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Poland Political Briefing: Cyber Attack on E-Mail Boxes of Important Polish Politicians Konrad Rajca

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Poland Political Briefing: Cyber Attack on E-Mail Boxes of Important Polish Politicians Konrad Rajca ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 42, No. 1 (PL) July 2021 Poland political briefing: Cyber attack on e-mail boxes of important Polish politicians Konrad Rajca 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Cyber attack on e-mail boxes of important Polish politicians Summary In early June, there was a cyber attack on the private email boxes of many prominent Polish politicians and institutions. The most affected was the head of the Prime Minister's Office, Michał Dworczyk. Hackers broke into his and his wife's private email and social media accounts. The content of the private mailbox, containing correspondence with other politicians from the ruling camp, showing the "political kitchen" and internal disputes in the ruling camp, is published on the Telegram platform. However, content related to the country's defense has also appeared there. Polish authorities accuse Russia of the attack and do not refer to the content of the published materials, which, according to experts, may be a mixture of real and manipulated information. Donald Tusk, the former Polish Prime Minister and the President of the European Council, now the Head of the European People's Party, is returning to Polish politics. He took over again, after 7 years, as the chairman of the main Polish opposition party Civic Platform, which may influence changes on the Polish political scene. Introduction The head of the Prime Minister's Office, Michał Dworczyk (who coordinates the Polish National Vaccination Program, among other things), announced in early June that hackers had broken into his and his wife's email inboxes and their social media accounts. The politician said on Twitter that the relevant services had been informed about the case. He stressed at the same time that "no information of a classified, restricted, secret or top secret nature was contained in the hacked email inbox". In another statement, he said that some of the leaked messages were crafted. He reported that "attacks on his family's accounts in various communication channels, even involving children, continue". Materials from Dworczyk's mail on Telegram platform Documents allegedly from Minister Dworczyk's private email have been published since June 4 on the Telegram platform. The minister indicated in his statement that "the materials 1 were posted on the Telegram service, which was founded by two Russians" and that "due to his political activity, he has been banned from entering Belarus and Russia for 11 years." He stressed that he sees the whole situation as a "large-scale disinformation operation." He also reported that "it is clear to the government that some of the published documents and emails have been fabricated and that the main intention of the attackers is to spread disinformation and undermine trust in people who currently hold public office”. If we are to believe the content of the e-mails that were disclosed to the public, we see in them rather political cooking and revealed sympathies or possible disagreements within the power camp. But among the materials there were also probably confidential messages concerning the armament of the Polish army and revealing details of defense negotiations with other countries. The government has adopted a strategy of not confirming or denying the veracity of the published documents and emails. Polish authorities and services: Russians are responsible for the cyber attack According to the Polish Internal Security Agency and the Military Counterintelligence Service, the cyber attack affected people from various political options, as well as media workers and NGOs. According to the findings of the Polish services, "the list of targets of the sociotechnical attack carried out by the UNC1151 group included at least 4,350 e-mail addresses belonging to Polish citizens or functioning in Polish e-mail services." Polish services say they have credible information linking the UNC1151 group's activities to those of Russian special services. According to the Polish services, at least 500 users responded to the information prepared by the authors of the attack, "which significantly increased the probability of the effectiveness of the aggressors' actions." At the beginning of July, the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) also established that the attack had also affected the electronic mail system of the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish parliament), a spokesman for the minister coordinating special services, Stanislaw Żaryn, said. It affected representatives of all political forces. The leader of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, deputy prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński, also commented on the cyber attack in a special statement. - The analysis of our services and the special services of our allies allows us to unequivocally state that the cyber attack was carried out from the territory of the Russian Federation. Its scale and range are wide - emphasized Jaroslaw Kaczynski. He assured that currently the explanatory actions are being conducted, but also to secure the evidence. He appealed "to everyone for caution and not to join 2 the scenario of an operation planned against Polish officials and politicians of various options, whose one of the main goals is to strike Polish society and destabilize our country”. Poland informed its NATO and European Union allies that it had information indicating that the Russians were responsible for the attack. The subject of cyberattacks was discussed at NATO and European Union forums. Solidarity with Poland was expressed by the European Commission, NATO said it would "look into the matter" and cooperate in sharing information with Poland on the issue, and the U.S. State Department stressed that the government in Washington was ready to work with allies to counter hostile actions. Cyber attacks were the subject of a closed-door session of the Sejm, during which the government presented information on the issue. After the session, government spokesman Piotr Müller announced that large-scale disinformation activities can be expected in Poland in the near future, and the relevant Polish services are conducting activities to identify and have already identified some of the authors of these activities. Experts and opposition: procedures were not observed A publicist at the Polish portal Onet.pl, former diplomat and president of the Foundation Center for Strategic Analysis Witold Jurasz has doubts that Russians were behind the hacking of Minister Michał Dworczyk's mailbox. Jurasz reminds that a private mailbox can be easily hacked by an average hacker. - Experience has taught me that until I see the evidence on the table, I don't believe in assurances of those in power as well as the opposition. I am skeptical that Russian services are really behind this action. Russia is dangerous and I'm not downplaying the threat from Russia at all, but the Russians really can do better. I think that accusing Russia of such actions says a lot about our complexes. Poles can lose with Russians at the most, but not with Belarusians. When the leak was announced, my first thought was rather towards Belarus. Michał Dworczyk has relations with the Lukashenka regime rather than with Putin - says Witold Jurasz in an interview with the Demagog.org.pl portal. Witold Jurasz points out that everything indicates that the documents that have been revealed so far are true. - The question arises as to why Minister Michał Dworczyk used (for official matters) an email box on WP.pl. portal while Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki used Gmail? Perhaps they both thought it was a better solution than those in the government domain, which will be read by the Polish services headed by Mariusz Kaminski - says Witold Jurasz to the Demagog.org.pl portal. Similar accusations are raised by politicians from the opposition pointing to the unauthorized use of private email boxes for official correspondence. 3 Conclusion The cyber attack on Polish politicians and institutions showed the inadequacy of Polish procedures related to the prevention of cyber threats online concerning prominent persons in the state. It seems necessary to improve procedures regarding the use by politicians of private email accounts for official correspondence, and to increase the activity of Polish services related to the prevention of similar cyber attacks. It is also necessary to strengthen cooperation in this area with European Union and NATO partners. Former European Council President Donald Tusk returns to Polish politics Donald Tusk, former Polish Prime Minister (2007-2014) and President of the European Council (2014-2019), has become the interim head of Poland's main opposition party, the Civic Platform (PO), which was in power in Poland from 2007 to 2014. Tusk returned to Polish politics after a seven-year hiatus. The former head of the party Borys Budka resigned as chairman of PO. - The political reason for my return is my belief that the Platforma is necessary, it is needed - it is needed as a force, not as a memory - to win with Law and Justice (PiS) the fight for the future - said during the PO National Council the former head of the European Council Donald Tusk. Speaking about politicians of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS), he assessed that it is a "grotesque group of people", and speaking about the governments of the coalition's United Right party, he called them "a parody of dictatorship". - We are going for victory, because we are not afraid of you. We are going for victory because we are not helpless, because we are not used to the evil that you have done here - Tusk said. He in strong words criticized those in power, among others, for illegal, chaotic and incompetent actions during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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