APSA-COMPARATIVE POLITICS The Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association

Newsletter Volume 24, Issue II, Fall 2014  Newsletter Staff Letter from the Editors The present is no less opportune a time to reflect on changes in Europe itself. Hertie School of Governance New Future of Europe Berlin has recently commemorated 25 Berlin, Germany by Mark Hallerberg and Mark Kayser years since the passing of the Cold War into history. This anniversary has invit- Editors We dedicate this issue, our last, to Eu- ed reflection on the progress of Eastern rope. After three years at the helm, Europe both in cross-national compari- Mark Hallerberg we have completed our term and are son (e.g., Schleifer and Treisman, 2014) [email protected] passing on the editorship to the capa- and relative to the expectations at the ble hands of Matt and Sona Golder at time (e.g., Milanovic, 2014). Compari- Mark Andreas Kayser Penn State. We have chosen to focus on sons relative to expectations are gener- [email protected] Europe both out of recognition of the ally disappointing. 25th anniversary since the fall of the Our first author, Jonathan Slapin, argues Berlin Wall, but also to commemorate that neither the predicted downsides of Assistant Editor the Hertie School of Governance’s role EU enlargement – governance gridlock as the first institution outside of the Marina Pavlova in an enlarged organization – nor many United States to host the Comparative of its predicted benefits – more robust Politics Newsletter. It is fitting that the democracy and the rule of law in new Comparative Politics Newsletter was, Editorial Board member states – have come to fruition. to the best of our knowledge, the first That laws passed in new member states Dani Marinova APSA newsletter to venture abroad. as a precondition for membership have That this was possible speaks not only been poorly implemented in societies Anke Hassel to the subject and interests of our sec- missing social norms to support them tion but to the theme of our first issue: suggests that the EU should adopt a Stein Kuhnle the internationalization of political sci- more measured assessment of its ability ence. US trained scholars continue to to change societies. Piero Stanig spread out geographically but neverthe- less remain active in scholarly debates Lawrence Ezrow, Jonathan Homola and that are increasingly cross-national in Margit Tavits also focus on Eastern scope. One sees a large number of col- Europe but on a different aspect: the leagues from the US at the now nearly development of party systems. In con- five year old European Political Science trast to the established democracies of Association – roughly a quarter of at- Western Europe where voters reward tendees at the first meeting – and nu- policy moderation with votes, they find merous internationally based scholars that policy extremism is electorally re- at major US conferences. At the same warded in new democracies. In low in- time, research methods and, as Gerald formation environments, radical policy positions are easier to communicate to Contact Schneider (2014) has recently shown, voters. Hertie School of Governance productivity are converging. Political Friedrichstr. 180 science has indeed globalized and we The most impressive example of policy 10117 Berlin Germany are happy that we and the Comparative extremism and the failure of liberal de- Tel: +49 (0) 30 259219-0 Politics Newsletter could play a small mocracy to take root might be Hunga- Fax: +49 (0)30 259219-111 part in the process. ry. Grigore Pop-Eleches argues that the Hungarian experience is unlikely to be raise and address. It may indeed have repeated in other parts of Eastern Eu- required a crisis to push nation states rope. Although polarization is common to pool sovereignty on banking super- across the region, and illiberal instincts vision and regulation despite that fact of many governments and ministers all that EU fiscal constraints make it diffi- too common, the ability of Prime Min- cult for nations to act as lenders of last ister Orban’s government to institution- resort. alize its advantage in the constitution is As in previous issues, we again include unique, enabled by a rare confluence of reviews of several datasets that promise circumstances. to aid research in field. Barbara Geddes, Mark Hallerberg is Professor of Public While the EU might not have brought Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz dis- Management and Political Economy about the expected shift toward politi- cuss their Autocratic Regimes Dataset, at the Hertie School of Governance, e-mail: [email protected] cal liberalism in new members, it may Frederick Solt reviews the latest version have initiated unexpected develop- of his Standardized World Income Ine- ments elsewhere. A single European quality Database, and Hazel Feigenblatt market lowers the cost of regional seces- discusses the indicators for the Global sion by allowing small countries to still Integrity Report. enjoy economies of scale. Laia Balcells, Finally, as fits our final issue, we -in drawing on work with Alexander Kuo clude an article by one of our co-edi- and Jose Fernandez-Albertos, investi- tors, Mark Hallerberg, on the promise gates the degree to which demands for of a greater role for area studies centers greater autonomy stem from economic from the shift toward causal identifica- inequalities as opposed to, in the case of tion in comparative politics research. Spanish regions, language-based iden- Mark Kayser is Professor of Applied tity. Economic inequality between re- So long. We are no longer editors but Methods and Comparative Politics gions seems to play a smaller role than we look forward to seeing many of you at the Hertie School of Governance, expected. in person out there! e-mail: [email protected] In contrast to secessionist minorities, Table of Contents identity politics for majorities is often driven by national-level “our people NEW FUTURE OF EUROPE first” parties. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten -ob Post-Communist Transitions and European Integration 3 serves that the Sweden Democrats de- by Jonathan Slapin viate from the profile of their successful Party Positioning and Election Outcomes: Comparing Post-Communist Europe counterpars abroad. Radical right par- to Established Democracies 5 by Lawrence Ezrow, Jonathan Homola, Margit Tavits ties most often fail where they are least Authoritarian Backsliding in Eastern Europe - “Achievements” and Limitations 7 able to distance themselves from charg- by Grigore Pop-Eleches es of racism. Ivarsflaten points out that Redistribution and Regional Independence Movements 10 other than the French National Front by Laia Balcells – and now the Sweden Democrats – Unlikely New Kid on the Western European Radical Right Bloc 12 no other extremist party in Europe has by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten succeeded after directly embracing un- (Not) Completing Economic and Monetary Union through Banking Union 14 by David Howarth, Lucia Quaglia adorned nativism as their central plank. While many of this issue’s authors ex- DATA SECTION amine the consequences of EU expan- The Autocratic Regimes Data Set 16 by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz sion, David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia Version 5.0 of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 18 explain its deepening. A decade and by Frederick Solt a half after the introduction of EMU, The Global Integrity Report 19 Europe has moved toward its comple- by Hazel Feigenblatt tion with the introduction of a banking union. Why only now, and why in such THE PROFESSION a modest form, are questions that they The Enhanced Role of Area Studies Centers at American Universities 20 by Mark Hallerberg APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 2 NEW FUTURE OF EUROPE es that some thought enlargement lock that many thought would happen would have on EU decision-making immediately following enlargement has have not come to fruition. On the other also failed to materialize. Indeed, de- Post-Communist hand, enlargement has not proved to be spite its recent enlargements, the EU Transitions and European a panacea for problems of democratic has managed to react reasonably well Integration transition in Eastern Europe. to the economic crisis and has taken arguably unprecedented steps towards In a recent special issue of the Journal economic integration. In the same is- by Jonathan Slapin of European Public Policy, my co-edi- sue, Julia Gray and I find that the EU is tors Dan Kelemen, Anand Menon and The fall of Communism twenty-five not unique in comparative perspective. I have collected articles that explore the years ago has had profound effects on When examining regional agreements, complicated relationship between EU European integration. In the late 1980s we find that those with more members enlargement and integration (Kelemen it was virtually inconceivable that the often harbor greater ambitions than et al. 2014a). The volume’s contributors borders of the European Community those with fewer, but size has no im- find little evidence for the “conven- (as the European Union (EU) was then pact on the ability of the members of an tional wisdom” that suggests a trade-off known) would extend to Warsaw bloc agreement to meet the goals they set for between a wider organization – that is, nations. By the early 1990s, it seemed themselves (Slapin and Gray 2014). almost inevitable. Today eight post- one with more members – and a deeper Communist countries have been EU one – that is, one which fosters more Meanwhile, EU membership has not members for a full decade and two cooperation. In our own contribution had the transformative effect on new more for seven years. Prior to EU en- to the issue, we argue that there are members that some had hoped it largement, many predicted its effects strong theoretical reasons to think that might. There is little doubt that many would be largely positive for the post- enlargement may actually facilitate co- new states have benefited tremendous- Communist nations (e.g. Vachudova operation (Kelemen et al. 2014b). For ly from membership, including from 2005) and mixed for existing members structural funds to improve infrastruc- (e.g. Schneider 2009). In post-Com- When the social norms ture and from Common Agricultural munist states, membership would help and conditions neces- Policy (CAP) funds to upgrade and im- prove farms. Nevertheless, troubles with secure democracy and rule of law and sary to support a law increase opportunities for trade and democracy remain throughout Eastern investment. The prospect of EU mem- do not already exist, Europe. Recently, Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, histrionically de- bership would ameliorate the pains of international pressure transition to market capitalism and clared that liberal democratic states are democracy. Existing members, mean- to create that law may no longer globally competitive and sug- while, would gain access to new mar- create perverse incen- gested he would move Hungary in a de- kets for their goods, benefit from a cidedly illiberal direction. Lisa Conant new source of cheap labor, and realize tives for governments has pointed to widespread problems increased security by having stable de- and citizens. of human rights violations across the mocracies as neighbors. However, these region, which have not receded with benefits would come at the cost of more example, increased transaction costs membership in the EU (Conant 2014). associated with decision-making in a competition. And the EU, itself, would In an ongoing research project, I bor- larger organization can lead members be hamstrung by its increasing size, its row concepts from the law and eco- to create and adhere to more formal decision-making processes ever more nomics literature to explain why EU rules, increasing institutionalization gridlocked (König and Bräuninger integration could have had unintend- and integration. Indeed, European lead- 2004). ed negative consequences for the rule ers have developed new rules regulat- of law in post-Communist countries After a decade of experience with post- ing speaking time and limiting the size (Slapin forthcoming). I argue that, at Communist countries as EU members, of delegations in the European Coun- the time of enlargement, governments we can now reflect on whether these cil and Council of Ministers. These in post-Communist countries felt im- predictions have come to pass. My re- changes have arguably made Council mense pressure to do whatever was cent research suggests that history has meetings more like legislative sessions required of them to become members. not played out as we thought it might. than forums for international diplo- The potential benefits of EU member- On the one hand, the dire consequenc- macy. Empirically, the legislative grid-

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 3 ship were great and the negative conse- older members. Moreover, laws meant other hand, the consequences may not quences of remaining on the sidelines to create one set of incentives in older have been as unambiguously good for were also likely large. As a condition of member states can have unintended the candidate countries as many hoped membership, new members agreed to consequences in post-Communist would be the case. Going forward, per- drastic reforms and they passed laws countries. A particularly good example haps the EU ought to be wary of further that they knew would be difficult to comes from the EU’s CAP. Post-com- enlargement in eastern and southeast- implement. Implementation problems munist land ownership patterns have ern Europe, not because of any havoc occurred both because the mandated meant that EU laws to support farms that enlargement would wreak on EU changes were costly, but also because create bizarre incentives in much of decision-making, but rather because the social norms and conditions neces- Eastern Europe. Beginning in the late the EU’s ability to change the condi- sary to support the new laws were 1990s and early 2000s, the EU slowly tions on the ground in any candidate lacking. altered farm support from the CAP to country is probably less than we would be less tied to the levels of production like to believe. I argue that when the social norms and and types of crops, reducing the market conditions necessary to support a law distortions that farm subsidies create. do not already exist, international pres- This policy has worked well in Western sure to create that law may create per- Europe where farmers own almost all verse incentives for governments and the farmland. In Eastern Europe, where citizens. The existence of these laws, farmland was collectivized under com- and a lack of observable compliance munism, the law has had unforeseen I provide empirical effects. With the fall of communism, much rural land was returned to the Jonathan Slapin is an Associate evidence that imple- descendants of the farmers who had Professor in the Department of mentation of and com- owned the land prior to collectivization. Political Science at the University However, these heirs now lived in cities of Houston. His email address is pliance with EU law is and they had no intention of returning [email protected] different in post-com- to farm the family land. Nevertheless, by fulfilling some basic requirements to munist members than have the land declared “farmland”, they in older members. have been able to apply for and collect direct payments from CAP perfectly le- with them, advertises to politicians, gally. While following the letter of the bureaucrats and citizens that societal law, these individuals clearly are not consensus regarding the importance of following the spirit. The legal literature these laws is absent. It is safe to ignore has dubbed this type of behavior “cre- any laws based on similar norms. Rath- ative compliance” and has argued that er than fostering new societal consen- it can have negative consequences for sus, these laws potentially undermine the rule of law (McBarnet and Whelan, the ability of law to shape behavior. 1991). The problem has been the source Their existence reveals to politicians, of some ill will towards the EU, espe- bureaucrats and citizens that it is ac- cially among citizens not lucky enough ceptable to write laws only to violate to have farmland they can claim. or ignore them. This dynamic could be particularly damaging in new democ- In short, this research suggests we racies where politicians and citizens are need to carefully examine the effects learning how rule of law works. of the fall of communism and Eastern enlargement on the EU and its new My work has been primarily theo- members. On the one hand, it has not retical, but I also provide empirical meant a collapse of EU institutions, evidence that implementation of and and warnings of dire consequences for compliance with EU law is different EU decision-making following enlarge- in post-Communist members than in ment were largely overblown. On the

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 4 ffg Party Positioning and model, that centrist parties gain more signal that helps to decrease ambiguity Election Outcomes: votes than noncentrist parties, has been and voter uncertainty about party posi- Comparing Post-Com- shown to hold in two-party settings tioning. This signal is likely to be most and multiparty settings. powerful in low-information environ- munist Europe to Estab- ments present in new democracies due In a recent article, “When Extremism lished Democracies to the lack of long-established party Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, reputations that otherwise would pro- and Party Support in Postcommunist by Lawrence Ezrow, Jonathan Homola, vide cues to voters about parties’ gen- Europe”, we argue that a similar rela- Margit Tavits eral policy profiles. tionship between party policy mod- Existing literature on the electoral con- eration and vote maximization is less To evaluate these arguments, we mea- sequences of party positioning has likely to exist in new democracies. By sured party policy extremism (i.e., party mostly focused on advanced democra- contrast, in these countries it is the dis- policy distances) and we collected party cies. In this context, macro-level re- tinctly non-centrist party positions that vote percentages. To measure how far a search looking at parties’ vote shares in attract more support. This expectation political party is from the mean voter real world multiparty elections con- is based on three specific arguments: position, we employed the Compara- cludes that parties typically gain votes First, the higher the voter uncertainty tive Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), when they are positioned closer to the about a party’s position, the less elec- which allowed us to construct measures center of the voter distribution (Ezrow toral support is it able to attract. Sec- of the mean citizen policy preference in 1 2005) . Most simulation-based empir- ond, the more centrist the policy posi- each country, as well as measures of the ical studies using individual-level sur- tion of a party, the more difficult it is parties’ positions as perceived by the vey data from real world multiparty for voters to discern what the party ac- citizens. Party extremism is measured, elections agree that centrist party posi- tually stands for. (Conversely, the more for each party, as the absolute distance tioning would increase popular support distinct (noncentrist) a party position, between the mean citizen preference (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Al- the clearer its message and the easier and the mean perceived position of the varez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000; Scho- it is for voters to identify its position.) party. field et l.a 1998a, b). These findings are Third, extreme party positioning on a Figure 1 plots the policy distances of in line with the traditional spatial mod- left-right scale is an especially potent parties along the x-axis, and their vote el of two-party electoral competition that predicts convergent party behavior (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich Figure 1: Party Extremism and Vote Share 1984), and with the theoretical models that assume probabilistic voting ac- cording to which parties maximize their vote shares by moderating their ideological policy programs in multi- party systems (Lin et al. 1999; de Palma et al. 1990)2. In short, the central elec- tion-level implication of the spatial 1 Niche parties, i.e., parties belonging to the Green, Communist, and the extreme-right Nationalist party families, are the exception (see Ezrow 2010). 2 This position, however, is somewhat con- tested. For example, the formal theoretical models that assume deterministic voting pre- dict noncentrist party behavior (Cox 1990; see also Adams 2001), and some simulation-based studies conclude that parties would maximize votes by presenting distinctly noncentrist positions (Adams and Merrill 1999, 2000). Still other studies highlight the relevance of valence characteristics in determining whether centrist Note: The figure presents party policy distances from the mean voter position and or noncentrist positioning is going to be more vote shares for parties in advanced and postcommunist democracies; including line of best fit. The data are based on respondents’ perceptions of parties’ left-right policy electorally beneficial (Schofield 2004; Schofield positions from the CSES. and Sened 2006).

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 5 percentages along the y-axis. The slope voters are more certain about their left- estimates of the “best-fit” lines for each right ideological positions than they are set of countries depict very clear and of the positions of moderate parties. different trends. In post-communist These results – between party policy democracies the effect of policy dis- distance, voter certainty, and vote share tance on vote share is distinctly positive – have important implications for our (Β = 2.54; p = .05), indicating that par- understanding of the differences in ties in post-communist democracies electoral competition between estab- Lawrence Ezrow is a Professor of tend to receive greater vote shares as lished and new democracies. The first Government at the University of their positions become more extreme. is that we have identified that extreme Essex. His email address is Alternatively, the negative slope-line parties systematically perform better [email protected] for parties in advanced democracies than moderate parties in new democ- (B = -2.37; p = .001) suggests that in racies, a finding that may seem obvious established democracies parties ben- in retrospect but that has not been ob- efit from adopting policies closer to the served empirically. The second impli- center of the voter distribution. cation is that this relationship emerges In our paper, we also test the mecha- because extreme positioning helps par- nisms that might explain the difference ties present clear policy signals to their in the “best fit” lines in Figure 1: name- electorates1. ly, we evaluate the relationship between Jonathan Homola is a Second Year Noam Lupu’s (forthcoming) research Graduate Student in the Depart- suggests that divergent party position- ment of Political Science at Wash- Extreme parties sys- ing enhances mass partisanship and ington University in St. Louis. His tematically perform strengthens ties to parties in the elector- email address is [email protected] better than moderate ate. If this is the case then party extrem- ism may in the long-term reduce the parties in new demo- uncertainty of the political landscape in cracies. This rela- newer democracies, strengthen party attachments in the electorate, and tionship emerges becau- thus weaken the relationship between se extreme positioning policy extremism and voter certainty (i.e. parties will not have to take ex- helps parties present treme positions to signal clearly to Margit Tavits is a Professor of voters). The incentives for parties to clear policy signals to Political Science at Washington present extreme positions might then their electorates. University in St. Louis. Her email decrease. address is [email protected] party policy extremism and voter cer- tainty; and the relationship between vot- er certainty and vote share. With respect to these relationships we report evi- dence that (1) uncertainty about party 1 Note that tradeoffs exist with respect to ex- positions repels voters, and (2) in new treme party competition: On the positive side, democracies, extreme positioning is es- parties taking clear stances on issues has been pecially effective in reducing voter un- shown to help voters make policy-based choices (Lachat 2008). However, it is simultaneously certainty about party positions because, less representative of the median voter position unlike in advanced democracies, other that is privileged by many theorists of democra- cues about party positions are lacking. cy (McDonald and Budge 2005; see also Powell 2000) and it has been associated with lower The evidence for (1) and (2) suggests levels of citizen satisfaction with democracy that in new democracies, non-centrist (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2011). Ultimately, most policy positions are electorally more scholars argue that too much extreme party beneficial than centrist ones, because success hurts the quality and stability of democ- racy (see, for example, Sani and Sartori 1983). APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 6 Authoritarian Backslid- Despite the inherent limitations of didates in a similar fashion, it cannot ing in Eastern Europe - checklist-type democracy scores be satisfactorily explained by either (Scheppele 2013), these scores capture “Achievements” and post-accession backsliding (Levitz and not only the well-known historical leg- Pop-Eleches 2010) or by the fallout of Limitations acy based differences between the vari- the economic crisis. ous sub-regions of the former commu- However, we need to be cautious about by Grigore Pop-Eleches nist bloc (Pop-Eleches 2007) but also being too easily reassured about the temporal trends, such as the gradual The last few years have brought mostly resilience of even flawed and shallow but continuous erosion of democracy bad news for liberal democracy in East- democracy in post-communist Eastern in the non-Baltic former Soviet repub- ern Europe. While bad news has come Europe. While we may interpret the lics, Ukraine’s backsliding under Yanu- to be expected from many of the for- recent political crises in Bulgaria, Ro- kovych1 and Hungary’s democratic de- mer Soviet republics, this new round of mania, and the Czech Republic as being cline since 2010 (especially with respect challenges has affected several new EU largely (dirty) business as usual, what is to judicial and media independence.)2 members, including the Czech Repub- more disconcerting is the tendency to lic, Bulgaria, Romania and particularly Worrisome as they are, these declines settle partisan conflict by trying to side- Hungary, raising the specter of a broad- do not yet amount to a substantial re- step or reshape democratic institutions, er regional trend. This paper evaluates versal of prior regime trends even for as happened most clearly in the Roma- the magnitude of this backsliding trend, the two clearest backsliders: Hungary nian government’s efforts to impeach analyzes its main causes and concludes and, until recently, Ukraine. More im- President Băsescu but was also an issue by discussing its implications for de- portantly, the graphs show that so far in the efforts by Czech President, Mi- mocracy in Eastern Europe. a broader regional authoritarian back- los Zeman, to ignore the parliamentary With respect to the first task, the an- sliding trend has not materialize among balance in appointing a personal friend swer depends quite a bit on whether we either the other new East European EU as Prime Minister. However, these ef- look at regime outcomes (as reflected member states or the Balkan EU candi- forts ultimately failed to result in the by a range of democratic governance dates. At most, we can detect a gradual type of difficult-to-reverse institutional indicators) or at the functioning, legiti- erosion in media freedom but since engineering that arguably cemented macy and stability of democratic insti- this trend started around 2005 and af- Orbán’s increasingly tight grip on pow- tutions. In terms of regime outcomes, fected both new EU members and can- er in Hungary. Thus, even some of the we can compare the temporal evolution 1 While Yanukovych’s fall has assuaged con- more problematic East European cases of several countries and country groups cerns about authoritarian consolidation, it is confirm the quantitative evidence sug- along three important dimensions of too early to speculate about the prospects of a gesting that so far the Hungarian model genuine democratic turnaround. democracy - electoral process, judicial 2 The decline in media freedom was dramatic has failed to produce significant region- framework and independence, and in- not only by regional standards but even com- al contagion. dependent media – as reflected in Free- pared to broader global trends: thus, according to the FH Press Freedom rankings, from 2010- What are the reasons for this conta- dom House’s Nations in Transit reports 12 Hungary experienced the largest two-year gion failure? An answer to this ques- of the past 15 years. decline of any country in the survey.

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 7 tion requires an assessment of the approval by popular domestic ingredients to Orbán’s suc- referendum that sty- cessful recipe and a broader discus- mied the enthusias- sion of the political dynamics of tic initial commit- contagion in the European context. ment to constituti- onal reform by the Domestically, the Hungarian constitu- Romanian govern- tional coup d’état benefited from sever- ment (Pop-Eleches al elements that are unlikely to be rep- 2013). licated in other countries at least in the short term. Most importantly, the uni- Internationally, the fied parliamentary supermajority which Hungarian govern- allowed Orbán to change the constitu- ment benefited from tion without any opposition input was a “first-comers advantage” that second Svoboda in Ukraine reminds us, po- the result of a combination of institu- generation would-be autocrats in the litical mobilization is not necessarily tional factors - a mixed electoral system EU sphere of influence won’t have. pro-democratic. Second, the growing in Hungary that has reliably produced Thus, Orbán’s ability to enact decisive partisan polarization between main- artificially large parliamentary majori- change with initially minimal interna- stream parties in many countries (in- ties - and a perfect political storm - the tional pushback was due to the tim- cluding Czech Republic, Romania and combination of a serious political scan- ing of his campaign in the midst of the Bulgaria) has contributed to a notice- dal and the fallout from the serious Euro crisis, and by Hungary’s reputa- able deterioration of public political economic crisis confronting Hungary tion as a regional democratic frontrun- discourse while at the same time pre- – that led to the implosion support for ner. By contrast, similar efforts by the venting political leaders from dealing the Hungarian Socialist and thus left Romanian government were met with with the pressing social and economic Orbán without credible mainstream stronger reactions from EU institutions problems facing the region, and thus political opponents. By contrast, the PR and resulted in more significant policy reinforcing the widespread cynicism reversals (Sedelmeier 2014). From this of East European publics towards their Even though EU’s insti- perspective, even though EU’s institu- political leaders and institutions (Mish- tutional instruments for tional instruments for disciplining its ler and Rose 1997). Whereas such dis- members are still woefully inadequate, affection may strengthen democratic disciplining its members there are reasons to be cautiously opti- oppositions in authoritarian countries are still woefully inade- mistic that the EU has learned an im- (such as Russia), in the largely demo- portant lesson from the Hungarian case cratic East European countries it will quate, there are reasons and will be more vigilant against similar further erode democratic legitimacy. to be cautiously opti- future efforts. Another encouraging de- Therefore, even though East European velopment, highlighted not just by the democracy has so far not been seriously mistic that the EU has Ukrainian Euromaidan protests but by threatened by extremist anti-systemic learned an important growing civic mobilization in tradition- parties, its weakened immune system ally more apathetic countries like Bul- after more than two decades of inef- lesson from the Hun- garia and Romania, is that a new gen- fective and corrupt governance makes garian case and will be eration of East European citizens may it vulnerable to authoritarian threats, finally express their political discontent as illustrated by the surprisingly weak more vigilant against not just by emigrating or protest voting domestic response to Orbán’s creeping similar future efforts. but in a more active fashion that con- authoritarianism and the strong show- strains the actions of political elites. ing of the extreme-right Jobbik party in systems of most other East European successive Hungarian elections. However, this cautious optimism needs countries are highly unlikely to produce to be tempered by several concerns Given the penchant of authoritarians such super-majorities. Furthermore, about the longer-term health of post- to learn from each other (Koesel and would-be copycats of Orbán’s revolu- communist democracy. First, as the Bunce 2013), the question is what les- tion are also likely to be constrained by prominent political activism of extrem- sons would-be autocrats in the region more restrictive procedures for consti- ist groups like Jobbik in Hungary and will learn from the Hungarian model tutional reforms, such as the need for

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 8 following Orbán’s successful reelection tially lead to a more balanced geopoliti- Redistribution and in 2014. They may try to emulate and cal competition between the erstwhile Regional Independence adapt democradura elements such as Cold War rivals. However, Russia’s Movements Fidesz’s increasingly tight control of heavy-handed actions in Crimea and the mass media and civil society. Or Eastern Ukraine lower the political ap- by Laia Balcells they could be inspired by its manipula- peal of playing the “Russian card” and tion of the electoral system, which al- may even trigger a rallying around the The fall of 2014 has arrived with several lowed it to win a 66.8% majority on a EU flag in an effort to counter the Rus- important events related to secession sub-45% vote share by increasing pro- sian threat. While the relative strength and regional autonomy in Western portion of single-member district seats of this countervailing phenomenon de- Europe. The people of Scotland voted and the extension of voting rights to pends on country/group-specific his- in September to stay in the United ethnic Hungarians living in neighbor- torical memories – not surprisingly the Kingdom in an unprecedented inde- ing countries. Alternatively, they may strongest anti-Russian reactions have pendence referendum in the European instead adopt potentially popular ele- come from Poland and the Baltics – Union. The regional government of ments from Fidesz’s rhetoric and policy Russia’s newfound military and politi- Catalonia is intending to hold a sim- agenda, such as the confrontational cal assertiveness in Eastern Europe may ilar vote early in November, although stance towards foreign companies and well strengthen the appeal of Europe both the Spanish government and the international financial institutions, or among East European elites and pub- Constitutional Court have denied the the mandatory public works program lics. While this scenario by no means possibility of a referendum on inde- for long-term social benefits recipients. guarantees the institutionalization of pendence (Chapell 2014) and thus it is Such appeals would not necessarily well-functioning liberal democracies in unclear how events will unfold in this infringe on formal democratic institu- the region, it will at least avert for now region. tions but will undermine liberal social the threat of genuine regional authori- and economic policies. tarian backsliding. The political geography of redistribu- Beyond the Hungarian model, the tion, to paraphrase Beramendi (2012), prospects for democratic stability in is highly intertwined with demands Eastern Europe will be affected by the for independence by ethnic or national rapidly evolving balance-of-power groups (Bolton and Roland 1997). At contest between Russia and the West. first glance, this might seem less the (Cameron and Orenstein 2012) While case of Scotland, a net recipient of re- the importance of this struggle is most distribution in the United Kingdom, obvious in Ukraine and other EU ac- but it is clearly the case of Flanders and cession hopefuls in Russia’s “backyard” Grigore Pop-Eleches is an As- Catalonia, which are net contributors sociate Professor of Politics and (especially Moldova and Georgia), it in their respective countries. In Cata- International Affairs at Princeton also has important reverberations for lonia, support for independence has University - Woodrow Wilson the new East European EU members. rocketed since 2010, after a Constitu- School of Public and Interna- tional Court ruling against Catalonia’s One possibility, already hinted at by the tional Affairs. His email address is rapprochement between the Putin and new regional Constitution (i.e. Statute [email protected] Orbán governments, is that Russia will of Autonomy), which implied further try to play a more active role in East Eu- devolution. In Catalonia, grievances re- ropean politics by providing an alterna- lated to political horizontal inequality tive source of economic and political (Cedermann et al. 2011) and unstable support for governments and parties federal agreements have met unhappi- who run afoul of the EU’s liberal demo- ness for what is perceived as excessive cratic establishment. This would mark a regional redistribution towards other return to similar Russian efforts in the regions. Redistribution motives are early 1990s and while at the time those nonetheless often hard to distinguish initiatives ultimately failed, Russia’s from identity-related factors (Klor and stronger current economic position, Shayo 2010). In Spain, for example, coupled with the weaker EU leverage both the Basque Country and Catalo- among its new members, could poten- nia, those regions with the most salient

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 9 national identities, are among the four What explains the diverging set of learn Madrid is richer become more wealthiest regions in the country. preferences in Catalonia and the rest hostile towards redistribution, provid- of Spain? More broadly, to what extent ing some interesting (though limited) In research conducted with Alexander are political economy models versus support of models in which poor indi- Kuo and Jose Fernandez-Albertos, we “identity-oriented” explanations more viduals in rich regions oppose transfers explore the public opinion dimension important in explaining these prefer- out of their regions (Beramendi 2012). to this issue, and seek to measure more ences? In our research, we use obser- The rationale is that these beneficiaries carefully actual preferences for inter- vational data and experiments embed- of redistribution prefer redistribution regional redistribution at the individ- ded in survey data to try to disentangle to take place within regions instead of ual level using 2012 survey data from these factors. between regions. This finding is also Spain. Our survey data give some sense coherent with the intuition that poorer In our data, we find quite limited sup- of the correlates of individual-level sup- citizens in wealthier regions often sup- port for the most straightforward polit- port for different regional policy issues. port independence movements; this ical economic models that incorporate Even across countries where regional intuition should nonetheless be more both individual and regional income demands are salient, there has been rel- systematically tested3. as relevant predictors. As expected, in- atively less exploration of preferences dividuals in poorer regions tend to be To what extent are preferences for re- for distribution across regions in con- more supportive of regional redistribu- gional redistribution and political insti- trast to the voluminous literature on tion, though the effect is quite modest tutional arrangements linked? In Cata- inter-personal redistribution. We also (moving from the richest to the poor- lonia, our data confirms that there is a explore preferences for political cen- est region among Spain’s 19 regions significant correlation between prefer- tralization and, within Catalonia, pref- increases support for regional redis- ences against regional redistribution erences for supporting independence tribution by 10-12 percentage points). and support for independence, but this in a hypothetical referendum. Table 1 The effect of individual income is none- relationship could vary across contexts shows some descriptive statistics in our theless quite limited in most regions. It and time periods. We also find that data, suggesting an obvious “clash of turns out that individuals are not fully identity matters, independently of fiscal preferences” between Spain and Cata- informed about their own region’s place considerations. For example, language lonia. Indeed, most Spaniards outside in the distribution, as Figure 1 shows2. (i.e. mother tongue) is one of the most of Catalonia (n=1428, control group) We employ an experimental design to significant factors explaining support prefer more redistribution from richer see whether randomly informing some for independence in Catalonia, regard- to poorer regions, and also strongly individuals of the region’s correct place- less of individual income (Figure 2). prefer increased political centraliza- ment matters and we find that, on aver- tion. In contrast, in Catalonia most What about identity-based arguments age, individuals who learn their region respondents (n = 227, control group) for regional redistribution? In our data is poorer than thought are more sup- oppose redistribution from richer to from Spain, we find that the Basque portive of such redistribution. As for poorer regions and almost half of them Country and Catalonia are the regions individuals who learn their region is oppose the central government having where people show the least support for richer than thought, the effect of infor- more control over the regions1. In ad- inter-regional redistribution (consist- mation is partially driven by individu- dition, 54% of respondents in Catalonia ent with Amat 2012). At the individual als who learn their regions are net con- favor independence. level, we isolated the causal impact of tributors or not. Within the region of “out-group” concerns by experimental- Madrid, however, poor individuals who ly manipulating cultural primes; we did 1 In Catalonia 60% believe that some regions should have more autonomy for historical 2 There is generally a moderating bias as so by having respondents in the sam- reasons; 80% of Spaniards (outside Catalonia) individuals in rich regions underestimate their ple (in all regions) randomly evaluate disagree with this statement and favor “equal regions’ relative position, and individuals in treatment” of all regions. poor regions overestimate. some “out-group” regions (Catalonia, the Basque Country); within Catalonia, they randomly evaluated other regions. 3 Secessionist parties such as the SNP (in Scotland) and ERC (in Catalonia) make claims about the preservation of the welfare state and benefits that they argue are not possible to guarantee under the unity with Spain and the UK. In Scotland there is a significant correla- tion, at the Local Authority level, between work benefit claimants and Yes vote in the recent referendum (Ayres 2014). APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 10 We find that when Spaniards are primed Our overall findings cast doubt on a ing at creating supranational unity, it by being asked to evaluate the economic purely political economic model of also eased the quest for sovereignty of rankings of regions representing their preferences for regional redistribution disenchanted regions. The absence of a “out-group” they display greater prefer- and regional policy issues. Of course, clear threat of violence within the EU ences for inter-regional redistribution, a distinguishing between purely politi- and the democratic consolidation of result that holds throughout non-Cata- cal economic and ‘identity-oriented’ European states also encourage move- lan regions, even in areas that are also explanations remains an empirical ments such as the Scottish or the Cata- net-contributors such as Madrid. With- challenge, and more research could lan, which are using referenda/elec- in Catalonia, when respondents are be done along these lines. tions as a tool for self-determination. primed by the poorest region in Spain These peaceful secessionist movements Taking a broader perspective, many and therefore the most obvious net re- contrast with current experiences in political economy models argue that cipient of transfers (i.e. Extremadura), other parts of Eurasia and the world the growth of free trade in the world they show significantly distinct prefer- (i.e. Ukraine), as well as with past expe- economy stimulates the demand for ences for redistribution, becoming less riences in other regions of the UK and sovereignty in peripheral nations be- favorable to inter-regional redistribu- Spain, where terrorist groups fought for cause it reduces the net benefit of at- tion. Thus, out-group priming activates self-determination during decades. The tachment to a multinational state preferences for or against inter-regional bad news for the EU states is that seces- (Hecther 2000: 117; Alesina and Spo- redistribution, and might operate in sionism is far from gone in the conti- laore 2003; Rodrik 2012). The paradox conjunction with information. nent: in a way, they are a byproduct of of the European Union is that, by aim- the common market, monetary stabil- Figure 1: Difference in the perceived relative location ity, peace, and globalization. The good of the AC and the actual position news is that self-determination move- ments are now using the tools of non- violence to achieve their goals, and that the era of nationalist terrorism seems to be fortunately over in Western Europe.

Laia Balcells is an Assistant Balcells, Fernandex-Albertos and Kuo (2014) Professor in the Department of Figure 2: Vote in an Independent Referendum in Political Science at Duke University. Catalonia, by Income Decile and Language Her email address is [email protected]

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 11 Unlikely New Kid on timing: why did it take so long before These worries can be mobilized by a the Western European we saw a party like this rise to influ- political party. The political slogans Radical Right Bloc ence in Sweden compared to , in the picking up such worries by radical right two neighboring countries of Norway and far right parties across Western Eu- by Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and Denmark? In Norway, a radical rope come in many shapes and forms, right party has been around for several but the most widespread formula is In the recent Swedish General Elections decades and is now in government. In ”[X country´s people] first!” (so for ex- on September 14th, the Sweden Demo- Denmark, the radical right has been amples, Swedes first, Danes First, Aus- crats (SD, Sverigedemokraterna) won around as long and it became the trians first, the French first etc.) Cas 12,9 per cent of the national vote. The country’s largest party in the European Mudde´s term for this ideological out- SD thus became the third largest party Parliamentary Elections in June 2014. look is nativism, Jens Rydgren called it in the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) Yet, when we dig a bit deeper—which ethno-nationalism (Rydgren 2004). gaining 29 seats over the previous elec- I will do to the extent possible in this The table below shows how perfectly the tion, which was their national break- short piece—we discover that the rise Sweden Democrats’ voters line up with through, to finish at a total of 49 out of the Sweden Democrats is more puz- voters of many of the other prominent of 349 MPs. Sweden thereby joined the zling than at first glance. ”my country first” parties: The Norwe- ever-widening circle of Western Euro- But let us first look at the unsurpris- gian Progress Party (Fremskrittspar- pean countries that have an established, ing aspect of the recent Swedish elec- tiet), the Danish People´s Party (Dansk and politically influential, radical right tion result. A significant share of the folkeparti), the (True/Basic/Real/ or party. electorate in Sweden, as in the rest of simply) Finns Party (Perussuomalai- On the surface, the only thing about the Western Europe, is worried about im- set), Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), Swedish case that needs analysis is the migration and European integration. the Swiss People´s Party (Schweizeri- sche Volkspartei), the Dutch Freedom Party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid), and the French National Front (Front Na- tional). The voters are a heterogeneous bunch, but they are similar in that they are more exclusionist than other voters in their respective countries1. The pat- tern is exactly the same as I found and reported in an article in Comparative Political Studies in 2008. In that analy- sis, I used data from the first round of ESS data (2003) and argued that the voters of electorally successful radical right parties demand more exclusionist policies than other voters (Ivarsflaten 2008). The puzzling thing about the Sweden Democrats is then not that they mo- bilize voters on exclusionist policies, but that they have been around since 1988 without being able to gain any- thing other than notoriety until the two 2014 elections. Most Western Europe- an countries have at some point in the past three decades had several far right parties or groups that gained very few 1 The data is from round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS 2013). I am thankful to Lise Lund Bjånesøy for preparing the table based on analysis presented in her MA-thesis. APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 12 votes and limited, and nearly exclu- have had both personnel and reputa- The example of Front National shows sively negative, attention. The Brit- tional resources to draw upon when that it is possible to gain significant ish National Party and the National defending themselves and their vot- electoral support with this normatively Democratic Party of Germany are ers in these frequent and intense con- ambiguous balancing act, even with a the most prominent examples. What flicts over racism and/or hate speech. team that includes far-out extremists. is puzzling about the Sweden Demo- Among the successful populist radical But the examples of numerous failures crats is that this party has risen from right we have examples of parties that in other Western European countries these dubious origins to become an started out as agrarians, as tax-protest- suggest that this is not the easiest path electorally successful and influential ers, as regional independence move- to electoral success on the “my own political actor in Sweden. That is un- ments, or as EU-skeptics.1 country´s people first” ticket. usual. But this analysis leaves us with a few Consider the BNP and UKIP in the The voters of radical puzzling cases, and the Sweden Demo- UK. The electoral results in the last crats is one of them. For now it appears European elections showed clearly right parties are a that the political scientist leader of the how much more electorally successful heterogeneous bunch, Sweden Democrats, Jimmie Åkesson the UKIP formula is than that of the and some in the group around him, BNP. Nigel Farage is simply much bet- but they are similar in have managed something which I have ter placed, both in terms of personnel that they are more ex- only seen Jean Marie le Pen do with and reputational resources, to counter some level of success in Western Eu- charges of unacceptable racism than is clusionist than other ropean politics previously. They stub- Nick Griffin. In a way, what we have voters in their respec- bornly insist, from within organizations seen in Sweden since 2005 could be tive countries. that have extreme nationalist pasts, that compared to a Farage taking over the there is legitimate room for nationalism BNP and trying to reform it instead of In an article published last year, Scott in contemporary politics, and that one starting a new party such as UKIP.2 Blinder, Robert Ford and I examined can put the country´s own people first While it now appears that this unlikely the micro-level dynamic explaining without breaking non-discrimination operation might be working for the the failure of these German and Brit- and non-racism norms. Sweden Democrats—a party with 49 ish parties (Blinder, Ford, Ivarsflaten The Sweden Democrats’ political pro- MPs and local representatives across 2013). We show that a large share of gram has changed markedly in both Sweden will not suddenly disinte- voters in the UK and Germany worry language and content under the leader- grate—a primary reason is Åkesson´s about immigration, but that these ship of Jimmie Åkesson, who took over persistent efforts to distance the party same voters are also highly motivat- in 2005. Even the symbols changed—a from it´s past. ed to avoid making decisions based flower replaced the torch in the party on prejudice. In a series of general emblem. The growth in electoral sup- population survey experiments we port coincides with Åkesson´s take- find that these voters support exclu- over of the leadership and the modera- sionist policies, but not when their tion of the party´s policies. Åkesson normative concerns about prejudice now even says that the party has ”zero are triggered. In the experiments, the tolerance for racism.” SD party repre- mere mention of the BNP or NPD in sentatives are time and again exposed connection with integration policies making blatantly racist remarks or even Elisabeth Ivarsflaten is an Associ- triggered normative concern and engaging in racist violence (as in the ate Professor in the Department of effectively reduced support for the iron tube scandal), and Åkesson´s pub- Comparative Politics at University policy. In other words, these parties lic response has been that such behav- of Bergen. Her email address is are highly inefficient vehicles for -mo ior and such remarks are unacceptable. [email protected] bilizing worry over immigration.

The widely successful radical right 1 Other parties that are often counted among parties, by contrast, have become ex- the successful radical right are the Austrian parties FPÖ and BZÔ, the Italian Lega Nord, perts at defending themselves against 2 Interestingly, the Sweden Democrats were ac- and nowadays also the British UKIP. We lack accusations of prejudice and racism. cepted into Nigel Farage’s parliamentary group voter data on these parties in this round of the in the European Parliament after the 2014 Nearly all of the parties in the table ESS. European Elections. APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 13 (Not) Completing Eco- move to ‘complete’ EMU – proposed constrained by fiscal rules in the euro nomic and Monetary only in 2012, over twenty years after area. Consequently, the safeguard of fi- Union through Banking the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty? nancial stability is outside the control of Why has a certain design for BU been the national authorities and can only be 1 Union agreed and some elements of this de- achieved at the euro area level. For these sign prioritised over others? reasons, euro area member state govern- by David Howarth, Lucia Quaglia ments agreed (in some cases with great Our analysis takes as a starting point reluctance) to move to BU. In June 2012, the European heads of Dirk Schoenmaker’s ‘financial tri- state and government agreed to deep- lemma’ (2013), which examines the en Economic and Monetary Union interplay of financial stability, interna- Without the menace (EMU) by creating ‘Banking Union’ tional banking and national financial of a major crisis, it is (BU) which was to be based on five policies, arguing that any two of the difficult to see how euro components: a single rulebook on bank three objectives can be combined – capital and liquidity; a single frame- given the rise of globally systemic im- area member state go- work for banking supervision; a single portant banks – but not all three: one vernments would have framework for the managed resolution has to give. We argue that in the EU, of banks and financial institutions; a there is a fourth ‘objective’ to be con- accepted the loss of common deposit guarantee scheme; sidered, namely participation in the policy making powers and a common backstop for tempo- single currency, hence the ‘trilemma’ rary financial support. Since June 2012, becomes an ‘inconsistent quartet’. We that some elements of these five components of BU have been borrow from Padoa-Schioppa’s use of banking union require. discussed and mostly agreed, with one the term, applied to the context of Eu- noteworthy exception: little progress ropean monetary integration, just as The UK was positioned differently on was made on the common deposit Schoenmaker’s trilemma borrows from the fourth element of the quartet, name- guarantee scheme. Mundell-Fleming. On the one hand, ly the single currency, thus British policy On the one hand, BU amounts to a the single currency reinforced finan- makers had less reason to seek partici- radical initiative to rebuild financial cial (banking) integration in the euro pation in BU. Central and Eastern Euro- market confidence in both banks and area. On the other hand, the single pean member states of the EU that had sovereigns – especially in the euro area currency undermined national finan- banking systems dominated by foreign periphery – to stabilise the national cial policies, because the function of (mostly euro area) owned banks had an banking systems exposed directly to the lender of last resort could no longer be incentive to join BU because they were sovereign debt-bank loop (with weak- performed at the national level. More- not in a position to safeguard financial ening domestic banks holding a grow- over, national resolution powers are stability domestically. BU is to replace ing share of public sector debt) and to reverse the fragmentation of European financial markets. BU also implies a significant transfer of powers from the national to the EU (to be precise, the BU) level. On the other hand, the form of Banking Union agreed – what we call ‘BU-lite’ – is a considerable dilution of the June 2012 vision and far from the ‘completion’ of EMU promised by the European Council (2012). Why was BU – presented by proponents as a crucial 1 This short piece reports work in progress on a broader research project on Banking Union. David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia wish to thank the Luxembourg Fonds National de la Recherche (FNR) for the mobility-in research fellowship awarded. Some sections of this work were previously published in Howarth and Quaglia (2013b) and Howarth and Quaglia (2014). APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 14 the third element of Schoenmaker’s configuration of their national banking the SSM and comprehensive BU. The trilemma, namely national financial (and more broadly financial) systems. French were opposed to the creation of policies. National financial policies in- To diminish the likelihood of moral an asymmetrical framework that would clude regulation, which, even prior to hazard, creditor countries (notably Ger- involve ECB supervision of banks BU was largely set at the EU level; su- many) sought to establish clear limits to holding the large majority of French pervision, which for large systemically their financial assistance to ailing banks bank assets, while this would not be important banks is to be performed by and governments in debtor countries the case in Germany and some other the European Central Bank (ECB) / hit by the sovereign debt crisis – this countries. Countries that had ailing Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) accounted for the limited scope of the banking systems, such as Spain (or po- in BU; resolution, which is to be per- SRM, the difficulty to agree on a com- tentially Italy because of the fragile po- formed by the Single Resolution Me- mon DGS, and the limited amount of sition of the sovereign), also supported canism (SRM) in BU, accompanied by ESM funds and their conditional use. a more comprehensive BU. Most policy the creation of a common DGS (so far, makers from Central and Eastern Eu- The configuration of national banking postponed) and the use of the Euro- ropean Countries (CEECs) (whether systems, and in particular the degree of pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a inside or outwith the euro area) were concentration, internationalisation of common fiscal backstop (subject to a in favour of BU because of the strong the activities of nationally-based banks, host on conditions). (often dominant presence) of euro area foreign penetration as well as systemic (Western European) banks. Without the menace of a major crisis, it patterns in banking activities, shaped is difficult to see how euro area member national preferences on the SSM. The The configuration of state governments would have accepted very small number of German-based the loss of policy making powers that banks with major cross-border opera- national banking sys- some elements of BU require – and no- tions meant that one of the four ele- tems, and in particular tably the transfer of supervisory pow- ments of the inconsistent quartet was ers to the SSM. The possible collapse less relevant for German policy mak- the degree of concentra- of at least one major national banking ers, thus decreasing German interest tion, internationalisa- system – that of Spain – and the threat in BU. German policy makers resisted of contagion to other national banking the ECB’s supervision of the coun- tion of the activities of systems, convinced many European try’s public Landesbanken and savings nationally-based banks, policy makers on the need for a radical banks (what we label ‘local champi- foreign penetration as initiative. Indeed, the backtracking by ons’). These banks, subject to a distinct several euro area member states – and regulatory and supervisory regime, well as systemic pat- notably Germany – on the transfer of were seen as having a ‘public’ function terns in banking acti- policy making power after June 2012 in Germany with strong ties to local reflects, in part, the calming of interna- and regional governments and tradi- vities, shaped national tional markets and the decline in bond tionally reliant on Land governments preferences on the SSM. yields thanks to the ECB promise in for financial backing. German interest late July 2012 ‘to do whatever it takes’ in supranational European supervision The UK with its three massive ‘interna- to save the euro. of the country’s two largest commercial tional champions’ with comparatively banks was also limited given that their greater extra-European exposure had However, in order to understand the cross-border presence was more inter- less reason to seek participation in a version of BU adopted – what we refer national than euro area / EU focused. European BU. Like the CEECs, there to as BU-lite, a significantly watered The precise threshold for direct SSM was strong foreign bank penetration in down version of the June 2012 vision supervision was a subject of consider- the UK. However, unlike the CEECs, – we employ a comparative political able intergovernmental debate. foreign bank (non-EU) presence in the economy analysis of national prefer- UK was high – the highest in the EU ences. The countries that faced the Countries, such as France, which had a at approximately half of total foreign quartet because they were members banking system characterised by large bank assets and a quarter of total bank of EMU had however different prefer- internationally active banks (‘national/ assets – further explaining limited Brit- ences on the various elements of BU, European champions’) with a strong ish interest in banking supervision at depending on the concern of national cross-border presence particularly in the euro area / EU level. policy makers for moral hazard and the Europe, supported a wide scope for

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 15 The decision to create BU represents a ing to investigate alternative or rather DATA SECTION major development in European eco- complementary explanations for the nomic governance and European inte- coming about of BU, its shape and its gration history more generally. It will subsequent effects on the EU and its The Autocratic Regimes be a key topic in EU studies for years member states, for example by focus- to come in the same way as EMU ‘kept ing the attention on the role of ideas Data Set scholars busy’ for more than a decade. (or policy paradigms) and elite social- by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, As in the case of EMU, some initial isation (or the lack of it). Erica Frantz questions worth asking – which have been flagged in this piece and are ad- The Autocratic Regimes Data Set uses dressed in the broader research project newly collected information to identify that informs it – are: why was BU set all autocratic regimes in existence be- up and why did it take the shape it did. tween 1946 and 2010 (Geddes, Wright, Subsequently, once BU is fully opera- and Frantz 2014). Like prior versions of tional, interesting questions to investi- the data set, such as Geddes (1999, 2003) gate concern the functioning of BU and and Wright (2008), the new data include its effects across the EU, especially the David Howarth is a Professor of information on categories of regimes – or different ‘adaptation’ of member states Political Economy at the Univer- “regime types.” In addition, we record the to BU membership (or non member- sity of Luxembourg. His email exact calendar dates of the political event ship, as it might be the case). address is [email protected] that constitutes the start of new auto- cratic regimes and the collapse of incum- The decision to create bent regimes and describe these events in a brief narrative for each regime. We BU represents a major also code new variables that describe the development in Europe- regime breakdown events along three di- mensions: the subsequent regime after an economic governan- breakdown; the mode of regime break- ce. It will be a key topic down; and the level of political violence in EU studies for years Lucia Quaglia is a Professor of during the regime breakdown event. Political Science at the University to come in the same The first of these three variables, “subse- of York. Her email address is quent regime,” records whether the ruling way as EMU ‘kept scho- [email protected] group (in power on the following January lars busy’ for more than 1) is coded as a democracy, a failed state, or a different autocratic regime. This in- a decade. formation can then be used to code two As pointed out in this short piece, BU “types” of breakdown: democratization and new autocracy. While many studies also provides a stimulating testing treat democratization as the only type of ground / laboratory for scholars work- “failure” event when modeling autocratic ing on political economy and public instability, we find that over half of all au- policy. It provides the opportunity to tocratic regime breakdowns from 1946 contribute to the comparative political to 2010 result in a new autocracy – not a economy of national banking systems new democracy. (see Hardie and Howarth 2013; and Hardie et al. 2013), by investigating The substantive difference between -au first how the institutional configura- tocratic breakdown and democratization tion of national banking systems has has implications for many research ques- affected national preferences on BU tions. For example, some theories link and then how BU will impact upon economic performance to autocratic sur- the configuration of national banking vival, but analysts often use democratiza- systems. Feeding into the literature tion – rather than all autocratic regime on public policy, it would be interest- breakdowns – as a proxy for autocratic

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 16 collapse, leading to underestimates of others have noted that military coups continuous latent variables. In another autocratic vulnerability to economic are the primary means through which project, we have attempted to do this crisis. Efforts to explain how foreign individual leaders in dictatorships are using information on roughly 30 time- policy tools – such as economic sanc- ousted from power (Svolik 2009, Table varying variables (Geddes, Honaker, and tions and military intervention – influ- 1), we find that military coups account Wright 2014). Because collecting raw ence autocratic survival also frequently for about one-third (34%) of regime data for constructing time-varying la- assess their effect on the probability of breakdown events. Other methods of tent dimensions is incredibly costly and democratization. However, academics coercively ousting the regime, such as time-consuming, however, we encour- and policy-makers may want to know popular uprisings, rebel victories, and age other researchers to examine alter- not only whether interventions con- foreign invasions constitute roughly an- native methods, such as text-mining, for tribute to democratization, but also other third of regime breakdown events collecting these data (Ulfelder, Minhas, whether foreign-induced autocratic (31%). Finally, non-coercive events, and Ward 2014). collapse might lead to a new dictator- such as multiparty elections where the ship or a failed state. incumbent either does not compete or loses, constitute another third (34%). The second of these variables, “vio- lence,” records the reported level of The right panel of the Figure 1 shows lethal violence during the regime col- that military coups – as a method of re- lapse event. It takes one of four values: gime ouster – have declined in the past 0 for no deaths, 1 for 1–25 deaths, 2 for two decades, a finding consistent with 25–1,000 deaths, and 3 for more than that reported in Marinov and Goemans 1,000 deaths. We find in the period (2013). Other coercive modes of tran- Barbara Geddes is a Professor of Political Science at the University of 1946-2010 that non-violent regime sition, such as rebel ouster or popu- California, Los Angeles. Her email collapses are more frequent (125) than lar uprisings, as well as non-coercive address is [email protected] violent ones (98) and that this dis- methods, which are mostly elections, parity is not simply a post-Cold War remain the primary methods of regime phenomenon, as illustrated in the left ouster in the post-Cold War era. panel of Figure 1. Further, we show that Future updates to this data set – for ex- non-violent regime collapse events are ample extending the temporal coverage more likely to result in a subsequent from 1946-2010 to 1946-2015 – will democracy while violent regime col- continue to provide information on the lapses are more likely to yield a new regime breakdown events along these autocracy (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz three dimensions, but will not provide Joseph Wright is an Associate Pro- 2014, 325). updated coding on “regime types.” fessor in the Department of Political The final variable, “how end,” records While we acknowledge that the regime Science at Pennsylvania State Uni- the mode of regime breakdown by typology has been useful for many ap- versity. His email address is [email protected] category: foreign invasions, military plications in comparative politics and coups, popular uprisings, ousters by international relations, we believe the rebel insurgents, elections, and rule information captured in exclusive cat- changes by incumbent leaders. While egorical variables is best structured as

Erica Frantz is an Assistant Profes- sor in Political Science at Bridgewa- ter State University in Massachusetts. Her email address is [email protected]

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 17 Version 5.0 of the Stan- Before the SWIID, researchers were timates for the Gini index of market- and dardized World Income faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, net-income inequality in 174 countries Inequality Database they could maximize comparability by for as many years as possible from 1960 using data from only one source or, to the present, a total of more than 4600 perhaps, data calculated on a single country-year observations. by Frederick Solt combination of welfare definition and These data far outstrip the alternative da- equivalence scale. This meant, how- tasets in both coverage and comparability. Research on the causes and conse- ever, discarding most of the available The superior scope of the SWIID is easy quences of income inequality—or any information and giving up on making to see-it more than doubles the number comparison of levels and trends in in- many comparisons. On the other, they of country-year observations available come inequality across countries and could maximize country-year coverage in next largest cross-national income over time—depends on comparable by lumping diverse data together and inequality dataset. The quality of the data. Although there is a great deal of including dummy variables or other SWIID estimates, in turn, is evidenced data on inequality available for cross- similarly simple adjustments to capture by its record of out-of-sample prediction. national and over-time analyses, unfor- the differences among their differing Since 2008, the LIS has added data on 71 tunately most of these data are simply bases of calculation. This approach, country-years that had been already in- not comparable due to differences in though, involves making the assump- cluded in the SWIID. In only 5 of these the population covered, in terms of ge- tion that the differences between these 71 country-years - that is, in just 7% - are ography, age, and employment status; bases of calculation is always and ev- the differences between the LIS and the the welfare definition employed, such erywhere the same. This assumption earlier SWIID predictions substantively as market income or consumption; is clearly problematic: all governments and statistically significant. Similar tests the equivalence scale applied, such do not pursue the same redistributive of alternative datasets yield rates three to as household per capita or household policies, patterns of savings and con- eight times higher (Solt 2014). adult equivalent; and the treatment of sumption across households are not various other items, such as non-mon- the same in all countries, and so on. The SWIID can be accessed in two ways. etary income and imputed rents. The First, for straightforward comparisons of The SWIID is built on a custom mul- Standardized World Income Inequal- levels and trends in inequality or redis- tiple-imputation algorithm that mini- ity Database (SWIID) was introduced tribution over time in as many as four mizes reliance on such problematic in 2008 to provide researchers with countries, there is a user-friendly graphi- assumptions by using as much infor- income inequality data that maximize cal web app. The figure displays a sample mation as possible from proximate comparability for the broadest possible of the web app’s output. Second, for sta- years within the same country. The al- sample of countries and years (Solt tistical analysis, the dataset is available gorithm estimates inequality statistics 2009). Since then, it has become a pre- pre-formatted for use with the tools de- for the missing country-years in the ferred source not only for social scien- veloped for analyzing multiply imputed very high quality, but very sparse, Lux- tists pursuing broadly cross-national data in Stata and in R. Both can be found embourg Income Study (LIS) data— research on income inequality but also at http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt. Com- deservedly considered the gold stan- for NGOs and international organiza- plete replication files are also available dard of cross-nationally comparability tions. Version 5.0 of the dataset has just for download. in inequality data—using over 10,000 been released. observations of inequality drawn from major regional data collections such as Eurostat and the So- cio-Economic Data- base for Latin Ameri- ca and the Caribbean, from national statisti- Frederick Solt is an Assistant Profes- cal offices around the sor in the Department of Political world, and from the Science at the University of Iowa. His academic literature. email is [email protected] The result, in Version 5.0, is comparable es-

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 18 The Global Integrity Evidence-based Expert academic studies, etc.) to substantiate Report Assessment Methodology the scores. Global Integrity’s evidence-based ex- Personality, language, and culture can by Hazel Feigenblatt pert assessments require researchers all affect the interpretation of a particu- (typically journalists, academics or civil lar indicator and the score assigned to it. The Global Integrity Report is a tool society experts) to compile and docu- To minimize this effect and to maximize for understanding the existence, effec- ment data points as evidence to inform inter-coder reliability, Global Integrity tiveness, and citizen access to account- and support their own final assessment. provides researchers and peer reviewers ability and anti-corruption mecha- Rather than relying on experiences or with scoring criteria for every single in- nisms at the national level in countries preexisting perceptions by experts, the dicator. The scoring criteria anchor each around the world. strength of Global Integrity’s metho- indicator to a predefined set of criteria. Prepared by local researchers and dology is that it requires a variety of In essence, the scoring criteria guide journalists by combining quantitative current sources of information (legal the researcher and the peer reviewer by data gathering with qualitative report- review, interviews with experts, review suggesting, “If you see X on the ground, ing, the Report doesn’t measure the of media stories, statistics, review of score this indicator in the following disease of corruption. Rather, it seeks to understand the medicine applied to cure it: the public policies, institutions, and practices that deter, prevent, or punish corruption. By understanding where those institu- tions are stronger or weaker, we can anticipate where corruption is more or less likely to manifest itself within a country’s public sector. Rather than act as a “name and shame” tool, the Report focuses on concrete reforms that governments and citizens can im- plement to build systems of integrity within their own countries. Instead of third-party opinion polls or surveys, the Global Integrity Re- port is generated by teams of in-coun- try journalists and researchers who gather original information each year through document research and inter- views with key experts on the de jure as well as de facto reality of corruption and governance. Since 2004, Global Integrity has worked with more than 1,200 of the best anti-corruption researchers, aca- demics and journalists in more than 100 countries worldwide. Each annual Global Integrity Report consists of a unique sample of countries represent- ing a diversity of regions and income levels.

APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 19 way.” For “in law” indicators, scoring Example: 56 (legal framework) criteria are provided for “Yes (100)” and −26 (actual implementation) THE PROFESSION “No (0)” responses. For “in practice” =30 (implementation gap) indicators, scoring criteria are provid- In short, the implementation gap ed for 100, 50 and 0 – the researchers The Enhanced Role of shows how well existing laws, regula- also have the option to score 75 or 25 Area Study Centers at tions, and institutions are being imple- whenever the higher or lower defined mented. American Universities criteria do not accurately represent the research’s findings. It often helps to tell us whether the by Mark Hallerberg missing ingredients to good gover- Researchers must provide a fact-based nance are technical in nature – creating There is a sense that area study centers rationale to substantiate the score cho- new institutions or writing new laws – are in difficulty in the United States. An sen for each indicator. They must also or instead political. Large implementa- obvious reason is funding constraints. provide references to substantiate their tion gaps for countries are often found Political battles in Washington have had narratives. The double-blind nature where high-level political will for gov- tangible effects on the level of support of the peer review process guarantees ernance reform is weaker, particularly for National Resource Centers (Title feedback free of considerations associ- in aid-dependent countries where VI). Cuts of over 50% in funding restrict ated with who collected the data and governments adopt international best what such Centers can provide.In Politi- scored the indicators and avoids a peer- practices at the behest of foreign donor cal Science, more qualitative area stud- influenced consensus. and but then fail to fully implement ies work has difficulty getting published In the last two years, Global Integrity them in practice. in the top journals. There are also some has conducted an intense review, test- who argue that Area Studies Centers are The implementation gap also may re- ing and improvement of the methodol- certainly needed but are less relevant in veal interesting ways in which citizens ogy. Among other aspects, researchers public debates—in a controversial piece are invoking their rights. For example, are now required to go beyond the ex- in the New York Times, Nicolas Kristof even if no law explicitly grants public perts’ opinions and provide fact-based noted the decline of area studies in the access to financial disclosures of politi- information when possible, and they public space and argued that academics cians, citizens may be using freedom of 2 must provide a detailed narrative to need to do more “relevant” research. information laws and processes to ob- substantiate their scores. In addition, in tain that very same information. While this decline of Centers at Ameri- the future “in law” indicators will also can universities is palpable, it is also have a “moderate (50)” scoring option The Global Integrity Report is a work lamentable. Changes in research practic- between “Yes (100)” and “No (0).”1 in progress. Suggestions and critical es, economies, and technology make an feedback from the community are wel- effective Center as, or more, important come and valued. Please connect any to its constituencies today than was true Implementation Gap time with Hazel Feigenblatt, Global In- when National Resource Centers were One particularity of the Global Integ- tegrity’s Managing Director. first established in 1965. rity Report is that it includes what we To understand this argument, one call an “implementation gap” for each should begin with the key constituencies country. The implementation gap refers of such a Center. to the difference between the country’s legal framework for good governance The first constituency is the research and anti-corruption and the actual community. There is an irony that area implementation or enforcement of that studies in particular have been under same legal framework. attack precisely when the social scienc- Hazel Feigenblatt is Global es have turned back towards research methods that require more area skills 1 For the purpose of producing a country’s Integrity’s Managing Director for aggregate scorecard, a simple aggregation Research in Washington DC. Her rather than fewer. “Methods” have be- method is used. After the researcher scores each email address is hazel.feigenblatt@ indicator and Global Integrity, and with the come increasingly specialized. There is help from the peer reviewers, she conducts a globalintegrity.org much more focus in the academic lit- rigorous quality control process. Each indicator score is then averaged within its parent category. erature on causal mechanisms, endoge- The category score is in turn averaged with the other category scores to average and produce an 2 “Professors, We Need You!,” New York Times, overall country score. February 15,2014. APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 20 neity, and sample selection. For this is of course important. One way is to mechanisms they can appeal to both reason, top journals publish increas- promote exchanges of students with in the Commission and in the Court. ingly more articles that use survey re- other universities. This can be through Some policy areas require that the busi- sponses and experimental methods. In university summer programs based in ness succeed in reaching policy-makers development economics, experiments other countries or through bi-lateral in Brussels; Microsoft, Google, and have become the dominant technique. exchanges. I stress “exchange” because Apple all have large staffs within blocks Similarly, professional schools of pub- internationalization is not only about of the key European Commission build- lic health need people who can contex- taking one’s students abroad but having ings. Other policy areas demand more tualize the trials they do outside of the diversity on campus at home. The stark lobbying at the national level; a defense United States. reduction in cost for e-learning should contractor would do better being based break down borders and make it easier in national capitals like Paris or Lisbon. Any such work faces questions con- to bring international perspectives into Contrast this European set-up with the cerning internal and external validity. the classroom. goals of “ASEAN 2015,” which are to Take a study of tax compliance in Ar- promote the free movement of capital, gentina. Is the study internally valid, The third constituency is “policy-mak- goods, and “skilled labour” across the that is, does the causal story fit the en- ers.” In a mundane sense, they remain ten members as of next year. The ASE- vironment one finds in Argentina? Is an important source of funding. But AN staff based in Jakarta is small and there external validity, that is, does the they also need strong Centers to guide ineffective. Disputes among companies lesson one learns in Argentina travel policy decisions. This is something the based in different countries are gener- to other countries? Internal validity policy-makers themselves seem to rec- ally settled (if settled at all) in the World requires deep knowledge of a particu- ognize—in a study that surveyed staff at Trade Organization. There is potential lar setting; one cannot easily do an ex- the CIA, the State Department, and the for more coordination after 2015 across periment across 20 countries that is in- Department of Defense almost 70% of borders, but for now most lobbying ternally valid. Indeed, for this reason, respondents indicated that they found would make sense in national capitals. there has been a wave of recent work in area studies skills as most useful for A Center can educate businesses about single country settings, and especially their work (Avey and Desch 2014, 231). opportunities and challenges in such in emerging and low income countries Yet “policy-makers” include more than regions. (e.g., Samuels and Zucco (2014) on government officials in Washington. Re- Brazil, Grossman, Humphreys, and gional leaders need greater understand- In sum, there are important changes in Sacramone-Lutz (2014) on Uganda, ing of how international factors affect comparative politics research that make and Malesky, Gueorgeiev, and Jensen’s their work. Non-governmental organi- area study centers more relevant. In the forthcoming article on Vietnam). zations play an increasing role in pub- past, these Centers dropped in status as lic policy decisions, as do private busi- research moved toward big-n studies. I would expect that a good Center nesses. The increasing importance of single- would be a leader in connecting cut- country (area) causal identification re- ting edge methods in the research ar- The fourth constituency is the pub- search strategies implies a rise again of eas that the university promotes with lic sphere, which includes the general the Area Studies Center. cutting edge study of regions and public as well as the private sector. The countries. Moreover, the individual education of citizens does not end when studies almost by definition (e.g., they they leave school. Companies increas- are in one setting) do a poor job of ex- ingly benefit from international markets ternal validity. A good Center could and from foreign direct investment in coordinate and promote the standards the United States. To take one example, and knowledge necessary to improve consider how the business environment external validity across research stud- changes after the creation of two “com- ies. This, in turn, would promote the mon markets” in Europe and in East Asia research mission of the university. and whom any corporation will need to Mark Hallerberg is a Professor of Public interact with (or lobby) in these regions. Management and Political Economy at The second constituency is the stu- In Europe, there is a European Parlia- the Hertie School of Governance. His dent body of the university. A core ment, a European Court of Justice, and e-mail is: [email protected] mission is to educate students and to even a common currency in a majority prepare them for careers in the public of Member States. In terms of disputes and private sphere. How this is done among firms across countries, there are APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. 24, Issue II, Fall 2014 21 Section Officers About The Organized Section in Comparative Politics is the largest organized section in the APSA-Comparative Politics American Political Science Association (APSA). The Section organizes panels for the APSA’s annual meetings; awards annual prizes for best paper, best article, best book, and President best data set; and oversees and helps finance the publication of this newsletter, APSA-CP.

Duane Swank The section website is: Marquette University http://community.apsanet.org/comparativepolitics

Vice-President Past newsletters can be accessed at: http://community.apsanet.org/ComparativePolitics/ComparativePoliticsSectionNewsletter Robert Kaufman Rutgers University How to Subscribe Subscription to the APSA-CP Newsletter is a benefit to members of the Organized Sec- tion in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association. To join the Secretary/ Treasurer section, check the appropriate box when joining APSA or renewing your Association membership. You may join the APSA online at https://www.apsanet.org/about/memb- Nicholas van de Walle form_start.cfm Cornell University

List of Awards 2014

2015 Annual Meeting Program Chair Powell Graduate Mentoring Award Co-winners: Barbara Geddes (UCLA), Karen Remmer (Duke University). Grigore Pop-Eleches Princeton University Lijphart/Przeworski/Verba Data Set Award Winners: Hein Goemans (University of Rochester), Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (University of Es- Monica Nalepa sex), Giacomo Chiozza (Vanderbilt University) for Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders 1875-2004. Notre Dame Luebbert Best Book Award Council Members Winners: Susan Stokes (Yale University), Thad Dunning (University of California - Berkeley), Marcelo Nazareno (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina), Valeria Brusco (Universidad Jason Brownlee Nacional de Córdoba, Argentina) for “Brokers, Voters and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics,” New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. University of Texas Honorable Mentions: Leonardo R. Arriola (University of California - Berkeley) for “Multi-ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing in Opposition Election Campaigns”, New York: Cam- Thad Dunning bridge University Press, 2012; and Pablo Beramendi (Duke University) for “The Political Geogra- University of California, Berkeley phy of Inequality: Regions and Redistribution,” New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Tulia Falleti Luebbert Best Article Award University of Pennsylvania Stanislav Markus (University of Chicago) for “Secure Property as a Bottom-Up Process: Firms, Stakeholders, and Predators in Weak States,” World Politics 64 (No.2, 2012): 242-277. Pauline Jones-Luong University of Michigan Sage Best Paper Award Winner: Alberto Simpser (University of Chicago) for “The Intergenerational Persistence of At- Evan Lieberman titudes Towards Corruptions” (paper presented at the 2013 APSA Annual Meetings). Princeton University Honorable Mention: Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz (Michigan State University), Devra Moehler (University of Pennsylvania) for “Mobilization by the Media? A Field Experiment on Partisan Media Effects in A f r i c a”. Irfan Nooruddin The Ohio State University Copyright 2014 American Political Science Association.

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