Party Patronage in Parliament: the Italian Experience
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Ph.D. Program in Political Theory Cycle XXVII PARTY PATRONAGE IN PARLIAMENT: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE. Ph. D. Dissertation by Michele De Vitis Supervisor: Prof. Leonardo Morlino Rome, January 2016 1 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 LIST OF TABLES 8 LIST OF FIGURES 10 PART 1 – CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES 11 1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12 1.1 Patronage: definitions and differences 12 1.2 Functions and styles of patronage 22 1.3 Why patronage is not corruption 30 1.4 Parliamentary patronage: a step forward and some expectations 37 2. THE PHENOMENON AROUND THE WORLD 45 2.1 Patrons and clients in US: from the post offices to the platform patronage 46 2.2 Patronage in Europe: between state penetration and professional affiliation 53 2.3 Exchange politics in Africa: the ethnical networks 61 PART 2 – THE ITALIAN PARTIES AND THE PARLIAMENT: WHICH PATRONS, WHICH JOBS 68 3. THE ITALIAN PARTIES: THE DYNAMICS OF THE PATRONS 69 3.1 The Italian party system under the new electoral law 70 3.2 The Italian party switching and the legislative turnover: patronage at stake and clients at risk. 79 3.3 Reforms in party financing: the need for the state 87 3.4 New tools for parties, new occasions for clients: the primary elections. 96 2 4. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: WHICH SPACE FOR THE PATRONS? 102 4.1 Parliamentary functions:which tasks for the clients, which clients for the tasks 103 4.2 Patronages in Parliament: a preliminary distinction 110 4.3 Collective patrons: the parliamentary groups. 115 4.4 Individual patrons: the institutional office-holders 123 5. PARTY PATRONAGE IN ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 135 5.1 The method and the questionnaire 137 5.2 Depth, quantity and reach of party patronage in Parliament 140 5.3 Why do patrons distribute jobs? 143 5.4 To whom do patrons distribute jobs? 146 5.5 Patronage and elections 151 5.6 A focus on the parliamentary groups 154 CONCLUSIONS 157 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 164 APPENDIX 166 REFERENCES 169 3 4 INTRODUCTION Party patronage is a recent notion in the literature. Often confused with clientelism, corruption and other distributive practices, this concept has to do with the cartel party (ideal) type and the party-state relationships, offering new and alternative resources for the parties based on the public money. Defined as the power of party to appoint people in public and semi-public life (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012), party patronage has been studied analysing the governmental sphere, the public and semi-public agencies and the bureaucracies in the general framework of the public administration. But does party patronage exist only when the patrons (the parties, their leaders, their representatives) distribute public appointments? Is traceable a further dimension of party patronage within the legislative assemblies in which the parties could directly or indirectly distribute jobs? This dissertation aims at answering these questions, providing an expansion of the definition, achieved after relevant theoretical efforts, and of the field of research, starting from common features such as the exploitation of public resources in order to fulfil party goals. The main argument of this work is that also the analysis of parliamentary patronage is helpful to explain the relationship between party and the state, investigating here the mechanisms of party installation within the Parliament, its working to satisfy its representative and legislative functions, its internal decision-making processes, its networks inside and outside the floor. The thesis is composed of two parts. In the first part (chapter 1 and 2) we explore the literature on patronage with its multifaceted points of view and the various historical experiences of patronage around the world, each one with its own peculiarities that contribute to the emersion of parliamentary patronage definition. In the first chapter we will consider the intricate confusion that, not without prejudices, scholars have caused across the time about the essence of patronage and its connection with the society and the state, both at micro and macro level. Further clarifications will 5 be given to distinguish more explicitly patronage and corruption. Moreover, new models of patronage will be developed on the basis of the intersections between merit and party affiliation, two categories usually conceived as mutually exclusive in the debate. A perspective on the evolution of patronage in regime changes that affect the party system or the public administration system will contribute to contextualize the phenomenon in a macro-scenario. Lastly the possible forms of parliamentary patronage in broad sense will be individuated, each one considered as a distributive relationship with different patrons and clients/recipients. It will follow a detailed focus on the specific kind of patronage object of this research, defined as the power of parties to distribute jobs in parliamentary structures. The second chapter examines the historical, empirical and social experiences of patronage, describing the American, European and African patterns without any ambition to include the whole course of the history, but just commenting upon specific cases with the purpose to underline the main trends in party-state relationship and take them into consideration into the explanation of the empirical research. The US case (Schudson, 1998) will outline the evolution of the patronage on two sides: the object of the exchange and the features of the clients. From the findings of comparative research in 15 European countries it will not emerge a European model, but the causes and the factors that at the end make the difference from a country to another country. In the last section dedicated to the African patronage, we will focus on the ethnical networks at the basis of it as point of departure to explore (party) factionalism and its consequences on patronage. The second part of the research consists of a preliminary and thorough study of the two dimensions of patronage in Italian experience: on one hand the party, the party system, its rules and its intra or inter party dynamics; on the other hand, the Parliament, here intended as a part of the state, its functioning and its permeability. This part prepares the ground for the empirical research and leads us to draw some hypotheses that will be present in the last chapter. In the third chapter, the first dimension will be illustrated with an in-depth focus on the last three legislatures, starting from the new electoral system approved in 2005 and now replaced by the so-called Italicum. The reforms in party financing, the party switching 6 and the legislative turnover, the emergence of new tools for the re-legitimation of the parties as the primary elections even for the parliamentary offices are expounded as possible factors respectively in the increase of the need for patronage, in modifying the resources at disposal and in shaping the patron-client relationship. Through a re-examination of the parliamentary functions and a study of the rules of procedure, the fourth chapter tries to identify the potential clients and the potential patrons in Parliament. In a first step, we zoom out on the actual development of the four types of parliamentary patronage theoretically distinguished in the first chapter. Once isolated and concretely defined the parliamentary patronage examined in this dissertation (the distribution of jobs within the Parliament), two types of patrons are found: collective (the parliamentary groups) and individual (the institutional office- holders). The empirical research, conducted through semi-structured and conversational interviews to a mix of patrons, will be oriented to trace the general features and trends of parliamentary patronage, without going in details in the single party performances, fully aware of the slippery field of study if not observed with the proper tools. Following partly the scheme of Kopecky, Mair and Spirova, we will assess the reach, the depth and the motivations of parliamentary patronage, adding then new elements of analysis based on the stressed differences between the institutions where patronage grows. Lastly we will draw the profile of the clients involved in parliamentary patronage. 7 LIST OF TABLES 1.1 Party allegiance and merit: internal patronage models 1.2 Party systems and states: external patronage models 1.3 Patronage and corruption 1.4 Different forms of parliamentary patronage. 1.5 Managerial patronage and parliamentary patronage. 2.1 Factionalism and patronage 3.1 Incidence of party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (2006-2015) 3.2 Collective party switching in the Senate from the same provenience from the same destination – Leg. XVII 3.3 Collective party switching in the Chamber of Deputies from the same provenience from the same destination – Leg. XVII 3.4 Legislative turnover, Chamber of Deputies, XVI- XVII legislatures (%) 3.5 Legislative turnover, Senate of the Republic, XV-XVII legislatures (%) 3.6 Verified expenses and reimbursements received by the parties until 2014 in elections from 1994 to 2013 3.7 Percentage breakdown of public/private/other funding with respect to major political parties revenues. 3.8 Valid choices of voluntary contributions from 2 ‰ Irpef 4.1. Amount of bills proposed in Parliament in last three legislatures 4.2. Amount of bills whose examination was concluded by the parliamentary committees in the last three legislatures 4.3 Bills definitely approved by the Parliament in the last three legislatures (XV-XVII leg.) 4.4. Presented and concluded initiatives