pretendedto be usingthe army.He declaredmartial law in some citiesin late summerof I978 and installeda military governmentin November.But afterthe Black Fridaymassacre of Sep- tember8, I978, he had muffledthe army,to the outrage of his generals. This is reflectedin low casualties,about 250 in theSeptember 8 massacre, about 750 in Tehran in the followingfive months, and probablythree timesthis figure for the whole of Iran. On December2I, I978, thePrime Minister,General Azhari-after a mildheart attack and fromhis bed- complainedto the Americanambassador of the demoralizationof the armywhich he attributedto theShah's orders forbidding the troops to fireexcept in the air, no matterhow badlyabused or pressed."You mustknow thisand you musttell it to yourgovernment. This country is lostbecause the kingcannot make up his mind."8 Unlike the Czar's troopsin I9I7, the Shah's armyremained largely intactand loyaluntil he departedon Januaryi6, 1979. Khomeini'sleaflets were distributedamong the soldiers.There were instancesof fraterni- zation with the demonstratorsand of desertion;twelve officers were killed by threerebellious soldiers of the ImperialGuard; a mutiny occurredin Tabriz in December;and therewere a numberof other minorincidents. There was also persistenttrouble with paramilitary techniciansof theAir Force,known as theHomafaran. But overall,the strainof confrontation with the people did notseriously affect the morale and disciplineof the armed forces. It was onlyafter the Shah's departure thatthe processof disintegrationof the armyunder political pressure set in seriously.I do not wish to assertthat the use of the armyfor massiverepression would have preventedthe revolution. We will never knowwhat would have happenedif the Shah had orderedhis forcesto be brutallyrepressive in Octoberand NovemberI978, whenthey were notyet affected by the revolutionary turmoil. The armymight or might

7Ibid., i68-7I; William H. Sullivan,Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, i98i), i90; JerroldJ. Green, Revolutionin Iran: The Politicsof Countermobilization(New York: Praeger, i982), 92-I24. 8 Sullivan (fn.7), 2I2. The figuresfor Tehran are taken froma Master'sthesis for Tehran Universitysupervised by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf.I am gratefulto Dr. Ashraffor this information. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 387 not have disintegratedor split;the factremains that it had not dis- integratedby JanuaryI6, I979. And the opposition knew it.9 The army's officershad a strong sense of professionalidentity, but no attachmentto any particularsolidary social group or any organized interests.Furthermore, the Shah had carefullychosen his top generals to assure theycould not act in concertagainst him, and he had succeeded in that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not let them. They could not act against him, but neither could they act for themselves or any other group. In desperation,some of them finally made a deal with the clerical opposition.Tilly has correctlyemphasized the importance of coalitions linking revolutionarychallengers to the military.0Although the term coalition would be too strong,the agree- ment worked out by Bazargan and Beheshti throughthe mediation of the American ambassador with a number of the generals was of crucial importance in bringing about a split in the army and its consequent neutralizationin February I979." If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army was intact,despite the fact that there was no defeat in war, and despite the fact that the state faced no financialcrisis and no peasant insurrections, where does all this leave the usual generalizationsabout revolutions? Mostly in the pits. War has been called the midwife of revolution,and peasant insurrectionsare considered indispensable in many currently fashionable theoriesof revolution.12 The inferenceswe can draw from the case of Iran are as follows: financialand fiscal crises-or, for that matter,the extractivecapacity of the state and heavy taxation-are not necessaryfor the occurrenceof revolution.It is possible for the societal structureof domination to collapse without the participationof the peasantry; and a major war or defeat of the army are not necessary preconditions of revolution. I will show how a political order may collapse without any of these conditions.For now, let us merely note that the Cuban Revolution was an instance of a revolutionwithout a rebellion of the peasantryand withouta major defeat in war. Skocpol, whose theoryof revolutionputs a great deal of emphasis on both these allegedly necessaryconditions, cavalierly dismisses Cuba in half a foot- note. Furthermore,she does not face the theoreticalconsequences of the

9 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America'sTragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, i985), I42-43- '0Tilly (fn. 2), 20. *ISullivan (fn. 7), I99-247. 12 Skocpol (fn. 2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank,"Theories of Revolutionand RevolutionWithout Theory: The Case of Mexico," Theoryand Society7 (No. 3, I979), I53; Zimmermann(fn. 2), 3I5, 322, 336-42, 352-57. 388 WORLD POLITICS absence of these factorsin her subsequentarticle about the Iranian Revolution.She is rightlydetermined to bringthe state into the picture, but does so in an unsatisfactoryway, largely by deployinga new pet phrase,"the rentierstate." The basic idea is misleadingin that the "rentierstate" was actuallycreated by Reza Shah fromthe earlyI920S to I94I, when the revenue receivedby the statefrom the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in fact small-some IO to I5 percentof government revenue, and minuscule compared to the oil revenue in the I970s. She mustersa modicum of other plausible but ad hoc subsidiarythemes to account for the Iranian Revolution. However, Skocpol never faces up to the problemof reconcilingthe Iranian Revolutionwith her theoretical schema of I979.'3 One generalizationis borne out by the revolutionin Iran:'4 the Shah was seriouslycompromised by his close and subservientassociation with the United States, and the American militaryand economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization. The antiforeignmotive in challenging the legitimacyof the societal structureof domination findsparallels in the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban rev- olutions,and in East European .

B. THE STATE, THE HIEROCRACY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHI ITE IRAN It would be a mistake to equate the societal structureof domination with the state alone. For Max Weber, its major components were the state and the church. He defined the two institutionsof legitimateau- thorityanalogously, and took care to analyze the relationshipbetween the church and civil societywhen appropriate.'5This point is significant because the unique featureof Iran's Islamic Revolution is that it is a crucial stage in the conflictbetween hierocracyand state,while at the same time being a modern political revolution.It is a composite of two phenomena whose counterpartsin Western historyare separated by centuries.The absolutiststates of had alreadywon the protracted contestwith the Roman Church beforethe coming of the early modern European revolutions.'6In the historyof Iran, the analogous contest

Skocpol (fn. 2), 3i8, n. 2; Theda Skocpol, "RentierState and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution,"Theory and Societyii (No. 3, i982), 265-304. On the Cuban Revolution,see JohnDunn, ModernRevolutions: An Introductionto the Analysisof a Political Phenomenon (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, I972), chap. 8. ' Samuel P. Huntington,Political Orderin ChangingSocieties (New Haven: Yale Uni- versityPress, i968), 304-o6. '5 Weber,Economy and Society(2 vols.),ed. byGuenther Roth and Claus Wittich(Berkeley: Universityof California Press, I978), I, pp. 54-56 and II, chap. I5. i6 Otto Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective,"in Reinhard Bendix and others, IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 389 betweenthe stateand thehierocracy occurred much later. Shi'ism was declared the state religionof Iran in I50I, but the hierocracyremained heteronomousand subordinateto the statefor a long time,consolidating its power and autonomy only at the end of the i8th and the beginning of the i9th century.The curtailmentof the power of the hierocracyand the appropriationof many of its prerogativesand functionsby the state took place in the 20th century.The Shi'ite religious authoritieswere and remained doctrinallyand institutionallyindependent of the state, however: they retained theirautonomous religious authorityas well as their control over appreciable resources independent of the state bu- reaucracy.'7 The Western revolutionswere directedagainst stateand church. The church had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and dis- established by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, it was an integral part of the monarchical regime. In the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the entire beleaguered Shi'ite hierocracyrose against the state. (This was partlydue to the Shah's fatefulineptitude in not splittingthe Shi'ite hierocracyin time; thereis now evidence that some of the grand ayatollahs were ready for a compromiseby the summer of I978, and a split did in fact occur afterthe revolution.) For analytical reasons, too, it is importantto conceive of the societal structureof dominationin more inclusiveterms. Revolutionary situations occur because of the disintegrationof central authority.With the dis- integrationof the authorityof the state,other elements of the societal structureof domination assume greater importance.Corporations and individuals with authorityin other spheres of life can extend their authorityto the political sphere and assume positionsof leadership. In such situations,they emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. The hierocracyand men of religioncan use theirtraditional authority in this fashion,and have often done so-for instance,in Spanish history.'8In

eds., State and Society:A Reader in ComparativePolitical Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, i968); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociologyof the State (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, i983), 63, IIo-II. ' Said A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and theHidden Imam: Religion,Political Order, and SocietalChange in Shi'iteIran from the Beginning to i890 (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, i984). i8 We encounterthis kind of situationin rebellionsin Castile in I520, where Franciscan and Dominican monks figuredprominently among the leaders of the Comuneros. Sim- ilarly,as the presidentof the Catalan Diputacio, the priestPau Claris assumed the leading position in the rebellion of the summer of i640. When the Spanish people rose against Napoleon in i8o8 withoutany king or government,they were led by the church-priests and monks. See Gerald Brenan,The SpanishLabyrinth: An Accountof the Social and Political Backgroundof the (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, I943), 42; Perez Zagorin, Rebelsand Rulers,I500-i66o (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versityPress, i982), I, pp. 266-67. 390 WORLD POLITICS Iran, manyof the high-rankingmembers of the Shi'itehierocracy led the popularopposition to themonarch during the ConstitutionalRev- olution of 1905-I906. In I978, many groups and individualswho wanted the Shah out but had no interestwhatsoever in a theocracyaccepted AyatollahKhomeini's leadership. The centralizationof the statenecessitates the concentrationof eco- nomic,coercive, and symbolicresources. It entailsencroachments upon local and provincialprivileges as well as fiscaland constitutionalim- munities;and it entailsthe dispossessionof certainprivileged social groups.It thussets in motionan intenseand continuouspolitical struggle. The reactionof privilegedgroups and of autonomouscenters of power againstthe expansionand centralizationof the stateis a major source of mostif not all of theearly modern European revolutions:'s the revolt of the Comunerosof the citiesof Castile againstCharles V in I520; the revoltof the Netherlandsin reactionto the centralizingpolicies of Philip II in the I560s; the FrenchCivil War of the i6th century;the revoltof theCatalans once Olivareshad consignedtheir "constitutions" to the devil,and of Portugalin i640; the earlyphase of the English Revolution;20and theFronde and thearistocratic pre-revolution of I787- I788 in France.2 In all thesecases, estates and corporationsreacted when theirautonomy and inheritedprivileges were threatenedby the state; and theyusually found men of religionas theirallies. The dispossessed or debt-riddennobility of theNetherlands, for instance, found allies in Calvinistpreachers and iconoclasts.22In theIran of the I970s, thepreach- ers and the chiefdispossessed solidary group capable of reactionwere the same group. Threemajor privileged social groups were victims of the centralization of the stateunder the Pahlavis.The firstconsisted of the tribalchiefs. The pacificationcampaigns of Reza Khan (laterto becomeReza Shah) in I92I-I925 brokethe power of thetribal chiefs and eliminatedmany of themphysically,23 even though resistance in themost peripheral areas suchas Luristancontinued until the early 193os. The land and property registrylaw of I922 convertedthe surviving tribal chiefs into big land-

19Eisenstadt (fn. 5); Baechler (fn. 3), I39; Goldstone (fn. 5), I94-95. 20 By i640, the English Crown had alienateda large segmentof the elite which included, notably,the proponentsof aristocraticconstitutionalism and the risinglocal landed gentry who resistedits increasinglystatist policies. See Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, I972), 30, 57, 92, I24. 21 De Tocqueville (fn. 4); Alfred Cobban, Aspectsof the FrenchRevolution (New York: Norton, I968); Zagorin (fn. i8). 22 Ibid., II, p. 94- 23 Richard Tapper, Introductionto The Conflictof Tribeand Statein Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, i983), 26-28. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 391 lords.24As such,they became members of the city-dwelling, landowning upper class, and, as individuals,many of them enteredthe Pahlavi politicalelite. The Shi'itehierocracy was nextto come underfierce attack by the centralizingPahlavi state. Under Reza Shah,the state deprived it of all its judiciaryfunctions, eliminated its prebendal,fiscal, and social priv- ileges,and greatlyreduced its control over education and overreligious endowments.In the faceof Reza Shah's determinationand severity,it did not reactin any significantfashion. Reza Shah had reachedan accommodationwith the class of big landlords,"the thousandfamilies," who predominatedin the Iranian parliament(Majlis) untili960. It was duringthe first-and onlygen- uine-stage of MohammadReza Shah's land reformin i962 and i963 that the landowning"thousand families," including the tribalchiefs, were liquidatedas a class.Once theMajlis was dissolved,the "feudal" landowningclass had no autonomousinstitutional basis and could not reactagainst its complete political and partialeconomic dispossession by thestate. Though manyof itsmembers retained large holdings of land and became mechanizedcommercial farmers, thus joiningthe petro- bourgeoisie,and thoughmany of them remained in thePahlavi political elite,the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was thepower basis of the landowningclass and accountedfor its prominencein the Majlis,had undoubtedlybeen destroyed.25 Relationsbetween the hierocracyand the monarchyhad improved afterthe resignationof Reza Shah-especially in the late I940S and I950s, when the monarchywas weak and the hierocracywas alarmed by the threatof communism.The stateresumed its aggressiveposture in the i96os and I970s, thistime encroaching upon thereligious sphere in the strictsense.26 In contrastto the landowningclass, the partially dispossessedShi'ite clerical estate did have an autonomousinstitutional basis.It could reactto theexpansion of the state,and eventuallydid. In thepolitical struggle set in motionby the centralization and mod-

24 Ann K.S. Lambton,Landlord and Peasantin Persia (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1953), chap. I5- 25 Ahmad Ashraf"Dehqanan, Zamin va Enqelab" [The Peasantry,Land and Revolution], in Kitab-eAgah (i982/I36), I, I I-I2; Eric Hooglund, Land and Revolutionin Iran, g60-oig80 (Austin: Universityof Texas Press, i982), 79, 8i; Ann K.S. Lambton,"Land and Revolution in Iran" (Review Article),Iranian Studies I7 (No. i, i984), 76-77. The destructionof the peasant-landlordrelationship was completed in the i960s, during the second and third phases of the reform,with the schemesfor division of land betweenpeasants and landlords. Though the redistributiveeffect of these phases was negligible,their sociopolitical effect in breaking the traditionallinks between peasantsand landlords was profound. 26 Said A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," Governmentand Op- positioni6 (Summer i98I), 293-3i6. 392 WORLD POLITICS ernizationof the state,the dispossessedsocial groups that retainan institutionalbasis forreacting against the expandingstate still need to createcoalitions with other social groups and classesif they are to succeed. In the early i96os, elementsfrom the hierocracy,the landlords,and the tribalchiefs made poorlycoordinated attempts to forgea coalition,but the separateuprisings of Khomeini'sfollowers and the Qashqa'i and BoyrAhmad tribes of Fars in i963 wereruthlessly suppressed.27 In I978, when an effectivecoalition did come intobeing, it carriedout a revo- lution. Because of theircommon hatred of the Shah, the revolutionaryco- alitionof I978 includedthe bulk of Iran'surban population. The peas- antrydid not playa rolein theIslamic Revolution, and neitherdid the industrialworking class. All othersegments of the populationactively opposed the Shah and acceptedKhomeini's revolutionary leadership. The two mostimportant coalition partners of the militantclerics con- sistedof thenew middleclass-government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia,and the white-collarworkers in the servicesector- and the traditionalbourgeoisie of thebazaar. The coalitionbetween the Shi'iteclerics and the new middle class was highlyunstable. It restedon fraudulentsilence on the partof the formerand on wishfulself-delusion on thepart of thelatter. It did not lastlong: having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no timein liquidating the Westernizedintelligentsia. The coalitionbetween the revolutionaryclerics and the traditional bourgeoisie,on the otherhand, rested on moretangible grievances on bothsides and on a moresolid historical basis. It hasbeen more enduring. It is the latestinstance of the allianceof the mosque and the bazaar, and resemblesthe allianceof the urbanbourgeoisie and the churchin the i ith and I2th centuriesin WesternChristendom. It was forgedin thelate I970s, underthe immediate impact of theShah's destruction of the seminariesin Mashad and his massiveantiprofiteering campaign againstthe bazaar merchantsand retailers.28 Whydid thenew middleclass lose out? Historycould havegone the otherway-as it did in the case of Nasser'stemporary coalition with the MuslimBrothers who had wide popularsupport and werein some waysmuch better organized than the mullahs. In 20th-centuryIran, the

27 Ann K.S. Lambton, The PersianLand Reform(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, i969), I02-I3; Tapper (fn. 23), 29. 28 According to Bakhash, 8,ooo shopkeeperswere jailed and as many as 250,000 fined during this campaign in I975 and I976. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs:Iran and the Islamic Revolution(New York: Basic Books, i984), I3. The last figureseems too high. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 393 centralizingstate had atomizedsociety to a considerabledegree. It had detachedthe tribal chiefs and dissolvedthe landowning class; and it had createdan intelligentsia,a bureaucratic class, a body of armyofficers and, lately,an industrial/entrepreneurialgroup; all of thesewere un- attachedto any solidarysocial community, be it a tribe,an estate,or a corporation.In partial contradistinctionto prerevolutionaryFrance, however,three elements of theold civilsociety had escapedthe atom- ization of Iranian society:the Shi'ite clericalestate; the bazaar and traditionalbourgeoisie; and urban communitiesin certainolder city quartersthat were dominatedby the previousgroup. To these,one shouldadd thenew urbancommunities created by chain migration from ruralareas and small townsinto the largercities. It is not surprising, then,that the atomizednew middleclass provedto be the proverbial Marxian"sack of potatoes"while the other solidary social groups in the coalitionwere capable of remarkably concerted political action, and soon tookover.29 The Shah had keptthe new middleclass under constant supervision by the secretpolice and had not allowed it to formassociations or to gain any politicalexperience. Moreover, its abilityto act was seriously impairedbecause the armyofficers were isolatedfrom the restof its elements.Thus, the politicalrepresentatives of the new middle class could not easilyform a coalitionwith the army, which was too closely identifiedwith the Shah and hisregime. They therefore decided to form a coalitionwith the Shi'itehierocracy. Accordingto Tilly,contenders who are in dangerof losing their place in a polityare especiallydisposed to "reactive"collective action. He rightlyobserves that for centuries the principal form of collectiveaction followeda "reactionary"pattern-i.e., it was "reactive"and "com- munal."Thanks to socialevolution, however, that is no longerthe case, and collectiveaction has becomepredominantly "proactive" in modern times.30This conceptualdistinction seems of dubiousvalue: a wholeset ofrevolutions analyzed in thispaper are both "reactive" and "proactive."

29 It is interestingto compare the heterogeneityand lack of cohesivenessof Iran's new middle class withthe same featuresassociated with its Western counterpart, which Gouldner erroneouslyportrays as a new class in the Marxian schema. Alvin Gouldner, The Futureof Intellectualsand the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury, I979). s Charles Tilly, "Revolutionsand CollectiveViolence" in Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, III: MacropoliticalTheory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,I975), 507-I0. It is highlyrevealing that the period identifiedby Tilly as markingthe transitionfrom traditional to modern formsof collectiveaction, the mid-igth century,coincided with theend of the classicage of revolutions.Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized in France, i845-i855," in William 0. Aydelotte,Allan G. Bogue, and Robert Fogel, eds., The Dimensionsof QuantitativeResearch in History(Princeton: Princeton Uni- versityPress, I972). 394 WORLD POLITICS In reality,collective action that Tilly had typifiedas "reactive"does not lose its importanceafter the middle of the i9th century;and it usually continuesto drawon communaltraditional solidarities. Whenever these communalsolidarities are class solidarities,they pertain not to rising but to decliningor threatenedsocial classes. The IslamicRevolution in Iran alertsus to the undeniableimportance of reactiveaction in the revolutionarymovements of thelast two centuries, including those that Marx took to be revolutionsof risingclasses. Fascinatingevidence for the importanceof reactiveaction and tra- ditionalcommunal solidarities in revolutionarymovements has recently come to light;it concernsthe very groups who inspiredMarx withthe theoryof revolutionthat has distortedour understandingof the phe- nomenonfor over a century.The mythof the middle class in theEnglish and theFrench Revolutions has longbeen exploded, notably by Hexter and Cobban.Trevor-Roper's characterization of theEnglish Revolution as the declining"mere gentry's" revolution of despaircontains an ele- mentof truth,but also much exaggeration.3'On the otherhand, we now know that the revolutionariesof I789 were not the capitalist bourgeoisie,32and thatthe revolutionaries of thefirst decades of the i9th centuryin Englandand of i848 werenot the industrialworking class. The Englishrevolutionary working class of thattime in factconsisted of the artisansand craftsmenwho werethreatened by capitalistindus- trializationand wereholding on to thememory of thegolden age of a communityof smallproducers based on mutualties and cooperation.33 A recentstudy of these "reactionary radicals," as one observercalls them, concludesthat "commitment to traditionalcultural values and imme- diatecommunal relations are crucialto many radical movements." Com- munal relationsare seen to be importantresources for mobilization as theyenable traditional communities to remainmobilized for a longtime and in the face of considerableprivation.34 Shopkeepers and artisans predominatedin theFrench insurrections ofthe i830S.35 The samegroup ofartisans reacting against industrial and proletarization,who

3' For an assessmentof Trevor-Roper'sidea, see J.H. Hexter,Reappraisals in History,2d ed. (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1979), 129-3I. 32 AlfredCobban, Social Interpretationsof theFrench Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, i964); JackA. Goldstone,"Reinterpreting the French Revolution,"Theory and Society13 (September I984). 33 Krishan Kumar, "Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-CenturyEngland: Theo- reticaland Comparative Perspectives,"European Journal of Sociology24 (No. I, 1983). 34Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: CommunityStrength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" AmericanJournal of Sociology88 (No. 5, i983), 886, 897, 908. 35 Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann(fn. 2), 374-75. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 395 drewtheir standards and idiomof protestfrom the past, constituted the backboneof the i848 revolutionsin France and Germany.In France, the journeymen'sbrotherhoods which perpetuated the traditionalcor- porateconsciousness and solidaritiesof theancien re'gime constituted the leadingrevolutionary element in i848. In Germany,artisan groups were prominentin therevolutionary movement of i848 whilethe proletariat was the mostquiescent of all socialentities.36 "Reactionaryradicals," concludes Calhoun, "have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacyin revolutions.But at thesame time, revolutions worthyof the name have neverbeen made withoutthem."37 With the IslamicRevolution, a groupof reactionaryradicals under the leadership of the custodiansof the Shi'itetradition have at last gainedsupremacy in what is theoreticallythe most interesting of modernrevolutions. Let us moveon to considersome movements that Marx did notstudy. First,there are the peasantrebellions. Generally speaking, the Islamic Revolutionhas this in commonwith peasantrebellions: it draws on corporatesolidarities and communaland kinshipties, and consequently has manyconservative and defensivefeatures.38 In Mexico,there was themassive peasant rebellion of i8io led byFather Hidalgo and Father Morelos,both parish priests.39 In Spain,the Carlists'aim in the i830s has been describedas the "restorationof 'monkishdemocracy' ": the clergyled theprosperous Basque and Aragoneseyeomanry in risingto defendtheir local autonomyand theirfueros against the centralizing policyof the Bourbongovernment.40 In the presentcentury, there was the revoltof Zapata in defenseof the local autonomyof traditional agrarian communitiesagainst the expandinghaciendas in Mexico. Thanksto thedevout Zapatistas (laws of 1915 and 1917)and to Cardenas (1934-1940), the Mexican Revolutionestablished the securityof the ejido-community-owned,inalienable individual or communalholdings in the villages.It should be added thatthe outcomeof the Mexican Revolutionwould have been much less secularist and moreconservative if the Cristeromovement, organized by priestsand lay Catholicsin reactionto theanticlerical policies of central government, with the motto 36 William H. Sewell, Jr.,Work and Revolutionin France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1980); BarringtonMoore, Injustice:The Social Basis of Obedienceand Revolt (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), I26, 127. 37Calhoun (fn-34), 911- 38 Georges Lefebvre,"La Revolutionfranqaise et les paysans[The French Revolutionand the peasants],in Etudes sur la Revolutionfranpaise (Presses Universitairesde France, 1954 [I933]), 250, 254; Tilly (fn. 30, 1975), 498; Zimmermann(fn. 2). 39Dunn (fn. 13), 52-53- 40 Brenan (fn. i8), 206-II, 213, note A. In the Second Carlist War (I870-1876), monks and priestsagain led the guerrillabands. 396 WORLD POLITICS

Viva CristoRey (Long live Christthe King), had succeededin 1927- I928.4' The perniciousidea thatfascism was a movementof thepetty bour- geois class has finallybeen laid to rest.42The pettybourgeoisie was somewhatoverrepresented in most fascistmovements, and it is un- doubtedlyoverrepresented in the Islamicmovement in Iran. But it is overrepresentedin all sortsof radicalmovements. We findthe "little people,"the "menus peuple," in thereligious riots in i6th-centuryFrance on bothsides.43 We findthem among the stormers of the Bastille44and, as we have just seen,we findthem among the i9th-centuryradicals who,for E. P. Thompson,made the English working class. Recent studies clearlyshow thatfascist parties were supportedby elementsfrom all social groups,but especiallythe dislocated,the dispossessed,and the declassed.What is more to the point(and not disputed)is that the leadershipof the fascistmovements came disproportionatelyfrom the declasse'and the dispossessed,from demobilized army officers, from displacedor unemployedbureaucrats (especially those dislocated by the redrawingof nationalboundaries), and fromthe occasional dispossessed aristocrat.The Nazis also did not failto tap the traditionalcommunal solidaritiesof the Protestantcountryside.45 Europeanfascism and the Islamicmovement in Iran are similarin thatthey were led bydispossessed elements. But there are twoimportant differences.First, the leaders were a heterogeneousgroup, whereas Khomeini'smilitant clerics form a homogeneoussolidary group. Second, thefascist leaders did nothave exclusive control over any cultural assets, and had to get theirideas wherethey could findthem. The Shi'ite hierocracyconsisted of thecustodians of a richreligious tradition. The consequencesof thesedifferences will becomeapparent presently.

4 Dunn (fn. I3), 49, 64-69; Franqois Chevalier, "The Ejido and Political Stabilityin Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., The Politicsof Conformityin Latin America(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, I967), i6i-69; Guenter Lewy, Religionand Revolution(Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1974), chap. i6; AlistairHennessy, "Fascism and Populism in Latin America," in Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism:A Reader'sGuide (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1976), 280. 42 Stein U. Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust,Who Werethe Fascists?Social Roots of European Fascism (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,i980); Richard F. Hamilton, Who Votedfor Hitler? (Princeton:Princeton University Press, I982). 43 Natalie Z. Davis, "Religious Riots in Sixteenth-CenturyFrance," Past and Present59 (1973), 85-86. 44George Rude, The Crowd in the FrenchRevolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), cited in Zimmermann(fn. 2), 387. 45Francis L. Carsten, "Interpretationsof Fascism," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 4i6-i9; Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective,"ibid., 38-39; Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing the Fascist Movements,"in Larsen and others(fn. 42), 764, 789; Miklos Lacko, "The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: The Arrow Cross," ibid., 395-96; Hamilton (fn. 42), esp. 444-55. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 397

C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL DISLOCATION We can now turnto thepreconditions of revolution-thesocial dis- locationand moraldisturbance that follow rapid social change. Let us beginwith normative disturbance at themost superficial level. The conspicuousconsumption on thepart of Iranian high society and the abundanceof nouveauxriches produced an acute sense of relative deprivationamong the new middle-classgovernment employees, white- collarworkers in theprivate sector, and schoolteachers.At times,there was theadded discomfortof absolutedeprivation, which resulted from an acutehousing shortage that was aggravatedby the influx of a sizable foreignwork force and Americanadvisers. In thiscontext, it would be validto speakof the widespread discontent of 1977-1978as a confirmationof Davies's J-curveof continuousrising expectationsand suddenfrustrations.46 Iran's GNP grewby 30.3 percent in 1973-1974and by a further42 percentin 1974-1975.Then came the economicdebacle-despite, or ratherbecause of, the massive unregulated inflowof oil revenue.Severe bottlenecks in skilledmanpower and in- frastructurehalted economic growth in 1976.47The problemwas more deep-rooted,however. What underlaythe widespreaddesire for revo- lutionarychange was a fundamentaldisorientation and anomiemore thana superficialand short-runfrustration of materialexpectation. As Durkheimhas pointedout, "crises of prosperity" generate disorientation by disturbingthe collectivenormative order.48 There can be no doubt about the tremendousconfusion and disordercreated by the massive inflowof petrodollars,just as therecan be littledoubt about similar confusionsin Nigeriaand Mexicotoday. The consequentsense of moral disorderand desirefor the reaffirmationof absolutestandards should notbe minimized.There was a widespreadcultural malaise throughout Iraniansociety, ranging from general confusion and disorientationon thepart of thenouveaux riches to sharplyfocused and intenserejection offoreign and antireligiouscultural influences on thepart of the mullahs and the merchantsof thebazaar. In Europe,the socialist and fascistmass movements were part of the extraordinarywave of masspolitical mobilization and nationalintegra- tionthat swept the continent in theearly decades of the20th century.49

46 JamesC. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution,"American Sociological Review 27 (No. i, I962). 47 RobertGraham, Iran: The Illusionof Power (London: Croom Helm, 1978). 48 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Studyin Sociology(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, I95I [1897]). 49Merkl (fn. 45), 760-62. 398 WORLD POLITICS It is easy to recognizethat these movements acted as vehiclesfor the integrationof the recentlymobilized masses into societalcommunity. But one should not forgetthat religious movements have oftenper- formedthe same functionin thepast. Politicalmobilization comes about as a resultof basic social change whichalso entailsconsiderable social dislocation. Social change displaces a largenumber of personsfrom the stratainto which they were born. These personsyearn for and demandinclusion in new formsof societal community.Religious movements and sectsare age-oldchannels for the reintegrationof such dislocatedindividuals. Political movements and partiesare the new channelsfor societalreintegration. The Islamic Revolutiondemonstrates that the old and thenew can combine. Urbanizationand theexpansion of highereducation in thetwo dec- ades precedingthe revolutionare the two dimensionsof rapid social change most relevantto the problem.Between 1956 and 1976,the urban populationof Iran increasedfrom 31 percentto 47 percent(from 6 to i6 million).Rural-urban migration accounts for a substantialproportion of this shift-over one-thirdfor the decade I966-1976, the rate being even higherfor Tehran. This decade also witnessedan unprecedented expansionof highereducation. The numberof personswith higher educationquadrupled (to about300,000) and theenrollment in univer- sitiesand professionalschools in Iran trebled(to about 150,000). These factorscontributed significantly to the rise of the Islamic movement. Thousandsof religiousassociations spontaneously came into being in citiesand in universities,and acted as the mechanismfor the social integrationof a significantproportion of themigrants into the cities and of thefirst-generation university students.50 By contrast,the Shah's par- allel attemptto integratethese same groups into his one-partypolitical systemproved to be a fiasco. There is nothingnew about dislocated,uprooted men and women findingnew moorings in religiousassociations, sects, and revivalistmove- ments.In England,for instance, many "masterless" men became sectaries in the i6th and i7th centuries.5'As earlyas the 1570s, Presbyterian classes were attended by laymen, but it is in the i62os and i630s that Puritanlectureships took root in townsto an astonishingdegree, to the dismayof the Anglican Church. Laymen became patrons and paymasters of the Puritanlecturers, and the congregationsclustering around the latterbecame "models for ideological party organization."52 The situation

50 Arjomand (fn. 26). 5- ChristopherHill, The WorldTurned Upside Down (Harmondsworth,England: Penguin, 1975), 45-48. 52 Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 399 stronglyresembles the growth of layreligious associations in Iran in the i960s and especially the 1970s, where the mullahs preached-at firstin personbut later,when demand outstrippedsupply, through cassette players-to avid audiencesof urbanites.We findan evencloser parallel in therise of Methodism.In the i8thand earlyi9th centuries, migrants intothe new industrialtowns of Englandflocked to the assembliesof theMethodist preachers. Here, the perspective of integration into societal communitybrings out the sociological cogency of Halevy's famous thesis: the MethodistRevival integratedthe recentlyurbanized masses into societalcommunity and thusprevented a politicalrevolution in Eng- land.53 Fascism,too, acted as the vehicleof integrationof rural-urbanmi- grantsinto societal community. In Germany,for instance, "many of the new urbanitesfailed to completetheir cultural adjustment to citylife and insteadremained curiously vulnerable to theagrarian romanticism of vdlkischideologues."54 One-half of the top leaders were bornin largevillages.55 Literacyand Puritanismwent hand-in-hand. The sameis trueof the growthof Islamicscripturalism. Islamic fundamentalism spread in Ira- nian universitiesjust as Puritanismhad spreadat Oxfordand Cam- bridge.56Many of the Islamic activistsof the 1970s, who currentlyform thelay second stratum of the Islamic regime, discovered "the true Islam" in universityassociations, just as Cromwellwas rebornat Cambridge. Fascismspread at Europeanuniversities in a parallelfashion. In Eastern Europein particular,university students and youngactivists constituted thecore of thefascist parties and theirleadership. Rumanian fascism is of particularinterest in this respect.In the early i92os, its leaders, Codreanuand Mota,were founders of universityassociations for Chris- tian reformand nationalrevival in the universitiesof Iasi and Cluj, respectively.57 The combinationof highereducation and socialdislocation is of par- ticularimportance for explaining the politicization of integrativemove- ments.The key to the social compositionof Islamic and university

53 Elie Halevy, The Birthof Methodismin England, trans. and with an introductionby Bernard Semmel (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1971). 54Merkl (fn. 45), 757- 55Linz (fn-45), 50- 56 Stone (fn. 20), 96-97; Michael Walzer, The Revolutionsof the Saints: A Study in the Originsof RadicalPolitics (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, i965), 140-43. 57 Hugh Seton-Watson,The East EuropeanRevolution, 3d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1956), 44; Carsten (fn. 45), 418; Linz (fn. 45), 48-50; JuanJ. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), i67; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historicaland Sociological Perspectiveon the , the Fascist Movementof Romania," ibid., 385- 87. 400 WORLD POLITICS

activistsof the 1970s is thatthey either moved from small towns to big citiesto go to universities,or theywere the firstgeneration from tra- ditionallower middle-class backgrounds to attenduniversities, or both.58 These youngmen contributedto therevolutionary politicization of the Islamic revival of the i96os and 1970s in the same way in which the educatedcountry gentlemen in Englandhad contributedto the revo- lutionarypoliticization of Puritanism.The parallelwith Rumanian fas- cismis evenmore striking. As thelast Iron Guard leader,Sima, put it, "in I926-27, our universitieswere flooded by a bigwave of young people of peasant origin ... who brought with them a robust national con- sciousnessand werethus destroying the last strongholds of foreignspirit in our universities."~5According to EugenWeber, "legionary leadership came fromthe provincial,only just urbanizedintelligentsia: sons or grandsonsof peasants,schoolteachers, and priests."6o Max Weber once remarkedthat with the adventof modernmass politics,the condition of clericaldomination itself changes. "Hierocracy has no choicebut to establisha partyorganization and to use demagogic means,just like all otherparties."6' Rapid urbanizationand the Shah's failureto integrateuprooted elements-especially the sociallymobile, newlyeducated elements-into his politicalsystem offered Khomeini and the corneredShi'ite hierocracyan unparalleledopportunity for creatinga politicizedrevolutionary mass movement.Using the organ- izationalnetwork of thelay religious associations and Islamicuniversity students,the mullahs periodically organized the massive anti-Shah dem- onstrationsand closuresof the bazaar whichamounted to a general strikeof unprecedented duration. Perhaps they could even have brought down a strongerregime; we will neverknow. What is certainis that theclerically led generalstrike did bringdown the fragile Pahlavi regime and its vacillatingruler.

D. THE POLITICAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF THE SUPPORTERS OF

REVOLUTION AND THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS INTEREST Politicalmotive may be definedas the motiveto retainor recover politicaland institutionalassets threatened or expropriated,and to gain politicalpower by membershipin, and maximally,control of, political society.On the negativeside, the moralmotive for supporting a revo-

58 Ahmad Ashrafand All Banuazizi, "State and Social Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution,"State, Culture and SocietyI (No. 3, 1985). 59Barbu (fn. 57), 392- 60 Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel,"Journal of ContemporaryHistory i (No. I, 1966), 107. 6, Max Weber (fn. I5)' II, p. 1195. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 401 lutionmay stem from the condemnation of a regimebecause it is unjust, becauseit is servileto foreignpowers, or becauseit is instrumentalin spreadingan alien cultureand underminingauthentic traditional cul- turaland religiousvalues. The moralcondemnation of the regimeas unjustmay, in turn,be due to its beingperceived as tyrannical,or it maybe due to a senseof relativedeprivation. On the positiveside, the moral motivefor supportingthe revolutionmay resultfrom the ac- ceptanceof the modernmyth of revolutionas a redemptivecollective act.Finally, class interest can act as a motivefor supporting the revolution ifthe economic interests of a class(so definedby virtue of theirposition in themode or systemof production) are protectedor furtheredthereby. With this schema,let us examinethe motivesthat can plausiblybe attributedto thesocial groups who supportedthe revolution against the Shah. Politicaland moralmotives are closelyintertwined in theattitude of Shi'itehierocracy. The primarymaterial interest of the clericalleaders was to regainthe prerogativesand functionsthey had lost as a result of the centralizationand modernizationof the state.This was trueof the leadingclerical militants who came fromtraditional urban back- grounds,were in theirforties or fiftiesat the timeof the revolution, and had a keenawareness of thedispossessions of theShi'ite hierocracy by the Pahlavi state.The youngermilitant clerics, who were primarily drawnfrom humbler rural and small-townbackgrounds, saw all avenues of upwardsocial mobility for people in theirprofession blocked under thePahlavis.62 They expected an Islamicgovernment to guaranteethem rapidsocial ascent and fullincorporation into the politicalsystem. Both the clericalleaders and the militantseminarians were morally indignantat thespread of immorality,libertinism, and an alien culture under the Pahlavi regime.In a significantstatement, Khomeini's son identifiedthe conservativemembers of theShi'ite hierocracy who sup- portedthe revolution against the Shah as personswhose motivation was exclusivelymoral.63 The politicaland moralmotives are also entwinedfor the intensely politicizedlay Islamic activists.These first-generationprovincial and lower middle-classuniversity students and graduates,mostly in the appliedsciences and engineering,saw themselvesbarred from the Wes- ternizedupper echelons of society and highgovernment positions. They,

62 Michael M.J. Fischer,Iran: From ReligiousDispute to Revolution(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, i980). 63 Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian,"Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution,"Middle East Researchand InformationProject 87 (May i980), 26. 402 WORLD POLITICS too, were motivatedby the desire to removethese barriersto their upwardsocial mobility. It wouldbe absurdto attributeany class interest to this young"petty bourgeois" group otherthan the desire to gain power and entryinto the politicalsystem, to move up on the social ladder,and to put an end to a culturalclimate they found alien and resenteddeeply. The motivesof the new middleclass were both political and moral. Many of its members-includingthe recentlymobilized middle-class women who figuredprominently in the anti-Shahdemonstrations- wantedinclusion in the politicalsociety. They consideredthe Pahlavi regimetyrannical and unjust,and acceptedthe mythof revolution.It should be noted,however, that the potencyof the politicalmyth of revolutioncaused the new middleclass, especially the women,to join theIslamic revolutionary movement against their class interests-indeed suicidally.64 The traditionalbourgeoisie-the merchants of the bazaar, the petty bourgeoisieof distributivetrades, and the craftsmenof the bazaar guilds-was theone socialgroup for which class interest was theprimary motivefor overthrowing the Shah. These groupsfelt threatened by the developmentaleconomic policies of the state which, among other things, excludedthem from easy access to credit;they also fearedthe encroach- mentof themodern sector of theeconomy on theirterritory in theform of competingmachine-made goods and new distributivenetworks of supermarketsand chain stores.To thismotivating class interestwas added a senseof relativedeprivation caused by the tremendousgains made by court-connectedindustrialists, as well as considerablemoral indignationcaused by the disregard of Islam and traditionalvalues under foreigncultural influence.

II. THE TELEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

A. MORAL RIGORISM AND THE SEARCH FOR CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY The fact that integrativesocial movementsare reactionsto social dislocationand normativedisorder explains the salience of theirsearch forcultural authenticity and theirmoral rigorism.

64 It was neitherthe firstnor the last time thata social class participatedin a revolution which did not furtherits interests.As BarringtonMoore has pointed out, peasants have oftenbeen the principalvictims of modernizationbrought about by communistgovernments they helped create by their participationin revolutionarymovements. See Moore, Social Originsof Dictatorshipand Democracy:Lord and Peasantin theMating of the Modern World (Boston:Beacon Press, 1966), 428-29; also see Zimmermann(fn. 2), 339-41, 356. Similarly, the outcome of the French Revolutionwas not especiallyfavorable to thepetite bourgeoisie, the sans-culottes,who most vigorouslyparticipated in it. Ibid., 387, 407. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 403 "Fascismwas a revolution,but one whichthought of itself in cultural, noteconomic terms."65 The sameis trueof the Islamic Revolution, which emphaticallysaw itselfin theseterms-even when not explicitlyso, as in the "Islamiccultural revolution" against Westernism and (Eastern) atheisticcommunism inaugurated with the closing of theuniversities in April i980. Sincethe revolution, Iran's secular judiciary sytem has been systematicallyIslamicized, the Shi'ite Sacred Law has beencodified for thefirst time in history,and Islamicmorals and coverageof womenare strictlyenforced by an especiallycreated official vigilante corps. Disorientedand dislocatedindividuals and groups cannotbe suc- cessfullyintegrated into a societalcommunity without the creationor "revitalization"of a moralorder.66 Walzer emphasizesthat Puritanism was primarilya "responseto the disorderof the transitionperiod."67 Ranulfhas correctlyunderscored the moral rigorismof and comparedit to Puritanism.68The intenseand repressivemoralism of the Islamicrevolutionaries in reactionto themoral laxity and disorder of PahlaviIran findsa strictparallel in Puritanmoralism in reactionto themoral laxity and sensualityof theRenaissance culture, and in Nazi moralismin reactionto thedecadence of theWeimar period. Further- more,the parochialrejection of cosmopolitanismis a commonfeature of the Islamic Revolutionand Nazism, and especiallyof EasternEu- ropean fascism.69The vehementre'jection of culturalWesternism in favor of revitalizedChristianity in Rumaniaand Hungaryfinds a counterpart in Khomeini's more systematicand successfuldetermination to extirpate Western cultural pollution by establishingan Islamic moral order.

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS The revolutionsof earlymodern Europe were made by men forwhom restorationwas the key word, and who "were obsessed by renovation- by the desire to returnto an old orderof society."The confusedteleology of these revolutions was marked by an absence of ideologyand by a corporateor national constitutionalism"which was mainly the preserve of the dominant social and vocational groups."7oIn the English Revo-

65 George L. Mosse, "The Genesis of Fascism,"Journal of ContemporaryHistory i (No. i, I 966), 22. 66 AnthonyF.C. Wallace, "RevitalizationMovements: Some Theoretical Considerations for theirComparative Study,"American Anthropologist 58 (April 1956). 67 Walzer (fn. 56), 313' 315- 68 Svend Ranulf,Moral Indignationand Middle Class Psychology(New York: Schocken, I964 [1938]). 69Eugen Weber, "Rumania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., The European Right:A HistoricalProfile (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, I965); Istvan Deak, "Hungary," ibid., 394; Barbu (fn. 57). 70 JohnElliott, "Revolution and Continuityin Early Modern Europe," Past and Present 42 (I969), 42-44, 48. 404 WORLD POLITICS lution,"with the nature, source, and groundsof politicallegitimacy all up forgrabs, there was almostinevitably a greateffusion of claimsto legitimacyon all sortsof grounds,old and new."7'Nevertheless, two elementspredominate in the teleologyof the EnglishRevolution: par- liamentarianism,and Puritanismand itsoffshoots. If theFrench Revolution instituted one thingfor all subsequentrev- olutions,it is the presenceof ideology.It gave birthto Jacobinismas the classicform of modernrevolutionary ideology. The ideas of con- stitutionalrepresentation and nationalsovereignty were coupled at the beginning.As the revolutionprogressed, however, the sourceof legit- imacydrifted from the representationof estatesto the symbolicem- bodimentof the will of the people.The claim to embodythe will of thenation as a singlehomogeneous entity could onlybe made through the manipulationof the maximalistlanguage of consensus.Presumed embodimentsof the will of the people becamethe sole and sufficient basis of legitimacy.During the periodof Jacobinascendancy, revolu- tionarylegitimacy triumphed; and withits triumph, revolutionary ide- ology"filled the entire sphere of power"and "becamecoextensive with governmentitself."72 The distillationof theJacobin experiment was the modernpolitical myth of revolution.Revolutionary legitimacy became an autonomousand self-sufficientcategory. In the i9th century,revolutions became "milestonesin humanity's inexorablemarch toward true freedom and trueuniversality."73 Len- inismcombined this conception of revolutionwith the Jacobin myth; it has becomethe justification for the seizure of powerby revolutionaries who proclaimthemselves in chargeof realizingthe next stage of socio- historicaldevelopment.74 With the consolidationof -Leninism in Russia,Leninist revolutionary ideology "obtained control over the interpretationof worldhistory."75 It is thiscontrol that is challengedby thefascist and theIslamic revolutionaries even while they are upholding, like theBolsheviks, the myth of revolutionas an act of redemptionand liberationof oppressedmasses and nations. Bothfascism and theIslamic revolutionary movement are latecomers to themodern international political scene. As such,they share a number of essentialfeatures. The foremostof theseis the appropriationof the

7 Hexter (fn. 31), 178. 72 Franqois Furet,Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. by Elborg Forster(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, i98i), esp. 29, 48-49, 70-74. 73Eugen Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution," in Carl J. Friedrich,ed., Revolution:Nomos VIII (New York: Atherton,I966), i26. 74Dunn (fn. 13), 8-I I. 75 Jules Monnerot,Sociology and Psychologyin Communism(Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 [1949]), 1 2. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 405 legitimatorypolitical myth of revolution.The Italianfascists boasted of their"revolutionary intransigence," and theNazis contrastedtheir rev- olution,the revolutionof theGerman volk, to the "subhumanrevolu- tion"of 1789.76 Similarly,Iran's revolutionariestake greatpride in the historicmission of the IslamicRevolution. "Economicswas indeedone of the least importantfascist consider- ations."77The same is trueof the IslamicRevolution. (Khomeini, re- spondingto complaintsabout the state of theeconomy, once remarked, "we did not make the IslamicRevolution so the Persianmelon would be cheap.")Furthermore, like the European fascists, the Islamic militants aim at integratingall classes,including the working class, into a national community.The fascistssubstituted "nation" for "class" and developed theconcept of "theproletarian nations." Class conflictwas thusreplaced by the conflictbetween nations, rich againstpoor. With the Islamic revolutionariesin Iran,we have an identicaltransposition of thetheme of exploitationof one classby anotherinto the exploitation of the "dis- inherited"(mustaz'af) nations by theimperialist ones.78 "The factthat fascism is a latecomer,"writes Linz, "helpsto explain, in part,the essentialanti-character of its ideologyand appeal." Fur- thermore,"it is paradoxicalthat for each, rejection there was also an incorporationof elementsof what theyrejected."79 Like fascism,the Islamic revolutionarymovement has offereda new synthesisof the politicalcreeds it has violentlyattacked. And, like the fascists, the Islamic militantsare againstdemocracy because they consider liberal democracy a foreignmodel thatprovides avenues for free expression of alien in- fluencesand ideas.(Also like thefascists, however, the Islamic militants would not necessarilyaccept the label of "antidemocratic.")8oSimilarly, bothgroups are antibourgeois,resenting the international cosmopolitan orientationof the new middleclass. Both movements are anti-Marxist- i.e.,anticommunist and antisocialist-whileappropriating the ideas and certainlythe slogansof social justiceand equality.The Islamic revo- lutionarymovement has theconsiderable advantage over fascism, how- ever,of combining this "anti-character" with strong traditionalism. Here

76 Ernst Nolte, ThreeFaces of Fascism (New York: New American Library, 1969), 281; Baechler (fn. 3), IO, n. 15. 77Mosse (fn. 65), 21. 78 Linz (fn.45), i6. Once theattempt to exportthe Islamic Revolution,temporarily checked by the setback in the Iran-Iraq war, is resumed fully,one may expect furtherresonances of the Italian fascistideas of "an imperialismof the poor" and "proletarianimperialism." Zeev- Sternhell,"Fascist Ideology," in Laqueur (fn.4i), 334-35; JosephBaglieri, " and the Crisis of Liberal Hegemony: i9oi-I922," in Larsen (fn. 42), 322-23. 79Linz (fn. 45), 5- 8o Ibid., .2-:2 i. 406 WORLD POLITICS we can see the consequenceof the factthat the dispossessed leaders of the Islamic Revolutionwere not a heterogenousbut a homogeneous solidarygroup and, furthermore,one thatguarded the Shi'ite religious tradition.In contrastto theNazi "Revolutionof Nihilism"(and to the strikinglack of referenceto Japan'sown intellectualtradition in the writingsof the leadersof thefascist New OrderMovement of the late I930s),8"the Islamic Revolutioncombines the rejectionof otheralien politicalideologies with a vigorousaffirmation of the Islamicreligious and culturaltradition. I have therefore characterized itas "revolutionary traditionalism."82 In additionto theircommon anti-character and otherincidental fea- tures,fascism and the Islamic revolutionarymovements both have a distinctconstitutive core. and anti-Semitismwere the most ob- noxiousfeatures of Europeanfascism, but, as Mosse and othershave convincinglyshown, not its core component.The constitutivecore of fascismthat goes beyondEuropean fascism and continuesto live in a varietyof formsas a vigorousideological force in thethird world is the combinationof nationalismand .As George Valois put it in 1925, "+ socialism= fascism."The marriageof nation- alismand socialismwas in thecards after World War 1.83This factby fartranscends the particular conditions of any dispossessed stratum, any Europeancountry, or, for that matter, of interwar Europe. It was arrived at bydifferent fascist leaders in differentEuropean countries, and it has been arrivedat independentlyby manythird-world ideologues since I945. An enduringfeature of fascistideology has been itsinsistence on the realityof the nationand the artificialityof class. To the emotionally unattractiveidea of perpetualclass struggle,the French fascist thinker MarcelDeat contraststhe appeal of belonging to a communityuntainted by divisiveconflict and fragmentation:"The total man in the total society,with no clashes,no prostration,no anarchy."84The Arab na- tionalistthinkers sought to utilizethe appeal of belongingto a com- munityby similarlyreplacing class by nation.The advocatesof Islamic ideologyonly needed to take one stepfurther to replacethe nationby theumma, the Muslimcommunity of believers. Thus, the emergenceof an Islamicrevolutionary ideology has been

8' William M. Fletcher,The Searchfor a :Intellectuals and Fascismin Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, i982). 82 Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalismin Twentieth-CenturyIran," in Arjomand, From Nationalismto RevolutionaryIslam (London: Macmillan, and Albany: SUNY Press, i984). 83 Sternhell(fn. 78), 320-2I, 326, 335-37- 84 Quoted, ibid., 335, 347- IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 407 in thecards since the fascist era. It has beenin thecards irrespective of the plightof the dispossessedShi'ite clerical estate in Iran. The latter did have theadvantage of institutionalautonomy and of independence in theexercise of religiousauthority, something the Sunni Islamic ideo- logues like Rashid Rida could onlydream of. But it was exceedingly slow in creatinga consistentideology in orderto defenditself against thestate. In fact,the Islamic ideology was developedelsewhere, by pub- licistsand journalistslike Mawdudi (d. I979) in Indo-Pakistanand Qutb (d. i966) in Egypt.Its essenceconsisted in presentingthe secularstate as an earthlyidol claimingthe majesty that is God's alone.When Kho- meinifinally rose againstthe Shah, he importedthe Islamic ideology fromPakistan and Egyptas a freegood. In I926, in a work thatanticipates most of the ideologicaldevelop- mentsof the past two decades,the youthfulMawdudi had declared: "Islam is a revolutionaryideology and a revolutionarypractice, which aims at destroyingthe socialorder of the worldtotally and rebuilding it fromscratch ... andjihad (holywar) denotesthe revolutionary strug- gle." Mawdudiconceived the modern world as thearena of the "conflict betweenIslam and un-Islam,"the latter being equated with pre-Islamic Ignorance(jahiliyya) and polytheism.Modern creeds and politicalphi- losophieswere equated with polytheism and Ignorance.Their predom- inancenecessitated the revival of Islam. A fewdecades later, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb adopted the contrastbetween Islam and un-Islam- conceivedas Ignorance-fromMawdudi and made it the cornerstone of his revolutionaryIslamic ideology. For acceptingsecular states, con- temporaryMuslim societies are brandedas societiesof Ignorance.To extirpateIgnorance from these societies, an Islamicgovernment has to be establishedand the Sacred Law applied. To establishan Islamic government-thatis, to establishthe rule of God-Islamic revolution is necessary.85 The distinctivelyclericalist Shi'ite idea of Islamicgovernment, to be realizedafter the revolution of I979, was not directlyinfluenced by the trendin SunniIslam. It is bestunderstood in thecontext of thestruggle betweenthe Shi'ite hierocracy and thecentralizing monarchy discussed earlier.Though a noveltyin Shi'itehistory, Khomeini's idea of Islamic government,first put forwardin i970, was statedin the traditional Shi'ite frameof referenceand does not betrayany influenceof the

85 Abu'l-A'la' Mawdudi, Processof Islamic Revolution(Pathankot, Punjab: Makteb-e Ja- maat-e Islami, 1947); Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam," Middle EasternStudies I7 (October i981), 500; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justificationfor Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," The Middle East Journal37 (No. i, i983). 408 WORLD POLITICS ideologicalinnovations of Mawdudi and Qutb. It simplyextended the generaljudiciary authority of the jurist(faqih), as well as some of his veryspecific rights of gerency,to includethe rightto rule.86 Nevertheless,Mawdudi and Qutb wereread avidly, in Persiantrans- lationand/or in Arabic,by Khomeini's militant followers, who adopted thefundamental revolutionary idea thatobedience to theimpious secular state-in thiscase the Shah's-was tantamountto idolatry.The cen- tralityof this idea is unmistakablein the revolutionaryslogans and pamphleteering,most notably in theapplication of theterm taghut (un- godly earthlypower) to the Pahlavi politicalorder. Its influencehas becomemore pronouncedsince the eliminationof the moderatesand Islamicmodernists in i980-i98i, and is easilynoticeable in thespeeches of the politicalelite of the IslamicRepublic of Iran. Furthermore,Ay- atollahSafi has no difficultywhatsoever in combiningthe advantages of the ideologiesof Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalistideas of Khomeini.For him,the government of the jurist on behalfof the Hidden Imam is the truegovernment of God on Earth,vowed to the imple- mentationof His Law. All otherpolitical regimes are ungodlyorders, regimesof Ignorance and oftaghut. The IslamicRevolution will continue untilthe overthrowof all theseregimes.87

C. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM, AND THE TELEOLOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF PROGRESS The Islamic Revolutionin Iran should draw our attentionto the neglectedimportance of reactiveand reactionaryelements in all revo- lutions.The ideologyof proletarian revolution, as Mannheimhas shown, incorporatedmany of theelements of the romantic, reactionary critique of the Enlightenment.88On the otherhand, Nazism, as bothits ideo- loguesand itshistorians (notably Bracher) have insisted,contained rev- olutionaryas well as reactionaryelements.89 The Islamic Revolutionconstitutes a wry commenton the debate amonghistorians as to whetherthe early modern European revolutions were conservativeor liberal,reactionary or progressive.It also dem- onstratesthat revolutionaries often act in defenseof traditionalvalues. Baechleris rightwhen he notes,"contrary to appearancesand accepted

86 Said A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Arjomand, Authorityand Political Culturein Shi'ism(forthcoming, i987). 87Lotfollah Safi, Nezam-e Emamat va Rahbari [Regime of Imamate and Leadership] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Be'that, i982/I36i), i6-i8. 88 Karl Mannheim, "ConservativeThought," in Essayson Sociologyand Psychology(Lon- don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, I953). 89 Karl D. Bracher, The GermanDictatorship (New York: Praeger, I970), 7-I3; Carsten (fn. 45), 428. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 409 belief,conservative revolutions are supportedless by the elite than by thepeople."90 Not surprisingly,some important teleological elements in the clericallyled popularuprisings such as Carlismand the Cristero movement'find resonance in theIslamic Revolution in Iran:repudiation of foreignand cosmopolitaninfluences and values,and vehementop- positionto anticlericalpolicies of modernizinggovernments, including, of course,. Marx's famous idea thatthe French revolutionaries parodiedthe Roman republicansbecause they had not yetdeveloped a politicallanguage of theirown shouldnot automatically be generalized. The revolutionarieswho draw on traditionalimagery can varygreatly in theirknowledge of and professionalidentification with tradition. The Ayatollahswere the official custodians of theShi'ite tradition and knew theirmethodology of Shi'itejurisprudence. In the past six years,they have provedthis by theirsustained efforts to IslamicizeIran's judiciary system,by institutionalizing substantial political functions for the Friday prayerleaders, and by presidingover the strictenforcement of Islamic morals. Islamicrevolutionary traditionalism does have its moderntrappings. The Constitutionof the Islamic Republicpays lip serviceto equality and especiallyto social justice,and it guaranteesfreedom of the press, ofthe expression of political opinion, of political gatherings and groups- provided,needless to say,that they are not contraryto the interestsof Islam. Finally,there is anothermodern element that is more than a trapping:the Majlis,or parliament.The constitutionalismof the early- modern European revolutionswas the idealizationof practice,and closelylinked to theaim of preserving local liberties. In Iran,even though constitutionalismentered as an importedpanacea in I905-i906, themul- lahs used the constitutionalistideology when opposing the Shah. Con- sequently,the MaJlisis an enduringfeature of the Islamicregime. Its legislation,however, is rigorouslysupervised by the clericaljurists of the Council of Guardians.In addition,both the rulingclerics and the lay Islamicsecond stratum of the regimehave a keen interestin tech- nology.They love broadcasting,being televised, and beinginterviewed bythe press, and theylove organizing seminars and congressesand using modern-soundingphrases such as "political-ideologicalbureaus." When thenotions of revolutionand progressare linked,as theywere in the i9th centuryand as theystill are today,a line can clearlybe drawnbetween revolution and counterrevolution.The evidenceoffered in thispaper makes it impossible to drawsuch a line.It has beenpointed

90 Baechler (fn. 3), io8. 91 Hennessy (fn. 41), 258. 410 WORLD POLITICS out thatall revolutionscontain counterrevolutionary elements. The ob- verseis also true:all counterrevolutionsmust incorporate revolutionary innovationsin orderto restorewhat they consider to be the traditional order.This is clearlythe case withIslamic revolutionary traditionalism in Iran. As I have argued elsewhere,it has in factbrought about a revolution within Shi'ism.92Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution has stimulatedconsiderable growth in the size of the state and the number of persons employed by it. One can legitimatelysee these factorsas the continuationof a trend in modernization.It is, however,best treatedas a universal trend making for continuitywith the past rather than as specificto the teleologyof this revolutionas distinctfrom others.

D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION Comparative evidence not only requires that we sever the conceptual link between revolution and progress,but also suggests that we link revolutionand religion. Religion was an importantfactor not only in the Puritan Revolution, but in all early-modernEuropean revolutions except the Fronde.93Walzer is rightin consideringthe Puritan Marian exiles of the I550s to be forerunnersof modern revolutionaryideo- logues.94But the same is true of the clericsof the Catholic League thirty years later.95In i640, the Puritan preacherswere calling the House of Commons God's chosen instrumentfor rebuildingZion.96 In the same year, their Catholic counterpartsin Catalonia were also engaged in revolutionaryactivity. Here is the commander of the Spanish king's forcesin Rossello complaining of the sedition and licentiousnessof the clergy: In the confessionaland the pulpitthey spend theirentire time rousing the people and offeringthe rebelsencouragement and advice,inducing the ignorantto believe that rebellionwill win them the kingdomof heaven.97 There are strikingparallels between the Puritan Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini as Abraham and Moses in one; forthe Puritan Saints,we have the militant mullahs; and for the fast sermons of I642-I649,98we had, under the

92Arjomand (fn. 86). 93 Zagorin (fn. i8), I, p. 74I. 94Walzer (fn. 56), 92-II3. 95Roland Mousnier,Social Hierarchies,I450 to the Present,trans. by Peter Evans (New York: Schocken, I973), 50, 6i; Zagorin (fn. i8), II, chap. io. 96 Stone (fn. 20), 90. 97 John Elliott, The Revolt of the Catalans: A Studyin the Decline of Spain (1598-i640) (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, i963), 487. 98 Hugh Trevor-Roper,"The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament,"in Trevor-Roper, Religion,the Reformationand Social Change,2d ed. (London: Macmillan, I972). IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 411 Shah,the gatheringsat forty-dayintervals to commemoratethe "mar- tyrs";after the revolution, we havethe Friday sermons at congregational prayers.Important differences, however, affect the teleologiesof these respectiverevolutions. There werestrong anarchic elements in Puritan- ism-especiallyIndependency, which considered itself the true Church withinthe corrupt church. Such anarchicinnerworldly millenarian pre- ceptsof the Independentsmilitated against their acceptance of a Pres- byteriannational church government. These preceptscould also lead in the directionof theLevellers' conception of man as a rationalbeing in theimage of God, and henceto naturalrights. The corporatesolidarism of the militantShi'ite clergy contrasts as stronglywith the factionalism of the PuritanSaints as methodologicallygrounded legalism contrasts withthe Saints' millenarian idea of Christas theLawgiver. Finally, the revolutionaryShi'ite clericalist theory of thesovereignty of the juristis in sharpcontrast to theidea ofcongregational representation-especially in Presbyterianism.99 The situationis differentwith regard to themodern revolutions; but let us see how. De Tocquevilleknew thatthe FrenchRevolution had produceda new religion.It aimed at nothingshort of a regenerationof thewhole human race.... It developed intoa speciesof religion, if a singularlyimperfect one, since it was without a God, withouta ritualor promiseof a futurelife. Nevertheless, this strangereligion has, like Islam,overrun the whole world with its apostles, militantsand martyrs.'00 The terms"secular religion" and "politicalreligion" have aptlybeen used to describecommunism and fascism.IoIModern revolutionsdo requirepolitical religions. The crucialissue is whetherthere is any necessaryincompatibility between religion and politicalreligion. The BolshevikRevolution was militantlyatheistic. But beforewe draw any conclusions,let us thinkof its totallyimported ideology and of the exceedinglynarrow social base of its politicalelite. What about theFrench Revolution? De Tocquevilledid notsee anyincompatibility betweenChristianity and the politicalreligion of the revolution.Anti- clericalismand the campaignagainst religion stemmed from the iden- tificationof theChurch with the ancien re'gime, and notfrom any wide-

99 Tai Liu, Discordin Zion: The PuritanDivines and thePuritan Revolution I640-I660 (The Hague: Nijhoff,I973), 50-5I, 94-97, I46-60; Zagorin (fn. i8), II, p. i66. tooAlexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regimeand theFrench Revolution, new trans.by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday Anchor, I955) I, I56. 1orMonnerot (fn. 75); Eric Voegelin,Science, Politics and Gnosticism:Two Essays(Chicago: Regnery Gateway, i968). It is interestingto note that in I949 Monnerot described com- munism as "the twentieth-centuryIslam." 412 WORLD POLITICS spreadanti-Christian sentiment.102 What about the fascistrevolution? European fascismwas oftenassociated with anticlericalism,but this associationis neithergeneral nor fundamental.The Nazis glorifiedthe mythicalpre-Christian German tradition and were anti-religious.The same is trueof otherfascist movements in Westernand NorthernEu- rope. At the otherend of the spectrum,however, the Rumanian,the Hungarian,the Slovak,and the Croationfascist movements were em- phaticallyChristian and aimed at establishingChristian corporatist states.103 Clerical leadershipand participationin the Slovak Republicestab- lishedby Father Hlinka's People's Party (presided over by Father Tiso) and in the Ustasha movementin Croatia offerinteresting points for comparisonwith Iran.104 But the mostilluminating parallel is between Shi'iterevolutionary traditionalism and theRumanian Iron Guards, the Legion of ArchangelMichael. Both movementsare characterizedby extraordinarycults of suffering,sacrifice, and martydom.Priests figured prominentlyin the legionarymovement, side by side with university students.Legionary meetings were invariably preceded by churchserv- ices,and theirdemonstrations were usually led bypriests carrying icons and religiousflags. The integralChristianity of the Legionariesdif- ferentiatedthem fromthe Nazis and the Italian Fascists.This they knew.As one oftheir leading intellectuals explained, "Fascism worships the state,Nazism the race and the nation.Our movementstrives not

102 It was "a spectacularbut transientphenomenon ... in no sense basic to its program." Therefore,the antireligiousfeatures faded as the true political teleologyof the revolution unfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. Ioo), 5-7. On the vitalityof religioussentiment among the insurgentmasses during the French Revolution,see AlbertSoboul, "Sentimentreligieux et cultes populaires pendantla revolution:Saintes patrioteset martyrsde la liberte"[Religious sentimentand popular cults during the revolution:patriotic saints and martyrsof liberty], Archivesde sociologicdes religionsi (No. 2, I956). ?3 These variationsbecome intelligiblein the lightof Linz's demonstrationthat the extent of organized preemptionof the politicalspace by Christian-democraticor Catholic-conser- vative parties was a decisive factorin inhibitingthe growth of fascism(as in Spain and Belgium). Where such partiesexisted and had carved up electoralterritories for themselves, fascism found a formidablerival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlericalin order to differentiateitself from the rival religiousparty (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-a-visthe Zentrum party).See Linz (fn. 45), i6-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), I56; Hamilton (fn. 45), 37-4I- Mexican fascism,the Sinarquismof the late I930s and early I940s, also fitsLinz's pattern. The movementdeclined when its middle-classsupporters defected to the Catholic Accion National. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280-82. Linz's account of cases in which fascismwas not anticlericalbut intenselyChristian is unsatisfactory,however; see Linz (fn.45), i6, and Linz (fn.57), 164, 184, n. 5i. The reverseside of Linz's argumentis well put by Merkl: "There is ample evidence that religiousdecline and confrontationsplayed a role in fascistdevel- opment .. ., creatinga massivereservoir of confusedquasi-religious fears and longingsopen to exploitationby fascistdemagogues." Merkl (fn. 45), 757. 104YeshayahuJelinek, "Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement,"in Larsen and others(fn. 42). IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 413 merelyto fulfillthe destiny of theRumanian people-we wantto fulfill italong the road to salvation."The ultimategoal ofthe nation, Codreanu and othersemphasized, was "resurrectionin Christ."105 Finally,we mustconsider Brazilian , the most important fascistmovement in Latin America.Its founder,Plinio Salgado, met Mussoliniin I930. The meetingmade a deep impressionon him,and he certainlysaw no incompatibilitybetween the fascist political religion and Catholicism.He returnedto Brazilto "Catholicize"Italian fascism. Taking advantageof an extensivenetwork of lay religiousassociations, whichhad been broughtinto existence by CardinalLeme, he founded the BrazilianIntegralist Action with the aim of creatinga corporatist, integraliststate. Integralism appealed to Catholicintellectuals because of itspromise of a "spiritualrevolution" and ofan IntegralState "which comesfrom Christ, is inspiredin Christ,acts for Christ, and goes toward Christ."Salgado accordinglycriticized the "dangerouspagan tendency of Hitlerism"and lamentedthe lack of a Christianbasis in Nazi ide- ology.106 Few wouldfind the statement that political revolutions are a modern formof millenarianismobjectionable. Russian communism was thesec- ular millenarianismof the Third Rome,and Nazism was the secular millenarianismof the Third Reich,"the Thousand Year Reich of na- tionalfreedom and socialjustice."107 As was the case withreligion and politicalreligion, political and religiousmillenarianism are byno means mutuallyexclusive. The religiouschiliastic element may predominate, as in the Taiping Rebellionwhich aimed at establishingthe Heavenly Kingdomof GreatPeace;"'8 or it mayplay an importantsubsidiary role, as in the PuritanRevolution in Englandand the IslamicRevolution in Iran. In thePuritan Revolution we encountertwo forms of millenarianism: the milder,more inner-worldly millenarianism of the Independentdi- vines,and thebetter known, activist one of themen of theFifth Mon-

'?5 E. Weber (fns.6o and 69); Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera,The GreenShirts and theOthers: A Historyof Fascism in Hungaryand Rumania (Stanford,CA: Hoover InstitutionPress, I970), 247, 266-70- io6Stanley Hilton, "Aca6 IntegralistaBrasileira: Fascism in , I932-I938," Luso- Brazilian Review 9 (No. 2, I972), i2; MargaretT. Williams, "Integralismand the Brazilian Catholic Church," Hispanic American Historical Review 54 (No. 3, I974), 436-40. In this typicalsearch for "a thirdway," Salgado also soughtto "Brazilianize" Italian fascism.He considered the two aspects of his project fullycompatible, and declared, "My nationalism is full of God." Ibid., 434-36. 107 Monnerot(fn. 75), chap. 3; Nicholai A. Berdiaev,The RussianRevolution (Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press, i96i); James M. Rhodes, The Hitler Movement:A Modern MillenarianRevolution (Stanford, CA: Hoover InstitutionPress, i980), 79. io8 Lewy (fn. 41), chap- 7- 414 WORLD POLITICS archy.There can be no doubtthat revolutionary political millenarianism playeda crucialrole in themotivation of the Iranianintelligentsia and othergroups. But in addition,the Shi'ite doctrine contains an important millenariantenet: the belief in theappearance of theTwelfth Imam as the Mahdi to redeem the world. This beliefwas as convenientfor Khomeini'srevolutionary purpose as it had been forthe founder of the SafavidEmpire in I50I.109 Although Shi'ite millenarianismplayed an importantrole in the Islamic Revolution,it did not have any of the divisiveand anarchicconsequences of Puritanmillenarianism because theclerics were firmly in controlof itsinterpretation, and in factpartly derivedtheir legal/juristic authority from it.

CONCLUSION The successof the Islamic revolutionaryideology is the novel and teleologicallydistinct mark of the IslamicRevolution in Iran. The ide- ologyis a powerfulresponse to the contemporarypoliticized quest for authenticity.It has been constructedthrough the unacknowledgedap- propriationof all the technicaladvantages of the Westernideological movementsand politicalreligions, with the added-or rather,the em- phaticallyretained-promise of other-worldlysalvation. In a sense,it has a considerableideological advantage over Nazism and communism, bothof whichclashed with religion. Rather than creating a new sub- stitutefor religion, as did the communistsand the Nazis, the Islamic militantshave fortifiedan alreadyvigorous religion with the ideological armornecessary for battle in the arena of mass politics.In doing so, theyhave made theirdistinct contribution to worldhistory.

log Arjomand (fn. I7), 269-70.