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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS: FROM BRENTANO TO MEINONG, HUSSERL, EHRENFELS AND MALLY

Winfried Löffler (*)

ccording to Otto Neurath and via his prominent pupils – was one of Rudolf Haller, philosophy in the most influential philosophers in in the 19th and early European philosophy of all . It is 20th had a very special character, and true that one important root of it is one of the main roots of modern is the Austro - analytic philosophy: It was open to Polish one which essentially goes the sciences, it was anti-idealistic and back to Brentano, his pupils (like realistic in its ontological tendencies, Meinong and Twardowski) and it had an empiricist tendency and it second-generation-pupils (like Mally, went back to the longer influence of Łukasiewicz, and Tarski).(*)Furthermore, Catholic scholastic philosophy and the Brentano’s influence contributed to Leibniz - Wolff rationalism. This in the appointment of Ernst Mach as turn has to do with the Catholicism of professor in Vienna, and this endorsed the Habsburg emperors, and it a science-friendly climate among prevented a stronger reception of the philosophers and a broader audience. philosophies of Kant and the German Interestingly, also the phenomenological Idealists. Barry Smith proposed an movement – today often seen in harsh addition to this thesis: The central opposition to analytic philosophy – figure for this so - called “Austrian originates in Brentano and his school. philosophy” was Franz Brentano Edmund Husserl writes that without (1838 - 1917); he served as a professor his teacher Brentano, he would not in Vienna from 1874 to 1880 and then have turned into a philosopher, and as a private docent till 1895. Personally, even – the paradigm I have certain doubts in detail about anti-analytic philosopher – confesses the Neurath-Haller thesis (which I that without reading Brentano’s first cannot elaborate in this short paper), book on he would not have but it cannot reasonably be doubted that Brentano – personally as well as (*) Assoc. Prof., Dr., University of Innsbruck, Austria.

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WINFRIED LöFFLER written a line of philosophy. Brentano Even if controversial and sometimes is often perceived as a philosopher, misunderstood, the intentionality but he is regularly mentioned also in thesis stood at the beginning of very textbooks on psychology as one of the different philosophical projects. fathers of modern psychology: Unlike 1. Franz Brentano – a brief portrait his predecessors, Brentano defined of a difficult figure psychology as the science of the Brentano displays the features of a psychic or mental phenomena, and not typically “Austrian” philosopher only the science of the . He thereby to a certain extent: He was definitely paved the way to modern, empirical influenced by Aristotle, Leibniz and psychology. the Catholic Neo-Scholasticism, but Brentano’s most prominent and he got this orientation already in best - known piece of doctrine is the Germany, beginning as a schoolboy so-called “intentionality thesis”. But when he read and interestingly, this thesis underwent then during his university studies. He various modifications and also came from Germany to Vienna in misunderstandings: it was modified 1874 at a when his principal by the late Brentano himself, it was works were already written: two modified by some of his prominent books on Aristotle and the first pupils, and it was heavily misunderstood volume of the Psychology from an by a good part of the Brentano Empirical Standpoint. He was definitely reception from the 1970s onwards. open to the natural sciences: In his Nevertheless, it proved fruitful for fourth habilitation thesis, he claimed subsequent philosophical in that the true method of philosophy many respects. My plan for this paper was no other than the method of the is this: natural sciences, but he was in no In section 1, I will sketch a portrait way a naturalist or a defender of any of Brentano as a philosopher; in section kind of scientism like the Vienna 2, I want to explain the intentionality Circle. “The method of the natural thesis as it was understood by the sciences” meant for him just an early Brentano and demarcate it from empirically founded procedure of some misunderstandings, and in sections deduction and induction, very different 3 to 7 I’ll give a brief survey of what in any case from the speculations developed out of this thesis among his of the German Idealists which he pupils and second-generation-pupils. strongly opposed. Concerning realism

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS... and objectivism, Brentano took a via his unpublished manuscripts. difficult stance: On the one hand, he Some fields in Brentano’s thought, was indeed a strong realist and e.g. , are extremely hard to objectivist, in as well as in understand since he repeatedly changed ontology, on the other hand he held his opinions, sometimes within weeks that all philosophy had to start from or months. Many of those manuscripts introspection, that means the inner were published only posthumously of our mental life. Clearly, by some editors, but partly in a such a position runs into a sort of questionable style: Some of the “bridging the gap” problems: How can editors combine older and younger we secure that our mental phenomena texts, and some have a tendency to display the external world correctly? propagate the opinions of the late Brentano applied various ways to fill Brentano. Hence, these opinions are the gap: In ethics, but also elsewhere, interpreted into the earlier texts, and he strongly used the of evident the result is sometimes confusing. A correctness: There is something like historico-critical edition, which hopefully evidently correct loving or hating. In manages to avoid these problems, is ontology, and philosophy currently in the making, a few of religion, he often works with volumes have already appeared. A probabilities and inferences to the little indication of the difficulties to best explanation: The best and most get an overall picture of Brentano is probable explanation for our the fact that there is to the present is the of an external world, day no bigger and comprehensive the most probable explanation for the account of his philosophy. There are structures in the world is the numerous studies on special topics existence of God. and a couple of brief overviews, but as Brentano’s immense influence cannot far as I know, nobody has risked so go back to his few published books. far to write a broad, balanced monograph Indeed, Brentano published little in about the whole thought of Brentano. his lifetime. After 1874, Brentano Especially his philosophy of religion is seemed to suffer under an inability to widely overlooked. finish bigger texts. He re-thought Why, then, was Brentano so problems again and again, modified influential? It was not via his books, his positions again and again, and so but rather via his own personality a big part of his work is only accessible and his pupils, and the pupils of these

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WINFRIED LöFFLER pupils in turn. I mentioned names psychology by defining it as the like Meinong, Husserl and Twardowski science of the psychic or mental before as direct disciples, and Heidegger, phenomena. This in turn led him to Tarski, Mally, and Łukasiewicz as the question how such phenomena indirect pupils. But there are many could be defined. After discussing a others. One example is Carl Stumpf, couple of inappropriate attempts, one of the founders of modern Brentano proposes his famous definition psychology, who was among his first which has been cited again and again: students in Würzburg, another one is Every mental phenomenon is Thomas Masaryk, the later president characterized by what the Scholastics of Czechoslovakia who provided for a of the Middle Ages called the Brentano archive at Prague to save intentional (or mental) inexistence of his writings. According to personal an , and what we might call, recollections, Brentano must have though not wholly unambiguously, been an absolutely impressive and reference to a content, direction fascinating personality as a teacher towards an object (which is not to be and philosopher, and especially his understood here as a thing), detailed, step-by-step style of or immanent objectivity. Every mental analysis and his frequent rethinking phenomenon includes something as of problems seems to have fascinated object within itself, although they do his audience. A rather controversial not all do so in the same way. In feature of his personality, however, presentation something is presented, seems to have been his intolerance in judgement something is affirmed or towards other standpoints, especially denied, in love loved, in hate hated, towards former disciples who changed in desire desired and so on. This their , like Meinong and intentional in-existence is characteristic Husserl. Interestingly, both of these exclusively of mental phenomena. No former disciples developed their physical phenomenon exhibits anything alternative positions out of the same like it. We could, therefore, define piece of doctrine, namely the mental phenomena by saying that intentionality thesis. And this is the they are those phenomena which topic of the following section. contain an object intentionally within 2. Brentano’s intentionality thesis themselves(1). I mentioned before that Brentano All mental phenomena, so we is among the fathers of modern learn, display a certain directedness

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS... or “aboutness”, they are directed to an that Brentano is a projectionist or immanent object. It is this claim which phenomenalist? can duly be labeled as “the intentionality Not really. Peter Simons once called thesis” or the “Brentano thesis”. Brentano a “methodological phenomenalist”, Some clarifications are in place here. and quite rightly so. We have to recall Firstly, “intentional” has nothing to Brentano’s general understanding of do with “” here, in the sense philosophy and his of of purposes or goals of action. By “phenomenon” in order to understand using the word “intentional”, Brentano this. I said in section 1 that Brentano refers to an old scholastic term “intentio” sees the introspection of our mental which was probably a translation life or, as he calls it, the “descriptive from the Arabic. Etymologically, this psychology” as the starting platform Arabic word meant something like of philosophy. Philosophers deal with stretching a bow: Just as a stretched “phenomena”, and these in turn fall bow with the arrow is directed to into mental and physical phenomena. something, the intentional mental A look at physical phenomena can be phenomenon is directed to something. the key to our problem: Physical Secondly, “in-existence” is to be phenomena, according to Brentano, taken literally here: It does not mean are not material things and the like, non-existence, but really “existence- but really “phenomena” in the sense in”. The intended object exists in the of appearances, or that which occurs mental phenomenon, as the last in our . In Brentano’s own words: sentence in my quotation makes clear. “Examples of physical phenomena Thirdly, we may really take Brentano’s [...] are a color, a figure, a landscape words at face : The object exists- which I see, a chord which I hear, in the mental phenomenon, it is a sort warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as of inner object. Brentano clearly calls well as similar images [in German: it an immanent object and says that it Gebilde] which appear in imagination”(2). “is not to be understood here as The italicized passages make clear meaning a thing” (see above). This that Brentano does not equate physical sounds very counterintuitive and phenomena with physical objects in unnatural at first glance: If I wish to the external world. Physical phenomena eat strawberries, I wish to eat real are not the colored objects, but rather strawberries and not only inner, the seen colors etc. According to mental strawberries. Does this mean Brentano, what we have as the input

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WINFRIED LöFFLER material for philosophy is phenomena, Brentano ultimately changed his occurrences in our mind, and they can mind in that context. It is also be physical or mental. What is behind interesting to consider what appears these phenomena, whether there is an as “Brentano’s problem” or “Brentano’s external world etc., is yet another thesis” in the literature: Sometimes, question. One could say that at the “Brentano’s thesis” seems to be that outset, Brentano is neutral as regards mental phenomena can never be ontological claims, similarly to Ernst reduced to physical objects, sometimes Mach or later Edmund Husserl. We it seems to be that physical might now understand the peculiarity phenomena are never intentional, and of mental phenomena: In contrast to sometimes “Brentano’s problem” seems mental phenomena, physical phenomena to be how mental phenomena can be in Brentano’s sense lack that aboutness, directed towards external objects, etc.. directnedness or intentionality. A All that, however, was not Brentano’s figure or landscape that I see is not primary concern. His primary concern directed towards something, but a was to find a suitable definition for wish or a judgment is. mental phenomena. Nevertheless, Brentano has been Another related point which would misunderstood in various ways. Some become influential is Brentano’s commentators mistakenly believed classification of mental phenomena. that Brentano divides the world into In the Psychology, Brentano sketches mental and physical objects, i.e. they a threefold classification: Mental take his definitions as an ontological phenomena fall into: a) Presentations claim (as which it was not meant). (in German: “Vorstellungen”); b) Judgments A second misunderstanding is that (“Urteile”); and c) Phenomena of intentionality is directed towards interest (there is neither a really good external objects. Of course, this German term nor an English one). interpretation may sound natural and Examples for such phenomena of plausible, but Brentano’s text in the interest are loving, hating, wishing Psychology of 1874 is simply against etc. This classification was only it. The intentional object is an inner, sketchy in 1874, but in the late an immanent object. This misunderstanding second volume (of 1911) Brentano is frequent in the literature since elaborated it in more detail. Brentano there was a lot of discussion in the is doing phenomenology here, and he Brentano School and the later sees the judgments and phenomena of

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS... interest as a sort of compounds with before that Brentano’s reading of the layers similar to an onion: Every thesis was somewhat surprising: judgment contains at least one According to him, the intentional presentation, and every phenomenon object is indeed immanent. It seems of interest contains a judgment. Let more natural to expect that the us take the example that I am happy intentional object is transcendent or to find a door open. When I see that external, that it is, so to say, “really the door is open, I have a out there”. However, both readings presentation of the open door, but it is have their advantages. The externalist not just an imagination: I judge that reading seems to be along with the door is indeed open. And I like it common sense: If we think of Paris that the door is open, i.e. I have a and wish to see it, then we want to phenomenon of interest towards the see Paris and not just a Paris content of this judgment. I must skip in the mind, and if someone fears the the details here, but over all neighbor’s dog, then he fears the real Brentano’s classification remains dog and not just an immanent dog in somewhat narrow like a corset, and the mind. However, there are cases especially the role of judgment seems where no external object exists: If to be overrated and artificial. (There someone asks for the perfect dictionary seem to be many mental phenomena or the present Emperor of Austria, which are more complex than just then there is no such object. The presentations, yet they don’t externalist reading of the intentionality appear as judgment-like.) We shall thesis gets into troubles here, but the see later on that Brentano’s pupil immanentist reading can easily Meinong solved a part of this problem. account for such cases. Our desire 3. Spin-offs of the intentionality might have an immanent object with thesis (I): Meinong’s “Theory of certain traits, but there need not be a Objects” corresponding real object. A first Let us now turn away from the attempt to solve the problem came historical and exegetical question of from Brentano’s pupil Kazimierz how to correctly interpret Brentano Twardowski, who would later return and turn towards a more systematic to Lemberg (today L’viv in Ukraine) question: How should we best and become the founder of the understand the intentionality thesis Lemberg-Warsaw school of logic, an and how plausible is it? We saw important root of modern Polish

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WINFRIED LöFFLER philosophy. In 1895, Twardowski proposed every intentional mental phenomenon a distinction between the content and has an object, even if this object has the object of a presentation. Every surprising or contradictory attributes. presentation has a content, but not If somebody thinks of strange objects necessarily also an object. The like the golden mountain, the content of a presentation is something fountain of youth or a round square, like linguistic meaning, and Twardowski then these objects somehow exist discovered something like the modern according to Meinong, although of distinction between meaning and course in another sense than Paris or reference here. apples exist. The philosophical price Inspired by Twardowski, Alexius which must be paid for this solution is Meinong (1853-1920) developed another, the introduction of different notions of highly detailed solution in his “Theory being. However, this price should of Objects” (Gegenstandstheorie). happily be paid according to Meinong, Meinong was born in Lemberg into a since the focus on existence in space family of Austrian military nobility, and time is narrow-minded anyway. but he moved to Vienna as a child and The range of objects of our interest is studied there with Brentano. Later on much wider than just material, he was appointed professor at the spatio-temporal objects: We are also University of and founded interested in numbers, like the first laboratory of experimental equality and inequality, similarity, psychology in Austria. It is little subsequence, causation etc., and known that Meinong was also a quite there is a whole successful scientific talented composer; some of his songs discipline dealing with non-bodily, (in the style of Anton Webern etc.) abstract and ideal objects: Namely were performed at the Austrian mathematics and geometry. To give Congress of Philosophy 2007. But his just a few examples for Meinongian most influential product was his objects: The five apples in my bag aforementioned “Theory of Objects”. exist spatiotemporally, but there is It can be seen as a consequent also the fiveness of them, the elaboration of the externalist reading similarity of color between them, the of the intentionality thesis – even genetic between their cells, with ontological consequences which the differences in weight between might seem implausible. The basic each two of them, the relation of lying tenet of the theory of objects is that side by side between them, the

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS... relation of between me and existence or subsistence. But not only my apples, and much more. All these presentations have their objects, but are interesting objects of our also judgments: Meinong calls the cognition, even if they don’t exist in a target-entities of judgments “Objektive”, spatiotemporal way. Sometimes such that means object-like things. If I objects even get the issue of processes judge that it rains then “that it rains” before the legal court: In cases of is the “Objektive” of my judgment. copyright infringement it might be “Objektive” resemble or the similarity between real and faked Fregean “” in many ways. handbags or the genetic identity It is clear that Meinong’s theory between corn-plants which is the leads to an ontologically rich or even salient point. overcrowded universe, and sometimes Meinong’s theory of objects can be it was caricatured as “Meinong’s regarded as a realist, ontological jungle”. But this idea proved extremely transformation of the externalist influential in an indirect way: Reacting reading of Brentano’s theory of to Meinong, developed intentionality. He tries to design a his theory of definite description in comprehensive table of the categories the paper On Denoting 1905: It is of all the objects of our cognition, and simply not true, says Russell, that introduces different notions of existence: every grammatically correct denoting Things like apples exist actually, phrase denotes some object, even if it relations like similarity hold or be a Meinongian “thin” object. Via subsist (in German: Bestehen), and logical analysis Russell showed that contradictory or unreal things like the such Meinongian assumptions are round square, the fountain of youth unnecessary. In this way, Meinong and the Golden Mountain are outside brought an important stimulation to of being (außerseiend). This is the develop the idea of logical analysis. weakest form of being there; Meinong Currently, Meinongian are seems to hold that every grammatically seeing a certain renaissance in correct description refers at least to existence-free logics, modal logics and an outside-of-being thing. According modal . There are philosophers to Meinong, one should prepare to who think that postulating Meinongian subscribe to the paradox that there objects is perhaps a way to reconstruct are things which are not there – at our discourse about possibilities, fictional least not in the sense of actual objects etc.

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4. Spin-offs of the intentionality partly because Meinong was not able thesis (II): Meinong’s discovery of to give it a very elaborate mathematical assumptions form. This in turn might go back to But Meinong did not only work on Meinong’s half-blindness which disturbed the objects’ side of the intentionality his work for decades, and which might relation. He also reflected on the also in part explain the complicated various ways how intentionality could character of many of his writings. take place. Meinong’s classification of 5. Spin-offs of the intentionality mental phenomena differs slightly thesis (III): Husserl’s phenomenology from Brentano’s (I can spare you the In the last chapter of this paper, I details here), and he discovers a new will just briefly sketch three other form of intentional relation: The fields where Brentano’s thought relation of assumption. Assumptions turned out to be influential. The first are neither presentations nor judgments one – Husserl’s phenomenology – will nor phenomena of interest, they are be known to many of you, the other something special. If I assume that I two – Ehrenfels’ “Gestalt Theory” and were in Hong Kong now, I do not Mally’s – probably not. think or judge that I am there, I do Or to be more exact: I presume that not wish or fear that I am there, but it many of you will have come across is a special intentional act: I assume Gestalt theories and deontic logic that I were there. But interestingly before in some context, but I think it one can draw conclusions from is hardly known that they have an assumptions. If the police assumes Austrian (and indirect Brentanian) root. that Jones was the bank-robber, one Edmund Husserl’s most influential can infer that he must have been out philosophical teachers were Carl Stumpf of his office at the time of the robbery, (a pupil of Brentano) and Brentano and perhaps one can check that fact. himself. Husserl even dedicated his It is clear that assumptions have high first bigger book, Philosophy of relevance for mathematics and the Arithmetics of 1891, to his teacher. natural sciences, but Meinong also Husserl tried to base mathematics on tried to develop a theory of possibility a psychological basis, but this approach and probability based on his doctrine was duly accused as psychologism, of assumptions. His huge, 700 pages and Husserl accepted this criticism: long treatise, however, did not receive Logic and mathematics as a set of much attention and appreciation, ideal and necessary cannot

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS... based on psychology as a set of off of an objectivist, externalist empirical truths about our mind. reading of the intentionality thesis. Husserl even turned into a sharp How successful it was, especially, critic of psychologism now, and for whether Husserl could solve the that purpose he made use of intersubjectivity problem, is controversial Brentano’s notions of descriptive to the present day. psychology, intentionality, phenomena, 6. Spin-offs of the intentionality and evidence. I cannot go into the thesis (IV): Ehrenfels’s Gestalt Theory details of the various stages in Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) Husserl’s development of phenomenology, is surely the most colourful personality but at least in the early stage of in our gallery of philsophers. A critical descriptive phenomenology the Brentanian pupil of Brentano and Meinong and influence is clear. Husserl held that later professor of philosophy at there is a correlation between the Prague, he dealt with many different intentional objects (the “phenomena”) subjects such as philosophy of and the intentional acts, and that the mathematics, value theory, aesthetics phenomena determine the intentional and psychology music, sexual ethics acts (not conversely, as psychologism (he was an opponent of monogamy) holds). If we are able to approach the and philosophy of religion (he wrote a phenomena without any prejudices, if quite speculative cosmogony), beyond we can step back from all the that he wrote various dramas, but his presuppositions which we normally best-known achievement is the so- take for granted, then the phenomena called “Gestalt theory”. A “Gestalt” reveal themselves in their objective (best translated perhaps as “shape” or , and with a certain feeling of “guise”, but mostly left untranslated) inner evidence. However, this evidence is a very special kind of Meinongian is not the simple, naïve attitude to the object. Let’s take Ehrenfels’s own things which the pre-philosophical example: A melody can be sung or mind has (“the mundane attitude”, as played by a violin or a piano, it can be Husserl calls it), but it must be transposed from, e.g., C Major to G excavated by an intellectual technique Minor, it can be played hectically or called the phenomenological method smoothly, but it is always recognizable with its various reduction steps. as this same melody. A similar Similar to Meinong, we can take example can be seen in graphics: A Husserl’s phenomenology as the spin- cartoon, a pencil drawing and a

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WINFRIED LöFFLER painting display the same face or avoid Meinong’s multiplicity of notions landscape. Ehrenfels distinguishes of existence, but he in turn had to pay between the Gestalt and its founding the price of a multiplicity of kinds of elements, e.g. the tones or the color properties. But this is not my main spots. The founding elements may concern here, I want to draw your change, yet the Gestalt (the melody or attention to another achievement of the figure) remains the same. These Mally’s: He was the first philosopher examples are simple and suggestive, who proposed a deontic logic, that but the exact ontological and means a formal, axiomatic logical psychological of “Gestalten” system for our discourse about what was a tricky and controversial issue we should do. Deontic logic is a among Meinong, Ehrenfels and many foundational discipline for modern others. Brentano rejected the idea as ethics and philosophy of law, but it a whole. One of Ehrenfels’ students at was developed only in the 1950s by Prague was Max Wertheimer, who Kanger and von Wright. But there should later be one of the chief was one predecessor: Ernst Mally. exponents of the “Berlin school” of Already in 1926 he published his The Gestalt psychology, together with Basic Laws of Ought: Elements of the Carl Stumpf, Kurt Koffka, Wolfgang Logic of Willing. Although Mally Köhler and others. The Berlin school himself found many logical consequences rather saw “Gestalten” as something in his system strange and there is objectively given, whereas the “Graz consensus today that Mally’s system school” (Ehrenfels, Meinong and is indeed fundamentally flawed, this others) rather saw them as products achievement 25 years before the of the mind on the occasion of others deserves mentioning. Unlike perceiving the founding elements. modern deontic logic which is usually 7. Spin-offs of the Intentionality conceived as a logic for actions (what thesis (V): Mally’s deontic logic we should do), Mally’s deontic logic is Our last philosopher is a Brentano a logic for a certain of states of spin-off only in loose way. Ernst affairs (or Meinongian “Objektive”), Mally (1879-1944) was assistant to namely for Objektive that should be and then his the case. The “ought” / “das Sollen” successor to his chair at Graz. Mally hence is a peculiar kind of object to developed a considerable revision to which we respond by certain intentional Meinong’s theory of objects: He could acts, for instance willing. Hence, even

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THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS...

Mally’s deontic logic can in a sense be less convincing solutions to it. More seen as an indirect by-product of the generally, one may ask whether the intentionality thesis. mind-world relation is really best This spectrum of ideas was not explicated as a relation to objects. Be meant as a defense of the intentionality that as it may: I hope that my little thesis. Indeed, we saw many questionable journey across variants of the intentionality aspects of it. Any attempt to base thesis showed that it was a perhaps philosophy on descriptive psychology wrong, but in any case fruitful thesis sooner or later runs into the objectivity – and hence, Brentano is an extremely problem, and we saw only more or inspiring and important thinker. 

Notes

(1) from: Franz Brentano. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), edited by L. L. McAlister, with a new introduction by P. M. Simons. Routledge press, London, 1995, p.68. (2) Franz Brentano. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). Ibid., p.61.

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