MEDIA AND MEDIA FREEDOMS
February, 2021
Publisher: Centre for Democracy and Human Rights – CEDEM (www.cedem.me) For publisher: Milena Bešić Author: prof. Miloš Bešić, PhD Associate: Marko Pejović Design and graphics: Brain studio, Podgorica
This project is partly funded by the USA Embassy to Podgorica. The opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations presented herein are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the State Department/USA Government.
2
Introduction
The Centre for Democracy and Human Rights – CEDEM, within the framework of the project “Strengthening the Capacities of Local Media for Reporting on Human and Minority Rights”, with the support of the USA Embassy to Podgorica, conducted the research on the topic of media and media freedoms in December 2020. Following the political changes that happened in 2020 and the removal of the Democratic Party of Socialists from power after thirty years, which was followed by special challenges for media and media actors, it is more than interesting to determine what goes on in the media scene. Especially when one has in mind the importance media have for the entire democratization process, as well as due to the challenges which media and their representatives have been faced with in recent years, not only in Montenegro, but on the entire western hemisphere. In short, the objectives/themes of the research can be defined in the following way: 1. Frequency of following different media 2. Frequency of following Internet portals 3. Measuring trust in media 4. Assessment of frequency and effects of fake news 5. Perception of the violation of media rights and freedoms 6. Position of journalists in Montenegro 7. Independence of media and influence of “power structures” on media reporting 8. Practice of media reporting on important issues and institutions 9. Relation between private and public media 10. Assessment of the work of institutions responsible for the improvement of media freedoms and the position of journalists
The survey was conducted from 10th to 21st December 2020. The total of 999 interviewees took part in the survey. The sample was double-stratified, with random selection of interviewees in final sampling units. Two levels of stratification are: region and size of polling stations. Since three regions had been defined, and within each one of those three categories of polling stations by their sizes, all nine strata were being individually addressed in the sampling process. Primary sampling units were the polling stations, secondary the households, and final – the interviewees inside the households. Primary units were selected using the method of probability, proportionately to the size; secondary units were selected using stop-and-step method, while the final units were selected using the method of birthday date. The sample is representative for the entire adult population in Montenegro, and the standard measurement error for the phenomena with 50% incidence is +/- 3.1%. After applying these sampling criteria, 17 Montenegrin municipalities were being included in this survey. The percentage of refusals to take part in the survey can be qualified as very satisfying (8%) and, on the basis of the interviewers’ reports, it cannot be attributed to any systematic factors, but to situation type. Data collection was being hindered due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the data collection, with a view to reducing measurement error, post-stratification was made by gender, age and ethnic background. Post-stratification weightings range from 0.75 to 1.40, thus having the scope of 0.65, the arithmetic mean of 1.033 and the median of 1.008. Skewness and Kurtosis distribution of post-stratification weightings indicate normal distribution. The instrument used in the survey consisted of nine demographic and 53 substantial questions. The questions were of both open and closed type. In most cases, the questions were in the form of a matrix aimed at detecting the structure of the interviewees’ views. In these situations, four-grade ordinal rating scales are used, and it is the same when it comes to measuring attitudes using Likert assessment scale,
3 only in this case, five-point scale was being used for measuring attitudes. Basic features of the sample are presented in the graph below. Graph 1: Demographic features of the interview ees
Coastal zone 26,0 Central part 44,0
Region North 30,0
Over EUR 1500 4,5 From EUR 1001 to 1500 5,9 From EUR 801 to 1000 8,5 From EUR 701 to 800 9,1 From EUR 601 to 700 14,6 From EUR 501 to 600 10,9 From EUR 401 to 500 13,0 From EUR 351 to 400 9,4 Income From EUR 301 to 350 7,1 From EUR 251 to 300 5,4 From EUR 201 to 250 4,7 from EUR 151 to 200 3,4 From EUR 101 to 150 1,7 from EUR 51 do 100 ,4 We have no income 1,4
Albanian 5,3 Bosniak_Moslim 12,7 Nation Serb 31,1 Montenegrin 50,9
55+ 32,8
Age 35-54 35,6 18-34 31,6
r Female 51,5 Male 48,5 Sex/Gende 0,0 10,0 20,0 30,0 40,0 50,0 60,0
Prior to exploring the attitudes on substantial issues, in our survey we determined the attitudes with regards to several questions concerning the situation in Montenegro. When it comes to the assessment of direction, a larger number of citizens consider that Montenegro has been moving along a wrong path, as compared to the reference number of those who think that Montenegro has been moving along the right path, with more than a significant number of those who have no attitudes with regards to this question (Graph 2).
4
Graph 2: Montenegro has been moving along - %
38,8 37,3
23,9
Right way Wrong way I don't know, I cannot assess
With our second question we wished to determine the level of satisfaction with the state of democracy in Montenegro (graph 3). The data indicate that there are just over 11% of very satisfied, while over 30% express moderate level of satisfaction. On the other hand, over one third of the citizens express moderate dissatisfaction, while every fifth citizen is very dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Montenegro. Graph 3: Generally speaking, how much are you satisfied with the state of democracy in Montenegro - %
34,5 31,1
20,2
11,4
2,8
I am very satisfied I am mainly I am mainly I am not satisfied No answer dissatisfied dissatisfied at all
The assessment of the future of democracy, however, is optimistic in relation to the estimate of the current state of democracy (Graph 4). In other words, citizens generally expect democracy to be progressing. More precisely, almost every fourth citizen thinks that in five years the situation will be considerably better, with almost 29% of those who think that the situation will be somewhat better. On the other hand, moderate pessimism is expressed by just over one fifth of the citizens, while, again, almost every fifth citizen has very pessimistic prediction with regards to the future state of democracy.
5
Graph 4. State of democracy in Montenegro in the next five years is going to be - %
28,7
22,1 21,6 19,5
8,2
Considerably A bit better A bit worse Considerably No answer better worse
The last introductory-type question is of general nature, but it concerns media, rather, it is about a strict assessment of the degree of trust towards media contents (Graph 5). The data indicate that there is a very small percentage of citizens who express their full trust, but there is over 35% of those who express that “they mostly have trust”. On the other hand, over 30% express the attitude of moderate distrust towards the media, with almost one fourth of those who demonstrate no trust in media. In other words, cumulatively, one can say that distrust is more prominent in relation to trust. Graph 5: Generally speaking, how much do you trust in what you can see/hear/read in the media - %
35,7 30,9
23,7
8,1
1,6
I have great trust I mainly have I have mainly no I have very little No answer trust trust trust
6
Graph 5.1: General trust in media: SUM trust vs SUM distrust
Trust Distrust
43,8 54,6
- %
Frequency of media following and trust in media
In the first place, the frequency of following all media is presented in the Table 1. In case all modalities of frequency are categorised in a clearer way, we can analyse the frequency of media following (Graph 6). The data indicate that TV is the most frequently followed type of media, then social networks and Internet portals. Radio is significantly less followed, with newspapers being the least followed.
Table 1: Frequency of media following - %
Many Several Once to Several Once to Several Once to Several Practically times a times a twice a times a twice a times a twice a times a never day day day week week month month year
Television 13.5 29.3 27.4 12.9 5.4 1.9 1.5 .7 7.3 Radio 6.2 5.3 9.8 9.4 10.2 4.9 3.1 2.8 48.3 Newspapers 1.1 1.9 5.4 10.5 8.5 7.7 5.1 4.0 55.9 Internet portals 6.3 15.3 19.1 11.9 4.9 1.2 .9 .2 40.2 Social networks 16.2 14.6 14.5 6.7 3.8 1.6 .8 .2 41.7
Graph 6: Frequency of media following by frequency categories - %
Every day Weekly Rarely Never
TELEVISION 70,2 18,3 4,1 7,3
SOCIAL NETWORKS 45,3 10,5 2,5 41,7
INTERNET PORTALS 40,7 16,8 2,3 40,2
RADIO 21,3 19,6 10,9 48,3
NEWSPAPERS 8,4 19,0 16,8 55,9
7 Media following frequency is presented in the Table 2 and in the Graph 7. The data indicate that the “Vijesti” portal has most visitors, as well as that every day, this portal is followed by every fourth Montenegrin citizen. The second, third and fourth portal by media following frequency rating are: “CDM” which is followed by over 16% of citizens a day, and the “RTCG” portal, which is followed daily by over 15% of citizens. Of other portals with significant rating, there is only the “Analitika” with somewhat below 12% of citizens following it on a daily basis. The rating of all other portals is below 10% on a daily level, and their hierarchy can be seen in the graph below. Table 2: Internet portals following frequency - %
Once Many Several Several Once to Several Once to Several to times a times a times a twice a times a twice a times a Never twice a day day week week month month year day Vijesti 2.3 10.8 11.2 12.8 7.0 2.3 1.2 .3 52.1 CDM .7 5.6 9.9 7.6 5.7 1.5 1.1 2.1 65.8 Analitika .2 4.5 7.0 5.9 3.5 2.6 1.6 1.2 73.5 RTCG 1.5 4.4 9.3 10.2 4.1 2.8 1.6 1.7 64.5 FOS media .4 1.5 3.3 6.0 3.5 2.6 1.8 .7 80.2 Aktuelno.me .3 2.0 3.5 4.6 4.2 3.0 1.3 .9 80.3 Kolektiv.me .4 1.7 4.9 5.1 3.1 2.2 1.6 1.9 79.0 IN4S .5 2.4 3.0 5.0 2.1 1.3 1.9 .8 82.8 Pobjeda .0 1.7 2.4 2.6 3.4 2.4 1.5 1.7 84.3 Mondo.me .8 1.1 2.8 3.5 2.8 1.6 .7 1.2 85.4 PCNEN .0 .7 .9 1.8 3.4 1.3 2.0 .7 89.3 Antena M .0 .8 2.0 4.1 3.7 2.9 2.3 1.5 82.7 Kodex.me .0 .7 1.4 2.8 2.4 1.5 1.5 .7 88.8 Standard.me .0 .6 1.2 1.4 1.6 .9 1.0 1.0 92.3 Borba .3 .9 2.1 3.6 1.0 1.2 .8 .6 89.5 Dan .3 .9 2.3 4.4 3.2 2.2 1.4 1.0 84.2
Graph 7: Internet portals following frequency by category - %
Every day Weekly Rarely Never
VIJESTI 24,3 19,8 3,8 52,1 CDM 16,2 13,3 4,7 65,8 RTCG 15,2 14,3 6,0 64,5 ANALITIKA 11,7 9,4 5,4 73,5 KOLEKTIV.ME 7,0 8,3 5,7 79,0 IN4S 6,0 7,2 4,1 82,8 AKTUELNO.ME 5,7 8,8 5,2 80,3 FOS MEDIA 5,3 9,5 5,0 80,2 MONDO.ME 4,8 6,4 3,5 85,4 POBJEDA 4,1 6,0 5,6 84,3 DAN 3,6 7,6 4,6 84,2 BORBA 3,34,62,6 89,5 ANTENA M 2,8 7,8 6,7 82,7 KODEX.ME 2,15,3 3,8 88,8 STANDARD.ME 1,83,02,9 92,3 PCNEN 1,65,1 4,0 89,3
8 Table 3: Trust in information on the portals - %
High level Some level Very little No trust Not of trust of trust trust following
Vijesti 8.3 24.5 11.3 3.9 52.1 CDM 2.9 15.4 10.4 7.8 63.6 Analitika 1.7 13.7 8.0 6.2 70.3 RTCG 6.1 15.4 8.1 6.8 63.6 FOS media 1.6 10.3 6.9 3.0 78.2 Aktuelno.me 1.1 8.2 7.8 3.4 79.5 Kolektiv.me 1.9 10.4 6.3 3.8 77.6 IN4S 2.6 8.3 4.3 3.0 81.8 Pobjeda .3 6.9 6.7 4.4 81.7 Mondo.me 2.3 5.1 5.7 3.7 83.3 PCNEN 1.5 4.6 4.3 2.4 87.1 Antena M .9 6.7 5.8 3.8 82.7 Kodex.me .4 5.3 5.4 2.1 86.8 Standard.me .3 2.3 4.9 2.2 90.3 Borba.me 1.1 4.1 4.4 2.4 88.0 Dan 3.9 7.0 4.0 2.1 82.9
Graph 8: Trust in information on Internet portals: SUM% trust vs SUM% distrust
Trust Distrust Doesn't follow
VIJESTI 32,8 15,2 52,1 RTCG 21,5 14,9 63,6 CDM 18,3 18,1 63,6 ANALITIKA 15,5 14,3 70,3 KOLEKTIV.ME 12,3 10,1 77,6 FOS MEDIA 11,9 9,8 78,2 DAN 11,0 6,1 82,9 IN4S 10,8 7,4 81,8 AKTUELNO.ME 9,3 11,2 79,5 ANTENA M 7,6 9,6 82,7 MONDO.ME 7,3 9,4 83,3 POBJEDA 7,2 11,1 81,7 PCNEN 6,2 6,8 87,1 KODEX.ME 5,7 7,5 86,8 BORBA.ME 5,1 6,9 88,0 STANDARD.ME 2,6 7,1 90,3
Irrespective of the Internet portals following frequency, we also measured the trust expressed by the citizens in relation to all portals (Table 3 and Graph 8). The data indicate that every third citizen has trust in the “Vijesti” portal which is the highest degree of trust measured. Then come the “RTCG” portal, with more than one in five citizens expressing trust in the same, while the trust in information published on the “CDM” portal is expressed by more than 18% of the citizens. Somewhat lower level of trust exists in relation to the information published on the “Analitika” portal, in which case the measured trust is over 15%. Over 10% of trust is pleasured when it comes to the following portals: “Kolektiv.me” (12.3%), “FOS MEDIA” (11.9%), “DAN” (11%), “IN4S” (10.8%). The “Aktuelno”
9 portal can be added here, recording almost 10% of trust. All other portals, by hierarchy, record lower level of trust. When it comes to newspapers, first of all in the Table 41 we are presenting the frequency of reading by all categories, and in the Graph 9 we are showing the account of categories integrated in several modalities. Generally speaking, the data indicate a low level of following the daily press, and in the category “daily and regularly”, the “DAN” daily have the largest readership, although the differences are very small. However, key information is that very few citizens follow any daily on a regular basis. Table 4: Dailies following frequency - %
I read almost I read rather I sometimes I rarely read I never read every day regularly read Pobjeda .6 3.6 10.2 12.2 73.4 Vijesti 2.2 4.0 12.9 13.7 67.3 DAN 2.0 5.4 11.9 12.5 68.1 Dnevne novine .6 3.1 10.1 8.0 78.3 Monitor .4 1.3 8.3 9.5 80.4
Graph 9: Newspapers following frequency by category - %
Everyday and regularly Occasionally and rarely Never
DAN 7,5 24,5 68,1
VIJESTI 6,2 26,6 67,3
POBJEDA 4,2 22,4 73,4
DNEVNE NOVINE 3,6 18,1 78,3
MONITOR 1,7 17,8 80,4
In the Table 5 and in the Graph 10, we are showing the level of trust in daily press. Almost 23% of the citizens express trust in the information they read in the “DAN” daily, and more than every fifth citizen trusts in the information published in the “Vijesti” daily. Furthermore, 18% of citizens more or less trusts the “Pobjeda” daily, while the trust in the “Dnevne novine” daily is somewhat at the level of 15%, whereas it is just over 12% in case of the “MONITOR”. Table 5: Trust in newspapers - %
1 It is the issue of data relevance when it comes to the “Monitor” having in mind that it is not the matter of a daily. The Graph, however, is showing the rating of this magazine together with the others since the category ’regularly’ is equally relevant irrespective of the frequency of publishing the “Monitor”.
10
I trust it to a I mostly trust I mostly do I have almost I do not read large extent it not trust it no trust newspapers
Pobjeda 1.8 16.2 8.4 7.5 66.0 Vijesti 3.2 17.8 10.8 3.9 64.4 DAN 4.2 18.7 8.8 6.7 61.5 Dnevne novine .4 14.4 8.1 10.7 66.3 Monitor 1.3 10.9 8.0 10.4 69.4
Graph 10: Trust in newspapers by category
Trust Distrust Doesn't follow
DAN 22,9 15,6 61,5
VIJESTI 20,9 14,7 64,4
POBJEDA 18,0 16,0 66,0
DNEVNE NOVINE 14,9 18,8 66,3
MONITOR 12,2 18,4 69,4
When it comes to the frequency of following TV channels, we are presenting the measurement scores in the Table 6 and Graph 11. The scores indicate that the “Vijesti” TV has the largest viewership and over half the citizens watch this TV station very frequently and frequently. Next comes the “RTCG 1”, which in the modalities “very frequently” and “frequently” has over 40% rating, and then the “PRVA” TV, which is followed by 30 % of citizens according to the same parameter. The “Nova M” is followed frequently and very frequently by almost one fourth of the citizens, whilst according to the same criterion the “RTCG 2” is followed by every fifth citizen. The rating of the remaining two TV stations is considerably lower. Table 6: TV stations viewing frequency - %
Very Frequently Rarely Very rarely Never frequently TV 16,7 35,5 23,4 10,1 14,3 Vijesti RTCG 1 10,1 30,4 24,8 13,1 21,5 RTCG 2 5,2 16,4 29,1 19,9 29,4 TV 8,7 21,9 25,5 14,3 29,6 PRVA Nova M 5,5 18,1 25,9 15,7 34,7 TV A1 1,7 3,6 19,8 19,7 55,2 TV7 1,0 2,6 16,9 16,7 62,9
Graph 11: TV stations viewing frequency by category
11 Very often and often Rarely and very rarely Never
TV VIJESTI 52,2 33,5 14,3
RTCG 1 40,5 37,9 21,5
TV PRVA 30,6 39,7 29,6
NOVA M 23,6 41,6 34,7
RTCG 2 21,6 49,0 29,4
TV A1 5,3 39,5 55,2
TV7 3,5 33,6 62,9
In the Table 7 and the Graph 12, there are the results of the measurement of trust in the information imparted on the TV stations. The data indicate that the citizens trust most to the “Vijesti” TV, to a smaller or greater degree (59%), only in this respect the difference between this TV station and the “RTCG 1” is considerably less pronounced in relation to the difference in viewing, since over 51% of citizens express their trust in the channel one of the public broadcasters. Then comes the “RTCG 2” with somewhat lower level of trust (over 46%), followed by the “PRVA” TV (43.8%), and “NOVA M” (38%). The remaining two stations enjoy the trust of less than one fourth of the citizens. Table 7. Trust in information on TV stations
I trust it to a I mostly do not I have almost No I mostly large extent trust it no trust response trust it
TV Vijesti 10,8 48,4 21,9 2,6 16,3 RTCG 1 8,5 42,9 21,1 7,7 19,8 RTCG 2 5,8 40,4 19,8 7,9 26,1 TV PRVA 4,3 39,5 21,8 4,3 30,1 Nova M 4,5 33,5 22,8 5,0 34,3 TV A1 1,7 23,3 18,1 8,6 48,4 TV7 1,1 20,8 15,4 9,8 53,0
Graph 12. Trust in information on TV stations: SUM% trust vs SUM% distrust
Trusts Doesn't trust No assessment
TV VIJESTI 59,2 24,5 16,3 RTCG 1 51,4 28,7 19,8 RTCG 2 46,1 27,7 26,1 TV PRVA 43,8 26,1 30,1 NOVA M 38,0 27,8 34,3 TV A1 24,9 26,6 48,4 TV7 21,9 25,2 53,0
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Table 8: Social networks following frequency - %
Once Many Several Several Once to Several Once to Several to times a times a times a twice a times a twice a times a Never twice a day day week week month month year day Facebook 13,0 18,8 11,0 7,8 1,2 2,4 0,2 0,4 45,2 Instagram 8,8 9,7 4,8 1,9 0,9 0,2 0,1 0,0 73,7 Twitter 1,9 2,9 2,8 4,3 0,9 0,1 0,6 0,2 86,2 Tik Tok 1,6 2,5 1,9 1,0 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,3 92,3 YouTube 5,8 12,1 12,9 11,2 4,4 0,8 0,5 0,2 52,0 LinkedIn 0,5 1,0 1,2 2,0 1,6 2,1 0,5 0,2 90,8
Graph 13: Social networks following frequency by category - %
Every day Weekly Rarely Never
FACEBOOK 42,8 9,0 3,0 45,2
YOUTUBE 30,8 15,6 1,5 52,0
INSTAGRAM 23,3 2,80,3 73,7
TWITTER 7,6 5,21,0 86,2
TIK TOK 6,01,10,6 92,3
LINKEDIN 2,73,72,8 90,8
The data on the frequency of following social networks are presented in the Table 8 and the Graph 13. When it comes to social networks, we measure that “Facebook” is the most visited one, with almost 43% of citizens following on a daily basis. Then comes “YouTube” which is visited daily by over 30% of the interviewees, followed by “Instagram” which is visited by just below one fourth of the citizens a day. The other social networks are significantly less visited. By measuring the trust in social networks, we established, first of all, that the hierarchy thoroughly matches the frequency of following these networks (Table 9 and Graph 14). Thus, we measure greatest degree of trust in “Facebook” (almost 36%) and “YouTube” (almost 35%). It is interesting, however, that the degree of trust in “Facebook” is higher than the degree of trust in “YouTube” (22.1% vs 17.2%). Furthermore, every fifth citizen expresses trust in “Instagram”, then considerably less in “Twitter” (11.4%) and “LinkedIn” (10.2%), while the lowest level of citizens’ trust is measured in “TikTok” (7.8%). Table 9: Trust in information on social networks - % I trust it I mostly I have No to a large I mostly do not almost response extent trust it trust it no trust
Facebook 7.2 28.6 17.8 4.3 42.1 Instagram 4.2 16.2 8.6 6.0 65.1 Twitter 1.4 10.0 7.1 7.0 74.4
13 Tik Tok 1.6 6.2 4.4 9.3 78.4 YouTube 3.4 31.3 12.1 5.1 48.1 LinkedIn 1.0 9.2 3.5 9.9 76.4
Graph 14: Trust in information on social networks: SUM% trust vs SUM% distrust
Trust Distrust
FACEBOOK 35,9 22,1
YOUTUBE 34,7 17,2
INSTAGRAM 20,3 14,6
TWITTER 11,4 14,2
LINKEDIN 10,2 13,4
TIK TOK 7,8 13,8
Experiences and attitude on fake news
Nowadays, the problem of fake news is very prominent on the entire planet, not only in Montenegro. Fabricating and spreading of fake news on a daily basis has largely called into question the issue of credibility of all media outlets, and the effect of fake news on political life is becoming increasingly prominent. Therefore, we dedicated one segment of this survey to this issue/problem. The first question in the survey was whether citizens had even heard of the problem/phenomenon of fake news (Graph 15). The results indicate that, although most of the citizens “have heard” of fake news, more than every fourth does not know what it means, and over 28% of citizens do not know what it is all about. Therefore, it is obvious that the phenomenon of fake news has still been largely hidden and such news are not recognized by a rather large number of citizens. Graph 15: Have they heard of fake news - %
44,9
26,9 28,3
Yes, of course Yes, but I am not sure what it means I don 't know
14 Graph 16: To what extent is prominent the problem of fake news - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 35,0
It is not a problem at all 6,9
It is not a problem 18,1
It is a prominent problem 26,1
It is a big problem nowadays 13,9
Previous finding was also confirmed with the question in which the citizens were assessing to what extent the problem of fake news is prominent (Graph 16). The results indicate, in fact, that 35% of citizens are unable to assess the seriousness of the problem. On the other hand, 40% of the citizens consider that the problem is prominent, i.e., 13.9% consider it “very prominent” and 26.1% consider it “prominent”. That the problem of fake news is “not a serious problem” is the opinion of 18.1%, with 6.9% thinking that it is not a problem at all. Therefore, cumulatively speaking, around 25% of citizens do not consider fake news a problem. Furthermore, according to their assessment more than 30% come across fake news on a daily basis and regularly, while almost identical number report it being rare. Less than one fifth claim that this is never the case, and over 17% are uncapable of assessing it. Graph 17: How often do they come across fake news - %
No answer 17,5
Never 18,9
Rarely 31,2
Often 23,6
Every day 8,8
However, one of the key issues is the very capacity of recognizing fake news, which is the reason why we explicitly asked the citizens if they were capable of recognizing such news (Graph 18). There is a relatively small percentage (6.5%) of those who claim that are able to recognize fake news without any problem and easily. We should also add here every fifth citizen who claims being mostly capable of recognizing fake news. We can, therefore, say that just over one fourth of the citizens are more-or-less capable of recognizing fake news. On the other hand, over 30% claim that they sometimes recognize fake news, whilst in sometimes this is not the case. More than 12% of the citizens claim that it is very difficult for them to recognize fake news, and every tenth claims being uncapable of ever recognizing fake news. Therefore, it has to be concluded that it is possible to manipulate fake news with around one fourth of the citizens.
15 Graph 18: Do they recognize fake news - %
No answer 19,7
I never recognize fake news 10,0
It is very hard for me to recognize fake news 12,6
I sometimes recignize it and sometimes not 30,7
I mainly do not have trouble in recognizing it 20,5
Of course, I almost always recognize it 6,5
The last question in the set dealing with the problem of fake news concerned the actions which the citizens undertake when they are faced with fake news (Graph 19). Most citizens claim that they simply ignore fake news. Considerably smaller percentage, more precisely, every tenth interviewee, “jokes” about the content of fake news where it is published, and somewhat below 7% share the news with the information of it being fake. Very small number of citizens report fake news to administrators, or “share” the same indicating that the news is fake. Graph 19: What do they do when they recognize fake news - %
No answer 19,2
Something else 4,6
I share the fake news, and make jokes about it 2,1
I make jokes about fake news on the website where it was published 9,7
I report it to administrators or the website where I found that the news is fake 3,7
I share it and inform others about it 6,9
I simply ignore it 53,8
Media rights and media freedoms
In the next segment, we were dealing with the issue of media rights and freedoms, in particular with the problems of the violation of these rights. The first question in this set concerned the general assessment of the situation when it comes to media freedoms (Graph 20). Very small percentage of the citizens consider that media freedoms are on a high level, but over 30% of them consider that these are “mainly” on a high level. In other words, we can say that one third of the citizens assess that media freedoms are on a more-or-less satisfactory level. However, on the other hand, over 40% of the interviewees consider
16 that media freedoms are mainly on a low level with over 17% of those who claim that these freedoms are on a very low level. Therefore, in cumulative sense, over 58% of citizens assess the situation with media freedoms in Montenegro as being negative, which is certainly a worrying information.
Graph 20: What is the level of media freedoms - %
I cannot assess 8,6
On a very low level 17,5
Mainly on a low level 41,0
Mainly on a high level 30,6
On a very high level 2,3
Then, by means of a special question, we wished to find out how citizens assess the degree of violation of media rights and freedoms (Graph 21). The data indicate that over one fourth of the citizens consider that the violation of media freedoms is very prominent, and more than every other interviewee claim that it does happen, but that it is not particularly prominent. On the other side, almost 19% of the interviewees claim that the violation of media freedoms happens rarely and that it is not a problem. Therefore, we can say that citizens’ general assessment is that the violation of media freedoms is present and that it is a problem and that more attention needs to paid to it. \ Graph 21: Perception of violation of media rights and freedoms in the last three years - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 3,4
I think that it is rare and that it is not a problem 18,6
I think that it does happen, but that it is not so prominent 51,1
I think that media freedoms are largely violated 27,0
When asked the open question to give an example of the violation of media freedoms, citizens mainly identified the following:
• Verbal and physical assaults on journalists • Censorship and auto-censorship • Assault on Olivera Lakić • Assassination of Duško Jovanović • Assaults on journalists on social networks
17 Furthermore, the citizens assessed the seriousness of the problem of pressures, threats and assaults on journalists (Graph 22). Cumulatively speaking, over 46% of citizens consider that this is a problem, of whom a smaller number (13.3%) express that this is a “very serious” problem, while every third claims that it is a “rather prominent” problem. On the other side, over 40% consider that “it is not such a big problem”, with almost 12% of those who claim that it “it is not a problem”. In other words, there is somewhat larger number of citizens who consider that pressures, threats and assaults on journalists are not a problem. Graph 22. To what extent are pressures, threats and assaults on media and journalists a serious problem - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 1,3
Not a problem 11,9
It is not such a big problem 40,2
Rather prominent problem 33,3
Very serious problem 13,3
Journalists status
Special set of questions, which is very important and sensitive from the viewpoint of the survey objectives, concerned journalists’ status. The first question in this set was general assessment of journalists’ status (Graph 23). Somewhat less than every tenth interviewee assesses that journalists’ status is “very good”, with over 40% of them who claim that their status is “mainly good”. On the other hand, more than a third of the interviewees claim that journalists’ status is “mainly poor”, with somewhat less than 15% who consider that their status is “very poor”. Cumulatively speaking, therefore, the views on journalists’ status are very much divided, or, one half of the population would assess journalists’ status as more-or-less good, while the other half assesses it as more-or-less poor. Graph 23: Assessment of journalists’ status in Montenegro - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 2,2
Journalists' status is very bad 14,5
Journalists' status is mainly bad 34,0
Journalists' status is mainly good 40,1
Journalists' status is very good 9,2
18 When it comes to the protection of journalists (Graph 24), over 11% of citizens consider that journalists are “very well” protected, while over 35% express that they are mainly protected. On the other side, again, over 35% consider that they are “mainly not” protected, with over 14% of those who consider that journalists are not protected at all. This means that there is somewhat greater number of citizens who assess that journalists are not sufficiently protected (almost 50%), as compared to those who consider that journalists are not sufficiently protected (almost 47%). However, we can conclude that even in relation to this issue, citizens’ assessments are very much divided. Graph 24: Are journalists in Montenegro sufficiently protected - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 3,6
Not protected at all 14,1
Mainly not 35,8
Yes, they mainly are 35,2
Yes, absolutely 11,5
Additionally, when it comes to journalists’ status, over 45% of citizens consider that the state should issue special measures in order to ensure additional protection for journalists, while every third citizen considers that there is no need for that (Graph 25). Graph 25. Should the state issue special measures in order to ensure additional protection for journalists - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 21,1
No, there is no need for that 33,4
Yes, absolutely 45,5
The issue of the attitude and behavior of the state is very important when it comes to the protection of journalists. Therefore, we asked the citizens to assess to what extent is the state efficient in this respect (Graph 26). There is a very small number of citizens (3.6%) who claim that the state is very efficient when it comes to prosecuting and punishing those who threaten and endanger journalists, while every fourth citizen consider that the state is mainly efficient. On the other side, over one fourth of the citizens consider that the state is “mainly inefficient”, with one fifth of those who claim that the state is “very inefficient”. Therefore, the efficiency of the state, when it comes to the protection of journalists is rather negatively assessed, having in mind that over 47% of citizens assess negatively the efficiency of the state in this respect, while almost half that number of citizens consider that the state is more-or-less efficient when it comes to the prosecuting and punishing those who endanger journalists.
19 Graph 26: How efficient is the state in prosecuting and punishing those who address threats and carry out assaults on journalists - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 26,8
State is completely inefficient 19,7
State is mainly not efficient 26,8
State is mainly efficient 23,3
State is completely efficient 3,4
Asked about the reasons for the inefficiency of the state when it comes to prosecuting a perpetrator of an assault on journalist, every other interviewee was unable to explicitly specify the reasons (Graph 27). Of those who stated the reasons, the key ones that stand out are corruption and organized crime, followed by inefficiency of judiciary and lack of political will. Graph 27: What is the reason behind the inefficiency of the state with regards to the protection of journalists - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 49,8
Corruption and organized crime 15,4
Organizational and technical capacity of judicial institutions 6,3 Lack of familiarity with the European Court of Human Rights case law in relation to the articles of the 6,6 Convention on Human Rights
Inefficiency and selectivity of judiciary 11,3
Lack of political will 10,7
Having in mind the fact that after the 2020 election the long-lasting rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists came to an end, the interviewees were asked the question concerning their expectations from the new government when it comes to the protection of journalists and media freedoms (Graph 28). Almost a third of the citizens were unable to assess how the new government was going to stand up for the issues of the protection of journalists and media freedoms. However, almost 30% of citizens consider that the new government is going to be considerably more efficient, and almost 17% consider that there is not going to be any difference between the new and the previous government in relation to this matter. Over 15% of the citizens consider that it is going to be less efficient, while a relatively small number of interviewees (6.4%) consider that the new government is not going to be tackling these issues. Therefore, predominantly, the citizens nowadays are unable to assess the attitude of the new government with regards to these issues, rather they wait for the government to either do or not do
20 certain things in this respect in order to be able to take a stance, with significant number of those with high, progressive expectations. Graph 28: Expectations in relation to the new government when it comes to the protection of journalists and media freedoms - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 32,1
New government will not tackle that issue 6,4
New government will be less efficient 15,5
New government will be equally efficient 16,9
New government will be significantly more 29,2 efficient
Special question was dedicated to the assessment of the work and effects of research journalism (Graph 29). The most dominant view is that research journalism is “mainly good”, but that few journalists approach this form of journalism in the right way (almost 40%). Every fourth citizen considers that research journalism is bad due to pressures coming from politicians and powerful individuals. Over 17% of interviewees has very negative view about this issue claiming that research journalism does not exist in Montenegro. On the other side, over 15% have a very affirmative view, claiming that research journalism is very good and that in this way scandals and wrongdoings come to light very quickly. Graph 29: View on research journalism - %
No opinion 2,2
Research journalism does not exist in Montenegro 17,5 Research journalism is bad, since there is a fear from politicians and powerful individuals 25,3 being detected Research journalism is mainly good, but only several journalists practice research journalism 39,5 in an adequate way Research journalism is very good and detects major scandals and wrongdoings 15,5
Media independence
In order to be able to fulfil its democratic role in a society, one of the key issues is media independence. Therefore, special set of questions in our survey is dedicated to this area. Our goal was to find out which actors, in citizens’ views, endanger media independence most. The first question in this set was the assessment/view on the extent to which media support certain political parties/structures (Graph 30). Over 57% of citizens consider that “certain media outlets” support the DPS, and “certain media outlets” the new government. On the other hand, approximately equal number of citizens consider that media mainly support the DPS (15.6%), and/or the new government (13.5%). Finally, less than 12% consider
21 that media do not support any political side. Therefore, we can say that smaller number of citizens assesses that media do not offer support to anyone, or more precisely, that they perform their role in a neutral way, but a huge number of citizens consider that media simply support one of the two key political sides. Graph 30: Which political structure do media support - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 2,0
I think that media mainly do not support either former or actual government 11,3 I think that some media support the former government, and other the new one 57,7 I think that media mainly support the new government 13,5 I think that media mainly support the former 15,6 government (DPS)
In the colloquial and everyday political rhetoric, one of the usual questions is whether media “work” in the interest of their owners or politicians, and/or to what extent they “work” in citizens’ interest, and to what extent in “someone else’s” interest (Graph 31). The results obtained in the answer to this question are very indicative and tell us that this colloquial opinion is very relevant from the viewpoint of the citizens themselves. In fact, the results indicate that almost identical number of interviewees (around 40%) consider that media work in the interest of politicians, and/or their owners, while half that number of citizens think that media work in the interest of citizens. In other words, only every fifth citizen consider that media work in citizens’ interest, while 80% consider that they work in the interest of politicians or their owners. In simple terms, from the viewpoint of media independence, the position of media in Montenegro, when it comes to advocating citizens’ interests, is very questionable. Graph 31: Do media mainly work for politicians and their interests or for citizens and their interests, or in the interests of their owners - %
I don't know, I don't have an opinion 1,3
I think that media mainly work in the interests of their owners 39,6
I think that media mainly work in citizens' interests 19,4
I think that media mainly work for politicians 39,7 and in their interests
Having in mind a large number of potential social and political actors capable of endangering media independence, in our survey we asked the interviewees to assess the extent to which each media outlet is independent (Table 1 and Graph 32). The data in this respect are simply discouraging. In fact, a large number of citizens consider that media are not independent in relation to all mentioned actors. In comparative terms, media outlets are least independent from political parties and their leaders, and then from the structures in power. Furthermore, more than half of the citizens consider that media are not independent in relation to powerful individuals, while almost a half of the citizens think that there are no independent media in relation to important businessmen, and only somewhat less than that
22 consider that media are not independent in relation to criminal structures. Furthermore, over 46% of citizens think that media are not independent in relation to big companies, and over 43% that media independence does not exist in relation to foreign embassies. There are also high percentages for the remaining three actors, to be precise, over 42% of citizens consider that media are not independent in relation to the pressure coming from the countries in the region; almost identical percentage of them think that media outlets are not independent in relation to the EU institutions, and over 41% consider that that media are not independent in relation to religious organizations. All in all, we can conclude that it is the citizens’ assessment that media are mainly not independent from a large number of political, economic and religious actors, which is a serious problem and challenge for media outlets nowadays. Table 1: Media independence in relation to different actors %
They are They are Mainly I don’t Not fully mainly not know, I independ independe independe independe am unable ent at all nt nt nt to assess
In relation to the Government and its structures 1.9 13.8 32.1 22.5 29.6 In relation to political parties and political 0.7 11.5 32.6 25.2 30.0 leaders In relation to powerful individuals 1.3 14.4 30.1 21.0 33.3 In relation to criminal structures 2.2 16.4 26.8 21.5 33.1 In relation to big companies 1.5 17.4 28.8 17.8 34.5 In relation to important businessmen 1.6 15.6 32.1 17.4 33.3 In relation to foreign embassies 3.7 18.6 26.4 16.9 34.4 In relation to EU institutions 3.6 19.4 27.1 15.0 34.8 In relation to pressure coming from regional 3.6 20.2 26.4 15.8 33.9 countries In relation to religious organizations 4.3 18.6 23.3 18.0 35.7
Graph 32: Media independence from actors: SUM % independent vs SUM % not independent
Media are not independent Media are independent
IN RELATION TO POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL LEADERS 57,8 12,2 IN RELATION TO THE GOVERNMENT AND RULING STRUCTURES 54,7 15,7 IN RELATION TO POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS 51,0 15,7
IN RELATION TO IMPORTANT BUSINESSMEN 49,5 17,2
IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL STRUCTURES 48,3 18,6
IN RELATION TO BIG COMPANIES 46,6 18,9
IN RELATION TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES 43,3 22,4 IN RELATION TO THE PRESSURE FROM REGIONAL COUNTRIES 42,2 23,9 IN RELATION TO EU INSTITUTIONS 42,1 23,1
IN RELATION TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 41,3 23,0
23 Then, for all key actors, we were assessing their influence on key Montenegrin media outlets. First of all, we checked the assessment of independence in relation to political parties and their leaders (Table 2 and Graph 33). Again, the percentages indicating media dependence in relation to political leaders and their parties are very high, or a large number of citizens think that all media outlets work under the influence of political parties and their leaders. The assessment for all media outlets is presented in the graph by hierarchy, and we can simply conclude that the assessment of media dependence in relation to political structures more-or-less correlates with media consumption. Table 2. Media independence in relation to political parties and their leaders - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 4.0 20.2 23.2 20.4 32.3 Vijesti daily 2.8 16.6 21.1 20.5 39.0 Vijesti Portal 2.1 15.1 20.1 19.9 42.9 CDM 2.9 8.6 16.4 24.1 48.0 Analitika 2.0 7.6 17.8 20.4 52.3 RTCG 4.0 12.7 18.3 28.5 36.6 FOS media 2.1 6.1 16.3 14.3 61.3 Aktuelno.me 1.5 4.0 16.1 16.8 61.7 Kolektiv.me 1.4 7.1 12.7 16.7 62.1 IN4S 2.2 6.3 12.0 21.0 58.6 Pobjeda 1.6 6.7 13.0 26.4 52.3 Mondo.me 1.8 6.5 13.2 14.4 64.1 PCNEN 0.8 5.7 13.2 14.5 65.8 Antena M 1.1 5.7 14.6 17.5 61.1 Kodex.me 1.1 6.0 11.9 16.3 64.6 Standard.me 0.9 4.0 11.4 16.2 67.5 Borba.me 0.7 4.3 11.4 21.6 62.1 Dan 4.0 11.8 13.1 23.6 47.6
24 Graph 33: Media independence in relation to political parties and their leaders: SUM % dependent vs independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 46,7 16,7 TV VIJESTI 43,5 24,2 VIJESTI DAILY 41,7 19,3 CDM 40,5 11,5 VIJESTI PORTAL 39,9 17,2 POBJEDA 39,4 8,3 ANALITIKA 38,2 9,6 DAN 36,7 15,7 IN4S 33,0 8,4 BORBA.ME 32,9 5,0 AKTUELNO.ME 32,9 5,4 ANTENA M 32,1 6,8 FOS MEDIA 30,6 8,1 KOLEKTIV.ME 29,4 8,5 KODEX.ME 28,2 7,2 PCNEN 27,7 6,5 MONDO.ME 27,6 8,3 STANDARD.ME 27,6 4,9
Table 3: Media independence in relation to powerful individuals - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 4.6 19.3 20.7 18.1 37.2 Vijesti daily 3.7 16.0 19.1 16.3 44.9 Vijesti Portal 3.3 13.9 17.6 16.5 48.9 CDM 3.7 10.2 15.7 16.7 53.7 Analitika 2.6 9.4 14.6 15.2 58.2 RTCG 5.0 14.6 17.4 22.4 40.6 FOS media 2.3 7.7 14.8 14.8 60.4 Aktuelno.me 1.2 8.3 14.0 14.6 61.9 Kolektiv.me 2.1 7.3 11.8 15.0 63.9 IN4S 1.9 7.8 13.5 15.8 61.0 Pobjeda 1.6 8.8 13.5 20.1 56.1 Mondo.me 2.1 6.7 12.5 14.8 63.9 PCNEN 1.8 5.9 11.5 12.8 67.9 Antena M 1.3 7.4 14.2 14.4 62.7 Kodex.me 1.4 5.7 12.2 14.0 66.7 Standard.me 0.8 5.6 10.3 14.4 68.9 Borba.me 1.2 5.8 11.9 18.3 62.8 Dan 3.8 13.8 12.9 18.5 51.0
25 Graph 34: Media independence in relation to powerful individuals: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 39,8 19,6 TV VIJESTI 38,9 23,9 VIJESTI DAILY 35,4 19,8 VIJESTI PORTAL 34,0 17,1 POBJEDA 33,5 10,4 CDM 32,3 14,0 DAN 31,4 17,6 BORBA.ME 30,2 7,0 ANALITIKA 29,8 12,0 FOS MEDIA 29,6 10,1 IN4S 29,3 9,7 ANTENA M 28,7 8,6 AKTUELNO.ME 28,6 9,5 MONDO.ME 27,3 8,8 KOLEKTIV.ME 26,8 9,3 KODEX.ME 26,2 7,1 STANDARD.ME 24,8 6,4 PCNEN 24,4 7,8
The assessment of independence of individual media outlets in relation to powerful individuals is presented in the Table 3 and Graph 34. The results indicate that the least independent in relation to powerful individuals are “RTCG”, TV “Vijesti”, “Vijesti” daily, portal “Vijesti”, then “Pobjeda”, “CDM”, “Dan” and “Borba”. However, key conclusion is that by this parameter we also measure high degree of influence of powerful individuals on all media outlets. Table 4: Media independence in relation to criminal structures - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 7.5 23.5 11.6 17.9 39.5 Vijesti daily 4.9 16.8 12.7 17.2 48.3 Vijesti Portal 4.1 16.2 11.5 17.0 51.2 CDM 3.3 10.2 10.9 19.1 56.5 Analitika 3.0 7.9 10.0 18.8 60.3 RTCG 6.9 13.2 13.5 21.0 45.4 FOS media 1.6 6.8 11.2 16.0 64.3 Aktuelno.me 1.4 6.3 9.4 17.5 65.4 Kolektiv.me 1.5 6.7 10.0 15.3 66.4 IN4S 2.2 6.4 9.3 17.8 64.2 Pobjeda 1.8 6.8 10.4 20.8 60.2 Mondo.me 1.9 7.1 8.4 15.7 66.9 PCNEN 1.5 6.2 9.3 15.8 67.3 Antena M 1.7 7.5 10.6 18.6 61.6 Kodex.me 1.3 6.5 9.1 16.5 66.7 Standard.me 1.0 5.4 8.1 16.8 68.6 Borba.me 1.4 7.2 7.4 18.3 65.7 Dan 6.9 11.9 7.4 19.1 54.7
26
Graph 35. Media independence in relation to criminal structures: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 34,5 20,1 POBJEDA 31,2 8,7 CDM 30,1 13,5 VIJESTI DAILY 29,9 21,8 TV VIJESTI 29,5 31,0 ANTENA M 29,2 9,2 ANALITIKA 28,8 10,9 VIJESTI PORTAL 28,5 20,3 FOS MEDIA 27,3 8,4 IN4S 27,1 8,6 AKTUELNO.ME 26,9 7,7 DAN 26,4 18,9 BORBA.ME 25,7 8,6 KODEX.ME 25,6 7,7 KOLEKTIV.ME 25,3 8,3 PCNEN 25,0 7,7 STANDARD.ME 25,0 6,4 MONDO.ME 24,1 9,0
When it comes to the independence of individual media outlets from criminal structures (Table 4 and Graph 35), the results point out to significantly higher degree of independence in relation to the measured degree of influence of political parties and powerful individuals. However, there is still a high degree of the assessed absence of independence in relation to criminal structures. In this respect, the data are interesting since there are media outlets where the assessment of independence is more pronounced than the assessment of dependence from criminal structures. This is the case with TV “Vijesti”. However, the overall hierarchy as regards the influence of criminal structures is somewhat different when compared to the previous two measurements. So that “RTCG”, “Pobjeda” and “CDM” come at the top of the list with regards to the absence of independence from criminal structures, followed by the daily “Vijesti”, TV “Vijesti”, “Antena M”, “Analitika” portal, followed by other media outlets. There are very high percentages of the absence of independence of certain media in relation to big companies (Table 5 and Graph 36). Again, the “RTCG” is at the top of the list, followed by three media under the “Vijesti” brand name. Table 5: Media independence in relation to big companies - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 5.4 19.0 18.3 16.9 40.4 Vijesti daily 4.0 14.6 17.4 16.4 47.6 Vijesti Portal 3.1 13.0 16.6 16.6 50.6 CDM 1.7 10.9 14.4 18.2 54.7 Analitika 1.9 9.0 14.7 16.9 57.5 RTCG 5.4 12.1 17.2 20.3 45.0 FOS media 1.6 8.8 14.4 14.7 60.4 Aktuelno.me 2.1 7.8 14.0 16.3 59.7 Kolektiv.me 1.8 9.2 13.4 16.3 59.3
27 IN4S 1.6 7.6 13.0 15.6 62.2 Pobjeda 1.7 8.1 12.2 20.2 57.9 Mondo.me 2.0 7.3 13.4 15.5 61.9 PCNEN 1.4 7.2 11.8 15.4 64.2 Antena M 1.3 6.9 12.8 16.3 62.7 Kodex.me 1.2 7.0 11.3 16.2 64.4 Standard.me 1.0 6.0 12.3 15.9 64.8 Borba.me 1.1 6.9 13.6 17.9 60.5 Dan 5.3 10.7 13.2 17.8 52.9
Graph 36: Media independence in relation to big companies: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 37,5 17,5 TV VIJESTI 35,2 24,4 VIJESTI DAILY 33,8 18,6 VIJESTI PORTAL 33,2 16,1 CDM 32,6 12,7 POBJEDA 32,3 9,8 ANALITIKA 31,6 10,9 BORBA.ME 31,5 8,0 DAN 31,1 16,0 AKTUELNO.ME 30,3 10,0 KOLEKTIV.ME 29,7 11,0 FOS MEDIA 29,2 10,4 ANTENA M 29,1 8,2 MONDO.ME 28,8 9,3 IN4S 28,6 9,2 STANDARD.ME 28,2 7,0 KODEX.ME 27,4 8,2 PCNEN 27,1 8,7
Even when it comes to the assessment of the absence of media independence in relation to important businessmen, we find that individually, in citizens’ opinion, a large number of media outlets find themselves under considerable influence of these actors. In the Table 6 and Graph 37, we are presenting citizens’ assessment for all individual media outlets when it comes to the influence exerted by important businessmen on media. Table 6: Media independence in relation to important businessmen %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 4.9 20.3 19.0 16.7 39.1 Vijesti daily 4.4 15.1 16.9 16.2 47.4 Vijesti Portal 4.0 13.5 16.3 15.2 51.1 CDM 3.3 9.5 16.5 15.2 55.5 Analitika 2.4 8.9 16.5 12.4 59.7 RTCG 5.3 12.9 16.5 19.5 45.8 FOS media 1.9 8.4 13.3 12.9 63.5 Aktuelno.me 1.9 7.0 13.1 14.4 63.6
28 Kolektiv.me 2.8 9.1 11.4 13.2 63.4 IN4S 2.4 8.3 12.0 14.2 63.1 Pobjeda 2.3 9.1 10.6 18.6 59.3 Mondo.me 1.5 8.3 10.8 13.6 65.7 PCNEN 2.3 8.2 9.2 12.2 68.1 Antena M 2.8 6.6 13.0 13.6 64.0 Kodex.me 2.1 7.0 9.6 13.1 68.2 Standard.me 1.3 6.5 9.6 13.5 69.2 Borba.me 1.8 7.1 10.9 15.4 64.8 Dan 5.0 13.7 11.5 16.2 53.5
Graph 37: Media independence in relation to important businessmen: SUM % dependent vs independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 36,0 18,2 TV VIJESTI 35,6 25,2 VIJESTI DAILY 33,1 19,5 CDM 31,7 12,8 VIJESTI PORTAL 31,5 17,4 POBJEDA 29,3 11,4 ANALITIKA 29,0 11,3 DAN 27,8 18,7 AKTUELNO.ME 27,5 8,9 ANTENA M 26,6 9,4 BORBA.ME 26,3 8,9 FOS MEDIA 26,2 10,3 IN4S 26,2 10,7 KOLEKTIV.ME 24,6 12,0 MONDO.ME 24,4 9,8 STANDARD.ME 23,0 7,7 KODEX.ME 22,7 9,1 PCNEN 21,4 10,4
The assessment of media independence in relation to foreign embassies is presented in the Table 7 and Graph 38. Although the measured values are somewhat lower in relation to the previously measured influence of the actors, we have to conclude, however, that citizens assess the influence of foreign embassies on certain media is very significant. Table 7: Media independence in relation to foreign embassies - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 6.1 21.0 13.3 14.4 45.2 Vijesti daily 5.2 16.8 12.6 15.3 50.1 Vijesti Portal 4.3 15.5 11.4 14.1 54.7 CDM 3.0 12.5 11.9 14.0 58.6 Analitika 2.9 10.7 11.8 13.2 61.4 RTCG 6.1 13.5 14.3 17.0 49.1 FOS media 2.2 10.3 11.6 13.0 62.9 Aktuelno.me 2.4 9.4 12.0 12.7 63.6
29 Kolektiv.me 2.9 10.4 10.0 12.7 64.1 IN4S 2.7 8.9 10.8 14.0 63.6 Pobjeda 2.6 9.4 11.8 14.7 61.4 Mondo.me 2.7 10.1 9.8 12.8 64.6 PCNEN 2.4 9.2 9.4 12.5 66.5 Antena M 2.4 10.2 9.9 13.8 63.7 Kodex.me 2.1 9.1 10.2 12.6 66.0 Standard.me 2.2 9.1 9.1 12.4 67.1 Borba.me 2.3 8.9 9.4 14.6 64.8 Dan 5.2 11.9 9.3 16.5 57.2
Graph 38: Media independence in relation to foreign embassies: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 31,3 19,6 VIJESTI DAILY 27,9 22,0 TV VIJESTI 27,8 27,0 POBJEDA 26,5 12,1 CDM 25,9 15,5 DAN 25,8 17,1 VIJESTI PORTAL 25,5 19,8 ANALITIKA 25,0 13,6 IN4S 24,8 11,6 AKTUELNO.ME 24,6 11,8 FOS MEDIA 24,6 12,5 BORBA.ME 24,0 11,1 ANTENA M 23,7 12,6 KODEX.ME 22,8 11,2 KOLEKTIV.ME 22,7 13,2 MONDO.ME 22,6 12,8 PCNEN 21,9 11,6 STANDARD.ME 21,5 11,3
When it comes to the assessment of the influence of the EU institutions on media outlets, generally speaking, according to citizens’ opinion, it is smaller as compared to all actors analysed thus far (Table 8 and Graph 39). Furthermore, it is interesting that the differences in the assessment among all media are less prominent then when it comes to other actors. Finally, although the assessment that media are not independent in relation to the EU institutions is mainly higher in relation to the assessment that media are independent (except in the case of the TV “Vijesti”), generally speaking the assessment of the independence is close to the assessment of the very influence of the EU institutions.
Table 8: Media independence in relation to the EU institutions - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent TV Vijesti 8.5 19.5 13.4 13.0 45.5 Vijesti daily 5.5 16.4 12.6 13.1 52.5
30 Vijesti Portal 4.9 14.9 12.2 12.0 56.0 CDM 4.2 11.3 12.3 11.7 60.4 Analitika 3.5 11.0 12.3 10.7 62.4 RTCG 6.8 14.3 13.1 15.2 50.6 FOS media 2.9 10.1 11.1 10.7 65.1 Aktuelno.me 2.8 10.5 10.6 10.8 65.2 Kolektiv.me 2.6 11.0 10.5 10.1 65.8 IN4S 3.9 9.0 9.8 11.6 65.7 Pobjeda 3.1 9.2 10.7 13.5 63.4 Mondo.me 3.1 8.6 9.1 10.8 68.4 PCNEN 2.6 8.7 9.6 11.1 67.9 Antena M 2.7 8.9 10.1 11.1 67.3 Kodex.me 2.9 8.3 8.7 10.7 69.4 Standard.me 2.5 8.3 9.0 11.1 69.1 Borba.me 3.1 9.9 9.3 11.7 66.0 Dan 7.4 12.2 8.1 12.6 59.7
Graph 39: Media independence in relation to the EU institutions: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
RTCG 28,3 21,1 TV VIJESTI 26,4 28,0 VIJESTI DAILY 25,7 21,9 POBJEDA 24,2 12,3 VIJESTI PORTAL 24,2 19,9 CDM 24,0 15,6 ANALITIKA 23,0 14,6 FOS MEDIA 21,8 13,0 AKTUELNO.ME 21,5 13,3 IN4S 21,4 12,9 ANTENA M 21,1 11,5 BORBA.ME 21,0 13,0 PCNEN 20,8 11,3 DAN 20,7 19,7 KOLEKTIV.ME 20,6 13,6 STANDARD.ME 20,2 10,7 MONDO.ME 19,9 11,7 KODEX.ME 19,4 11,2
It is the citizens’ assessment that regional countries have significant influence on certain media. In the Table 9 and Graph 40, we are presenting the assessment of the influence of foreign countries on all individual media. Table 9: Media independence in relation to the pressure of regional countries - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent
31 TV Vijesti 8.6 18.7 14.1 13.8 44.8 Vijesti daily 6.6 16.1 13.0 13.9 50.5 Vijesti Portal 5.1 14.4 13.7 11.2 55.7 CDM 4.4 14.8 11.6 10.5 58.7 Analitika 3.4 12.9 12.0 10.4 61.3 RTCG 8.3 16.7 11.5 13.1 50.4 FOS media 2.7 11.3 10.8 10.0 65.2 Aktuelno.me 2.1 11.9 11.9 9.3 64.7 Kolektiv.me 2.1 11.9 11.1 9.9 65.0 IN4S 2.4 10.0 11.1 14.1 62.4 Pobjeda 3.1 11.4 10.7 11.8 63.1 Mondo.me 2.3 10.1 11.0 10.0 66.7 PCNEN 2.1 9.3 12.0 10.0 66.6 Antena M 2.4 10.6 11.4 10.3 65.3 Kodex.me 1.3 10.0 10.5 10.3 68.0 Standard.me 1.5 9.5 9.8 10.0 69.2 Borba.me 1.3 9.7 11.1 12.8 65.1 Dan 5.4 10.3 11.8 15.4 57.1
Graph 40: Media independence in relation to the pressure of regional countries: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
TV VIJESTI 27,9 27,3 DAN 27,2 15,7 VIJESTI DAILY 26,8 22,7 IN4S 25,2 12,4 VIJESTI PORTAL 24,8 19,5 RTCG 24,6 25,0 BORBA.ME 23,9 11,0 POBJEDA 22,5 14,4 ANALITIKA 22,4 16,2 CDM 22,1 19,2 PCNEN 22,0 11,4 ANTENA M 21,7 12,9 AKTUELNO.ME 21,2 14,1 KOLEKTIV.ME 21,0 14,0 MONDO.ME 21,0 12,4 FOS MEDIA 20,8 14,0 KODEX.ME 20,7 11,3 STANDARD.ME 19,8 11,0
Finally, citizens were assessing the influence of religious communities on individual media outlets. Measurement results are presented in the Table 10 and Graph 41, and the general finding is that individual media find themselves under significant influence of religious communities. Table 10: Media independence in relation to religious communities - %
They are They are fully Mainly not Not independent I don’t know, I am mainly independent independent at all unable to assess independent
32 TV Vijesti 10.9 14.5 15.5 17.8 41.3 Vijesti daily 8.5 11.5 13.0 18.2 48.7 Vijesti Portal 6.6 11.2 13.4 16.3 52.6 CDM 7.9 9.1 12.5 15,5 55.0 Analitika 7.2 7.5 12.4 13.8 59.1 RTCG 11.2 11.0 13.7 15.6 48.5 FOS media 5.3 7.3 10.5 13.7 63.2 Aktuelno.me 4.8 6.9 11.0 13.7 63.6 Kolektiv.me 4.3 8.8 8.5 13.7 64.8 IN4S 4.5 4.7 9.4 19.9 61.6 Pobjeda 6.0 6.8 12.8 14.9 59.6 Mondo.me 4.8 6.6 12.0 12.0 64.7 PCNEN 4.7 5.9 9.1 12.6 67.8 Antena M 4.8 6.0 10.3 14.0 65.0 Kodex.me 3.3 6.1 9.5 13.0 68.2 Standard.me 3.4 5.4 8.3 13.4 69.4 Borba.me 3.3 5.0 8.7 19.3 63.7 Dan 7.0 6.6 12.2 22.3 51.8
Graph 41: Media independence in relation to religious communities: SUM % dependent vs SUM % independent
Not independent Independent
DAN 34,6 13,6 TV VIJESTI 33,3 25,4 VIJESTI DAILY 31,2 20,1 VIJESTI PORTAL 29,7 17,8 RTCG 29,4 22,2 IN4S 29,3 9,1 BORBA.ME 28,0 8,3 CDM 28,0 17,0 POBJEDA 27,7 12,7 ANALITIKA 26,3 14,7 AKTUELNO.ME 24,8 11,7 ANTENA M 24,2 10,8 FOS MEDIA 24,2 12,7 MONDO.ME 24,0 11,3 KODEX.ME 22,4 9,3 KOLEKTIV.ME 22,2 13,0 STANDARD.ME 21,7 8,8 PCNEN 21,6 10,6
However, when it comes to the issue of media independence, one needs to notice that in relation to all indicators the degree of dependence matches the degree of media independence. In other words, the higher the measurement value of some media outlet being dependent, the higher the degree of measurement of it being independent. This happens due to a large number of, different, interviewees who are unable to make an assessment. So, for instance, if we take the last indicator (independence in relation to religious communities), we can notice that for the TV “Vijesti” 33.3% of the interviewees stated that it was not independent, but 25.4% stated that it was. In this way, we obtain the information that a larger number of interviewees consider “Vijesti” as being more dependent and more independent.
33 Because of this, we formed a unique score which measures the degree of TOTAL media independence. We did that by forming a score which integrates all nine degrees of independence measurement, that is to say, independence of all nine actors. This score was optimised from 0 (not independent) to 1 (fully independent). This is presented in the Graph 42. The data indicate that the most independent are three media outlets under the brand name “Vijesti”, followed by the “RTCG”, “DAN” and “CDM”. Somewhat less independent are the “Analitika”, “FOS media”, “Kolektiv”, “Aktuelno” and “Mondo”, even less independent are the “Pobjeda”, “Antena M”, “PCNEN” and “IN4S”. The least independent are, according to this parameter, the “Kodex”, “Borba” and “Standard”.
Graph 42: Media independence in relation to all political and societal actors - %
TV Vijesti 0,330 Vijesti daily 0,293 Vijesti Portal 0,280 RTCG 0,279 Dan 0,263 CDM 0,251 Analitika 0,231 FOS media 0,217 Kolektiv.me 0,214 Aktuelno.me 0,208 Mondo.me 0,207 Pobjeda 0,200 Antena M 0,198 PCNEN 0,196 IN4S 0,196 Kodex.me 0,188 Borba.me 0,183 Standard.me 0,174
Finally, in this set of questions we wanted to find out citizens’ views on who bears most responsibility for the violation of media rights and freedoms (Graph 43). The results indicate that, according to citizens’ opinion, central government bears most responsibility for the violation of media rights and freedoms, with almost 30% of citizens identifying this actor as the key one for the violation of media rights and freedoms. Not an insignificant number of citizens (over 15%), however, consider that this is done by the owners of media outlets, and every tenth citizen blames journalists themselves, while almost 9% say that it is editors’ fault. All other percentage values are considerably lower.
34 Graph 43: Who bears most responsibility for the violation of media rights and freedoms - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 4,3 Journalists themselves 10,0 Editor or a superior in a media outlet 8,6 Media owner 15,0 Deviant individuals 2,5 Police (on their own, independent from the state and the… 0,5 Individual from criminal circles 3,5 Individual - economically powerful person 1,6 Individual - political leader 3,9 Political party 5,2 Government at the local level 5,4 Government at the central level 29,7 I think there is no violation of media rights and freedoms 9,9
Media reporting on important issues and institutions
In the following segment, we were analyzing citizens’ views when it comes to reporting on important issues and institutions. The first question in this segment concerned citizens’ assessment on potential damage suffered by individuals due to biased media reporting. Over 40% of citizens are unable to assess whether media cause damage to individuals, but almost the same number think that media do not pay sufficient attention to the rights of the people they report about. Twice as smaller is the number of interviewees who consider that media pay sufficient attention to the rights of the people they report about. Graph 44: Do media pay attention to the rights of the individuals they report about - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 41,6
I think that media do not pay sufficient attention to the rights of the people they report about 40,8
I think that media pay attention to the rights of the people they report about 17,6
Furthermore, we were dealing with citizens’ assessment when it comes to the frequency of reporting about public institutions (Graph 45). In this respect, again, over 40% of citizens are unable to assess whether media write insufficiently or excessively about public institutions. Almost 30% of the citizens think that media public just the right amount of information about public institutions, while just over one fourth think that media do right sufficiently about public institutions. The number of those who think that media right excessively about public institutions is symbolically small.
35 Graph 45: To what extent do media follow the work of public institutions - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 40,2
I think that they report insufficiently on public institutions 26,1
I think that they report on public institutions 29,7 exactly as they should
I think that media report too much on public institutions 4,0
When it comes to the criticism of the work of public institutions in the practice of media reporting, (Graph 46), again, most citizens were unable to assess whether media express sufficient or insufficient criticism in their reports. However, every third interviewee considers that media should criticize more the work of public institutions, while over 20% of them think that the criticism is currently on an ideal level. On the other hand, just over 5% of the citizens think that the criticism of the work of public institutions is excessive. Graph 46: To what extent do media criticize the work of public institutions - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 39,6
They should criticize mor 33,0
They criticize as much as they should 21,7
They criticize more then they should 5,6
Relation between private and public media outlets
In Montenegro, there is a large number of private media outlets, but also public broadcasters. One of the questions must be what their relationship is, and especially what the treatment of the state is towards all of them. For this reason, in our survey we dedicated several questions to this topic. The first question in this set concerned the assessment of equality of operating conditions of public and private media (Graph 47). Over 40% of citizens consider that public media have better operating conditions in relation to private ones, while just over one fourth think that private media have better operating conditions in relation to the public ones, and somewhat fewer than that think that private and public media outlets have equal operating conditions.
36 Graph 47: Do public and private media outlets have equal operating conditions - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 9,6
Public broadcasters/state-owned media outlets 40,1 have better operating conditions
Private media outlets have better operating 26,0 conditions
Private and public broadcasters/state-owned media outlets have equal operating conditions 24,2
On the other hand, when it comes to the assessment of media freedoms in public and private media, more than every other citizen thinks that the degree of these freedoms is more present in private than in public media (Graph 48). That the degree of these freedoms is equal in private and public media think 22% of the interviewees, while less than 18% think that public media have greater degree of media freedoms than private ones have. Graph 48: Are public and private media equal when it comes to media freedoms - %
I don't know, I cannot assess 10,3
In public broadcasters/state-owned media, there is greater degree of media freedoms 17,2 There is a greater degree of media freedoms in private media 50,5 Media freedoms are equally present in private and public broadcasters/state-owned media 22,0
Finally, in this segment of our survey, we asked one question concerning media financing. We asked the interviewees to assess whether the distribution of financial assets from public funds for individual media is done in an adequate way (Graph 49). In this respect, over 35% of citizens are unable to assess the distribution of assets from the funds. However, comparatively speaking, there is a significantly higher percentage of those who think that public media take precedence in relation to the others (over 34%), as compared to those who think that certain commercial media take precedence (over 14%). That the distribution of funds is done in an adequate way is the opinion of a bit less than 16% of the interviewees. Graph 49: Distribution of assets for individual media outlets from public funds - %
I don't know, I canot assess 35,5
Public broadcasters/state-owned media outlets have precedence in relation to others 34,2
Certain commercial media outlets have precedence in relation to others 14,4
Distribution of assets from public funds is carried out in an adequate way 15,8
37
Assessment of the work of institutions responsible for the improvement of media freedom and status of journalists
In the last segment of our survey, we were analyzing the relation and contribution of institutions when it comes to media freedom. With the first question we wanted to find out citizens’ assessment when it comes to the contribution of the key actors, but also when it comes to the contribution towards the improvement of media freedoms (Table 11 and Graph 50). The data indicate that the citizens expect from all the actors to offer significant contribution in this respect. Comparatively speaking, the greatest contribution is expected from journalists themselves, from the state, media and media owners. Then follow professional associations, with somewhat smaller, but still more than significant contribution, being expected from other actors. Table 11. Who should contribute most when it comes to the improvement of media freedoms - %
Key Important Small No Cannot contribution contribution contribution contribution assess Media 44.2 40.8 6.9 3.6 4.6 Journalists 46.0 41.1 7.0 1.6 4.3 Professional associations and 29.9 48.3 13.6 3.5 4.7 organizations Media owners 45.1 37.8 9.7 3.0 4.3 Advertisers 22.1 44.6 19.0 8.7 5.6 State 51.7 33.6 9.4 1.6 3.8 NGOs 28.5 40.0 20.0 6.4 5.1 Universities 23.0 42.0 20.7 9.1 5.2 Representatives of international 27.4 40.5 18.7 8.0 5.4 community
Graph 50: Who should contribute most when it comes to the improvement of media freedoms - SUM % key and important contribution
Journalists 87,1 State 85,3 Media outlets 85,0 Media owners 83,0 Professional associations and organizations 78,2 NGOs 68,6 Representatives of international community 67,9 Advertisers 66,6 Universities 65,0
When it comes to the institutions and bodies active in the field of media freedom, one of the key ones is the Media Self-Regulation Council. Therefore, we asked the citizens to assess the work of this body (Graph 51). Over 30% of citizens think the work of this body is “mainly good”, with over 8% of those
38 who claim that their work is “very good”. On the other hand, every fourth interviewee thinks that the work of the Media Council is “mainly bad”, with over 16% of those who claim that its work is “very bad”. Therefore, in cumulative sense, the opinions on the work of the Media Council are quite divided, i.e. just over 40% consider that the Media Self-Regulation Council does not work well, and just below 40% think that it works well. Every fifth interviewee was unable to give the assessment. Graph 51: Assessment of the work of the Media Self-Regulation Council - %
Don't know, cannot assess 20,5
Work of the Media Council is very bad 16,4
Work of the Media Council is mainly bad 23,8
Work of the Media Council is mainly good 31,3
Work of the Media Council is very good 8,1
A large number of media outlets have the position of an Ombudsman who everybody can address for the violation of the Media Code. We asked the citizens if they were familiar with the existence of such an institution (Graph 52). The results indicate that almost two thirds of the citizens are not familiar with this institution, and just over one fourth say that they have some idea, but that they do not know exactly what it is about. Only every tenth citizen explicitly claims that media outlets have their Ombudspersons who they can address. However, when asked if they had ever addressed some media Ombudsman, only one out of 999 interviewees said that he had done it (this will not be presented in the graph). In other words, citizens do not use at all the institution of Ombudsman in individual media outlets. Graph 52: Do they know of the existence of media Ombudsmans - %
I don't know 63,3
I know roughly, but not in details 26,8
Yes. Of course 9,9
With our last question we analysed the degree of agreement with the set of views concerning the independence of media and journalists’ status. The interviewees we offered the views to express their agreement on the five-point Likert assessment scale (Table 12 and Graph 53). Out of all the views, citizens mostly agreed with the view that media editors exert influence on journalists and their views (almost 56%). Over 48% of citizens agree with the view that the censorship of the work of journalists is a significant problem, while over 44% consider that auto-censorship is a prominent problem. Furthermore, over 31% of citizens agrees that journalists work in public interest and to the benefit of all citizens, while 28% consider that journalists work independently and autonomously. Finally, the smallest number of interviewees agreed with the view that judiciary is efficient in resolving the cases of threats and violence against journalists. Therefore, we can conclude that the agreement with negative views is more pronounced than with the positive ones, as well as that the problem of editors’ influence
39 on journalists, as well as censorship, and/or auto-censorship is a very prominent problem when speaking about media freedom. Table 12: Agreement with views - %
I neither I don’t I fully I mainly I mainly agree or agree at agree agree disagree disagree all
Journalists work in public interest and to the benefit of all Montenegrin citizens 4.4 26.9 38.1 21.3 9.4 Journalists work independently and autonomously 4.8 23.2 36.2 25.6 10.2 Media editors exert their influence on journalists 19.0 36.9 36.6 5.6 2.0 and their reporting Judiciary is efficient in resolving the cases of threats and violence against journalists 4.5 17.9 38.7 22.4 16.5 I think that censorship of the work of journalists is 13.3 34.8 40.4 8.3 3.1 a significant problem I think that auto-censorship among journalists is a very prominent problem 13.8 30.6 43.6 8.0 4.0
Graph 53: Agreeing with views: SUM % fully agree and mainly agree
Media editors exert their influence on journalists and their reporting 55,9
I think that censorship of the work of journalists is a significant problem 48,1
I think journalists' auto-censorship is a very prominent problem 44,4
Journalists work in public interest and to the benefit of of all Montenegrin citizens 31,2
Journalists work independently and 28,0 autonomously
Judiciary is efficient in resolving the cases of threat and violence against journalists 22,4
40