april 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 4

Contents Hizb Allah Resurrected:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Hizb Allah Resurrected: The Party of The Party of God’s Return to God’s Return to Tradecraft By Matthew Levitt Tradecraft Reports By Matthew Levitt 6 The Sinaloa Federation’s International Presence By Samuel Logan 10 Boko Haram: Reversals and Retrenchment By David Cook 13 The Salafist Temptation: The Radicalization of Tunisia’s Post- Revolution Youth By Anne Wolf 16 Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia By William Reno 19 France: A New Hard Line on Kidnappings? By Anne Giudicelli

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Lebanese Hizb Allah militants visit the grave of former military chief Imad Mughniyyeh. - Anwar Amro/AFP/Getty Images uring the past few years, This article traces Hizb Allah’s recent Lebanese Hizb Allah’s spike in operational activity since global operations increased 2008, highlighting the group’s efforts markedly, but until recently to rejuvenate the capabilities of its IJO. Dits efforts yielded few successes. In July Many of these details derive from the 2012, however, Hizb Allah operatives author’s extensive conversations with bombed a busload of Israeli tourists in Israeli security officials in Tel Aviv, Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israelis which were then vetted and confirmed About the CTC Sentinel and a Bulgarian bus driver.1 Yet what in conversations with American and The Combating Terrorism Center is an may prove no less significant than this European security, intelligence and independent educational and research operational success was another plot military officials. institution based in the Department of Social foiled in Cyprus just two weeks earlier. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, The Cyprus plot provided the clearest The article also provides a detailed case West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses window yet on the rejuvenation of Hizb study of Hossam Yaacoub—the convicted the Center’s global network of scholars and Allah’s tradecraft and the capabilities of Hizb Allah operative now serving time practitioners to understand and confront the group’s international terrorist wing, in a Cypriot prison for his role in a plot contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO). targeting Israeli tourists—to show how other forms of political violence. Hizb Allah has resurrected its terrorist capabilities. Drawn from the police depositions of interviews with Yaacoub The views expressed in this report are those of 1 “Israelis Killed in Bulgaria Bus Terror Attack, Minister the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, after his arrest, the case provides unique Says,” CNN, July 18, 2012; John Kerry, “Bulgarian An- the Department of the Army, or any other agency insights into how Hizb Allah recruits of the U.S. Government. nouncement on Hizballah’s Role in Burgas Attack,” U.S. and trains new operatives. Department of State, February 5, 2013.

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The article finds that while Hizb Allah’s foiled in Egypt and Turkey too, as well more on the much larger concern of decision to stay out of the crosshairs of as attempts to kidnap Israelis in Europe combating threats to its nascent nuclear the war on terrorism after 9/11 caused and Africa.6 program.11 Malfunctioning components its global terrorist capabilities to ruined Iranian centrifuges,12 Islamic decline, the group has since rebuilt its Nevertheless, however committed Hizb Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) IJO networks. Allah was to carrying out such attacks, officers defected,13 and then a bomb the IJO was not up to the task. Hizb killed Iranian physics professor Masoud Operation Radwan Reveals Degraded Skills Allah’s leaders had actively pared down Ali Mohammadi outside his Tehran In February 2008, a Damascus car bomb the IJO’s global network of operatives home in January 2010.14 killed Hizb Allah’s military chief, Imad following the 9/11 attacks in an effort Mughniyyeh. At his funeral, Hizb Allah to stay out of the crosshairs of the war According to Israeli intelligence Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on terrorism. Moreover, the “strategic officials, Iranian leaders reached two promised to retaliate with an “open partnership” it had shared with Iran for conclusions after Mohammadi’s death: war” against Israel. The Israelis took the past decade appears to have focused 1) Hizb Allah’s IJO had to revitalize its the warning seriously, but Nasrallah on funding, training, and arming Hizb operational capabilities, not only to may not have realized how ill-prepared Allah’s increasingly effective standing avenge Mughniyyeh’s death, but also Hizb Allah was to follow through on the militia, not on its cadre of international to play a role in Iran’s “shadow war” threat. terrorists. Therefore, Hizb Allah not only with the West; and 2) the IRGC would lacked the resources and capabilities to no longer rely solely on Hizb Allah to Israeli officials quickly took preventive execute a successful operation abroad, carry out terrorist attacks abroad.15 action—from issuing specific travel but it could also not rely on Mughniyyeh These officials claimed it would now warnings to covert disruptive measures— to plan and direct operations.7 deploy Qods Force operatives to do so against what they deemed the most likely on their own, not just as logisticians scenarios. Israeli officials did not have to New Tasking from Tehran: Target Israeli supporting Hizb Allah hit men.16 Even wait long for Hizb Allah to act. Yet when Tourists more than the loss of its scientists, the IJO—then under the command of A foiled attack in Turkey in September Tehran sought to address its damaged Mughniyyeh’s brother-in-law, Mustafa 2009 was a watershed event for Hizb prestige—the image of an Iran so Badreddine, and Talal Hamiyeh— Allah’s operational planners and weak that it could not even protect first set out to avenge Mughniyyeh’s their Iranian sponsors.8 Despite the its own scientists at home.17 For its death, Operation Radwan (named for increased logistical support Qods Force part, Israeli officials contended that Mughniyyeh, who was also known as operatives provided for that plot, Hizb the Qods Force instructed Hizb Allah to Hajj Radwan) experienced a series of Allah operatives still failed to execute prepare a campaign of terrorist attacks setbacks.2 the attack successfully.9 Israeli officials targeting Israeli tourists worldwide.18 claimed that Hizb Allah and the Qods Even as it decided to operate in countries Force blamed each other for the two Under Nasrallah’s instructions, with comparatively lax security rather years of failed operations, culminating Badreddine and Hamiyeh “undertook than vigilant Western states, Hizb in the botched attack in Turkey and a massive operational reevaluation Allah’s efforts to exact revenge for then another failed plot in Jordan in in January 2010, which led to big Mughniyyeh’s death failed repeatedly. January 2010.10 Meanwhile, by late 2009 changes within the IJO over a period In places such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Israeli officials contended that Iran’s of a little over six months,” in the and Turkey—and even with significant interest in Hizb Allah’s operational words of one Israeli official.19 During support from Qods Force3 agents—Hizb prowess focused less on local issues this period, IJO operations were put Allah suffered a series of failures, starting like avenging Mughniyyeh’s death and on hold and major personnel changes with the May 2008 fiasco in Baku, when a made.20 New operatives were recruited number of actions, including the planned Tracks of a Resur­gent Iran-Hezbollah Threat,” Foreign bombing of the U.S. and Israeli embassies, Policy, July 30, 2012. 11 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, were disrupted.4 The event led to the 6 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tel Aviv, Israel, September 13, 2012. quiet release of Qods Force personnel, but Tel Aviv, Israel, September 13, 2012; Daniel Edelson, 12 “Stuxnet: Targeting Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” Inter- the public prosecution of two Hizb Allah “Hezbol­lah Plans Attacks on Israeli Targets in Turkey,” national Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2012. operatives.5 Operations were soon Ynetnews.com, October 20, 2009; Rotella, “Before Dead- 13 Laura Rozen, “Where is Ali-Reza Asgari?” Politico, ly Bulgaria Bombing, Tracks of a Resur­gent Iran-Hezbol- December 31, 2010. 2 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, lah Threat”; “Hezbollah Denies Egypt Accusations,” al- 14 Alan Cowell, “Blast Kills Physics Professor in Teh- Tel Aviv, Israel, March 17, 2008. Jazira, April 11, 2009; Amos Harel, “Hezbollah Planning ran,” New York Times, January 12, 2010. 3 The Qods Force is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Attack on Israelis in West Africa,” Haaretz, August 4, 15 Personal interviews, Israeli intelligence officials, Tel Corps’ (IRGC) special unit responsible for extraterrito- 2008. Aviv, Israel, September 13, 2012. rial operations. Like the IRGC, the Qods Force is under 7 Ibid. 16 Ibid. the direct control of the Iranian government. 8 Edelson. 17 Ibid. 4 Sebastian Rotella, “Azerbaijan Seen as New Front in 9 Ibid. 18 Ibid.; Rotella, “Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, Mideast Conflict,”Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2009; Lada 10 Personal interview, Israeli counterterrorism official, Tracks of a Resurgent­ Iran-Hezbollah Threat.” Yevgrashina, “Lebanese Militants Jailed in Baku Over Tel Aviv, Israel, September 13, 2012; Barak Ravid, “IDF 19 Personal interviews, Israeli intelligence officials, Tel Israel Plot,” Reuters, October 5, 2009. Chief Reported: Hezbollah was Involved in Attack on Is- Aviv, Israel, September 13, 2012. 5 Sebastian Rotella, “Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, raeli Convoy in Jordan,” Haaretz, December 8, 2010. 20 Ibid.

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Issue 4 from the elite of Hizb Allah’s military earlier, escaped.27 Within days, police the fake Michigan driver’s license wing for intelligence and operational issued an arrest warrant for Atris’ used by the bomber that featured a training, while existing IJO operatives roommate, a Lebanese man who went by Baton Rouge, Louisiana, address.33 were moved into new positions.21 At the name James Sammy Paolo.28 Other aspects of the plot, however, the same time, the IJO invested in demonstrated improved tradecraft. the development of capabilities and Questioned over the weekend of January Hizb Allah dispatched two operatives tradecraft that had withered since the 12, Atris led police to a three-story to see the bomber through his mission, 2001 decision to rein in operations.22 building on the outskirts of Bangkok both of whom traveled on legitimate where he and his housemate had foreign passports (one Canadian, the Fits and Starts stockpiled approximately 8,800 pounds other Australian).34 They traveled to Meanwhile, Hizb Allah operatives were of chemicals used to make explosives.29 Bulgaria through Poland, then returned busy planning operations to fulfill The materials were already distilled into through Romania and Turkey.35 Yet their end of Iran’s “shadow war” with little more has been made public by the West: targeting Israeli tourists “The Bulgarian and Bulgarian authorities, and despite their abroad.23 Although it was still struggling conclusion that Hizb Allah executed the to rebuild its foreign operations Cypriot cases present attack, the investigation remains open capabilities, Hizb Allah continued compelling evidence of with investigators pursuing leads on at to dispatch insufficiently prepared least three continents. operatives abroad in the hopes that one Hizb Allah’s return to might succeed. Yet the increase in plots traditional tradecraft.” The Cyprus Case Study: A Window into Hizb did not yield results. According to a U.S. Allah Recruitment and Training law enforcement official, in one plot In contrast to the aforementioned Hizb Allah paid criminal gang members plots, a treasure trove of information $150,000 each to target a Jewish school crystal form, a step in building bombs.30 has poured out of the trial in Cyprus in Baku.24 Then, around the same Information on international shipping of Hossam Yaacoub, the Lebanese- time that authorities foiled a January forms found at the scene indicated that Swedish dual citizen and self-confessed 2012 plot targeting Israeli vacationers at least some of the explosives—which Hizb Allah operative arrested just in Bulgaria—just weeks ahead of were stored in bags marked as cat litter— days before the Burgas bombing.36 All the anniversary of Mughniyyeh’s were intended to be shipped abroad. of the subsequent details on this case assassination—authorities disrupted Israeli intelligence officials surmised are derived from Yaacoub’s police another Hizb Allah plot in Greece.25 that Hizb Allah had been using Thailand interviews and depositions from the Yet it was halfway across the world, as an explosives hub—Atris had rented official English translation, which are in Bangkok, where Israeli and local the space a year earlier—and decided to in the author’s possession. authorities broke up a far more task its on-hand logistical operatives, ambitious—but no less desperate—Hizb who were apparently not trained in Arrested in his Limassol hotel room on Allah bid to target Israeli tourists. the art of surveillance, to target Israeli the morning of July 7, 2012, just a few tourists. The conclusion should not hours after returning from a surveillance On January 12, 2012, acting on a tip from have been a surprise: U.S. officials had operation at Larnaca airport, Yaacoub Israeli intelligence, Thai police arrested already determined that Hizb Allah was was first interviewed by Cypriot police Hussein Atris—a Lebanese national known to use Bangkok as a logistics and over a five hour period starting within who also carried a Swedish passport—at transportation hub, describing the city an hour of his arrest. At first, Yaacoub Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport as he as “a center for a [Hizb Allah] cocaine provided only basic background attempted to flee the country.26 Another and money-laundering network.”31 information about himself and insisted suspect, whose police composite portrait strongly resembled Naim Haris, a Hizb Six months after its failed attempt 33 See cover photo at Matthew Levitt, “Hizballah and 32 Allah recruiting agent whose photo to target Israeli skiers in Bulgaria, the Qods Force in Iran’s Shadow War with the West,” Israeli officials had publicized a year Hizb Allah bombed the Israeli tour The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January bus in Burgas. While successful, some 2013. elements of the Burgas plot highlighted 34 Matthew Brunwasser and Nicholas Kulish, “Multina- 21 Ibid. operational shortcomings, such as tional Search in Bulgaria Blast,” New York Times, Febru- 22 Ibid. ary 6, 2013. 23 Ibid.; Rotella, “Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, 27 Ibid. 35 Ibid. Tracks of a Resurgent­ Iran-Hezbollah Threat.” 28 Ibid. 36 All references to Hossam Yaacoub’s interviews and 24 Judith Miller, “Bagels and Plots: Notes on the NYPD’s 29 James Hookway, “Thai Police Seize Materials, Charge depositions came from the official English translation High Holy Days Threat Briefing,” City Journal, Septem- Terror-Plot Suspect,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, of his police depositions. These were taken in Arabic, ber 7, 2012. 2012; Rotella, “Before Deadly Bulgaria Bombing, Tracks translated into Greek, and then into English by a certified 25 Personal interview, Israeli official, Tel Aviv, Israel, of a Resurgent­ Iran-Hezbollah Threat.” translator. For details, see Depositions of Hossam Taleb September 13, 2012. 30 Ibid. Yaacoub (some spelled Yaakoub), Criminal Number 26 Dudi Cohen, “Bangkok Threat: Terrorist’s Swedish 31 Thomas Fuller, “In Twisting Terror Case, Thai Police ∑/860/12, File Page 35, 79, 85, 110, 134, 187, by interview- Connection,” Ynetnews.com, January 15, 2012; “Second Seize Chemicals,” New York Times, January 16, 2012. ing police officer Sergeant Michael Costas. Depositions Terror Suspect Sought, Court Issues Warrant for Atris’s 32 Yaakov Katz, “Bulgaria Foils Terror Attack Against taken on July 7, 2012, July 11, 2012, July 11-12, 2012, July Housemate,” Bangkok Post, January 20, 2012. Israelis,” Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2012. 14, 2012, July 16, 2012, and July 22, 2012.

3 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 he was nothing more than a Lebanese The next interview took place a couple there, not at a Hizb Allah military or businessman looking to import Cypriot of days later and ran for two and a half terrorist facility, that Yaacoub was told goods into Lebanon. He had been to hours in the middle of the night. By he was needed “for the secret mission Cyprus three times, he explained, first the time the interview ended at 3:15 of Hizb Allah.” Yaacoub was flattered: as a tourist about three years earlier, AM, police had a much fuller picture “I accepted because I considered that then for business in December 2011 and of Yaacoub’s recruitment by Hizb he needed me for something great and I now again in July 2012. Yaacoub stuck Allah and the nature of his mission in was for them the chosen one.” to his cover story throughout his first Cyprus and his previous operations two police interviews on July 7 and July elsewhere in Europe. Again, Yaacoub Reda immediately arranged for Yaacoub 11, 2012. opened the interview with a bombshell: to meet his first Hizb Allah trainer, “I am an active member of Hizb Allah Wahid, later that same day outside a Several hours passed after the second organization [sic] for approximately Beirut storefront. Yaacoub worked with interview, and as soon as Cypriot police four years now. I was recruited by a Wahid for two to three months before began their third interview of Yaacoub Lebanese called Reda in 2007.” going to Sweden to visit his father. later that same night the story began to change. “With regard to the previous For a full week after his arrest, Yaacoub “For all of his European deposition I gave to the police,” Yaacoub kept Cypriot police at bay first by said. “I did not tell the whole truth.” sticking to his well-established cover travels on behalf of Hizb Four deposition pages later, Yaacoub story as a Lebanese merchant and then Allah, Yaacoub used his had changed his story, claiming to have by conceding that he was asked to collect been approached in Lebanon by a man information on Israeli flights but making Swedish passport, which named Rami in June 2012. He described up a fake story about his recruitment. he had renewed for this clandestine meetings with Rami, always In fact, Hizb Allah has a long history of conducted during outdoor walks on teaching its operatives basic but effective purpose. Once his basic which he was not allowed to bring resistance-to-interrogation techniques. training was complete, his cell phone. Rami tasked Yaacoub In March 2007, the same year Hizb with checking on the arrival of Israeli Allah recruited Yaacoub, a seasoned Yaacoub became a salaried flights at Larnaca airport. Whatever Hizb Allah operative was captured by Hizb Allah operative, favors he asked, Yaacoub recalled Rami British forces in Iraq. In that case, Ali saying, would “be done for the sake of Musa Daqduq al-Musawi pretended earning $600 a month since the religion and the ‘end.’” Yaacoub to be deaf and mute for several weeks 2010.” detailed Rami’s instructions to set up before speaking and admitting to being e-mail accounts through which he could a senior Hizb Allah operative.37 From contact Rami, to change his appearance a counterintelligence perspective, and avoid cameras at the airport, and misleading one’s interrogators for a Yaacoub explained that “when I say to collect leaflets from specific Cypriot period of time enables other operatives ‘work’ I mean that Wahid explained hotels. Yaacoub said he took the $500 to escape. The reason Yaacoub to me roughly the secret operation, in that Rami offered, traveled to Cyprus, ultimately revealed the truth after a which I would participate. He always wore a hat and glasses and avoided week of deceptive statements likely pointed out that nobody should know security cameras when he went to the parallels al-Musawi’s experience in anything, neither my family nor my airport to observe the arriving Israeli Iraq: presented with hard evidence friends.” Wahid trained Yaacoub for flights, and went to an internet cafe undermining his cover stories, and another couple of months after he to create the new e-mail accounts per having bought time for accomplices to returned from Sweden, all of which Rami’s instructions. cover their tracks, there was no longer was theoretical discussion focused on a need to mislead. “explaining to me that my secret mission Yaacoub described Rami as a 38-year- would be surveillance and undercover old Lebanese man, muscular and 5’11” How Hizb Allah spotted Yaacoub is activities on behalf of Hizb Allah.” Then tall, with a fair complexion, green eyes unknown, although their interest in Wahid handed Yaacoub off to his next and blond hair. “I could recognize him his European citizenship and import trainer. from a picture,” Yaacoub noted, adding, business was clear. Reda apparently “I don’t know if Rami belongs to Hizb called Yaacoub on the telephone A man named Yousef trained Yaacoub Allah, he never mentioned such a word, suddenly, inviting Yaacoub for a meeting for another five to seven months, but I suspected that he belongs to this in his office at a Hizb Allah bureau focusing on operational security organization.” Yaacoub concluded responsible for “student issues.” It was concepts. Yousef taught Yaacoub by saying “everything I said in my “how to handle my personal life and deposition is the truth.” It was not the 37 “Press Briefing with Brig. Gen. Kevin Bergner, Spokes- my activities, so that people won’t get truth, however. “Rami” never existed. man, Multi-National Force-Iraq,” Multinational Force- information about me and so that I Only later would Yaacoub admit that Iraq, July 2, 2007; U.S. Military Commission Charge can work undercover and persuasively “the story I told you in a previous Sheet for Ali Musa Daduq al Musawi, ISN #311933, Janu- without giving rise to suspicions... deposition about a guy called Rami, as ary 3, 2012; Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive he taught me how to create stories you can guess, did not happen.” True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq (New undercover.” York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), pp. 224-225.

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Later, Mahdi took over the training In 2009, Yaacoub explained, Abu Ali Hizb Allah operative, earning $600 a regimen which included Yaacoub’s sent him on a mission to Cyprus “to month since 2010. first test-run. In 2008, Yaacoub was create a cover story for people to get given a large, thin envelope to deliver to know me, to keep coming with a Yaacoub’s next interview with Cypriot to someone in Antalya, Turkey, with justifiable purpose and without giving police occurred on July 16, 2012, in the specific instructions about the day, time rise to suspicions.” He traveled to late evening. His first words were: “My and place where the delivery was to be Cyprus via Dubai to strengthen his operational name, that is my nickname made. The meeting point was outside cover, and spent a week vacationing within Hizb Allah, is Wael.” Yaacoub a Turkish department store, and the in Ayia Napa at Hizb Allah’s expense. offered more details about Hizb Allah’s recipient recognized Yaacoub based on When he returned to Cyprus two years operational security protocols, such as the specific hat and clothes Yaacoub later, he would be able to say that the the need to answer a coded question wore, per his instructions. Once they idea for importing merchandise from each time he was picked up in Beirut exchanged the pre-arranged code Cyprus came to him while on vacation for military training out of town. Aiman words, the handoff was made. Yaacoub there in 2009. provided the updated passwords each stayed in Turkey a couple of more time, and then different passwords days, at Hizb Allah’s expense, before Each time he returned from a mission, would be provided by each instructor. returning to Lebanon. “I don’t know including this one, Yaacoub was what its contents was [sic] and I had not debriefed by a Hizb Allah security Yaacoub now admitted that his entitlement to ask, because everything official who wanted to know where December 2011 visit to Cyprus actually is done in complete secrecy within the Yaacoub went, who he met, what the involved several separate missions. organization,” he explained. climate was like, how people live in First, Aiman tasked Yaacoub with the given location, and the state of gathering details on a parking lot Having passed this test, Yaacoub was the economy. On his return from his behind the Limassol Old Hospital and finally ready for military training and 2009 Cyprus vacation, Yaacoub was near the police and traffic departments. was assigned yet another instructor assigned to a new instructor, Aiman, Aiman wanted Yaacoub to take pictures named Abu Ali who he first met at a who sent him on his next mission to and be able to draw a schematic of the secret meeting arranged by Mahdi. Lyon, France, at Hizb Allah’s expense. area on his return. Yaacoub was to Abu Ali organized Yaacoub’s military His assignment: to receive a bag from specifically look for security cameras, training over the next few years, one person and deliver it to someone if payment was required on entry, if car which involved six to seven different else, all using the same tradecraft keys were left with a parking attendant, training sessions each lasting for three (identification signs and codewords) he if there was a security guard, among to five days at a Hizb Allah military employed on his last courier mission other observations. Yaacoub was also camp. Yaacoub would get picked up at in Turkey. Shortly thereafter, Aiman told to find internet cafes in Limassol different spots in Beirut each time, and sent Yaacoub to Amsterdam, where he and Nicosia, which he marked on a map was driven in closed vans so he and retrieved a cell phone, two SIM cards, for Aiman, and to purchase three SIM fellow trainees could not see where they and an unknown object wrapped in cards for mobile phones from different were going. Once there, Yaacoub added, newspapers, and he brought them back vendors on different days, which it was clear from the topography that to Aiman in Lebanon. he did. He also found good meeting they were in southern Lebanon. places, such as at a zoo in Limassol Then, in December 2011 and again in and outside a castle in Larnaca. In Each military training group consisted January 2012, Aiman sent Yaacoub the event a meeting was necessary, of 10-13 trainees, all of whom wore back to Cyprus “to create a cover story” Yaacoub would receive a text message. hoods—as did the instructors—to hide as a merchant interested in importing A text about the weather meant to go to their identities from one another. They to Lebanon juices from a specific the Finikoudes promenade in Larnaca each slept in their own tent and trained local company in Cyprus. He was also that day at 6 PM. If no one showed up, at another site. Yaacoub described being tasked with collecting information Yaacoub was to return the following trained in the use of multiple firearms, about renting a warehouse in Cyprus. day at 2:00 PM, and then again the next from handguns to shoulder-fired “I did all these things after receiving day at 10:30 AM. Aiman also wanted missiles, including the FN Browning, clear instructions from Hizb Allah, so Yaacoub “to spot Israeli restaurants in Glock, AK-47, M-16, MP-5, PK-5, and to have Cyprus as a basis [sic] and be Limassol, where Jews eat ‘kosher,’” but RPG-7. He also trained in the use of C4 able to serve the organization,” he said. an internet search indicated there were explosives. Over the same period of time Yaacoub maintained he did not know none. Later, in January 2012, Yaacoub while under the overall responsibility why Hizb Allah wanted this base of was instructed to check out the Golden of Abu Ali, Yaacoub attended training operations, but speculated “perhaps Arches hotel in Limassol, collect sessions in Beirut basements focused they would commit a criminal act or brochures and reconnoiter the area (he on teaching surveillance techniques, store firearms and explosives.” did survey the area, but the hotel was how to work safely undercover, how to being renovated). create a cover story, and resistance-to- For all of his European travels on behalf interrogation techniques such as how to of Hizb Allah, Yaacoub used his Swedish “Hizb Allah knows Cyprus very well,” defeat a polygraph test. passport, which he had renewed for this Yaacoub told police, adding he thought purpose. Once his basic training was his taskings were intended to update the complete, Yaacoub became a salaried group’s files “and create a database.”

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He insisted that he was not part of any alive. Indeed, while Mughniyyeh’s plot “to hit any target in Cyprus with assassination prompted the group to The Sinaloa Federation’s firearms or explosives,” adding that he resume international operations in a International Presence would have had the right to refuse the way they had not since before 9/11, Hizb mission if asked to execute such an act. Allah never stopped identifying and By Samuel Logan recruiting new operatives for a variety Five days passed before Yaacoub’s of different types of missions at home during former mexican President Felipe final police interview, which took and around the world. Calderon’s six-year term that ended place midday on July 22, 2012. Yaacoub in 2012, the Mexican government took conceded he was “aware of the ideology There is no question, however, an aggressive stance against the many and the objectives of [the] Hizb Allah that the operational failures that drug cartels operating in the country. organization,” adding this was limited to followed Mughniyyeh’s assassination “Calderon’s War,” as some in Mexico protecting Lebanese territory “with all demonstrated that the group’s foreign have come to call it, continues to legal means,” which he noted included operational capabilities had weakened simmer as the remaining transnational “armed struggle, military operations, over time. When Mughniyyeh was criminal organizations (TCOs) seek and the political way.” He opposed killed, and later when Iran wanted Hizb accommodation with rival groups.1 terrorism, he stressed, saying it was Allah to play a role in its “shadow war” Smaller “tier-two”2 groups grow in different from war. Yaacoub expressed with the West, Hizb Allah was not yet strength, while mostly rural vigilante support for “the armed struggle for the fully prepared to do so. Yet the Bulgaria gangs that form to protect communities liberation of Lebanon from Israel,” but and Cyprus cases suggest that this may from drug traffickers and corrupt police was “not in favor of the terrorist attacks no longer be the case. Yaacoub was no alike reflect society’s lack of patience against innocent people.” anomaly, as the Burgas attacks made with a slowly evolving government clear. Like Yaacoub and the Burgas solution.3 Yet of all the criminal Then, he added: “I don’t believe that operatives, some of those new recruits organizations in Mexico, one group the missions I executed in Cyprus were are Western citizens. During one of remained largely unscathed during connected with the preparation of a his training sessions, Yaacoub heard Calderon’s six-year war: the Sinaloa terrorist attack in Cyprus. It was just another trainee speaking fluent Arabic Federation. collecting information about the Jews, with some English words mixed in. and this is what my organization is According to Yaacoub, the trainee spoke The Sinaloa Federation, led by Joaquin doing everywhere in the world.” with a distinctly American accent.39 “El Chapo” Guzman, has suffered its share of setbacks, including a recent On March 21, 2013, a Cypriot criminal Dr. Matthew Levitt is a senior fellow at multi-ton drug bust in Baja California.4 court convicted Yaacoub of helping to The Washington Institute for Near East Yet compared to Los Zetas, La Familia, plan attacks against Israeli tourists on Policy where he directs the Institute’s and the Gulf Cartel, Guzman has not the island last July. In their 80-page Stein Program on Counterterrorism and suffered the dissolution of critical decision, the judges rejected Yaacoub’s Intelligence. Previously, Dr. Levitt served elements within his organization.5 defense that he collected information in the senior executive service as the His strategic position promotes deal- for Hizb Allah but did not know for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence making over bloodshed and business what it would be used. There could be and Analysis at the U.S. Department of no “innocent explanation” of Yaacoub’s the Treasury and before that as an FBI 1 The idea of accommodation stems from an analysis that actions, the court determined, adding counterterrorism analyst, including work rival TCOs almost always reach a business savvy agree- th that he “should have logically known” on the Millennial and September 11 plots. ment rather than an alliance when they decide to stop his surveillance was linked to a criminal He also served as a State Department fighting. 38 act. counterterrorism adviser to General James 2 A “tier-two” group is one that has demonstrated L. Jones, the special envoy for Middle strength and capability at the city or state level, but has Reason for Concern East regional security (SEMERS). Dr. not yet reached beyond those limitations. La Linea in Taken together, the Bulgarian and Levitt is the author of the forthcoming Juarez or the New Generation Jalisco Cartel are two ex- Cypriot cases present compelling book Hezbollah: The Global Footprint amples of tier-two groups. evidence of Hizb Allah’s return to of Lebanon’s Party of God (Georgetown 3 “Criminal Technology Transfer,” Southern Pulse, traditional tradecraft. As the Yaacoub University Press, 2013). March 2013, available at www.vimeo.com/57382082. case makes clear, several years before 4 “Mexican Army Seizes 5 Tons from Chapo in BCS,” the Qods Force instructed Hizb Allah Borderland Beat, April 5, 2013. to rejuvenate its IJO terrorist wing in 5 Three men run the Sinaloa Federation: El Chapo, El January 2010, the group had already Mayo, and El Azul. Compared to Los Zetas, which lost been recruiting operatives with foreign Heriberto Lazcano, or the Gulf Cartel, which lost Osiel passports, and providing new recruits Cárdenas Guillen, his brother Antonio, and most recent- with military training and surveillance ly El Coss, the Sinaloa Federation has not suffered the skills. Yaacoub was recruited in loss of high-level leaders, whose removal would certainly 2007, while Mughniyyeh was still 39 Depositions of Hossam Taleb Yaacoub (some spelled produce disruption through the entirety of the organiza- Yaakoub), Criminal Number ∑/860/12, File Page 187, by tional system, from supply to transport, protection to 38 Menelaos Hadjicostis, “Cyprus Court Convicts Hez- interviewing police officer Sergeant Michael Costas. De- intelligence, and offensive to weapons and communica- bollah Member,” Associated Press, March 21, 2013. positions taken on July 22, 2012. tions procurement.

6 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 over violence.6 From an absolutist product, methamphetamines, Central increasing his presence in Peru, Bolivia, perspective, his organization is one of America served as a temporary source and Ecuador, where he has already the bloodiest in operation today, but as he searched for options in Argentina, made significant inroads, possibly compared to his enemies the Sinaloa before settling on sources in Asia, as a contingency plan to his focus in Federation has perhaps been the where he worked with three criminal Colombia.12 In total, Guzman’s Sinaloa least violent relative to its large size. organizations based in China.9 Federation subsidiaries have a presence Guzman’s current expansion strategy across 16 countries in the Americas, rests on the same pragmatic decision- Pushing south from Central America, according to the Mexican Department of making that led to his resilience during Guzman focused on Colombia, the Justice.13 the Calderon administration. He sees “farm gate” source for cocaine. In Mexico as a sturdy foundation, and a twist of fortuitous consequence, Meanwhile, the Sinaloa Federation has the rest of the world—Africa, Asia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of been actively pursuing supply control Australia, Central and South America, Colombia (FARC) have again entered strategies across the Pacific Ocean. the European Union, and the United into peace negotiations with the Since the 2007 discovery of some States—as pieces in a strategy of Colombian government.10 A key point $205 million in cash in the house of “deviant globalization.”7 for the government in the talks, which Mexican-Chinese businessman Zhenli have been ongoing since November Ye Gon, law enforcement has explored This article explains the sources of the 2012, will be the FARC’s de facto the Sinaloa Federation’s sourcing of Sinaloa Federation’s drug production, removal from the regional drug trade.11 precursor chemicals in China.14 its international expansion, and the As the insurgents pull out of the drug role Chicago plays in the cartel’s trafficking business, local groups in More recently, however, various news operations. Colombia are likely to benefit from the reports offer anecdotal evidence of the windfall in captured market share, but Sinaloa Federation’s continued interest International Expansion: Supply the Sinaloa Federation is arguably the in Asia-based supply control. Malaysian Central America was the first stop only Mexican group that will capture a officials charged three Mexican brothers along Guzman’s business plan for similar benefit. Further consolidation from Sinaloa for operating a meth lab international expansion. It was a of Guzman’s network in Colombia there in June 2011.15 The bricklayers logical move to control relationships facilitates supply logistics and transport, from Culiacan, Sinaloa, were thought and territory in Guatemala and later reducing transaction costs as he moves to have been members of the Sinaloa Honduras that secured upstream access the product north from Colombia to Federation, and were found with $15 to one of his primary products: cocaine. Mexico. A strong presence in Colombia million in methamphetamines at the From the coca bush plantations in the allows him to capture more value as time of their arrests in 2008.16 Andes in South America, cocaine travels he consolidates purchase power at the from the leaf to the nostril, passing highest end of the upstream supply Meanwhile, in January 2011, Mexican through Central America, often through chain of cocaine, maximizing profit for media reported that Sinaloa Federation Honduras or Guatemala, before landing every kilo purchased in Colombia and operatives were purchasing heroin in Mexico, where it may be warehoused delivered inside the United States. in Afghanistan to supply cities in the for a period of time before a final leg United States, including New York of shipment to the United States, or to Yet as the Colombian government and Chicago. According to Edgardo Europe through Africa. moves beyond the FARC to focus on Buscaglia, the Sinaloa Federation other trafficking networks, the Sinaloa used front companies in partnership When the Mexican government Federation may find itself in need of with Turkish or Indian criminal complicated Guzman’s plans in 2006 other options. As Colombia becomes organizations to purchase and ship and 2008 for acquiring precursor a more difficult “market” to source the heroin.17 chemicals8 for another principal cocaine, Guzman will likely respond by

6 As explained by Malcolm Beith, “There is a level- chemical process becomes methamphetamine. Coun- headedness about the [Sinaloa] leadership that the other tries such as India and China are well known for loose groups lack. To the authorities, first priority always has export controls for these chemicals while being two of the 12 Croda; “Chapo’s Multinational Mafia,” Borderland to be quelling violence. When other groups throw gre- world’s most active producers of pseudoephedrine. Mex- Beat, January 6, 2012. nades into a crowd of innocents or behead[s] people, it’s ico complicated methamphetamine production in 2006 13 Elyssa Pachico, “Mexico Cartels Operate in 16 Coun- obvious what needs to be done. Sinaloa has perpetrated by implementing tight controls over precursor chemicals tries: Report,” Insight Crime, September 19, 2013. its share of violence, but by and large it did not cause and again in 2008 by banning the sale of pseudoephed- 14 “Chinese-Mexican Businessman Found with $205M disruption to the general well-being of the population.” rine altogether. Cash Says he Sold Black Market Meth Chemicals,” As- See Jan Albert-Hootsen, “How the Sinaloa Cartel Won 9 Rafael Croda, “El de El Chapo, un ‘narcoholding,’” sociated Press, October 23, 2009. Mexico’s Drug War,” Global Post, February 28, 2013. Proceso, January 5, 2013; “3 Asian Organized Criminal 15 “Investigan las operaciones de El Chapo Guzmán en 7 Bruce Sterling, “Deviant Globalization,” Wired, May 5, Groups Supply Chapo with Precursor,” Borderland Beat, Asia,” Associated Press, April 25, 2011; Patrick Corc- 2010. January 12, 2013. oran, “‘Sinaloa Cartel’ Operatives Face Death Penalty in 8 The production of methamphetamines requires the 10 “Colombia, FARC Rebels Say Peace Talks Making Malaysia,” Insight Crime, June 3, 2011. pharmaceutical product pseudoephedrine or its deriva- Progress on Land Reform,” Reuters, March 21, 2013. 16 Ibid. tives. Also known as “precursor chemicals,” this white 11 Iván Ventura, “Tentáculos del Chapo alcanzan a las 17 Doris Gómora, “Cárteles mexicanos compran droga powder forms the base of the product that through a FARC,” Excelsior, March 28, 2013. en Afganistán, alertan,” El Universal, January 4, 2011.

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International Expansion: Demand recent reports suggest that Mexican it happened,” explained John Riley, The United States remains the most criminal organizations continue to special agent in charge of the Drug important demand market for Sinaloa expand—although with little to no Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Federation products—marijuana, cocaine, violence compared to other routes.21 Chicago Division.27 and methamphetamines. The European In Guinea-Bissau, reporting indicates Union and Australia, however, have that the Sinaloa Federation and U.S. cities, such as New York, Dallas, proven attractive due to the economics possibly other Latin American criminal Atlanta, Chicago, San Diego, and Los of price elasticity and their distance organizations work directly with the Angeles, are integral parts of any drug from the supply source. Drugs are a military in that country.22 The business trafficker’s downstream or distribution lucrative product because addicts are model that Guzman most often employs, strategy. Since the 1990s, however, the highly “elastic” when it comes to high however, is one where he partners with number of major Colombian groups prices. The farther a kilo of cocaine local criminal groups and empowers inside the United States has slowly travels from Colombia, the more profit them. He rarely uses force to push them diminished while the number of cities it produces for the merchant. out of the way.23 Due to this model, the Mexican media has begun to refer to the “As a major Midwest Prices from Colombia to Texas, for Sinaloa Federation as a “narco-holding,” example, could jump from some $5,000 or a holding company for several smaller city, Chicago presents a kilo to $16,000 a kilo; to Paris, subsidiaries located worldwide.24 distribution advantages $25,000 a kilo, and further abroad to Australia could be as high as $250,000 a Australia, by comparison, offers the as well as a strong local kilo.18 Economics demand that distance fantastic opportunity of a mark-up demand market.” from the supply source in the Andean that at first glance seems unbelievable. mountains results in a higher price at Anything purchased at $5,000 and the local level. The nature of cocaine marked up to $250,000 is a good as a product adds a significant amount investment.25 According to one press where drug trafficking “wholesale of risk during transport, and the price report, the investment was so lucrative networks” operate has increased.28 of this risk is then passed along to the that “the drug ring also allegedly Generally speaking, the downstream final consumer. discussed in an unrecorded conversation market for multinational groups such using a plane to move millions of as the Sinaloa Federation stops at For example, a route from Colombia to dollars a month in cash from Australia the wholesale level, where nodes of France increases the price for a pure to the U.S. to buy cocaine to sell back in connected buyers in the United States kilo of cocaine significantly. There Australia, court records show.”26 create a wholesale network. The is a risk to move the cocaine out of number of cities within these wholesale Colombia and into Central America, “Though there is no evidence that networks has grown steadily over the likely Honduras, where it is stored until points directly to the Sinaloa Federation years due to the profuse demand for Guzman’s men are ready to move it to shipping cocaine from Chicago to methamphetamines—a product that Mexico. Once the cocaine enters Mexico, Australia, I wouldn’t be surprised if many observers believe has taken over it takes another jump in value due to cocaine as the number one demand the “market pressures” of government entry points to be exploited in the south. The two most product inside the United States, and rival action. The kilo then makes a common are between Tangiers and Italy, and Morocco behind prescription pills. The increased significant jump in price when it moves and Spain. Apart from simply “muling” the product into demand for methamphetamines in the from Mexico into the European Union the European Union, which remains an option, larger eastern states is largely responsible for 29 through West Africa, or perhaps Spain, quantities may be introduced into Africa, where local this ranking. and finally again when the sales price is groups are paid to transport the product north. Guinea- 19 placed in euros, not dollars. In some Bissau in West Africa is the most strategic point due to cases, the exchange rate increases the the tacit acceptance of local authorities, including the value; in others, such as in Australia, military, as well as its geographical proximity to South 27 Personal interview, John Riley, special agent, U.S. the street price of a kilo of pure cocaine America. For details on Guinea-Bissau, see “Guinea Bis- Drug Enforcement Administration, April 26, 2013. is so high that exchange rates have sau Armed Forces Chief Charged with Narcoterrorism,” 28 Colombian groups are seen as having pulled out of little impact on the business decision to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, April 18, 2013. downstream markets due to pressure at home. Once Plan transport cocaine across the Pacific. 21 Alexander Smoltczyk, “Africa’s Cocaine Hub: Guinea- Colombia—the U.S.-Colombia regime to fight cocaine Bissau a ‘Drug Trafficker’s Dream,’” Der Spiegel, March production and criminality in Colombia—took shape, As an entry point to the European Union, 8, 2013. the government was able to hit the Colombian criminal West Africa remains a key strategic 22 Ibid.; “Guinea Bissau Armed Forces Chief Charged syndicates harder and faster than they could reconsti- 20 goal for the Sinaloa Federation, where with Narcoterrorism.” tute themselves. They left downstream markets to the 23 Croda. Mexicans as a calculated retreat, focused on survival not 18 John Burnett, “Mexican Drug Cartel Targets Austra- 24 Ibid. profits. lia,” National Public Radio, March 2, 2012. 25 Adam Shand, “Dollar Draws in Mexican Cartels,” 29 For a visual of the methamphetamine demand expan- 19 “Spain Fights to Lose Status as Drug Gateway to Eu- Australian, February 12, 2013. sion, see the maps in this report: Michael Kelly, “16 Maps rope,” Agence France-Presse, April 22, 2013. 26 Steve Schmadeke, “High-Flying Cartel Planned to of Drug Flow into the United States,” Business Insider, 20 Because European Union ports—sea and air—are so Smuggle Drugs Through Small Suburban Airport, DEA July 8, 2012, available at www.businessinsider.com/16- well protected in northern Europe, there are only a few Says,” Chicago Tribune, February 13, 2013. maps-of-drug-flow-into-the-united-states-2012-7?op=1.

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As Colombian networks dried up, ranks with Los Angeles as a street an increase in demand for heroin, the Mexican cartels replaced them. Through gang mecca, with over 100,000 street Sinaloa Federation has captured market the early 2000s, as Mexico’s criminal gang members.34 According to Special share due to their strong smuggling and organizations fought for control of Agent Riley from the DEA, “There are distribution networks and long-time border crossings, they naturally some 120,000 documented street gang control of the black tar heroin trade.40 established routes inside the United members in Chicago. El Chapo’s people States contiguous to the areas where have ventured into obvious business Even as Mexican TCOs expand their they could cross product. The Arellano- relationships with surrogates for street presence inside the United States, Felix organization, based in Tijuana, gangs; it allows Sinaloa to stay on the the amount of reliable information developed a strong distribution network sidelines where they can be much available to the public is relatively through California.30 The Gulf Cartel more fluid with their movement.”35 He limited, presenting an unclear picture developed distribution networks east signaled that the Gangster Disciples at times illuminated by a high-profile of Texas, along the I-10 corridor, and are one of the local gangs most actively arrest or flutter of media coverage based north through Oklahoma into Georgia working with the Sinaloa Federation.36 on interviews given by high-level law and beyond.31 enforcement operatives. From this centralized distribution The Role of Chicago in Sinaloa’s Operations point, Guzman’s distribution channels One salient point remains clear: The Sinaloa Federation developed may spread to points east and west. The operatives of the Sinaloa Federation distribution networks into the United presence is so strong that local DEA communicate better than the disparate States initially through Nogales and into agents based in Chicago remarked in state, local and federal organizations Phoenix, but as the criminal organization and agencies tasked with stopping their developed relationships with former growth. The criminal operator’s ability rivals, it spread its influence into those “No amount of DEA, to hide in plain sight and keep a low areas of the United States where its FBI, local or state police profile exacerbates complications formed rivals had operated.32 No other city by the necessary limitations of sharing was perhaps more fundamental to this investigations in the United actionable intelligence across state lines strategy than Chicago. States or abroad will or between agencies in the same city.

As a major Midwest city, Chicago systemically disrupt the Can the Sinaloa Federation Be Stopped? presents distribution advantages as Sinaloa Federation as long Osorio Chong, Mexico’s new interior well as a strong local demand market. minister who oversees the country’s It connects several major interstate as it remains untouchable current public security challenges, systems that offer distribution across inside Mexico.” remarked in late February 2013 that the United States, and it is the final point capturing Guzman is his most important along a hardened logistics route that objective.41 Yet Guzman’s location has passes from Juarez to Chicago through remained a mystery—several Mexican Oklahoma City and St. Louis. Arguably, late 2012 that law enforcement operates analysts and reporters have argued Juarez is the Sinaloa Federation’s as if they were on the U.S.-Mexico that the Mexican government has strongest border crossing point given the border.37 Less than three months later, purposefully avoided his capture in amount of daily vehicle traffic that crosses the city declared Guzman as public enemy favor of other targets, possibly because the border there compared to other border number one, the first individual to receive of Guzman’s ability to provide actionable crossings used by the group. the infamous title since Al Capone.38 intelligence on other, high value targets from rival cartels.42 Whether true or not, The focal point for the Sinaloa Underscoring the organization’s Guzman remains free—largely because Federation in Chicago is the city’s position of strength inside the United of his constant adherence to a principal “Little Village” neighborhood, States, the Sinaloa Federation has of pragmatism over violence. which is part of the South Lawndale made some inroads into the East Coast, Community Area. From this strategic previously considered dominion of the Throughout Guzman’s history, well point, Guzman’s men distribute their Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, and Colombian covered in The Last Narco by British- product at the wholesale level to literally criminal organizations.39 On the back of American reporter Malcolm Beith, dozens of street gangs—as much as examples abound of Guzman’s penchant two metric tons a month.33 Chicago 34 Sari Horwitz, “U.S. Cities Become Hubs for Mexican for using intelligence and his networked Drug Cartels’ Distribution Networks,” Washington Post, connections to facilitate his preferred 30 Nathan Jones, “Captured Tijuana Cartel Boss Con- November 3, 2012. outcomes. He may have shared firms Sinaloa Truce,” Insight Crime, December 12, 2011. 35 Personal interview, John Riley, special agent, U.S. information with Mexican authorities 31 Ricardo Ravelo, Osiel: Vida y Tragedia de un Capo Drug Enforcement Administration, April 26, 2013. (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2009). 36 Ibid. 40 Doris Gámora, “Cártel de Sinaloa se expande en la 32 Marc Lacey, “76 Arrested as Officials Break Up Mex- 37 Horwitz. Costa Este de EU: DEA,” El Universal, April 1, 2013. ico-to-Arizona Drug-Smuggling Ring,” New York Times, 38 Ibid. 41 “Mexico’s ‘Chapo’ is Chicago’s New Public Enemy No. October 31, 2011. 39 James Bargent, “Drug Investigation Links Sinaloa 1.” 33 “Mexico’s ‘Chapo’ is Chicago’s New Public Enemy No. Cartel to Canadian, US Mafias,” Insight Crime, January 42 “Outsmarted by Sinaloa,” Economist, January 7, 1,” Agence France-Presse, February 15, 2013. 16, 2013. 2010.

9 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 to facilitate the arrest of his former As the Sinaloa Federation deepens its ally, Alfredo Beltran-Leyva, who he roots in countries outside of Mexico, it Boko Haram: Reversals thought had become too brazen. Rather will rely ever more on the strength of and Retrenchment than prolonging battles for Tijuana its foundation inside that country. No and Juarez, which were prosecuted by amount of DEA, FBI, local or state police By David Cook his proxies, Guzman decided to reach investigations in the United States or a business agreement with the leaders abroad will systemically disrupt the during the period of June 2012 to April of the Arellano-Felix Organization Sinaloa Federation as long as it remains 2013, Nigeria’s Boko Haram militant in Tijuana and the Carrillo-Fuentes untouchable inside Mexico. Although group has suffered some significant Organization in Juarez—agreements U.S. authorities at the federal, state reversals and setbacks. It has changed that may help explain the precipitous and city levels are making headway in its tactics in accord with the rise and drop in violence among cartels in both Chicago, Special Agent Riley commented collapse of Ansar Eddine in neighboring cities.43 These agreements were based that he is focused on “getting people on Mali and the decrease in its own ability on two basic premises: each side would a regional basis to understand what to project force inside Nigeria. After order their respective groups to stop we’re up against.”45 much indecisiveness during 2010-2012, fighting, and the formerly rival groups the Nigerian government and armed would establish a system of rents or Regardless of whether or not the current forces have to some extent developed “usage fees” that would allow for the free Mexican administration is focused on a policy of containment with regard passage of product as long as the rents Guzman, as Minister Osorio Chong to Boko Haram by employing a classic were paid. Guzman’s decision to enter purports, Mexico’s public security stick and carrot approach. Nigerian Guatemala by solidifying relationships policies are still taking shape, and may security forces employed blunt force with local criminal organizations, not reach required levels of efficacy until attacks on the group’s bases and safe such as the Chamale gang, to support 2015 when the proposed Gendarmerie is houses throughout the north—resulting methamphetamine production, rather expected to be operational.46 Mexican in the killings of substantial numbers than forge a bloody path of dominance President Pena Nieto is ripping out the of militants, as well as causing high like Los Zetas, is a clear sign of this old public security apparatus before the civilian casualties—while also offering strategy.44 new one is entirely formed, a decision an amnesty, which was rejected.1 that may be politically motivated. As careful as Guzman is in Mexico, During this period, Boko Haram has for where he has the most latitude to kill Meanwhile, Guzman continues with the first time demonstrated verifiable with impunity, he has demonstrated his structure intact, expanding connections with radical groups in only increased levels of caution as through mergers and partnerships, and northern Mali—al-Qa`ida in the Islamic his organization distances itself from improving the quality of his product. Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement its base of operations in western After six years of “Calderon’s War,” the for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Mexico. This is the primary reason Sinaloa Federation remains secure in (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine—and has why observers will likely not identify its home base, and Guzman confident spawned what appears to be a break- violence attributed to the Sinaloa in his ability to alter the political off Salafi-jihadi organization of more Federation outside of Mexico, especially landscape as necessary, so much so that globalist tendencies, Jama`at Ansar inside demand markets in Australia, he has embraced a global strategy for al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan (known the European Union, and the United expansion and domination. as Ansaru).2 Unlike Boko Haram, States. In these destination markets, which is based in northeastern Nigeria, layer upon layer of proxy organizations, Samuel Logan is the Founder and Ansaru has operated in and around such as street gangs, provide insulation Managing Partner of Southern Pulse, a Kano, the heartland of the Hausa- from his immediate employees when field-based investigations firm focused Fulani, in north-central Nigeria. The corrupt law firms, front businesses, and on security, politics, energy, and business genesis of Ansaru is likely connected politicians cannot. in Latin America. From 1998 to 2009, he with the paradigmatic suicide attacks lived and worked in Central and South Boko Haram employed throughout the America as an investigative journalist. north and central regions, which killed 43 For a more detailed discussion of the Sinaloa Fed- Mr. Logan is the author of This is for the many Muslims during the fall of 2011 3 eration, the Arellano-Felix organization, and the Car- Mara Salvatrucha (Hyperion, 2009), and spring of 2012. In June 2012, for rillo-Fuentes organization, see Samuel Logan, “Tijuana co-author with Dr. George Grayson of example, Ansaru leader Abu Usmatul Criminal Environment,” Southern Pulse, December The Executioner’s Men (Transaction, 2012; Samuel Logan, “Juarez Criminal Environment,” 2012), and is working on a third book 1 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Rejects Jonathan’s Amnesty Southern Pulse, October 2012. that focuses on the business and culture Idea,” BBC, April 11, 2013; Tim Cocks and Isaac Abrak, 44 For a review of the Sinaloa Federation’s methamphet- of weapons smuggling in the United States “Heavy Fighting in Northeast Nigeria, Death Toll Un- amine production and partnering strategy for Guatema- and Mexico. clear,” Reuters, April 22, 2013. la, see E. Eduardo Castillo and Sonia Perez, “Mexican 2 Eric Schmitt, “American Commander Details Al Qae- Gang Seen Ramping up Meth in Guatemala,” Associated da’s Strength in Mali,” New York Times, December 3, 2012; Press, December 13, 2011. For a review of Los Zetas’ strat- 45 Personal interview, John Riley, special agent, U.S. Mark Doyle, “Africa’s Islamist Militants ‘Co-ordinate Ef- egy for Guatemala, see Jason Beaubien, “Mexican Cartels Drug Enforcement Administration, April 26, 2013. forts,’” BBC, June 26, 2012. Spread Violence to Central America,” National Public 46 Simon Gardner, “Mexico’s New President to Reset 3 “Multiple Bomb Blasts Hit Northern Nigerian City of Radio, May 30, 2011. Drug War, Push Reforms,” Reuters, November 29, 2012. Kano,” Los Angeles Times, January 20, 2012.

10 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 al-Ansari stated: “Islam forbids [the] 2012, 15 of these operations were in its characterized by heavy use of suicide killing of innocent people including home region of Borno and Yobe states attacks (a total of seven recorded non-Muslims. This is our belief and we (northeastern Nigeria), while five were suicide attacks during this period, in stand for it.”4 in Kano, and four in Kaduna and Zaria. addition to those utilized previously), All of the Kaduna and Zaria operations but there have been no suicide attacks This article analyzes Boko Haram’s (all attacks against churches), however, since the attack on the phone system in patterns of operation, and the likelihood occurred prior to November 25, 2012. Kano on December 22, 2012. Perhaps of whether the group collapses, Of these 29 operations, 19 were directed this change in tactics has resulted accepts an amnesty or assimilates into against Christians—including massacres from the discovery of a bomb-making mainstream society. of Christian villagers throughout factory by the Nigerian authorities in northern Nigeria, suicide attacks and early December 2012.9 Alternatively, Patterns of Operation other gun and machete attacks against the appearance of Ansaru could Boko Haram’s opponents are three- churches, Christian gatherings, or have made the use of suicide attacks fold: the Nigerian government, army Christian neighborhoods. Boko Haram’s doctrinally problematic (because of and police; the Muslim political and leader Abubakar Shekau stated: “We their indiscriminate nature). Ansaru, religious elites in northern Nigeria; and are also at war with Christians because for example, claims that it is against the the Christian (largely Igbo) minorities the whole world knows what they did to killing of civilians, as opposed to Boko in the north and central regions of us,” adding that “the group’s successes Haram’s more indiscriminate targeting the country. During the period June in killing innocent civilians indicates selection. 2012-April 2013, Boko Haram has struck they [i.e., Boko Haram] are on the right repeatedly at all three targets; however, path.”6 One should also note the parallels to it has not claimed responsibility for a Ansaru in the use of kidnappings. Ansaru suicide attack since December 22, 2012. It is worth noting, however, that a number kidnapped seven foreigners on February of the targets chosen by Boko Haram 16, 2013, and executed them on March Since the beginning of June 2012, have been secular in nature and relate to 9,10 while Boko Haram then kidnapped Boko Haram’s geographic pattern of the group’s adherence to “enjoining the a French family of seven (including four operations has shifted. Of the group’s right and forbidding the wrong” (al-amr children) in Cameroon on February 29 claimed5 operations since June bi-l-ma`ruf wa-l-nahy `an al-munkar). These 19, 2013, and then transported them to operations include: attacks against Nigeria, where they were freed on April 11 4 “New Islamist Group Emerges in Nigeria, Claims ‘Dif- polio inoculation workers on February 18. In both cases, the kidnappings ferent’ Understanding of Jihad,” al-Arabiya, June 3, 2012. 8, 2013; the murders and beheadings of were directed at the outer world and Although one can note that Ansaru’s methodology does three South Korean doctors on February not at Nigerian targets. Ansaru stated not preclude the slaughter of Westerners—such as the 10, 2013; attacks against park rangers that the executions were revenge for seven British, Lebanese, Italian and Filipino hostages it in Sambisa Park (possibly because they “atrocities done to the religion of Allah killed on March 9, 2013—there are close parallels in the threatened Boko Haram’s base in the by the European countries in many 12 splintering between Boko Haram and Ansaru and the area); a campaign against sellers of bush places such as Afghanistan and Mali.” Algerian paradigm of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) meat in Maiduguri in January 2013, Boko Haram said that the kidnapping of 7 and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in which 23 people were killed; and a the French family was in revenge for the 13 in 1997. In this latter case, the GIA’s indiscriminate kill- suicide campaign against the telephone French invasion of northern Mali. ings of civilians led to the breakup of the parent group companies of Kano (Airtel and MTN) and the establishment of a new strategy that was to avoid on December 22, 2012. True to the The most striking conclusions from indiscriminate killings, at least initially. Ansaru has group’s primary opposition to secular Boko Haram’s operations during the stated that it will not target Muslims or Nigerian govern- non-Islamic education, some of its period June 2012-April 2013 is the mental bodies (which is not entirely consistent with their operations against Christians have been inability (or unwillingness) of the record), or even Christian churches, but said that the directed against schools or universities, group to carry out the paradigmatic “rampant massacre of Muslims in Nigeria will no longer in which the Christian students have suicide operations that characterized 8 be tolerated and that they will never attack any religion or been singled out for execution. its rise during the period 2010-2012. government institution that did not attack them and their To a large extent, Boko Haram has been religion.” These comments should be seen as an implicit The types of weapons used by Boko critique on the part of mainstream Hausa-Fulani radicals Haram are also revealing: the spring, 9 “Gunmen Kill Five in Borno as Sect Leader Speaks on located in and around Kano against Boko Haram. For the summer and fall of 2012 were all Global Jihad,” Osun Defender, December 1, 2012. ethnic angle, see Freedom C. Onuoha, “Jama’atu Ansarul 10 Tim Cocks, “Nigerian Islamist Group Posts Video of Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan: Nigeria’s Evolving Mili- ology, only those operations for which it has taken credit Hostages’ Bodies,” Reuters, March 11, 2013. One should tant Group,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, April 7, 2013. will be discussed. note that Ansaru has kidnapped other Westerners in the Most Boko Haram members are believed to be of Kanuri 6 “Malam Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram Leader-Pro- past. ethnicity (spread in the region of Borno, and into Camer- claim War With Christians,” Nigerian Civil Right Move- 11 “Kidnappers Free French Family Abducted in Camer- oon and Chad). ment, March 20, 2013. oon, Officials Say,” CNN, April 19, 2013. 5 There are a large number of violent operations that take 7 Bush meat is from animals caught in the wild, which 12 Ibid. place in northern and central Nigeria which may or may is popular throughout Africa. These animals are not 13 John Irish and Bate Felix, “Islamists Threaten to Kill not be the work of Boko Haram (because local rivalries slaughtered according to the Islamic laws of halal. French Kidnapped in Cameroon,” Reuters, February 25, between Muslims and Christians and/or tribes versus 8 “Boko Haram Massacres Christian Students in Nige- 2013; “Video Claims French Family Kidnapped by Boko settled are also a factor). Therefore, to assess its method- ria,” CBN News, October 7, 2012. Haram,” France24, February 26, 2013.

11 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 confined to the region of Borno and Looking at the larger strategic picture, the Christian population—it does not Yobe states (northeastern Nigeria), with the future for Boko Haram is not bright. seem to have broadened its appeal occasional operations in Kano (north For most of 2012 until the French during the past year. Indeed, northern central Nigeria). There have been none invasion of Mali in January 2013, Boko Muslim politicians who were suspected of the major operations that regularly Haram’s publicity was negated by the of supporting Boko Haram during occurred in Abuja or Jos (which is successes of Ansar Eddine in Mali 2011-2012 have carefully distanced largely Christian, and is a flashpoint (with effects also in Algeria, Niger themselves from the group, especially for Muslim-Christian tension). While and Mauritania). While Boko Haram as Boko Haram’s message has become Boko Haram retains the ability to carry has only been able to execute guerrilla more toxic within the context of out deadly operations in its home base attacks, Ansar Eddine was able to hold Nigerian politics.21 The closest parallel region, it appears to have been cut off a significant piece of northern Mali, to Boko Haram’s trajectory is that of the from the rest of the country.14 including important local cities such Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines— as Timbuktu and Gao, for a period of originally also a jihadist organization Also indicative of the transition in almost a year. While Ansar Eddine which has now developed into more Boko Haram is that approximately a benefits from close connections with the of a criminal element (with Islamic third of its major operations are now larger world of radical Islam (including rationales for operations).22 utilizing machetes and knives (six out at least a nominal tie to al-Qa`ida), of 29 incidents) rather than gun attacks Boko Haram was likely bereft of such Such a trajectory raises the question (11 out of 29 incidents), explosives connections at least until 2012.17 of whether the amnesty offered by the or suicide attacks (seven out of 29 Nigerian government—effective with incidents). Increasingly, Boko Haram Nevertheless, signs that Boko Haram regard to the Niger Delta militants appears to be utilizing more low- is developing close connections with in southern Nigeria—will have any tech methods of killing rather than the larger field of radical Islam have effect on Boko Haram. Most likely continuing on a trajectory of ever more grown during this recent period. For it will not because Boko Haram has complex operations. the first time, on November 29, 2012, developed a sufficiently hardened Abubakar Shekau issued a video in group of supporters who are willing Collapse, Amnesty or Assimilation? Arabic; all of his previous videos had to continue their operations even if The prognosis for Boko Haram within been in Hausa.18 When Boko Haram (hypothetically) the leadership were to Nigeria remains difficult to determine. was temporarily squeezed in February accept an amnesty. In developing ties to For Boko Haram, the evidence suggests 2013, Shekau is believed to have briefly Ansar Eddine and other West and North that the group’s appeal has dwindled, sought refuge with Ansar Eddine in African radicals, Boko Haram sees the and it cannot carry out major operations northern Mali;19 it is possible that with future—after the French withdrawal outside of its home base. Nigeria’s his return to Nigeria, he brought more from Mali—as being favorable for the increased policing of money transfers of a mainstreaming of Boko Haram continued success of Salafi-jihadism. has taken its toll on Boko Haram’s within worldwide Salafi-jihadism. As a result, Boko Haram likely sees no financial support,15 compounded by the Additionally, the kidnapping of the reason to surrender at this time. fall in popular support (most likely due French family from Cameroon signals to the suicide attacks it executed in 2012 the willingness of Boko Haram to operate Dr. David Cook is associate professor of against Muslim targets).16 outside of Nigeria’s boundaries for the religious studies at Rice University. He first time, and to execute attacks for the completed his undergraduate degrees at cause of Ansar Eddine or AQIM.20 Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and 14 The recent revelation of a plot to blow up the Third received his Ph.D. from the University of Bridge in Lagos in April 2013, however, would be, if true, Conclusion Chicago in 2001. His first book, Studies a major move toward operations in the south. See “Boko Boko Haram has been contained to in Muslim Apocalyptic, was published Haram Planned To Bomb Third Mainland Bridge,” Nige- a large extent within northeastern by Darwin Press in the series Studies in ria News, April 9, 2013. Nigeria. Although it remains extremely Late Antiquity and Early Islam. Two 15 “Nigeria to Pursue Boko Haram Financiers,” United deadly in that region—especially to further books, Understanding Jihad and Press International, August 22, 2012; “Boko Haram’s Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Funding Sources Uncovered,” AllAfrica.com, February 17 Schmitt; Doyle. Some believe that there has been a Literature were published during 2005, 14, 2012. connection with al-Shabab in Somalia, leading to the and Martyrdom in Islam as well as 16 “Northern Leaders not Supporting Boko Haram Kill- use of suicide attacks during the period of 2010-present, Understanding and Addressing Suicide ings –ACF,” Punch, April 5, 2013. As far as gauging Boko and the unique martyrdom video of September 18, 2011. Attacks (with Olivia Allison) have been Haram’s actual support, this is problematic. One only There is no significant evidence, however, that this was completed recently. has the Gallup poll of February 2012, which revealed the case. that approximately 34% of the interviewees in north- 18 M.J. Smith, “Boko Haram Leader Salutes Global Jihad- eastern Nigeria held views identified as anti-Western. ists in Video: SITE,” Agence France-Presse, November 21 “Nigeria Senator Ali Ndume ‘Linked to Boko Haram,’” See “Northern Nigerians Differ With Boko Haram,” 29, 2012. BBC, November 22, 2011; “Boko Haram: Ndume Asks NOI Polls, February 13, 2012. This, however, does not 19 “Boko Haram Leader Wounded in Gun Duel, Flees to Court to Quash Evidence,” Vanguard, February 8, 2013; reveal Boko Haram’s actual support, but it is interest- Mali,” Nigerian Bulletin, January 19, 2013. “We Must End Boko Haram, Says Sultan of Sokoto,” Sa- ing that this number is higher than the other northern 20 Boko Haram said that the kidnapping of the French hara Reporters, February 6, 2012. regions (but only half of the 68% negativity in the south- family was in response to France’s intervention in Mali 22 “Are Abu Sayyaf Rebels Linked to Bin Laden?” Voice east, the region of the Delta). in January 2013. of America, October 29, 2009.

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The Salafist Temptation: accused of sabotaging meetings of left- details the main post-revolutionary The Radicalization of wing politicians, committing violence religious youth movements and outlines against civil society activists, and the factors that are encouraging Tunisia’s Post-Revolution being involved in the death of Lotfi some young Tunisians to join Youth Naguedh, a local coordinator of the ultraconservative groups. opposition Nidaa Tounes Party.6 In a By Anne Wolf country long hailed for its peculiarly It finds that the ruling Islamist moderate interpretation of Islam,7 Ennahda Party risks losing its appeal on february 6, 2013, Tunisian opposition most observers have been surprised among Islamist youth, who may move leader Chokri Belaid was assassinated by the increase in religiously- increasingly toward Salafist, and in outside his home. A critic of Tunisia’s motivated violence perpetrated some cases jihadist, groups. current Islamist-led government, by Tunisian youth.8 Although the Belaid was shot four times by one to two causes of radicalization in Tunisia Background assailants.1 In the wake of his death, are complex,9 this article focuses on Tunisia’s current Islamist youth opposition parties and some civil society the under-researched Islamist youth movements can only be understood in activists accused the ruling moderate movements to better understand the context of their predecessors. In Islamist Ennahda Party of organizing the dynamics attracting some young the 1970s, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the Belaid’s assassination.2 Accusations Tunisians to violent jihad. current head of the Ennahda Party, against Ennahda continued even when was a popular teacher, preacher and four young Salafists—all between 26- This article first provides a brief youth leader, attracting students and and 34-years-old—were arrested shortly historical account of Tunisia’s Islamist young people to his weekly discussions after the incident for their alleged youth and its links to violence. It then and events. Initially concerned with involvement.3 The suspected assassin, sociocultural change, in the late- Kamel El Gathgathi, a 35-year-old 6 Angelique Chrisafis, “Tunisia Gripped by General 1970s al-Ghannouchi’s movement, 4 violent Salafist, is still at large. Strike as Assassinated Chokri Belaid is Buried,” Guard- then known as Jama`a Islamiyya (The ian, February 8, 2013; “Tunisie: Maya Jribi réitère son Islamic Group), became more political 10 Chokri Belaid was among those appel à la dissolution des Ligues de protection de la révo- in its goals. The student wing of politicians who suspected Ennahda lution,” Kapitalis, March 31, 2013; “Tunisia Clash Leaves Jama`a Islamiyya—which was renamed of supporting Tunisia’s controversial Opposition Official Dead,”al-Jazira , October 19, 2012. the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) Leagues for the Protection of the 7 This perspective has long been fueled by past regimes’ in 1981 and then Ennahda in 1989— 5 Revolution. Some young Islamist policies of Westernization that opened Tunisia up, eco- was particularly revolutionary and members of the Leagues have been nomically and politically, and brought secularism, edu- confrontational toward the regime. cation and women’s rights to the country. The apparent The student wing openly supported 11 legacy of early-20th century modernist thinkers, such as the 1980 Gafsa attack —during which 1 Eileen Byrne, “Tunisian Opposition Leader Shot Dead,” Tahar Haddad, as well as accounts according to which Tunisian dissenters bombed several Guardian, February 7, 2013. polygamy was practically absent in Tunisia long before strategic government locations—while 2 “Ennahdha et un pays du Golfe derrière l’assassinat de its official prohibition under Habib Bourguiba in 1956, Jama`a Islamiyya released a statement Chokri Belaïd?“ Webmanagercenter.com, April 2, 2013. seemed to confirm the argument that there is indeed condemning the incident. For details, see “Tunisie: l’assassinat de Chokri Belaid something specifically modern about Muslims in Tuni- provoque une vague de manifestations anti-Ennahda,” sia. See, for example, Dalenda Larguèche, Monogamie en In 1985, Islamist students officially Jeune Afrique, February 6, 2013. Islam: l’Exception Kairouanaise (Manouba, Tunisia: Cen- created the General Tunisian 3 Former Tunisian Interior Minister Ali Larayedh stated tre de Publication Universitaire, Laboratoire Régions et Union of Students (UGTE), whose in February that the principal suspects belong to an “ex- Ressources Patrimoniales de Tunisie, 2011). confrontational attitude led to several 12 tremist Salafi movement.” For details, see “Meurtre de 8 In addition to these incidents, an estimated 11 out of clashes with the regime. Although Chokri Belaid: la mouvance salafiste pointée du doigt the 32 hostage takers at the In Amenas gas facility in Al- a predominantly peaceful movement par Tunis,” France24, February 26, 2013; Bouazza Ben geria were of Tunisian nationality. Additionally, young comprising mostly young Ennahda Bouazza, “Chokri Belaid Murder: 4 Arrested For In- Tunisians are actively participating in the Syrian war. members, the UGTE was dissolved in 13 volvement In Death of Tunisian Politician,” Huffington See Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian Government Arrests al 1991 when the Bab Souika affair led Post, February 26, 2013. Qaeda Cell Tied to Ansar al Sharia,” The Long War Jour- 4 “Assassinat de Chokri Belaid: Genèse d’un crime et nal, December 22, 2012; “The Algerian-Tunisian Border: 10 For details, see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: velléités d’épilogue!” AfricanManager.com, March 1, Tales of a Taxi Driver,” Economist, April 4, 2013; Mischa Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Benoit-Lavelle, “Tunisian Salafis on the Rise,”al-Monitor , 1998). 5 The Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution were January 30, 2013. 11 Alaya Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between Con- initially established under Tunisia’s transitional govern- 9 Many reports cite socioeconomic background and edu- frontation and Participation: 1980-2008,“ The Journal of ment to safeguard the objectives of the revolution. Al- cation as primary factors of radicalization. The release of North African Studies 14:2 (2009): p. 261. though originally comprising various political and ideo- radical Salafists from prison and the return of exiled ul- 12 For details, see Francois Burgat and William Dowell, logical streams, the Leagues are said to be increasingly traconservatives to Tunisia following the revolution are The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, TX: Uni- dominated by Islamists, some of whom are accused of also important factors explaining their increased visibil- versity of Texas Press, 1993). having attacked political opponents, journalists and civil ity in society. For details, see, for example, “Tunisie: vio- 13 On February 17, 1991, three young members of the society organizations. For details, see Roua Seghaier, lences et défi salafiste,” International Crisis Group, Feb- Ennahda movement attacked the office of the govern- “What are the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolu- ruary 13, 2013; Anne Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs of Domestic ment Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party in tion?” Tunisia Live, January 23, 2013. Radicalization Post-Revolution,” CTC Sentinel 6:1 (2013). Bab Souika. The incident led to the death of one security

13 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 the regime to a nationwide crackdown leadership inside Tunisia capable of religious conservatism among some on Islamists.14 countering this trend, given that the UGTE activists. more moderate Ennahda activists were The repression of the Ennahda either imprisoned or exiled. It is by the While united on campus, Tunisia’s movement resulted in an “Islamic light of this Salafist trend, as well as the Islamist youth take distinct forms vacuum” that was partially filled early Ennahda youth movements, that outside the universities. Shortly after by more religiously conservative Tunisia’s Islamist youth must today be the revolution, the Ennahda Party movements that emerged in the mid- understood. launched its own youth wing, whose 1990s and 2000s, including the members meet regularly for various violent Salafi-jihadi trend, which Mapping Tunisia’s Post-Revolution Islamist social and educational activities. particularly attracted young Tunisians. Youth The priority of the Ennahda youth The religiously conservative movements Tunisia’s current Islamist youth, a movement lies in Islamic education, and were composed of generally small highly heterogeneous movement, is weekly lessons are given in local party informal groups without any central in many ways a hybrid of two distinct offices across the country.21 Senior leadership, but they often entertained Islamist dynamics—the Ennahda and Ennahda members argue that many of regional links to more religiously Salafist movements—that have shaped their young members lack an in-depth radical movements.15 The 2001 Djerba Tunisia over the recent decades. This understanding of Islam and blame the hybrid can be seen in the membership culture of authoritarianism under Ben of the current UGTE, the student union Ali, which made it difficult to receive a “The trend toward that was banned in 1991 but was legalized quality Islamic education.22 ultraconservatism and the following the recent revolution. Before its dissolution in 1991 being a member of On Ennahda’s right, Tunisia’s Salafist increasing polarization the UGTE was almost synonymous with movements are increasingly recruiting between secular and being an Ennahda member,18 but this is young Tunisians.23 Although minority no longer the case post-revolution. movements, many divergent Salafist Islamist forces will likely streams exist in Tunisia,24 with Ansar continue to attract some Today, the Islamist student union al-Shari`a, led by Seifallah ben Hassine brings together members of Ennahda’s (also known as Abu Iyad), who is wanted young Tunisian Muslims to youth wing as well as young Salafists, by the police for his involvement in the jihadism.” alongside some independents, and U.S. Embassy attack in Tunis, probably can therefore be classified as much the most prominent.25 Most of Tunisia’s more religiously conservative than its Salafist movements concentrate their predecessor during the 1980s and early- activities entirely on preaching and in attack, for example, was conducted 1990s. The visibility of Salafist youth the sociocultural sphere, although with by a young Tunisian with links to on university campuses has particularly the creation of Jabhat al-Islah (Reform al-Qa`ida.16 The so-called “Suleiman increased, as have their demands, such Front Party)26 in mid-2012, they have group,” established in 2006 to as wearing the niqab (a veil that covers confront the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali the entire face, except for the eyes) 21 Personal interviews, Ennahda youth activists, Tunis, regime by force, consisted mostly of during classes and examinations, as Tunisia, March 2013. Tunisians in their 20s and early 30s, well as establishing special prayer 22 Ibid. 19 many of whom were still university rooms. This has contributed to a 23 For details, see John Thorne, “Islamist Militancy Qui- 17 students. The increasing allure of strained atmosphere and sometimes etly Makes Inroads in Post-Revolution Tunisia,” Chris- ultraconservatism for young Tunisians, violent conflict between the UGTE and tian Science Monitor, March 28, 2013. including its jihadist dynamic, at that its competitor, the General Union of 24 Broadly speaking, the Salafist movement can be classi- time represented a reaction to the fierce Tunisian Students (UGET), a secular- fied into two streams: the “Scientific Salafists,” who reject 20 regime repression of Islamists. Yet it leftist body. The resulting polarization the use of violence, and the Salafi-jihadis, who are pre- was also the result of a wider regional on university campuses, reflecting the pared to use violence to reach their goal of implementing tendency toward Islamic conservatism, wider political climate in Tunisia, is Shari`a in Tunisia. For details, see Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs and reflected the lack of any religious only likely to contribute to increased of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution.” 25 Founded by Abu Iyadh upon his release from prison guard. See Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radicaliza- 18 The UGTE at that time also comprised some indepen- shortly after the Tunisian revolution, Ansar al-Shari`a tion Post-Revolution.” dent Islamist members, such as Souad Abderrahim. See organized a mass rally in May 2012 in Kairouan that 14 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Al­ personal interviews, former UGTE activists, Tunis, Tu- was attended by up to 5,000 Salafist activists. Ansar geria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab nisia, August 2012 and March 2013. al-Shari`a has also organized Salafist lectures and cam- Spring (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), p. 168. 19 For details, see, for example, “Tunisie. Six étudiantes paigns against blasphemy. For details, see Aaron Zelin, 15 For details, see Alison Pargeter, “Radicalisation in Tu- en niqab en grève de la faim à Manouba,” Kapitalis, Janu- “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” Foreign Pol- nisia,” in George Joffe ed., Islamist Radicalisation in North ary 17, 2012; Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Tunisia Manouba icy, November 14, 2012; Louisa Loveluck, “Planting the Africa: Politics and Process (New York: Routledge, 2011). University Students Face Off Over Islamic Veil On Cam- Seeds of Tunisia’s­ Ansar al Sharia,” Foreign Policy, Sep- 16 “France Tries Trio over Djerba Synagogue Bombing,” pus,” Huffington Post, April 1, 2012. tember 27, 2012. Agence France-Presse, January 4, 2009. 20 For details, see, for example, “Tunisie – Violences au 26 For details, see Anne Wolf, “New Salafist Party: A 17 Pargeter; Wolf, “Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radical- campus entre UGTE et UGET, Ennahda prend parti,” Threat to Tunisia’s Democratic Transition?” Middle East ization Post-Revolution.” Business News [Tunis], April 6, 2012. Online, August 3, 2012.

14 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 also entered the political arena, even Third, some blame the government for Conclusion though their membership base is small.27 continuing economic hardship,33 and The challenge to Tunisia’s security The heterogeneous Salafist landscape and claim that the current regime has failed clearly lies in the potential radicalization its various movements, most of which are to launch substantial socioeconomic of the country’s youth. With many informal, seem to play into the strength reforms.34 young Islamists still striving to find and visibility of the movement. their identity, a competition for the To the unease of Ennahda’s leadership, religiously conservative youth has The Salafists Threaten Ennahda’s Support this threefold criticism is actually emerged in Tunisia between Ennahda Base shared by many current members of its and the Salafists, with both offering With both Ennahda and the Salafists youth branch as well. Indeed, it seems youth-targeted religious lectures, and actively recruiting Tunisian youth, that the split between moderates and cultural and social activities. Ennahda’s some former members of Ennahda’s more radical activists, predominant solid institutional structures and youth branch have decided to join the among Ennahda’s senior members, historical legitimacy—derived from ultraconservatives, citing three main is even more pronounced within its its fierce opposition to Tunisia’s past reasons for their resolve.28 youth, pitting those who grew up as autocratic regimes and subsequent sons and daughters of exiled activists persecution—will continue to attract First, they were disappointed that in the liberal atmosphere of the West some young people. Yet Ennahda’s Ennahda did not support including a against those of political prisoners who important role in the political sphere, reference to Shari`a in the new Tunisian had remained in Tunisia, often under and the blame it must take for economic constitution.29 This decision led many harsh conditions. As a young Ennahda stagnation and political compromise, conservative Muslims to reproach member explained, which some conservative Muslims the Islamist party for betraying the perceive as contrary to the Islamic way of very spirit of Islam.30 Many Salafists when I grew up, my father, an life, will continue to play into the hands subsequently labeled Ennahda as “un- Ennahda activist, was in prison. of the Salafist movement. Also, the fact Islamic” and an ally of the West.31 I was lucky because my mother that some young Ennahda members worked and taught me a modern do not feel sufficiently included in the Second, many young conservative interpretation of Islam. But I am decisions taken by their leaders does Muslims feel that Ennahda is not doing more of an exception. Many other not play in favor of the ruling party. enough to “clean” the country of people young Islamists grew up in deep who had worked for the autocratic and poverty and did not receive this In the midst of this religious turmoil, the secular Ben Ali regime.32 Some cite this kind of education but instead trend toward ultraconservatism and the as one of the main reasons behind the watched Saudi TV. This led some increasing polarization between secular controversial behavior of the Leagues members of Ennahda’s youth and Islamist forces will continue to for the Protection of the Revolution, branch to become actually very attract some young Tunisian Muslims stating that if the government does not close to the current Salafi trend.35 to jihadism. Although Ennahda initially do enough to protect the country and its featured a “soft” approach to small-scale revolutionary objectives, this task must Therefore, when Ennahda decided religiously-motivated violence, it has be taken up by the people. against including a reference to Shari`a become increasingly uncompromising in the constitution, many young toward jihadism.37 It is also attempting, members were disappointed. They mostly through education, to prevent also reproached their leaders for not many of its young members from being consulted about the decision in defecting to ultraconservative religious advance.36 Integrating its youth, many movements. This may eventually signal of whom appear to be ideologically to society, including those who were active in accusing Ennahda of being 27 Personal interview, Mohammed Khouja, head of Re- detached from the leadership, seems to responsible for the death of Chokri form Front Party, Tunis, Tunisia, August 2012. be a difficult task for Ennahda. Belaid, that the true division in Tunisia is 28 Personal interviews, Salafists, former and current not between Islamists and secularists, but members of Ennahda’s youth branch, Tunis, Tunisia, between moderate and radical Islam. March 2013. 29 For details, see “Tunisia’s Ennahda to Oppose Sharia Anne Wolf is a graduate of Cambridge in Constitution,” Reuters, March 26, 2012. University specializing in North African 30 When Ennahda dropped a reference to Shari`a in the affairs. She works in Tunisia as a constitution, even some senior Ennahda members pro- 33 In some regions, youth unemployment is more than journalist, researcher and political risk tested in front of the Constituent Assembly. See Wafa Sdi- 30%. See “Tunisia Raises Economic, Social Challenges analyst. ri, “Tunisie: Habib Ellouz au Bardo assure qu’Ennahda Amid Historic Transformation,” International Monetary va oeuvrer pour l’inclusion de la chariaa dans la Consti- Fund, September 5, 2012. tution,” Tunisie Numerique, March 16, 2012. 34 Personal interviews, Salafists, former and current 37 For example, following the U.S. Embassy attack in 31 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack members of Ennahda youth branch, Tunis, Tunisia, September 2011, Tunisian authorities arrested more than for One Year,” Reuters, October 24, 2012. March 2013. 100 Salafists. While in prison, several Salafists engaged 32 Personal interviews, Salafists, former and current 35 Personal interview, member of Ennahda’s youth in a hunger strike resulting in the deaths of two activists. members of Ennahda youth branch, Tunis, Tunisia, branch, Tunis, Tunisia, March 2013. See “Tunisia Govt Faces Dilemma over Islamist Hunger March 2013. 36 Ibid. Strikes,” al-Arabiya, November 20, 2012.

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Rethinking The fundamental difficulty for are relevant to counterinsurgency, as counterinsurgency in such societies reluctance to accept conventional state Counterinsurgency in lies in the mismatch of the concept and institutions and policies undermines Somalia reality of the state. Counterinsurgency the viability of the two core tenets: a rests upon two fundamental principles: reformist government, and a cohesive By William Reno 1) there must be a government with the indigenous armed force. political will and capacity to reform in august 2011, soldiers from the African and effectively engage citizens; 2) This article examines how the shifting Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) there must be a cohesive indigenous loyalties of clan politics challenge the and Somali militias forced the militant armed force with the ability to protect centrality of the institutions of the state group al-Shabab out of Mogadishu. By the government and provide security as the drivers of actors’ interests and mid-2012, al-Shabab had lost control to civilians.4 Both tenets presuppose the real alignments in politics. It finds of much of Mogadishu’s hinterland. On that local political actors accept the that in the case of Somalia, there is an March 6, 2013, the UN Security Council existence of a state, that state collapse enduring resistance to the idea of the partially lifted an arms embargo, is temporary and state restoration is state—a fundamental tenet upon which allowing Somalia’s government to possible and desirable.5 State-building counterinsurgency rests.8 legally import light weapons to arm its tasks require clear distinctions between own forces.1 Somalia’s political situation insurgent and government, subversion Shifting Loyalties has improved considerably as well.2 and support, and legal and illicit, even The January 2013 French operation if it is acknowledged that individuals to rescue a security consultant Although this progress is real, Somalia’s often act on divided loyalties and that al-Shabab kidnapped in 2009 political logic of kinship (“clan”) based multiple motives.6 illustrates some difficulties facing social structures poses serious challenges counterinsurgency in Somalia. The to a sustainable counterinsurgency Key elements of politics in Somalia (as kidnapping of two French security strategy. These difficulties appear in in many collapsed states) violate this consultants sent to train Somali other collapsed states with relatively logic. Local authorities collaborate with Transitional Federal Government (TFG) egalitarian, small-scale societies where the insurgents that they fight. Armed soldiers was allegedly masterminded by political decisions involve constant groups unify and then suddenly split. a relative of a former minister in the wrangling and discussion. Historically, Political authority, personal honor, TFG and a deputy leader of the Islamic this behavior has frustrated external and social practices of vendetta and Courts Union (ICU), a predecessor of efforts to reliably identify and work protection become wrapped up in what al-Shabab.9 The kidnappers had joined with permanent leaders.3 Yet these are others see as subversion, infiltration the Islamist faction Hisbul Islamiyya not static societies. By the middle of and corruption, further blurring and almost all were part of government the 20th century, their leaders aspired externally defined distinctions between security forces; when former ICU leaders to construct effective institutions, licit or illicit activities. Scholars of joined the government, they took many manage local disputes through policing Somalia heatedly debate the importance powerful rank-and-file positions in the and state-administered justice, of these characteristics.7 These debates security and intelligence services.10 This and politically incorporate their provided groups within the ICU and communities—an earlier version of the 4 A classic formulation of combined political-military others associated with it access points state-building thrust of contemporary strategy appeared in Robert Thompson, Defeating Com- through which to infiltrate their agents, counterinsurgency. munist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Viet- collect intelligence, and operate in 11 nam (New York: Praeger, 1966). These principles also government territory. The patterns of appeared in David Kilcullen, “The Three Pillars of 1 Rick Gladstone, “Security Council Loosens Somalian Counterinsurgency,” U.S. Government Counterinsur- (1998): pp. 100-108. Arms Embargo,” New York Times, March 6, 2013. gency Conference, Washington, D.C., September 28, 8 Much of the data for this article is based on the author’s 2 The February 2012 London Conference brought 2006, available at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ visits to Somalia since 2006. together representatives of dozens of governments uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf. The U.S. 9 This is a perspective expressed in the author’s discus- and most major Somali groups to create a new national Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) sions with a Somali government official on July 4, 2012, government, reconstruct Somalia’s justice and security devoted considerable attention to “public diplomacy,” and in “Somalia: the Abduction of French Agents Well sectors, and sustain funding for AMISOM. International which presupposes a political strategy that includes an Planned, Sources,” Mareeg, April 15, 2013. backers denounced “spoilers” and pressed Somali leaders incumbent government acceptable to civilians. David 10 ICU forces suffered defeat at the hands of the Ethi- to appoint a legislature and write a new constitution. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice opian-backed TFG after December 2006. In December On August 20, 2012, a parliament was sworn in, and (New York: Praeger, 1964), noted the centrality of insti- 2008, ICU head Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad signed on September 10 it elected a president, Hassan Sheikh tutionally cohesive and coordinated “political action” to a power-sharing agreement with the TFG and became Mohamud. On January 17, 2013, the United States counter insurgents. TFG president in January 2009, a position that he held officially recognized Somalia’s government. See “London 5 Ibid. until August 2012. This agreement signaled the split of Conference on Somalia: Communique,” UK Foreign and 6 Ibid. the ICU and TFG into several new factions, with the ICU Commonwealth Office, February 23, 2012; “UN and 7 Catherine Besteman, “Representing Violence and ‘Oth- rejectionists continuing their armed opposition. Partners Issue Warning Against Somali Peace Process ering’ Somalia,” Cultural Anthropology 11:1 (1996): pp. 11 Several TFG officials and militia leaders revealed in Spoilers,” United Nations News Center, May 1, 2012. 120-133; I.M. Lewis, “Doing Violence to Ethnography: discussions with the author, which took place in Moga- 3 Meyer Fortes, The Dynamics of Clanship among the Tal- A Response to Catherine Besteman’s ‘Representing Vio- dishu in June and July 2012, that they had personal lensi (London: Oxford University Press, 1945). lence and ‘Othering’ Somalia,’” American Ethnologist 13:1 concerns about security due to perceived al-Shabab infil-

16 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 alliance and opposition would appear to These episodes show how family and possible attack,23 but the government facilitate this sharing of information and clan issues shape and influence conflict did not respond accordingly. This collaborative operations. For example, in Somalia, regardless of the wider begs the question whether al-Shabab Hisbul Islamiyya emerged among political shift to “reconstruction.” sympathizers in the security services the factions of the ICU that rejected a were to blame for the lack of action. A December 2008 power sharing deal These shifting loyalties continued as January 29, 2013, suicide bomb attack with the TFG. Hisbul Islamiyya then internationally-sponsored reforms at the prime minister’s home in the merged with al-Shabab in December gathered steam, as seen in the January presidential compound by a former 2010.12 In 2009, these groups fought 2013 French attempt to rescue the intelligence service employee—a together against the TFG in Mogadishu remaining hostage. Those rescuers compound that required clearance at at the same time that they fought against needed intelligence to locate their several checkpoints—also raised the each other in Kismayo.13 This situation target. The Somali government’s possibility of inside assistance.24 underlines the difficulty of applying National Security Agency (NSA),18 built rigid political labels to many of these with U.S. help, was supposed to assist, Clan Politics factions as they are prone to collaborate but given the infiltration of Islamist Infiltration points less to ideological in some areas and on particular issues group agents into the government’s commitment than to clan politics. A while fighting one another in other intelligence apparatus,19 they appeared large element of Somali politics involves instances, often in the service of clan or to lead the French into a trap instead.20 heads of clans and sub-clans playing other kinship obligations. The rescue attempt encountered heavily a pragmatic balancing game, seeking armed al-Shabab fighters who battled protection from stronger groups and The escape of one hostage a few weeks the French for several hours. An al- then shifting to balance them when one after the kidnapping of the security Shabab statement claimed that they had side becomes strong enough to threaten consultants sheds some light on intricate captured one of the French soldiers and its partner’s autonomy. Leaders in family and clan networks.14 Initially, killed another,21 while French officials al-Shabab and other groups have the two hostages in Hisbul Islamiyya’s announced that two soldiers were killed used clan politics to their advantage, hands drew al-Shabab onto the scene. A in the operation.22 offering protection to smaller clans that combination of threats and negotiations have been targets of other clans that left one hostage for Hisbul Islamiyya to The timing of a suicide bomb attack appropriate their lands and marginalize sell for a ransom and another with al- on Somali intelligence chief Khalif them in continuous and often violent Shabab.15 The ransom activated other Ahmed Ilig’s vehicle on March 18, 2013, political negotiations. For example, cleavages, as the original kidnappers also pointed to inside help. A week some members of the Warsangali sub- and the ultimate recipients of the ransom earlier, a government-allied militia clan, squeezed between Puntland quarreled over how this act and the warned Somali security services of a and Somaliland forces in disputes distribution of the money it generated over control of territory and business would affect the relative power of each supposed allies possibly indicated that local al-Shabab networks, accepted protection from the faction within the larger collection of commanders were concerned that their Hisbul Islamiyya al-Shabab-aligned militia commander 16 25 armed Islamist groups. The story became “allies” would use the kidnapping to their political and fi- Mohamed Said Atom. Yet even as al- more complex after that, but it underscored nancial benefit. An al-Shabab spokesman told a reporter Shabab (or the government) establishes the difficulties of viewing Somalia’s that “we shared the two men to avoid clashes between an alliance, they have to contend 17 political scene in terms of rigid labels. Islamists,” which is also a plausible assertion in line with with supporters whose loyalties are local custom to manage conflicts. See “Qaeda Linked divided between their partners and the tration into the security services. Infiltration is also dis- Somali Group Takes One of French Hostages,” Reuters, complex obligations of kinship. This cussed in Mohamed Mubarak, “Spying Game: Shabab’s July 16, 2009. This episode shows the ease with which was illustrated in Atom’s case, as an Double Agents in Somali Intelligence,” Jane’s Intelligence groups can intermingle and collaborate at the same time offensive on the part of the Puntland Review, March 2012. that they are in conflict over other issues. Authority resulted in the defection 12 “Somali Islamists al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam ‘to 18 Some Somalis alternately refer to this as NSSA and of several hundred of the al-Shabab- Merge,’” BBC, December 20, 2010. others as NSS. aligned fighters to the ranks of the 26 13 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Lesson from Kismayo,” Jihadica. 19 “French Somalia Raid ‘Was a Trap,’” Africa Confiden- Somali intelligence agency. com, October 6, 2009. tial 54:2 (2013). 14 “Somalia Hostage Tells of Escape,” BBC, August 26, 20 This report cited the French defense minister’s al- 23 Glen Johnson, “Mogadishu Calms, but the Line in the 2009. legation that al-Shabab fighters were forewarned of the Sand Blurs,” The Courier, April 6, 2013. 15 “Gunmen Snatch French Agents from Mogadishu French attack in the moments before the incident as lo- 24 These details are based on the author’s personal ob- Hotel,” Agence France-Presse, July 14, 2009; “Somalia cal residents detected the approaching French force. See servation of the compound several months earlier. The Moves to Free French Agents,” al-Jazira, July 15, 2009. “France Defends Failed Somali Raid as Toll Mounts,” author counted five checkpoints, including ones that ap- 16 Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Denis Allex, l’agent français Agence France-Presse, January 13, 2013. peared to search Somali government officials. See “Sui- otage en Somalie,” Le Monde, May 10, 2012. 21 “Second French Soldier Dies after Somalia Raid – cide Blast by Offices of Somalia President and PM,” BBC, 17 Allegedly, an Islamist faction with members in the Rebels,” BBC, January 14, 2013; “Soldat français tué en January 19, 2013. TFG president’s security force took the hostages and gave Somalie; les islamistes publient des photos,” Le Monde, 25 “Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea them to Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys’ faction of His- January 14, 2013. Issues List of Individuals Identified Pursuant to -Para bul Islamiyya which was not part of the power sharing 22 Peter Beaumont, “French Secret Service Hostage and graph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008),” United Nations Se- agreement with the TFG. Yet even though al-Shabab also Soldiers Killed in Somali Rescue Mission,” Guardian, curity Council, April 12, 2010. opposed the TFG, the al-Shabab confrontation with their January 12, 2013. 26 “Galaga Militia Prepares to Fight Puntland,” Somalia

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A good illustration of the fragmented leaders who are directly responsible builders mimic the radical Islamists, nature of identity and mobilization to kin and communities, tend to be provoking rounds of assassinations appeared in late 2009 as Islamist pragmatic to the extreme. and factional violence among those who groups around the port of Kismayo fear that new arrangements will be less fought foreign-backed TFG and Activities commonly labeled as flexible and will need to be counter- AMISOM forces. Earlier, al-Shabab corruption also reflect shifting clan balanced.33 Pragmatic local leaders produced a video professing support for politics and obligations to clan or family constantly play multiple sides, creating al-Qa`ida in 2008, with declarations lineage. A World Bank report in 2012 an exceptionally difficult social terrain of a common cause.27 Upon closer found that 68% of government revenues for insurgents and counterinsurgent examination, declaring allegiance to went missing.31 An unpublished UN state-builders. Many locals focus their al-Qa`ida could have been a power report told of government ministers ire on “Americans and other devils,” play of the Ras Kamboni Brigade, transferring government assets, often blaming all of their problems on foreign which was then still part of al-Shabab, cash, to associates.32 This activity, influence.34 to counter rival commander Hassan however, is integral to building and Dahir Aweys’ effort to assert personal sustaining political alliances. Officials Alternatives control over al-Shabab fighters.28 In are under great pressure to protect Alex de Waal argues that trying to any event, Aweys split from al-Shabab kin and allies. If they chose to follow change systems of conflict and social in February 2009 and created Hisbul proper administrative practice, they relations in states such as Somalia is Islamiyya to bring together dissident would lose authority among people that futile. He suggests playing to existing factions, including parts of the Ras they supposedly serve and powerful patronage networks embedded in local Kamboni Brigade. Then in February notables would shift support to other clan relations. The shifting constellation 2010, the Ras Kamboni Brigade joined groups, much as infiltrating the security of alliances and factional splits can be TFG forces in attacks on al-Shabab, services can be a way to hedge bets. harnessed for limited goals, much as while other elements of the brigade NATO forces in Afghanistan assembled rejoined al-Shabab.29 Life is difficult for state-builders and an alliance to topple the Taliban in violent Islamists alike since both can October 2001.35 Playing clan politics is This episode provides lessons to be deeply threatening to the social a well-known technique in the region, counterinsurgents who propose to networks around them. The insistence and Ethiopian officials practice it to bring different groups under a single on a distinct sphere of political life prevent the consolidation of Somali authority. The dispute was due in part separate or superior to personal and groups that might pursue irredentist to brigade members’ attachments to family agendas forces individuals to agendas among Ethiopia’s ethnic Somali the town of Ras Kamboni and its local decide whether to risk violating social population. Through this strategy, notables who had personal agendas. obligations to pursue an abstract Ethiopian forces supported Hawiye sub- Disputes over port revenues among political vision. This makes it difficult clan Islamist militias that splintered clan lineages in the town of Ras for foreigners to find reliable local from al-Shabab and other groups to ally Kamboni also influenced how these partners. Ultimately, foreigners in with the TFG.36 Islamist groups fractured, recombined Somalia’s conflict who are connected and shifted alliances.30 To others, this to big political projects almost always This approach argues for an extremely seems like a barely organized chaos, subordinate themselves to shifting light footprint, focusing on local islands the unpredictability of Somali political interests of Somali leaders to survive of stability maintained with indigenous behavior. Somalis may seem like they for any length of time. forces. Empowering a particular faction have very limited or tentative buy-in with a foreign-supported intelligence to agreements, and are unreliable and Foreign guests, whether military service like the NSA and a national army selfish. In fact, leaders, particularly local trainers, administrative experts or will generate subversion and infiltration radical Islamists, are tolerated in as other clan groups hedge their bets Report, April 2, 2012; personal interview, Puntland min- Somalia when they spend money and are and assemble new alliances, possibly in istry of security official, July 8, 2012. Those conversations useful in local power struggles. Yet those coordination with more violent Islamists, indicated that Puntland security forces are abundantly who try to spread radical visions too to oppose the new concentration of aware of the importance of kinship relations in shifting vigorously (whether jihad or upholding power. Private security contractors political allegiances. UN Security Council resolutions) may be especially destabilizing in local 27 Nick Grace, “Shabaab Leader Sanctioned as Zawahiri encounter what many of them regard as politics, as strongmen appear adept at Responds to Group’s Oath of Loyalty,” The Long War grasping and conniving local behavior. Journal, November 21, 2008. Usama bin Ladin also called Local notables complain that the state- 33 Personal interview, minor warlord, Mogadishu, So- for Somali cooperation. See Usama bin Ladin, “Fight On, malia, July 1, 2012. Champions of Somalia,” March 2009. 31 “Somalia Government Money Goes ‘Missing,’” BBC, 34 Personal interview, major warlord, Mogadishu, So- 28 “Islamist Ally Turns on Somalia’s al-Shabaab,” Voice June 1, 2012; “Summary of Financial Diagnostic Assess- malia, July 4, 2012, who otherwise helps Americans. of America, December 2, 2009; personal interviews, po- ment of ‘Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-10,’” 35 Alex de Waal, “Dollarised,” London Review of Books litical actors, Mogadishu, Somalia, July 2012. World Bank, May 30, 2012. 32:12 (2010): pp. 38-41. 29 “The Smiling Warlord Who Controls Ras Kamboni,” 32 “Advanced Copy – Report of the Monitoring Group 36 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists”; personal interview, Daily Nation, June 12, 2012. on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council former Ethiopian official who was stationed in Moga- 30 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” International Crisis resolution 2002 (2011),” United Nations Security Coun- dishu in conjunction with the Ethiopian intervention, Group, May 18, 2010. cil, June 2012. April 14, 2013.

18 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 incorporating them into local power February 2010, Sarkozy’s determined struggles between political rivals and France: A New Hard Line activism to secure his release led to a family disputes.37 on Kidnappings? diplomatic crisis in the region. Sarkozy placed diplomatic pressure on Amadou In collapsed states, a counterterrorism By Anne Giudicelli Toumani Touré, the president of Mali,4 component that includes alliances to agree to the kidnappers’ demands, an of convenience to target dangerous since 2003, militants in North Africa act that both undermined Bamako and individuals is about “as good as it gets.” have regularly kidnapped Westerners, exposed France to severe criticism from As a former Ethiopian official noted, including French nationals. The its partners and allies in the region, pragmatism may include supporting militant group most responsible was especially from Algeria.5 Algeria’s claim “the good al-Qa`ida against the bad the Salafist Group for Preaching and to regional counterterrorism leadership al-Qa`ida.”38 Drones are not especially Combat (GSPC), which merged with rests officially on the rejection of any welcome in Somalia, but their effects al-Qa`ida in 2006 and was renamed al- kind of negotiation with kidnappers and are registered much like other foreign Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on the fight against ransom payments.6 action, evaluated in terms of impact on in 2007.1 In most of these cases, France local politics and the risks they pose in appeared to negotiate with the hostage- After this incident, France launched a supporting a concentration of power. takers.2 Despite French denials, Paris military raid in July 2010 to try to free In this and other ways, the United has been accused of paying ransoms another hostage, Michel Germaneau, States is very influential in Somalia. to free French hostages in Lebanon, a 78-year-old humanitarian worker Its influence is contingent on this Iraq, Afghanistan and North Africa. kidnapped by AQIM in northern capacity to affect short-term outcomes According to former U.S. Ambassador Niger.7 In a break with tradition,8 the without becoming influential enough to Mali Vicki Huddleston, for example, raid was authorized after negotiations to cause commanders and politicians to France paid a ransom of $17 million in collaborate to oppose U.S. power. This 2010 in an attempt to free four French 4 In February 2010, French Foreign Minister Bernard 3 requires working within this system of hostages kidnapped by AQIM. Kouchner flied twice to Bamako, along with the Elysee’s politics that produces groups that ally general secretary, Claude Guéant, on the second trip. one day and then oppose each other Yet toward the end of President Nicolas French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited the Malian the next, and that will work with the Sarkozy’s term in office, France’s policy capital himself to bring Pierre Camatte back home on United States and within the Somali on kidnappings began to harden. Under February 25. government at the same time that they French President Francois Hollande, 5 According to several testimonies, four Islamists were subvert the institutions of that state. who assumed office in May 2012, France released from prison in Mali, as demanded by Camatte’s This will disappoint committed state- made clear that it would no longer kidnappers. France also reportedly compensated the builders who envision a government negotiate with kidnappers, and force Malian government financially in gratitude for its assis- that provides for and protects all would be used to rescue hostages when tance in resolving the Camatte case. Both Mauritania and civilians with the help of a cohesive possible. Algeria criticized the Malian authorities for having con- national army and police. sented to free four alleged terrorists—two Algerians, one This article examines the origins of Burkinabe and one Mauritanian. In protest of Bamako’s Dr. William Reno is a Professor of Political this evolution. It then questions the attitude, Nouakchott and Algiers recalled their ambassa- Science and Director of the Program of political capacity of assuming a new dors in Bamako. President Sarkozy denied any diplomat- African Studies at Northwestern University. hard line against kidnappers. It finds ic crisis while President Touré emphasized in return the He is the author of Corruption and State that France’s new aggressive policy persistent lack of a common action plan among regional Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge against kidnapping incidents will be partners in the fight against terrorism. University Press, 1995), Warlord Politics challenging to maintain, as the recent 6 Algiers has obtained approval from the Security Coun- and African States (Lynne Rienner, kidnapping of a French family in cil to add a clause to Resolution 1906 adopted in Decem- 1999) and Warfare in Independent Cameroon demonstrates. ber 2009 criminalizing the payment of ransoms to ter- Africa (Cambridge University Press, rorists groups. 2011). His current research investigates The Germaneau Precedent 7 “Al-Qa`ida Kills French Hostage,” al-Jazira, July 26, choices among armed group leaders as they France’s policy on kidnappings abroad 2010. confront social diversity (“clan” and ethnic changed after AQIM kidnapped 8 Before the Germaneau case, the only similar incident politics) in their efforts to build cohesive humanitarian aid worker Pierre occurred in April 2008 when French troops launched a organizations. Camatte in November 2009. In successful assault on Somali pirates, who had seized the French yacht Le Ponan and its 30 crewmembers in the 1 In February 2003, the GSPC kidnapped 32 European Gulf of Aden, while they were attempting to flee in the 37 This information is based on the author’s personal ob- tourists in the south of Algeria. Some were freed in May desert. The ship’s owner had previously paid a 1.7 mil- servations in Bossasso and Garowe, as well as personal 2003 in Algeria, and the rest in August 2003 in Mali. lion euro ransom to free the crew, and the French opera- interviews, TFG officials, Mogadishu, Somalia, 2012; 2 Due to a lack of formal evidence confirming such prac- tion ocurred after the pirates freed the hostages. In the “Somalia: New Guns on the Block,” Africa Confidential tices, the only common European doctrine boiled down Germaneau case, however, the raid occurred while the 51:25 (2010); Mark Mazzetti, “Private Army Formed to to never officially mentioning the existence of- coun hostage was still in the hands of the kidnappers, which Fight Somali Pirates Leaves Troubled Legacy,” New York terparties granted to the kidnappers, a fortiori when it differed from the April 2008 incident in Somalia. For de- Times, October 4, 2012. comes to ransom. tails, see Angela Doland, “French Troops Attack Somali 38 Personal interview, former Ethiopian official, Ga- 3 “France ‘Paid $17 Million’ Ransom for Mali Hostages,” Pirates After 30 Hostages Freed,” Washington Post, April rowe, Somalia, 2012. France24, February 8, 2013. 12, 2008.

19 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 failed,9 giving legitimacy to a joint before they could reach northern Mali.13 spiral that leads to ever-increasing Franco-Malian military operation Although both hostages died during the amounts being paid to hostage takers.”18 around Kidal in northern Mali, where assault, the operation confirmed the They considered that “the French the hostage had been spotted. The “turning point” in France’s management position, or rather the lack thereof, kidnappers murdered Germaneau in of hostage crises. France’s goal was blurs the message of resolve she wishes response to the raid.10 Nevertheless, to rely on the local armed forces and to send.”19 Sarkozy announced the action as a intervene before the militants reached “major turning point” with the intent the relative safety of northern Mali, Mali Crisis: The Point of No Return of breaking from French and European and thus avoid being drawn into In early 2013, France took a major shift “traditions” in the way such incidents negotiations. Alain Juppe, the French when it intervened in northern Mali minister of defense at the time, justified to unseat AQIM-affiliated militants France’s actions, stating that who had taken control of the region. “In official discourse, As Laurent Fabius, the French foreign France now refuses to doing nothing meant running a minister, explained, France could double risk: the risk of seeing our not allow northern Mali to become a concede that foreign hostages taken by their abductors “Sahelistan,” where militants could policy choices impact the to one of their refuges in the Sahel—and we know how they motives of militants or treat them—and a more global risk “An exception to this new kidnappers.” in that doing nothing would send policy on kidnappings the signal that France is no longer fighting terrorism.14 would discredit France’s engagement in Mali, its were handled previously.11 Sarkozy France’s new hard line policy did not, also said that from that point forward, however, occur abruptly. In September commitment to fighting “paying ransoms and freeing prisoners 2010, AQIM kidnapped seven expatriate terrorism, and encourage in exchange for innocent victims cannot workers abducted from the Arlit uranium be the (appropriate) strategy,”12 thus mine in Niger. Five months later, three more kidnap-for-ransom turning this precedent into the guiding of the workers were released, allegedly incidents in Africa.” principle of French policy. after a ransom was paid.15 Despite official denials, a number of testimonies In January 2011, France again have confirmed the initial allegations intervened militarily to try to free of negotiations by France, with the two kidnap Westerners, move them to the hostages. A joint French-Nigerien companies as intermediaries, leading to relative safe haven of northern Mali, and operation intercepted a convoy of the exchange of money.16 Two French then make ransom or other demands.20 militants—who had just recently ministers of parliament expressed their France pushed the UN Security Council abducted two Frenchmen in Niamey— concerns in a report on security in the to pass a resolution authorizing the use Sahel published in March 2012.17 They of force in Mali, and Paris called for the 9 Critics denounced a policy of double standards regard- called for a “clarification” of the French restoration of the country’s territorial ing the state’s mobilization to negotiate with hostage-tak- policy on ransoms “so as to break the integrity and constitutional order. ers, arguing that the state only attempted to free hostages based on political interests or the personal profile of the 13 The two Frenchmen were Antoine de Léocour and As the first French troops were specific hostage. According to these critics, Michel Ger- Vincent Delory, both 25-years-old. De Léocour was deployed to start Operation Serval in maneau was “less valuable” than Pierre Camatte, as the working for an NGO in Niger. Mali, French special forces attempted latter was an ex-Legion member and close to the French 14 Alain Juppe, interview for the French TV channel to rescue a French intelligence foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner. TF1, January 9, 2011. operative held by al-Shabab in Somalia 10 “French Hostage ‘Executed’ After Raid on al-Qaeda 15 “France ‘Paid $17 Million’ Ransom for Mali Hostag- since 2009. Despite the raid’s failure, Base,” France24, July 26, 2010. es.” the rescue mission demonstrated 11 In May 2006, the Times of London stated that France, 16 According to Vicki Huddleston, the former U.S. am- France’s new hard line policy against Italy and Germany agreed to pay $45 million in a deal to bassador to Mali, France paid $17 million to free French all terrorist groups, including those 21 free nine of its hostages kidnapped in Iraq. France alleg- hostages seized in Niger in 2010. In an interview aired on in Somalia. edly paid $25 million between December 2004 and June February 8, 2013, she said that “the ransoms, like other 2005 for the release of three journalists. As for the Sahel ransoms, were paid indirectly, ended in the hands of the 18 Ibid. zone, according to the assertions of Algerian authorities Malian government and were turned over, at least part of 19 Ibid. in September 2010, Madrid allegedly paid a total of $10.3 it, to the Salafis.” Other sources had earlier mentioned an 20 Laurent Fabius started to use the word “Sahelistan” in million for the release of three Spanish hostages in March amount of $13 million. See Angus MacKinnon, “France July 2012 to describe the situation in Mali as the next ter- and August 2010, Italy $4.7 million for the release of two Funded Mali Foes with Ransom Payments: US Envoy,” rorist sanctuary if no military action was conducted. hostages in the hands of AQIM in May of the same year, Agence France-Presse, February 8, 2013. 21 According to French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le and Austria $3.2 million for two hostages in April 2009. 17 “The Security Situation in the Countries of the Sahel Drian, the failed rescue mission in January 12, 2013, cost 12 Nicolas Sarkozy, “Opening Speech of the 18th Confer- Zone,” information report addressed March 2012 to the the life of the hostage, who was killed by his captors dur- ence of French Ambassadors,” Elysée Palace, August 25, Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly by ing the assault. A French soldier was killed and another 2010. Francois Loncle (PS) and Henri Plagnol (UMP). went missing and may have been killed. An estimated 17

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The attack on the In Amenas gas site French government suggested that the who had been abducted in northern by Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group22 hostage could have died as a result of Cameroon on February 19, 2013, already on January 16, 2013, five days after disease—and not killed at the hands raises questions, as it appears that the launch of Operation Serval, gave of AQIM—in perhaps another attempt France may have made an exception to the French government another to dissociate the military intervention the doctrine. Hollande said in a press opportunity to reaffirm its unfaltering from the hostages’ fate, further conference that secret talks had been resolve in such circumstances. As establishing France’s new hard line taking place for the past few weeks Hollande expressed his support for policy on kidnappings.27 to help secure their release, but that the somewhat controversial decision neither France nor GDF Suez paid a by the Algerian armed forces to Conclusion ransom to free them.29 intervene, he reiterated that “there The majority of citizens and the political could be no negotiation” with hostage- class support “Hollande’s method,” but Cameroonian media sources, however, takers.23 this backing remains fragile. Nothing revealed on April 25, 2013, that proves that it will survive the death approximately 16 Boko Haram members Such statements are also meant for of other hostages, new kidnappings were freed in exchange for the family’s the kidnappers; counterpropaganda or terrorist attacks targeting France’s release, and a ransom of $5-7 million is part of France’s new weaponry interests and nationals. To secure was allegedly paid.30 The origin of the of war. “Protecting our nationals, its success, France’s new policy on payment is still unclear, but according fighting against terrorism, securing kidnappings also includes pressure to Cameroonian sources, it may include our hostages’ release, there is no on hostages’ families to keep both both Cameroonian President Paul Biya’s contradiction in all that,” Hollande told confidentiality and confidence in the funds as well as indirect funding from the press in December 2012. “But I say state’s efforts to free their relatives GDF Suez.31 Should that information to the [AQIM-affiliated] hostage takers despite the temptation of publicizing be confirmed, it may jeopardize the [who are holding a number of French their cases.28 It is, however, not clear objectives of France’s new hard line nationals]: it is time you released whether private companies will in all policy against kidnappings and may them!”24 cases “play by the rules” and refrain only encourage such acts in the future. from paying ransoms. Such an injunction In official discourse, France now might be perceived as state interference Anne Giudicelli is a consultant and the refuses to concede that foreign policy in their business activities and internal founder of TERRORISC, a consulting choices impact the motives of militants management. organization in political and security risks, or kidnappers. According to France, strategic issues and decision-making. She the latest abduction of French nationals For now, the real challenge for worked in the Middle East section of the in Cameroon was unrelated to the Hollande’s presidency is to maintain French Ministry of Foreign and European French intervention in Mali despite the its hard line policy on kidnappings Affairs for eight years, in Paris as well kidnappers’ claims.25 despite obvious pressures. An as in other countries. After 9/11, Ms. exception to this new policy on Giudicelli has been in charge of analysis of In two successive statements sent to kidnappings would discredit France’s terrorism and Islamism in the Middle East the media at the end of March 2013, engagement in Mali, its commitment to and North Africa. AQIM said it executed Daniel Verdon, fighting terrorism, and encourage more a French hostage captured in northern kidnap-for-ransom incidents in Africa. Mali two years ago, in retaliation for France’s intervention in Mali.26 AQIM The recent hostage release of an warned that its other French captives executive from the French power were at risk. The information has not company GDF Suez and his family, yet been officially confirmed, but the 27 The French government said that intercepted phone members of the Somali al-Shabab militant group were conversations between the kidnappers suggested that also killed. See Jamey Keaten and Abdi Guled, “French Verdon may have died of natural causes before his sup- Commando Killed in Somalia Hostage Raid,” Associated posed execution. Verdon suffered from a number of Press, January 12, 2013. health complications. See “L’otage Philippe Verdon se- 22 Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former member of AQIM, rait mort de maladie,” Le Parisien, April 6, 2013. broke from the group in December 2012 and created his 28 Such an approach has been used in the case of two own militant unit, Those Who Sign in Blood. recent kidnappings in Afghanistan (a freelance photog- 23 “Hollande: Talks were Not an Option in Algeria Hos- rapher in November 2012 and a humanitarian worker tage Crisis,” Reuters, January 19, 2013. in January 2013) for whom French officials had made no 29 In a presidential communique released on April 19, 24 “Otages : «la parole crédible» n’est pas celle des ravis- previous public statement regarding their capture. Ac- Hollande thanked “the Cameroonian and Nigerian au- seurs, dit Hollande,” Liberation, December 27, 2012. cording to the French daily newspaper Le Monde, both thorities, which worked to achieve this outcome, and 25 “Rapts de 7 Français: Boko Haram responsable, pas families were warned that the policy of paying ransoms particularly [Cameroonian] President Biya in close coop- de lien avec le Mali, selon Paris,” Mali Actualités, April was over and that they were not allowed to act on their eration with France.” 29, 2013. own. The photographer said he escaped on April 8. As 30 “Libération des otages français: que s’est-il vraiment 26 “Qaeda Says French Hostage Executed in Mali,” for the French humanitarian, who was freed the same passé?” Journal du Cameroun, April 25, 2013. Agence France-Presse, March 20, 2013. day, conditions of his release remain unclear. 31 Ibid.

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Pakistani Taliban. Khan is a U.S. citizen March 9, 2013 (NIGERIA): Nigerian Recent Highlights in who came to the United States in 1994. security forces said that they killed 52 Terrorist Activity – New York Times, March 4 Boko Haram group militants during 10 days of fighting in Borno State. – Reuters, March 1, 2013 (SOMALIA): Suicide March 4, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber March 9 bombers detonated explosives at a in a vehicle killed five police officers in beachfront restaurant in Mogadishu, Mosul, Ninawa Province. – BBC, March 4 March 11, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide killing one civilian. – Reuters, March 1 bomber killed three people at a police March 4, 2013 (YEMEN): A suicide station in Dibis, northwest of Kirkuk. March 2, 2013 (MALI): The Chadian bomber in a vehicle killed 12 members Many of the wounded were students at military claimed to have killed Mokhtar of a pro-government militia in Lawdar, an adjacent Kurdish secondary school Belmokhtar, a former top operative Abyan Province. – BBC, March 4 for girls. – AFP, March 11 in al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) who now leads a group of March 5, 2013 (UNITED STATES): March 11, 2013 (IRAQ/SYRIA): The militants in the Sahel, in northern Mali. The Federal Bureau of Investigation Islamic State of Iraq, which is linked Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for arrested Reaz Qadir Khan, 48-years- to al-Qa`ida, claimed responsibility the deadly hostage-taking incident at old, on charges of aiding a suicide for killing 48 Syrian soldiers and state the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria in bomber who conducted an attack near employees who were in Iraq last week January. His death has not yet been the headquarters of Pakistan’s Inter- after fleeing across the border from a confirmed. Another top AQIM operative, Services Intelligence (ISI) in Lahore in Syrian rebel advance. The convoy of Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, was confirmed 2009. Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen Syrians was ambushed as it was escorted killed in northern Mali in late February living in southeast Portland, allegedly back home through Anbar Province. 2013. – Reuters, March 2 provided money and advice to one of the – Reuters, March 11 suicide bombers involved in the Lahore March 2, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- attack. Khan was a wastewater employee March 13, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A Taliban Pakistan threatened to bomb with Portland’s environmental services suicide bomber detonated explosives a mobile phone market in Peshawar, bureau since 2007. He is originally from amid crowds at a horseback game of saying that the market is responsible for Pakistan. – Los Angeles Times, March 5 buzkashi in northern Kunduz Province, the “shameless” selling of video clips, killing at least eight people. Buzkashi ring tones and accessories. Taliban March 5, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants shot to is Afghanistan’s national sport. – AFP, militants frequently claim that such death a leader of an anti-al-Qa`ida militia March 13 businesses are “un-Islamic.” – Dawn, in western Baghdad. – AP, March 5 March 2 March 14, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants March 6, 2013 (SOMALIA): The UN executed a large and complex assault on March 3, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Security Council voted to temporarily the Iraqi Justice Ministry in downtown detonated explosives between major lift part of the 21-year-old arms embargo Baghdad. The attack began with at shrines in the Shi`a city of Karbala, on Somalia, as part of an effort to allow least two explosions—one from a car causing a number of casualties. – al- the Somali government to purchase light bomb and the other believed to be from Arabiya, March 3 weapons. – New York Times, March 6 a suicide bomber—near the Justice Ministry. An estimated six gunmen March 3, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): March 7, 2013 (UNITED STATES): U.S. wearing police uniforms and suicide Militants ambushed a supply convoy authorities announced that they had vests then entered the ministry, where of Afghan National Army soldiers in captured Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, Usama they engaged in gunfire with security Warduj district in northern Badakhshan bin Ladin’s son-in-law and allegedly forces. After approximately one hour, Province, killing one soldier and a core official in al-Qa`ida. Jordanian security forces stormed the building kidnapping 22 others. Despite security officials reportedly handed and some of the militants detonated negotiation attempts, 16 of the soldiers Abu Ghaith over to U.S. custody, and he their explosive vests. An estimated were later executed, while six were is expected to appear in federal court in 24 people were killed in addition to freed. According to the New York Times, New York on March 8. – AP, March 7 the militants. The al-Qa`ida-linked “If the death toll was accurate, it was Islamic State of Iraq later claimed one of the single deadliest attacks on March 9, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A responsibility. – AP, March 14; Deutsche government soldiers by the insurgents suicide bomber attacked the gate to the Welle, March 17 in recent memory.” – New York Times, Defense Ministry in Kabul, killing nine March 6 civilians. The incident occurred during a March 14, 2013 (NIGERIA): Suspected visit to Afghanistan by U.S. Secretary of Boko Haram group militants attacked a March 4, 2013 (UNITED STATES): A Defense Chuck Hagel. – Reuters, March 9 prison in Borno town, reportedly freeing U.S. court found Hafiz Khan, 77-years- a number of prisoners. – ThisDayLive, old, guilty of two counts of conspiracy March 9, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A March 16 and two counts of providing material suicide bomber attacked a joint Afghan support to terrorists. Khan, the imam and foreign patrol in Khost Province, March 16, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): of a small mosque in Miami, provided killing seven civilians and a policeman. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb thousands of dollars of support to the – Reuters, March 9 (AQIM) appealed for new recruits to

22 april 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 4 fight against France’s “crusader” war in border with Orakzai Agency. - Dawn, March 23, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik- Mali. “The front of the Islamic Maghreb March 19 i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) threatened to today is in dire need of the support of assassinate former Pakistani President the sons of Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, March 19, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): Pervez Musharraf if he returns to the and Mauritania, to thwart the attack of Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb country as planned. The TTP said that Crusader France and defeat its agents (AQIM) reportedly announced that they would send a death squad to kill in the region, and empower the Islamic they beheaded French hostage Philippe Musharraf, who is supposed to arrive in project,” the statement read. – Reuters, Verdon. According to the statement, Pakistan on March 24. – CNN, March 25 March 17 AQIM killed Verdon on March 10 in revenge for France’s intervention in March 23, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide March 17, 2013 (IRAQ): A car bomb northern Mali. – AP, March 20; Los Angeles bomber drove an explosives-laden exploded near an outdoor market in Times, March 21 water tanker into a checkpoint in North Basra, killing at least nine people. Waziristan Agency of the Federally – Deutsche Welle, March 17 March 20, 2013 (UNITED STATES): Administered Tribal Areas, killing 17 U.S. prosecutors charged Ibrahim soldiers. – The News International, March 24; March 18, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen Suleiman Adnan Adam Harun (known Geo TV, March 24 and at least one suicide bomber attacked as “Spin Ghul”) with plotting to kill U.S. a court complex in Peshawar, killing at diplomats in Nigeria and conspiracy March 23, 2013 (PHILIPPINES): The least three people. – AP, March 18 to murder U.S. military personnel Abu Sayyaf Group released Warren in Afghanistan. Harun was captured Rodwell, an Australian man held March 18, 2013 (SOMALIA): A suicide in 2005 and extradited to New York captive by the group for 15 months. bomber in a car targeted a vehicle City last year. He was born in Saudi – BBC, March 22 carrying Somali intelligence chief Arabia. According to Fox News and the Khalif Ahmed Ilig and other officials Associated Press, “Authorities said they March 23, 2013 (SOMALIA): A female in Mogadishu. Before the bomber believe Harun killed American soldiers human rights worker was shot to death could reach his target, however, a during his time on the battlefield [in in Mogadishu. Two men with pistols commuter minibus passed in front of Afghanistan], where he was known as killed the worker, who was identified the government vehicle just as the bomb the ‘White Rose.’ They also said the only as “Zaynab.” – Garowe Online, exploded. Approximately 10 people died bomb conspiracy had targeted the U.S. March 23 in the blast, although the intelligence Embassy in Abuja and a consulate in chief survived with only minor injuries. another Nigerian city, but they provided March 24, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- – Los Angeles Times, March 18 no further details about the failed plot.” Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – Fox News, March 20 named Djamel Okacha as the successor March 18, 2013 (NIGERIA/ to Abdelhamid Abu Zeid, who was CAMEROON): Nigeria’s Boko Haram March 20, 2013 (MALI): A suicide killed in late February. Okacha, an militant group released a new hostage bomber detonated explosives at a Algerian, is reportedly close to AQIM tape, with audio of the French family it checkpoint in Timbuktu, killing one leader Abdelmalek Droukdel. Media recently kidnapped from Cameroon. On Malian soldier. It marked the first reports said that Okacha is 34-years- the tape, the militants also threatened suicide bombing in Timbuktu since the old. – Reuters, March 24 to execute more attacks in Cameroon if French-led offensive in January 2013. that country did not stop detaining the – Voice of America, March 21 March 24, 2013 (SOMALIA): Gunmen group’s followers. – RFI, March 18 shot to death Rahmo Abdukadir, March 21, 2013 (GLOBAL): The U.S. a female journalist, in Mogadishu. March 19, 2013 (IRAQ): A dozen car State Department offered $5 million – Capital FM, March 25 bombs and suicide blasts went off in rewards for information about two Shi`a districts in Baghdad and south of U.S. citizens who have fought with the March 25, 2013 (DENMARK): A Danish the capital, killing more than 50 people. militant group al-Shabab in Somalia. court found two Danish brothers guilty The incidents occurred on the 10th The two Americans have been identified of planning a terrorist attack with anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion as Omar Hammami (also known as Abu Somalia’s al-Shabab militants. The of Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein Mansur al-Amriki) and Jehad Mostafa, two brothers, of Somali origin, were from power. The Islamic State of Iraq a former California resident. – Voice of sentenced to three and a half years in claimed responsibility. – Dawn, March 19 America, March 21 prison. – AFP, March 25

March 19, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Hundreds March 21, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide March 25, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) bomber detonated explosives inside a Insurgents detonated a minivan filled militants flooded into the last bastion mosque in Damascus, killing at least with explosives outside a patrol base in of their rival group, Ansar-ul-Islam, 42 people. The blast reportedly killed Helmand Province, and then opened fire in the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency top Sunni Muslim preacher Shaykh with small-arms. One British soldier in the Federally Administered Tribal Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti, who was killed. – Telegraph, March 26 Areas. Ansar-ul-Islam’s remaining was a long-time supporter of Syrian fighters, including its leader, fled their President Bashar al-Assad. – Fox News, headquarters and took refuge near the March 21

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March 26, 2013 (TUNISIA): U.S. March 28, 2013 (THAILAND): Militants CTC Sentinel Staff General Carter Ham, the head of Africa detonated a roadside bomb and then shot Command, warned that “al-Qa`ida at Thai troops in Narathiwat Province, Editor-in-Chief intends to establish a presence in killing three soldiers. – AP, March 28 Erich Marquardt Tunisia.” – AP, March 27 Senior Editor, CTC March 29, 2013 (IRAQ): Car bombs March 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): exploded outside five Shi`a mosques Editorial Board An estimated eight suicide bombers in Baghdad and Kirkuk, killing 19 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. attacked a police headquarters in worshippers. – Reuters, March 29 Department Head Nangarhar Province, killing five Department of Social Sciences (West Point) officers. – Tolo News, March 26 March 29, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber tried to assassinate a senior COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. March 27, 2013 (UNITED STATES): Pakistani police commander near Deputy Department Head U.S. authorities arrested Eric Harroun, the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar. The Department of Social Sciences (West Point) a former U.S. Army soldier, at commander, Abdul Majeed Marwat, Dulles International Airport outside was only slightly injured in the attack, MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Washington, D.C. On March 28, the but 12 people, including two women, Director, CTC United States charged Harroun with were killed. – AFP, March 29 “conspiring to use a destructive device outside the United States.” Harroun, March 30, 2013 (MALI): A suicide 30-years-old, is accused of entering bomber detonated his explosives after Syria in January 2013 and fighting failing to force his way through the with the al-Nusra Front, a designated barricade at the western entrance terrorist organization fighting to to Timbuktu, wounding one Malian overthrow the regime of Syrian soldier. As part of the attack, other Contact President Bashar al-Assad. The al- militants managed to enter the city, Combating Terrorism Center Nusra front is considered a Salafi- yet Malian soldiers—backed by French U.S. Military Academy jihadi rebel group, with links to al- troops—killed two of them. – BBC, March 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Qa`ida in Iraq. Harroun, a Phoenix 31; AFP, March 31 West Point, NY 10996 native, served in the U.S. Army from Phone: (845) 667-6383 2000 until 2003. – New York Times, March 30, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A Email: [email protected] March 29 suicide bomber attacked a police patrol Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ in Katalang, 30 miles northeast of March 28, 2013 (GLOBAL): Al-Andalus, Peshawar. One policeman was killed. * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 the media arm for al-Qa`ida in the – AFP, March 30 Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), launched an official Twitter account. The account March 31, 2013 (NIGERIA): Nigerian name is @Andalus_Media. – AFP, troops reportedly killed 14 alleged March 28 members of Boko Haram in Kano. One soldier died in the raid. The military support March 28, 2013 (THAILAND): The said that the militants were planning an The Combating Terrorism Center would Thai government and representatives Easter Sunday attack in the city. – BBC, like to express its gratitude to its financial for the insurgents in southern March 31 supporters, for without their support and Thailand met to discuss peace terms. shared vision of the Center products like the Paradorn Pattanatabut, the chief of CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you Thailand’s National Security Council, are interested in learning more about how said that the Thai government will to support the Combating Terrorism Center, give the representatives one month to please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call demonstrate that they can control the Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association insurgents in the southern provinces. of Graduates at 845-446-1561. The representatives reportedly requested amnesty for insurgents, “including the lifting of arrest warrants against suspected insurgents, the release of prisoners convicted in southern violence cases, pending cases against suspected insurgents being dropped, The views expressed in this report are those of and a rebel suspects blacklist being the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, lifted,” according to one press report. the Department of the Army, or any other agency The next round of talks is scheduled for of the U.S. Government. April 29, 2013. - UPI, March 29

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