The Nature of Desire/ Federico Lauria Jia & Julien Deonna
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T HE N AT URE OF DESIRE FEDERICO LAURIA JULIEN DEONNA OXJORD VKIYERSITY PRESS Oxford University Press is a department of thtfthe University or Mord. It furthers the Uni1ersity's objective of excellence in res, research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registerstered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. s. Published in the United Slates of America by by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, 16, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publicationtion may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any fornnrm or by any means, without the CONTENTS prior permission in writing of Oxford UniversversityPress, or as c.vpressly permitted by law.by license, or under terms agreed wittNith the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning repneproduction outside the scope of the aboveshould be sent to the Rights Depar1mem1ent, Oxford University Press, at the addre�above. You must not circulate this work in any other her form Acknowledgments vn and you must impose this same condition on ;on any acquirer. Contributors ix Libraryof Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatioation Data Names:Lauria, Federico, author. I Deonna, Ju, Julien A., author. Introduction: Reconsidering Some Dogmas Title:The nature of desire/ Federico Lauria Jia & Julien Deonna. Description: New York : Oxford University P1y Press, 20 I 7. I about Desires J Includes bibliographical references arid ind index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017008872 (print) I LCCICCN 2016047086 (cbook) I Federico Lauria and Julien A. Deonna ISBN 9780199370962 (cloth : alk. paper) l:r) I ISBN 9780199370979 (pdf) I ISBN 9780199370986 (online course) Subjects: LCSH: Desire (Philosophy) PART I I Conceptions of Desire Classification: LCC B IOS.D44 L38 2017 (eb1(ebook) I LCC B 105.D44 (print) I DOC 128/.3-dc23 Evaluative Views: Desire and the Good LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/20 /2017008872 27 Desire and the Good: In Search of the Right Fit 29 9876543 21 CHAPTER I Craham Oddie P1intcdby She1idan Books, Inc., United Stat�tates of America CHAPTER 2 Desire, Mental Force and Desirous Experience 57 Daniel Friedrich Motivational Views: Desire and Action. 77 CHAPTER 3 Desires without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want 79 Sabine A. Doring and Bahadir Eker CHAPTER 4 Des(res, Dispositions and the Explanation of Action 119 Maria Alvarez The Deontic Alternative: Desires, Norms, and Reasons 137 CHAPTER 5 The "Guise of the Ought-to-Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire 139 Federico Lauria HAPTER 7 Might Desires Be Beliefs uhoul No,·111111ivc Reasons l'or Action? 201 Alex Grego,)' Empirical Perspectives: Desire, the Reward Systern, and Learning 219 CHAPTER 8 Empirical Evidence a&ainst a Cognitivist Theory of Desire and Action 221 TimothySchroeder CHAPTER 9 Learningas an Inherent Dynamic of Belief and Desire 249 Peter Railton PART u I Desiderative Puzzles CHAPTER IO Desiderative Inconsistency, Moore's Paradox, and Norms of Desire 279 David Wall CHAPTER 11 Deliberation and Desire 305 G. F. Schueler CHAPTER 12 Introspection and the Nature of Desire -325 - Lauren Ashwell Index 337 1 vi I Contents Acknowledgments University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online The Nature of Desire Julien A. Deonna and Federico Lauria Print publication date: 2017 Print ISBN-13: 9780199370962 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.001.0001 (p.vii) Acknowledgments Federico Lauria, Julien A. Deonna The project of this book took shape in 2012 as we organized the conference The Nature of Desire at the University of Geneva, which most of the contributors to this volume participated in. While Federico was writing his dissertation on this topic, it had become apparent that there was no serious contemporary debate on what desires are. Hence the conference. To our eyes and ears, it was a great success: the papers presented were challenging, exemplified very different perspectives, and revealed that there was much more to desire than lots of stale dogmas receiving cursory treatment in the literature. This naturally spurred us to collect the papers for a special volume and add a few more to the mix, forming an ensemble that would bring fresh insight and stimulate further explorations on the nature of desire. We were delighted that Oxford University Press shared our enthusiasm, and we feel elated today to finally have our desire for the finished product gratified. Page 1 of 2 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York Public Library; date: 03 April 2019 Acknowledgments This project would not have been possible without the assistance, expertise, and support of several people. First, we wish to express our gratitude to the contributors to this volume for their precious work and perseverance. The help and patience of Lucy Randall from Oxford University Press was crucial; we are very grateful to her. This book is an achievement of the Swiss National Science Foundation Project “Desire, Emotion, and the Mind,” and we thank the Foundation for its support. We thank the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, the interdisciplinary center for the study of emotions of the University of Geneva, which hosted this project. We owe a word of appreciation also to Thumos, the Genevan research group (p.viii) on emotions, values, and norms, to all its members, friends, and many visitors. Finally, our most important debt is to the following three persons: Kevin Mulligan, who taught us what philosophy is about and how it should be done ; Gianfranco Soldati, for his incisive questions and friendship ; and Fabrice Teroni, our best philosopher friend. Access brought to you by: Page 2 of 2 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York Public Library; date: 03 April 2019 Contributors University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online The Nature of Desire Julien A. Deonna and Federico Lauria Print publication date: 2017 Print ISBN-13: 9780199370962 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.001.0001 (p.ix) Contributors Federico Lauria, Julien A. Deonna Maria Alvarez is a reader in philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, King’s College London. Her research focuses on the philosophy of action, including the nature of agency, the metaphysics and explanation of actions, choice and moral responsibility. She has also published widely on the nature of reasons, especially practical reasons and normativity. She is the author of Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action (Oxford University Press, 2010). Lauren Ashwell is an associate professor of philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at Bates College. Her areas of specialization include metaphysics, epistemology of mind, and feminist philosophy. Her published work includes articles in Philosophical Studies, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy Compass, and Social Theory and Practice. Julien A. Deonna is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Geneva and a project leader at the Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences. His research interests are in the philosophy of mind, in particular the philosophy of emotions, moral emotions, and moral psychology. In addition to many articles in the area, he is the co-author of In Defense of Shame (Oxford University Press, 2011) and The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction (Routledge, 2012). He is the co-director of Thumos, the Genevan philosophy research group on emotions, values, and norms. Page 1 of 3 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: New York Public Library; date: 03 April 2019 Contributors Sabine A. Döring is the chair of practical philosophy at Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen. Research interests are (meta)ethics and the theory of agency with an emphasis on the emotions. Recent publications include “Expressing Emotions: From Action to Art,” in Art, Mind, and (p.x) Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie, edited by Julian Dodd (Oxford University Press, in print); “What’s Wrong with Recalcitrant Emotions? From Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity,” in Dialectica (2015); “What Is an Emotion? Musil’s Adverbial Theory,” in the Monist (2014); and (with Eva-Maria Düringer) “Being Worthy of Happiness: Towards a Kantian Appreciation of Our Finite Nature,” in Philosophical Topics (2013). Bahadir Eker is a PhD student at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen. Daniel Friedrich works as a data analyst. He did his PhD at the Australian National University. He has published articles on desire, motivation, promises, and the ethics of adoption. Alex Gregory is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Southampton. He works mostly in ethics and meta-ethics, and more specifically on the role that desires play in explaining and justifying behavior and related questions about moral motivation and reasons for action. Federico Lauria is a postdoctoral researcher in the Philosophy Department and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences of the University of Geneva. He was recently associate researcher at Columbia University. His work is at the intersection of philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics.