CEU eTD Collection The CausesofInterstate Dispute Escalation In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of International Relations and European Studies Supervisor: Professor Erin Professor K.Jenne Supervisor: Central European University European Central Word Count: Word Count: 17,232 Budapest, Hungary Matthew Stenberg Submitted to Submitted 2012 By CEU eTD Collection War that emphasizes the key role of proximity. upon a case elaborated disputesstudy through surrounding Rhodesianof the several interstate contiguity is the predictor strongest interstateof disputes escalatingintowar. This findingis models forsuggests thatgeographic the existingInstead, that showsupport research shown to have at most limited significance and do not successfully explain dispute escalation. Board andaugmented with International TheseConflict hypotheses were original research. likelihood of escalation. Binary logistic regressions were run using data from the the affect pacific characteristics or nationalizations, recent regimes, opposed politically aretested inter-regimehypotheses role the to seeif regarding political of differences having Several peacefully. areresolved disputes other violence while into escalate disputes certain This paper investigatesThis paper potential disputethe interstate causes for escalation, and why Abstract i CEU eTD Collection Bibliography Appendices Conclusion Chapter 4 –TheCase of Zimbabwe Chapter 3 – Proximity Chapter 2 –DataAnalysis Chapter 1 –WhyViolence? Introduction List ofFigures Table of Contents Abstract Appendix B Appendix A Appendix 2.5 Data Analysis Variables 2.4 Dataset 2.3 2.2 Methodology 2.1 Hypotheses 1.4 Research Design Research 1.4 1.3 Argument Review Literature 1.2 Question Research 1.1 2.4.3 Control Variables Control 2.4.3 2.4.2 Independent Variables 2.4.1 Dependent Variable ...... i 54 ...... 56 27 ...... 1 ...... 58 ...... 57 56 ...... 30 iii ...... 11 ...... 16 ...... 27 ...... ii ...... 35 ...... 14 ...... 4 41 ...... 3 ...... 32 16 ...... 30 ...... 3 ...... 31 Table of Contents ...... 47 ii CEU eTD Collection Table 42 3…………………………………………………………………………………… Table 39 2…………………………………………………………………………………… Table 35 1…………………………………………………………………………………… List of Figures iii CEU eTD Collection with ideological Theseopponents. hypotheses aresupported by subordinate arguments that becausefindingcharacteristics, in common negotiations can ground be more challenging escalation into violence might occur more often between states with opposite political their position on the left-right political spectrum – might share an affinity. Meanwhile, ideastates share by the –represented addresses that policy political that and characteristics it and states. More specifically, initiator in both target characteristics domestic political moreless or violence likely. into makesescalation which therefore initiating states, to more orlessmake it attractive target of the characteristics the that posits theory broadly selection Target states. targeted and initiating both of characteristics the analyzing been has Among forward put explanations the explanations. institutional and military, ideological, normative, from question this have are.Scholars addressed bemorethan others likely resolved violently are disputes to into violence. furtherescalate seem that ready to importantly,negotiations. More can learned lessons conflictsbe usedin the protracted those peaceful andtostimulate encourage moreto can proactively behave actors violence, into will when escalate predict criteria befound to disputes can If accurate mitigation. conflict seektoplaythat in role an active and international organizations states for implications aremorelikely Predicting disputes which eruptintoviolence canhave to policy major states. in a few between however, conflict mediation; resultviolent and negotiation with historically friendly relations. Many of those disputes are resolved peacefully, through Disputes between states are a constant feature of world diplomacy, even among states This paper proposes This hypothesespaper proposes abouttargetselection focusingand escalation, on interstate why explains that conclusive no hasbeen study certain there Unfortunately, Introduction 1 CEU eTD Collection illustrating that proximity that illustrating political supersedes domestic characteristics. are then applied to acase study of Zimbabwe before and after its transition intomajority rule, Theseexplanations hegemony, conflict: regional territory, andresources. proximity escalates bywhich mechanisms important three and explores this association demonstrates thesis effect war. likelihood intoThisshown to havethe on of greatest escalating disputes the assets playing arole inviolence. Instead, geographic proximity – specifically contiguity is– and only inconclusive,preliminary, but is support offered fornationalization of corporate violence, effect on significant no have hawkish regime characteristics or Dovish resolution. having similar political toincreasecharacteristics proves likelihoodthe for violentdispute provokelikely escalation. be would more to nationalizations recent with escalation wouldand states pacific toprovoke beless likely states that hypothesize The statistical findings, however,donotsupport thetheories as Indeed, predicted. 2 CEU eTD Collection implications. Determining when violence is likely to emerge between states can help states islikely toemerge between violence when Determining implications. effects. have limited characteristics inter-regime political that questions find that geographic proximity plays a roledefinitive in why andescalation occurs Kingdom was between two conservative, rightist regimes. Ultimately, the answers to these between a rightist and aleftist regime. The Falklands War between Argentina and the United between regimes. For example, the conflict between North and South Yemen was a dispute regime on the left-right political spectrum as a method of assessing the political relationship amonginterstate disputes. This question bewill addressed bylooking atthe position a of escalation of likelihood the affects political regimes between relationship howthe test that avenue researchinto escalation. for undertheorized dispute forms Thisresearch hypotheses like border clashes, that do not resultin military escalation are notclassified as violent. states, between skirmishes Minor clashes. for serious criteria Board Conflict International resolved peacefully. The lower bound of violence is defined here as meeting theare that those and violent turn that disputes those differentiates what and escalation of cause donot. intowar whereas others escalate peacefully? This paper will questionthe seek toaddress disputes why interstate of some neighbor, escalate intoviolence while a dispute between Vietnam and Thailand is resolved success. For instance, why might adispute between Vietnam and China, amore powerful cannot by necessarily beescalate predicted military of likelihood and theircapabilities instead, aninterstate isundertaken; dispute resolvedwith military means. that Conflicts 1.1 ResearchQuestion Answering why Answering escalate and why certain disputes has others donot major policy hasbeen regimes an between interaction Thus far,the of characteristics political This paper analyzes existing disputes between determinestates to whatis likelythe are never fail or means resolution of whenpeaceful either arises escalation Dispute Chapter 1 –Why Violence? 3 CEU eTD Collection how how past two hundredyears. democratic the peacehasemergedthe Cederman’s over to war. escalate choose pursueto nonviolentonly means of resolutiondispute between notthem and do focusing especially normativeon andinstitutional explanations, for why democratic states peace, explain to democratic the avenues various haveScholars pursued another. with one states have selected their military targets in such a fashion so as to avoid violent escalation theory: liberal democracies have notgone to war with one another in the modern era. These of Unionthe address. foreign policy in principles saying, “Democracies don’tattack each inother” 1994State the scholar on the subject, notes how President Clinton engrained the democratic peace intoU.S. 1 anything we have to an empirical law ininternational relations.” as as close comes democracies “absencewar between of the that said peace, democratic involving democratic regimes escalate and others do not.Jack Levy,in of his support the interstate explainwar, seeking of to hypotheses patterns regarding conflicts why some 1.2 LiteratureReview violence. byminimizing long-term in the lives and money both saving escalation, financial and human capital in aneffort disputes toquell those with risk greatest the of minimize the loss of human life. This would allow for more effective allocation of both effectively to escalation for at risk most cases those identify anddiplomats mediators 2 (Spring662. 1988), International Security 26, 1994, A17, as quoted by John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” “Excerpts from President Clinton’s State of the Union Message,” Lars-Erik Cederman has modeled normative reasons in a three-step process to explain hasina modeled reasons Cederman normative three-step Lars-Erik Democratic peace theory isyet philosophical controversial, enduring, peacetheory oneof most Democratic the 2 19:2(Autumn 87.1994), President Clinton’s quote describes the crux of democratic peace Journal ofInterdisciplinaryJournal History 4 1 John Owen, another Owen, John New YorkNew Times 18:4 , January CEU eTD Collection 6 (Norman: University Oklahoma Press,of 1991). not go to war with each other: hence the democratic peace. Selection theory need not apply neednot Selection theory peace. hence democratic the gotowarwith not other: each democracies tend that suggest decisions Those and success. predicting escalation conflict on dispute shouldbe resolved violently nonviolentlyor allow for them maketo decisions better determine use a when to democratic states that mechanisms and abilities, incentives, the that theory argues war. selection Democratic to escalate rarely democracies between disputes methods used by fordemocratic states selection intarget violentconflicts toexplain why more onthe rigorous focusing between democracies, lack of peace and escalation the defensive security.own ensuredemocraticinstitutions soasto proximate adopt their todemocracies states leads concentrate in clusters. concentrate geographic 5 88:4 (December545-574. 1998), Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994,” S. Cohen, David S. Brown, David Reilly,Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Michael Shin, “The (London: Sage,2004),23-44; John O’Loughlin, Michael D.Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin Citizenship, Participation, andRepresentation Diffusion of Democracy,” in (1995), 297-323;John O’Loughlin, “Global Democratization: Measuring and Explainingthe successfully, transition asregimes norms of democratic diffusion leading to states, between contact greater 4 Journal ofConflictResolution 3 forsecurity democracies toalign. andlogic asubsequent of liberal collective states between leading toalliances democracies, for that decision. He argues that democracies change their behavior toward fellow normative reasons he but emphasizes the attack another notdemocracy, to decision conscious in it aregime’sinvolves that selection democratic with somesimilarities shares approach Cederman, 489-490. Samuel P. Huntington, Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, and Peace,” Lars-Erik Cederman, “Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Selection Process,” Democratic selection isDemocraticexplain selection themost convincing argumentto democratic the 5 or itcould supportCederman’s contention that the logic of collective security 6 The ThirdWave: Democratization inthe Late Twentieth Century Spaces ofDemocracy:Spaces GeographicalPerspectives on 45:4(August2001), 470-502. 3 Several authors have found that democracies tend to 4 This could suggest either that proximity allows for Annals of the Association ofAmerican Geographers 5 , eds. Clive Barnett and Murray Low, International Interactions 20:4 , The CEU eTD Collection opinion. democracies opposes most violent methods of dispute resolution, so leaders cater to popular winning warsoutof leadershipfear of transition. This assumespopular that in opinion readily; as such, democracies pick targets more carefully and generally exert greater effort in policy as compensate for failure they because inbecannot must their successful policies members of the winning coalition expect minimal spoils given the size. Democratic leaders when in than in of staying democracies, on power likelihood the more effect dramatic a than a democratic leader would. As such, shifting resources from patronage to war can have coalitions,meaning thatautocrats need tomaintaina smaller of group allies tostay in power winning wars. havesmaller moreAutocracies win often forwhy explanans the democracies or violent conflict resolution. This calculus incorporates the size of the winning coalition as for forlikelihood constraint, peaceful aninstitutional the country as adefining characteristic, initiating the of leaders for reselection of likelihood the incorporates model the war, of spoils select targets in an effort toexplain the democratic peace. Instead of focusing solely on the Democratic Initiation of of Conflict,” Initiation Democratic 8 93:4 (Dec1999),791-807. Peace,” Democratic the of Explanation “An Institutional 7 into the war effort. As a result, democracies tend to only pursue military means in wars they Smith. Alastair and Siverson, by de Mesquita, Randolph Jamesdemocratic selection was conducted Bruce Bueno Morrow, modeling of of types Gameother regimes. theoretic than more carefully for escalation incentives only present in democratic societies lead democracies to choose military targets generally. more selection itanalyze target has to on broadened andliterature democracies, only to Dan Reiter and Erik R. Tillman, “Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on the Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M Siverson, and Alastair Smith, Theories based on target selection specifically argue that institutions or other institutions selection or argue that basedontarget Theories specifically 8 Autocratic leaders have less to lose from loseand from putfewer havelessto Autocratic a military leaders resources defeat 7 Theirmodel articulates the process by which democracies Journal ofPolitics 6 64:3(August2002), 812. American Political Science Review , CEU eTD Collection paper was published in Working paper, University of Rochester, October 31, 2006. An abbreviated version of this 12 ScienceReview American Political 11 10 9 associated with war. andeconomiccosts higherhuman the fearing Reiter and thatthe Erik public findings Tillman’s in a democratic system is “conflict-averse,” and perceive ahigh amilitary probability advantage success. of they when democracies) potentially autocracies (and target however, will, Democracies each other. with rarely and democracies escalate therefore make less targets inviting they winning to wars, resources more todevote arepredicted Since win. democracies to expect for omitted variablesfor omitted inBuenode Mesquita correct Stone ClarkeandRandall Kevin and sizeof winningcoalition. the the democracies between relationship the on emphasis the challenged have scholars other notably, grounds; believedo not they achieve victory.can significant effect on democracies winning wars, as they avoid escalating in those when they aversion and other democratic variables as posited by scholarshave indeed ahighly both as initiators and targets. Reiter and Allan C. Stam III found that the effects of conflict that democracies be aremore likely suggests in successful to regimes, autocratic wars than rather than decrease, the probability of war breaking out. breaking war of probability the decrease, than rather the opposite conclusion: expanding the size of the winning coalition was likely increase,to likelihood initiatingof unwinnableis wars notinfact significant. In fact,models their draw They increasedsizeand areduced relationshipbetween the predicted. coalition argue that between winning coalition size and the likelihood of violent conflict does not behave as Bueno deMesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith. Kevin A. Clarke and Randall W. Stone, “Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival,” Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory,” Reiter and Tillman, 812. The conclusions of Bueno deMesquita American Political Science Review 92:2 (June 1998), 377-389. 92:2(June 1998), 11 et al 7 et al ’s research and’s research have been challenged on several on challenged been have 12 102:3(August2008), 387-392. 9 conclude that the relationship the that conclude This coincides with Dan 10 Existing research also research Existing The CEU eTD Collection Likely to Act on the Lessons of History?” 15 International Organization University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evra, “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” Snyder, 14 International Organization 13 decision- policy and structures political on have societies democratic that effects institutional conflict. unwinnable an initiating democracies of likelihood the aremore capable bureaucracies professional which tolimiteffective policy of helps advising, etal havede Mesquita argued. as Bueno tothesameextent defeats military military defeat. This suggests that autocratic leaders may not, in fact, be able to withstand be leaderscompensatefor may then ableresources not to toappropriately redistribute in than power often argued. If elites are properly incentivized topunishleaders for failure, in staying difficulties greater face and signaling inpolicy maneuverability less have leaders autocratic that hasfound commitments and credible bargaining on Weeks’research Jessica likelihood of dictators being able to hold power after adefeat has also been challenged. the likelihood of escalating to war with a more powerful opponent. societies with traditions of freedom of the press result in better policy outcomes,minimizing Snyder and Stephen Van Evra, who separately argue that debates in the media of open focuses on the policy effects of the exchange of ideas. This builds on existing work by Jack peaceby of ideasin exchange democratic it on focusing the instead however, a free society; of the explanation to functional the tied is somewhat This theory averageautocracy. the methods information aresupportedby weaker regimes,because theirthan greater selection war. to escalate to resources which to they conflicts devote those be about will selective leaders also autocratic that Dan Reiter, “Political Structure and Foreign Policy Learning: Are Democracies More Reiter and Stam, 378-379. The following are as summarized by Reiter and Stam: Jack Jessica L.Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” The conclusion that democracies have greater incentives to win due to the greater win the due to to incentives havedemocracies greater that The conclusion Reiter and Stam suggest that democracies target each other less, and tend to target Myths of Empire:Domestic Politics and International Ambition 18(Spring5-39. 1994), 62(Winter 2008),35-64. International Interactions 8 15 Both arguments rely on the 14 21(March 1995),39-62. Reiter also argues argues that also Reiter , (Ithaca: Cornell 13 This implies This CEU eTD Collection Players,” Unpublished manuscript, Februarymanuscript, Players,” Unpublished 2008. 17 Measures,” 16 research This state. the of infavor mobilization ensure to resources redistribute to regimes likelymoreinitiate conflicts than capacity state to having greater military democracies, than likely beto escalated by military regimes than one-party regimes. One-party regimes are not more are conflicts interstate rule –violent individual both –for and that collective indicate collectiveindividual vs. and rule one-party military vs. structure.state Theirfindings differentiates between different types of nondemocratic, authoritarian regimes, both in defining characteristic for the likelihood of escalation,conflict buttheir typology have been artificially limited to democracies. They maintain the focus on regime types as a peacemay democratic suggests the that researchthat conducted havealso Slater and Dan for democracy. sufficient nor neither beingnecessary numbers players is of with significant veto large numbers weak, and argue thatdemocracies between conceptual the regimesconnection but and democratic individual society, not regime types. They acknowledge a correlation between veto players of within points veto the each is instead representative and democracies limited to artificially is peace thedemocratic that argue andChoi Tsebelis democratic regimes, limited to not deviation from policythe quo status to initiate amilitary Withconflict. multiple vetoplayers veto players there are in a system, democratic or not, the more difficultit will be for between democracies: the number of veto players presentin a political system. The more Whan Choi argue that different institutional constraints can explain the lack of escalation therefore less likely to be presentin autocratic regimes than in democratic societies. making; these effects would not be replicated in a society without freedom of debate and are George Tsebelis and Seung-Whan Choi, “The Democratic Peace Revisited: It is Veto Kenneth Bollen, “Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Other scholars have expanded target selection theory beyond democracies. Brian Lai Not all focuson scholars singleinstitutionalthis effect. GeorgeTsebelis andSeung- American Journal ofPolitical Science 17 9 37:4 (November1207-1230. 1993), 16 CEU eTD Collection selective regimes decide on which targets to pursue escalation into war. This largely coincides with Lai and Slater’s findings while beginning toexplain how more regimes. autocratic less other than selective are military regimes and regime, democratic mixed- or less than are selective democracies autocratic regimes found that they disputes, been targeted. Basing their criteria of selectivity on the military strengths of regimes in in differentiating between autocratic types while investigating the types of regimes that have have Palmerbuilt Daehee Lai andSlater’s on in escalation. Bak and Glenn violent targeted ongoing. still is escalation for regimes aretargeted what as to andresearch regime types, across applied universally been and why they are perceived to be easier targets. As such, the same constraints cannot be have whotargets focused those on has onescalation research Subsequent are conducted. war into for escalation conflicts selecting internal how the processes carefully explained and 19 (January 113-126. 2006), Initiation in Authoritarian 1950-1992,” Regimes, 18 domestically. peace the be must focusedcontrolling on much –becauseso attention to escalate dictatorships areless use likely abroad military theirto – and implicitlyresources likely less states. democratic between low of explain incidence conflict withthe can best democracy correlated islimited that democratictheory and too in often factors suggests peace other scope 2011, http://www.apsanet.org/mtgs/program_2011/program.cfm?event=1556138 at APSA presented the Seattle,Regime 1, 2011AnnualMeeting, Paper September Type,” 20 Strategic Studies Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” Brian Lai and Dan Slater, “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Daehee Bak and Glenn Palmer, “Looking for Careless Dictators: Target Selection and 18 Some existing literature has begun to explore which regimes are more likely beto more targets regimes some select why haveestablished readily All scholars these of These results also challenge Stanislav Andreski’s findings; he argues that military 19 , 3:3 (1980),3-10. , 10 American Journal ofPolitical Science 20 Journal of 50:1 CEU eTD Collection that suggeststhat ideology that of opposing anddispute regimes escalation irreversibly are on the left-right political spectrum. This logic emerges from the approach to foreign policy andlocation links foreign policy positions between aregime’s canoften there be significant matter a great deal and even cause shifts in party overall strategy leaders,among suggesting 1.3 Argument Falklandthe Islands orGrenada’s antagonizingUnited under the States Ronald Reagan. why likea weakerstate Argentina would challenge Unitedthe Kingdom in over dispute the explain cannot capabilities strategic pure on A focus differently. be resolved might regimes resolution among democraciesit becausefails to accountfor why disputes with autocratic in accountfor all dispute variation of the cannot peacetheory Democratic peacefully. resolved are disputes which and violent turn conflicts which to as puzzle the for explanation by initiatingstates violentdisputes. explanations of target selection, namely, if certain political ideologies are targeted more often potential other will Thisresearch pursue war areselected. for into escalation targets Argentina against theUnited Kingdomin 1982. Assuch, capacity alone cannotexplainhow disputesviolent with likestronger opponents, Iranagainst in United the States 1979 or instigate military capabilities weaker with objectively states instances where those explain cannot explanations these But regimes. selective weaknessamong target of perceptions to could contribute factors Other not but others. regimes some autocratic against escalate selection but are not exhaustive. Democratic peace theory fails to explain why democracies intarget variation the of some explain capacity military and institutions of Explanations Existing literatureExisting does notanswer all dispute about questions escalation. Existing literature hasExisting found role the that of inforeignideologies party policy can potential a as tested sufficiently been not have states between relations Inter-regime 11 CEU eTD Collection Political ScienceReview Choice: Defense and WelfareinAdvanced Industrial 1948-1978,” Democracies, 25 Democracies,” in Parliamentary Behavior Conflict International on Constraints Political of Sources 24 251-261. Parties: SelectedReadings in in France,” Forces Political of Realignment “The Thorburn, andIntegration, European 1988-95,” UniversityPrinceton 113-133;Press, 2002), Matthew Sowemimo, “The Party Conservative on AmericanPoliticalDevelopment “War, Trade, and U.S. Party Politics,” in Political Science Journalof Midwest Benjamin“Critical Ginsberg, Elections and Substance the of Party 1844-1968,” Conflict, Ideologies inAmerica, 1828-1996 Midwest Political ScienceAssociation, (Chicago: April 20, 2006); John Gerring, American WarRepublican on Party presentedIdeology,” at Paper Annual the Meeting of the 23 and World War II,” 22 World, 1955). Louis Hartz and his work 1992),Praeger, 2-4. According Chen, to the of origins this can line of thought be traced to 21 terrain.” new the to ideologies their adjust to parties political intertwined. disputes. in military involved be to likely more significantly are regimes right-wing democracies, fact in intoviolence. escalate may when conflicts impact ideology and position initial the disputants, of ideology political the change ideological positioning and resolution. dispute parties alongleft-right the spectrum, there is suggesting that arelationship between addressed howboth violentand nonviolentinterstate disputes have played a role inmoving funds between funds between defense andwelfarefor funding, government spending. While some studieshave found that there is notactually competitiondirect for William K. Domke, Richard C. Eisenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, “The Illusion of Glenn Palmer, Patrick M. Regan, and Tamar R. London, “What’s Stopping You?: The John W. Compton, “From Commerce to Mission: The Impact of the Spanish- Robert P. Saldin, “Foreign Affairs and Party Ideology in America: The Case of Democrats Jie Chen, Glenn Palmer, Patrick Regan, and Tamar London argue that, among parliamentary 24 This finding islogically by supported empirical findings regarding defense 21 Ideology inU.S. Foreign Policy: CaseStudies in U.S.ChinaPolicy, Robert Saldin argues that as wars affect national politics, “itis natural for International Interactions Journal of PolicyHistory 77:1(March 19-35. 1983), The LiberalTradition in America , ed. Andrew J. Milnor, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), , (NewYork, Cambridge University Press, 1998); , eds. Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, (Princeton: Party Politics, 16:4 (November 1972),603-625; Saldin; Martin Shefter, 30:1(January-March 1-24. 2004), Shaped byWarandTrade:InternationalInfluences , 22:4(2010),387-422. 12 23 Rather than simply arguing that disputes can 2:1 (January 77-97; Hugh 1996), G. , (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 25 22 that does not preclude rightist Other scholars have Comparative Political (London: American Party CEU eTD Collection both mightexpect. as parties both one among those who do favor isolationist foreign policies, the data is roughly similar between 1967), Domestic SourcesofForeign Policy 29 and North Strong “The True 29. Free:Stephen for plan (2008), Canadians,” Harper’s Party,13,Canadian Conservative http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v02n3p13.htm; 1986), 28 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aruidIvvQ2bc ‘Useless’ Military Defense, DPJ Official Says,” idUSTRE73B4PR20110412; SachikoSakamaki Takashi and “Japan Hirokawa, Cut Should http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-usa-budget-democrats- 2011, 27 which defense spending wasconsidered acomponent. on the subject, but found that there were significant effects for foreign policy as a whole, of successfully correlated with the left-right policy domain in an analysis of 23 existing studies Political Research ameta-analysis,” ideologies: ideology party government and right have found this conclusively. Louis M. Imbeau, François Pétry, and Moktar Lamari, “Left- 47:4 (August2003), 413 outline aseries of support studies that this position. Notall studies the Defense Budgetin the United States and Western Europe,” 26 outline how the Republican Party in the United States was able to use national security as a be stronger on national defense issues. Jack Snyder, Robert Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon Party. Democratic 45% more likely favor increasedto spending defense who than voters supported the Party were Republican the whosupported American voters that found McClosky Herbert This is notlimited solely to the views among party elites: in a general population survey, Party. Conservative Canadian the and France in parties Gaullist including spending, defense and Japan,States military funding cuts in to social expenditures. democratic regimes are more likely favorto lower defense spending, preferring cuts in and parties leftist from supporting ideological those respectively.positions, Leftparties in Herbert McClosky, “Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation,” in John Bacher, “How Socialist France Embraced the Bomb,” Andy Sullivan, “Take hike, defense cuts in House Democrats’ Budget,” Richard C. Eichenberg and Richard Stoll,“Representing Defense: Democratic Control of 94. The data in question refers to those voters who do not favor isolationist policy; 27 29 40:1(2001),1-29 foundmilitary that couldspending notbe purely and among others. Perhaps more importantly, conservative regimes are often perceived to perceived are often regimes importantly, more conservative Perhaps By contrast, right wing parties typically favor increased favor typically wingBy right parties contrast, , ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press, 13 26 For example, this is true in the United Bloomberg , September 11,2009, Peace Magazine Journal of Conflict Resolution European Journal of Reuters (June-July , April 12, 28 CEU eTD Collection Rule at Home,” 30 check for the significance of several ideological factors. This dataset is based on the be against hypotheses interstate a large-Nwill after1975 disputes tested of dataset 135 to characteristics largely associated with the left-right political spectrum. In Chapter 2, these of methods ideological in selection target violent focusing onideological disputes, regime thepotential to test areproposed Several hypotheses study. case andadetailed analysis 1.4 ResearchDesign distant. aregeographically that rather than states contiguous those be to mechanisms between operative tend that resources: the models. Proximity promotes conflict escalation for reasons of territory, hegemony, and ofinter-regimesupersede theeffects orany factor differences included explanatory in other provides the strongest explanation for which conflicts escalate into violence. These effects reach. to difficult when in conflict with rightist regimes and vice versa, as common positions would be more violently disputes resolve to likely more be to be expected should regimes leftist Conversely, will be easier to find common ground and policy positions among similar regimes. shouldstands toreason states that with like-minded seekalliances governmentsbecause it this spectrum also manifest itself ideologically in foreign policy as by suggested itSaldin, left-rightspectrum with crossingtrends borders andhavingfairly standard effects. Should War. Vietnam the issues after defense on stronger issueappeal wedge more because to traditional tobe voters to itwas thought democratic Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon,“Free Hand Abroad, Divide and This research will be conducted through approach a multi-method This researchwillbe with large-N through conducted This paper tests these hypotheses and ultimately thatgeographicconcludes proximity onthe within countries security has beenpolarized that clearly shows This evidence World Politics 61:1 (January 2009), 155-187. 61:1(January 2009), 14 30 CEU eTD Collection political changes. of geographic proximity on likelihoodthe of violentresolution ineven facethe ofmajor to contribute to escalation. Zimbabwe will serve as a pathway case, demonstrating the effects disputes with contiguous states continued. Several nationalizations on both sides also served leftist, redistributionistthe to governmentSmith of Robert Ian Mugabe.of In spite of this dramatic shift,government interstate conservative the from spectrum political domestic meets Zimbabwe conditions scope the for study the by having a indramatic shiftthe Southern Rhodesia and Zimbabwe and its interstate disputes in latethe 1970s and early 1980s. will be discussed. conflicts for their reasons thematic andthe overarching will bedisputes inclassified, violent actors likelihood of resolution:violent geographic the proximity actors. Proximateconflictof significance of some effects of the political spectrum, exerts the greatest influence on the violence. on nationalizations expectationsagainst and provide only conditional and for preliminary the support impact of goes ideologies political of opposite effect statistical indicate the that The tests assets. and theirprotect seekcitizens to asstates lead escalation might that to action destabilizing original research for autocratic regimes. Nationalizations are also tested as a potentially with Projectsupplemented Manifesto from the democracies for characteristics left-rightand level including ICBactor data the datasets, from several other havebeen collected variables International Board systemic Conflict interstate datasetof disputes since 1918. Additional Finally, the statistical approach will be augmented with a longitudinal case study on The third chapter will explore the findings of the variable that, even beyond the 15 CEU eTD Collection Cambridge University 2011),120. Press, 32 Politics,” 31 republics.” state. Ideological insteadopponents soughtand often found ideological allies in other between andLiberalsoften “conflicts remainnot didConservatives confined within each between ideological across groups borders in post-independence CentralAmerica, noting that disputes using peaceful means. Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans note the affinity measured by their position on the political spectrum, should be more likely to resolve can be greater conflict between states when they are administered by leaders and/or parties by leaders and/or when administered they states are conflict between can be greater then there borders, international limited not to are conflicts ideological samethe If country. in world politics.” 2.1 Hypotheses independent models. subordinate hypothesis is temporally limited by criteriadifferent and subsequently in tested accountforthat violentdispute resolution between states from 2007. An1975 to additional likelihood of dispute escalation. The first four hypotheses are tested in a series of models onthe differences inter-regime impact the of political investigate hypotheses following The untested. yet areas manycharacteristics but political advantage, acompetitive perceive might regimes selective in which situations the of some investigated has research Existing morelikely to pursue dispute escalation into war when it perceives victorythat is morelikely. Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Andrew Moravcsik argues that, “the configuration of state preferences matters most a is democracy that argues persuasively theory selection democratic on The research International Organization 32 These groups were seen to have more in common than disparate groups within 31 Along those lines, states with similar ideological preferences, as Chapter 2 – Data Analysis 51:4(Autumn 513. 1997), Leaders Conflict andInternational 16 , (New , (New York: CEU eTD Collection 37 36 of Speculative Philosophy regimes should face fewer constraints in the use of force than leftist ones. ideologies along the foreign policy spectrum are generally similar andthatconservative regimes they are in disputes with. Palmer, Regan, and London demonstrate that political with by beshared values constrained can therefore spectrum political left-right place on the share regimes asimilar Those that arepredominant. ideologies with similar where regimes This suggests that parties of the left or right might behave differently in areas of the world different conceptions of the world, which will resultin different propensities for conflict. increasing the likelihood of conflict breakingout. 1946-1986,” 38 Journal ofConflictResolution “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” 80:4 (December1151-1169; 1986), 35 World Politics 34 33 international conflict resolution policy. on values shared of effects the of robustness the demonstrated have states between and leaders. action constraining culture peaceful with that political associated norms the with peacefully, sharedact that democratic peacehavelong posited canexplain values states why democratic ideologies. with different Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” Palmer, Regan, and London, 5. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Peace, of Democratic the Causes “Normative Structural and and Russett, Zeev Bruce Maoz William S. Lewis, “War, Manipulation of Consent, and Deliberative Democracy,” Idean Salehyan, “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuary for Rebel Groups,” Ibid, 136. political spectrum. H1: Regimesare less likely togo to war with regimes that share similar space on the Beyond this, William Lewis argues that regimes with differentideologies have 37 American Political ScienceReview American Political Normative arguments for the occurrence or absence of violent conflict , 59:2 (January , 59:2(January 217-242. 2007), 33 22:4(2008),274-275. States can States offer refuge togroupsand opponents when proximate, 35:2(June187-211. 1991), T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, 38 These results suggest that: suggest results These 17 87:3(September624-638. 1993), 34 American Political Science Review 36 Scholars of the Journal 35 CEU eTD Collection Italian Democratic Party of ( Left’s the of Party Democratic Italian of European politics, constituent member parties have had RILE scores as diverse as the which would be classified as centrist, but rightleaning, regimes. In the post-Maastricht era modern modern democraticideologiesmembers party by of Manifestothe Project. the Government Coalitions +6.90 with the Democratic Party of Moldova ( ( 41 http://www.pes.org/en/about-pes 40 Routledge,131. 2006), 39 Labour Party ( At present, RILE scores among PES members range from -38.18 with both of the Norwegian Constituent members of the Party of European Socialists varied considerably on this scale. RILEthe score,with being-100.0 furthest the leftand 100.0beingthefurthest right. ideological share identical spaces. spectrumright within politicaltheir domestic cultures. However, they not do objectively left-right scale…is likely varyto in meaning as we move from country to country.” within each society. As Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver point out, “by its very nature the position political their share that others with solidarity ideological find might regimes that associate members, and sixobservers. members, associate social democratic, andlabor parties within European the Union, with members,34 11 example, the Party of European Socialists defines itself as an agglomeration of socialist, Parti SocialistSuisse The RILE scale was developed byMichael Laver and Ian Budge, eds. Party of European Socialists, “About the PES,” Accessed April 23, 2012, Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, Similarly,if we assume the importance of state preferences, we might also assume The Manifesto Project codes each party’s political position on a left-right scale left-right called a on position each political codes party’s Project The Manifesto Det Norske Arbeiderparti ) to +0.65 with the Dutch Labour Party ( , (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, 1992), and has been applied to many 40 Party PolicyinModernDemocracies Democratici diSinistra Those parties all occupy the same area of the left- ) and the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland Party Social-Democratic the ) and 18 Partidul democrat dinMoldova ) +16.82 RILEscore in 1997 Partij vandeArbeid Party Policy and , (New York: , (New ), both of ) and a 39 41 For CEU eTD Collection when China began perceive it as when began of itself began to China a member of international community, the inviting Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for an official visit. an official for Khrushchev Nikita Premier Soviet inviting political parties on the relative, domestic left-right scale was indicative of their support for national of position the that demonstrated Galtung Johan policy, foreign Norwegian of study parties. for ifboth In isinfactperhaps more than acase beneficial objectively something positioned. different domestic political systems rather than those parties that are similarly ideologically of same in segment that toally with parties andthey Labour Party, chose Dutch as does the European level. These parties, however, do not occupy the same center-left domestic space (New York: The Free Press,1967), (New York: party ( Affairs Czech Public or the Party Norwegian Norwegian inCase Study,” 43 project.wzb.eu/ (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB),https://manifesto- 2012). ( Dutch Labour Party might ally with the Swedish Christian Democratic Community more, the mattered measures If ideologies. objective party their of particular assessment conception of the domestic political spectrum therefore matters more than any objective same political space (center-left) within their own democratic systems. This mutual the European level. This signifies that they each conceive of themselves as occupying the these parties have all chosen to affiliate themselves with the Party of European Socialists at classified as a rightist regime according to the typology used in this study. Annika Werner, 42 Party’s ( Democratic and Serbian the Kristdemokraterna Johan Galtung, “Social Position, Party Identification, and Foreign Policy Orientation: A Andrea Volkens, Onawa Lacewell, Pola Lehmann, Sven Regel, Henrike Schultze, and Perceptions of of at and interestsshared values domatter Perceptions common level, international the Despite the objective differences in their policy goals and ideological inmanifestos, ideological andtheir goals policy differences objective the Despite The Manifesto Data Collection: Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MAPOR) ) with a RILE score of +0.81 and amember of the European People’s Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Domestic Sourcesof 161-193. Demokratska stranka) 9Č ci ve 19 Ĝ ejné ), scored at +0.83 and unaffiliated at the +18.30in 2011, which wouldbe 43 , ed. James N. Rosenau, Yongjin Zhang notes that notes Zhang Yongjin 42 , CEU eTD Collection Protecting Profits 48 Conflicts,” 47 Review Economic 46 War,” 45 ‘Civilization,’” 44 efforts. have a correlation with violentdisputes, both for physical control andmilitary financing escalation. of thelikelihood conflict on characteristics systemic of other perceptions of significance states. more fully other with to cooperate intentionally or not, undercut the power of the local governmentin whose countries they are maintained. be will rights property that commitment credible a make in force potentially destabilizing a country. among certain participants. Third, it offers an indication of the presence of resources as a point on the political spectrum. Second, it could demonstrate a possible impetus for conflict demonstrates potential instability in the economic sector as well as a likely shift toa different developed by transnational firms. A policy of nationalization indicates three factors. First, it resources and industries of nationalization the specifically nationalism, economic of form operating inthesame relative political space within their respective domestic systems. Witold Jerzy Henisz, Philippe Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources,” Woosang Kim and Bruce Bueno deMesquita, “How Perceptions Influence the Risk of Yongjin “China’s Zhang, intoEntry International Society: Beyond Standard the of International Studies Quarterly 47 One of potential source of conflict between leftist and rightist regimes comes in comes regimes the andrightist leftist between of conflict source One of potential H2: Regimesare less likely togo to war with regimesthattheyperceive to be When transnational corporations invest in a country, they expect the government to government the expect they in acountry, invest corporations transnational When 45 Political Geography Theinfluence of perceptions suggests that: Review Review International Studies of 45:4-6 (May 45:4-6(May 827-838.2001), , (Northampton, MA:, (Northampton, Elgar, 2002), Edward 46. Politics and International Investment: Measuring Risks and 20(2001), 561-584. 39:1(March 51-65. 1995), 44 Kim and Bueno deMesquita have illustrated the 46 Natural resources have been demonstrated to demonstrated been have resources Natural 20 17:1 (January 3-16. 1991), 48 They alsocan, European CEU eTD Collection 55 dispute with Guinea in 1959, according toSigmund, 6. 57 394-402.(September 1974), 56 Pigs 52 (Madison: University Wisconsinof 1980), Press, 50 military venture in response totheEgyptian nationalization of SuezCanalthe in 1956. solely to the United States. Israel, France, and the United Kingdom undertook a joint have whose resources beenappropriated. corporations transnational of countries host the from responses military with met been periodically has resources. or held companies privately nationalize to often choose governments resources, natural Intervention and the Democratic Peace,” Democratic the and Intervention 54 Guatemala, 1952-1954 53 Studies 51 Journal ofInternationalLaw 1975) International Firms and ModernImperialism 49 in response to the expropriation of U.S. corporate assets. Latin across andcompaniesindividuals America. againstpotential seizure rightsenforce of andEuropean theproperty American to power” international police Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, which it used as a rationale to act as “an investing. Western Western Hemisphere. The United supported States incoups Iran in 1953, the of outside and inside both action military overt or covert either in itself manifested 1954, Trumbull Higgins, Trumbull DerekVarble, Louis Turner, “Multinational Companies and the Third World,” Moyara de Moraes Ruehsen, “Operation ‘Ajax’ Revisited: Iran, 1953,” B.A. Wortley, “Indonesian Nationalization Measures – An Intervention,” Alexander B. Downes and Mary Lauren Lilley,“Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Nick Cullather, Paul E. Sigmund, Stephen Hymer, “The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development,” in , (New York:Norton,, (New 1989). 53 , 37-62. 29:3(July 467-486. 1993), and Chilein 1973 The decision to nationalize, however,is not without consequences. Nationalization 49 In response to this threat, and with the promise of liquid currency resources from The SuezCrisis 1956 Secret History: TheCIA”s Classified Account of ItsOperations in Multinationals in Latin America: The Politics of Nationalization The Perfect Failure:The Perfect Kennedy, Eisenhower, andtheCIAat the Bayof , SecondEdition, Stanford (Stanford: University Press, 2006). 54 and an sponsored invasion inattempted Cuba in 1961, 55:3 (July 55:3(July 680-683. 1961), , (Oxford: Osprey, 2003). France also had a major Security Studies , ed. Radice,Hugo (London: Penguin Books, 21 21-22. 50 The United States developed the 56 19:2 (2010),266-306. Such actions were notlimited The World Today 52 Middle Eastern 51 Guatemala in Guatemala Sometimes, this American 55 partially 30:9 , 57 CEU eTD Collection 61 60 59 nationalizing-oil-could-have-role-in-military-intervention-experts-say-2011-03-30 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=gadhafi8217s-plans-for- say,” experts intervention, nationalization.” and right to “the have natural resources” General Assembly in May 1974, assert that states enjoy “permanent sovereignty...over [their] the New International Economic Order, endorsed at the Sixth Special Session of the UN on Principles The becomemainstream. hadclearly nationalizations wave 1970s,the the of Challenge 62 early conflicts. nationalizations in the 1970s begins before the dataset, but can still be seen in many of the Bruce Mazlish, Cambridge (NewYork: University Press,2005),89. The wave of Multinational Corporations andtheNew Global History 58 domestic This has protection enterprises. been often aggressive carriedthrough out 18 abstentions) and 87to19,respectively. and“good faith” dealingsforeignwith capital and corporations were rejected 71to20(with Economic Rights and Duties that December that would have required “just compensation” 2011. in March Spring Arab inthe intervention NATO the motivated sector petroleum of Libyan the further nationalization toward Gaddafi’s threats that speculated Some have traditional focustraditional onbalance of trade, the than rather diplomacy through goals corporate protecting on focuses now mercantilism citizens and national (often corporate) capital abroad. Indeed, the modern conception of their protect intervene to Home abroad. countries interests economic theircitizens’ to protect firms’ home multinational countries. with disputes economic that began developinginthe nationalizations across world early the creating new 1970s, Geoffrey Jones, “Multinationals from 1930s the to in 1980s,”the Ibid, 5. Sigmund, 5. Peter W.B. Phillips, “Whether Free orFair Trade, Corporate Mercantilism Rules the Day,” Sev Õ l Küçükko Neo-mercantilist policies have frequently been by used developed countries in order 35:1(January/February 57-59. 1992), ú um, “Gadhafi'sum, plans for nationalizing oil could have role in military Ankara-Hürriyet DailyNews 62 conflating national needs with those conflatingnational needs with those of biggestthe 60 This UN posturing coincided with the wave of 22 , March , March 30, 2011, , eds. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and 59 Amendments to the Charter of 61 Leviathans: 58 By CEU eTD Collection autocratic regimes. autocratic initiate preventative (or offensive) warfare, which he sees as exclusively the purview of Regime Type and War andRegime Type Involvement,” 64 209-241.1991), Development intheThird World versusinMexican State Transnational Automobile Corporations,” 63 in engage war. preventative to ispredicted which regime, average autocratic the dovish than initiation being more the and therefore conflict preventative typical avoiding democracy toward still points evidence of Schweller’s preponderance for by the his theory, accounted autocracy. than average the fewer wars andfewer instances resolution. dispute violentof Thatis, average fought the democracy normative basis,finding that there is a high correlation between higher levels of democracy on aprimarily democracies of pacificnature the investigates Benoit Kenneth types. regime than other have to characteristics pacific average, more likely,democracies on are that shown corporations intheoilindustry within thepasttwoyears are more likelytobe violent. resolution. its on haveeffect be to apotential recentenough to wasconsidered yearsof two a dispute in restoring the assets of multinationals. For these tests, a nationalization occurring within negotiation, Pacific?” 65 636-657. Kenneth Benoit, “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe, “Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power: The Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventative War: Are Democracies More War: andPreventative AreDemocracies Structure “Domestic RandallL. Schweller, Though the findings from this research have been contested, many scholars have scholars many contested, been have research this from findings the Though H3: Interstatedisputes in which onestate hasundertaken nationalizationsof World PoliticsWorld 63 but once nationalization has taken place, negotiation is of limited is negotiation of effectiveness has taken place, but nationalization once 65 While the experience of the U.S. Invasion of Iraq in 2003 is not 44:2(January 235-269. 1992), , ed. Atul Kohli, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Journal ofConflict Resolution 64 Randall Schweller argues that democracies never 23 The Stateand 40:4 (December 1996), CEU eTD Collection anticipate will inanticipate resultsupport. electoral in democracies. decisions policy foreign not always favored pacific foreign policy, public opinion tends to act as a constraint on 66 preventative likelihood that increased the This signaling characteristics. hawkish signals initiation. They first found that regimes would not initiate conflict unless the targeted regime modeling of perceptions ofhawkishness and dovishness on likelihoodthe of conflict in a system. anddemocratic stability democracies. in wagingconsequences electoral notion supports the warhas that literature of scholarly military buildup, aspopular opinion wouldfavor peace over war. stemming from Immanuel Kant. A world of democratic societies would not necessitate is based on along tradition of philosophical infavorarguments of democratic peace likely goto to war with other democracies than with other regimes. This statistical evidence foreign foreign policy leaders. 1955),both Brown, challenge the notion public that opinion ismoderate more inherently than of Foreign Policy 67 &Itemid=28 http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=357 (London: MacMillan, 1946); andWalter Lippmann, Twenty YearsCrisis,1919-1939: An Introduction to theStudyof International Relations Freedom,” Operation Iraqi to Responses Democracies’ 69 68 Constraining theColossus 70 138-140.2006), Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Richard Sobel, Richard Steve Chan and William Safran, “Public Opinion as a Constraint Against War: Kenneth N. Waltz, “Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises,” in A positive view of the role of public opinion is of course not without critics. E.H. Carr, Democratic peace theory research has long demonstrated that democracies are less are democracies that longhas demonstrated research peacetheory Democratic Finally,Woosang Kim and Bruce Buenode Mesquita undertook game theoretic 69 This necessarily follows utopianthe view thatpublic opinion favors peace , ed. James N. Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), The ImpactofPublic Opinionon ForeignU.S. PolicySince Vietnam: , (New York: Oxford, (New University 2001). Press, 70 67 68 As such, leaders pursue foreign policies that they Steve Chan and William Safran show that a range that show Safran William and Chan Steve 24 The PublicPhilosophy Foreign Policy Analysis Liberty Fund, 66 Though publicthe has , (Boston: Little,, (Boston: Domestic Sources 263-293. 2:2(April , The CEU eTD Collection 77 National Security Policy 76 75 1969),Praeger, 31,129. policy. foreign American of out phased be might strategy containment thatthe indicated initially Jimmy Carter President after even continued War 74 the ColdWar 72 to war (55).” 71 necessary supportAmericanto foreign policy goals. to be amenable allies to the United States, being the sort of “strong administrations” and “expansive Communist geographic spreadof minimizethe the tendencies.” threat freedom. domestic political not andfrom influence, West with was freedom the alliances UnitedSoviet for States the criteria United States and its democratic allies pursued a similar series of coalitions. The primary (especially after its split with China created rivalry within the Communist camp), policy for democracies.motivators As theSovietUnion leftist supported regimes worldwide pursueapeaceful would similarly path. violentaction would betaken. If the targeted regime signals isit that pacific, initiator the 73 Affairs differences. exercised diplomatic control over all communist states regardless of their internal policy Charles Burton Marshall,“Alliances with Fledgling States,” in Gaddis, Lewis John GeorgeKennan, “The of Sources SovietConduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 576. 1947), Hans J. Morgenthau, Donald S. Zagoria, “Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World,” Kim and Bueno deMesquita. This model assumes that “all the players prefer negotiation Paul H. Nitze, “Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order,” in , ed.ArnoldWolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,222. 1963), 57:4(Spring733-754. 1979), During the Cold War, realpolitik concerns and alliances were the overriding foreign are H4: Regimes less likely toescalatewar governments indisputeswith pacific 74 , ed.ArnoldWolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,22-25. 1963), The American foreign policy response to this was containment, attempting to Strategies of Containment:Strategies of A Critical AppraisalofPostwar American A New theForeign Policy for United , (New York: Oxford, (New University 345-357.Press, 1982), 73 Indeed, the United States behaved as if the Soviet Union 71 25 76 Conservative dictatorships often proved often dictatorships Conservative 77 Potentially hostile democratic regimes States, (New York: Frederick A. Alliance Policy intheCold Alliance Policy in 72 the Foreign 75 This . CEU eTD Collection openly attempting to move away from dictatorial rule.” democracies to emergein regimes. to of place autocratic democracies Congress and other organizations with budgetary control saw possibilitythe for nascent democratic support for ideologically allied dictators did as well, especially when the U.S. possible. wherever paramount remained liberalism economic American anti-communist, conservative regimes worldwide throughout the Cold War to ensure that 1991), 28.1991), 78 preservation the and interests policy foreign on contingent still was abroad democratization Japan, This mission is shared by majorother democraticincluding powers, the European Union, statement contains the phrase to “shape and sustain a peaceful,just, and democratic world.” tenet of American foreign policy goals. The U.S. State Department’s current mission in ideological regard. this allies alike, were and nondemocratic democratic regimes, encouraged. were not President,” in 85 Democracy, 1990-99,” Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for 84 2005, http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=10059905 83 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2011/index.html, 5 82 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm 2012, 81 November 2011,6. 80 Cambridge University 2006). Press, 79 Democracy intheTwentieth Century, Tony Smith, Dante B. Fascell, “Learning from the Past without Repeating it: Advice for the New James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, “Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Ministry of External Affairs, India, “India – U.S. Global Democracy Initiative,” July 18, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2011: “Diplomatic Summary,” Bluebook April 2011, European Commission,“Human Rights and Democracy,” EuropeAid, Accessed May 2, United Department States “Fiscal of State, Year 2011Agency Financial Report,” David F.Schmitz, 82 However, since the fall of the Cold War, democracy promotion acentral become has fall since democracy War, Cold the the promotion However, of and India. US Foreign Policy in the1990s America’s Mission: TheUnitedStates andtheWorldwide Strugglefor 83 Democracy in aid least at “1990scountries…at [was]directed the The UnitedStates and Right-Wing Dictatorships 78 The United and States its allies therefore installed andsupported Democratization (Princeton: Princeton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 12:4(August2005), 453. 26 , ed.GregSchmergel, MacMillan, (London: 85 84 Of course, democratic support for So as the Cold War came toa close, , (Cambridge: 79 Right-leaning 81 80 CEU eTD Collection www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ The dataset covers The dataset theyearswww.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ 1918-2007. 88 87 127-148.1990), and Transitory Interests in U.S. Foreign Policy,” 86 state; of the dataset. 2.3 Dataset selection. target regimes’ democratic Hypothesis 5 will be tested in a separate series of models that test for the periodization of variables andseveral informed by control literature oninterstate conflict. the Hypotheses 1through 4 will be in tested a series of models three accountingfor the study will for the test determinants of violentdispute in resolution interstate dispute.an indicator of whether or not violence has reached a serious level in a conflict. These models 2.2 Methodology less likely to go war with rightist regimes. Warsaw of Pact. the disintegration tothe prior were safety net provided by the Cold War, rightist regimes are more likely beto targeted than they changesinwithoutthese wouldideological one foreign expect that the policy rationales, support for rightist and dictators less leftist comprehensively oppose governments. diplomatic ties. This data is augmented with data from several sources. Data on regime International Conflict Board, “Data Collections: Version 10,” July 2010, http:// Schmitz, 242. Morris H. Morley and James F. Petras, “Sacrificing Dictators to Save the State: Permanent Primary data on conflicts comes from the system-level International Conflict Board Conflict International from system-level the comes conflicts on data Primary The regressions arerun using binary models,logistic variable asthedependent is an H5: Duringthe Cold War and prior to the fall of the BerlinWall, democracies were 88 This dataset focuses on international disputes between states with with existing states between disputes international focuses on This dataset 86 however, the United States and other Western democracies began to lessen 27 Rethinking Marxism 3:3-4 (Fall-Winter 3:3-4 87 With CEU eTD Collection party manifesto,party RILEthe score available for oldestthe manifestois used. This happened in of the initiation of the crisis. For those cases which predate RILE scores for their particular band for qualification as a centrist regime. Data is taken from the manifestoin effect at time 91 90 dataset. system-level 89 sovereign states. two between initiation condition of scope as dispute the fallfrom they outside dataset been the removed event by actors, haveor by multi-state non-state a internally, wereinitiated which Disputes ofinitiators havetypes and from targets beentransposed ICB actorlevelthe dataset. regimes. scores from -9.99 to 9.99 are coded as centrist; scores above 10.0 are coded as right on the left-right political spectrum. Scores below -10.0 on the RILE scale are coded as left; ProjectDatabase. Manifesto the objective position on the right-left political spectrum, data when possible was collected from violence. non-violence a rare occurrence, with most state disputes having at least aminorlevel of a does of create rather potential indisputes issueissuesdyad-years,than making however, of Nepal andFiji). Use (i.e. interaction, waslittle becausethere limitedrelevance with political disputes as unitthe of analysis the avoids problemlongstanding of dyads peaceamong state of periods peace among alliance membersthroughout Coldthe War. Second, theuse of problems of the use of dyad-years. First, it avoids creating spurious effects as a result of long have been broken up intospecific disputes between pairs of states. This solves two potential beginning 1975and after enduringfor any amountof time. Protractedinternational conflicts endthe War. of Vietnam the Most RILE values are fairly concentrated around the center, resulting in narrow fairly around resulting the the center, fairlyRILE values Most concentrated are Volkens These were disputes coded 995, 996, and 997for thevariable TRIGENT in ICB the Variables regarding position on the political spectrum were manually coded. For states between any two conflicts disputes: bilateral isinterstate The unitof analysis 91 For non-democratic regimes excluded from the database, other coding rules were coding rules other from database, the excluded For regimes non-democratic et al . 89 The dataset has been truncated to begin in following1975 90 Regime RILE scores were used to calculate their position 28 CEU eTD Collection of “left,” “communist,” or “socialist” were used. For regimes coded as centrist, “moderate” regimesascentrist, For coded used. were “socialist” or “communist,” of “left,” 94 States Successor 1992); BogdanSzajkowski, ed., Eastand Roger 1992); Tanyaeds., Joseph, Political Partiesthe Americas of and theCaribbean 93 fruitful. still regimes (especially those without party structures) on a left-right scale, such an exercise is contexts (Linz, 17). As such,in spite of some of the difficulties in coding authoritarian regimes,“ideology sayingthat shaped behavior the and actions of in social groups” these indeed173. Linzfor areimportant authoritarian actual that also notes ideological differences D.J. Sagar, eds., Parties:Comprehensive Guide A (Detroit: Longman Current Affairs, 1993); Francis Jacobs, ed., 92 for which itis available. manifesto. The Labour Party’s RILE score has remained consistently leftist over the period one case, for theMaltese LabourPartyin 1980, whichwas accordingcoded 1996 tothe mentions of party the its leaderand/or in DepartmentState Background notes were used. shiftedideologicallyinaugurated publicationor after the of Longmanguide, applicable the published by Longman Current Affairs were used. spectrums toandprior including early the the reference1990s, guides of political parties the initiator. action of byfirst the targeted initially primarily) is(and typically target state the dataset; The initiator is coded as described by the ICB Data Viewer descriptions for each crisis in the political institutions might be very similar despite suchpseudoideological differences.” because of the frequent inauthenticity of their claims…actual policies and the operation of regimes authoritarian in studying confused be to likely are “Scholars in saying, regimes, authoritarian andregimes his warnings of difficulty the inand danger classifying dictatorial according topolitical institutions, keeping inmind Juan Linz’s proposed typology of werecoded Remainingregimes regimes. asrightist werecoded dictatorships theocratic and fascist all while regimes, leftist as coded were regimes communist All followed. For regimes coded as left relative to their own political system, search terms and variations Five volumes of these reference guides were used. John Coggins and D.S. Lewis, eds., Juan J. Linz, For codingFor the remaining objective ideological positions and relative political Totalitarian andAuthoritarian Regimes , (Detroit: Longman Current Affairs, 1994). Political Parties ofAsia and the Pacific Political Parties ofEasternEurope, Russia, andthe (Detroit: Longman Current Affairs, 1989); D.S. Lewis and Political Parties of Africaandthe Middle East 29 93 For those regimes that eitherwere that regimes For those , (Detroit: Longman Current Affairs, , (Boulder: LynneRienner, 2000), , (Detroit: Longman Current Affairs, Western European Political 92 94 , CEU eTD Collection 97 Palgrave MacMillan, 157. 2000), 96 95 can Notes beBackground accessedonline relation to party and/or leaderin office at the time of the crisis. State Department the potential confusion that might arise as a result of its use. Terms were in searched in different conceptions of the term between the United States and other political systems and and Islamization of political institutions. Liberal was notused as a search term due to relating to the religious-based legal system of a country, which typically referred to Shari’a political system, search terms “right,” “fascist,” and “conservative” were used, as were terms own totheir asrightrelative coded For regimes wereused. andvariations “center” and positions can be devised by taking economic and social policy positions left-right andwhoadvise that Laver, Benoit according to werecoded positions Objective that basis to synthesize a position on the left-right scale across countries. types, and this factorwaskeptin mind whencoding military regimes. broadly centrist orientations, with party positioning being “milder” in than authoritarianother spectrum if opposition were allowed; Paul Brooker notes that many military regimes have fall political todeterminea relative they would on where states, in one-party especially relative domestic political spectrum. Special care was taken with authoritarian regimes, which typically where on offeredguidance Notes, located Background the regimeswere on was based information on provided in Longmanthe Guides Departmentand State coded as an coded inordinal variable ICBsystem the level dataset, 2.4.1 Dependent Variable 2.4 Variables presence of unsanctioned opposition in either direction was used as a reference point. in a dispute, and 1indicating either serious violence or full-scale war. Conceptually,if intoa dummy variable, with 0 indicating there was either no violence or only minor clashes none, minor, serious, and full-scale war. For these tests, the ICB variable has been converted Variable 10, VIOL. Paul Brooker, Benoit and Laver, 130. The dependent variable indicates whether the interstate dispute escalated to war. disputeinterstate whether escalated towar. variable indicates ItisThe dependent the Non-Democratic Regimes: & Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, Politics 30 97 with four levels of violence: of levels four with 96 In some cases, the a priori 95 Relative position , (New York: , (New and using CEU eTD Collection oil company in a participating country within the two years prior to conflictinitiation. Data if the measure which variables, dummy two Manifesto Project and in part from the Longman series. This data has been used to create military intervention was initiated by a coalition multipleof states. isStates notcodedas hawkish during the Iraqinvasion in because2002 the Afghanistan Albania despite the violence of the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s. Similarly, the United example, Yugoslavia is creditednot as having hawkish in tendencies its 1999 conflict with measure is not perfect, as it neglects cases with multi-state causes or non-state actors. For all chronologicallyconflicts after firstthe werecoded as having violentprecedent. This andlack ofinitiation as 0. Ifmultiple disputesinitiated were during same the calendaryear, account for protracted disputes. It is a dummy variable, with previous initiation coded as 1 98 models. inparallel berun will are opposite among the bilateral disputants. These two variables showmulticollinearity, so and pacific if they had notinitiated a dispute. This also serves as a Board for initiating a violent conflict within the past ten calendaryears of a disputeinitiation 2.4.2 Independent Variables nonviolent. be violence does not escalate to the point of significant battle deaths, adispute is considered to will test if support shifted after the end of the Cold War. shifted theend Cold of the after if support will test which aregime is whether variable, whichisrightist, indicating a dummy a separate variable SeeAppendix A. As previously discussed,left and right variables have been coded in part from the States were coded as hawkish if they had been credited by the International Conflict International the by credited been had they if ashawkish coded were States The variable nationalization 98 For Hypothesis 5, the left-right datahas been used to create captures whether there has been a nationalization of an of therehasbeenanationalization whether captures relative regimetypes relative 31 and conflict conflict lag objective regime types objective regime variable to CEU eTD Collection were also as 2 coded values components, for conflict364. military significant without 1980s in the monarchies both Bahrain, and Qatar (for conflict 313,365,355,360,347, 339,andnumbers 323, 331)weresimilarly as coded a 2. per Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, and Peace,” 320. Some missing values authoritarian regime, given the level of political disenfranchisement present in the society as 101 military regimes. types tested of the between initiation conflict 100 hassectors ledto onnationalizations exclusive focus the within industry. oil the School, September 2009. The lack of consistent data on mining and other natural resource the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data,” Working Paper, New Economic 99 in sector. petroleum the nationalization on work Sonin’s Konstantin and Kolotilin, Anton Guriev, Sergei from comes coded as missing so as to not skew the results. were ambiguous upon cases Longman guides; thatmore were introductory research than was supplemented by data from other conflicts in similar time periods and research using the variable. regime military a unified into simplified were rule military regimes. ICB classifications for direct military rule, indirect military rule, and dual authority military or civilian-authoritarian, weredemocratic, states the whether indicating states, for initiating targeted and dataset from ICBactor the weretransposed variables typeregime The disputes. interstate in differently behave to demonstrated been have democracies) mustinitiator becontrolledas different for, types (and relationshipsbetween especiallytypes, means the that regimes, in authoritarian differences initiation are tested. of dispute for and explanations existing are accounted 2.4.3 Control Variables target. or the initiator side eitherthe of the on occurred Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin, and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in Apartheid-era South Africa was coded at several points in the ICB study as 2, for civilian This is supported by Lai and Slater’s findings that there were no significant differences in Existing research on democratic peace theory, and supplemented by Lai and Slater for of states relative capabilities the ensure that to necessary are control variables Several 99 It is a dummy coded variable indicating if nationalization has nationalization if indicating variable coded Itisadummy 32 101 For Hypothesis regime5, the type variable regime type of both the target and the 100 Some missing data CEU eTD Collection weapons, a state would become a less attractive target to aggressor states, who wouldfear states, who toaggressor less would target a attractive become astate weapons, much of the logic of weapons proliferation during the Cold War. By possessing nuclear governedline with of that theories andmutually the deterrence assured destruction nuclear states if power nuclear coded any the variable of likelihood of effective deterrence leading tomore peaceful conflict resolution. It is a dummy 1998. entirety of timethe period under study; AfricaSouth from 1979 to1990; and Pakistanafter 104 in involved another. aretoone states a dispute Empirical Literature,” Empirical studies, as Paul does F.“Geography Diehl, War: A and Review andAssessment of the 103 102 advantagefordemonstratingabovehighly onecombatant. significant a eight similar capabilities, between three and eight indicating amoderate level of superiority, and categories for modeling, with an discrepancy ICB-coded less of than indicatingthree roughly two statesinvolvedin a dispute. These have data been into grouped equal three ordinal measures thegapin and military, between the geographic capabilities the alliance, economic, negativewould coefficient supportthis existing research. into violence; escalate aremore tohave likely disputes states more proximate that suggests research Muchexisting region. immediate outside the distance conflict significant directly bordering one another, 2 indicates non-contiguousproximity, 3indicates and (0). not or as was recoded a dummy indicating of ifvariable disputewas the initiator the democratic (1) United States, U.S.S.R/Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, and India for the Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, Peace,”298-302summarizes and several relevant ICB system variable 57. A variable measuring the status measuringof A variable stateas the status the a targeted The Geographic proximity power discrepancy International Interactions is an ordinal variable that accounts for how proximate the proximate how for accounts that variable ordinal is an variable is derived from the ICB system level dataset and 33 102 104 17:1 (1991), 11-27. A classification of 1 indicates states were targeted in a dispute. This falls in nuclear power checks for the checksfor 103 a CEU eTD Collection should be marginal. should on results effectthe andthe thetwo between conflictis of direct case only there one dataset high resultactually indicating an alwaysdispute. non-violent Luckily,in particularthis violence,having so codedasseven this the potentialwould have skew withto data the such a 108 107 and Practice 106 Cambridge University 1990). Press, 105 1989. conflict initiation to determine if democratic regimes behaved differently after November 9, response. potential catastrophic a conflict was initiated after the fall of fall the after initiated the of was a conflict disputes directly involving the U.S. and USSR are rare in the dataset, minimizing the effect. involved, this should skew the results insignificantly in the nonviolentdirection. aredirectly both states indicating that seven with leaders; however, from alliance support Generally, higher values for this variable should predict greater violence, with significant wasbeingdispute and usedasaproxy Union. Unitedthe war between Soviet States in any form). Fundamentally, this variable serves as a measure for whether an interstate scale, with seven being aconflictdirectly statesbetween (andthe involvingtwo not proxies here named dataset, system foreign policy intervention) is measured by the power involvement variable from the ICB expect less violent escalation when would-be targets had nuclear capabilities. opponentwould respondin kind: theultimate deterrent. mutually be whennuclearweaponuse destruction, usedbecause could not assured your Direct disputes between the U.S. and Soviet Union never crossed the threshold into threshold the crossed never Union Soviet and U.S. the between disputes Direct ICB system variable 19. Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Powell, Robert Finally,for hypothesis 5 only, there is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not The presence of War-eraCold proxy wars (and subsequentAmerican and Russian , (Washington: Strategic, (Washington: 2004). Studies Institute, Nuclear DeterrenceTheory: SearchforCredibility Nuclear The Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction, ItsOrigins proxy war 105 Among fellow nuclear states, this manifested itself as . 107 Involvement from either power is coded on a 2-7 Berlin Wall 34 . This simply measures the date of 106 With these effects, one would , (New York: 108 However, CEU eTD Collection 109 lag and conflict study variables. the regression without either variable testing political differences and only the nationalization separately multicollinearitydue to in Models 1and2. Model 3 shows the results of running independent variables. The two variables assessing inter-regime political differences are run dispute.violencein occurring interstate Tablean modelsfor 1showsthree accounting 2.5 DataAnalysis other leaders appear to matter more than any objective policy similarities. The objective This only relativeapplies to inter-regime left-right positioning; perceptionsthe of states as to withconflict one another; instead, effectthe is foundbe to both negative andsignificant. of politicalthe spectrum within their domestic systems wouldbe more likely engageto in for.regimes Hypothesis byleadersends administered 2predicted atopposite controlled that reasons. First, the direction of several effects is counter to what was hypothesized or * Is significant at the .1 level; ** is significant at the .05 level; *** is significant at the .01 level. Initiator Regime Type Target RegimeType Power Power Discrepancy Proxy War Nuclear Nuclear Target Geographic Proximity Nationalization (Objective) Political Spectrum Opp. Opp. Political Spectrum (Relative) Conflict Lag Nagelkerke R-Square The caseis universe 135interstate disputesfor Models 1 3. through The coefficients of the variables demonstrate their effect on the likelihood of serious The models show unexpected findings. These results are surprising for several 109 Model 1 .153 (.324) .727 (.356)** .298 (.299) .561 (.246)** .0 .9)* 1.278 (.761)* 1.502 (.795)** -1.126 -1.117 (.465)** -1.079 (.472)** (.477)** 1.172 (.712)* (.507)* -.891 .176 (.469) .221 Table 1 35 Model 2 .141 (.321) .642 (.344)* .282 (.299) .587 (.248)** -.540 (.509) -.540 .987 (.706) .109 (.463) .199 Model 3 .228 (.316) .629 (.338)* .293 (.298) .548 (.242)** 1.287 (.747)* .656 (.648) -.076 (.441) -.076 .185 CEU eTD Collection containment theory and the domino effect with shifts on the political spectrum. the political shiftswith on effect domino the and theory containment 81-95. This wouldfall also inline many with predictionsthe of of Cold War-era Rise of Populism and the Leftin Latin America,” progressively spreading throughout the region, as summarized by Mitchell A. Seligson, “The terms,leftist populist,regimes arose Latin throughout America 2000s, the throughout the disputes to greater levels of violence than the initiator states anticipate. An example of choose escalate This nuclearbe to couldfairly largecoefficients. becausethe states targeted to increase the probability of escalation greatly, with it being significant all three models with itappears rather, conflict; violent toinitiating is aclear not deterrent Nuclear power control. skewing These results. potentially the disconfirm results 1 andHypotheses 2. a casescreate negative conflicts, important effectby and excluding protracted emphasizing componentdisputesin ICB the coding, data the may have been unintentionally structured to withconflicts multilateral non-state initiators,or and byincluding protracted conflicts as emerge.might this could coincide with geographicthe relationship variable explain to morewhy conflicts State,” Welfare of Developmental Hypothesis the the Testing Asian WelfareRegimes: Ku, “East Journal ofEuropeanSocialPolicy report,” A More? or state-of-the-art Welfare Capitalism of Worlds “Three Gelissen, and John Welfare Capitalism geographicmost clustering, importantly Esping-Anderson,Gøsta has but demonstrated related, isseparate which welfare state, the Research on prediction. 111 not just apply to democracies but authoritarian regimes as well. International Studies Quarterly Regime Change: An Evolutionary Model of the Spread of Democracy and Peace,” for most of thesystem modern world era.in the Lars-Erik dyads all Cederman among and Kristian distance Skrede Gleditsch, average the “Conquest than less and been has democracies 110 cluster. could potentially be for two reasons. First, regimes of different types have been found to results are not significant. The negative sign and significance of the relative positioning Though not fully applied to the political spectrum, there is some empirical basis for this for basis empirical is some there spectrum, political the to applied fully not Though between distance averagehas geographic that the found Gleditsch, 316, Nils Petter 110 Social Policy and Administration The effect ofnuclear powers as targets also runs counter to the predicted effect as a If the same held true for regimes similar to each other on the political spectrum, 111 Second, it could simply be an artifact of the dataset. By excluding , (Princeton: Princeton University 1990); Press, supplemented by Wil Arts 48:3 (September605, 2004), confirm regional clustering does 12:2 (May 137-158; Yih-Jiunn 2002), Lee andYeun-wen 41:2(April 197-212. Inpurely2007), political 36 Journal ofDemocracy Journal The ThreeWorlds of 18:3(July 2007), CEU eTD Collection significance. statistical neverapproached and small remained here; sizeof effect the reported the not 114 113 196-210.1982), 112 somewhat is This variables. spectrum political objective or relative either with models thereby hypothesisbecome 4. violent, disconfirming violentdispute initiation plays nosignificantrole in whethernotsubsequent or disputes provide more conclusive Hypothesis results; therefore, 3 is inconclusive. comprehensive data on nationalizations across a range industries, of rather justthan oil, could nationalization on violence; however, the models are ultimately inconclusive. More Model 1. This shows preliminary and conditional support for the potential role of likelihood of violence breakingin out a dispute.Statistical in significance is demonstrated costreduces the involved of violencein states for dispute. a often provide when neighboring states were in conflict, acting as a proxy war. funds,with the military andthatthe Soviet weapons, wouldUnion and training States United This coincides of violence. likelihood increased the after theendWar) Cold of the States Similarly,involvement by in superpowers the Coldthe War era(and Russia and the United likely escalate. conflicts are to influencewhat on greatest has the among This effect less atcost. for violence opportunity it creates because of conflict on likelihood the impact The size of this effect is large and quite significant. Proximity should indeed have this them. between in escalation disputes of likelihood violent thelesserstates, the two between Falklands War, when they did not anticipate British military escalation. this would be Argentina’s offensive actions taken toward Unitedthe Kingdomin the Several other iterations of the model including the conflict lag variable were also run but John Lewis Gaddis, Lewis John Lawrence Freedman, “The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,” These results inModels 1 3 showthrough fairly evidenceconclusive thatprevious The effect of a recent nationalization in the oil sector had a positive effect on the distance geographic the greater The in directions. go thepredicted effects Other The ColdWar: ANew History 37 114 , (New York:, (New Penguin, 121-124. 2005), The effect was not significant in Foreign Affairs 112 113 This again This 61:1 (Fall CEU eTD Collection democracies (which were coded as 1). (whichwerecoded democracies morebe likely than forregimes regimetargeted were those values that to type suggest 116 characteristics. pacific assess comprehensively disputes. Further study individualcould study more leaders than morestates to regime inlater be by could a violentinitiator replaced pacific a more regime that possibility 115 time over significantly changed have state in initiator violence.Thiscircumstances into mean escalate an couldare likely that to are clearly important initiation more than when violent whichconflicts previous determining amplefor opportunity these initiatorsprevious beto active inmultiple dyads. Other variables surprising giventhatmany conflicts appearprotracted multiple times in providing dataset, the restrict the case universe to democratic initiators of violentdemocraticinitiators asshowndisputes, to in of caseuniverse restrict the 2. Table Berlin Wall owing to changing systemic political conditions, necessitated a separate model to military dangerous be more because likely they opponents. targeted to are potentially additional for Buenosupport de Mesquita All regimes factor in likelihood of victory when deciding when to escalate. It also offers for type. theinitiator non-democraticsignificance no byfinding selective are also that regimes not offer unconditional support. Specifically,it offers support for Lai and Slater’s arguments also butdoes literature, selection as1). is with target incompatible the (coded This not result more ones than tobe likely democratic for military)as 2fortargeted are and3 civilian (coded non-democratic regimes that indicates regimefor type the target coefficient positive regime type is not significant in any model,meaning that all regime types are selective. The method of dispute resolution. a strong signal of escalation when they are determining if negotiation could be a successful As civilian regimes were coded as 2 and military regimes as 3, the positive, significant This is possible as the variable is coded for states, not individual regimes, leading to the Hypothesis 5, that the behavior of democracies would change after the fall of the of fall the after change would democracies of behavior the that 5, Hypothesis Among control variables, the regimetarget type isalways significant and the initiator 115 or that states or previousthat do nottake initiation violent as et al 38 ’s theory, that democratic regimes are less 116 CEU eTD Collection suggests rejecting the hypothesis. suggests rejectingthe in larger-Nsignificantly could test strongly still significance, truncated butthis result 117 Power Power Discrepancy Proxy War Geographic Proximity Nuclear Nuclear Target leftist regimes. or than centrist regimes attack either rightistlikely more to areconsiderably democracies regime typesin suggests previousthe threemodels. Thesize of effectthe suggests that relative position within their political spectrum, which runs counter to what the data for all likely attackto regimes based on their objective status as a rightist regime but not their U.S., and Unitedthe involved Kingdom in sample.the Third, democracies appear tobemore is probably due to potential sample size restrictions with only democratic initiators India, the and Stam. Second, the status of a target regime as anuclear state is nowinsignificant. This Wall? Berlin After Target Right Objective TargetRelative Right Nagelkerke R-square Nagelkerke target selectionespecially de Mesquita literature, target Bueno significant in disputes initiated by democracies. This coincides with much of the existing as limited to democracies, and the results from Table 1. First, power discrepancy is 2, in Table results the between differences main three are There model. neither in significant 2007. between 1975and November 1989ascompared to between period the November 1989and democracies did not behave significantly differently toward rightist regimes in the period * Is significant at the .1 level; ** is significant at the .05 level; *** is significant at the .01 level. Given a full universe of disputes in the Cold War from 1945,it is possible that the 117 The results of Table 2 appeartoconclusively Hypothesis disprove 5 and suggestthat This time shift was represented by the Berlin Wall dummy variable and was Model 4 1.830 (.951)* 1.702 (1.118) -3.560 (1.624)** -3.560 .550 (1.540) .444 (1.054) (1.159) -1.206 .419 Table 2 39 et al , Reiter and Tillman, and Reiter , Model 5 3.255 (1.479)** 2.894 (1.557)* -5.545 (2.442)** -5.545 3.142 (1.701)* 1.362 (1.550) -.760 (1.437) -.760 .550 and Reiter CEU eTD Collection have argued are the most selective, contiguity has a huge effect on escalation. on ahugehas effect selective, contiguity most arethe have argued an effect, but even when controlling for those democratic initiators that previous theorists dispute between states will turn violent. Other variables are statistically significant and have variable. Again, geographic proximity exerts the greatest influence on whether or not a Hypothesis 5 and the previous models: thesign and significance of geographicthe proximity spectrum. political the on elsewhere located regimes than more widely regimes be conservative to targeting democracies cases. 118 over the timedisputes period, regimes. This could be an artifact of a small number of democratic initiators of violent alliance structure, in which democratic NATO members allied with rightist, anti-Communist more resources to devote to war. This also runs counter to the expectations of the Cold War accordingde Mesquita Buenotherefore, to with thatrightmilitary associated regimessuggests higher arecharacteristically and spending to focus more military on capabilities than all types.regime Previously evidencediscussed After narrowing the case universe to democratic initiators, the N for these models was 28 In spite of these differences, there is one key similarity between the models testing This resultis unexpected, given that democracies are demonstrated in Models 4 and 5 118 but it is still demonstrative of a potential general trend for et al 40 ’s arguments for democratic selection have CEU eTD Collection Journal ofPeaceResearch 122 Company, 1944). 121 war. for prerequisites arethe two willingness (Columbia: Carolina University of 23 South argue Press,1989), that opportunity and 120 Journal ofConflictResolution 119 control in all tests. borders as one of its two measures for relevance, essentially mandating that it be an implicit used –whichanalyze parameter states to between includes international relations direct contiguity is present in the general definition of politically relevant dyads – the most common manageable bynonviolentmeans than ones. distant The widespread significance of areless states contiguous between Conflicts escalation. of likelihood conflict on the left-rightthe political spectrum any or control other variable, seems haveto a clear influence is half of is half war. prerequisitefor the of interactions cannot alone explain disputes. globalizing world with increased communication on a worldwide scale, the amount of and more frequent interactions than distance. However, as suggested by John Vazquez, in a violence. into will escalate conflicts in factor which decisive predicting for all but the most powerful. This has not changed with increasing economic globalization. economic increasing with changed not has This powerful. most the but all for concentrated. less are geographically that in conflicts rarer are states that contiguous between in many present disputes be characteristics must there increased interaction on a global scale can be seen even across great distances. As such, and history, throughout been have they than time and finances both of interms costly less John A. Vazquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Nicholas John Spykman, Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, Douglas Lemke and William Reed, “The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads,” Geographic proximity,more than variablesthe pertaininginter-regime to position on Geography Geography plays amajor role in behavior,state Most states cannotproject power worldwide, so opportunities for conflict are limited 119 Indeed, contiguity and proximity provide opportunity, andopportunity 32:3(August1995), 277-293. The Geography of the The Geographyof Peace 45:1(February126-144. 2001), Chapter 3–Proximity 120 The size and significance of the effect suggest that it is a Inquiry, Logic, andInternational Politics 122 Present relations between distant states are far 41 121 , (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and and proximity necessitates different andnecessitates proximity , CEU eTD Collection 127 Walter, York:Cambridge (New University 204.Press, 2006), Territoriality andConflict in an Era of Globalization 126 Journal ofPolitics 125 interstate disputes. interstate emphasis placed by previous scholars on contiguity as a decisive factor in the escalation of states; nonviolentand violent) is themaximum of percentage disputesa at time between contiguous states. contiguous 92% of out of between disputes wars escalate that more demonstrating results, dramatic period. time a similar over disputes military inexplaining factor War, 1816-1965,” 124 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1991). 1816,” Publication of Series Internationalthe Relations Working Group (Berlin: 123 speaking,fall they majorintothree notexhaustive) (though categories: over disputes territory Non Violent Violent states. contiguous between in when war result from 59.8% 1946 to1976. militarized40.7% of disputesbetween contiguous in states periodfrom the 1816 to1848 military disputes to be more likely to be among proximate states, increasing steadily from Over period the of 1816 to1976,Charles a Gochmannotes fortrend thepercentage of Gochman. Halvard Buhaug and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “The Globalization of Armed Conflict,” in Paul F. Diehl,“Contiguity and in Military Escalation PowerRivalries,Major 1816-1980,” Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate Charles Gochman, “The Geography of Conflict: Militarized Interstate Disputes Since 127 Table 3–Percentages of Geographically Cases Contiguous MeetingCriteria Not all between disputes arecontiguous states motivated by samethe issues.Broadly bilateral the in disputes this dataset largely predictionfollow that and confirm the 125 47(1985), 1203-1211. Journal ofConflict Resolution Overall, when a dispute is militarized, it is five times more likely to Political Gap 83 ae 5.%cniuu) 38/48 cases (79.2% 18/32 contiguous) cases (56.3% contiguous) 34/39 cases (87.2% 13/16 contiguous) cases (81.3% contiguous) 123 Stuart Bremer finds contiguity to be the single most important 42 126 Gochman itconsiders likely 80% that (both 36:2 (June 1992), 309-341. , eds. Miles Kahler and Barbara F. No Political Gap 124 Paul Diehl finds even CEU eTD Collection Disputes,” 133 Studies Review 132 57-84. Do We Know About War? 1816-1992,” 130 International Security 129 Compass 128 longesttaking toresolve the of any type. dispute set. might such a loss of that sovereignty potential precedent identity. national solidify psychological benefits for potentially adding territory ethnicthat kinmay in,reside helping to benefits toastate, adding butalso resources projecting animage of andpower retaining oversimplification; risks classification any to one completely Distilling aconflict highly interrelated. course areof These reasons and overregional boundaries, disputes hegemony, access resources. anddisputesover to 131 conflict of interstate disagreement. any of type findHenehan that territorial havedisputes thehighest probability resultingof in violent andconflict. of power in conceptions neorealist important proximity. lands, orbattleresource-rich regional issues for because those from all dominance derive havestates fewer todispute opportunities rebelterritorial harbor claims, feud over groups, Distant beless common. issueswill these on interactions simply because borders direct between China andVietnam.less Suchdisputesare likely occur among withoutto states show patterns. Some conflicts can be a combination of two factors, like some of the disputes Ron E. Hassner, “The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, Century,” in and Twenty-first the Security Line:Borders the Andreas, “Redrawing Peter Philippe Le Billon, “Geographies of War: Perspectives on ‘Resource Wars,’” Paul R. Hensel, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,” in Historically, territory has been the leading cause of war and remains fundamentally 1:2 (2007), 164. 1:2(2007), International Security Journal ofPeace Research 5:4 (2003), 137-153. 5:4(2003), 28:2(Fall 80-81. 2003), 131 John A.Vazquez, ed.,(Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), Indeed, states sometimes fear not the loss of territory but lossfear the of the territory not sometimes states Indeed, 31:3(Winter107-138. 2006/07), 128 38:2(March 123-183. 2001), however, general trends within conflicts can still 43 130 133 Territory has both tangible and intangible And of course the territory may simply 129 132 John Vasquez and Marie Disputes become Disputes intractable, International Geography What CEU eTD Collection the emergence of violent conflict. emergence of the policies within their sphere of influence; this may resultin rejection of hegemonic status and areableSuccessful hegemons maintain to legitimacy results in that offensive unchecked by demonstrated competitionthe between Brazil Argentinaand duringWorld War II. Competition for regional hegemony havecan amajorinfluence foreign on policy actions, as leader. regional the and region as within beperceived their project power their to be able from longstanding disputes over who is the dominant power in a region. Hegemons have to constraints of great powers. of great constraints borders. over spill they when implications international have in Hegemonic Enforcement,” 136 territory should be pursued. Journal ofModernAfrican Studies 139 138 Area Studies Working Papers,77(May 2008). Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and ‘Quiet Diplomacy,’” German Institute of Global and 137 471. the Foreign Policies of Somalia and Serbia,” 135 134 rebels, when aresupportingdomestic conflicts neighboring states for and providing sanctuary drivers than baseddisputes land. on different fundamentally have they but component, territorial a have often resources natural have economic or strategic value sought by states in conflict. Disputes over hegemony and David R. Mares, “Middle Powers under Regional Hegemony: ToChallenge of Acquiesce Ruth Iyob, “Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa,” Mares. Miriam Prys, “Developing a Culturally Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Stephen M. Saideman, “Inconsistent Irredentism? Political Competition, Ethnic Ties, and Salehyan. 134 Regional Regional hegemons attemptto exert influence overweakerneighbors amidst the Other times territorial conflict can be a function of spillover from civil wars and irredentistor can states be by motivated internal instigating factors political which 136 135 International Studies Quarterly Conflicts, especially protracted ones, are sometimes derived Though these disputes arise out of domestic situations, they 139 31:2(June 1993),257-276. Security 44 Studies 7:3(Spring51-93. 1998), 32:4(December453- 1988), 138 137 CEU eTD Collection war,” 145 153-181.2003), 144 143 49-61.2001), 142 625-633.(August 2005), Hoeffler, “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict,” Cases,” 141 140 resources. international relations, with a special emphasis on the strategic geography of essential now govern unlike interests Warera,economic Cold in Klare arguesthat, ideological the presence of tothe resources. beattributed cases can in conflict certain of violent states. materiel. vulnerability by controlling supply necessary of energy sources, metals, andimportant other categories can be seen in Appendix B. Even several of the noncontiguous disputes fall into fall disputes noncontiguous the of several Even B. in Appendix beseen can categories breakdown states. into The full of cases between in contiguous found readily disputes resources, suggesting that the issues presentin these violentconflicts are those that are most of into disputes83.6% these fit the themesof hegemony,three natural territory, regional and byBoard. Conflict analyses provided conflictthe according International the to categories Sudanese independence – is only militarization driving a year later. before South control Sudanese –previously under oil over resources Sudan, where control South independent newly and Sudan between conflict violent emerging the with seen directly resource rents, have the potential to shape the economic futures of countries. This can be and control of land that states fight for. British Broadcasting Corporation, “South Sudan’s Salva Kiir says Sudan has declared Jesse C. Ribotand Nancy Lee Peluso, “A Theory of Access,” LeBillon, “Geographies of War,” 165-166. Michael T. Klare, “The New Geography of Conflict,” Michael Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Spykman, 22-23. BBC News 140 Natural resources play an especially significant role in betweenborder role play conflicts significant resources an Natural especially The violent disputes in the dataset have been classified into these three broad three these into classified been have dataset in the disputes violent The International Organization Michael Ross and several other scholars have shown evidence that the emergence 143 142 Resource access has a range of benefits for a state, not just the property rights These conflicts generally have a strategic component, as states seek to reduce , April , April http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-1782631624, 2012, 38:1(Winter35-67; Paul 2004), Collier andAnke 144 The conflicts in question,motivated in part by 45 Journal ofConflict Resolution Foreign Affairs Rural Sociology 145 80:3(May/June 141 68:2 (June Michael 49:4 CEU eTD Collection drivers of escalation. of conflict drivers should compelling evidencefor thesignificance of provide importantproximity other over its neighbors Zimbabwe between and of series disputes escalation. The conflict on an effect inendured face of the and shownregime in changes factors inother 2 shifts to haveChapter primarily harboring andsupporting rebel movements within their borders. These disputes issues, territorial nontraditional over states neighboring with disputes longstanding had it as disputes is clear. emerges ininterstate whenescalation for variable majorthe explanatory great proportion of violentconflicts in sample,the importance the of geographic proximity as they still more distantdrive conflicts with reduced frequency.With issues these driving a states, bordering with salient more are issues these though that suggesting categories, these Chapter 4willChapter discuss cases Rhodesia the of Southern (andZimbabwe), subsequently 46 CEU eTD Collection (Spring177-184. 1980), 147 University 77.Press, 1997), 146 of beganrebel groups guerrilla conflictsagainstminority the government. In facethe of in 1965. In response to this, trade sanctions were applied to the Ian Smith regime and a series independence.for This failed, negotiation and declaredindependence unilaterally Rhodesia when Southern –underRhodesia backdrop the of general decolonization – began negotiate to participation. British without forces military own ruled directly from London. Most importantly, the white minority government controlled its 1920s and was adominionconsidered Canadaequal to Australia, and never havingbeen mechanisms. in model,the bestthe job does of explaining the emergence ofviolentdispute resolution shows thatgeographic proximity,more than found factors other tobe statistically significant continued with contiguous neighbors across politicalthe spectrum. The case of Zimbabwe higher likelihood of conflict escalation. However, in spite of these shifts, external conflicts redistribution schemes once taking power. This is thus a form of nationalization, predicting a nationalized Rhodesian assets under Smith, and the Mugabe regime undertook major land to aSocialistregime Mugabe. ledby Additionally,Robert neighboring countries statistical analysis: statistical having a large variance ontwo importantvariables within-case from independent the by case comparison for qualitative selection Stephen for meets criteria Van Evra’s Zimbabwe War and continuinginto the 1980s makes SouthernAfrica an especially rich study. however, the series of bilateral disputes emerging between many states during the Rhodesian Lord Saint Brides, “The Lessons of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” Stephen Van Evra, Stephen Southern Southern Rhodesia became mandate a self-governing of Unitedthe in Kingdom the There aremany worldwide bilateral cases of protracted that conflicts violent; turned 146 first, there is a major shiftfrom a conservative regime led by Ian Smith Chapter 4 – The Case ofZimbabwe Guide toMethods Students for Political Scienceof 47 147 This arrangementremained until 1963, International Security , (Ithaca: Cornell , (Ithaca: 4:4 CEU eTD Collection 153 Raftopoulos and A.S. Mlambo, (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 144. in 152 151 Modern AfricanStudies 150 of their is encampments beyond scope the of this paper. Either way, the targets were tied to the Rhodesian War broadly and the nuances of the nature Mtisi military as of targets the significance. and characterized McLaughlin Moorcraft generally 149 (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball 123. Publishers, 2008), 148 The Africa. in Southern advancement Communist continued for proxies into rebels the collapsed. secure white dominance in AfricalastedSouthern thatuntil government Portuguese the growing insurrection, Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa entered a covert alliance to and organized by Moscow and bytheSovietand intoRhodesian the Union War, brought Moscow organized border. Rhodesian ZIPRAbases nearthe tothe worldwide Tanzania, servedas and funnelan intermediary from to resources support movements military arm of the ZAPU party led by Joshua Nkomo. The Zambian government, along with intowar. escalated states between two the The ongoing dispute organizations in Zimbabwe by 1974, reversing his earlier position extolling nonviolence. on this front led to escalating rhetoric, with Kaunda offering “all possible assistance” torebel between andrebel London, Smith, mediator organizations. support for nonviolent methods of regime change in Southern Rhodesia, offering to act as a demands closer attention. Inthe 1960s, Zambian PresidentKenneth Kaunda announced his regime. Smith the against series of asconflicts with neighboring theyharboredviolent groupsseeking states revolution Becoming Zimbabwe: AHistory fromthe Pre-colonial Period to2008 Moorcraftand McLaughlin, 73. Joseph Mtisi, Munyaradzi Nyakudya, and TeresaBarnes, “Warin 1965-1980,” Rhodesia, Ibid, 90. Timothy M. Shaw, “The Foreign Policy of Zambia: Ideology and Interests,” Accounts differed on the nature of the targets of Rhodesian attacks across border. the across attacks of Rhodesian targets of the thenature differed on Accounts Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, Paul and Peter L. Moorcraft et al Zambia participated in the conflict escalation by offering safe harbor to ZIPRA, the in Rhodesia and Zambia particular Southern between The history of relationship the 148 disputed this andgenerally characterized the as encampments hosting refugees. Ultimately, the white-dominated Southern Rhodesian government began a 14:1(March 90. 1976), 149 The RhodesianWar: AMilitary History 48 152 150 ZIPRA’s training was funded However, the lack of progress , eds. Brian Journal of 153 turning , 151 CEU eTD Collection conference in Geneva, when Rhodesian forcesconference camps, in seized when supplies,attacked Geneva, Rhodesian andbombed over 1,000ZANLA troops. involved aconvoy infiltratingof scouts amajor guerrillagroupingNyadzonya at and killing significantmost of these The intoMozambican territory. forty moreattacks than launched 161 160 159 158 157 Mozambique. Operationundertook Thrasher, the military campaign against guerrillas and theirhosts in after Zambia exclusively threw its lotin with ZAPU and ZIPRA. ZANLA, Mugabe-led ZANU’s military arm, received military support from Mozambique leader MachelMozambican Samora backed the guerrillastrongly in struggle Rhodesia. Lisbon. with agreement an of because confrontation interstate based on Portuguese territory, forces butRhodesian could engage rebel forcesrisking without guerrilla base against the Smith regime. Even before independence, guerrillas had been 156 155 bases, rebel housed minimizeZambia to their support. 154 economy, violentin 1977-1978. support, undertook cross-border raids against and ZAPU their reaching sponsors, most their ZIPRA troops is demonstrative of this effect. The Rhodesian government,in response to this training in Zambia involvement Soviet and resolution, dispute violent of likelihood the increases involvement Soviet or American that demonstrates also 2 in Chapter data statistical Ibid, 43-45. Ibid, 42. Ibid, 41. Ibid, 43. Moorcroftand McLaughlin, 39. Mtisi Moorcroftand McLaughlin, 40. Mtisi Camps were not limited to Zambia. Contiguous Botswana and nearby Tanzania also et al et al 155 and were meant to guarantee Rhodesian security undercutguarantee and also Rhodesian security weremeantto tryingto while , 162. , 149. 160 As the conflict escalated, the Rhodesian Air Force attacked villages and 156 154 and Mozambican allowed independence for more territory serveto as a These raids had a major disruptive effect on the Zambian 161 Subsequent attacks were undermineattacks Subsequent timed apeace to 49 157 Like Kaunda in Zambia, Kaunda Like 159 In1976, Rhodesia 158 CEU eTD Collection 166 165 164 163 162 leftist regime emerging in Zimbabwe as it hadin Angola and Mozambique. policy of promotion of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, fearful of a potentially hostile, nature ideology.of The National Party regime inPretoria began (nonviolently)to pursue a began pull to its for support theSmith government in 1976, demonstrating secondary the across their borders. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia’s closestideological ally in the region, rebels harbor to decision overtheir but theregimes between conflicts not over emerged but parts of movement, violencethe andWar really Pan-African the proxies component disputes. interstate on can have nationalization and capabilitiesgoods transport of isillustrative potential the that effect escalating export other theseizureof nationalization; this after wasonly undertaken Thrasher Operation in infrastructure region.Mozambican the brought about foreign about brought currency shortages, route, restricting their ability engageto in trade and import war materiel. Ultimately, this forces. from otherstates deter anti-government harboring used, attempting to notably andtrains transportation infrastructure. Mozambique closed its borders afterindependence, nationalizing Rhodesian property, most forrebelcontextualized by in support forcestheir War. Rhodesian the ideologically opposed at this time, direct violence with the Machel regime was Mozambican support for guerrillas, specifically safe harbor. Though the two nations were focus of Rhodesian offensives demonstrates that the escalation of the conflict related to Brides, 182. Ibid, 144. Ibid, 144. Mtisi Ibid, 46. These disputes appear to have some ideological components to them, both as Cold Nationalization also emerged as a major factor in escalating in this dispute. in this inescalating factor major a as emerged also Nationalization et al , 149. 162 165 Napalm and other more deadly weapons were severely hampering the Rhodesian economy. Rhodesian the hampering severely 50 164 This also cut off Rhodesia’s eastern trade 166 163 Another The narrow CEU eTD Collection (Harare: Weaver Press,167. 2009), thePre-colonialHistory from Period to2008 171 in elections. democratic victory the anticipated militia, own different rebel groups, most notably Mugabe’s ZANU and Nkomo’s ZAPU, each with its preserved a form of minority representation and set the stage for free elections. All the 170 National Defence Forces, 1980-1987,” 169 168 167 its overtones. Rhodesiacolonial and to connection became Prime Ministerandthecountry’s namefully from any transitioned previous transition. the following neighbors its and Zimbabwe between conflicts cross-border continued the constitution. itforallowed majority butgovernment only minority with block to protections changes tothe country’s name toZimbabwe. The black population rejected the constitution the next year as helping to push forward the Rhodesian transition to majority rule. Africaideology: South moved toundercut its ally in topreserveorder its ownregional power, change in policy was nonviolent, it is illustrative of the supremacy of proximity issues over essentially joining embargo the widespread trade against Ian Smith’s regime. AfricaSouth did thisprimarily by of stopping supplies energy and weapons Rhodesia,to transition to a leftist regime could endanger South African security and regional hegemony. integrate the rival militias into one cohesive national force and undertook nationalization of nationalization force andundertook national cohesive into one rival militias the integrate class, which had beenimpossible undertheprevious regime. country the its years after conflict ofviolentwith and neighbors todevelop ablack middle James Muzondidya, “From Crisis,Buoyancy in to 1980-1997,” Mtisi Martin Rupiah,“Demobilisation and Integration: Operation Merger and the Zimbabwe Brides, 182. Moorcraftand McLaughlin, 125. The final transitionpolitical in Zimbabwe came onApril 18, 1980,when Mugabe Ultimately, transition this come,beginningdid in March 1978 andchanging the et al 168 , 166. The ConferenceLancaster House in1979negotiated asettlement, which African Security Review , eds. Brian Raftopoulos and A.S. Mlambo, 51 170 Mugabe’s pushedtoreconstruct regime 169 171 This belief set the stage for Notably, heattempted to 4:3 (1995), 52-64. 4:3(1995), Becoming Zimbabwe: A 167 Though this Though CEU eTD Collection troops. Zimbabwe and Botswana directly stemmed from its larger dispute with South Africa, its erstwhile ally. Africa, South Africa funded South some with exiled ZAPU members to formdispute the Super-ZAPU larger its from stemmed directly Botswana and Zimbabwe Force. Defense Botswana the and Zimbabwe between spilled over into Botswana, as refugees fled the Zimbabwean military, leading to conflict March 1983, Mugabe’s civil war againstotherNkomoand leaders leftist other of ZAPU for Zimbabwe’s violentdispute resolution. isfuture of a natural further evidenceof resource the explanations of preeminence geographic threatened. rebels; however, Zimbabwe also intervened to protect its oil transit resources that were Primarily this was on the side of the leftist government against the conservative RENAMO Zimbabwe remained embroiled in Mozambican the Civil War throughout 1980s.the conservative, restrictive regime, while Mugabe was elected to power as a Marxist. However, developed Africa with South was by predicted 1andHypotheses Africa 2:South remained a however,continued neighbors the with throughout decade.The antagonistic that relationship between wereViolentZimbabwe andideological itsconflicts, disputes over. neighbors guerrilla groups that ultimately came topower following the Lancaster House Accords. The disputes with neighboring which states, were derivedpredominately from harboring those 91. 175 Journal ofModernAfrican Studies 174 173 172 leader. farmland from white farmers, confiscating 3.5 million hectares after taking power as a leftist Richard Dale, “Not Always So Placid a Place,” Glenda Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo,” Ibid, 188. Ibid, 172. 172 174 Relations with other Marxist neighbors remained periodically violent as well. In The earlier hypotheses predict that this shiftshould have broughtan end toits This level militaryof ininvolvement a neighboring ally secure to long-term the 173 Deployments toprotect in installations these Mozambique reached 10,000 28:4(December 1990), 618. 52 African Affairs 175 The border conflicts between conflicts Theborder 86:342(January 73- 1987), CEU eTD Collection 177 Studies 176 the region. throughout policies Africa’s broader South 1987 in an effort to keep Zimbabwe militarily occupied so as to minimize their resistance to its harboring and supporting the African National Congress. militia tosplitfrom and Nkomo destabilize Mugabe’s fears governmentemerging of out of proximity and territorial relationships theescalationdrove disputesinterstate of into violence. decision to support the rebel units, but the case of Zimbabwe shows that above all else, remained somewhat of a factor – both before and after the transition – in neighboring states’ Smith, continued in Mozambique and Botswana when Mugabe was in power. Politics effort tomaintain regional its hegemony. clashes, Border endemic the1970s during under after the transition. Apartheid-era South Africa pulled support for the Smith regime in an colored by political affinity. That said, violence was present with neighbors both before and after thetransition relationshipdoes canbesuggest that the left-leaning neighbors and political lines, though the behavior of the Portuguese settler-colonies and South Africa before transition. Support for either the Smith or Mugabe regime did notsimply and solely follow region. the in solidify its own preeminence efforts to African South military underscore Zimbabwean the againstconflicts Africa South in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. Suchefforts distract to Moorcraftand McLaughlin, 189. Terence Ranger, “War, Violence and Healing in “War,Violence HealingZimbabwe,” and Ranger, Terence 18:3(September698-707. 1992), Violent dispute resolutiondispute Violent after political neighbors with the continued Zimbabwe’s 53 177 Zimbabwe offered support for 176 They through were supported Journal of Southern JournalAfrican of CEU eTD Collection removing removing ideologiesscenarios in like worked peacefully with which governments together conflicts many with international dataset, initialwere excluded, causes or potentially actors opposite ones – should beexpanded onin thatstudies include multilateral disputes. Inthis Models 1through 3 –find that similar ideologies political moreare prone to violence than were surprising and should be studied with a larger dataset. Similarly, the results from regimes, more conservative target generally democracies 5, that Hypothesis from findings spectrum ran counter to what was hypothesized. This, too, warrants further study. The thepolitical to relating variables of the effects the Second, in escalation. larger significance into nationalizationresearch industries all across and its role inviolence could addressits besides Comprehensive in in oil play sectors can escalation. other nationalization that account of conflicts between Rhodesia and its neighbors offers empirical evidence of the role in model one and approached itin despiteothers being restricted to one industry. The variable limited nationalization in– petroleum to the sector this study significance – reached the First, escalate. will disputes when of understanding for valuable be could characteristics long fall. power distances of riseprojecting the andon costs are interactions the in even era when worldwide a global why demonstrates states proximity havecan suchaninfluence onthe likelihood of violence, isselection clearly justified. Subsequentanalysisfrequent causes of of with nearby violence geographic proximity. The use of proximity as a standardcontrol variable instudies of target likelihood of violence in a dispute. However, the variable with the greatest significance is having similar domestic political characteristics all have a significant effect on increasing the predict which disputes escalate into violence. Proxy wars, targeting a nuclear state, and The significance of study variables suggestsfuture that research on domestic political The results of this study demonstrate the significance of several factors in trying to Conclusion 54 CEU eTD Collection susceptible disputes in susceptible disputes worldthe today. utilize scarce funding and ensure that violence does not emerge in some of the most than those distant states with grievances. Such a policy has the potential to more effectively rather states may border between conflicts allocated resources that bebest to those suggests This deployments. evidence and troop put mediation,negotiation, toward to resources havelimited and governments aswell.organizations International implications practical dataset. the of artifact be an against other regimes; as a result, the significance the opposite political regime variable could This confirmation of the overwhelming influence of proximity on escalation has escalation on proximity of influence overwhelming the of confirmation This 55 CEU eTD Collection Appendix Appendix A DISCREPANC C PROXIMITY C NATIONALIZA GEOGRAPHI WAR PROXY LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT OBJECTIVE OPPOSITE VIOLENCE OPPOSITE CONFLICT INITIATOR NUCLEAR TARGET = RELATIVE REGIME TARGET REGIME DUMMY POWER TYPE TYPE TION LAG OIL Y N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson N Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. Pearson TARGET = NUCLEAR -,462 ,546 ,264 ,258 -,031 -,009 ,179 -,086 ,724 ,000 ,002 ,920 ,909 ,010 ,039 ,321 ,003 ,000 ,899 ,012 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 ** ** ** ** * INITIATOR REGIME TYPE -,017 -,091 -,076 ,301 ,098 ,861 ,952 ,006 ,152 ,136 ,340 ,427 ,927 ,009 ,075 ,170 ,243 ,899 ,012 ,112 113 113 113 113 112 113 110 113 113 111 111 1 REGIME TARGET TYPE -,282 -,462 -,044 -,058 -,124 -,021 -,050 ,063 ,163 ,001 ,618 ,077 ,156 ,514 ,162 ,816 ,576 ,243 ,000 ,112 130 130 130 130 128 129 130 128 130 130 110 1 ** ** DISCREPANCY POWER Appendices ,448 ,324 ,258 -,089 -,050 ,355 ,081 ,000 ,000 ,594 ,047 ,898 ,201 ,308 ,576 ,075 ,170 ,003 ,011 ,112 133 133 133 133 132 132 133 133 128 133 111 1 ** ** ** NATIONALIZ 56 ATION OIL ,260 ,228 -,110 -,158 -,089 -,021 -,086 ,679 ,036 ,205 ,068 ,862 ,015 ,003 ,008 ,308 ,816 ,927 ,009 ,321 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 ** ** LEFT RIGHT OPPOSITE RELATIVE ,767 ,228 -,106 -,124 -,076 ,179 ,222 ,135 ,130 ,712 ,032 ,393 ,074 ,000 ,008 ,201 ,162 ,427 ,039 ,112 134 134 134 134 133 134 134 132 129 134 112 1 ** ** * LEFT RIGHT OBJECTIVE OPPOSITE ,767 ,260 -,070 -,058 -,091 ,423 ,768 ,026 ,523 ,056 ,136 ,000 ,003 ,898 ,514 ,340 ,909 ,010 ,119 ,011 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 132 128 133 111 1 ** ** CONFLIC T LAG -,009 ,619 ,043 ,108 ,056 ,165 ,136 ,393 ,074 ,862 ,015 ,594 ,047 ,077 ,156 ,152 ,136 ,920 ,211 ,119 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 PROXY WAR ,549 ,324 ,264 ,184 -,158 -,044 ,033 ,000 ,056 ,165 ,523 ,056 ,712 ,032 ,068 ,000 ,618 ,952 ,006 ,002 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 ** ** ** * GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY -,282 ,549 ,448 ,546 -,108 -,110 -,017 ,000 ,108 ,768 ,026 ,135 ,130 ,205 ,000 ,001 ,861 ,000 ,211 ,211 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 ** ** ** ** VIOLENCE DUMMY -,108 ,184 -,070 -,106 -,031 ,033 ,619 ,043 ,423 ,222 ,679 ,036 ,355 ,081 ,063 ,163 ,301 ,098 ,724 ,211 135 135 135 135 133 134 135 133 130 135 113 1 * CEU eTD Collection number of individual disputes. of the regardless in once areonly table this included states between conflicts Protracted that is*Indicates dispute the between states. not contiguous Appendix B Democratic Republic of the Congo v. of Congo the Republic Democratic NATURAL RESOURCES Zimbabwe v. Mozambique Pakistan v. India (1990) South Africa v. Angola Azerbaijan v. Armenia v. Azerbaijan Zimbabwe v. Angola* Yugoslavia v. Albania Myanmar v. Thailand Bosnia v. Yugoslavia Zambia v. Zimbabwe Burkina Faso v. Mali Cameroon v. Nigeria Uganda v.Tanzania Argentina v. UK* Morocco v. Spain Morocco Russia v. Georgia Israel v.Lebanon Israel Thailand v. Laos Panama v. U.S.* Peru v.Peru Ecuador Nigeria v. Chad v. Nigeria TERRITORY Iraq v. Kuwait Libya v.Chad Rwanda Types of Violent Disputes 57 South Yemen v. North Yemen REGIONAL HEGEMONY REGIONAL Pakistan v. India (1998) Vietnam v. Cambodia v. Vietnam Ethiopia v. Somalia v. Ethiopia Cambodia v. U.S.* Gambia v. Senegal Vietnam v. China Grenada v. U.S.* Egypt v. Libya Sudan v. Chad v. Sudan Iraq v. U.S.* Iran v. Iraq OTHER CEU eTD Collection Canadian Conservative Party. “The True North Strong and Free: Stephen Harper’s plan for plan 1-41.Canadians.” (2008), Harper’s Stephen Free: and Strong North True “The Party. 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