Reassesing 1989: Lessons for the Future of Democracy
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Reassesing 1989: Lessons for the Future of Democracy edited by Rachel Tausendfreund with Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff | Karen Kornbluh | Janka Oertel | Paul Hockenos | Wawrzyniec Smoczynski | Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer & Martin Quencez | Jan Techau | Jack Janes | Laura Rosenberger | Lindsay Gorman BRUSSELS FORUM PREVIEW Four Different 1989s What a Difference 30 Years Make 35 The Misinterpretation of 1989 and Liberal Overreach 3 by THOMAS KLEINE-BROCKHOFF Fighting for a Democratic Future The End of Techno-Utopianism 8 by KAREN KORNBLUH Authoritarian Advance: How Authoritarian Regimes Upended Assumptions about Democratic Expansion 46 1989 with Chinese Characteristics 13 by LAURA ROSENBERGER by JANKA OERTEL A Silicon Curtain is Descending : Yugoslavia 1989: The Transition that Never Came 16 Technological Perils of the Next 30 Years 51 by PAUL HOCKENOS By LINDSAY GORMAN Freedom’s Legacies The Mixed Fruits of Poland’s Freedom 19 by WAWRZYNIEC SMOCZYŃSKI Can the Transatlantic Security Relationship Reach Adulthood? 23 by ALEXANDRA DE HOOP SCHEFFER & MARTIN QUENCEZ From Triumph to Travail: The EU’s 1989 Legacy 29 by JAN TECHAU Of Leadership And Burdens 32 by JACK JANES hen the Berlin Wall fell 30 years ago, many in the West dreamt of a The Misinterpretation of WEurope whole and free and at peace. Tis was back when the nations of Europe and North America agreed on the Paris Charter and its fairy- 1989 and Liberal Overreach tale ending, a “new age of democracy, freedom and unity” for Europe, and implicitly, for the entire world. It turned out somewhat diferently. by THOMAS KLEINE-BROCKHOFF Tree decades later, Europeans are neither unifed nor do they all live in peace and democracy. In the rest of the world things do not look any more promising. Instead, the types of government that get by without too much liberal democracy have been making a comeback. A new nationalism is tightening its grip on Western nations. Its target is no less than the idea of an international cooperation that is built on norms and rules and values. As German historian Andreas Roedder writes, today we are confronted with “the ruins of our expectations.” What went wrong? What has led to the recession of democracy, the resurgence of neo-authoritarianism, and ultimately the weakening of the liberal international order? BRUSSELS FORUM PREVIEW Te small cohort of “populism experts” have placed the sources of the crisis without end. To the south of Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany is in the domestic domain of Western democracies. Tey ofer two related enjoying its second economic miracle. Entire regions of the country are able explanations, an economic one and a cultural one. to report nearly full employment. Te gains have not been all in precarious The employments, as critics like to insinuate. Also in East Germany unemployment Misinterpretation According to the economic thesis, an ever-increasing global division of labor rates have been falling continuously, even if they are still higher than West of 1989 and Liberal Overreach has, over decades, prevented middle class incomes in many relevant Western German levels. And inequality is not rising at levels comparable to the United nations from rising. Income stagnation is deemed to be the cause of the States. On the contrary, the German Economic Research Institute states that by Thomas feeling of being lef behind which, in turn, has caused anti-elite and anti- “net incomes have been increasing signifcantly for large portions of society.” Kleine-Brockhoff internationalist sentiment. Te other interpretation sees a cultural backlash Compared with other western countries, income against a one-world-movement at work. As this narrative goes, globalization Economic factors inequality is below average in Germany and has for has made borders porous or even eliminated them, has created uncontrolled cannot account the most part, not increased since 2005. Before the migration thereby undermining the status of the nation state and its middle for the rise of the labor market reforms of the early 2000s inequality classes. Tis development has ultimately resulted a kind of political revolt. populist Alternative for had been increasing, largely because of Germany’s Germany (AfD), given then-overregulated economy which had helped Both explanations are not mutually exclusive. However, the mix between them that four out of fve to produce mass unemployment thus opening up varies from country to country. For France, Great Britain, and particularly the AfD-voters say they large income gaps between the employed and the United States, the economic thesis can help to explain what happened. In these were doing well or very unemployed or the underemployed. Te reforms countries, industrial production has been exported to China on a broad scale. well economically. and modernization of Germany’s industrial In several regions, this has led to the loss of well-paid jobs and to long term production combined with signifcant redistribution unemployment. dampened and even stopped the move towards growing inequality of net incomes. Recent data shows newly rising levels of income inequality. But it Especially in the United States, income distribution is signifcantly more could be a transitionary phenomenon, as the German Institute for Economic unequal today than several decades ago. Adjusted for infation, incomes of Research assumes. Te reason is deemed to be the large infux of immigrants full-time employees have not increased since 1980. In 1999, the median family since 2010. Many of them fnd themselves at the bottom of the income ladder, income in the United States was at $ 59.039. Seventeen years later, a typical at least initially. family had just $374 more at their disposal, again adjusted for infation. Te tremendous wealth gains that the innovation boom of the digital age has When labor shortage is the most signifcant problem of the labor market, generated found their way almost exclusively to the bank accounts of the top it is hard to argue that victimization from globalization and economic 10 per cent. Teir share of the America’s gross national product has risen from marginalization are at the heart of the anti-liberal revolt. As British historian 34 to 47 per cent since 1980. It should not come as a surprise that those people Timothy Garten Ash put it at an event here in Berlin, in regards to Germany will revolt when they consider themselves the victims of globalization and “it’s not the economy, stupid!” He points out that economic factors simply stand watching a new economic oligarchy develop in their own country. cannot account for the rise of the populist Alternative for Germany (AfD), BRUSSELS given that four out of fve AfD-voters say they were doing well or even very FORUM PREVIEW Te situation looks quite diferent in Northern and Central Europe. In Sweden, well economically. the economy has been growing since 2010, barely interrupted and at healthy rates. Growth rates of up to six per cent are quite unusual for mature industrial Given its lack of persuasive power, the economic thesis rarely helps to explain | 4 societies. Consequently, the unemployment rate is decreasing seemingly the rise of the anti-liberal movement in Germany and its afuent neighboring countries. Which leaves the cultural thesis and the sentiment of cultural distraction, for there is something else that has not been sufciently considered alienation and uprooting. It is remarkable how little attention has been payed in the discussion. It could be called the internationalist’s original sin: the self- to this phenomenon for years. According to Timothy Garton Ash, the ruling serving and lazy interpretation of the events of 1989 and their consequences The liberal majorities – in Germany as in other Western countries – have not only for the international order. Misinterpretation been ignoring dissenting opinions on migration and identity politics. Tey of 1989 and Liberal Overreach have delegitimized such views. Whoever voiced what did not fall into the In retrospect it is evident that afer the end of the Cold War, Western countries mainstream of liberal thinking was easily maligned as “sexist, racist, or fascist,” settled into a naive optimism about the future of the world. It was commonly by Thomas says Garton Ash. He attributes this behavior to an “illiberal liberalism” which believed that the triumph of capitalism over communism would translate into Kleine-Brockhoff will only tolerate liberal views, thereby turning liberalism on its head. the global triumph of the Western model of organizing society. Governing elites in Western countries proved themselves to be willing students of the Garten Ash does not primarily focus on inequality of incomes but inequality American scholar Francis Fukuyama. Tey adopted, repeated and trivialized of attention and, as he calls it, an “asymmetry of respect.” It is precisely this his thesis of “the end of history” and his expectation of a lasting democratic respect – the acknowledgment and consideration of their views – that populist peace. Unintended by Fukuyama, his theory became the blueprint of Western rebels want to regain. Te semi-authoritarian nationalists from Poland’s triumphalism. For it was not just optimism that won out, but a belief in “Law and Justice Party” (PIS) have developed a democratic determinism. Hope for a better future turned into certainty about Hope for a better battle cry from this observation: Tey promise the course of history. Yale University historian Timothy Snyder identifes future turned into the “redistribution