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A What Is Existence? A What is Existence? 1 Holes David Lewis and Stephanie Lewis 2 On What There Is W. V. O. Quine 3 Beyond Being and Nonbeing R. M. Chisholm Introduction Ontology is the part of metaphysics concerned with the question, “What is there?,” when that question is taken in the broadest or most unrestricted sense possible. As Peter van Inwagen points out in the introduction to this book (“What is metaphysics?”), sometimes the question “Is there any such-and-such?” means merely, “Restricting our attention for the moment to just things that are so-and-sos, is there a such-and-such among them?” When we ask, for example, “Is there any beer?,” we usually mean merely “Restricting our attention to just beverages in the fridge (or in the restaurant, or available for purchase in the county, etc.), is there any beer?” If the last beer has been taken from the fridge at a party, and someone asks, “Is there any beer?,” it is a poor joke to say “Yes” and then explain that there is plenty in the grocery store (which is closed, by the way). The metaphysician interested in ontology wants to know what the world is like in its entirety, ignoring nothing. She wants a complete catalogue of “the furniture of the world,” but at a very high level of abstraction. Ontology is one of the oldest parts of philosophy; it has a central place in Plato’s philosophy, for instance; and Platonistic ontological views are defended by philosophers even today. Quine, however, says that “Plato’s beard” (his cata- logue of “what there is”) needs shaving – meaning that Plato’s ontology is too rich; it is full of entities that Quine fi nds it hard to accept as real. For instance, Plato says there are universals – features, properties, or attributes that can be D2 ccmp01.inddmp01.indd 1199 77/6/2007/6/2007 33:40:47:40:47 PPMM 20 METAPHYSICS: THE BIG QUESTIONS attributed to many individuals (whiteness, triangularity, courage, etc.). Quine, on the other hand, is a “nominalist,” admitting that there are words that can be used to describe many things but denying that there is any single thing present in all the objects truly described by one such word. For example, on Quine’s view, many things can truly be described as red, but there need be no extra thing – “redness” – that somehow unites them or is part of them all. In van Inwagen’s “Introduction: What is metaphysics?,” Quine’s “On What There Is,” and the charming dialogue about “Holes” by David and Stephanie Lewis, we fi nd contemporary philosophers wrestling with the ancient questions of ontology, but using some more recent tools – such as the notions of “exis- tential quantifi cation,” and the technique for eliminating “singular terms” known as “Russell’s Theory of Defi nite Descriptions”. Phrases of “existential quantifi ca- tion” are simply expressions like “There is a . ,” “There are some . ,” “There exists a . ,” “There exist some . .” – phrases that can be completed in ever so many ways to affi rm the being or existence of different kinds of thing. State- ments express “existential commitment” to so-and-sos if they begin with these sorts of phrases and then go on to describe a thing or things that are so-and- so. Van Inwagen, Quine, and the Lewises all share the view that the way to do ontology is to consider all the things one believes to be true, and then to see what statements of existential commitment seem to follow, as a matter of logic, from these beliefs. They all also agree that appearances can be deceiving; that a statement apparently committing someone to the existence of so-and-sos can be regarded as innocent, a mere manner of speaking, if one can readily provide a “paraphrase” of the statement that does not even appear to imply that there are so-and-sos. Van Inwagen, the Lewises, and Quine do not see an important difference between saying that there is a certain kind of thing, and saying that there exists a certain kind of thing; both signal existential commitment to things of that kind. But some philosophers – like Quine’s fi ctitious “Wyman,” and the Austrian phi- losopher Alexius Meinong (described by Chisholm in Ch. 3) – think that the difference between “there is . .” and “there exists . .” is an important one; that what there is includes more than what exists, and “existence” and “being” come apart. Wyman (and Meinong) say that the things that have being but not existence are ones that merely “subsist” (Meinong using the German word “bestehen”). Quine’s Wyman takes an extreme view about singular terms – that is, names (“Bill Clinton,” “Pegasus”) and descriptive phrases that can serve as the subject in a sentence with a singular verb (“Zimmerman’s favorite book,” “the present king of France”): If a singular term can be meaningfully used in a sentence, then there must be something answering to the term; it must at least subsist. So, Wyman claims not only that there are “ideal entities” such as universals and numbers, but also that there are mythical beasts, such as Pegasus. Meinong’s position (as described by Chisholm) is a little more complicated. Like Wyman, he says that there are “ideal entities” like universals and numbers – they subsist, although they do not exist – and he reserves existence for concrete D2 entities in space and time (in Ch. 4, Russell uses “exist” and “subsist” in the ccmp01.inddmp01.indd 2200 77/6/2007/6/2007 33:40:47:40:47 PPMM A WHAT IS EXISTENCE? 21 same way). Unlike Wyman, however, Meinong denies that Pegasus, golden mountains, and other merely possible objects either exist or subsist. In other words, there are no such things; they have no “Sein,” no being, whatsoever. So far, then, Meinong agrees with Quine. We can, however, talk meaningfully about these merely possible “objects,” ascribing this or that feature. For instance, we can truly say, of Pegasus, that he has wings; and, of the present king of France, that he is French. Meinong used the word “Sosein” (“so-being” or “being thus- and-so”) to describe the characteristics truly ascribable to an object, whether or not there is such a thing. This led to the principle (fi rst formulated in these terms by his student, Ernst Mally, but propounded by Meinong) of the “independence of the Sosein of an object from its Sein”: an object can be thus-and-so despite the fact that there is no such object. Pegasus can be winged, though there is no Pegasus. (It should be pointed out that Chisholm does not explicitly endorse Meinong’s theory; he merely defends it from the charge of absurdity, and makes what he takes to be a strong case for it. Chisholm’s own views about the nature of exis- tence, and the way to pursue ontology, were more like those represented here by van Inwagen, the Lewises, and Quine.) Suggestions for further reading Alston, William P., “Ontological Commitments,” in Laurence and Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) pp. 46–54. Aune, Bruce, Metaphysics: The Elements (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1985) chs. 1 and 2. Dorr, Cian, “There are No Abstract Objects,” in Hawthorne, Sider, and Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007). Eklund, Matti “The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump,” in Hawthorne, Sider, and Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007). Haack, Susan, “Quantifi ers,” in Laurence and Macdonald (eds.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998) pp. 55–68. Hirsch, Eli, “Ontological Arguments: Interpretive Charity and Quantifi er Variance,” in Hawthorne, Sider, and Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007). Lambert, Karel, Meinong and the Principle of Independence: Its Place in Meinong’s Theory of Objects, Its Signifi cance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Parsons, Terence, Nonexistent Objects (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), Intro- duction, and chs. 1 and 2. Russell, Bertrand, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919), chs. 15 and 16. van Inwagen, Peter, “Meta-ontology,” Erkenntnis 48 (1998), pp. 233–50; reprinted in van Inwagen, Ontology, Identity, and Modality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 13–31. D2 ccmp01.inddmp01.indd 2211 77/6/2007/6/2007 33:40:47:40:47 PPMM 22 DAVID LEWIS AND STEPHANIE LEWIS 1 Holes David Lewis and Stephanie Lewis Argle: I believe in nothing but concrete material objects. Bargle: There are many of your opinions I applaud; but one of your less pleasing characteristics is your fondness for the doctrines of nominalism and mate- rialism. Every time you get started on any such topic, I know we are in for a long argument. Where shall we start this time: numbers, colors, lengths, sets, force-fi elds, sensations, or what? Argle: Fictions all! I’ve thought hard about every one of them. Bargle: A long evening’s work. Before we start, let me fi nd you a snack. Will you have some crackers and cheese? Argle: Thank you. What splendid Gruyère! Bargle: You know, there are remarkably many holes in this piece. Argle: There are. Bargle: Got you! Bargle: You admit there are many holes in that piece of cheese. Therefore, there are some holes in it. Therefore, there are some holes. In other words, holes exist. But holes are not made of matter; to the contrary, they result from the absence of matter. Argle: I did say that there are holes in the cheese; but that is not to imply that there are holes.
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