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The Gujars of Islamabad: A study in the social construction of local ethnic identities

Spaulding, Frank Charles, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1994

UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

IH E GUJARS OF ISLAMABAD:

A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL ETHNIC

IDENTITIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Frank Charles Spaulding, B.S., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1994

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Erika Bourguignon, Ph.D.

Robert Femea, Ph.D.

Alam Payind, Ph.D. 7 Sabra Webber, Ph.D. Adviser Department of Anthropology Copyright by Frank Charles Spaulding 1994 To Beth, Susan, and Joanna

and

In Memory of My Mother ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the product of nearly a decade of research and writing. In completing this project, I have had the good fortune to have the advice, support, and counsel of a large number of individuals and institutions. The debts I have incurred are therefore similarly large.

My sincerest thanks go to Dr. Erika Bourguignon, who has been my advisor throughout my graduate career. She has read this and many earlier incarnations of this dissertation in their entirety, remaining ever gracious and willing to share of her precious time. Our many conversations about things "anthropological" are a memory I will always cherish. While she is not cited specifically by name, her influence-especially her view that the subject of anthropology is the study of humankind it all its diverse manifestations-pervades this dissertation.

The debt of gratitude I owe Dr. Webber is similarly quite large. She too has given of her time unselfishly. Her support, guidance, and cheerful optimism has buoyed my spirits. Her willingness to entertain (and suggest) alternate points of view and theoretical approaches exemplifies all that is best about the discipline of anthropology.

While she is cited only once in the dissertation, her influence is equally pervasive.

Thanks also go to Dr. Alam Payind. As the Director of the Middle East Studies

Center at the Ohio State University he has been my immediate supervisor for nearly three

111 years. The sense of balance and restraint that he brings to his numerous administrative responsibilities has been a source of inspiration and education. Our conversations on matters relating to South Asia and the Middle East have helped sharpen my thinking on a number of points and issues raised in the dissertation.

The list of other people I should also wish to thank is quite long. Dr. Robert

Femea of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Texas, Austin, served as an outside reader. His suggestions concerning the organization of the dissertation were especially helpful. Dr. Paul Sciulli provided valuable suggestions and guidance in the

regards to the statistics used throughout the dissertation. Conversations with Dr. Stephen

Dale (Department of History) were also helpful in clarifying my thinking about certain

key issues relating to the history of the Gujars. Dr. Anthony Walker (Department of

Anthropology), who read an earlier version of the dissertation, provided a number of

valuable suggestions regarding its organization.

I should also like to thank Cynthia Smith, Karlene Foster, and Gregory Bell, who

read various sections of the dissertation. Ronald McLean of the Center for Instructional

Technology at the Ohio State University must also be thanked for producing some of the

figures appearing in the text.

The fieldwork could not have been possible without the help and assistance of

many individuals. Dr. Rauf, former Chair of the Department of Anthropology at Quaid-

i-Azam University (and a Ph.D. Graduate from OSU’s Department of Anthropology)

arranged for institutional affiliation and assisted in obtaining a "No Objection Certificate"

IV from the Government of Pakistan. My thanks to him are posthumous as it was that he unfortunately passed away shortly after I arrived in Pakistan.

I should like to thank Dr. Bruce Lohoff and Dr. Peter Dodd, who served as

Directors of the United States Educational Foundation during the research. They and their staff helped make my stay in Pakistan comfortable, enjoyable, and productive. I wish also to thank Dr. Adam Nayyar, Director of Research at Pakistan’s National

Institute of Folk Heritage. He and his staff assisted in helping to locate and identify the subjects of this study-the Gujars of Islamabad. The Director and staff of the Pakistan

Institute of Development Economics, Dr. Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, also provided access to certain survey materials. Although the research led in another direction than was first envisioned, their kind offer of assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

I should also like to express my deep gratitude to those many Pakistanis whose friendship was critical in completing the research. The Gujars of Islamabad welcomed me into their homes with graciousness and warmth. They did so without regard for the fact that as government employees they were prohibited from talking to foreign investigators. In order to protect their privacy and anonymity, all personal names appearing in the text have been fictionalized. On occasion, I have also altered place

names and street addresses. Similar considerations of professional ethics unfortunately

do not allow me to mention them by name here either. For their assistance, I thank them

all.

In regards to the contacts that I made in Pakistan, I should also like to

acknowledge the following for their friendship: Asad Khan (and his brothers) for many hours spent "at the table," Khalid Sirhandi (especially for the trip to the Old City), Saida

Ajmeri (for ride to Raiwind), Javad Reza Khan (who is a doctor . . .), and my two assistants, Ramzaq Khan and Humayan Iqbal. While in Pakistan I also had the good

fortune to meet a number of American and Foreign scholars including Drs. James

Warner Bjorkman, Marcella Sirhandi, Verne Scarborough, Holly Edwards, Robert

Wirsing, and Jonathan Addelton. Their contributions are hereby gratefully

acknowledged.

My greatest debt of gratitude is, however, to my wife, Elizabeth Ann Spaulding.

Friend and confidant, she has sacrificed much in order to see this dissertation through

to completion. In spite of the many long days and nights she has had to shoulder the

majority of our family’s responsibilities, she has nonetheless succeeded in combining

careers as a wife, mother, and social worker. Throughout she has seldom asked for

assistance and has remained ever cheerful. As my friend Said Akbar had said of you,

"Ap behwt sharif hey." To my two daughters, Susan and Joanna, I must also express

my deepest gratitude. Their love and cheerfulness--while all too frequently cut short by

the needs of researching and writing this dissertation-has remained a constant source of

solace and comfort.

The research was supported by a grant from the American Institute of Pakistan

Studies, with additional funding provided by Sigma Xhi. Funding for writing the

dissertation was provided by the Ohio State University Graduate School (OSU

Presidential Fellowship). Various forms of additional assistance have been provided by

the following OSU administrative units; the Department of Anthropology, the Division

VI of Comparative Studies in the Humanities, the Department of Near Eastern, Judaic, and

Hellenic Languages and Literatures (formerly JaNELL), and the University Center for

International Studies, and the Middle East Studies Center at the Ohio State University.

The OSU Inter-Library Loan Office was helpful in obtaining various materials that are not locally available. The combined support of these institutions is hereby gratefully

acknowledged.

Vll VITA

October 15, 1956 ...... Bom - Boston, Massachusetts 1978 ...... B.S., Bridgewater State College 1979-1980 ...... CETA Social Worker South-Eastern Correctional Center, Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Bridgewater, Mass. 1982 ...... Graduate Research Assistant, The Ohio State University, Department of Anthropology. 1982 ...... M.A. in Anthropology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. 1983-1984 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, The Department of Anthropology. 1984-1985 ...... Course Instructor, The Ohio State University, The Department of Anthropology. 1987 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University, The Department of Anthropology. 1987-1989 ...... Course Instructor, The Ohio State University, The Department of Anthropology. 1988-1990 ...... Editor, The Middle East and South Asia Folklore Newsletter/Bulletin, The Ohio State University, Division of Comparative Studies in the Humanities. 1991-Present Assistant Director, Middle East Studies Center, The Ohio State University

vui 1992-Present Course Instructor, The Ohio State University, Dept, of Anthropology, University Center for International Studies

PUBLICATIONS

1986 Margaret Mead: Coming of Age in America. In Margaret Mead: The Anthropologist in America. Dr. Erika Bourguignon, ed. Occasional Papers no. 2, The Department of Anthropology, The Ohio State University. Department of Anthropology, The Ohio State University: Columbus, Ohio. Pp. 22-33.

1987 Migration and Politics in Pakistan. In Proceedings of The First Annual Research and Scholarly Activities Forum sponsored by The Council of Graduate Students, The Ohio State University. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press. Pp. 59-64. (Refereed article)

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Anthropology

Studies in Ethnicity, Historical Anthropology, Mathematical Anthropology, Migration and Urbanization, Psychological Anthropology, Women in Development. Professors Erika E. Bourguignon, Robert Femea, Alam Payind, Paul W. Sciulli, Sabra J. Webber.

IX TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

VITA ...... viii

LIST OF TABLES ...... xiii

LIST OF FIGURES...... xv

CHAPTER PAGE

PART I: FROM ETHNICITY TO IDENTITY: THE CHALLENGE OF GUJAR ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY

I. INTRODUCTION...... 2

Gujar Ethnicity and Ethnography ...... 3 Islamabad’s Gujar Community: An Analytical Framework ...... 4 Fieldwork M ethods ...... 10 Analytical Techniques ...... 23 Chapter Contents ...... 26 A Note on Terminological Conventions Employed in the T ext ...... 29

II. THE GUJARS AND THEORIES OF ETHNIC IDENTITY...... 33

Theoretical Challenges of Gujar Ethnicity ...... 35 Sites of Ethnic Production and Reproduction ...... 40 Analytical Strategy ...... 45 PART 2: THE GUJARS IN SOCIETY, CULTURE AND HISTORY m . THE GUJARS IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT...... 51

Social Geography ...... 52 Social Sites of Subsistence and Economy ...... 80 Sites of Integration as Sources of Ethnic Stereotyping ...... 90 Conclusion ...... 97

IV. GUJARS AND ISLAM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT...... 98

Islam and Gujars in South A sia ...... 101 Land and Land Tenure in the Punjab ...... 108

V. ISLAM AND GUJAR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION...... 128

Muslim Gujars and the Influence of Islam ...... 129 Muslim Gujar Marital Practices in an Indian Context ...... 131

VI. THE GUJARS UNDER BRITISH IMPERIALISM ...... 146

The Mutiny and the Question of Gujar "Martiality"...... 147 The British Punjab and Muslim Gujars ...... 167 Conclusion ...... 185

PART 3; THE CITY OF TOMORROW: THE URBAN CONTEXT OF ISLAMABAD

VII. BUILDING ISLAMABAD: THE CITY AS PHYSICAL S IT E ...... 187

The Master Plan of Islamabad ...... 188 Development of Islamabad/Rawalpindi ...... 204 Conclusion ...... 208

VIII. READING ISLAMABAD: THE DEVELOPMENTAL CITY ...... 209

Prelude to Pakistan ...... 210 Islamabad: Site of Rupture, City of Consolidation ...... 222

XI IX. PEDESTRIANISM, STRATIFICATION, AND VENERATION: AUTHORITARIAN FORMS IN ISLAMABAD...... 232

Doxiadis’ Theory of Urban Life ...... 233 "Pedestrian" Sectors; Non-Ethnic Sites of Association ...... 235 Designs of Stratification, Dispersal, and Dominance ...... 237 Ayubabad: Urban Forms of Exaltation, Praise, and Veneration ...... 251 Conclusion ...... 260

PART 4: THE GUJARS IN ISLAMABAD

X.DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTIONS OF GUJAR ETHNICITY 263

Migration and Gujar Ethnic Identity ...... 264 Intervening Migratory Movements ...... 279 Summation ...... 282

XI. SETTLING ISLAMABAD...... 284

Length of Residence and Settlement ...... 285 Class and Regionality in the Practices of Gujar Settlement ...... 293 Strategies of Subversion and Compliance ...... 312

XII. SOCIAL FORMS: MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, AND ASSOCIATION .... 318

Marriage and Kinship among the Gujars of Islamabad ...... 319 Gujar Kin Groups in Islamabad ...... 326 Discussion ...... 339

XIV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS...... 364

Concluding Remarks ...... 365 Directions for Future Research ...... 368

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 371

APPENDIX: Community Survey Form ...... 410

XII LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Islamabad Gujars by District and Region ...... 8

2. Region of Origin by Residential Location ...... 16

3. Marital Patterns by Natal Origin ...... 135

4. Correspondence Analysis of Table 3 ...... 135

5. Population Rankings of Canal Colony districts (All-Punjab Population and Gujar Population) ...... 177

6. Average Plot Area by Income Group ...... 199

7. Schedule of Housing Accommodations ...... 2(X)

8. Number of Private Cars Per Family on the Basis of 1970 Family Incomes ...... 240

9. Number of Private Cars per Family on the Basis of 1980 Family Incomes ...... 241

10. 1963 Projections of Sector G-6 Traffic Requirements ...... 243

11. Proposed Distribution of "Civic Amenities" ...... 247

12. Proposed Open Spaces in Islamabad ...... 247

13. Planned and Present Population of Developed Sectors and Residential Densities ...... 248

14. Natal Region by Rural/Urban Background ...... 266

X lll 15. Natal Region by Rural/Urban Last Residence ...... 266

16. Average Date of First through Fourth Move by Region of O rigin ...... 271

17. Results of Kruskal Wallis Test of Regional Difference for Year of First through Fourth Move ...... 271

18. Employment History of Government Employees ...... 273

19. Community Descriptive Statistics ...... 275

20. Residence Prior to Islamabad by Rural/Urban Components ...... 282

21. Region of Origin by Residential Location ...... 287

22. Region of Origin by Residential Location ...... 289

23. Three-Way Table of Region of Origin Length of Residence, and Residential Location ...... 290

24. Region of Origin by Residential Location ...... 292

25. Yearly Breakdown of Government and Private Investment Required for the First Five Year Plan ...... 309

26. Relation of Government and Private Investment in Islamabad ...... 310

27. Second Generation Marital Patterns by Region ...... 321

28. Correspondence Coordinates of Second Generation Immigrants ...... 321

29. Demographic Features of Urban Biraderi Kin Group 2 ...... 333

30. Employment and Additional Demographic Data on Urban Kin Group 2 ...... 333

XIV LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Pakistan and Northwestern India Showing Distribution of Gujars as of 1 9 3 1 ...... 5

2. Paldstan and Northwestern India Showing Home Area of Islamabad Gujars ...... 6

3. The Master Plan of Islamabad ...... 17

4. Physical Features of the Islamabad Gujars’ Home Area ...... 63

5. Correspondence Analysis of Table 5 ...... 138

6. Master Plan of Islamabad ...... 191

7. Islamabad Road Network showing G-6, G-7, F-6, F-7 and Administrative Sector ...... 202

8. Dynapolis Showing Planned Growth of Islamabad and Rawalpindi ...... 206

9. Display of Correspondence Analysis of Table 28 ...... 322

10. Kinship of Urban Dairy Kindred G ro u p ...... 335

11. Kinship of NIH Dairy Kindred G ro u p ...... 338

XV PART 1

FROM ETHNICITY TO IDENTITY;

THE CHALLENGE OF GUJAR ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Not only is our knowledge of the facts as nothing compared with our ignorance; but the facts themselves vary so greatly from one part of the Punjab to another, that it is almost impossible to make any general statement whatever concerning them which shall be true for tiie whole Province (Ibbetson 1916: V).

This dissertation examines ethnic identity formation among the Gujars of Islamabad. As is appropriate for an ethnographic dissertation, this study seeks to describe and analyze the processes of identity formation by examining Gujar ethnic identities as they are produced and deployed within the urban context of Islamabad. At a further step, this

dissertation is also concerned with the challenges that Gujar ethnic identity formation

processes pose for conventional theoretical treatments of ethnicity and ethnic identity

formation. At its broadest, this dissertation is also an essay on the particular lessons

Gujar ethnicity provides for the development of more general theories of human nature

and society. To set the background for the discussion of these topics as they relate to

Gujar ethnicity, it is first necessary to identify and then situate the people to be studied. 3 Gigar Ethnicity and Ethnography

The Gujars of Islamabad are local representatives of a group of agro-pastoralists widely distributed in Pakistan and Northwest India (see Figure 1). The British Indian Census of 1931 is the last census to compile comprehensive data on the tribes, races, castes, and biraderis of the Indian subcontinent. Although events of the post-War era that resulted

in severe demographic dislocations make these data relatively unreliable for describing

more contemporary population distributions, the census indicated that as of 1931 there

nearly 2.5 million Gujars (2,430,700) in the region, with the population fairly evenly

split between (Hanafi) Muslims and caste Hindus. While there is the suggestion of a

pattern in the geographic distribution of these religious communities (with higher

concentrations of Muslim Gujars to the northwest), in general, Muslim and Hindu Gujar

communities overlapped to a considerable extent, at least at the district level.

The Gujars who constitute the focal group of this study are Muslims who trace

their roots to a relatively more restricted area within the larger regional population.

Where appropriate this area will be referred to throughout this dissertation as the

"Greater Punjab." This is an area that roughly corresponds to the boundaries of the

British India Punjab as they stood from the annexation of the province in 1848 up to its

reorganization in 1901.' Calculated on the basis of these boundaries, a survey of 160

families indicates that fully 89 percent of the Gujar heads of household in Islamabad were

' Under the 1901 administrative reorganization of the British Indian Punjab, the province’s western settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan were amalgamated with tribal territories to their west to create the North West Frontier Province. 4 bom in districts located within this region (see Figure 2). The use of these boundaries further indicates that of the remaining 11 percent of the community, fully nine percent are from natal villages that are located either immediately adjacent to or in close proximity to the Greater Punjab.^ Given the nature of the geographic background of the

Islamabad community, the examination of regional influences will focus, whenever necessary, on the history and culture of the Greater Punjab.

Islamabad’s Gryar Community: An Analytical Framework

In spite of the restricted geographic background of the Islamabad community relative to

that of the larger regional population, the Greater Punjab is noteworthy for the extent of

diversity evident in its social, economic, religious, and cultural patterns. Aside from the

Gujars, the list of major caste/biraderi groups inhabiting the region included Rajputs,

Jats, and Pathans. With the exception of the Pathans, who are invariably Muslim, each

group, including the Gujars, counted among its numbers Muslims (Sunni and Shi’i),

Hindus, Christians, and (especially in the case of the Jats) Sikhs. Other groups of less

statistical importance include the Arains, Aroras, A wans, Dogars, Dundhs, Kashmiris,

Meos, Qureshis, Sheikhs, and Sayyids. While some, such as the Sheikhs and Sayyids

are exclusively Muslim, most of these latter groups are also split along religious lines.

A nominal percentage (.03) were bom in the port-city of Karachi. \93\- 3&ot

se» SW Ara’

V. ŸWjxte Pakistan and India Provinces 1. Nortfiwest Frontier Province G ujars 2. Sind PAKISTAN 3. Punjab (Pakistan) Province Borders 4. Azad Kastiimir 5. Indian Jammu and Kastrmir International 6. Punjab (India) Country Borders 7. H aryana Disputed txirder 8. Rajasthan 9. U tar D esert 10. Madyha Pradesh

BANGtJVDESH

Bay of Arabian Sea Miles

Indian Ocean A SRI LANKA

Y'" Islam7 / abad

Thai:.: /Deséd:

PAKISTAN "Qrieat

Karachi

10 INDIA

Arabian Sea

Figure 2. Pakistan and Northwestern India Showing Home Area of Islamabad Gujars. 7 Along with these other Punjabi groups, the Gujars participated to varying degrees in a mixed subsistence economy that traditionally combined elements of barani (rain-fed) field cultivation, irrigation agriculture, settled pastoralism, and pastoral transhumance.

The distribution of goods and the provision of services was accomplished through the agency of a complex form of exchange that is locally known in the Punjab as the seypidari system, but which is more widely known in the literature as the jajmani system

(Wiser 1988 [1936]).

In spite of the seemingly incomprehensible patchwork nature of Punjabi rural culture, there are three relatively distinct sub-groups within the Islamabad Gujar community (see Table 1). Here, I will provide a thumbnail sketch of a few of the distinctive characteristics of each group. Later chapters will supply further detail as the need the arises.

The first group includes those Gujars who came to Islamabad, principally by way of Karachi, from that section of the Punjab that was ceded to India under the terms of

Partition in 1947. They are the largest segment of the community, representing upwards to 45% of the Gujar families in Islamabad. Most of the household heads within this sub group are employed by the government in various service and professional capacities.

On average, this group has resided in Islamabad for the longest period of time, many

having moved to the city in the early 1960s. As a function of their age, this group also

has on average the largest families.

Members of the second group moved to Islamabad from districts located in

northern Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike their Table 1

Islamabad Gujars by District and Région

District No. Region No. %

NWFP Northern 39 24% Abbottabad 5 Kohat 2 Mansehra 12

Azad Kashmir Poonch 11 Rawalkot 7

Indian Jammu and Kashmir Punch 1 Rajuri 1 Pakistan Punjab Central 49 31% Bahawalnagar 1 Faisalabad 6 Gujranwala 2 Gujrat 14 Kasur 3 Lahore 4 Mianwali 1 Multan 1 Rawalpindi 5 Sahiwal 3 Sargodha 6 Sheikhupura 1 Sialkot 1 Vehari 1 Haryana (India) Eastern 72 45% Ambala 39

Punjab (India) Firozpur 1 Gurdaspur 1 Hoshiapur 18 Jullundur 4 Ludhiana 2 Patiala 2

Karachi 5

Total 160 160 100% 9 Indian-bom counterparts in the Punjab—for whom migration to Islamabad has effectively come to a close-sizeable numbers of Gujars continue to move to the city from villages distributed throughout the northern region. Of the three, this group has the most complex pattern of migration, with most respondents having lived in two, three, or more towns before arriving in Islamabad. In terms of employment, the group is distinctive for the high number of respondents employed in Islamabad’s mosques and madrassas.

Relative to the other groups, this group has the lowest per capita income and the highest male/female sex ratio.

The third and final group includes those Gujars who moved to Islamabad directly from natal villages located in their home districts in the eastern and northern Punjab. On average, this group represents the most recent arrivals to the city. Consequently, they share in a general lack of experience in dealing with the complexities of urban life. This would seem to suggest that members of this group would be at an economic disadvantage relative to other community members. This indeed seems to be the case as most group members are employed in relatively low-paying jobs. Consequently, the majority of families within this group have a per capita income that is lower than the community average. However, a substantial number of families within this group are fairly wealthy and rank among the richest families in the city. Of the latter, many are professionals or entrepreneurs who have received advanced training and education at overseas institutions.

The latter are also distinctive in that they are among the community’s oldest and most established families. 10 In terms of their ethnic identities, the Gujars of Islamabad are similar to many ethnic groups in that their claim to ethnic distinctiveness is couched in an idiom of kinship and shared descent. Put simply, to be a "Gujar" is to claim membership in a kin group that is known in the Greater Punjab as a biraderi, or "brotherhood." Achieving a definitional consensus as to what constitutes a "biraderi" has been an illusive goal (see

Chapter 5). Nonetheless, the biraderi is for its members a primary of vessel of emotional investment and content. It is to the biraderi and its members that the Gujar in Islamabad is expected to owe her or his first loyalty, and it is to this group that an individual will frequently turn in time of crisis or need. In a very real sense then, the assertion of kinship and shared descent—which is articulated by representatives of all three sub-groups-serves as the basis of their collective ethnic activities. As such it also constitutes the central subject matter of this dissertation.

Fieldwork Methods

The data on the Gujar biraderi was collected during fieldwork conducted in Pakistan from

December, 1985, to November, 1986. I went to Pakistan equipped with a research

strategy designed to examine the interaction of ethnicity and migration in Pakistan’s planned, modernist capital city. Mine was to be a focused study, concentrated on

gathering data on urbanization and ethnicity in Islamabad.

Why Islamabad?

Much of what I report on in this dissertation is not known or is at least

imperceptible to many local people and foreigners. This is not to suggest that this is a 1 1 revelatory work. Rather, it comments upon the perceptions people have of the city.

Often when I would meet foreigners (i.e., non-Pakistanis) and tell them of my work I would be met with an incredulous "there are no migrants here." After I pointed out that everyone above the age of 25 (and a fair number below this age too) are by definition migrants I would be rebuffed with the disclaimer "well, not the type of migrants you mean anyway. " Of course, in this view "the type of migrants I meant" lived in industrial cities, were drawn there by the possibility of employment, and evinced social segmentation through residential segregation.

It is exactly the absence of these features, and the rapid growth of the city, that prompted me to explore the dynamics of migration to Islamabad in the first place. I thought at that time, that Islamabad would present a foil to explore the ramifications of

migration in a non-industrial context. I further thought that my research would be assisted by the fact that all residents above the age of 25, by definition, were migrants.

Also, the juxtaposition of a planned, capital city to the much older Rawalpindi would

allow me to model the impact of Westernization on Pakistan’s urban society.

In researching and writing this dissertation, I have attempted to address a number

of issues of concern to the anthropology of cities and ethnic groups. As one of a handful

of urban ethnographies of Pakistan, and of an even smaller number analyzing the social

construction of urban ethnicity, it fills partially a gap in the ethnographic record of urban

Pakistan. This analysis of urban ethnicity as it is expressed at the cross-roads of South

Asia and the Middle East should be of interest both to South Asianists and Middle

Eastern specialists. Comparing Islamabad to other planned cities, whether they are the 12 seat of the national government (e.g., Brasilia, Ankara, Delhi) or a provincial capital

(e.g., Chandigarh), should be of interest to scholars examining cross-cultural variations in urbanization and ethnicity.

Still another objective of this dissertation is to contribute to theory building within ethnic studies. The analysis of the data I collected during my field work among the

Gujars of Islamabad have led me to question some of the key concepts and ideological presuppositions underpinning and supporting various ethnic theories. The material I collected on Gujar ethnicity was resistant to my attempts to reduce it to a specific theoretical paradigm.

Not unexpectedly, the study of nomadic, tribal and peasant communities has long dominated the anthropology of Pakistan. As of 1986, there were only a handful of urban ethnographies on Pakistan, and most of these had been written in the 1950s and early

1960s. While some improvement has been seen of late, a perusal of a recent bibliography compiled by Frank Korom (1988) underscores the continuing need for urban

ethnographic fieldwork.^ Of 387 publications listed in Korom's (1988) bibliography,

only 10 deal with issues one can consider even tangentially related to urbanization and

urban life in Pakistan. Of the latter, only two qualify as urban ethnographies in the strict

sense of the term, and they are both studies of non-Muslim minority groups (Frankowski

1982; Gustafson 1969).

’ In spite of its title, Pakistani Folk Culture, Korom’s (1988) book is in actuality a general anthropological bibliography. Such diverse topics as agricultural credit schemes, marriage timing, as well as discussions about material culture, oral narrative, and so forth appear in the listings. 13

Contributing to the development of urban anthropological theory was an equally important factor motivating the research. Urban studies have made a relatively meager contribution to theory building in anthropology. This is so in spite of a well established tradition of research that extends back over five decades to the late 1930s when Godfrey

Wilson first proposed to found an institute concerned with, among other things, promoting the study of urban Africa (Brown 1973). Yet, in spite of this history, urban anthropology is seen by many to be a relatively new sub-discipline, something of a poor step child of urban sociology. This is reflected again in the anthropological literature:

The first book bearing the title Urban Anthropology was published as recently as 1968, and the first issue of a journal by the same name did not appear until 1972 (Basham

1978).

Addressing various issues relating to fieldwork methodology were also important objectives of the research. The slow pace of development in urban anthropological

theory has been matched only by the equally torpid rate of advancement in urban

fieldwork methodologies. The number of field guides written specifically for urban

ethnographic research is few indeed. A recent bibliography by Gravel and Ridinger

(1988) provides a barometer by which to gauge developments in this area. Of 700 titles

listed in their bibliography (Gravel and Ridinger 1988), just 14 are indexed under the 14 rubric of "fieldwork in complex societies.'"* Of the latter, just three are concerned with urban fieldwork in non-Westem societies.^

In order to achieve these different objectives, the research, as initially conceived, was to consist of two distinct phases of fieldwork. Six months were to be spent in

Islamabad researching ethnicity among the city’s migrant population. This was to be followed by six months of residence in a village that was to be selected on the basis of the contribution it made to Islamabad ethnic community. Delays caused by time spent establishing contact with the Gujar community made it impractical to shift field sites.

Moreover, the benefits of such research seem in retrospect not to outweigh its potential costs. Ethnic variation among Gujars stems, in part, from the diverse geographic backgrounds of community members. While a worthwhile goal, conducting fieldwork in each of these home areas was impossible given budgetary and time constraints.

“ The Outline of Cultural Materials (Murdock et al 1982), has limited applicability as it is designed primarily for use in the study of traditional, non-urban societies.

* To keep their bibliography at a manageable level of complexity. Gravel and Ridinger (1988) were selective. Thus, titles of "textbooks and volumes of ethnography containing an introductory chapter presenting a project’s history and research design or ethnographies with reflections upon individual reaction" were not included (Gravel and Ridinger 1988:VIII). This is unfortunate as some useful materials (e.g., Basham 1978; Eames and Goode 1977: and Hannerz 1980) were overlooked. Curiously, the bibliography does not include Whiteford’s (1980) "Doing It: Urban Research in Popayan, Columbia" that appears as a chapter in Gmelch and Zenner’s (1980) Urban Life. Moreover, the authors do not list the innumerable dissertations by urban anthropologists. Dissertations with an urban focus at the Department of Anthropology at The Ohio State University include Hartranft 1992; Lerch 1978; and Pressel 1971. 15 General Outline of the Research

The fieldwork was conducted primarily in Islamabad, although the research site was frequently extended to include Islamabad’s "twin city,” Rawalpindi and neighboring villages and towns. Occasional research was conducted in more distant areas. The need to investigate such a wide geographic range was due to the nature of the ties that link

Islamabad’s Gujars to their compatriots throughout the country. As is the case with

Islamabad’s other biraderis (except Christian sweepers and Afghan refugees), the Gujars do not live in segregated quarters (see Table 2 and Figure 3). Nor, for that matter, do they perceive their ethnic identity as coterminous with the city’s geographic borders.

Yet, they share the understanding that they are in spirit an integrated and unified ethnic community. In order to develop an understanding of Gujar ethnicity as a property of this urban community, it was necessary, therefore, to balance the ethnographic demand for in-depth research against the analytical requirements of comprehensiveness.* This had a direct impact on the methods by which data were collected.

Data Collection Techniques

Qualitative and quantitative techniques were combined to gather data for this

dissertation: The qualitative techniques of participant-observation, interviewing,

photography, and genealogical inquiry provided a general framework in which to situate

quantitative data gathered primarily through a survey of 160 Gujar households in

* The Islamabad material was supplemented with data I collected on a number of Gujar families living in Rawalpindi. Further information was gathered during a three week tour I conducted of some of the home regions of the Gujar community of Islamabad. 16

Table 2

Region of Origin by Residential Location

Sector* Region of Origin Northern Central Eastern Total E-7 1 1 1 3 F-5 1 0 0 1 F-6 1 9 6 16 F-7 1 4 2 7 F-8 0 2 1 3 G-6 0 7 28 35 G-7 23 14 17 54 G-8 2 1 9 12 G-9 2 7 7 16 G-10 1 0 1 2 H-8 1 0 0 1 1-8 2 0 0 2 1-9 1 0 0 1 NIH Colony 1 3 0 4 Rawal Dam 1 0 0 1 Quaid-e-Azam 1 1 0 2 University Total 39 49 72 160

•The sectors completed as of 1986 include E-7, F-5 through F-8, and G-6 through G-9. 17

PfesiOeniiai Mansion _ Constitution Ave / Quaid-i-A: 5nan Faisai Mased iNationa» Ave> I university

Khyaben-i-Quaid -Azam iCaDiiol Avenue) KEY

m CiviC'Commerce-Busmess

^ 0 Administrative Center m ^ Wholesale m [ ) moustnal Workshop

H Green Areas

I Military Residential

r~ ] Residential

Figure 3. The Master Plan of Islamabad 18

Islamabad (see Appendix). During the course of conducting this research, I assembled a network of contacts in the Gujar community. Through the personal introductions these contacts provided, I was able to meet with and interview what I believe to be a representative sample of the Islamabad Gujar community. Nonetheless, while the advantages of a network-based research strategy have long been realized (see Epstein

1958, 1961), its limitations must also be recognized as they have a direct impact on the findings of this study.

The data analyzed in this dissertation are, not surprisingly, biased by the ideas, opinions, views, attitudes, and preferences of those individuals who served as intermediaries. Largely absent from the discussion are the voices of those Gujars who for whatever reason could not participate actively in the affairs of the community.

However, as the objective of the study is to develop an understanding of ethnicity as a property of a self-selecting community, this does not constitute as major a drawback as might otherwise be the case. Of analytical interest are precisely the ways in which the social processes of exclusion and inclusion relate to the expression and maintenance of

Gujar ethnicity.

There are also the difficulties of the gender-bias that is inherent to a network- based research strategy. Such problems are further compounded by the highly sex- segregated nature of Pakistani society. The social norms regulating inter-gender social interaction prohibit males from investigating systematically the role of women in the construction of Gujar ethnic identities. The data, therefore, are admittedly biased in that

they represent a male perspective. In analyzing the data, a consistent effort was made 19 to control for this bias. Nonetheless, the addition of a female perspective would aid immeasurably in filling out the picture of Gujar ethnicity.

Participant-Observation

During most of the fieldwork, I stayed at a hostel run by the United States

Educational Foundation in Pakistan. The principal reason for this was the shortage of available (and appropriate) alternate housing accommodations. Most of Islamabad’s

Gujar families live in small crowded houses. As such few were able to provide me with a room, even in consideration of the relatively high rent I was prepared to pay.

Living with the Gujars was also impractical because of the community’s diffuse residential pattern and wide ranging socio-economic stratification. As mentioned previously, except for some scattered pockets of relatively high concentrations, Gujar

households are dispersed throughout the city. Moreover, although most Gujars are at or

near the bottom of the local economic ladder, some families have amassed fairly

substantial amounts of personal wealth. Thus, the "community,” although it exists as an

artifact of the deeds and thoughts of Islamabad’s Gujars, is neither geographically

localized nor economically delineated.

The nature of community politics also weighed in the decision to live at the guest

house. Very early in the research it became apparent that there was a good deal of

tension just beneath the rather placid surface that the Gujar community otherwise seeks

to project. Living with a particular family would have dramatically increased the risk

of disaffecting large sectors of the community. It therefore would have jeopardized my

chances of examining the community-wide expression of ethnicity. The belief that I was 2 0 allied to one side or another of a dispute would have complicated the fieldwork in untold and uncontrollable ways (although it would have provided some interesting material for political study).

Living at the hostel presented its own advantages for conducting the type of

research in which I am interested. A house staff consisting of three assistants, Naseer,

Muhammad, and Tariq, oversaw the hostel’s daily operations. One of these house

assistants, Tariq, was a Gujar who had married a Nepalese convert after having divorced

his first wife. These men, and their families and friends, who visited often, were great

sources of information and insight. The data they contributed has helped me in placing

the Gujars within the context of Pakistani society and of making some preliminary

comparisons.

Most adult males work as wage employees in business offices, government

ministries, and private companies. Unlike village settings where the nature of the rural

economy generally allows the anthropologist to accompany villagers as they go about

their daily chores, the nature of work in Islamabad’s urban labor market made it

impractical to visit many Gujars at their place of employment. This meant that contact

with a large sector of the community was limited to evening hours or weekends.

The circumstances of urban life also made it difficult to maintain contact with

children and young adults. They were frequently occupied with their studies, working,

busy helping their parents, or off visiting friends and family. It was also difficult to

interview adult women in the absence of appropriate male chaperonage. These various

considerations channeled my research in the direction of some groups more than others. 21 Although I possess substantial data on the entire community, the most complete data I possess was provided by four specific groups: (1) males who own their own stores and businesses; (2) religious clerics who serve in the mosques and madrassas of Islamabad;

(3) unemployed men; and (4) those whose work took them outdoors.

Interviewing Techniques and Issues

Both structured and open-ended interviewing techniques were used during the research. Structured interviews were tape recorded in all but three instances. Open- ended interviews were more informal, ranging from impromptu conversations on the street to extensive discussions lasting the better part of a day. On occasions when the tape recorder was not at hand, copious notes were taken and the major points of the discussion were recreated in my journal.

Two interpreters were used for the purpose of interviewing. Ramzaq Khan, the son of an official who had served in Pakistan’s embassy to Iran, had learned his English in Tehran, where he had attended the International School. He was an affable, highly energetic, and insightful young man. His interests were wide ranging and eclectic. He

left after six months in order to ride his bike to China on the Karokorum highway just

"...to see what that was like."

A second interpreter, Humayan Iqbal, was also fluent in English, though he had

learned it in Pakistani schools. To the extent to which one is entitled to apply Western

standards of evaluation to non-Westem attitudes, Humayan thought the Gujars quaint, at

best, but in general considered them something of a cultural anachronism. Consequently, 2 2 he tended to define our relationship exclusively on the basis of our contractual arrangement.

The issue of language competency is, of course, central to the success of any fieldwork. Fortunately, a fair number of Gujars were able to speak at least some broken

English. Intensive language study that I undertook in Pakistan was also helpful. By

August my language competency had progressed to a point where I understood most conversations and could frame some fairly elaborate questions. By late September, I was working more or less independent of an interpreter, though continuing to use Humayan’s services intermittently.

Survey Data

Survey data were collected for 160 Gujar residential groups. Adult male heads of household were asked 82 questions regarding themselves and all household residents

(see Appendix). The questionnaire took from thirty minutes to more than one hour to complete, depending on family size, complexity of migration history, and so forth. Two field assistants aided in the survey. Except for a handful of questionnaires collected during a brief illness, all the instruments were completed either by me or under my direct supervision.

As is the case with other types of data collected in the field, the survey sample was self-selecting. For a number of political reasons-not the least of which is the irreconcilable ideological gulf that separates Islamic social principles from those of caste 23 society—the government of Pakistan has never collected data on biraderi affiliation in its decennial national censuses/

The lack of background data made it impossible to construct a sampling frame or to pre-test the survey instrument. This resulted in under-enumerating the following categories of Gujars: (1) those who were recent migrants and transients; (2) individuals not well known or very active in the community; or (3) those individuals shunned by the larger community. However, the value of the data collected in this manner lies not in what it says about all Pakistanis, but in what it says about the society and demography of this self-referential ethnic community.

Analytical Techniques

The study of Gujar ethnicity presented in this dissertation draws heavily on quantitative analytical techniques. I should, therefore, lay out my understanding of the value of such

techniques for analyzing Gujar ethnicity. As will become clear in subsequent chapters,

my use of various statistical techniques is premised on the idea that Gujar ethnicity is as

much about contradiction and incongruity as it is about achieving consensus and

cooperation. Therefore, statistical analysis is directed at interpreting and explicating

Gujar ethnicity as a consequence of this diversity, rather than at generating universal

laws of society. Thus, I am as interested in and attach as much if not more analytical

^ An exception to this is the 1961 national census in which the canvasser collected information on biraderi affiliation in the preliminary instructions of the instrument. These data were never tabulated and were later destroyed (Population Census Organization of Pakistan 1963:6). 24 significance to the particulars of history, value systems, and ideology as I do to uncovering the "universal" materialist, cognitive, or linguistic laws of human society.

Such an analytical approach to the data affords an opportunity to use statistics in a somewhat unconventional manner. Specifically, I use statistical analyses to tease out the "significant" patterns of association extant within the Gujar community of Islamabad.

Although it is my supposition that these statistics reflect understandings and formulae for the solution of more widely shared problems, I do not claim that these data or their analyses are representative of Pakistani society in general. Reliance on quantification is due rather to the topic of this dissertation and the substantive nature of the material examined in it: Migration, household economics, demographic data, marital practices, and so forth are not only amenable to such analyses, but their comprehensibility is greatly enhanced if the data are cast within a statistical framework. Thus, although I see much value in the current "reflexive moment," I am not entirely convinced that textual and literary critiques are sufficient for "doing" the type of anthropology in which I am interested. To be an anthropologist, as the etymology of the term implies, is to accept that there is indeed something "out there" that approximates reality and that it is worthy of study and analysis by whatever tools one has at hand.

Since the justification for assigning quantitative techniques to the positivist side

of the debate has recently come under attack (Bernard 1988), it seems equally illogical

to accord narrative the privileged position it enjoys in "interpretive anthropology." Yet,

some proponents of the interpretive approach seem more than willing to consider

quantitative analyses as the last gasps of a dying positivist epistemology. Van Maanen 25 (1988:11, n.7) is quite explicit on this point. In introducing his discussion of fieldwork methodology he sets the following as his frame of reference:

By examining culture only as it appears in the writing of ethnographers, I obviously neglect culture as portrayed by native and student alike in photographs, films, videos, performances, poetry, theater, and documentary art. I also ignore culture as it appears in history, fiction, folklore, literary criticism, and oral history. All these forms, like mathematical models and statistical tables, I regard as distinct from ethnography.

This quote not only reveals a lack of appreciation of the history of the discipline, but it suggests an equally narrow understanding of the range of issues that are addressed efficiently by statistics. To my way of thinking, statistics is another language. As such, it comprises a vocabulary of concepts and terms that like other languages are difficult to translate into English. Yet, writers have always made recourse to foreign terms to enliven a narrative or to breach the incomprehensibility of foreign lands.^ It is precisely

this capacity wherein I believe lies the value of the quantitative analytical techniques for

cultural anthropology. Statistics, like the study of film, oral history, folklore, and so

forth, provide still another window through which to view our world.

Given the nature of these statistical analyses, the extent to which their results are

useful for cross-cultuial comparison is open for debate. This is to question neither their

validity nor their representativeness, which, in general, I believe to be fairly high.

Rather, it is to highlight the potential biases that were introduced in the process of coding

and enumerating the field data. I am not unaware of these potential weaknesses.

Although the classificatory criteria I employ are not arbitrary, they are rendered unique

* It should be noted that Malinowski (1932 [1922]) advocated strongly the use of tables as a methodological technique to organize and analyze field data. 26 by the knowledge and understanding of the Gujar community of Islamabad that went into the design of the questionnaire. In order to control for this bias, most of the data were reclassified in order to see if contradictory results were more conclusive. Where necessary and appropriate, these additional tests are mentioned in the text.

The majority of statistical analyses conducted throughout the dissertation use non- parametric tests. The exception to this was the correspondence analysis used to examine the Gujars’ marital patterns across time and space (see chapters 5 and 12). The latter is a multivariate analytical technique that was originally developed by French statisticians interested in uncovering the "system of associations" extant in a rectangular matrix and to graphically display these results in low dimensional space. Benzécri used it initially to probe the systems of associations between the final vocals and consonants in Mandarin

(Greenacre 1984:9). Unfortunately, this technique has seen limited use in the English-

speaking world (Greenacre 1984:9-10). Its lack of assumptions regarding distribution

and so forth make it a particularly appropriate tool with which to analyze the type of

nominal data cultural anthropologists frequently collect.

Chapter Contents

The dissertation consists of four main sections. Aside from this chapter, the first part

also includes the following chapter on ethnic theory. In presenting a brief discussion of

ethnic theory and analysis as it relates to Gujar ethnicity, the latter chapter develops the

framework for subsequent analytical treatments of the data. 27 The second section of the dissertation, "The Gujars in Society, Culture and

History,” consists of four chapters. The socio-economic background for the study is established in Chapter 3. This consists of a detailed treatment of population demography, forms of economic organization, subsistence patterns, and so forth extant within the

Greater Punjab. The data presented in the chapter are drawn from a number of sources-- historical studies, ethnographies, census reports, monographs written by British scholar- administrators, and so forth. The material that was ultimately selected to appear in this chapter was determined on the basis of two considerations; (1) the relative availability of pertinent data;’ and (2) the geographic background of the Islamabad Gujar community. To a certain extent the material presented in this chapter constitutes the

"ethnographic setting" frequently encountered in traditional monographs. Unlike many traditional ethnographic dissertations, the background material is reviewed as a means to lay the groundwork for developing an understanding of the ways in which history informs contemporary expressions of Gujar ethnicity.

Chapter four examines the history of the Gujars from the regional perspective of

medieval Indian social history. Documentary evidence on Gujars during this time is

’ In some instances, there is in actuality an overabundance of data. For example, for the Punjab alone, Dewey (1991:7) counted "300-odd assessment reports, 170 settlement reports, 190 district gazetteers, and 50 codes of customary laws-produced by more than 160 Punjab settlement officers" during ninety years of British rule in the province. However, only now has this material begun to be catalogued and indexed. That the Gujars are distributed across a number of provinces, combines with the absence of an all-India index, to make it impossible to review this literature systematically. Moreover, there are relatively few primary documents on the Gujars before the arrival of the British. Most of the Mughal and Sikh documents of this period are exclusively concerned with revenues matters. They therefore do not go into any great depth about social and economic organization in rural areas (see Kessinger 1974:16-17). 28 rather sparse, especially during the earlier periods. Therefore, insights are provided by examining more complete histories of other nomadic groups, or by reading this period from the perspective of what is known about the Gujars from about the early 1800s.

Admittedly, this is less than perfect as method of historical research. However, the lack of viable alternatives coupled with the fact that the Gujars themselves frequently talk and

write about this period makes it all the more pressing to develop some understanding of

it. The fifth chapter examines the ways in which conversion to Islam among the Gujars

influenced the subsequent development of culture and society among the Gujars. The

analysis presented in this chapter is based on material I gathered in the field. The final

chapter of this part of the dissertation examines Gujar society and culture under British

rule. Here, the basis of the analysis rests on the substantial body of literature produced

by British bureaucrats, officers, and administrators.

The third part of the dissertation describes the history, physical setting, and

ideological context of the city of Islamabad. "The City of Tomorrow; The Urban

Context of Islamabad" consists of three chapters. Chapter 7 describes Islamabad’s

physical setting, considers the design principles of the city’s master plan, and examines

the built form environment. Chapter 8 discusses the nature of national politics in

Pakistan from the country’s founding in 1947 up to the 1969 ouster of the military

dictator, Mohammad Ayub Khan. This latter history is critical to the dissertation. On

the one hand, it establishes the background for understanding the events that led the state,

under the direction of Ayub Khan, to intervene in the urban history of Pakistan and

found a new national capital on the Punjab’s Potwar Plateau. On the other hand, the 29 discussion provides the background necessary to uncovering the means by which building a planned capital city in the northern Punjab was to achieve Ayub Khar.'s political objectives. Chapter 9 develops the latter idea further by examining the political agenda embedded in Islamabad’s built form environment.

The fourth section, "Gujars in Islamabad," describes important aspects of Gujar ethnicity as they are expressed and articulated in the local urban context of Islamabad.

The demographic composition of the Gujar community of Islamabad as it relates to the construction of ethnic identities is examined in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 considers the contributions that settlement practices make to community organization and the definition of Gujar ethnic identities. Chapter 12 examines the social forms of marriage, kinship and association extant within the Gujar community of Islamabad. A concluding chapter

(Chapter 13) summarizes some of the major findings of the research and briefly discusses its implications for future study and research.

A Note on Terminological Conventions Employed in the Text

The following are the principal conventions I have devised to aid in the exposition:

1. As Tom Kessinger (1974:9) has noted, "the repeated changes in the Punjab’s boundaries in the past one hundred years make it difficult to select a definition that is

both relatively precise and stylistically acceptable." In 1849, when the British annexed

the province, the "Punjab" constituted an administrative division of the British Indian

empire that included Delhi (conferred a separate status in 1911 when it was made the

colonial Capital), and the districts of Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar, and Hazara 30 (amalgamated in 1901 with the tribal districts along British India’s border with

Afghanistan to constitute the North West Frontier Province). At Independence, the

Punjab was further reorganized by the terms of Partition which split the province between India and Pakistan. Subsequent administrative reorganization within India has resulted in the Indian Punjab being split between Haryana and the Punjab (1966), and the transfer of the Punjab’s northern districts of Chambal and Kangra, to Himachal Pradesh.

As mentioned previously, I use the "Greater Punjab" to refer to that area of the province and neighboring districts that constitute the Gujars’ home area. In other cases, the

"Punjab" to which I refer is made clear by the context of the discussion.

2. The Gujars of Islamabad are the local representatives of a larger social grouping known in Pakistan as a biraderi. Various other labels, e.g., "caste" (Ahmad

1978; Barth 1981b; Dumont 1980a; Mandelbaum 1972), "descent group" (Eglar 1960),

"kinship system" (Alavi 1976); "tribe" (Ibbetson 1916), and "ethnic group" (Gilmartin

1988b; Manku 1986) have been used synonymously with this term. While the factors underlying such diversity are far too numerous to consider here, such ambiguity requires some explanation of the terminological conventions observed in the dissertation.

In a substantive sense, "caste" is used in reference to all Gujars of the medieval era and to those Gujar communities that did not convert to Islam. "Caste" is also used in a collective sense in reference to all Gujars of the subcontinent. It is adopted here for expository purposes only as it is in keeping with traditional usage. It is not meant to be pejorative, as I trust the Gujars recognize. Analytically, however, the term is used 31 in exclusive reference to those endogamous clusters of exogamous patricians that constitute the basic unit of the Hindu caste system/"

"Biraderi" denotes all Muslim Gujars of the subcontinent, whether of the contemporary world or of the historical past. In an analytical sense, this term refers to the collection of highly ramified kinship networks found throughout much of Pakistan and

North India. Thus, in discussions of history or rural society, biraderi is used in a collective and essentially statistical sense.

By ethnic group, ethnicity, ethnic identity, and the like I mean those identity constructions that inscribe conceptual boundaries around a reputedly specified and integrated assemblage of social relations. Of course, at any given time there are as many different levels and perspectives from which to view these ethnic identity constructions as there are different ethnic identity definitions circulating within the Islamabad community. In some cases, a Gujar ethnic identity encompasses the localized community of Islamabad and adjoining areas. At other times, these identity constructions are more

inclusive and are attributed to regional sub-groups or even to the entire national biraderi.

In general, the group to which a particular ethnic identity refers is made clear by the

context of the discussion.

3. Instead of attempting to develop a consistent system of transliteration, I have

used the commonly accepted English renderings of Urdu, Hindi, Punjabi, Persian, and

Arabic words. Those terms that are not widely recognized are rendered according to the

Jati is perhaps a more appropriate term for this type of social unit. However, as most scholars of Muslim South Asia have chosen to use the term caste (e.g., I. Ahmad 1976, 1978, 1983), this convention is followed here. 32 system of phonetic transliteration appearing in Barker, Hamdani, Dihlavi, and Rahman

(1975 [1967]:5-16). These terms either appear with their English equivalent, or are discussed in the text.

4. A large number of transliterations of "Gujar’ " (e.g., Gujjar, Gurjjara, Goojar,

Goojur) appear in the literature. The version adopted in this dissertation conforms to the

English transliterations which appear in the ethnic publications that are produced by and circulate among the Gujars of Islamabad. CHAPTER n

THE GUJARS AND THEORIES OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

. . . a group or an individual has no one identity, but a variety (a potentially very large variety) of possibilities, that only incompletely or partially overlap in social time and social space (Chapman, McDonald, and Tonkin 1989:17).

. . . the analysis of opposition, exclusion, and the struggle for identity within a framework of often opposing interests is a necessity for socM theory (Lindholm 1986:72).

At a very early stage in the research process, it became apparent that the Gujar community of Islamabad lacked a corporate social identity. In its place, a number of ethnic identities-some only partially formulated-circulated widely within the community.

The meanings associated with these different ethnic identities varied to the extent that in some instances they were openly contradictory. The lack of definitional consensus as to what constitutes a "Gujar” was matched by a concomitant degree of indeterminacy and flexibility in the community’s social organization. Aside from the symbolic point of reference and unity that was provided by the idiom of biraderi brotherhood, there was very little that the Gujars shared in common. Instead, various groups vied to have their views achieve some measure of acceptance within the larger community. The nature of the community diversity, however, argued against the possibility that any one ethnic identity definition would indeed be accepted by the entire community. The result is that

33 34 diversity, inconsistency, and ambiguity are as much a part of city identity as are homogeneity, coherence and equilibrium.

As Chapman, McDonald, and Tonkin (1989:17) have theorized about ethnicity in general, at any given time "a variety (a potentially very large variety)" of ethnic definitions circulate within the Gujar community of Islamabad. Yet, community members are relatively consistent in asserting that they belong to a unified and socio culturally homogenous ethnic group. Indeed, it is this-and perhaps this belief only -that defines their shared ethnic identity.

This dissertation is concerned with developing an understanding of the conceptual incongruity of Gujar ethnicity as a product of a number of historically, socially, and culturally defined forces. In this chapter, I develop the theoretical orientation that underlies the variety of analytical perspectives used to examine the inchoate nature of

Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad. In a certain sense, then, this chapter is autobiographical.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, I went to Islamabad in late 1985 looking for consistency and patterning in the socio-cultural organization of the city’s

migrant groups. I left Pakistan eleven months later girded with the materials I had

collected during that time, knowing that there existed within these data a great deal of

inconsistency and contradiction, but still confident that given sufficient treatment, the

patterns inherent to these materials would become apparent. In a highly schematic form,

this chapter retraces my thoughts as I wrestled with, reasoned through, and attempted to

reconcile my views of the anthropological mission, on the one hand, and the idea of

ethnic incongruity, on the other hand. 35 The Theoretical Challenges of Gigar Ethnicity

The idea that ethnic group processes are about homogeneity and logical coherence presupposes the concomitant view that self-identity, affect, emotion, even basic personality are static, inviolate, and eternal. As the repositories of an essentialist psychology, ethnic traits are seen to change only in response to external stimuli. The data I collected in the field paints a picture that is strikingly at odds with such characterizations. The point is not that conflicting and contradictory ethnic identity images circulate among the Gujars of Islamabad, which they do. Rather, what is at issue is that individual Gujars embrace and frequently articulate quite disparate views of Gujar ethnicity. This observation poses a fundamental, perhaps irresolvable dilemma for traditional forms of ethnic analysis.

Traditional Theoretical Approaches to Ethnicity

Since the early nineteen-hundreds, ethnic studies have been dominated by two approaches labelled, somewhat awkwardly, as the "primordialist" and "circumstantialist" schools of thought (Glazer and Moynihan 1975). To understand the weaknesses of these approaches as they relate to the Gujar data, it will be helpful here to provide a brief comparative overview of each model.

The primordialist paradigm posits that ethnic groups are bounded, autonomous,

and relatively cohesive social units that arise more or less independent of external

causality and stimulus. Ethnic social integration, shared identity formations, and

collective cultural practices are all, therefore, seen to be the productions of the

affectively charged, and historically transcendent social ties and cultural symbols linking 36 group members. In the classic formulation of the primordialist paradigm, ethnic groups are said to "crystallize" (Geertz 1973:261) in a gestalt-a cultural ethos if you will-that serves as an essential, unchanging, and timeless basis for the construction of ethnic identities. The exact time, place, and nature of ethnic crystallization is seldom specified.

Nor, for that matter, are the causes and processes responsible for such events analyzed to any great depth: Ethnic groups just are, and have always been. Elements of primordialism are evident in socio-biological (Hawkes 1983; van den Berghe 1978), psychoanalytical (Epstein 1978; Stein 1975), culturological (Inkeles 1969), historical

(Shils 1957) and interpretivist/symbolic (Geertz 1973; Andretta 1989) treatments of ethnicity.*

In contradistinction, the circumstantialist paradigm locates the sources of ethnicity in interest-directed group activities. This view tends to see ethnicity largely in terms of

its instrumentalist functions, analyzing ethnicity as a response to the contextual demands

and impingements that are imposed on subordinate ethnic groups by encapsulating,

frequently dominant societies. This is to say that ethnicity functions as a socio-political

tool by which to channel favoritism, muster political support, provide jobs, and engage

in a number of other interest-directed practices. Ecological (Barth 1969a, 1981a),

economic (Despres 1975; Foster 1974), historical (Charsley 1974), migratory (Sama

1978; Turton 1979), and political (Cohen 1969, 1974; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Olzak

1983; Patterson 1975) studies of ethnicity reveal in their frequent references to the

' Studies of "plural" societies (e.g., Kuper and Smith 1969; Smith 1965), while generally descriptive accounts, to a certain degree rest on a primordialist perspective. 37 instrumentalist qualities of ethnicity, the extent to which ethnicity is rendered a

"dependent variable" by such theoretical treatments.

Each of these views provides its own particular insights into the Gujars’ ethnic practices--even in the assimilative context of Islamabad. A shared ethnic identity, for example, provides the Gujars with access to important sources of political patronage and favoritism. Nevertheless, Gujar ethnicity is not only about the struggle for survival. It is, after all, a tautology to speak of the interests engendered by a group’s articulation with the local political economy if it is these forces which constitute, shape, and define the nature of an ethnic group in the first instance.

So too does the primordialist view provide valuable insights into the dynamics of the Gujars’ political relations with the nation-state of Pakistan. Recent elections, for example, have shown a continuing and strong correlation between voting and ethnicity

(Wright 1991). Yet, as has been recognized (Cohn 1969; Said 1978; van der Veer

1993), the essentialist quality of primordialist theories attributes a quality of existence to an ethnic group that transcends time and space. And it is this which is perhaps its greatest weakness.

The political implications of such essentialist theories, especially as they relate to

the scholarship of the colonial and post-colonial worlds, have become a subject of wide

discussion, especially since the appearance of Edward Said’s (1978) path breaking book.

Orientalism. In his study. Said charts the evolution of the mutually supportive and

symbiotic relationship that tied orientalism, as a form of scholarship, to various projects

of European colonization. Central to his thesis is the idea that the essentialist view of 38 the orient and the oriental "Other" served as a mask which concealed the true nature of this relationship.

While Said overstates his case (see, e.g., Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993), it is nevertheless important to recognize the ways in which essentialist views of ethnicity conditions one’s understandings of the political nature of the ties that link ethnic groups to the state. Establishing a reified category of ethnicity, and ascribing to it a character that is both eternal and unchanging, leads inevitably to the view that it is the larger, state-level society which must accommodate the ethnic groups within it. The nature of the responses to such situations range from constitutional guarantees aimed at maintaining ethnic diversity through state-sponsored programs directed at fostering the displacement of archaic ethnic identities to those projects whose intent it is to eliminate ethnic groups politically, culturally, and genetically.

The ways in which primordialism and circumstantialism deal (or fail to deal) with diversity, ambiguity, and contradiction reveal their shared weaknesses at the same time that they shed light on the theoretical presuppositions which these ostensibly distinct paradigms share in common. While their views on the origin and causation of ethnicity are diametrically opposed, circumstantialism and primordialism are of a piece in that they ascribe a centrality to ethnic homogeneity, coherence, consistency, and inviolability.

This leads both models to overlook dissonance, discord, and dissent as they are engaged in and contribute to the formation of ethnic identities.

Recent efforts to reconcile the differences between these two paradigms have made use of dialectic (see, e.g., Nagata 1981) and "practice" (see, e.g., Bentley 1987) 39 theoretical approaches. Ironically, such efforts--as they incorporate the paradigmatic referents they seek to transcend-serve to reinforce the differences inherent to these perspectives. They thereby cloud the issue even further. An interest in variability, contradiction, and dissent should, however, be central to any discussion of ethnicity, especially when such discussion pertains to groups in contexts of rapid change or political indeterminacy, such as the Gujars of Islamabad.

A consideration of the reasons why sub-group variability has not been adequately studied by anthropologists is far beyond the scope of this dissertation. What is of importance in the context of this discussion is how one’s understanding of ethnicity in general is altered by redirecting one’s focus to the ways in which contradiction, conflict, and incongruence serve to inform the construction of local ethnic identities. The Gujar data are again instructive on this point.

Most Gujars are well aware of the contradiction that exists between their claim

of ethnic unity and uniformity, on the one hand, and the social reality of inconsistency,

indeterminacy, and ambiguity, on the other hand. It was, after all, the Gujars who drew

my attention to the nature of this ambiguity as I sought, in vain, to uncover the

characteristic elements of their ethnic identity so that I might link them to some

antecedent variable. Yet, in spite of their checkered history and their contemporary

diversity, of which the Gujars themselves are amply cognizant, group members express

a devotion to and investment of energy in a reified, idealized group that does not 40 acknowledge variation either spatially or historically.^ It is precisely their ability to suppress their differences in order to act in concert that poses the greatest challenge to the essentialist views of traditional theories of ethnicity.

That the Gujars are capable of acting cooperatively and that the communication necessary for organizing such activities occurs despite the inconsistencies of their ethnic identities is the fundamental observation underlying the analysis developed in this dissertation. In order to explain how collective action remains possible within a context of conceptual ambiguity and indeterminacy, I model Gujar ethnicity on the basis of an analytical framework that attends simultaneously to the social phenomena of cultural aesthetics and social power. This understanding of the processual underpinnings of ethnicity represents something of a departure from traditional analytical approaches.

Here I sketch the major tenets of this analytical methodology, returning in the concluding chapter to consider its implications for anthropological research and theory building.

The Sites of Ethnic Production and Reproduction

In constructing and deploying their ethnic identities, the Gujars engage in a multiplicity

of dialogues that are as self-reflexive as they are external and directed to other Gujars,

Pakistanis, and foreigners. These dialogues constitute the discursive arenas for the

expression, exchange, debate, and definition of ideas, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and

sentiments about what socially and morally constitutes a "Gujar.” As such, discourse

^ Thomas and Znaniecki (1984 [1918-1920]), for example, observed that while Polish-American society bore little resemblance to its European counterpart, Polish- Americans were vociferous in the assertion that their's was a pristine Polish identity. 4 1 moves the discussion of Gujar ethnicity between the poles of the esoteric and the exoteric, as well as between those of the present and the past.

These ethnic discourses—underpinned by the capabilities and limitations of human imagination-are embedded within a specific cultural context that is informed by the organization and distribution of power. They therefore serve both to empower and delineate the extent to which innovations in the Gujars’ ethnic identity definitions are adopted by the larger community. As a consequence of the nature of this interaction and consequent weight of tradition, the acceptance (although not the formulation) of an ethnic identity constructed de novo would seem to be a relatively rare event. More common are those instances wherein preexistent and sometimes quite old motifs are interwoven with new elements and interpretations to create novel and innovative configurations, that are nonetheless acceptable to a wider audience.

The discursive processes of Gujar ethnicity perform a number of intricate and complex social operations. Building a consensus as to what constitutes a Gujar has the concomitant effect of legitimating the verisimilitude of the Gujars’ claim to be a distinct ethnic community. Paradoxically, as they confer legitimacy on the community’s

existence, these ethnic identities simultaneously function to restrain the scope and range

of variation in ethnic identity formations. To understand how these divergent operations

occur concurrently, it is necessary to develop a model of the ways in which cultural

aesthetics and power relate to Gujar ethnicity. 42 The May of Aesthetics

Some ethnic definitions circulating within the community achieve a wide measure of success and acceptance. They are the subject of favorable commentary and positive discussion and are frequently linked in a complimentary manner to individuals believed to be their authors or chief advocates. Conversely, some ethnic identity constructions preferred among Gujars in other urban and rural communities (e.g., the idea that they are thieves and brigands), are conspicuous by their absence from the repertoire of ethnic identities circulating within Islamabad’s Gujar community (although they exist as a social commentary in the discourses of Islamabad’s other ethnic groups).

At one level, the degree to which an ethnic identity definition is accepted or

rejected by the community is explicable by reference to its aesthetic appeal, or lack

thereof.^ Of the criteria against which an ethnic identity may be evaluated and judged,

the fieldwork experience suggests that three are critical: (1) its credibility as a particular

"reading" of history; (2) its relevance to and practicality within the larger cultural and

political context; and (3) the degree to which it is consonant with the perspectives and

experiences of individual community members.

The relative weight assigned to each of these criteria varies in relation to

differences in settings, circumstances, and contexts. In some instances an ethnic identity

definition may resonate for community members to such a high degree that it outweighs

^ I am using "aesthetics" as developed by Scheff (1979:46-79) in his study of catharsis. This is to say that some ethnic identity definitions are more compelling than others simply because tiiey are at an appropriate "aesthetic distance" (Scheff 1979:61). However, unlike Scheff s definition, 1 do not differentiate between the psychological and ratio-logical components of aesthetics. 43 whatever limitations it may possess as a plausible reading of history or context. On average, however, those ethnic constructions that score high on all three criteria achieve the widest currency and acceptance within the community.

Evaluating the aesthetic appeal of an ethnic definition determines the extent to which individuals are authorized to disseminate specific interpretations of the Gujars’ ethnic identity. In this way aesthetic appeal also serves to legitimate as reality the

"imagined communities" (Anderson 1983) inherent to the Gujars’ ethnic identity definitions. Where aesthetic appeal is great-as in the definition of the Gujars as a religiously devout and pious ethnic group—community members are justified to propagate, as reality, the community’s ethnic images and imaginings. Conversely, where

aesthetic appeal is absent-as is the case for the definition of the Gujars as thieves and

brigands-an ethnic identity commands that much less of the community’s acceptance.

The Play of Power

As history has shown repeatedly, the definition of a system of aesthetic referents

seldom, if ever, operates in isolation of the political context. In the case of the Gujars,

the pursuit of prestige, status, and economic advantage-the bases and objectives of social

power and control-exercises a direct and telling influence on Gujar ethnicity. Influential

community members maintain a modicum of control over the community, at least in part,

by virtue of the role they play in defining Gujar ethnicity. Their positions of authority

and respect afford them a greater opportunity than less powerful compatriots to stamp

their imprint on the community’s ethnic identities. Uncovering who has power,

understanding how they got it, and having once acquired it, how they went about 44 augmenting it, are as important then to explaining the distribution and circulation of ethnic identities within Islamabad’s Gujar community as is uncovering the aesthetic referents of a specific identity construction.

Nevertheless, in the asymmetrical relationship of followers and leaders, not all is about coercion, control, and exploitation. Ideas concerning Gujar ethnicity and ethnic identity deemed aesthetically acceptable by those in positions of power and privilege are assimilated by followers and supporters, if given the appropriate circumstances and set of motivations. At the same time, however, the norms and values that authorize individuals to speak to, for, or about a community serve to restrict the range and scope of permissible variation in ethnic identity definitions. All things being equal, it is just as likely that those not needing, or willing to accept a particular ethnic image will alter, reject or subvert it.

The differential allocation of power within the community is therefore critical to explaining the ways in which aesthetics and social power participate in the construction

of social identities. However, the relationship of aesthetics to power is more complex

in that aesthetics itself may perform the function of enhancing one’s social status and

prestige. In some cases, it is imaginable that a particularly appealing ethnic identity may

provide the exclusive basis for individual’s social power and cultural authority. It is even

imaginable that a radically novel ethnic identity of great appeal may provide an impetus

for overturning an extant socio-political order (as in messianic or prophetic movements).

The interaction between aesthetics and social power-where ethnic production,

reproduction, and deployment occurs~I provisionally refer to in this dissertation as the 45 sites of ethnie production. The Euclidian image of this trope is intentional. Its repeated invocation is designed to draw attention to the fact that the historic and cultural landscape of the Gujars’ home area is populated with innumerable sites of ethnic production, many of which have political consequences. Its use is also intended to draw attention to the ways in which the sites of Gujar ethnic production in Islamabad combine elements of ethnic images that have been created at other sites and at other times. A review of the ethnographic data provides the material to examine the nature of this interactive relationship in regard to the social practices they sanction and the cultural operations they license. Before moving to this discussion, however, a few words should be said about the organization of the analysis.

Analytical Strategy

This understanding of the dialogic processes of ethnicity directs research toward disentangling the elements interwoven in Gujar ethnic identities, of identifying their numerous sources and symbolic referents, and of locating the issues to which they speak.

In the case of the Gujars, the sources of the material from which ethnic identities are constructed are many and diverse. As mentioned previously, the vastness of the Gujars’ geographic homeland and the socio-cultural diversity extant within it is one such source of ethnic variation. So too is the Gujars’ long and colorful history. But the contributions these two sources make to the definition of Gujar ethnicity do not begin to exhaust the

full range of influences that shape, define, and condition the substance of Gujar ethnicity.

As members of a common Pakistani culture, the Gujars, like people everywhere. 46 have few reservations about appropriating the traditions of other biraderis and social groups. In a similar manner, themes and concepts current in the larger political, social, economic, and religious contexts constitute other sources that are rich in the materials which the Gujars draw on in constructing their ethnic identities.

The principal objective of this dissertation is to provide an analytical description of Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad. Doing so requires addressing a number of questions:

What are the major themes of the Gujars’ ethnic identities? What are the social, political, economic, cultural, and historic issues to which these ethnic identities speak?

In what manner (and why) do they vary by region? In what ways (and why) have they changed over time? What are the social, economic, or political factors accounting for this temporal and spatial variation? What is the nature of the social ties linking ethnic group members? In what ways do the creation, maintenance, and transformation of these ties influence the production and deployment of Gujar ethnicity? In what ways do cultural norms and values regarding power, authority, and respect influence the authenticity accorded to specific ethnic identities? In what ways do these norms and values influence the construction and subsequent deployment of Gujar ethnic identities?

In order to address this broad array of topics and issues, I have adopted a somewhat unconventional style of exposition. Specifically, a wider net is cast than is

standard practice for most ethnographic dissertations, especially in regard to the history

of Muslim South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. In some instances (e.g., in

examining the impact of British imperialism on Gujar ethnicity) such historical

discussions seem to digress from the central topic of this dissertation. The study of 47 social history is, however, critical to this dissertation for the following reasons. It is only through such studies that it becomes possible to address the many research questions raised by the analytical methodology adopted in this dissertation. Furthermore, such study indicated by the importance that history assumes in the Gujars’ attempts to legitimate their claims to ethnic uniqueness, to explain the particulars of their relationships with other ethnic groups, as well as to account for the ambiguities of their social status and rank. As such, the histories reconstructed in this dissertation shed light on the traditions and events that continue to inform the Gujars’ contemporary ethnic identities.

A second reason for including such a detailed history has to do with the nature of the Gujars’ conceptual relationship with the planned modernist city of Islamabad. In addition to providing a vehicle for diverse interpretive readings of their own history, rhetorical devices embedded within the Gujars’ self-representations are a means whereby the community is able to wed its political, social, and economic agendas to the justifying arguments the government uses to legitimate the building of a new national capital. To

disentangle this interwoven discourse requires that analytical attention focus on the

circumstances and events surrounding two key events in the history of Pakistan, its

founding in 1947 and the subsequent decision of 1958 to build a new national capital.

For the purposes of reconstructing these histories, it was often necessary to

consult secondary source materials. However, explicating the way in which history

operates to influence and shape Gujar ethnicity provides the dissertation with a unique

organizational focus. Wherever possible and appropriate, historical material particular 48 to the Gujars is introduced to illustrate a point, clarify an issue, or provide a comparative perspective. The thread of historical analysis that runs throughout the text provides a point of departure for exploring various aspects of Gujar ethnicity in the contemporary world.

Casting a wide net, however, serves purposes other than just developing an understanding of the Gujars’ place in time and space. Through the skillful manipulation of architecture and urban design, Islamabad’s Master Plan was intended to achieve a number of related political and social goals. While they might be only partly recognized by city residents, Islamabad’s political agenda has made an indelible impact on the definition of Gujar ethnicity. To achieve its goals, zoning ordinances and regulations, housing codes, street layout and design, and a myriad of other aspects of the city’s urban built form were designed with the intent of ordering Islamabad’s urban society along lines derived from a Western-inspired, autocratic model of political organization.

Developing an understanding of the ways in which architecture and urban design were

intended to order urban society in Islamabad is necessary as it is that the Gujars live

throughout the city, making the Gujar community especially liable to the political agenda

that pervades the city’s Master Plan.

Still another reason for casting as wide a net as possible are the gaps that exist

in the ethnographic literature of Muslim South Asia. In the study of Muslim South Asia

the ethnographic literature has been dominated by approaches that highlight either the

similarities (e.g., in economic organization), or differences (e.g., in religious beliefs and

ritual practices) between Hindu and Muslim society on the subcontinent. Not 49 surprisingly, the findings of these studies have provided fuel for an ongoing debate over the character of Muslim Indian society. Scholars (e.g., Robinson 1983,1986) who have used such observations to highlight the inherently Middle Eastern (and hence Islamic) character of Indian Islam, are frequently chided by their colleagues for a lack of concern with context. Conversely, those scholars interested in context and circumstance frequently highlight (often implicitly) the commonalities of Muslim South Asian and

Hindu society (see, e.g., Ahmad 1976, 1978, 1983; Das 1984; Minnault 1984).

The purpose of this dissertation, however, is not to engage in this debate. Indeed, as a consequence of the need to illuminate some analytical point or to introduce various descriptive data the reader will find ample evidence to support either side to the debate.

Rather, in respect to its descriptive goals, the objective of this dissertation is to identify the diversity of sources that inform the social construction of Gujar ethnic identities, regardless of their religious, cultural, or historical essences or origins. It is to a consideration of the ethnographic data that I now turn. PART 2

THE GUJARS IN SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

50 CHAPTER m

THE GUJARS IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT

. . . the pastoral nomads are as integrated into the mosaic of Indian culture as any other group; within the bounds of expected differences, they assume an assigned place. The pastoral nomads collectively are different from the sedentary castes, but the differences are perceived on both parts to be ones of degree rather than of kind . . . (Leshnik and Sontheimer 1975:X).

Micro-level studies of the economy, society, and culture of India have lead many

scholars to investigate systems of thought and social organization from a regional or all-

India perspective (see, e.g., Bailey 1962; Bhatt 1980; Cohn 1971; Cohn and Marriott

1958; Crane 1967; Dumont 1980b; Elder 1973; Fox 1969, 1971a, 1976, 1984, 1985;

Marriott 1965; Mayer 1960; Noble and Dutt 1982; Pettigrew 1975; Platt 1962; Pradhan

1966; Saberwal 1971; Singer and Cohn 1968; Srinivas and Béteille 1964). The Gujars

of Islamabad are no exception to this in that their ethnic identities incorporate motifs

draw from a number of geographically diverse sources. This chapter seeks to analyze

elements of the Gujars’ ethnic identities that are rooted in the context of "traditional’’

North Indian society. The outline of the discussion is in large part based on readings in

the secondary literature. In a certain sense this chapter constitutes "the ethnographic

51 5 2

setting" found in most traditional case studies. The chapter differs, perhaps, in the extent

to which it pursues this line of investigation.

The chapter consists of three sections. The first section reviews Gujar population

distribution, social geography, and language use. This is followed by a regional

overview of the traditional patterns of subsistence and economic organization. A

concluding section examines the ways in which the regional economy underpins

stereotypical images of Gujar ethnicity and ethnic identity.

Social Geography

For the purposes of this dissertation, the types of demographic data necessary to examine

patterns of Gujar population growth and distribution in the contemporary world simply

do not exist. Since achieving independence from Great Britain in 1947, neither Pakistan

nor India have collected census data on the biraderi or caste affiliations of their citizens.*

Such data as exists are only available in the publications of the British Indian

government, the most useful of which are the British Indian census reports.

A Reconstruction of Gujar Demography

The British Indian government took an all-India population count decennially

commencing in 1871. While the 1941 Census of India was the last census administered

under the aegis of the British Indian government, the 1931 census provides the most

* * Exceptions to this are the census counts of India’s scheduled castes and tribes and Pakistan’s religious minorities. In addition, the 1961 Census of Pakistan, as mentioned previously, had enumerators gather information on biraderi affiliation. These data, entered in the preliminary sections of the census instrument, were apparently destroyed before being tabulated (Population Census Organization of Pakistan 1963:6). 5 3 recent and systematic data on caste/biraderi affiliation. The history of these censuses and the nature of the data that were coUected-especially as regards their quality, evenness, and reliability-have been dealt with previously (see, e.g.. Barrier 1981; Cohn 1990a).

They therefore do not need to be reviewed here to any great depth.

Studies of the biases inherent to the British Indian census (and its successors in the subcontinent), however, do serve as constant and vivid reminders of the fact that the census was the product of a colonial encounter that brought the ruling British elite into direct and close contact with their Indian subjects. As one observer has noted (Jones

1981:74), the Census of India became "... a crucial point of interaction between the

British-Indian government and its subjects."

As initially envisioned, the Census of India was intended to provide an overview of the Indian population, identify emergent trends in population growth and movement, and estimate the size, distribution, and growth of various social groups. Later census undertakings saw a shift in focus to issues of economic and industrial importance (Barrier

1981:VI11). All of these were subjects of immense importance to the administrative

needs of the British Indian empire. The census (as well as other related government

documents, reports, and surveys) was seen as an instrument by which to collect the sorts

of materials necessary for the formulation of "scientifically" based, yet politically sound

policies, statutes, acts, and laws.

In the selection of these subjects, the Census of India thus reveals itself as a

product of British imperialism and of the interests inherent therein (see Barrier 1981;

Cohn 1990a). After the assumption of India as a Crown colony in 1858, these interests 54 were to revolve increasingly around three critical issues; (I) preventing and containing

civil strife and unrest; (2) securing the country’s borders against invasion; and (3)

extracting sufficient revenues to sustain and justify the British presence in India (see

Chapter 6). Revenue extraction in British north India was based, in large part, on taxes

levied against agricultural produce. In this, the regions of the Ganges-Yamuna Doab (the

upland interfluves), the Yamuna-Sutlej plains and the Punjab were to make, each in their

respective turn, substantial contributions to the economy of British India.

The nature of this tributary economy led the British to an involvement in the

management of rural society and economy that deepened as they moved northwest from

the Bay of Bengal into the heartland of the Indian subcontinent. In the absence of

representative democratic institutions-which would have provided for the collective

expression of individual needs—the demand for efficient management increasingly dictated

the collection, cataloging, and "scientific" analysis of a substantial and extensive body

of data about the populations that came under British control. In addition to the Indian

census, the imperative to rationalize colonial rule served to legitimize a much broader

project (Cohn 1990b).^ Armed with the tools, methodologies, and utopian naivete

generated by the newly emergent "sciences of man," civilian bureaucrats, army

personnel, and administrators set their hand to compiling a documentary record of Indian

society in all of its cultural, religious, political, and economic dimensions. In addition

^ Barrier (1981 :V) identifies three sets of published records-settlement reports, gazetteers and censuses. To these one must add the various official and private correspondences of government authorities and the numerous "spin-off" publications that both types of documents made possible and necessary. 55 to the decennial census, vast resources were expended on gathering information for gazetteers, census ethnographies, settlement reports, revenue assessments, and various other government reports. While these materials cover a wide range of topics, their overriding objective was to understand rural society as it related to such issues as, for example, agricultural productivity, the definition of land tenure and property rights, the containment of social unrest, and the relief of rural indebtedness. It was believed that such information would allow the British to resolve many of the contentious debates that had arisen in regard to the nature and legitimacy of British colonial rule. So doing, it was further believed, would produce a stable and prosperous peasantry whose interests would be wed to those of the British empire.

The ways in which British conceptualizations of Indian society influenced their colonial practices, has served as a point of analytical departure for a good deal of the contemporary scholarship on the colonial history of South Asia. Studies of this critical period in the history of South Asia are helpful in that they have deepened our understanding and appreciation for the ways in which the data that were collected by the

British ideologically legitimated British colonial domination (see, e.g., Appaduri 1993;

Barrier 1981; Cohn 1990a, 1990b). Such studies also alert one to the fact that these materials speak to the conceptual relationship that linked Indian society to the British empire, as much as they describe the actual demography of the regional population (see

Chapter 6). The use of the British Indian census for the purposes of recreating Gujar demography thus requires an understanding of their inherent biases, especially as the relate to the larger project of British colonial rule. 56 Notes on the British Indian Census and Gujar Demography

Starting in 1881, the first synchronized population count, the all-India census was taken on a day in late January or early February. The timing of the census was based on problems the British had encountered in early censuses. It was reasoned that the moderate weather during this time of the year would act less to deter enumerators from canvassing the population as had been the case when censuses were taken during the hot summer months (Barrier 1981 :IX). The timing of the census count must have skewed the population count of pastoralist populations in favor of those sites where they had established their winter camps. The extent to which this may have happened is unclear and awaits further research as the narrative sections of the Census reports are silent as

to the ways in which enumerators dealt with this issue.

The manner in which the data were collected in specific villages may have also

skewed the Gujars’ population count. A review of the available ethnographic and

documentary literature indicates that with some exceptions (e.g., Gujrat, in the Pakistan

Punjab (this study, Chapters 4-6], and Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh, India [Raheja 1988])

there were relatively few districts where the Gujars controlled large agricultural estates.

Moreover, in those areas where they were substantial property holders (e.g., northeast

Indian Punjab [Manku 1986], or Mathura in Uttar Pradesh [Misra 1959]), the land they

controlled was often of inferior quality. This was an apparently longstanding tradition.

In Jullundur district (Indian Punjab), for example, Kessinger (1974:30, Table II) reports

that as of 1851 Gujars controlled four percent of the villages and four percent of the total

area, but provided only 2% of the total revenue assessment. This contrasts with the 57

Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim Jats who controlled 51% of the villages with a total area of

48%, but who were assessed 56% of the total revenue.

A lack of landownership among Gujars must have had a negative influence on the estimates of their population size. Most north Indian villages are characterized by the presence of a large number of economically interdependent caste/biraderi groups. In matters concerning the entire village or large sectors of it, rights of decision-making and adjudication are allocated on the basis of economic standing, with power vested in the members of the locally dominant caste (see Srinivas 1987). As this was an agrarian economy, social power was thus directly tied to the extent to which individuals and families enjoyed rights of appropriation over the produce of the land.

The Gujars’ relative insignificance as landholders had the consequent effect of undermining their importance in the political affairs of the village, area, and region.

This was consequently reflected in lower population counts. Indian census agents, who filled in census forms on their own (Cohn 1990a:248), must have found it expeditious to accept the word of village elites regarding the number of politically insignificant or competitive groups within the village, no matter how inconsistent it might have been with

what they knew. This must have been especially so in the earlier census counts, when

entering a large number of tied laborers was seen as a symbol of political worth and

ascendancy over other groups (Neale 1979).

With later censuses, Indian subjects became aware of the connection between the

British Indian census and the formulation of colonial policy. By the early 1900s, for

example, arguments by Muslim and Hindu leaders for greater representation on various 58 legislative bodies were couched in terms of different interpretations of the census returns

(Jones 1981).

The Census of 1921 and 1931 are particularly notorious for the extent to which the census had become an arena for the interests of diverse groups intent on influencing the returns to serve their own political purposes. In a sense, the census had come to be seen as a door to imperial favoritism, patronage, and recognition. In the Punjab, for example, success at having one’s caste entered under the heading of a "martial- agricultural caste" not only conferred legitimacy to a group’s pretension to higher status within the village and region, but opened the door to the receipt of imperial favoritism in the form of land grants in the recently opened canal colonies of the province’s western districts (see Chapter 5).

The relationship between census enumeration and various "poor relief" programs implemented under the British may have similarly functioned to lower the number of

Gujars ultimately listed in the census report. The literature indicates that with some exceptions (see Elliot 1869, vol. 1:179; Hasan 1986:XIII) the Gujars, although looked

down upon by many villagers, were not generally categorized as an "untouchable" caste

group in the British Indian census. This meant that Gujars, due to their caste ranking,

were ineligible to receive government relief. Thus, it seems likely that some Gujars

provided enumerators with a false caste/biraderi designation in hopes of acquiring such

assistance.

Another potential source of reporting error relating to the Gujars is the purported

correlation said to obtain between occupation and group membership. Even today a 59 fairly high percentage of non-Gujars believe the Gujars to be goat and buffalo-herding

pastoralists. In those cases where geographic distance or the difficulty of the terrain

made direct interviewing impossible, census enumerators might have resorted to

occupation as a criterion by which to determine caste/biraderi identity. As a

consequence, groups that happened to be engaged in pastoralist activities may have been

categorized as Gujars even though they were of a different caste.^

These various sources of bias, misunderstanding and deliberate distortion do not,

however, entirely eliminate the British Indian censuses as a source of demographic data.

While the discussion above makes clear the inadvisability of accepting the proposition

that "the British were good Christian men who recorded events and feelings~[and that]

their record therefore must be treated as honest and at face values" (cited in Barrier

1981:v), these data can be used to answer specific and limited questions, given the

exercise of prudence. Moreover, knowing various aspects of Gujar demography is

necessary because it was largely through the agency of these censuses and their

associated descriptive accounts that the Gujars interacted with the British. The nature

of this interaction in one area shaded the character of their relations in other areas. With

these various qualifications in mind, the British Indian census reports (and other

materials) provide the following information regarding Gujar demography.

^ The possibility of this occurring was recognized by the British themselves. They cautioned the readers that the high male to female sex ratio recorded for the Gujars might have been due to enumerators using (a male-dominated?) occupation as a proxy for caste (Census of India 1931, vol. 17, pt. 1:339). 6 0 Gujar Demography

As of 1931, the Gujar population of British India and its dependent states and principalities numbered 2.5 million (2,430,700).* The core of the population was

located in the northwest quadrant of the Indian subcontinent (see Figure 3). A

combination of topographic features and cultural discontinuities circumscribed the

boundaries of the population’s distribution within this region.* To its west, northwest,

and north the population abutted the subcontinental-facing slopes and upland valleys of

the "lesser" (Middle) Himalayas and the Sulyman ranges. Although outlying groups

existed as far west as central Afghanistan, these mountain ranges constituted a geographic

barrier against further expansion.® To the east, the core population extended to the

midpoint of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (Uttar Pradesh).’ Here, an iso

precipitation line demarcating the transition from plow to paddy cultivation (Cohn

1971:14; Sopher 1975) circumscribes the eastern extent of the Gujar population (Sopher

1975). The population’s southern border, which ran parallel to the northern border, was

broken by a geographic spur that extended peninsula-like on a belt of arable land located

* The provincial volumes of the 1931 Census of India consulted for the purpose of presenting an overview of Gujar demography are volumes 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 27.

* This and following discussions of the environment and ecology of north India are based on Dutt and Geib (1987) and Platt (1962).

® The actual geographic limits to which the Gujar population extends is uncertain. Most scholars agree that Gujars are found as far west as Afghanistan. Less widely accepted are the affinities of Gujars to Georgians (Goldman 1968).

’ Except where otherwise noted, the data presented in this chapter conform to the provincial and district borders as they stood in 1931. Where different, contemporary equivalents are provided in parentheses. 61

between the northern escarpment of the Deccan Plateau (to the east and south) and the

Great Indian (Thar) Desert (to the west).

Within this region, five provinces had a Gujar population of more than 100,000

as of 1931. These included the Punjab (696,442),* Rajputana agency (526,791), Jammu

and Kashmir State (402,781), the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (368,702), and the

North West Frontier Province (121,510). Populations of less substantial size were

located in the Central India agency (84,813), the Central Provinces and Berar (60,028),

and Ajmer-Merwara (35,063).®

In terms of relative percentages, Gujars constituted 11 percent (. 1105) of the

population of Jammu and Kashmir State, 5 percent (.0244) of the population in the

Punjab, and just over 2 percent (.0259) of the population of the North West Frontier

Province. Gujars constituted just over 2 percent (.0208) of the population in Rajputana,

while in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh they represented less than 1 percent

(.0076) of the population.

Among the districts included within the natal catchment area of the Islamabad

community, the major areas of Gujar settlement are found in a band that straddles the

border separating the greater Punjab from Jammu and Kashmir State (see Figure 3).*°

* Includes princely states and dependencies.

’ In 1931, 14,622 Gujars were counted in the Imperial Capital of Delhi. Given the unique political status of this town and its location at the border between the Punjab and the United Provinces, this population figure has not been included in either province.

The following discussion refers only to Hindu and Muslim Gujars. Not included in these calculations are the 3,353 Sikh and 10 Christian Gujars enumerated in the 1931 census. 6 2

In the Punjab, Gujrat was the district with the highest concentration of Gujars, with the

1931 census returning a population of 118,933." Other Punjabi districts of the area with substantial concentrations of Gujars included Hoshiapur (93,094), Gurdaspur

(58,830), Ambala (46,601), Gurgaon (37,572), Ludhiana (35,001), Kamal (31,255),

Rawalpindi (27,419), Jhelum (20,526), and Jullundur (19,660). As of 1931, fully 81%

(.8085) of the Punjab’s total population of Gujars were settled within ten of the provinces

29 districts. Of these, the six districts of Gujrat, Hoshiapur, Gurdaspur, Amballa,

Rawalpindi, and Jhelum alone accounted for 60% (.6043) of the Punjab’s total Gujar population.

In the North West Frontier Province, the highest concentration of Gujars was in

Hazara where 98,599 of the 121,510 Gujars enumerated in the province lived. With the exception of Ladakh and the northern frontier areas, they were distributed throughout the

kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir. However, they were heavily concentrated in those

districts located on the Punjab’s northern border.

The Ecological Context

The location of these districts situated the Gujars in relation to a set of

environmental variables that are significant for the influence they have had on

contemporary social constructions of the Gujar ethnic identities (see Figure 4). A brief

review of the geography of the area develops the background necessary for a more

" Population figures were gathered for the twenty-nine districts that constituted the Punjab as of 1931. 6 3

Province Borders PAKISTAN — International ® Sudej Poiwar Country Borders M ita (D Beas Da sen © R a v i p~] Desert ® Ctienab Mountains © Jh elu m © Indus / / Plateau

BANGLADESH

Arabian Sea

Indian Ocean

P\ SRI LA N KA

P lateau

Dès^ï

Pakistan Desalt

Karachi

flange

Arabian Sea

Satputa

Figure 4. Physical Features of the Islamabad Gujars’ Home Area. 64 sustained consideration of the ways in which historical developments within the area and

the subsequent movement of Gujar migrants from these areas to Islamabad helps in

defining and lending shape to contemporary expressions of Gujar ethnicity.

Within Jammu and Kashmir, and much of northern Pakistan, the ruggedness of

the terrain precludes open field cultivation. As a consequence terrace-farming of various

degrees of elaboration is widespread throughout the lower and mid-range valleys. This,

however, has never been an exceedingly productive subsistence strategy as the growing

season is short and the soil is rocky and nutrient deficient. As a consequence, buffalo

and goat-herding predominates, especially at higher elevations.

To the south of the Punjab/Jammu and Kashmir border, one encounters an

environment that ranges from verdant, occasionally sub tropical conditions to barren

dessert waste. Before the last decade of the nineteenth century, when numerous projects

to develop the Punjab’s soil and water resources were implemented, the environmental

variability of the Punjab could be geographically categorized into four distinct zones:

the Himalayan, the sub-Himalayan, the Indo-Gangetic, and the northwest dry area

(Punjab Census 1921, vol. 1:95).

Not surprisingly, major concentrations of population occurred in those areas

where the climate and the soils allowed for intensive agriculture: the sub-Himalayan zone

and the Indo-Gangetic plain. The belt of the sub-Himalayan zone combines features of

a desert environment with that of a monsoon seasonal rain pattern.'^ Sufficient rainfall

" Sialkot, the eight sub-Himalayan district of the Punjab, contained only 7,785 Gujars. 65 and fertile clay and loam soil have allowed for a traditional subsistence economy in

which rain-fed (barani) field cultivation predominates over settled and semi-nomadic

pastoralism. As one might surmise, this is not an invariant pattern. The relative location

of a village within the sub-Himalayan zone determines, in part, the extent to which field

cultivation predominates over pastoralism.

The primary source of irrigation water throughout the region is the summer

monsoons, with supplemental irrigation provided by tube-wells." Depending on

relative location, the monsoon season begins anywhere from late June to mid-July,

lasting, in some instances, until early September. During this period, up to 75% of the

region’s total precipitation may fall. A second rainy season in January and February is

equally critical as it provides supplemental irrigation for crops that were planted at the

end of the summer monsoon.

The monsoons are carried aloft by winds that originate in the Arabian Sea. After

making their way across the Indian plain they hit the geological wall of the Himalayan

mountains. The geography of the area causes them to veer sharply to the northwest as

they ascend the mountains. The lower dew point of the cool mountain air results in the

disgorging of humidity in the form of periodic torrential downpours.

The amount of air-borne humidity, the direction of the winds, and their ultimate

point of contact with the Himalayas, shifts widely from year to year. This makes

geographic location an important variable in determining the nature and extent of the

" In areas with sufficient rainfall, the agricultural year is divided into the rabi (summer) and kharif (winter) growing seasons. 66 monsoon’s impact on the local economy. The central districts of the greater Punjab

constitute the area where the southwest winds first strike the Himalayas. This results in

a fairly high risk of flooding if the monsoons are too heavily laden with moisture or

persist too long.

As the winds move along the mountains from south-east to north-west, the amount

of airborne moisture drops. When they finally reach the Punjab’s north-western districts,

they may bring little more than a few showers. Consequently, the western districts suffer

greatly from prolonged periods of drought.'^ The more optimal agricultural conditions

obtaining in the districts of the central zone have encouraged settlement since very early

times. The Ain-i-Akbari (Abu al-Fazl ibn Mubarak 1873-1894 [1596]) lists a large

number of revenue paying castes in this part of north India, including some Gujar

communities.

Moving south, one enters the Punjabi districts of the Indo-Gangetic plain. While

in the northern reaches of these districts farmers rely on the monsoons and winter rains

for their irrigation needs, these districts are overall much drier than their northern

counterparts. In districts such as Gurgaon, Ludhiana, Kamal, and Jullundur, however,

the relatively high water table allows for the widespread use of tube-wells. The

availability of year-round irrigation has allowed for double cropping for some time.

Kessinger (1974:119, Table 17), for example, reports that in the village he studied in

Jullundur District, 31% of the agricultural land was double cropped as early as 1848.

The commercialization of agricultural, the extension of credit, the introduction of the concept of private ownership, and the alienability of land as they effected the local economies are considered more fully in later chapters. 67 A zone of high aridity and desiccation-while periodically intruding into the

Punjab’s northern districts-is first encountered as an established feature of the

environment in the southern reaches of these central districts. It becomes more

pronounced as one moves toward the southwest, culminating eventually in a climax desert

formation. The expansive tract of desert that predominates in the southwest is broken

only by the rivers of the Punjab which flow through the region (the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi,

Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus)."

As Baden-Powell (1892, vol. 2:534-537) observed some 100 years ago, it is

nearly a misnomer to refer to these flowing bodies of water as "rivers." The doabs

(interfluvial uplands) that separate the rivers are relatively flat and the rate of increase

in elevation is barely perceptible. As these rivers flow from the Himalayas, they deposit

silt, causing the river bottoms to rise constantly. As a consequence of the flatness of the

surrounding topography, and the dynamics of river deposition, there is a tendency for the

rivers to overflow their "banks" and cut new channels. This is especially so during the

summer monsoons when the rivers swell to uncontrollable proportions.

The relationship of land, water, and climate in the southwest, provided a limited

subsistence base for human habitation. While opportunistic farming, supplemented with

semi-pastoral nomadism was possible, the harshness of the climate, the irregularity and

unpredictability of flooding, and the level of technological development seems to have

" The "Punjab" literally means land of five (Punj) rivers (ab). These are the Sutlej, Beas, Chenab, Ravi and Jhelum. By this definition the Indus is not technically a part of the Punjab. However, it is included here as it has been historically administered as part of the Punjab. 68 restrained population growth, the accumulation of land, and the acquisition of material and landed wealth. As a consequence, most of the indigenous inhabitants were clustered in small hamlets along the riverain tracts of the Punjab’s five rivers (Darling 1947:61).

The Historical Context

Environmental variations are alone insufficient to explain the pattern of population distribution among the Gujars. For example, the 7,785 Gujars enumerated in Sialkot in

1931 represented just one percent (.0100) of the district’s population of 778,048 people.

Thus, while Sialkot was the eighth most populous district in the province, it ranked 18th relative to the Punjab’s Gujar population. The reason for the disparity between these two rankings remains to be determined. It is known, however, that Babur (1493-1530), founder of the Mughal empire, considered them something of a menace. As he expanded his empire deep into the Indian subcontinent, his lines of communication to his homeland in Afghanistan became increasingly vulnerable to attack. District Sialkot was particularly troublesome in this regard as it brought the Grand Trunk Road precariously close to the hills where Gujars and Jats "always poured down in countless hordes . . . for loot in bullock and buffalo" (Beveridge 1979 [1922]:454). In retribution for their depredations,

Babur "had the silly thieves sought for, and ordered two or three of them cut to pieces"

(Beveridge 1979 [1922]:454). Although the Bübur-Nama is silent on further actions

taken against the Gujars, it is conceivable, given their low numbers, that they were at

some point expelled from the district.

Babur’s actions against the Gujars may have established a precedent for later

adventurers. The names of the neighboring districts of Gujrat and Gujranwala, for 69 instance, clearly testify to the traditional importance of Gujars within this area of the

Punjab. This contrasts, however, with the disparity in population size between the respective Gujar populations of each district. While the 1931 census returned a population of just 3,385 Gujars for district Gujranwala, it recorded 118,933 Gujars in neighboring Gujrat. The small Gujar population in Gujranwala is again an historical consequence of the forced expulsion of Gujars from the district in the 18th century (M.

F. O’Dwyer, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the district in 1895, cited in the

Punjab District Gazetteer of 1935 [Punjab District Gazetteer 1936, District XXIV-A: 1]).

Both of the above examples underline the importance of historical factors in

determining certain features of Gujar demography in the Punjab. The canal irrigation

schemes initiated by the British constitute still another example of the ways in which

history interacts with ecology in delimiting the historical demography of the Punjab. In

many respects, the movement of population that occurred as a result of the opening of

new lands and the forms of society that resulted from it, established a socio-cultural field

that continues to comprise an important component of the context of contemporary Gujar

ethnicity in Islamabad. The pervasive nature of this impact, and the importance of it to

understanding the ways in which Gujar ethnic identities resonate to and are structured by

history, deserves a separate analytical treatment. For that reason, details of the

relationship of the Gujars to the British and the British Indian empire are considered

more fully in Chapter 6. 70 Language and Gi^ar Social Demography

The relationship of language to the delineation of group boundaries and the definition of group identity is a fascinating aspect of the study of ethnicity and ethnic identity. A wide range of intermediary variables including the nature of the political context, the development and elaboration of networks of communication, the geographic dispersal of groups, and so forth profoundly influence the ways in which language serves to demarcate social boundaries and inform ethnic group identities. Among geographically dispersed populations whose distribution may cross a number of distinct linguistic zones, the question of determining ethnic group boundaries is itself problematic, thus making the relationship of language to the ethnic group even more complex. Such is the case for the Gujars of North India.

A family of related languages known as Indo-Aryan are distributed across the upper half of the Indian peninsula (Masica 1991). More widely recognized language family members include Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali,

Nepalese, and Assamese. A number of lesser-known languages, spoken in communities that number from a few hundred to the millions and tens of millions (Masica 1991), include Siraiki, Hindko, Shina, Awadi, Kangri, and so forth. The extent of overlap, borrowing, and intermingling of various languages is so extensive that it is possible to argue that two, three, or even more languages are indigenous to a specific region.

Language use among the Gujars of Islamabad reflects the complexity of language distribution in North India. Community members are frequently capable of speaking two or more languages, one used at home, and another spoken in school, at the job, in the 71 marketplace, or among government officials and army personnel. As it is with the nation as a whole, the linguistic diversity among Gujars is in part linked to the differences in regional origin. For example, Punjabi, Urdu, and Siraiki are more frequently spoken by

Punjabi Gujars, while those Gujars from the North-West Frontier Province are more likely to speak Pashto or Hindko. Moreover, with an admittedly wide range of skill and ability, there are many Gujars who speak introduced languages such as Farsi, Arabic, and English.

The extent of such linguistic diversity poses an obvious dilemma for the community and its leaders. Such diversity makes it difficult to achieve a consensus as to what constitutes the Gujars’ native tongue. But this does not deter those seeking advantage and position to attempt to convince the group of the verisimilitude of a particular accounting of the history of the Gujar language. Not surprisingly, attempts to

achieve such an objective is a source of a fair measure of competition and discord within

the community. The study of these efforts thus provides valuable insights into the

internal political dynamics and social organization of the Gujar community.

Some community members argue that the Gujars had once spoken their own

unique language. Known as Gujuri (or Gojari), it is asserted by some to have been the

lingua franca of the Guijara empire: An imperial power that it is reputed ruled over

much of north India during the late classical and early medieval periods. The language

is heard now in villages and hamlets scattered about Himalayan India and Pakistan.

Most community members accept as fact the existence of the Guijara empire, and

that of descent from it. However, the community is divided over the history of the 72 Gujars’ ascent to power. Many accept Cunningham’s (1871, cited in Ibbetson 1916

[1883]: 182) account that identified "the Gujars with the Kuhan or Yuchi or Tochari, a

tribe of Eastern Tartars" which moved into the subcontinent about one century B.C.

Others agree with Smith (1924:303), who set the Gujar’s date of arrival at the fifth

century A.D., and traced their origin to the White Huns.

There are an equally large number of community members who concur with those

scholars who assign the Gujars an indigenous origin (e.g., Chohan personal

communication, 1986; Tod cited in Elliot 1869, vol. 1:180; Manku 1986:1-11; Puri

1986; Vaidya 1979 [1924]).“ According to Chohan (personal communication),

contemporary Gujars descend from a pre-Aryan jati of north India. Vaidya (1979

[1924]), on the other hand, has set the Gujars’ place of origin at Mount Abu, Rajasthan,

and assigns them a Rajput ancestry.

The various positions taken in this debate hinge on the different explanations

offered for the geographic distribution of Gujuri and Mewati. In his monumental

Linguistic Survey of India, the British linguist George A. Grierson (1968 [1916], vol.

9:925) classified Mewati and Gujuri as closely related "familial" languages. However,

he identified Mewati as a Rajasthani dialect spoken by the Meos of Alwar in north

central India and Gujuri as the language of the Gujars who live in the "hills north of the

[pre-partition] Punjab.""

“ "Indigenous" in this sense means a reputed Aryan origin.

" The Gujars of Islamabad, although they were unable to produce anyone within the community who spoke Gujuri, nonetheless assert that Gujuri is their native language. 73 The various protagonists in the debate on Gujar origins find much of value in the idea that Mewati and Gujuri have developed from a shared common language. The

respective explanations they offer for the anomalous geographic distribution of these

cognate languages, however, differ radically. To those arguing for a foreign origin, the

Gujuri-speaking populations of the Himalayas are remnants of a central Asian population

that swept into north India during the first millennium. For those arguing for an

indigenous (read Aryan) origin, the isolated pockets of Gujuri-speaking peoples represent

the relics of the far flung and highly successful (if short lived) medieval Guijara

kingdom, which ruled most of north west India from its capital located at Bhimâl or

Srînâl, Rajputâna (Smith 1924; 340; Manku 1986:1-11).**

Rose (1919:39), basing his argument on the existence of the Guijara empire,

attributes the presence of Gujars in the Punjab to the administrative needs of the empire:

It appears that the Rajput-Gujars and the Gujar settlements of modem Punjab may owe their origin to administrative or military colonization of the Punjab and its eastern hills by the great Gujar empire whose rulers found the Punjab difficult to hold and had constantly to enfief Rajput or Gujar condottieri with allodial fiefs held on conditions of military service.

These accounts of medieval Gujar history are highly speculative and based largely

on conjecture and unsubstantiated facts. This is especially so for the linguistic etymology

said to link contemporary Gujars to the Mewati-speaking Guijara kingdom. The role of

the empire-building Guijaras in the medieval history of north-central India was unknown

until the late 1800s, when the "prominent position occupied by Guijara kingdoms" (Smith

'* The historic legacy of this empire is presumptively registered in the names of the various towns, districts, and provinces of northwestern India and Pakistan founded by the Guijara rulers (e.g., Gujarat, Gujarkhan, Gujranwala, Gujrat). 74 1924 [1908]:427) was first uncovered. A preliminary review of the literature suggests that until this "discovery," there were no traditions, written, oral or otherwise, among the Gujars to suggest the existence of this medieval kingdom and of the contemporary

Gujars’ link to it. Whether or not the connection of the Gujars to the Guijara kingdom can withstand close scrutiny is not, however, the point. What is significant for the purposes of this dissertation are the ways in which the Gujars use this history to substantiate contemporary political claims, define their ethnic essence, and give meaning to their individual and collective lives.

It is little surprise that those community members most supportive of the theory of the Gujars’ foreign origin hail from districts located in northern Pakistan, while those who support the theory of indigenous origin are from districts in the eastern Punjab.

However, the relationship of language to ethnic group boundaries is more complex than is suggested by this rather straightforward correlation.

Gujar accounts of their history project onto the past a trajectory of events that serves to validate and legitimate claims to ethnic distinctiveness. At the same time, these accounts provide the underpinnings to diverse contemporary interpretations of Gujar ethnicity. The process of recreating (or rereading) the past in reference to the present is an ongoing process apparent in the histories offered by Gujars. All Gujars are members of what is claimed to be a corporate social group. Yet, the accounts of Gujar history that I collected in the field challenge the validity of this claim, suggesting, instead, that the Gujars’ ethnic histories are constructed from an assemblage of ethnic motifs. The historical accounts constructed from these materials not infrequently 75 contradict each other as to events, chronology, and interpretation of fact. They do, nonetheless, resonate to varying degrees to the shared experiences and understandings that link a storyteller to his or her audience.

Comparing these histories reveals the diversity of these accounts, while simultaneously highlighting some of the themes which underlie their appeal and popularity within specific sectors of the population. The most important of these themes is the idea that the Gujars had once been an imperial power who had lost their empire due to the invasions of foreign powers. In one account it had been Alexander the Great, in another it was the Mughals, while in still another it is the British who are the villains of the story. It is significant to note in regards to these various accounts that all three histories attribute the Gujars current low status to the loss of empire and the ensuing need of colonial powers to "keep the Gujars down."

Another aspect of these historical accounts involves the identification of the

Gujars’ point of origin. In the accounts of the foreign origin, the Gujars are believed to

have moved into the subcontinent from Asia minor. In this respect, the Gujars legitimate

claims to higher status by linking their history to the myth of an Aryan origin.

Moreover, these regional histories of indigenous origin, while embellishing the idea that

the Gujars have an indomitable martial spirit, state that the pristine expression of these

qualities were historically located at or near the regional home of a storyteller. While

it was seldom stated explicitly, the implication is clear that the expression of these

qualities decrease in relation to the distance from the point of "cultural climax," to

borrow a term from the American Historical school of Anthropology. This was apparent 76 in the disclaimers I received when I mentioned to narrators that I had heard accounts of

Gujar history that were at variance with those they had told me. Although alternate readings of Gujar history were acknowledged to exist, most of these contending accounts were dismissed out of hand by assertions that other storytellers "were not Gujars," or had not researched the subject thoroughly.

While these stories are set in a distant past, they allow the Gujars to link themselves to and strategically locate themselves within a contemporary multi-ethnic nation. This is especially so in regards to their currently low status which they argue is a consequence of their loss of empire. To summarize their current socio-economic state, the Gujars frequently refer to themselves as "poor." As used in the urban context of

Islamabad, this polysémie trope is amenable to many different interpretations. In effect

the use of this term makes three overlapping, yet contradictory claims. First, it asserts

the obvious that the Gujars are poor in relation to other biraderis. In this, it voices the

perception that "pastoral nomadism is a degradation" (Leshnik 1975:XIII). Second, as

Pakistan is a "poor" country, the use of this term asserts in a very real sense that the

Gujars are among the poorest of the poor. The use of the term "poor" in the latter sense

demands further elaboration as it is only within the context of usage provided by the

modem capital city of Islamabad that one can fully grasp the third meaning inherent to

the use of the term "poor."

It is a widespread practice of city residents to attribute all manner of social

inequities to fact that "Pakistan is a poor country." This sentiment is articulated by the

elite and western-educated of the city, as frequently as it is heard among the lower strata 77 of society. I was struck by the fact that while this conceptualization represented the conception of a class and perhaps Marxist-inspired model of international economic relations it did not square entirely with my understanding of the various dependency theories. While it is understandable that the underprivileged of Pakistan would consider themselves poor, the articulation of the same sentiment by the stratum that Frank (1967,

1969) has labelled the lumpen-bourgeoisie came as something of a surprise, given that the latter's loyalties are suppose to lie with social classes that exist outside the country.

While not expecting the elite to demonstrate open disdain for the poor, 1 did anticipate the "eery silence" (Chapman, McDonald, and Tonkin 1989:18) that Marxists-leaning

scholars associate with politically dominant groups.

The use of the term poor, however, serves a quite different political effect in that

it creates and sustains a basis of shared identification which reduces the social distance

separating the rich from the poor. In other words, by using this term Pakistanis assert

in a sense that they are all in the same boat. It is in this sense that the third implication

of the term "poor" becomes clear. If all Pakistanis are "poor," regardless of their class

differences, then the Gujars have a legitimate right not only to seek redress and to benefit

from various forms of positive discrimination, but also to participate and participate fully

in governing the country.

Of course this sentiment can be reconciled with a Marxist model by invoking the

concept of "false consciousness." One may also attribute it to the perceived economic

gulf that separated me from Pakistanis. Whatever the case may be, the appeal to a

common class identity, on the one hand, and to the Gujars’ right to be its preeminent 78 representatives, on the other hand, is real and has consequences for the ways in which their ethnic identities are constructed and presented.

In this regard, the idea that Gujuri is the community’s primordial language aesthetically resonates to contemporary beliefs relating to Pakistan’s national culture. A widespread belief has it that the country’s northern districts are particularly productive of Pakistan’s religious functionaries, leaders, and thinkers. Locating the Gujuri-speaking

Gujars within this region performs a series of discursive operations. First, it supports the contention that the Gujars are exceptionally pious and devout and because of this are the ideal candidates to oversee the moral regeneration of the country. As it does so, however, this origin myth denotes Gujars from the northern districts as those most appropriate to assume the mantle of leadership should it fall on the larger Gujar

community. But even subtle distinctions such as this, do not begin to capture the full

range of issues to which the Gujars’ ethnic identities speaks.

A large part of the ideological context in which the Gujars function in Islamabad

is informed by the tentative nature of Paldstan’s claim to be a modem nation-state. As

anyone who has followed the recent history of Pakistan well knows, defining the

country’s national language has been an exceedingly difficult and illusive goal. While

the country’s national leaders seek to achieve some form of national unity, such efforts

are continually thwarted by the fact that Pakistan’s ’’national language,” Urdu, is the first

language of slightly less than 8 percent (.076) of the country’s households.’’ More

” Language data collected by the 1981 census was restricted to a question on the main language spoken in each "household" enumerated. As household sizes vary by widely due to a number of variables (rural/urban location, ethnic background, age of family heads and 79 significant is that of the small number of Urdu-speaking households, 55 percent (.5517) are located in the just three cities (Karachi, Hyderabad, and Islamabad).

It is Punjabi, at 48 percent (.482), rather than Urdu, that is the most widely spoken household language in the country. However, Punjabi is seen by many outside the province to be the native tongue of a ruling elite who have overseen the suppression of provincial rights. Furthermore, even within the Punjab little support exists for Punjabi to be denoted as the national language; Urdu is preferred as the medium of literature and high culture (Masica 1991:2). Given its political liabilities, and the fact that it does not have its own well-developed literary tradition, it is inconceivable that Punjabi will ever be proposed as the country’s national language.

These conditions complicate the problem of selecting a national language either

as a medium of instruction or for use in government affairs. Efforts to resolve this issue

in favor of one language or another have frequently been met with protest and rioting.

The choice of Urdu as the national language, for example, led to an outbreak of protest

and violence in East Pakistan in 1953 (Sayeed 1980:39-53). Although the issue was

finally resolved in favor of East Pakistan’s demand that Bengali be granted a status equal

to that of Urdu, the tensions generated by this issue remained a longstanding irritant in

the relations between East and West Pakistan. Similarly, language riots that took place

in Sindh during the 1972 population count resulted in the complete omission of linguistic

data from the 1972 census (Addelton 1986:56). Consequently, considerations of the

so forth) the comparison of different segments of population is precluded (Population Census Organization of Pakistan 1983). 80 impact of government policies as they relate to issues of language use have laid just beneath surface of many government actions.

In part, it is because of the irresolvable nature of this issue, that efforts to have one’s particular interpretation of the history of Gujari accepted by the wider community

seem destined to fail. The assertion that the Gujars speak a language distinct from Urdu

(or Punjabi) combine with their allusions to national leadership to produce a politically

volatile mixture. An assertion to this effect would be seen as a dangerous expression of

ethnic particularism, tantamount to sedition. The Gujars are well aware of the fact that

the government would respond, and respond forcibly if necessary to the open advocacy

of any such position. To avoid this possibility the Gujars use a fair measure of

circumspection (and good deal of justifiable caution) in disseminating their views of the

group’s history and of its relationship to the nation-state of Pakistan. Consequently, as

it is with much of the ethnic activities in which they are engaged, the Gujars’ support for

a particular historical account-no matter how intrinsically appealing it might be-is

constrained by the considerations of the embracing political context of Islamabad.

Social Sites of Subsistence and Economy

Village society in the core area of the Gujars’ regional population is characterized by

subsistence economies that incorporate to varying degrees of dominance pastoral

transhumance, opportunistic cultivation, settled agriculture, and semi-pastoralism

nomadism. This section reviews the contribution these various subsistence strategies 81

make to contemporary definitions of Gujar ethnicity and ethnic identity. In order to do

so subsistence patterns are examined from a regional perspective.

Occupational Geography

Economic lifestyle is an important classificatory criterion for categorizing various

communities of north India. At the level of the economic system it is analytically

possible to distinguish those communities whose economies are based on agricultural

subsistence from those which engage in various forms of pastoralism. At lower levels,

it is possible to make finer distinctions, differentiating, for example, between herders

and shepherds, or between those who cultivate the land and those whose own it.

It is also possible to differentiate economic lifestyles according to their geographic

aspects, although the results are often something less than concise. For example, in spite

of a large measure of geographic overlap between herding and shepherding, buffalo-

herding is far more prevalent on the Indo-Gangetic Plain of North India than it is in the

Himalayan highlands (Sopher 1975). In large part it is coterminous to the zone of plow

agriculture that stretches across much of the north Indian plain. The clinal distribution

of animal usage by type appears to be determined by the relative economic potential of

each type of animal under different environmental conditions and limitations.

As it name implies, water buffalo must be kept fairly close to wading pools,

especially on the plains.^ During the summer months the availability of water is

critical as cows are prone to rapid dehydration if they are not driven to a stream or pond

In the Punjabi village she studied, Eglar (1960:58) reports that "once a day cattle are taken to the pond to drink and to wade." 82 to wallow in the cooling waters. Doing so not only dissipates body heat, but if wading does not occur regularly, milk output is liable to drop appreciably. The cooler temperatures of winter months decrease the rate of loss of critical bodily fluids. This provides herders with a measure of mobility in managing their animal livestock that is not otherwise available during the hotter months of late spring and summer. Among highland communities, many families avail themselves of the opportunity to allow their buffalo free-range on whatever grasses they might find. On the plains, winter’s lower

temperatures allow families to drive their herds much greater distances, thereby relieving

pressure on local resources.

Water is a far less critical variable in the management of sheep and goat as both

require less of it. The combination of their agility and nimbleness, and the relatively

minimal need for water, allows shepherds to drive flocks great distances in search of

pasturage, even to the arid highland pastures where they live during the summer months.

But pastoralism among the Gujars, is often complemented by reliance on

opportunistic and petite cultivation. The considerations of importance in determining the

extent of contribution each subsistence strategy makes to the family economy include the

quality, distance, and relative availability of pasturage; the age, health, number and types

of animals a family owns; the relative availability of water; traditional patterns of land

tenure; access to land; the quality of the soil and so forth.

As is the case in many areas of the world, the pastoral transhumant Gujars

frequently engage in opportunistic cultivation, sowing crops along their migratory routes

or at their summer encampments (Barth 1981a). In some instances, the Gujars combine 83 pastoral transhumance with settled petite cultivation on land that is of marginal economic value (see Barth 1981a). This practice encourages a division of labor in which older boys and young men tend the flocks, while women and mature men remain home to cook, nuse the children, farm, and participate in the political and social life of the community (Barth 1981a).

The inability of petite agriculture to provide for all of a family’s dietary and material needs leads many individuals to supplement their income by becoming tenants,

sharecroppers, field laborers, or settled pastoralists. In these cases, milch cows may be

stall fed, pastured on non-cultivable waste lands, or on recently harvested fields. The

milk produced by the cows is either sold directly to villagers or marketed in local

bazaars.

Among village communities located on the Indian plain, field cultivation is

widespread even among the Gujars (see, e.g., Raheja 1988). This, however, is the

exception rather than the rule. More widespread is the pattern in which Gujar

communities combine to varying degrees of elaboration settled and nomadic pastoralism,

opportunistic cultivation, tenancy cultivation, and small-scale proprietary cultivation (see

Darling 1947: 62; Manku 1986; Misra 1959:20; Sopher 1975; Stokes 1978).

Economic Organization

The economic organization of North Indian villages, in which a number of

occupationally distinct groups were brought into economic interdependence, is a widely 8 4 known, rather distinctive feature of South Asian society.^’ Referred to in the Punjab by the local term, "seypidaii," this system is a regional variant of the more widely known jajmani system first discussed by Wiser in 1936 (1988). Studies of mixed and

Muslim communities (e.g., Ahmad 1978; Ahmad 1977; Alavi, 1971,1976; Ansari 1960;

Aschenbrenner 1967; Eglar 1960; Misra 1964; Ullah 1958; Waldl 1972) suggest that in broad outline the seypidari system is a functional equivalent of the more widely known

Hindu jajmani system.

At the apex of the social ladder are the village landowners: A category which

includes among its numbers a range of different types of property-owners, from small

owner-cultivators, through family representatives of locally dominant biraderis, to large

absentee landlords. Beneath the "propertied" class, are various types of tenant

cultivators. Some enjoy hereditary occupancy rights while others work the land largely

on sufferance of the landowners or their estate managers. Tied to these cultivating

tenants were various artisan and service groups known as the kammis. Included within

this category were the nai (barbers), dhobi (washers), chamars (leather workers) and

other such village specialists. While the kammis were responsible for producing and

maintaining household and farm implements, performing various services such as

collecting refuse, sweeping streets, cutting hair and otherwise providing for the daily

I use the past tense to describe this system of economic relationships, as it is not clear to what extent it still obtains in rural areas. My informants had little knowledge of its existence. However, this may be due to a lack of historical experience with it as much as it is to the monetarization of rural economies. 85 needs of the village, they also served as source of extra labor during the critical planting and harvesting seasons.

As few villages were able to sustain a sufficient and sufficiently diverse labor force to meet all its material needs seypidari ties ramified to villages throughout the local area and beyond (see Kessinger 1974:26; Srinivas and Shah 1960). This was so in those cases where the demand for a particular service or product was light but steady, say in

the case of genealogists. In such cases, a family located in one village would provide

services to a number of villages throughout the local area. Conversely, those families

engaged in piece-work or who provided services on a one-time basis were paid in kind

at the end of the day or on the successful completion of the agreed upon task (Ahmad

1977:62-69). In addition to these traditional arrangements, families also bartered goods

and services at local bazaars or with itinerant merchants, artisans, and so forth.

A broad range of debts, credits, and rights situated these socially distinct groups

within a highly stratified system of socio-economic relations. In consideration of the

various services they performed throughout the year, the kammis received from their

seypi patrons a portion of the harvest "commensurate" with the services they rendered

(Ahmad 1978; Ahmad 1977; Alavi, 1971; Ansari 1960; Eglar 1960; Ullah 1958; Waldl

1972).

The extent to which the harvest was apportioned "commensurately" has been

widely debated in the literature (Alavi 1971; Ahmad 1977; Gough 1977).^ Suffice it

^ Raheja (1988:24-31) provides a succinct review of the debate, as well as contributing her own convincing reinterpretation of the issues involved. 8 6

to say here, the ethnographic evidence suggests that the extent to which the seypidari

system was exploitative varied in relation to differences obtaining in the land to

population ratio. Saghir Ahmad (1977:58), for example, has noted that when the canal

colony of Sahiwal was settled in 1865 "land was unlimited and the landlords ‘begged’ the

tenants to cultivate as much as they could.

By the 1960s, the reversal of the population to land ratio in Sahiwal provided

village landlords with a much greater measure of control over their cultivating tenants.

The extent of political dominance this provided the absentee landlords of the village was

symbolized by the success they enjoyed in forcing their tenant cultivators (through,

among other means, the threat of eviction) to assist them in circumventing the intent of

the Government of Pakistan Land Reforms Act of 1959 (Ahmad 1977:37).

Gujar Pastoralism in an Agrarian Context

Seypidari ties are frequently extended to pastoralist groups such as the Gujars.

The strength and extent of these economic ties again vary widely. The nature of Gujar

integration into local village economies is mediated by the type and extent of the

particular subsistence practices possible under different sets of cultural-ecological

conditions.

The pattern of the Gujars’ annual migrations is among the more important

variables determining the extent to which seypidari ties served to integrate Gujar

pastoralist into village economies. For example, Kashmiri Gujars shepherd their flocks

^ These demographic conditions were once widespread throughout South Asia (Srinivas 1987:33). 87 of sheep and goat approximately 200 kms from their summer pastures north of the Pir

Panjal range to their winter encampments on the Punjab plains. Along the way, they remain apart from the villages through which they pass, camping along the side of the road at some distance from nearby towns. They prefer to sell their milk, meat, and wool to urban brokers rather than village merchants. This is an extreme example of the extent to which Gujars exercised some independence from village social life and economy.

More frequently are those instances where pastoral transhumants were loosely integrated into villages located within a specified migratory home range.

Settled pastoralism, however, seems to promote greater levels of symbiosis between villager and pastoralist (Palmieri 1982). Bovines are important village assets as they provide leather (historically useful in the production of various farm and household implements), milk, meat, ghee (clarified butter used as cooking oil), and manure (as both fertilizer and fuel source). But even here, pastoralism keeps the Gujars somewhat apart from the village life. Kessinger (1974:58), for example, notes that the

Gujars of Vilyatpur settlement (district Jullundur, Indian Punjab) were mainly concerned with settled pastoralism and "relied on the Sahotas (the locally dominant caste group) for the opportunity to do casual labor during peak seasons." 8 8 Seypidari at the Village Level

The economic ties at the center of the seypidari system linked the family representatives of caste/biraderi groups rather than single individuals (Eglar 1960:35;

Kessinger 1974:75). This has given many observers the false impression that villages endure relatively unchanged over many generations. As Eglar (1960:4) notes for her village, change over the past two centuries has been "little noticed at the village level."

The element of continuity and stability this conferred on society led many observers to concentrate on the stability and essentially unchanging character of village India.

Kessinger's (1974) study of Vilyatpur, a village in the Punjabi district of

Jullundur, cautions one against accepting such assertions too readily. Using a combination of anthropological and historical methods and techniques, he has demonstrated fairly convincingly that the history of Vilyatpur has been one of constant change at least since 1848 when the province came under British control. The records

Kessinger (1974:42) consulted indicated that

In most cases a number of different gots [clans] appear for each caste, indicating that the discontinuity in Vilyatpur was real, and not an artifact of the pilgrimage and records system. Apparently the nonlanded found it possible or necessary, or both to migrate with considerable frequency in the politically fluid conditions of eighteenth and nineteenth century Punjab.

Explorations of the biases inherent to the British censuses, by focussing on

"village communities," in a certain sense revivify the focal interest of British rule in the

subcontinent. The concentrated attention given "village India" is somewhat unfortunate

as it tends to draw attention away from areas of investigation where study might reveal

significant sources of cultural change. This is especially so in the case of nomadic 89 groups where "there is a general deficiency of studies" (Leshnik 1975: X-XI).“ The historic depth of the Kashmiri Gujars’ preference for dealing with urban brokers underlines the importance of recognizing the extent to which "tradition" may be a product of relatively recent socio-economic transformations.

Statements taken from informants indicate that the Gujars of Azad Kashmir

traditionally bartered wool and other animal products in local bazaars with village

merchants. In this they were incorporated into the locally-based seypidari economic

systems of redistribution. Their current economic practices of dealing with brokers

located in Pakistan’s major cities has broken these traditional economic ties. They

attribute this change to the road-building program sponsored by the Pakistan Army Corps

of Engineers. Intended as strategy by which to strengthen Pakistan’s defenses along its

volatile frontier with India, this program has opened up new economic opportunities for

Kashmiri Gujars.

Engineers built roads along lines that followed the paths traditionally used by the

Gujars in their semi-annual treks between winter and summer pastures. The building of

roads along these routes eliminated many of the logistic problems that previously limited

flock size to that which was manageable on small mountain paths. As a consequence,

families have been able to increase flock size dramatically. This increase, in turn, has

drawn many Gujars into contractual relations with urban wool merchants, who now visit

the Gujars at the sites of their winter encampments. Although Gujars believe that the

^ This contrasts with a long history of scholarly interest in village India that stretches back to Maine, Marx, Metcalfe, and Munro. 90 actual rate they receive for their wool is low, they are equally convinced that they get

a better return for their efforts from urban merchants who are often willing to buy in

large quantity.

Sites of Integration as Sources of Ethnic Stereotyping

Throughout much of their recent history the Gujars have been subjected to prejudice and

outright discrimination. The 1931 Census of the Punjab, for example, noted the low

rates of literacy among Gujars relative to other groups, and a low number of Gujars

serving on various legislative bodies (Census of India 1931, vol. 17, pt. 1:338).

Significantly, it did not suggest any measures to rectify these imbalances. Similar

disparities are also evident in the pattern of landholding among the Gujars (see, e.g.,

Kessinger 1974:30, Table II; Misra 1959:20). A review of the ethnic backgrounds of

successful candidates in recent elections in Pakistan (1970, 1977), show little

improvement in the number of Gujars elected to national office in Pakistan (Robert

Wirsing, unpublished study cited with permission of the author).^ Across the

international border, conditions seem to show equally small levels of improvement

(Hasan 1986).

“ Data on ethnic subgroup identity were collected for the 1970 and 1977 elections to the National Assembly. In the 1970 elections data were collected for 106 of 138 MNAs (i.e., 76.8%) of the total group). Of the 106 on whom data were collected, 4 (i.e., 1774%) were Gujars. All four were ethnic Punjabis. In the 1977 elections, data were collected for 125 of the 200 MNAs elected to the National Assembly. Of the 125, on whom data were collected, 4 (3.2%) were Gujars. All four were ethnic Punjabis. 9 1

The discrimination against the Gujar is ideologically supported by a number of

defamatory stereotypes. Echoing a theme articulated in Babur’s memoirs (see above),

the Gujars are believed to be lawless, morally lax, and recalcitrant. Men are believed

to be lazy and given to thievery, while women are seen to be willing to engage in "all

manner of depravity. It is not uncommon for families to complain that Gujars dilute

the milk they sell (often with polluted water), steal cattle, and engage regularly in

prostitution, theft, and various other illicit and sordid activities.”

The image of the lawless Gujar is a widespread and deeply entrenched cultural

motif. It was articulated repeatedly in conversations I had with my non-Gujar friends,

colleagues, and acquaintances. I was frequently queried as to why I chose to study the

Gujars. They were, as I was informed, a people of minimal political consequence who

"stole for a living" or just "sold milk." After all, they did "work with their hands

making goobers (dung patties)." Such stereotypes have also spread into the local

folklore. One proverb narrated to me by both Gujars and non-Gujars captures the

essence of this perception.

Dog and Cat are two, Rangar^* and Gujar are two.

The assertion that the Gujars are cattle thieves may not be unique to this group. This image instead may reflect a cultural trait common to all mobile herders. Michael Meeker (1979) working among camel-herding Bedouins, has argued that the successful theft of adult cattle is economically advantageous because a small investment of time and energy results in an immediate and substantial return.

” While one may question the assertion of a unified Gujar kingdom in medieval India upon which their claim to a preeminent political position rests (see pp. 70-80), my field experiences in Islamabad would support the Gujars’ self-ascribed moral attributes.

A Rajput sub-caste. 9 2

If these four are not near, Open your doors and sleep in safety.”

Through the agency of the metonymic devices embedded in such proverbs, the Gujars

are rendered socially reprehensible, no better than a dog or a cat, animals known

throughout South Asia for their feral nature.

I will discuss in a later chapter ( Chapter 4) the ways in which these ethnic

stereotypes serve, in some sense, as the stuff from which the symbolic context of

Islamabad is constructed. Here, however, I will continue with a discussion of the ways

in which these seemingly defamatory stereotypes echo an underlying yearning that

Paldstanis themselves have to live in a state of existence that is free of the rules and

expectations of human society as they know it.

Field pastoralism requires a division of labor that is quite distinct from that of

agricultural cultivators. Gujars spend a great deal of time at some distance outside the

village walls, collecting fodder, pasturing their animals, or driving them to water

(Palmieri 1982). Doing so seems to have two related effects on village perceptions of

the Gujars. On the one hand, it increases social distances between pastoralist and

cultivators while, on the other hand, it allows nomadic pastoralists the freedom to escape

from the web of social expectations and obligations that enmesh, support, and comprise

so much of village life.^®

2 9 For variants of this and other proverb see Ibbetson (1916:183-185).

^ Aloofness, social detachment, and so forth are social characteristic that are often associated with the Gujars both by themselves and other Pakistanis. 93 The relative social autonomy Gujars enjoy, however, is not come without its associated costs. As most scholars agree, the culture of North India is pervaded by an underlying ideology that exalts the values of friendship, brotherhood, and sociability.

Through the agency of this ideology, the economic basis of social life are rendered of secondary importance to the social ties that link individuals, groups, and social classes.

This is especially so in the case of the long term seypidari relationships of village life.

Here, the economic underpinnings of patron/client ties are rendered "social" by defining as "gifts" the various and innumerable services and goods transferred between parties

(see Eglar 1960; for a similar observation in India see Raheja 1988).

In contrast, nomadism is inextricably bound to a geographically mobile lifestyle.

As a consequence, the ties that link pastoralists to sedentary agriculturalist are defined

as "economic." The foregrounding of the exchange basis of village/pastoralist

relationships has the effect of rendering as pretense and false the idiom of sociability that

pervades and surrounds village life. The removal of this central, reigning idiom infuses

social relationships with uncertainty, anxiety, and suspicion. I contend that it is the

uncertainties associated with these types of relationship that inform Gujar stereotyping.

The idea that Gujars’ are scoundrel reflects the suspicions and anxieties that villagers

have towards those parties with whom they must necessarily interact but with whom they

do not share formal social ties. Conversely, it is the very nature of these relationships

that constitutes the basis of the idealization of a people who exist outside the constraints 94 of village society. In other words, pastoral independence evokes desires villagers

themselves have to evade the burdensome, yet inesc£q)able demands of village life.^‘

The conflicting feelings that these relationships invoke are perhaps best reflected

in the ethnic stereotyping of Gujar women. Perceived as sexually immoral, Gujar

women constitute an object of fascination, fantasy, and desire among Pakistani males.

Gujars are believed to have a vast storehouse of sexual knowledge and to be endowed

with immense sexual appetites and prowess.^^ More than once it was suggested that I

travel to distant parts of Pakistan where I would find, with the aid of the man (or men)

making the suggestion, Gujar women capable of meeting all of my sexual needs and

desires.

The conflicting image of Gujar women (as both paramour and harlot) reflects

again on the essence of the social ambiguities inherent to the relationship between settled

agriculturalist and nomadic pastoralists. Pastoralism frequently requires women to

perform many of their daily chores outside the home and village walls. This makes them

Although such negative perceptions are widespread, the degree of apprehension may vary by eco-niche. Insecurity and anxiety may be more pronounced in those villages where Gujars, in their yearly migration, make biannual appearances. It is perhaps less pronouncW where Gujars are pastoral agriculturalists. Even here, however, a lack of trust is suggested by comments regarding the ownership of cattle, the quality of their milk, and the morals of their women. Gloria Raheja (1988) reports that Hindu Gujars are the dominant gift-giving caste of the village she studied in Saharanpur, India. It is interesting that these Gujars, who are known for their generosity, are also the dominant land holding agricultural caste and are not pastoralists.

It is my impression that these statements reflect fantasy rather than fact. The Gujars I have the good fortune to call my friends are devout Muslims who never pilfered my belongings. Moreover, the women were very conscientious in maintaining a chaste public decorum. 95 visually accessible to a degree not typical of other agricultural groups in which women

are kept in purdah (seclusion) or are of such low standing that they must work in the

fields and frequently attend to the sexual needs of dominant males (Srinivas

1987:102)/^ The women of sheep and goat-herding Gujars of Azad Jammu and

Kashmir, for example, seldom veil, yet they pass through a number of villages and

hamlets on their annual migrations. Even among settled pastoralists, the demands of

pastoralism promotes a measure of visual accessibility that is as great as it is for any

class of women. Denzil Ibbetson (1916:185) noted in the 1880s that in Hazara district,

Gujar women traveled to town "every morning with baskets on their heads." One-

hundred years later, one can still observe Gujar women making their daily trips to town

in order to barter for goods in local bazaars. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that they

are more visually accessible, pastoral mobility makes women less sexually accessible:

The types of social ties that are a precondition for such access simply do not exist.

The contribution women make to the tending to the livestock is still another

feature of pastoralism that may weigh in the ethnic stereotyping of the Gujars.

Pastoralism provides a type of knowledge regarding breeding and rq)roduction that

cultivators and other such groups seldom attain. As a consequence, women pastoralist

are seen to possess a storehouse of sexual knowledge that is both thorough and accurate.

Moreover, as a subsistence strategy, pastoralism entails contributions of effort from the

I do not mean to overemphasize the point. It is widely known that women throughout the Muslim world are active in various aspects of field cultivation and so this is not unique to pastoralist groups. However, what is unique to them—and which sets them apart from settled agriculturalists-is that they, unlike the former, are not tightly integrated into village society (see below). 96 entire family. Thus, women are believed to have come by such sexual knowledge at a

fairly young age."

To summarize, pastoralism establishes the conditions that, to use Scheffs

(1979:60) terminology, locate Gujar women at an appropriate "aesthetic distance."

Their occupational lifestyle takes them outside the village walls thus removing them from

the seclusion of purdah. In doing so, it also provides them with knowledge about sexual

matters that is considered to be both accurate and detailed. Yet, because they function

outside the "norms" of village life and its expectations regrading sexual modesty and

decorum, Gujar women are perceived to be immoral.”

The balance obtaining between these opposing sentiments also varies in relation

to the degree to which Gujars are integrated in a local village economy. While the data

necessary to demonstrate this are unavailable, the literature does suggest that where the

Gujars are fully integrated in a village economy in the role of a settled pastoralists, they

have occupied a fairly low ranking in the local hierarchy (see e.g., Kessinger 1974:58).

Similarly, in those cases where they lived in regions far removed from the residents of

" I am not asserting that this is indeed accurate. At a fairly young age females in virtually all families become knowledgeable about such matters as a consequence of the large families and small living quarters that most occupy. Rather, what I am trying to emphasize is how visual accessibility in the public domain shape popular perceptions of Gujar women.

” Hayden (1987), working in a different context and with a wholly different type of nomad/village economy anticipates some of the conclusions drawn here. While he does not deal specifically with inter-gender differences in ethnic stereotyping, he has noted the uncertainties inherent to the economic relationship as a defining basis for contradictory social images. 97 settled villages and xave had limited social interaction with them, they are also despised

(see Darling 1947:61-62).

Recognizing the variant and variable nature of these perceptions, as they relate to contextual differences, is an important aspect of developing an understanding of Gujar ethnicity from a diachronic perspective. Unfortunately for the Gujars of Islamabad, their recent history and the contextual circumstances of their life in the city, have established conditions which tend to highlight the negative aspects of these ethnic stereotypes. Why this is so, what conditions led to it, and its implications for understanding the social productions of contemporary Gujar ethnic identities constitute the subjects of the

following chapters.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Gujar demography and language, patterns of subsistence and

the socio-economic basis of ethnic stereotyping from a regional perspective. With some

notable exceptions, the discussion has skirted the issue of how various elements of the

regional culture have changed over time. Telescoping the data in such a manner strips

the analysis of its historic specificity, concealing the many ways in which history

functions both to constrain and inform contemporary constructions of Gujar ethnic

identities. The next chapter will initiate the process of unpacking this history by picking

up the thread of the analysis in the context of the late medieval period of North India. CHAPTER IV

GUJARS AND ISLAM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The model of the ‘traditional Indian village’ found commonly in anthropological studies and some works in economic and administrative history is of little value because of its generality and timelessness. Ideas and institutions that are commonly labeled traditional are actually the product of long-term historical change, and do not transcend time (Kessinger 1974:4).

In many respects, today’s Indian society grows out of the conditions of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. When the anthropologist or the historian uses "traditional” Indian society as a timeless and spaceless referent, he is speaking usually of institutions whose roots are in this period (Cohn 1971:69).

Given the great extent of their geographic distribution, it is not surprising that there is considerable disagreement as to the Gujars’ origin. While some scholars argue that the

Gujars are of Central Asian origin (e.g., Cunningham cited in Ibbetson 1916:182;

Wikeley [1915]:94), others link the Gujars to indigenous (read Aryan) or autochthonous

(pre-Aryan) peoples of India (e.g.. Tod cited in Elliot 1869, vol. 1:101; Manku 1986:1;

Puri 1986:18). The paucity of evidence combines with the inherent flexibility of the

principles of social classification (Yalman 1971) to render suspect such unilineal historic

reconstructions. More complete materials would undoubtedly emphasize the need to

conceptualize "history" as process by which a number of factors operated to assign the

label "Gujar" to an ill-defined and amorphous social group whose boundaries and

98 9 9 membership was constantly changing. Whatever the ultimate origin of the Gujars, or of the term "Gujar," references to an agro-pastoralist group known as "Gujars" appearing in Mughal documents (e.g., the Babur-Nama [Beveridge 1922:454]) indicate that a distinct Gujar social identity had developed by the medieval period.

The religious identity of the Gujars during the early medieval period is similarly unknown. Given the nature of their geographic distribution, it would seem fairly safe to conclude that the Gujars were a religiously diverse and heterogenous group. In the east, Gujars were most likely Hindu, although their exact position within the local caste hierarchies varied widely. So little is known about the north-western parts of the Indian

subcontinent during this period that it is impossible to say with much confidence that the

Gujars belonged to any particular religion. Indeed, it seems more than likely that they

subscribed to the various religious beliefs and practices common among the pastoral

tribes of north west India. Unfortunately, no records survive (or perhaps have ever

existed) that would allow one to assess this aspect of their history.

Unlike the earlier medieval age, scholars are in broad agreement that conversion

to Islam among India’s rural masses occurred during the medieval period, corresponding

roughly to the establishment of the Delhi Sultanates (1206-1526). In the case of the

Gujars, the date of conversion varied widely by region. According to a legend that

Crooke (1974 [1896]:449) recorded among the Gujars of Oudh, "mass" conversions

occurred as early as 1398 a.d. when Timur sacked Delhi. A note appearing in the Ain-i-

Akbar, to wit that upon conversion the Gujars "are generally styled Thatthar by their

brethren of the ancient faith" (Elliot 1869, vol. 1:101), suggests that like other Punjabi 1 0 0

castes, the conversion was an ongoing process in the late medieval period. To this day,

the process of conversion is far from complete. Significant sectors of the regional

population are only now beginning to adopt a distinctly Muslim lifestyle (see Hasan

1986:19,63,67). Within the Islamabad community, inter-generational changes in marital

practices are indicative of the ways in which Islamization continues to promote social

change and adaptation (see Chapter 12).

In order to develop an understanding of Islam’s impact on contemporary ethnic

identity definitions, this chapter explores the processes of conversion among the Gujars.

A regional overview of the religious composition of the Gujar population establishes the

background for developing an understanding of the differential nature of Islam’s impact

on Gujar ethnicity and social organization.' A dearth of documentation specifically

relating to the Gujars of this period have made it necessary to consult alternative sources

of data to gamer insight into the Gujars’ conversion to Islam: These include

anthropologically-informed studies of late medieval Indian history, more recent census

and survey materials, ethnographies of contemporary Gujar communities, and studies of

the agrarian and economic history of India. An analytical review of these materials

provide the basis for modelling Punjabi society and the Gujars’ place within it as each

relates to issues involving the socio-cultural processes of conversion. The second

' Recent works suggesting the ways in which Islam has been adapted to differing social and political contexts include: Recogniàng Islam (Gilsenan 1982), Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place q/" Adab In South Asian Islam (Metcalf 1984), Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (Gilmartin 1988b), Shari’at and Ambiguity in South Asian Islam (Ewing 1988), Muslims through Discourse: Religion and Ritual in Gayo Society (Bowen 1993). 101

section, by reviewing the late medieval period in the Punjab, provides the necessary

historical context to flesh out the process of conversion among the Gujars.

Islam and Giÿars in South Asia

Of the nearly 2.5 million Gujars enumerated in 1931 census, approximately one million

(1,073,529) denominated themselves as Muslims.^ In terms of regional distribution, the

area of greatest Muslim Gujar concentration was Jammu and Kashmir State, where the

entire Gujar population of 402,781 denominated themselves as Muslims. Similarly, in

the North West Frontier Province, nearly 100% (.9988) of the population of 121,510

Gujars denominated themselves as Muslims. In the Punjab, Muslim Gujars were also

in the majority, comprising 75 percent (.7486) or 521,347 of the provincial population

of 696,442 Gujars. At 73,568, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh was another

province with a substantial concentration of Muslim Gujars. However, they represented

just 20 percent (.1995) of the total provincial Gujar population of 368,702 (Census of

India 1931, vols. 1, 15, 17, 18, 24).

In terms of provincial distribution, the majority of Muslim Gujars in Jammu and

Kashmir were located in the State’s southern and western districts (Census of India 1931,

vol. 24, Table XVII). In the North West Frontier Province, Muslim Gujars were

primarily concentrated in the districts of Hazara and Peshawar (Census of India 1931,

^ Tlie census does not distinguish between Sunni and Shi’i Gujars, nor among the different schools of Islamic law and jurisprudence. My research and various documentary sources indicates that the vast majority of Muslim Gujars are of the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. 1 0 2

vol. 15, Table XV). In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Muslim Gujars were

largely found in the province’s western districts where they inhabited the barr (dry

upland) of the Yamuna-Ganges doab (the land between two rivers including the barr and

the khadir, or riverine tracts) (see Hasan 1986; Sopher 1975; Whitcombe 1974:84-85).

In the Punjab, Muslim Gujars were most densely settled in a tract that ran from

the province’s eastern districts north to the southern rim of the lesser Himalayas. There

the distribution of the population turned rather sharply to the northwest, skirting the

southern rim of the Himalayas, ultimately extending into the North West Frontier

Province and Afghanistan. Within this area, the ratio of Muslim to Hindu Gujar was

similar to the proportions among the general population. That is to say that the

proportion of Muslim to Hindu Gujars increased from east to west (1931 Census of the

Punjab, vol. 17, Table XVII).^

The discussion for the remainder of this chapter focusses in large part on the

conversion of the Gujars within the Greater Punjab. As noted in the previous chapter,

districts within this region constitute the "homeland" of the Islamabad Gujar community.

Furthermore, unlike the Punjab, and the north Indian plain, for which there is rich and

ample materials, the mountainous regions of north India, especially Jammu and Kashmir,

have, for a variety of reasons (most of which are political in nature) suffered from a lack

* The extent of numerical preponderance varied within the region. In the six districts constituting the Punjab’s westem-most division of Rawalpindi (Gujrat, Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi, Attock, and Mianwali) the census returned 182,441 Muslim Gujars and only 795 Hindu Gujars. Contrastingly, in Ambala division, the Punjab’s eastern-most division (Hissar, Rohtak, Gurgaon, Kamal, Ambala, and Simla) there were 94,503 Hindu Gujars against 41,631 Muslim Gujars. 103 of research. Nonetheless, the evidence that is available suggests that the model of

conversion in the Punjab that is developed below is broadly applicable to the mountainous

reaches of north India.

Sufis and Islam

Studies of the conversion in the non-Middle Eastern context of India have

frequently focussed on the institutional complex of religious belief and ritual practices

referred to as saint worship, or, more appropriately, sufism.* The role of Sufi pirs as

spiritual intermediaries between the sacred and the secular worlds has been seen as

critical in drawing non-lettered rural populations into the orbit of Islam and the Muslim

world (see, e.g., Eaton 1978; 1984). Studies of the early history of Islam in the

subcontinent have stressed the appeal the ethos of Muslim brotherhood and the

doctrinaire egalitarianism of Islam held for low caste groups anxious to escape the

oppressive conditions of the Hindu caste system (see, e.g., Ahmad 1964:83; Rahman

1966:155).

While such findings are suggestive of overall processes, they frequently fall short

in providing insights into the patchwork distribution of religious communities within the

Punjab. This is especially so in the case of the Gujars whose distribution of Muslim and

Hindu communities seems resistant to simple explanation. For the purposes of

developing an understanding of tlie variegated pattern of conversion among Gujars it has

* Sufism comes from the Arabic for "wool, " sitf. It refers to the habit of sufi ascetics who gave up all worldly possessions except a wool frock as a sign of devotion and piety. 104 proven helpful to phrase the research question in terms of "why didn’t more Hindu

Gujars convert to Islam?"

Historical evidence seems to suggest that the impetus for conversion would have

been quite substantial. By the late 11th century, incursions by Afghan and Central Asian

nomads had undermined the strength of Hinduism within the region (see Cohn 1971:66).

The founding of the Delhi Sultanate in the 12th century established a pattern of Muslim

political dominance that was to continue more or less unbroken for six centuries, ending

only with the collapse of the Mughal empire (1556-1858).* Throughout the period,

Muslim states exercised increasing control over the lives of their Indian subjects.

Furthermore, unlike in the eastern Mediterranean where Christians and Jews were

provided state protection because they were considered ahl-i-khitab (people of the book),

Hindus were non-believers and thus merited no special considerations. Moreover,

conversion-even if it was of dubious authenticity-would seem a strategy by which Hindu

elites could maximize their chances of maintaining their position. It would seem also that

as an introduced religion, Islam might have had an intrinsic appeal that existed over and

above the pragmatic considerations of securing material wealth and political advantage.

In short then, in the medieval world of north India, conversion to Islam may have

been appealing in and of itself, it may have indeed been "the thing to do." But it is

significant that it was not "the thing to do" for all groups and people, even among the

* These are the technical dates for the Mughal empire. They correspond to Akbar’s ascension to the throne in 1556 and the British removal of Bahadur Shah II from the throne in 1858. Effective Mughal rule starts with the first effort to institutionalize Mughal rule under Akbar’s grandfather Babur in 1527 and ends with the death of the last "Great Mughal," Aurangzeb, in 1709. 105 members of a single caste group such as the Gujars. Addressing the question of "why didn’t more Hindu Gujars convert to Islam?" focusses attention on the nature of the integrative challenge sufism posed for indigenous Hindu society.

The Challenges of Sufism

Sufism has been extensively studied throughout the Middle East and South and

South East Asia. Although a number of issues remain to be resolved, scholars are in general agreement as to its major organizational features and social roles. A review of the literature on Sufism in general, or on its particular manifestations in India and the

Punjab is, therefore, neither practical nor necessary. Understanding the potential role sufism played in the conversion of the Gujars, however, requires some consideration of the ways in which sufism challenged traditional forms of social organization. As we shall see, it is in light of the responses to this integrative challenge, that the pattern of

Gujar conversion is in part rendered explicable.

As a religion, Hinduism is diffuse, stressing the worship of concrete divine images and their worldly representatives. Guided introspective contemplation develops one’s insights into human nature, the proper role of ethics and morality in the constitution of society, the place of humans within the cosmological order of things and

so forth. Conversely, such speculative thinking about the divine origin of things and of

the place of humans within the cosmological universe is of secondary importance to

Islamic theological thought.

Islam is based on the ultimate moral authority of the Qu 'ran, the written word of

God as it was revealed to his prophet Muhammad. The emphasis on the Book as the 106 ultimate authority makes Islam accessible to all members of the Muslim unana

(community of believers), whether Arab, Persian, Turkish, or Indian. Social distinctions, such as those ascriptive criteria that support Hinduism are thereby rendered theologically anathema to Islamic belief and doctrine. In its eschewal of social distinctions, Islam therefore challenges the very basis of Hinduism.

The religious organization of sufi shrines, however, was as stratified as was

Hindu society: Various classes of religious personnel, consisting of the pir (founding saint), murids (disciples), sajjida nishin (descendants/successors), devotees, and biraderi relatives, were assigned specific socio-religious roles (Eaton 1978; 1984; Gilmartin 1984;

1988b:39-46). Within tins hierarchical framework, pirs functioned in a manner analogous to that of the Brahmin priest. That is to say, that the shrine, as physical repository of the material remains and baraka (spiritual charisma) of the pir, theologically interposed the saint between God and the devotee. Given the organizational

similarities of sufism and Hindu society, the subtle theological distinctions between

Hinduism and Islam would appear to have been of relatively minor significance to the

largely unlettered rural communities. This, however, is only part of the story.

Differences in the underlying ideological principles that sustain, support, and justify social stratification in Muslim and Hindus societies, while widely recognized, have

received insufficient analytical attention (Ahmad 1976). Unlike Hindu society, where

social hierarchy rests on the religiously-legitimated principles of the differential allocation

of caste duties (dhamrn), social stratification in Muslim Indian secular society was

grounded in economic expediency, while religious society rested on the individual’s 107 personal, unmediated relationship with God. Separating the religious from the social wrested from the hands of the economically dominant caste the authority it traditionally enjoyed in ensuring the successful dispensation of caste duties (Dumont and Pocock

19575:31; Srinivas 1987:9),

A second challenge that sufism presented to Hindu dominance related to questions of land ownership and control. It is widely recognized that the founding pirs and many of their more famous successors generally eschewed involvement in the mundane world of economics and politics. Disciples were often cautioned to avoid contact with the

"world of the court and its ministers" (Eaton 1984:338). Frequently, pirs refused to accept offers made to them by the court. On its side, the state’s relationship with rural shrines was also marked by a great deal of inconsistency. The Delhi Sultan, Muhammad bin Tughluq, for example, although he attended Chishti shrines as a young man, "became influenced by rationalist philosophers who rejected [the sufi] doctrine of the Unity of

Being and stressed instead a strict conformity to the shari'at” (Eaton 1978:48).

Nonetheless, the histories of many shrines recount stories of how gifts of land, livestock, and produce were given to pirs by state authorities, and large landlords, as well as devotees of more modest means. These gifts were often of substantial size.

During the Delhi sultanate, for example, Muhammad ibn Tughluq bestowed the city of

Ajudhan on the shrine of Bâbâ Fafîd (Eaton 1984:339). On the death of Dîwân ‘Ala’ ad-

Dln, the sajjida nishin (spiritual descendent and caretaker) of Bâbâ Farid’s shrine, Sultan

Muhammad ibn Tughluq commissioned the building of a huge tomb in his honor (Eaton

1984:338). Whatever their size, it was expected that such gifts and endowments would 108 provide for the upkeep and support of the saint’s tomb, and its associated dormitories, mosques, madrassas, shops, and so forth (see, e.g., the discussions in Eaton 1978; 1984;

GUmartin 1984; 19885:37-46).

The effect of these endowments was to transform the caretakers of the shrine into rural magnates, with all the social prerogatives, military needs, and economic responsibilities such positions necessarily entailed. Indeed, in some instances the combination of access to the baraka of the saint and the landed property and other resources of the shrine gave rise to the founding of a new biraderi (Eaton 1984:223-224).

In this, the sacred was fused with the mundane, albeit in an inherently conflictive form

(see Gilmartin 1984). It is in respect then to its theological, social, and economic dimensions that sufism posed an integrative challenge to Hindu society. It is to a discussion of these issues as they relate to traditional forms of political dominance and economic organization that I now turn.

Land and Land Tenure in the Puqjab

Indigenous understandings and definitions of proprietary rights have been studied now

for well over a century. In the Punjab, two major categories of land tenure have been

identified in the literature-the zamindari, and the bhaiacara/pattidari systems. As we

have seen previously, in the zamindari system, rights of appropriation were vested in the

hands of influential landlords and their coteries of family members, lineage relatives, and

political allies. Frequently, zamindars were absentee landlords who contracted with local

intermediaries or village relatives to manage the estate. In other instances they served 1 0 9

as revenue farmers, collecting taxes for other zamindars on a rental basis. In still other

instances, zamindars developed their landed estates into petty kingdoms in which they

exercised suzerainty as a local raja (ruler).*

Conversely, bhaiacara/pattidari tenures were village-based corporate bodies that

shared a common emphasis on kinship as the basis for allocating proprietary rights in the

land. In bhaiacara villages, tenurial right was apportioned on the basis of need. Periodic

redistribution of ancestral shares among members of a coparcenary cultivating body

functioned to balance output against need. Pattidari tenures allocated rights in the land

along lineage lines with the extent of subdivision correlated to the degree of genealogical

segmentation. For both bhaiacara and pattidari tenures, "the community as a group,

under the direction of a muqaddam (a headman), managed the affairs of the village and

paid the land revenue to whoever was entitled to receive it" (Metcalf 1964:39).

In addition to the land controlled either in zamindari or bhaiacara/pattidari tenure,

there were, until the relatively recent past, large tracts of open range land and

unredeemed waste. Most of this land was in the western plains. Yet, it was not totally

absent even in the province’s eastern-most districts.

* In the Punjab, the term zamindar has evolved to include within it virtually all property owners of any substance, including the landed elite, as well as small-scale owner cultivators, and those tenant farmers and sharecroppers who own small parcels of land, but who subsist on the income they derive from working other property holders land. The term is used in the present context in reference to its older usage, i.e., as a large landowner who collected revenue from subsidiaries. 1 1 0 Land Tenure and Kinship

The nature of kinship, the diverse and changing ecology of the Punjab, and historical factors have repeatedly functioned to shift the balance and extent of zamindari and bhaiacara/pattidari tenures within the Punjab. In terms of kinship, the relative extent and strength of supra-village lineage and clan ties was a critical variable in determining

the relative extent of either tenurial type. Erik Stokes’ (1978) study of the relationship

of land alienation to rural revolt in the Mutiny of 1857 sheds valuable light on the role

kinship played in the definition and maintenance of property rights.

Erik Stokes (1978:159-184)-who frequently uses the Gujars as the subject of his

case studies-has argued that where zamindari land tenures predominated, a market in

land titles and the circulation of proprietary rights was more likely to develop. In

contrast, where land was held in bhaiacara or pattidari tenure, land was less likely to be

alienated to outsiders, even in areas of low agricultural output (Stokes 1978:168). In

explaining the different rates of land alienation, Stokes (1978:63-89) stresses the role

supra-village clan ties played in determining the extent to which a market in land titles

ultimately developed.

If I understand Stokes correctly, he relates the rate of land transfer to different

economies of scale associated with each tenurial type. Among bhaiacara/pattidari

villages, supra-village lineage and clan ties provided a mechanism whereby members of Ill

the locally dominant Gujar cultivating caste were able to transfer resources from villages

that were financially solvent to those that were heavily encumbered with debt/

While he does not note its occurrence, it is possible that the dominant Gujar caste

engaged in a form of inter-divisional "debt financing." That is to say, loans might have

been advanced in one village for the benefit of indebted relatives located in other

villages. At one step further, it is even conceivable that clan ties allowed Gujars to play

money lenders against each other, in effect incessantly shifting debt among the villages

in a clan territory.* Although it may not have been fiscally sound in the long term, such

a practice would have allowed Gujars to extend the schedule of repayments during

periods of poor harvest.®

In contrast, the nature of zamindari dominance was such that it left landlords far

fewer clan mates who would be willing or capable of "bailing them out" financially as

the case may be. The financing necessary to maintain a zamindar’s position was of such

a magnitude that, aside from moneylenders, the only individuals capable of providing

’ That this may have indeed occurred is suggested by Stone’s (1984:309-310) observation "that Jats from no less than three different parghanas [subdistricts] pooled there resources in order to buy an entire village and send forth "a colony to inhabit and cultivate it."

* To the best of my knowledge this has not been recognized in eitlier the anthropological or historical literature. The lack of such comments, however, does not necessarily verify its absence. That such practices would escape the attention of the ethnographer or historian is understandable given that it would only be evident if the ethnographer was able to record the domestic finances of two or more villages at relatively the same period in time. This would seem an especially difficult task, as data on economic activities of this type have always been concealôl from outsiders (see Kessinger 1974:149- 153 for a discussion of the difficulties the "iron chest system" poses for economic surveys).

’ This strategy appear most practical where double-cropping was possible. 1 1 2

such capital were other zamindars. But the latter would seldom provide such assistance

as they were often competing for the rights to the same village or piece of land (Hasan

1979:24-29).

The absence of the layer of the landholding kin groups of bhaiacara/pattidari

villages appears to have provided zamindars with greater economy of scale. But this was

not always the case. In order to ensure the loyalty of dependent cultivators and laborers,

zamindars frequently found it expedient to fund projects requiring large amounts of labor

that were not necessarily remunerative (Neale 1979:13). In addition, zamindars were

also expected to support various social and religious ceremonies and mediate inter-caste

disputes (Srinivas 1987:35-36).'“ Yet, it was relatively infrequently that a zamindar

would redirect resources to develop labor saving devices as this had the effect of

undermining the dependency of the cultivating and laboring classes.

Where labor was scarce and land plentiful, as it has been throughout much of the

history of the Punjab, competition from without and a "continuous sub rosa kind of

warfare" from within (Cohn 1971:84), made large landholders susceptible to the coercion

of their dependent tillers and laborers. It also provided the latter with a greater measure

of autonomy and independence of action.

It is in respect to the differences between these two tenurial types that sufism can

be understood to have posed its greatest challenge to bhaiacara/pattidari villages rather

Stokes (1978:67) notes that the zamindars were responsible for extending taqavi loans to village cultivators for the purpose of digging wells. This is just one example of the numerous expenditures zamindars must have had to make in order to maintain tranquility and peace within his possessions. 113 than zamindari estates. Put simply, the theological, social, and economic dimensions of

the sufi/pir religious system, through its critique of hierarchy, its diminution of the

dominant caste’s role as cultural arbitrator, and the possibility of large-scale land

alienation threatened to subvert the very basis of caste dominance." Where

bhaiacara/pattidari tenures were secured by well-organized, geographically-extensive clan

ties, a dominant caste must have both desired and indeed been capable of preventing sufis

from establishing themselves within the confines of their precincts. In those cases where

shrines were founded in a clan area, the model I have been developing here suggests that

they would be located in marginal areas, i.e., at the periphery of the clan area, in more

remote rural areas, or in towns or among villages that did not enjoy strong and widely

ramified clan ties.

In this, marital practices performed an essential role in maintaining clan strength

and resisting sufi incursions. Among Hindus, the nature, extent, and definition of the

incest taboo varies in relation to caste and village social status. Among the landed elite,

the incest taboo includes lineage and clan members, even those who only link was a

commonly shared clan name. As one observer notes the "... regulation of marriage

seems to be the only function of most such sibs [clans]" (Kolenda 1985:15)." A rule

" For a succinct statement of this concept and a review of its reception and modifications see Srinivas (1987:1-19).

" In some instances, the prohibition against clan marriage is extended to fictive kin (Kolenda 1985:18). Among some higher north Indian castes the rule of gotra (clan) exogamy is extended even further by a patronymic prohibition against marriage between caste members who share the clan name of their father, their mother’s father, their father’s mother’s father, and their mother’s father. 114 of village exogamy-often extended to encompass the residents of neighboring villages-

reinforced the incest taboo by prohibiting caste marriages within the village (Karve

1968:119). Conversely, beyond the boundaries of this circle of exclusion, marriage was

not only acceptable, but was rather strongly encouraged by the prohibition against caste

exogamy."

These various marital practices strengthened local lineage/clan identities (see Cohn

1971:85; Srinivas 1987:96-115), while simultaneously situating the dominant village

proprietors within a larger, regional caste group. The upshot of all of this was to

enhance the power and authority of locally dominant castes (Cohn 1971:85). The

combination of bhaiacara/pattidari tenures and supra-village lineage and clan ties

provided locally dominant caste groups with the means whereby they could prevent the

establishment of a sufi shrine within a clan area. These same factors also allowed a

dominant caste to block the conversion of its tied cultivators and laborers. In this

manner Hindu clans stemmed the tide of conversion, producing the patchwork

distribution of religious communities in the Greater Punjab.

History and Ecology

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Yamuna-Sutlej, Sutlej-Beas, and

Beas-Ravi doabs are characterized by a relatively dense population and high agricultural

output. Kessinger's (1974:14) observation that "the combination of regular rainfall, rich

" The clusters of intermarrying clans defines the limits of what is referred to in the literature as the "effective caste group" (Dumont 1980b; Fox 1971a, 1971b; Karve 1968:125; Kolenda 1985; Mandelbaum 1972). These local-level effective castes are subsumed linguistically within a regional hierarchy and scripturally within the all-India caste taxonomy (Dumont 1980b, Fox 1969, Marriott 1965). 115 soil, and extensive areas irrigated from wells made Jullundur [district] one of the richest areas in north India throughout the Mughal and Sikh periods" can be generally applied to most of the central Punjab.

Political conditions have been quite fluid all along the rim of the southern

Himalayas. The limited agricultural surplus relative to the population density seems to have made it difficult for zamindars to hold territory once they had it acquired:

Resources that were in critically short supply had to be expended continually in order to ensure the loyalty or political subjugation of intermediary zamindars, bhaiacara/pattidari holding cultivating brotherhoods, and dependent cultivators, laborers, and servants. The ecology of the area seems equally incapable of providing for the large scale horizontal stretch of a clan area (see Baden-Powell 1892, vol. 2:609-722).

Political instability has been especially marked during those periods when there was the absence of state control. Unfortunately for the people of the Punjab, the region’s history has been marked by relatively short periods of peace, repeatedly interrupted by rather long periods of political turmoil and internecine warfare. The removal of state authority has repeatedly occasioned outbreaks of hostilities among zamindars intent on extending their tenurial claims at the expense of their counterparts in the region. During

the medieval period, the petty chiefs who engaged in tltese conflicts were often of Rajput

social status. As such, most considered it demeaning to walk behind the plow. Their

reluctance to engage in agricultural work had a profound influence on the distribution of

the cultivating castes of the Punjab such as the Jats, Gujars, Sayids, Qureshi, and so

forth. When village cultivators refused to treat with a recently ascendent zamindar, they 116 were replaced with more amenable cultivators and revenue farmers. From these factors there arose the characteristic patchwork distribution of bhaiacara/pattidari landholding villages, small clan areas, and truncated zamindari estates that the British recorded throughout the Punjab from the Yamuna-Sutlej doab to Jhelum, and beyond to

Rawalpindi, Attock and Hazara (see Baden-Powell 1892, vol. 2:611, 617; Gilmartin

1988b:20).

In the southern districts of the Yamuna-Sutlej doab, conditions were more prohibitive than in the central Punjab: A low level of population density correlated with

an even lower and more unpredictable agricultural base. The conditions obtaining in the

area seem to have made it difficult to establish large zamindari estates (Stokes 1978:75,

82-89). As a result, bhaiacara/pattidari tenures have been common throughout the

territory for a long time and few traces remain of the petty state building processes that

occurred in the central Punjab during the medieval period (Stokes 1978:82).

In the Western Punjab, bhaiacara/pattidari tenures were largely unknown. Here,

zamindari agricultural estates of expansive proportions were in great abundance

(Gilmartin 1988b: 19). A significant difference between these zamindari tenures and

those of other parts of India was that with the exception of low-lying riverain tracts (bet)

the land was incapable of supporting a large population or a very elaborate caste system

(Darling 1947:61, 62). Although these zamindari estates were large, a landlord’s de

facto rights of expropriation were constrained by a lack of agricultural surplus, the

thinness of the population, the relatively small size of the zamindari lineages, competition

with neighboring zamindari lineages, and the open stretches of "barren wasteland," the 117 latter providing the tillers of the soil with an easy means of escape from the exactions of an overly rapacious landlord.

These conditions changed slightly with the introduction of the Persian wheel in the 14th or 15th centuries. Its appearance occasioned something of a small-scale agricultural revolution as nomadic pastoralists adopted a sedentary agricultural lifestyle

(Eaton 1984). Never overly extensive, this new irrigation technology did allow the compact, tightly nucleated settlements of the western Punjab to expand their areas of cultivation in the low-lying riverine tracts.

Against this backdrop, the greater success Islam experienced in the western

Punjab becomes explicable. Here, sufism offered an emerging elite a ready means by

which to confront the problem of establishing authority and legitimacy. By patronizing

shrines, zamindari/clan leaders, some of whom may have already embraced Islam, were

able to participate in the reflected glory of the pir, as well as that of the Sultanate and

Mughal imperial courts (Eaton 1984:347). In so doing, large landholders were able to

link their authority to the religio-political legitimacy of the shrine: A legitimacy that was

often cemented through marital alliances (Gilmartin 1988b:65-71). Perhaps more than

any other single cause, it was the nature of this relationship—in which an emerging

landed elite gained ideological legitimacy, while shrines and their caretakers acquired

access to political and material resources-which accounts for the widespread distribution

of shrines in the western Punjab. In this sense shrines were, as Gilmartin (1988b:41)

asserts, "outposts of conversion." But they were also outposts of a particular type of

religious society in which subsistence was increasingly based on an agrarian economy. 118 Gujars, Sufîs, and Land

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Gujars’ catchment area is in large

part confined to eastern, central, and northern districts of the old Punjab. In addition,

there are significant outlying contributions have been made by Jammu and Kashmir. To

the best of my knowledge there is only one monograph-length study on a Gujar

community within this area, and that has as its focus the Hindu Gujars of the Indian

Punjab (Manku 1986). There are in addition a number of studies on Gujars outside the

region. These monographs, and passing references and citations in other publications

provide the basis from which to formulate some general statements regarding the patterns

of conversion among the Gujars.

The literature indicates that with relatively few exceptions those Gujars who

denominate themselves as Muslim are either sedentary agro-pastoralists or nomadic

pastoralists. This is so for the mountainous tracts of Uttar Pradesh (Bandyopadhyay et

al. 1986; Hasan 1986, 1989), the plains of the Yamuna-Ganges Doab (Hasan 1986;

Sopher 1975:206; Stone 1984:109-110; Whitcombe 1974;84-85), the greater Punjab

(Kessinger 1974:55, Table 4; Stokes 1978; Darling 1947:61-62); as it is for the

mountainous areas of Pakistan (Barth 1981a, 1981b), and Jammu and Kashmir (Khatana

1976). It is significant in the context of this discussion, that across these diverse

ecological zones Muslim Gujars occupy an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the web of socio

economic relations that constitute the seypidari/jajmani system.'*

'* Indeed in one Punjabi village where they do occupy a formal position, the Gujars have changed their biraderi name (Ahmad 1977:73), suggesting an attempt to dissociate themselves from their disparaged ancestry. 119 The literature further suggests that where Gujars do occupy a formal position within the jajmani economic system, they do so as a dominant Hindu caste, holding either zamindari or bhaiacara/pattidari tenures (see Mukeiji [1982] for the Chandiagrh

Dun region of Himachal Pradesh; Misra [1959:20], Raheja [1988], and Stokes

[1978:159-184] for the upper Ganges-Yamuna Doab; and Manku [1986] for the Indian

Punjab). Indeed, even in those relatively few instances where Muslim Gujars are

cultivating proprietors, the location of their lands in upland dry areas or low-lying

khadirs seems indicative of settlement processes that occurred subsequent to conversion

(see Stone 1984:109-110; Whitcombe 1974:84-85 for the Ganges-Yamuna Doab; this also

appears to have been the case in Gujrat District, Punjab).

The factors that facilitated the pastoral Gujars’ conversion to Islam are numerous.

Physical proximity of shrine and Gujar is, of course, a primary factor. So too however

is the fact that pastoral Gujars were not subjugated by a dominant caste. This provided

a far greater degree of autonomy and independence to convert than might otherwise have

been the case. As a disparaged group they had less to lose in converting to Islam than

did a dominant caste whose power and authority rested on the hierarchical ordering of

village caste groups. The geographic mobility associated with pastoralism may have also

provided family members, especially women and children, with opportunities to

participate in the shrine’s annual round of festivals.**

** Ahmad’s (1971) findings in his study of "Islam and Pakistani Peasants" suggests that lower ranking village servants have a better knowledge of Islam and attend prayers more often than do cultivators for this precise reason (Cited in Ahmad 1977). Eglar (1960:193) suggests similar differences underlying the preference for education among the ^mmis classes in the village she studied. 1 2 0

That Islam was an egalitarian religion and as such appealed to a disparaged community, that it was introduced and not yet part of the fabric of village life from which Gujars lived apart, and that it was linked through sufi shrines to a great world religion, while certainly not compelling, may have been additional factors motivating the

Gujars to convert. In terms of its pragmatic implications, as a disparaged group the

Gujars may have seen in the rituals and symbols that sufism offered a means whereby to establish claims to a higher social status: Similarities in sufi and state ritual (Eaton

1984) allowed devotees to participate vicariously in the social enactments of the state and to do so on a footing that was perceived to be symbolically equal to that of the ruling elite.

As stated previously, sufis and state authorities were, however, partners to a relationship that was ambiguous and liable to rapid redefinition. This arrangement, in which religious power did not necessarily translate into court influence, accentuated the

economic aspects of land ownership in defining the relationship of devotees to the shrine.

Over time a shrine’s economic interests became synonymous with and wedded to those

of local landholding groups and Muslim state authorities (see Eaton 1978). Many shrines

were to become the center of their own landholding "saintly" biraderis. In so doing,

forms of social organizations developed that were structurally analogous to secular

cultivating groups in the local area. This shift to a status of a dominant landholding

group marks the extent to which Islam was "Indianized." It also signifies the point at

which pastoral Muslim Gujars’ were once again marginalized vis-à-vis the graded

hierarchies of Indian agrarian society. 121

It is in the light of this historical model of conversion that the geographic distribution of Muslim Gujar communities becomes understandable. In Saharanpur district (Uttar Pradesh), Gujars are the dominant caste. It is therefore no coincidence that the 1931 census returned one of the lowest ratios of Muslim to Hindu Gujars in all the districts included within their regional homeland. In the Punjab, Gujar conversion to Islam seems to have been more extensive. Here, "Brahmanism has always been weaker . . . than perhaps in any other part of India" (Rose 1919:3). Indeed, "it is doubtful whether a fullblown caste system ever existed" (Gough 1977:14) in the area.

In traditional (i.e., non-canal colony) villages of the Punjab

the fact of belonging to different castes does not create social barriers among the people, all of whom are Muslims. Kammis and zamindars sit together and may eat together, accept food from one another’s houses, smoke a common huka, draw water from a common well, and pray side by side. The fact of being Muslims creates a sense of unity and of equality among the people (Eglar 1960:29).

Due to the migration into the canal colonies (see Chapter 6), caste seems to have been even less important as a basis of social organization (Eglar 1960:3; Tandon 1968:161-

162).

The weakness of caste in the Punjab is, in part, attributable to the nature of clan dispersal within the region. A large number of caste names appear in the Babur-Nama

(Beveridge 1922) for the Punjab. So too does the number of Punjabi revenue-paying castes listed in Xht Ain-i-Akbar (Abu al-Fazl ibn Mubarak 1873-1894) seem large relative to other regions of the Mughal empire. Schwartzberg’s (1968:93, Fig. 8) findings in his study of "Caste Regions of the North Indian Plain," however, indicate that the average number of castes per village across all village sizes was lower in the Punjab than in Uttar 1 2 2

Pradesh. These observations suggest that intra-village caste organization was of a fundamentally different character in the Punjab than in other regions of India.

Specifically, they tend to indicate a high degree of socio-cultural heterogeneity.

In the central Punjab, historical processes culminated in the patchwork distribution of clan villages. The spatial organization of these numerous "peasant proprietary" villages is important for the light it sheds in explicating the spread of Islam among the

Gujars. As the previous chapter indicated, the Central Punjab was characterized by densely populated, nucleated village settlements. The agrarian subsistence economy

combined at varying levels of dominance, barani (rain-fed) agricultural, irrigated field

cultivation, and settled and nomadic pastoralism. In terms of social structure, most

villages had a dominant landholding caste that held rights of expropriation over the

resident village seypidaris. The patchwork distribution of clan areas and the pronounced

cultural heterogeneity of the Punjab combine to suggest that the supra-village kin ties

linking dominant castes within a clan territory were of a much reduced scope compared

to other regions of India. The reason for this appears to be linked to the historical

causes.

During the period from the 11th to the 16th centuries superior landholders,

anxious to reward their friends and allies, must have settled their supporters on the lands

they wrested from the opposition. As a consequence, small chunks of clan territory

underwent constant reassignment (see Fox 1971; Stokes 1978:69-74 for descriptions of

the indigenous processes of estate building during the late Mughal period that are equally

applicable to this time). The consequence of such settlement processes was to increase 123 the overall marginality of the central Punjab, reducing the ability and importance of clans as bulwarks against the spread of Islam. As pastoral Gujars were restricted to the

interstices of Punjabi society, it was they who were most likely to convert to Islam. In

the east (and northwest) of the Punjab, social conditions were similar to the central

Punjab in that cultural geography was marked by a patchwork distribution of clan areas.

While ecological factors seem more responsible than historical events in accounting for

the conditions in these areas, their outcome was the same-an increased likelihood that

Gujars would convert to Islam.

Thus, a combination of demographic, ecological, social, and historical factors

impinged differentially on Gujar society to produce the pattern of geographic distribution

of Muslim Gujars in the Punjab. Its effect was to associate a specific set of social,

economic, political, and cultural characteristics to those Gujars that converted to Islam.

Not only were there large numbers of Gujars in the Punjab, but those that were Muslim

were consigned to the periphery of society.'*

The various factors implicated in the process of conversion as outlined above have

also proved helpful in explaining one of the great ironies of Muslim history in the

subcontinent. That is, why is it that the establishment of the Mughal state-inarguably

the strongest of India’s many Muslim states-apparently precipitated a slowing in the rate

of conversion. Addressing this issue not only sheds light on some important and hitherto

'* How a Muslim identity functioned to differentiate Hindu, and Muslim Gujars from Sikh Gujars is not considered in this dissertation. Preliminary results of an ongoing study of the reasons why so few Hindu and Muslim Gujars converted to Sikhism lend support to processes and history of Gujar conversion modelled in this chapter (Spaulding m.s.). 124 unrecognized effects of Mughal administration, but more importantly provides some

suggestions as to the underlying causes of what for want of a better term one might refer

to as the Gujars’ attitude of indifference, and aloofness.

To Supply is To Rule"

The Mughal empire (with the exception of the regency of Aurangzeb) is

considered remarkable for the restraint it demonstrated by not interfering in "traditional"

culture (Kessinger 1974:19; Saran 1941:207-214).“ The basis of such restraint seems

to lie in the nature of the administrative organization of the empire. The Mughals

assigned a class of zamindars as intermediaries and charged them with the responsibility

of mustering troops and collecting taxes (Cohn 1971:72-73).

The origins of the zamindars and their relations to the state varied greatly from one region to another. Caste and lineage groups that either conquered or settled an area, officials who were able to turn their land grants into hereditary holdings. Rajas who had been deprived of their official position but still held land, and the descendants of holy men who had received land grants, are a few examples. The crucial factor was state recognition of the responsibility for the collection and transmission of the revenue throughout a specified area (Kessinger 1974:19-20).

A number of revenue paying villages were organized under a zamindar in a

pargana (subdistrict). Those villages considered the "home" of the revenue collecting

zamindari lineage were held at a reduced revenue rate (Hasan 1979:24-25). In other

" This is an adaptation of Walter Neale’s 1979 chapter "Land is to Rule." The slight alteration of the title is intended to stress the fact that political intermediaries in Medieval India occupied a structural position in which they managed the flow of political patronage and protection to their suWrdinates, in return for the latter’s assistance in meeting the state’s revenue and military demands.

“ What makes Mughal restraint "remarkable" is that it had the capability to proselytize to a much greater extent than did its predecessors. 125 villages, the local landholding lineages were engaged with directly or through revenue farming primary zamindars (Hasan 1979:24-29; Kessinger 1974:20-21). In a sense then, the fiscal and military administration under the Mughals, though pyramidal in theory, was seldom symmetrical in implementation.

To collect revenue, and to do so effectively, substantiated one’s political status as it demonstrated one’s worth to the state as friend and ally. Those able to meet the revenue demand and to muster troops were accordingly provided state protection.

Failure to meet the state’s fiscal and military demands, however, resulted in the (often forced) removal of the zamindar and the assignment of a new intermediary revenue agent

(Cohn 1971:71). Although zamindars were, therefore, obligated to the state for their title and prestige, their position rested in large part on the compliance of those cultivators from whom they collected revenue and recruited soldiers.

The nature and extent of the social ties that zamindars had with revenue cultivators were critical in determining the former’s political fortunes. In this, petitions to a higher authority, flight from the village or the open rebellion constituted sanctions

that cultivators and laborers were ever ready and willing to levy against an overly

rapacious zamindar (Srinivas 1987:32-34). These conditions created a political field in

which political power was determined as much by the acquisition of material wealth, and

the presence of armed retainers, as it was by the zamindar’s ability to function in the

cultural tradition of a social maximizer: Those zamindars who were able to maintain a

highly ramified network of supporters were likely to maintain their positions of power 126 (Neale 1979). This placed a premium on a maintaining stability within a zamindar’s

possessions."

The administrative mechanisms the Mughals employed to collect taxes and muster

troops ossified the distribution and organization of power. The coaptation of dominant

groups made possible by the dispensation of royal favors and the assignment of the

responsibility to raise revenues and troops functioned to pacify Punjabi societyAs

a result, the politically fluid conditions that had characterized the earlier age evaporated

rather quickly in the aftermath of the establishment of Mughal rule.

The bureaucratization of Mughal fiscal and military policies eliminated much of

the economic advancement and access to political power that Islam had promised.

Although members of the same religion, sufis, when not coopted by the state (see

Gilmartin 1988a:45), remained an institution distinct from and in opposition to the

Persian-dominated court ulema (learned religious specialists) (Lawrence 1984: 109).

While capable of intercession in the spiritual world, their ability to enact change in the

mundane world was far more modest and increasingly eclipsed by the nature of the fiscal

" In contrast, it was apparently a common practice for zamindars to stir up trouble in the villages under the jurisdiction of other intermediaries, in the hope of setting them aside and becoming the direct beneficiaries of the revenue (Hasan 1979:26-27). Indeed, disturbances within a subordinate’s revenue villages was to a certain extent welcomed, as removing an oppressor allowed them to regain a measure of their popularity with peasant cultivators (Srinivas 1987:34).

“ The Mughals also patronized exemplary sufis and their shrines by offering them town and village land grants and honors (Habib 1963:309). In one case, the sajjida nishin were given official office as the governors of Multan (Chopra 1940, vol. 2:203-242). 127 and military demands of the Mughal state, and the social distancing that was attendant upon the ongoing Persianization of court culture (Richards 1984).

In addition, Mughal rule, "by establishing comparatively greater peace and security, by enabling trade and commerce to expand, and by increasing and diversifying the purchasing power of the consuming classes, . . . brought about conditions favorable to the growth of a money economy" (Hasan 1979:21). The development of a money economy affected the composition of the agricultural market.

The Mughal tax revenues were levied against agricultural output, especially that of cash crops (Eaton 1984:348). Sheep, goat, and buffalo were apparently too difficult to assess and were, for that reason, not taxed in most cases. This had the effect of increasing the overall output of cash crop at the state level (Hasan 1979:23). However, on individual estates, it actually had the reverse effect. As zamindars were not entitled to tax livestock, and because taxes were differentially levied against cash crops, rural magnates, including landholding sufis, were encouraged to favor the expansion of food crops (Eaton 1984:348). The implication of this shift for the Gujars’ relationship to

Muslim shrines needs little comment. In short, their marginality was confirmed under

Mughal rule. The implications of these historic developments for Gujar social organization and ethnic identity are considered in the next chapter. CHAPTER V

ISLAM AND GUJAR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The pronounced tendency among sociologists to equate Hindu society with Indie, though sometimes explicit, often remains an unstated assumption (Ahmad 1976:175).

The type of Muslim society that developed from the fusion of Islam and Indic society were decidedly different in form, practice, and content from counterparts in the Muslim

Middle East. In the clothing styles, arts, architecture, diet, and rituals of Muslim South

Asia, one can identify the unmistakable and pervasive influence of Indic society.

Nonetheless, one can draw distinctions between Muslim and Hindu South Asian societies that are at least as numerous and salient as those that one can draw between Muslim

South Asia and the Middle East. This is especially so in regards to kinship reckoning, marital practices, and descent. Unfortunately, the study of kinship as representative of the synthesis of Muslim and Indic principles of social organization has traditionally drawn very little attention among South Asian scholars (Ahmad 1976). In an attempt to rectify this imbalance, and to understand the social impact of Islam in the subcontinent, this chapter examines, in two sections, the unit of Gujar social organization known as the biraderi.' The first section outlines briefly the major features of biraderi organization.

' There is some debate as to whether jat, zxit, quom, and other such terms might be more appropriate than biraderi for the type of social unit I will presently describe.

128 129 The second section uses data collected in the field to examine Gujar marital practices from within a regional perspective.

Muslim Giyars and the Influence of Islam

The biraderi is the unit of society that was most heavily influenced by the forms of social organization and kinship reckoning articulated in the sufis’ vision of IslamAs a kinship unit, the biraderi is a highly indeterminate social form. The understanding of the term "biraderi" that Zekiye Eglar (1960:75-77) developed after living in a Punjabi village for five years provides some idea of the ambiguities of the term. According to Eglar

(1960:75-77) "a biraderi is a patrilineage." In those cases where "...links to other members cannot be established..." individuals "... are said to be biraderi, but they are not accepted as such." Occupationally, "the term biraderi may also be used in an extended sense, when it refers to a group of people who are not kin. Thus in its extended meaning, biraderi may refer to all the zamindars who live in one village, or in

a locality, or throughout the country." And, residentially, "... the biraderi of zamindars

as a whole may be against the biraderi of the kammis; or one craft group may be against

another; or one village, that is, zamindars and kammis together, may combine against

another village." A brief review of the etymology of "biraderi," in its sense as a kinship

As "biraderi" is the term the Gujars prefer, I will defer to their preference.

^ Over sixty years ago E. A.H. Blunt (1931:190-191, 196-197) proposed that the impact of Islam on South Asian society was greatest in regards to social organization. With the exception of a few scholars (e.g., Alavi 1976, Das 1973; Wakil 1970, 1972), his insights have been relatively neglected. 130 term, helps in shedding light on the factors responsible for the term’s diverse meanings and usages.

A cognate of the Sanskrit term bhratr (brother), "biraderi," in the sense that it is employed among north Indian Muslim communities, is more appropriately viewed as a derivative of the Persian biradar. In Persian, biradar is used as a term of reference, and occasionally of address. In its abstract sense (biradari) the term connotes the idea of

Islamic fraternity and egalitarianism (Alam Payind, personal communication).^ In India, the idea of social equality (fraternity)* implied by the Persian biradari was confronted by a social system whose organization was based on the diametrically opposed principles of hierarchy, social divisiveness, and economic interdependence (Ashraf 1970). As a consequence of its adaptation to the Indic social context a subtle shift in meaning seems to have occurred as the term assumed the more flexible definition that Eglar (1960) and others (e.g. Alavi 1976) have noted.*

In its sense as a kinship term, biraderi reveals most clearly the influence of Islam on South Asian society. Within the Gujar biraderi, descent is reckoned patrilineally.

Lineage segments are unranked and are only of a few generations in depth. At more

* I have used these variant transliterations only to emphasize semantic distinctions. In actual usage, there is little phonetic differentiation.

* This idea of "brotherhood" should not be confused with the various institutionalized Muslim brotherhoods. In this sense, biradari is more akin to the French idea of fraternité.

* At the same time that biraderi was adopted into the vocabulary of recently converted north Indian Muslims, a reverse process assimilation appears to have occurred among some Hindu groups. Blunt (1931:10) notes that biraderi, ‘fraternity,’ was used by Hindus to refer to the exogamous "... group of caste brethren who live in a particular neighborhood and act together for caste purposes." 131 inclusive levels, patrilineages are grouped into named patri-clans. Geographic origin and genealogical relatedness do not figure prominently in measuring kinship distance, although one suspects that such considerations are more important among landholding lineage segments in rural areas (see Ahmad 1977; Eglar 1960). As in Hindu society, clan patronyms are believed to represent actual kin relations. Like other biraderis of

Pakistan and north India, the Gujars use a bifurcate-collateral (Sudanese) kinship terminology: Relatives are terminologically categorized according to differences in age, gender, generation, descent and social status. Unlike Hindu forms of social organization and kinship, there are important differences in the respective marital practices of Muslim and Hindu Gujars. In order to explicate these differences, the following section uses data that were collected in the field to compare Muslim marital practices from the regional perspective of the greater Punjab.

Muslim Gujar Marital Practices in an Indian Context

The available data suggests that the spread of Islam in the subcontinent was associated with a distinct change in the rules governing marriages. This was especially so in regards to the introduction of the well-known Muslim preference for cousin marriage.*

The literature contains numerous references which testify to the historic depth of the

* Unfortunately for the purposes of this dissertation, most researchers have, with some notable exceptions (e.g., Aschenbrenner 1967; Alavi 1976; Donnan 1988; Eglar 1960), focused on kinship and marital practices among Muslim communities of India (Ahmad 1978; Eade 1983; Goodfriend 1983; Jain 1978,1986; Mines 1976,1983; Monin 1978; Rizvi 1976; Siddiqui 1978; Wright 1976, 1983). The paucity of anthropological and historical studies on kinship and social organization among Muslim communities of Pakistan thus qualifies the analysis. 132 practice of cousin marriage among Muslim South Asian communities. Bernard Cohn

(1971:66), for example, has noted that the early Muslim invaders of Afghanistan and

Central Asia practiced cousin marriage. High rates of endogamy and presumed cousin marriage may have also been common among certain ethnic groups comprising the

Mughal nobility (see Richards 1984:258, n. 3). While the above references relate to the nobility and court culture, British documents substantiate that cousin marriage had become a widespread practice among the Muslim communities in the Punjab and north

India at least be the late 1800s, if not a good deal earlier (Gilmartin 1981:164; see also

Crooke 1974 [1896], vol. 2:449; Tupper 1881, vol. 2:70, 200). The Deputy

Commissioner of Jhelum district, for example, observed that "Muhammad Law (sic) had

such a strong effect as regards the question of intermarriage of relations that it has

entirely abrogated the [Hindu] rule forbidding intermarriage of agnates, and such

intermarriages are everywhere very common, indeed it is thought preferable that a man

should marry his cousin" (Talbot 1901:3; cited in Gilmartin 1988a:49). This was

supported by Blunt’s (1931:196-197) remarks that among Muslims of the United

Provinces of Agra and Oudh it "is the custom to select a wife, whenever possible from

a relatively small circle of close relations. The natural result of this custom" he further

observed "is that the marriage of cousins is extremely common."

Unfortunately, most of the recorded instances of "cousin marriage" are anecdotal.

They do not, therefore, provide a context within which to compare and contrast marital

practices at the regional level. Marital practices among the Gujars of Islamabad are 133 suggestive of the ways in which social, ecological, and cultural variation at the regional level mediate the social impact of conversion.

In order to develop an understanding of the social impact of Islam on Muslim

South Asian society in general, and on Gujar social organization in particular, marital data were collected hrom 116 married male respondents. The sample included representatives from Indian Punjab and Haryana, the Pakistan Punjab, northern Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. As this effort was exploratory in nature, correspondence analysis (Greenacre 1984; LeBart, et al. 1984) was used to tease out the patterns underlying these marital statistics. The initial data set was entered as a six (row) by twelve (column) matrix with the provincial region of origin coded as row entries, and the pre-marital genealogical relations of (male) ego to spouse listed under the appropriate column heading.

Many marriages were arranged between known relatives. It was therefore possible for spouses to trace their relationship through two or more intermediary relatives. In one instance, for example, a man had married a woman who was both his matrilateral cross-cousin (i.e., his mother’s brother’s daughter) and an agnate (i.e, his father’s patrilateral parallel cousin’s daughter). Given such multiple classifications, it was necessary to "focus" (Greenacre 1984:222-226, 275-280) the matrix: Various classificatory criteria were used to emphasize different aspects of the genealogical grid.

For each marriage, all such possible combinations were considered. The results of each computation were compared to all previous analyses. Through this process the most

salient and comprehensive patterns of interrelationships were teased out of the matrix. 134 Table 3 is the data matrix used in the final computations. Table 4 gives the tabular results of the correspondence analysis as applied to Table 3. As the first axis explains 96.56 percent of the variation in Table 3, the second axis can be discarded as it provides very little additional information.

Analysis

In regards the rate of biraderi marriages across all groups, fully ninety percent of all marriages were between relatives or biraderi members (see Table 3). In this, the

Gujars may be somewhat atypical relative to other Muslim groups, even those groups that occupy structurally similar socio-economic positions. Barth (1959:20, Figure 1), for example, reports that 85 percent of the marriages among the Gujar "caste" of the North

West Frontier Province (hereinafter NWFP) practice biraderi endogamy, the highest rate among the 10 groups he surveyed.

While statistics on Gujar communities in the Pakistan Punjab are not available,

Aschenbrenner (1967:245, Table XVb) provides data that are useful for constructing a statistical base against which to compare marital statistics in this region. In her village, the highest rate of endogamous marriages for males, at 67 (67.4) percent, was among the low status non-Arain "castes," while among the dominant landholding Arains, 56 (56.2) percent of the marriages were "caste" endogamous.’ In contrast, at 30 percent, the

highest rate of male lineal endogamy was recorded for the Arain "caste" (Aschenbrenner

’ The Arains are a biraderi renowned for their acumen as vegetable farmers and marketers. 135 Table 3

Marital Patterns by Natal Origin

Marriage Type

Region Lineal* Kin" Biraderi* Exogamous Total Northern 11 (.50) 3 (.14) 4 (.18) 4 (.18) 22 Central 11 (.33) 9 (.27) 7 (.21) 6 (.18) 33 Eastern' 7 (.11) 24 (.39) 28 (.46) 2 (.03) 61 Total 29 (.25) 36 (.31) 39 (.34) 12 (.10) 116

* Marriage of agnates. Marriage of demonstrable (but non-agnatic) kin. ' Marriage of biraderi members. ' Includes two respondents bom in Karachi known to be of families that had moved to that city from the Indian Punjab.

Table 4

Correspondence Analysis of Table 3. Eigenvalue Percentage Cumulative % 1. .22100925 96.56 96.56 2. .00787301 3.44 100.00 First Principal Axis Marriage Type Coordinates Correlation* Contribution" Lineal .61 .98 41.6 Kin(ship) -.31 .94 13.4 Biraderi -.38 .97 22.1 Exogamous .70 .94 22.9 Region Northern .68 .96 39.5 Central .35 .89 15.7 Eastern -.43 1.00 44.8 a M : . ^ b wContribution" is a measure of the weight of each point to the orientation of the axis. 136 1967:251, Table XIX), while the "low-caste" non-Arains, at 19 (18.6) percent, have a much lower rate of lineal endogamy. Compared to Aschenbrenner’s statistics, marital data I collected indicate that those Gujars bom in the Pakistan Punjab (i.e., the central group, see Table 3) have higher rates of both biraderi (82 per cent) and lineal endogamy

(33 percent).

The Jammu Gujars of Himachal Pradesh also have a high rate of endogamous marriages (Hasan 1986; Roychoudhury 1976). This group is distinctive for the fact that aside from the preference for biraderi endogamy, they have "maintained many of the rituals and practices of their Hindu ancestors" (Hasan 1986:19), continuing to "practice clan exogamy [and] worship krishna" (Hasan 1986:63, 67).

Two studies include marital statistics for Muslim communities of northwest Uttar

Pradesh. Bandyopadhyay et al. (1986) report a high rate of "consanguinity" (.6161 of

112 marriages) among the nomadic Muslim Gujars of northern Uttar Pradesh. This is so in spite of the fact that these Muslim Gujars observe clan exogamy (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1986:134).* Basu’s (1975) study of Shia Muslims in Uttar Pradesh again demonstrates the extent to which high rates of biraderi endogamy are unique to Muslim

Gujar populations. As a distinct minority, Shia Muslims evidence high rates of consanguineous marriage. However, at 49.40 per cent of 1,(X)0 marriages the rate of biraderi endogamy is substantially below endogamous rates reported for Muslim Gujars

* Bandyopadhyay et al (1986) are unclear as to the lineal background of the various "exogamous" cousin marriages they record. It is possible that reckoned on the male side many cross- and matrilateral marriages are in actuality to agnatic relatives once removed. It might, therefore, be more appropriate to recognize the group as practicing a modified form of lineal exogamy. 137 either in the literature or in this dissertation. In the Delhi region, Basu (1975) recorded a 28 per cent (27.65) rate of biraderi endogamy among non-Gujar Muslims. This contrasts with the endogamous rate of 96 per cent recorded for the Muslim Gujars of the eastern Punjab surveyed in this study.

The high rate of biraderi endogamy among the Gujars is apparently of some historic depth. According to the editor of Elliot’s (1869, vol. 1:100, footnote) Memoirs,

the author had quoted "a Lt. Robinson as stating that Musulman (sic) Gujars . . . do not

marry much with other tribes." This pattern, therefore, is fairly consistent across time

and space. Bandyopadhyay et al. (1986) assert that this social trait is related to the

restrictions of Gujar nomadism and the more recent imposition of restrictions in mobility.

These are indeed important factors, as previous discussions in this dissertation have

suggested. But as previous discussions also suggest, one cannot ignore the role historical

developments have played in promoting Gujar indifference, insularity, and aloofness.

The high rate of endogamous marriages among the Gujars may indeed be linked to and

reinforced by both sets of factors.

Regional Variations

One of the strengths of correspondence analysis is its ability to display graphically

the row and column profiles as points in low dimensional space: Figure 5 shows the

relative position of the row and column points projected in a single dimension.

The correspondence analysis of Table 3 indicates that marital strategies can be

categorized under three different regional rubrics: (1) an "eastern group" (which includes

respondents bom in what became the Indian Punjab); (2) a "northern group" (comprising 138 Eastern Central Northern

Kin marriage Lineal endogamy Biraderi endogamy Biraderi exogamy

Figure 5. Display of Correspondence Analysis of Table 5

respondents bom in the NWFP, Azad Kashmir, and Indian Jammu and Kashmir); and

(3) a "central group" (consisting of respondents bom in the Pakistan Punjab).* The marital strategies of each of these three groups are considered in turn.

TTie Eastern (Indian) Gujars

"Biraderi endogamy," "kin marriage" and the "eastern group" cluster at the left end of the axis. These marital strategies are reflective of the pattern of patrilineal and patronymic (clan) exogamy and caste endogamy characteristic of north Indian Hindu

village communities.*® In this region, Muslim Gujars were confronted by the dominant

* In interpreting these results it is necessary to exercise some caution. The tendency to assume that the row and column points in the same region of the graph are directly related must be resisted. Distance can be measured among row or among column points only and not diagonally across the matrix (i.e., between a column point and a row point). To interpret the relationship of row and coluntm points it is necessary to focus instead on the principal axis as it is this that provides the rationale for projecting both row and column points onto one line.

*® It is possible that the system of military recruitment, as it related to the revenue burden, had the effect of slowing the shift in marital practices among recent converts. It would be illuminating in this regard to compare marital practices of large Muslim landowning families against those of small landowners, hereditary tenants, tenants at will 139 Hindu culture that the Mughals and British (see Chapter 6) had sought to preserve, at least as a basis of their revenue administration. As the sufi’s power to enact change in the mundane world was relatively limited, conversion portended to isolate an individual from one’s relatives without immediate or sufficient forms of material recompense. As a result, when conversion occurred it was a mass phenomenon involving either sections or sub-sections ofajati (Baljon 1974). A consequence of this pattern of conversion, and the continuing presence of a majority Hindu rural population, convert groups, including the Gujars, retained many of their pre-conversion customs.

Political, economic, cultural and historical forces further argued against this group’s complete abandonment of Hindu marital practices." Specifically, a high rate

of lineal endogamy, by reducing the size of the affinal kin network, limits one’s potential political and social support. Combined with the Gujars’ ambiguous caste ranking and

their need to cooperate with Hindu zamindars and bhaiacara/pattidari patron groups, this

factor must have served as an impetus to continue to observe lineal exogamy. Although

Islamic fraternity is a powerful and persuasive idiom, it may have been in this instance

insufficient to override the importance of the vertical ties of patronage and

dependency." It would appear that although conversion to Islam may have displaced

and artisans.

" See Bourdieu (1977:30-71) for a full if somewhat difficult discussion of the various benefits and drawbacks of cousin-marriage, especially FBD marriage.

" The extent to which vertical ties of patronage take precedence over the horizontal ties of a shared faith has been shown in Miller’s (1954) study of Mappilas (Muslim) seafarers of Malabar. In spite of sharing a religion that was radically distinct from their Hindu patrons, the Mappilas nevertheless divided into two separate communities that reflects the political allegiance and dependence of these communities on the beneficence 140 the ostensible source of gotra-cluster unity among the Gujars from the Eastern Punjab, traditional marriage practices persisted, albeit in a somewhat modified form as lineal

endogamy developed as an option to traditional marital practices.

Hindu marital rules combine to express in a geographically characteristic fashion

what some cultural geographers have labelled a "crater effect" (Libbee and Sopher

1975:351). That is to say that the observance of the various marital rules produce a

characteristic pattern in which each village is surrounded by a belt within which all

marriages occur and outside of which they are prohibited. This "crater effect" is most

evident on the plains of north India where the flatness of the terrain, and the existence

of a widespread communication field, facilitates its uniform expression.

Yet, even where village exogamy is closely observed, the geographic expression

of such affinal networks is seldom found to be symmetrical. Factors such as social and

political relations linking villages, territorial discontinuities, distance and topographic

restrictions on movement, the nature and extent of communication networks, differential

caste rankings, the degree of conformity to the Brahminic lifestyle, as well as the

mobility associated with specific occupations influence the geographic expression of

affinal kin networks (see Gould 1960, 1961). Similarly, caste expression at the regional

level is mediated by regional differences in language and caste-composition, demographic

variables, and discontinuities in economic organization. On the basis of such reasoning.

and patronage of two antagonistic and dominant Hindu castes. In addition to feuding and warfare, the social cleavages among the Mappilas were expressed symbolically by group endogamy and status displacement, wherein differences of ornamentation and clothing "tended to be expressed in terms of rank, [and where] members of a caste on opposite sides of a political boundary [claimed] to be superior" (Miller 1954:416). 141 it has been assumed that the high ranking "twice bom" Hindus would have some of the more widespread affinal kin networks (Libbee and Sopher 1975).

The degree of elaboration of a marriage circulation field does not necessarily correlate directly with differences in caste ranking. At the lower end of the caste hierarchy, one frequently finds caste groups that also have fairly extensive regional caste networks. For example, the ". . . occupation of tanner and leather worker from the traditional basis of what is in northern India the largest single caste-cluster (Chamar) and also one of the most widespread" (Sopher 1975:207, n. 29). As a function of their

mobility, pastoralists such as the Gujars have similarly widespread marriage circulation

fields (Sopher 1975:207).

The Northern Group

In the northern group, lineal endogamy and biraderi exogamy cluster at the right

end of the axis. The northern areas of Pakistan and India are still predominantly Muslim

(Ahmed 1976, Barth 1959, Lindholm 1982). That a high rate of lineal endogamy is

observed among the northern Gujars is hardly surprising given Islam’s pervasive

influence in the region. Berreman’s (1962) work in a Hindu context, in which high rates

of village endogamy were observed in a mountainous setting, suggests that topographic

discontinuities and socio-economic factors are helping to generate this marital patterns.

Among the sedentary agro-pastoralist Gujars of northern Pakistan and India, demographic

imbalances, a lack of geographic mobility, social insularity, and low social status may

therefore combine to restrict the geographic stretch of their affinal networks. Lineal

endogamy, however, holds a symbolic appeal for Muslims that exists over and above 142 such material considerations. By marrying their close relatives, the Gujars in a sense proclaim their piety and devotion as good Muslims, albeit to a locally perceived and understood model of Islamic society.

The association of biraderi exogamy with the northern group seems to contradict the observations and conclusions drawn above, especially regarding the religious symbolism of close kin marriages. However, statements collected in the field indicate that this is not necessarily so. In some instances informants were able to recount how their parents, unable to marry their son to a close relative, did not feel compelled to arrange a marriage within the biraderi. These same informants, many of who were religious clerics, surmised that their parents had reasoned that a good marriage to a non-

Gujar Muslim (frequently of equal or higher status), was as worthwhile as a poor marriage to some distant, and unknown biraderi. relative whom, it was also reasoned, would be reluctant to move far away from her natal home.'^ Because they were prevented from achieving their first marital objective, parents were in effect free to arrange whatever marriage best suited their’s or their children’s culturally-defined self- interests.

Other factors that play in determining the high rate of biraderi exogamy among

this group include geographic mobility and age. As we shall see, the northern Gujars

are the most geographically mobile and "urbanized" of the three groups. Most have

moved to Islamabad along a male-dominated migration chain that extends to many of

" The strategic use of endogamous and exogamous marital arrangements has of course been reported for other parts of the Muslim world (see Bourdieu 1977; Cole 1984; Combs-Schilling 1981). 143 Pakistan’s major urban areas (see Chapter 10). One effect of this form of migration has been to reduce to a nucleus of lineal kin the potential pool of marriageable biraderi relatives. In terms of their age, the northern group has the lowest average age of all three groups. As such they have been heavily influenced by recent movements to

Islamicize Pakistan and internationalize Islam. While their perceptions conform in broad outline to local and regional understandings of Islam, marriage to non-Gujar Muslims reflects the adoption of a more cosmopolitan interpretation of Muslim values and ideas.

The Central (Punjabi) Gujars

The central region is slightly to the right of the center of the axis. While the disturbed conditions in the Punjab that followed in the wake of Partition in 1947 make the analysis of these data highly speculative, correspondence analysis indicates that the central Gujars employ a range of marital strategies. This is reflective of the overall

cultural diversity and socio-economic heterogeneity of the Punjab. As such, it also

underlines the extent of socio-economic diversity that obtains among the Gujars of the

Pakistan Punjab (see Chapter 6).

A low social standing, a historic lack of access to lands and social networks

located in the canal colonies of the western Punjab (see Chapter 6), a supposed

propensity for stealing, and a low political standing delimit and restrict the range of

marital options, at least for certain sectors of this group. Turning inward, they have

arranged marriages between the daughters and sons of their geographically and

genealogically close relatives. While the number of families may have been small, large

family size would have facilitated this strategy. 144 The closer proximity of the central group to the right end of the axis may again reflect the social discontinuities that result from demographic imbalances. Put simply, the Gujar social networks of the Pakistan Punjab may have encompassed an insufficient number of kin to compensate for random fluctuations in population size and sex ratios.

Gaining political advantage, sustaining a privileged position, adopting more modem attitudes towards marriage (e.g., letting children make their own decisions, arranging marriages regardless of biraderi background), or simply falling in love have motivated these exogamous marriages.

General Implications

The results of the statistical analysis are suggestive of the diverse impact Islam has had on Indian society. It appears that the arrival of Islam in the subcontinent, while it supplanted the ideological moorings of Hindu marital rules, resulted in marital practices that varied by region and social status. In Hindu-dominated areas, Muslim converts continued to observe the marital customs of their region and former caste status, though with slight increases in lineal endogamy. In Muslim majority regions, lineal endogamy was more widely practiced. Throughout the Greater Punjab, the Gujar marital strategies reflect the variegated and heterogenous socio-economic context of the province.

The adoption of marital practices perceived to be based on scriptural understandings and injunctions have, nevertheless, had a profound impact on Gujar social organization and kinship reckoning. Among Hindu communities, marriage practices serve to demarcate the boundary between the domain of economic, social, and political activity and the affinal circle of marriageable kin. In essence, Hindu marital rules drive 145 a conceptual wedge between the clan as the unit of economic and political cooperation and the caste as the unit of marriage (see Gould 1961:298; Mandelbaum 1988). The removal of this prohibition, as signified by the adoption of lineal, kin, and clan marriage, undermines the social unity of the affinally-linked gotra-clusters found among Hindu

Gujars.*^ Khatana (1976:11), for example, has observed that among the Muslim Gujars of Indian Jammu and Kashmir "...the significance of the clan groups among the Gujar

Bakarwals [sheep herders] has declined gradually since their conversion." Converting to Islam thus laid the groundwork for creating conditions in which the reckoning of kin relatedness no longer served as a means by which to differentiate between those one marries, and those one seeks out for political and economic purposes. The implications of this conceptual merging, as they influence Gujar social organization in Islamabad, are developed more fully in subsequent chapters. The next chapter, however, continues to develop the historic background of Gujar ethnicity by examining the nature and impact of British rule in the subcontinent.

" For a theoretical consideration of the fissionary aspects of lineal endogamy see Murphy and Kasdan (1959, 1967). For a specific application to rural Pakistani society see Kurin and Morrow (1985). CHAPTER VI

THE GUJARS UNDER BRITISH IMPERIALISM

The British hate the best Gujars because they revolted against them in 1857. Commission in the Army were banned for Gujars by the British because they participated in the revolt and inspired other peoples to revolt against the British ^ohammad Arshad Gujar, April 19, 1986).

In 1857, when the Chibs of Deva fell on the village of Doklua, [the Gujar], Chaudri Sultan Ali], came forward at the head of 1,000 retainers of his own clan, for whom he refused to accept any pay, and guarded that part of the district which borders on Kashmir. His troops also went to Delhi and were useful during the siege. For these services [he was granted] the village of Dhinda Kalan (Chopra 1940, vol. 2:188).

Previous chapters have focussed on the historical factors that have informed Gujar ethnicity and ethnic identity. Using these earlier discussions as its foundation, the present chapter considers the ways in which the practices of British colonial rule have contributed to contemporary political and economic relations among the Gujars of

Islamabad.

The analysis picks up the threads of the story with the Mutiny of 1857. The discussion is contained in two sections. The first section examines British explanations of the causes of the Mutiny, especially those that developed in the decades immediately following the uprising. This chapter is concerned with examining the ways in which these views structured the relationship of the colonial state to its subject populations only to extent to which they illuminate British perceptions of the Indian peasantry in general.

146 147 and the Gujars in particular. The second section examines British settlement policies in the western Punjab. Here, the discussion focusses on the ways in which the settlement practices in the "canal colonies" of the western Punjab inform Gujar politics, economics, and ethnic discourse within Islamabad.

The Mutiny and the Question of Gujar "Martiality"

The Mutiny of 1857 constituted a critical chapter in the history of British rule in India.

Before 1857, British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent had been marked by the aggressiveness with which British authorities had set to reforming Indian society (see

Metcalf 1964:1-45; Stokes 1959; 1978:90-119). Inspired by a combination of evangelical fervor and Benthamite utilitarianism, and sustained by the Enlightenment belief in the infinite malleability of human nature, the British set their hand to the task of reshaping

India into a peasant/bourgeois parliamentary state (Metcalf 1964:1-18).

The principal objective of this mission was to assault what many British authorities perceived to be the traditions that supported the "moral decadence" and

"economic inequities" of Indian society (Metcalf 1964:3-45; Stokes 1959). By attacking the basis of such social ills, the British thought it possible to promote India’s social progress and economic development. The Indian attitudes, ideas, and values that would evolve as a consequence of such development would, in turn, reduce the need for a strong military presence. While Utilitarianism motivated and legitimated British policies and attitudes toward education, religious instruction, and social reform, it was most 148 faithfully and consistently drawn upon in regard to what is commonly known as the land settlement process.

The right to establish proprietary rights, set the revenue demand, and appoint intermediaries to collect and pay taxes was the economic cornerstone of British colonial rule. Assigning the responsibility for meeting the state’s revenue demand both symbolized and enacted British political dominance in the subcontinent. In the hands of the British-Indian Utilitarians, this "right" was to develop into a powerful weapon by which to attack the very basis of Indian society (see Metcalf 1964: 36-45). To do this, however, required that the British first confront and then redefine preexisting forms of land tenure and property rights.

As the British empire expanded westward from the Bay of Bengal into the heartland of the Indian subcontinent, it assumed sovereignty (through its agent, the

British East India Company) over peoples and cultures that exhibited a wide range of tenurial systems and definitions of property rights (see, e.g., Baden-Powell 1892).

Among the welter of property relations they encountered, the British searched for a land

tenure system that was similar to that of the British yeoman society. The ryotdari system

of South India, with its class of peasant proprietors, was the closest the British came to

discovering such a system in the Indian subcontinent. However, for the most part what

they found instead was that proprietary rights were defined along the lines of the

zamindari (or taluqdarî) tenurial forms, with the vast majority of villagers serving as

tributary tenants to large absentee landlords. 149 In general, the British viewed the Indian landlord as a "drone on the soil"

(Metcalf 1964:41) who, through the appropriation of the surplus value of tenant labor, stymied individual initiative and slowed economic growth. The continued existence of such tenurial relations could not be tolerated as it was believed to be a cause for the peasantry’s political dissatisfaction with British rule. In order to redress the inherent inequities of such tenurial arrangements, wherever it was possible zamindars were set aside and the responsibility for meeting the revenue demand settled on the landlord’s former occupancy tenants.

The Death of Utilitarianism

The contempt with which British functionaries treated Indian landlords evaporated rather abruptly in the heat of the summer of 1857. In May of that year an insurrection, that started among the sepoys of the British Indian army, spread to engulf much of the

North Indian countryside, threatening thereby to sweep the British back into the Bay of

Bengal. During the hostilities, the British watched, perplexed and in shock, as the cultivators whom they had favored joined in common cause with recently retired

zamindars, taluqdars, and other revenue intermediaries. Referred to variously as the

"First War of Indian Independence," "The Sepoy Revolt," and "The Mutiny of 1857,"

the conflict cast a long shadow over the subsequent economic, political, social, religious

and even literary history of British India. Among its most renowned casualties was the

doctrine of Indian Utilitarianism (see Metcalf 1964: 92ff).

The peasant’s "betrayal" destroyed whatever faith the British might have had in

the ability of Indians to recognize their own economic self-interests. Erased from the 150 discourse of Imperialism were the concepts of "educational reform," "moral uplift," and

"social progress." In their stead, there arose a new Imperial vocabulary whose essence was captured in such concepts as "the Raj" and "Vice Regency." Yet, in spite of the image of absolute control suggested by such terms, the complementary imperial practices that arose beside this new attitude were far less uniform than had been the policies of the pre-Mutiny period.'

British colonial policy formation during the post-Mutiny period was increasingly based on a doctrine of selective intervention. That is to say colonial policies in late-

Victorian British India were not formulated in accordance to some abstract free market principle. Rather they were developed to achieve the pragmatic goals of maintaining law and order, defending the country’s borders (against threats posed by Russia and various

Middle Eastern powers), and refining an administrative system capable of extracting resources and revenue. The nature of British colonial rule during this period left an indelible imprint on the content, form, and structure of Gujar ethnicity. To see how the indeterminateness of British colonial rule influenced the subsequent development of the self-reflective images of Gujar ethnicity it necessary to examine the nature of British colonial rule from a regional perspective.

' Commenting on this aspect of British rule in the subcontinent, Ainslie Embree (1969:36) has observed that "whether referring to land systems, foreign affairs, or moral judgments, the use of ’British’ as a modifier implies a unity in the British impact that never existed." 151 Imperial Rule in India

During the latter half of the 19th century, North India saw the commencement of a number of public works projects developed under British direction. While such projects varied in their sites of implementation and degree of invasiveness, they shared in the objective of promoting the advancement of the colonial state’s policy objectives.

In north India, a number of towns were "renovated" in a accordance with a design that was intended to facilitate government control of potentially riotous urban populations.

For instance, in the city of Lucknow, where Europeans had suffered some of their worst

"disgraces," roads were cut through the city’s old neighborhoods. Similarly, alleys were widened and straightened, popular meeting places were either occupied or cleared of surrounding obstructions, and houses and other buildings considered dangerous to public safety were razed (Oldenburg 1984:27-48). Many of the military cantonments in South

Asia’s cities and towns owe their design and origin to this period when the British, anxious to insure their safety, sought a physical means to isolate themselves from the rest of Indian society.

Politically, the British buttressed their political control by elevating local intermediaries to symbolic positions of power and prestige. In return for their political support, urban bosses (rais) were provided various perquisites such as appointments to various boards and committees, greater access to the higher echelons of the provincial government, and so forth. Yet, the British apparently held few illusions as to extent of

authority these ward bosses had among the constituents ostensibly under their jurisdiction. Nonetheless, they were apparently content with what little information an 152 urban boss might provide regarding potential disturbances, ongoing political developments, and so forth (Oldenberg 1984), recognizing that the ruthlessness with which urban renovations had been pushed through left little doubt as to where power actually lay in post-Mutiny British India, i.e., with the British.

The practices of colonial rule in the countryside was of an entirely different character. True enough, the British did initiate a series of public projects of similar in magnitude and aim of the urban projects of the 1860s and 1870s. Roads were straightened, widened and "metalled"; bridges were refurbished or built; dikes, dams, and levees were upgraded or constructed; railroad tracks were laid and old beds were restored; telegraph lines (and later telephone wires) were strung; and extensive systems of canals were dug (Oldenberg 1984:23). Nonetheless, the nature of agrarian society, together with the nature of British interests in the agrarian economy, combined to motivate the institution of an entirely different structure of political control.

The rural areas of British India were rich in agricultural wealth, and contained potentially vast stores of mineral, vegetable, and other natural resources. Yet, the

countryside was a vast area that was populated by innumerable towns, villages, and

hamlets. The diffuse and decentralized nature of rural society, and the need of "budget"

colonialism (Fox 1985:17), combined to render impractical and impossible the type of

control the British had developed to rule the major cities of north India. In their place,

the government used various means of enticement to coopt landed magnates into the

administrative structures of British India. 153 Known widely as the "policy of indirect rule," the effort to develop a system of rule that governed through the manipulation of traditional elites required the British to gather information and knowledge about rural Indian society at a level that had heretofore never been considered. British revenue and settlement officers, most of whom had some knowledge or direct exposure to the ideas of such leading social thinkers as Sir Henry

Sumner Maine (Dewey 1991:29), set out to develop a comprehensive encyclopedia of the

"life, thought, sociology, and history" (Cohn 1990b:652) of India. The findings of such

"studies" appeared initially in the census reports, settlement records, revenue surveys and other official documents of the British Indian government. They eventually attained a

"scholarly" status as district gazetteers and census ethnographies (Dewey 1991:26-30).

Such studies were as instrumental as they were reflective of the ideological presuppositions that licensed British explanations of the Mutiny’s causes. In this regard the "varieties of policies, of attitudes, and influences" (Embree 1969:36) were grounded in a widely shared ideology of imperialism. Contra Embree (1969), British colonial rule was consistent, but it was consistent only to the extent that British authorities embraced an ideology that itself licensed inconsistent and contradictory explanations of human behavior.

Indian l.amarckianlsin

The towns, villages, and hamlets of North India had been the scene of some of

the Mutiny’s bloodiest skirmishes. They had also been the scene of the most ambitious

land reforms enacted by the British (Metcalf 1964:3-45). It was here then, that British

authorities were hardest pressed to come to terms with events as they unfolded during 154 the summer of 1857. The seemingly "irrational" and treacherous acts of the peasantry

contradicted the calculus of bourgeois rationalism that was at the heart of Utilitarianism.

In locating the causes for the peasant’s supposed inability to recognize his or her

economic self-interests, and in rebuffing the attacks of reactionary conservatives

(especially in the Punjab), British authorities embraced as dogma and doctrine an

explanation of human behavior that located its genitive roots in the inheritance of

acquired racial instincts (see Dewey 1991:27; Fox 1985:140-159; Gilmartin 1988b: 11-13;

Metcalf 1964:310-313; Ranger 1976:116-117).

In accordance with such understandings, the British increasingly viewed Indian

society as composed of a conglomeration of distinct caste, racial, and tribal groups, with

each possessing its own unique, inherited behavioral predisposition (see Fox 1985:140-

159; Metcalf 1964:312). On the basis of different racial qualities of each group a "social

order was established with the British crown seen as the centre of authority, and capable

of ordering into a single hierarchy all its subjects, Indian and British" (Cohn 1990b:648).

But this is just one side of the imperial equation of late-Victorian British colonial rule.

Descriptive labels such as "agricultural" or "non-agricultural," "martial" or "non-

martial," "thrifty" or "improvident," "industrious" or "lazy" assigned to each group were

thought to convey something about the underlying character of specific group members.

In actual practice, however, the social taxonomy of caste, racial, and tribal groups was

never systematized, but instead "varied through time and from region to region of India"

(Cohn 1990b:663). The flexibility of these caste labels was in part an outgrowth of the

underlying ideological presuppositions that licensed their use. 155 The British, like their European and American counterparts, had invoked the concept of "Social Darwinism" in justification of their global political hegemony. As is well known, projecting Darwin’s concept of "the survival of the fittest" onto the realm of social relations (or race relations as it was more commonly known in the United

States) provided an ideological basis by which to rationalize the coexistence of "free market" competition and discriminatory racial practices. However, in regard to administering its Indian colonial possessions, it was Lamarck, rather than Darwin, who supplied the ideological sustenance necessary to legitimate the practices of British colonial rule in India.^

The functional value of this conceptualization of social behavior is found in its ability to resolve the inherent contradictions of late-19th century European imperialism.

Great Britain was a liberal democracy in which political power and authority was allocated on the basis of majority voting. Such traditions clashed with their colonial experience in India. There the British constituted a minority whose power ultimately rested on the sword, rather than on the ballot box. Lamarckianism-an inchoate complex of ideas and associations—served collectively to reconcile the contradictions of British imperialism.

In a sense, Lamarcldanism supplied the ideology which licensed the belief that

social behavior arose in response to environmental factors as often as it reflected

^ In his Race, Culture, and Evolution, Stocking (1968:234-269) draws attention to similar functions that Lamarcldanism performed in American race relations at the turn of the century. To the best of my knowledge, his insights have not been developed in relation to the practices of British colonial rule. 156 instinctive predilections. Placing environmental forces on a footing equal to instinctual responses made it possible to argue that caste, racial, and tribal attributes, while

inherited, in some inexplicable way remained liable to immediate changes in the

environment. Such reasoning legitimated the conflictive practices of the colonial state.

On the one hand, it allowed the British to contend that evolutionary forces could be

arrayed in such a manner as to ensure India’s political complacency, while concomitantly

promoting the country’s march to civilization.^ On the other hand, such reasoning also

made it possible to attribute the responsibility for India's backwardness to the

conservative nature of the Indian peasantry.

The disparate aims of mastering Indian society and appropriating its resources,

while overseeing its march towards civilization, were conjoined at a still deeper level on

the basis of the idea that Indian and European society were genealogically related through

the links they shared to ancient Aryan society (see Pollock 1993:80-83).“* While Social

Darwinism legitimated colonial domination at the global scale, the contradicting ideas

that India was inherently inferior, yet racially indistinct from European society, could

only be reconciled on the basis of a Lamarckian view of the relationship of race and

culture. Again Lamarckianism’s inherent flexibility and indeterminateness supplied a

rationale whereby it became possible to argue that India was "a storehouse of ‘survivals’

’ See van den Dungen (1972) for a discussion of British views of their civilizing mission in India.

* While the work of late 18th and early 19th century philologists had established the Aryan linguistic affinities of the Indo-European language family, the ideological implications of this discovery are only now being fully realized (see Breckenridge and van der Veer 1993). 157 from the earliest stages of Aryan civilization" (Dewey 1991:26). From the perspective of this convoluted logic (whose linkages and associations had not yet been fully charted), it can be said that the greatest lesson the British learned from the events of 1857 was not the folly of Indian Utilitarianism, but rather the extent to which the Aryan society of

India-credited with having brought civilization to India—had come to be, in the words of one of British India’s most influential scholar-administrators. Sir Alfred Lyall, "at an arrested state of development" (Owen 1973:233-234), a state which they significantly attributed to the retrogressive influences of non-Aryan Muslim, Turanian, and other

Central Asian peoples (Owen 1973; van der Veer 1993:40).

In light of this colonial worldview, British use of the methods of social analysis developed by the nascent "sciences of man" takes on very different meanings and implications. The ethnographic studies of late Victorian British scholar-administrators, especially those who were working on Punjabi society, were frequently directed at

uncovering in the customs, manners, languages, and religions of the people the traces of

an underlying social form that was at once, both "rational," and "Aryan" (Dewey

1991:26).^ The findings of these ethnographic studies merged the idea of Aryan descent

with the concept of inherent rationality, in effect making each a synonym for the other.®

® The nearly a century of "social research" devoted to uncovering the Aryan roots of Hindu society culminated in such works as Risely’s (1891) two-volume Tribes and Castes o f Bengal. Other works that are less explicit in nature, but no less telling in their attempt to "uncover" the underlying principles of social organization include Tupper’s (1881) Customary Laws o f the Punjab and Baden-Powell’s (1892) Land Systems o f British India.

® The implications of this merging for studies of the history of anthropological theory, sub-altemity. Orientalism and so forth have not been sufficiently acknowledged. 158 In so doing, the ethnographic study of traditional society was wrested from the hands of the antiquarians, and made an essential element in the "science of government" (Dewey

1991:26).

Puiyabi Tribes and Aryan Survivals

In accordance with these views. Settlement Officers, with an eye toward uncovering (or at least substantiating) the Aryan structures underlying Punjabi society, set out to document the customary laws of the Punjab that related to inheritance, descent, marriage and so forth of the various tribal groups in the province. While British administrators recognized that marriage between cousins occurred among some Punjabi

Muslim groups and that the shar’iat represented an alternative to the Punjab’s customary laws (see Chapters 4 and 5), the foundations of Punjabi society and culture were seen to rest on the fundamental unit of the exogamous tribal clan (see Baden-Powell 1892, vol

2:609-726; Lyall 1882; Tupper 1881). These principles of social organization were held to be essential to maintaining the racial purity and the corporate strength of indigenous society (Mason 1974:358).

In British attempts to codify the Punjab’s "customary laws" (see, e.g., Tupper

1881), it is possible to recognize the goal of uncovering the Aryan principles of Punjabi society. In protecting and strengthening the Punjab’s tribal organization one glimpses further a British effort to create conditions conducive to the reemergence of the Punjab’s ancient Aryan roots. Uncovering the Aryan principles of social organization in the

Punjab supplied the ideological grounding and conceptual linkages necessary for an entire project of colonial domination and economic appropriation. 159 In actual practice, the organization of Punjabi tribes varied widely from the "local tribe of the frontier, with its known leader or council" to the "village clans of the central

Punjab, still acknowledging a common tribal name" (Tupper 1881, vol. 2:69). The more

"important" of these tribes were politically dominant within particular territories and united under a local "tribal leader." The basis of a tribal leader’s power rested on the three pillars of tribal cohesiveness, territorial control, and clan exogamy. These were each in turn supported by the tribe’s customary laws, especially those rules regulating descent, inheritance, and marriage (Tupper 1881, vol. 2:70-82).

Upon these tribal "structures" the British erected a pyramid of loyalties that extended upward from the proprietary body to the apex of the Government of British

India. The zail, a revenue tract that brought together from five to forty villages of

kindred proprietary castes (Ali 1988:108; Gilmartin 1988b:20-21) was the key

administrative unit in the structure of colonial rule.’ In every zail the government

appointed a zaildar (lit. a controller or master of a zail), who was ideally recognized as

"the leading [man] of a particular tribe or section of the country" (E. A. Prinsep in

Gilmartin 1988b:21). The zaildar’s primary responsibility was to represent, protect, and

promote government interests in the zail (Gilmartin 1981:153). Although of much less

significance to the British, it was also the zaildar’s responsibility to represent the interests

of his constituents in their dealings with the government. The criteria by which zaildars

’ According to Baden-Powell (1892, vol. 2:741, no. 3) a "zail means literally ‘the margin of a grant or document’; and in old days the zamindarie grants used to have in the lower margin a list of the names of village belonging to the estate: hence zail would imply the tract of country specified in the margin of any appointment warrant." 160 were selected are critical to understanding how British colonial rule has influenced the

Gujars’ contemporary ethnic imaginings.

Zaildars were ostensibly selected on the basis of their landholdings and their position within the tribe. Acts of loyalty, support of the crown and so forth enhanced a man’s chances of being appointed to one of these prestigious and influential positions.

In actuality, it was more often the case that these latter ascribed characteristics were the criteria used to select zaildars (see Gilmartin 1988b:21-26,46-47).®

The hereditary custodians of the province’s rural shrines were brought into the colonial political structure in a similar manner. Although the British, as Christians, were unable to ground their authority in a religious idiom, important sajjida nishins were appointed as "zaildars, honorary magistrates, and district board members" (Gilmartin

1988b:50). Moreover, they were also to receive substantial land grants in the western

Punjab when, in the late 18(X)s, irrigation projects began to make land available for dispensation by British authorities (Gilmartin 1988b:SO-Sl).

A review of the literature suggests that within the Punjab, the extent of political power that a zaildar wielded ranged rather widely. In the eastern and central districts of the province, historical, ecological and social factors, which favored bhaiacara tenurial forms, served to check a zaildar’s political power.’ In the western Punjab conditions

* As discussed later, establishing the boundaries of each zail was a contributing factor for a growing interest among provincial British administrators in the developing social sciences of sociology and anthropology.

’ Kessinger (1974:79) reports that in Jullundur district it was the coparcenary landholding bhaiacara that was in actuality responsible for meeting the revenue demand. Where zamindars were present, they must have functioned as little more than revenue 161 differed in that they were favorable to the zaildari form of political organization. The system of indirect rule was sufficiently flexible to accommodate either a strong or weak zaildari system. Indeed, as if to demonstrate the extent of flexibility, in settling the canal colonies, the British, wherever possible, established a peasant proprietary body rather than a zaildar (see Gilmartin 1988b: 140-141).

Underpinning the tribal structures of colonial rule was the importance the British ascribed to land ownership and the control of agricultural capital as the sine qua non of political position and social status. British rule in the Punjab, especially the opening of the canal colonies, initially laid the groundwork for the growth and development of an open market in land titles. Yet, in spite of their proclaimed support of free market principles, the British passed a series of legislative acts throughout the late 1800s (the

1862 Punjab Code of Civil Procedure, the Punjab Laws Act of 1872, and the Alienation of Land Bill of 1900) that, by virtue of restraining the introduction of urban capital into the Punjab, protected the interests of the landed elite. In so doing, the British threw their

weight solidly and irrevocably behind the property holding status groups (see Barrier

1966:3-13; Gilmartin 1988a; 1988b). As it did so, it laid the groundwork for the

development of class differences within the Gujar biraderi. To understand how this

happened it is necessary to examine the caste concept of "martiality."

Martial and Non-Martial Gujars

The concept of inherent "martiality" was a cornerstone of British endeavors to

organize and bring order to Indian society. Tribes, castes, and biraderis were denoted

clerks. 162 as "marital castes" if they had stood with the British during the Mutiny. Loyal, courageous, brave, and devout, members of the martial classes were considered amenable to the rigors and demands of military discipline. Conversely, "non-martial" castes were those groups that had risen against the British in 1857. In general, they were seen as rebellious, unruly, deceitful, cowardly, and prone to flight during battle. Considered unfit for military life, they were banned from serving in the British Indian Army (Mason

1974:341-361).

Again, as in so much of the history of British India, this concept was never applied uniformly or consistently either through time, across regions, or even to specific groups. Comparing the post-Mutiny histories of the Gujars and the Sikhs illuminates some of the historic, social, political, and geographic factors that influenced the differential categorization of caste groups.

Martiality and Non-Martiality among Sikhs and Gujars

Aside from scattered uprisings in the province’s eastern districts, the castes, tribes, races, and biraderis of the Punjab remained loyal to the British in 1857. Punjabis

mustered large numbers of troops and provided various other forms of military assistance

in response to Chief Commissioner John Lawrence’s call for reinforcements to help in

relieving the besieged city of Delhi.

The fidelity of the Punjabis to their colonial masters was seen by the British as

a manifestation of the inherent martial spirit of the province’s hardier races, tribes, and

castes, especially Sikh and Hindu Jats, Muslim Rajputs, and Pathans. In recognition of

the assistance they rendered the British during the summer of 1857, the Punjab’s martial 163 "caste groups" received large grants of land, appointments to influential jobs in the administration, and disproportionate recruitment to and advancement in the army (Fox

1985; Gilmartin 1988b). At the provincial level, British support for indigenous political structures took the form of the series of legislative enactments mentioned previously (i.e.,

The Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868; The Punjab Laws Act of 1872, The Alienation of Land

Act of 1900).

In the dispensation of imperial beneficence, the Sikhs were especially favored.

While they had fought the British in two wars leading up to the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, their aid had been crucial in suppressing the Mutiny. As they were neither

Hindu nor Muslim, the British must have seen in them the means whereby to confront a possible Afghan-Russian invasion (Barrier 1966:24). On the basis of these various

factors, the British perceived the Sikhs (along with the Gorkhas with whom they share

a number of interesting demographic, geographic and cultural similarities) as the "martial

caste" par excellence, the "Lions of the Punjab" (see Fox 1985; Mason 1974:341-361).

The Sikhs were also renowned for their acumen as peasant cultivators.

In terms of their geographic distribution, the Sikh homeland was in the main

restricted to the districts of the Central Punjab.’” Consequently, the classification of the

Sikhs as a martial caste corresponded to a high degree with the actual distribution of the

Sikh population (see Fox 1985). The compact nature of the population meant that the

benefits of imperial patronage had a much greater effect than it would among a more

That is the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Hoshiapur, Jullundur, and Ferozepur. 164 geographically widespread and diffuse population. The history of the Sikhs during the late 1800s was therefore one of overall relative prosperity (Fox 1985:27-51). The Sikh experiences during the post-Mutiny period contrasts markedly with those of the Gujars.

As mentioned in Chapter three, the Gujars are distributed across much of western, northern, and north-central India. Within this region, the "official" British view of the Gujars was remarkably diverse and inconsistent. To many authorities, the Gujars were among the most heinous and treacherous of the mutineers. Elliot (1869, vol.

1:179-180), for example, observed that they had a very bad reputation in Bulandshahr district "where they were particularly troublesome and riotous during the Mutiny, plundering the town of Sikandarabad, and doing a deal of mischief." They were

"unenviably notorious as being among the few rural populations who rose against [the

British] at that trying time." Similarly, in Gwalior and Rajputana, T. R. E. Holmes

(1891:1239) noted that "swarms of Goojurs . . . girding on their swords and bucklers,

and shouldering their matchlocks [had] plundered peaceful villages, and murdered the

villagers. "

To some, the Gujars exemplified the negative traits of India’s thieving castes. "In

all the towns [of India], as in those of the rest of the world, there were swarms of

worthless vagabonds, known by the generic name of budmashes, who, like the Goojurs,

detested the Government, precisely because it was a good and law-enforcing

Government, and would not allow them to commit the villainies for which they were

always ready" (Holmes 1891:44). 165 In his History o f the Indian Mutiny, T.R. E. Holmes (1891:44) is quite explicit as to the Gujars’ "instinctive lawlessness." The Gujars were "hereditary thieves . . . who, though they had been for fifty years restrained by the curb of a civilising power, were still straining to plunge back into the violent delights of an Ishmaelitish life." To

Holmes (1891:119) the aptitude with which they went about committing crimes "could only be explained on the theory that with them the propensity to crime was an inherited quality” (emphasis mine)."

With the exception of some districts (see, e.g., Stokes 1978:159-184), the Gujars,

regardless of their religious background, suffered terribly in the sack that followed in the

aftermath of the Mutiny. In Mathura district, for example, they lost 14 of their 35

villages and many were summarily executed (Misra 1959:20). While these acts of

retribution were brutal, the effects of denoting the Gujars as a non-marital caste were felt

far longer.

As a non-marital caste, Gujars were barred from enlisting in the army. The lack

of remittances limited the Gujars’ level of participation in the land market, reduced their

opportunities to find government employment, and effectively precluded whatever

chances they might have had of finding employment as an overseas laborer. In addition

to these material effects, the sanctions served to lower the Gujars’ social status, thereby

reinforcing anti-Gujar prejudices and opinions.

" The belief that British views reflected the essential nature of indigenous Indian society was supported by various folktales and parables collected from the Indian peasantry (see, e.g., Crooke 1896:448). 166

But even here it remained possible to reform the Gujars’ "instinctual" behaviors, given the right set of circumstances and environmental context. As one District Officer noted, the Gujars were physiologically amenable to being "comparatively reformed” when influenced by "the most civilizing agent" at the disposal of the British, that is, canal water (Muzaffamagar District Gazetteer, cited in Stone 1984:109). Developing this theme, another Settlement Officer commented that: give the Gujars "a canal and teach them the profits of agriculture and they work their villages like Jats. Put them in a [sub- optimal] tract like Loni Khadir and they pay their revenue by stealing cattle and committing burglaries in Delhi" (Gillan 1901:9-10 cited in Stone 1984:110). The post-

Mutiny record of the Punjabi Gujars contrasts with their experiences in post-Mutiny north

India. For the assistance they rendered to the British, Punjabi Gujars were denominated as a "martial caste," at least in some of the province’s districts (see Wikeley [1915]:93-

94). In those districts where they were denominated a marital caste, the Gujars shared in the prosperity British rule brought to the Punjab in relation to their political status and historical circumstances.

Gujar Martiality in Islamabad

Among the residents of Islamabad there is a widespread consensus that Gujars were denominated as a non-martial caste throughout the British Indian empire. As was mentioned in previous chapters, the members of other biraderis believe such an attribution is both accurate and well-deserved. The Gujars, quite expectedly, reject such characterizations out of hand. On this, there is broad-based agreement. Throughout the

community, with admittedly varying levels of interest and conviction, it is argued that 167 after the Mutiny was suppressed, the British found it expedient to subjugate the Gujars further because, as I was told, "every victor must keep the losers down."

Such readings of Gujar history are significant for a number of different, but related reasons. First, the Gujars use this chapter of their history to explain their current status as an economically depressed community. It is also invoked by the Gujars to explain their traditional association with occupational pastoralism: As they argue, the loss of ancestral lands after the Mutiny left few other options but to adopt a "wandering" lifestyle. Such readings are also significant for the fact that although the causal explanations differ, neither the Gujars nor their non-Gujar contemporaries, recognize (or at least acknowledge) that the Gujars were denominated a "martial caste" in some Punjabi districts.

That a less than charitable view of the Gujars has achieved some measure of currency among the ethnic characterizations circulating within Islamabad is indicative, in part, of the socio-cultural changes that occurred in the wake of the introduction of large scale irrigation projects in the western districts of the Punjab. It is to a consideration of these changes that I now turn.

The British Punjab and Muslim Gujars

The British ruled the Punjab for two years short of a century, annexing the province in

1849 and relinquishing it at Independence in 1947. During this period the Punjab

experienced a period of unprecedented prosperity and economic expansion (Ali 1988:10;

Blyn 1966:98). Facilitating this economic growth was a vast network of irrigation 168 canals, dams, weirs, locks, and ditches the British laid out in the province’s parched western scrub lands.

The application of water to vast reaches of open range and scrub land transformed the area into one of the richest agricultural tracts in all of South Asia. The extent of this transformation as measured by increases in cultivable acreage is truly astounding.

During the sixty odd years of the irrigation projects, it is estimated that cultivable acreage increased from around 3 million to over 14 million acres, representing a near five-fold increase in arable land (Ali 1988:9-10).

The opening of the Punjab’s vast western districts provided the British with an opportunity to create a society in India that embodied the values and virtues of the British yeoman peasantry. In order to do so, the canal colonies had to be populated with the

"best" cultivators, i.e., those deemed capable of breaking the land and husbanding its resources. In selecting agriculturalists for these purposes, canal colonists (as they were called) were recruited from among the "agricultural" castes of the Punjab, i.e., those castes, tribes, races, and biraderis (e.g., Jats, Rajputs, Gujars, and so forth) whom the

British considered the most efficient farmers (Ali 1988:13). However, the political, social, geographic, and historical dimensions of the selection process reinforced rather than transformed the preexisting patterns of social and political stratification.

Because the proprietary cultivators and zamindars of the Punjab had not

"mutinied" in 1857, the land settlements of the 1840s and 1850s were preserved (Dewey

1991:25). On the premise that the Punjab was the home of the peasant proprietary 169 cultivator par excellence,r ig h ts in the land had been settled with village notables

(Dewey 1991:25). That is to say, those who provided the information necessary for assigning rights in the land represented the politically dominant cultivating sectors of rural society. The combined effect of the romantic view of the Punjabi peasant cultivator and the method used to determine rights in the land, gave the initial revenue settlement process a conservative character that was otherwise absent in the settlement operations conducted in other parts of pre-Mutiny British India.

In the canal colonies, the indigenous inhabitants were relocated to inferior lands, while settlers were recruited from among the cultivating classes of the congested districts of the eastern and central Punjab. Through this settlement process, the systems of

lineage stratification and inter-caste relations extant in the eastern Punjab were projected

onto the canal colonies (see Darling 1947:116). The background of the cultivators

selected to settle the newly opened canal colonies demonstrates the extent to which

"scientific" criteria could be bent to the service of the political purposes of the British

This belief was a consequence, in part, of the history of British colonization of the Punjab. The eastern Punjab was the area into which the British first moved when they colonized the province. If the British had instead colonized the Punjab from the west, their perception of land tenures in the province would have undoubtedly been quite different. 170 Indian empire." The selection of cultivators from among this class was viewed as critical to ensuring the overall political stability and economic growth of the Punjab.

At the time of the opening of the canal colonies, the central Punjab (i.e, Ambala,

Hoshiapur, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Ludhiana) was in the grips of high rates of rural indebtedness and overpopulation (Ali 1988:15; Barrier 1966:15). These conditions greatly concerned British authorities as similar conditions had preceded the outbreak of unrest in the Deccan, Bombay, and among the Sontal tribes (Barrier 1966:24). The specter of rebellion that such conditions might precipitate in the Punjab threatened to strike at the very heart of British colonial rule in India. Not only were the peasant cultivators the backbone of Punjabi society, but by the early 19(X)s, wheat and cotton exports from the Punjab had become important sources of foreign earnings (Fox 1985:54-

56). In addition, the Punjab had become the principal source of recruits to the British army, with upwards to 65% of the British Indian army comprised of troops drawn from

the central districts of the Punjab (Fox 1985:44). And, until reorganization in 1901

created the North West Frontier Province, the Punjab was the front line province in the

"Great Game" Britain was playing with Czarist Russia (Barrier 1966:24). On the basis

of these various reasons the canal colonists were selected from the congested districts of

" Land was allocated in three categories: Peasant, Yeoman, and Gentry grants. Peasant grants were of fifty acres or less and were given to farmers who, it was envisioned, would break the land largely with the help of family labor. In some of the early settlement schemes (e.g., in the Bari Doab canal colony) over 80% of the land was allocated to peasant farmers. "Yeoman" grants of 50 to 1(X) acres were allocated to agriculturalists who came from families with demonstrable farming experience. "Capitalist" gentry land grants were of latifundia proportions. 171 the eastern, central, and northern Punjab, rather than from other areas in India where the population was pressing equally hard on the land.

Gujars as Pastorallsts, Seypidaris, and Canal Colonists

The economic development of the region that was ushered in by the advent of canal irrigation had a number of related economic, social, and political consequences for the Gujars. Even in "dry" villages such as Vilyatpur, the "seypidari system was replaced by a series of yearly contracts and then by daily bargaining over the wage to be paid."

As a result, "there was steady increase in part-time rural employment which supplemented agricultural labor as a source of livelihood for the unskilled laborers"

(Kessinger 1974:125). In place of the generalized seypidari network, a system of dyadic patron/client relationships developed that served to tie individuals-freqaently through the agency of an intermediary zaildar—to the international economy of the British Indian empire (see Ali 1988:65, 99-100, 164-169; Fox 1985:37-39; Kessinger 1974:123-129,

156-163; Stone 1984:314-327).

Pastoralism was particularly affected by these changes. Migratory patterns appear to have shifted to the type of circulatory movements that are common to other settled regions of the subcontinent.*^ Concomitantly, the demand lessened for the traditional

services of the Gujars. Although there was an incremental increase in the demand for

milk, meat, and hide, the need for draught animals declined (especially those needed to

Palmeri (1982) discusses various types of migratory patterns possible in different ecological regimens of the subcontinent. Although his model is generalized from data drawn from northern India, it appears applicable to the historical experiences of the Punjab. 172 pull water from wells). Combined with the increases in cultivable land made possible by perennial canals, villagers were able to give over more of their land to the production of animal fodder. This meant, that villagers were now able to meet the demand for animal products out of their local stores (Ali 1988:210-230) rather than rely on the

Gujars.

Many Gujars apparently sought to maintain their lifestyle by selling milk and other dairy products in the Punjab’s towns and cities (Ali 1988: 210). Others reverted to a more complete reliance on nomadic pastoralism, often exploiting sub-optimal ecological zones (see Hasan 1986). Still others abandoned their traditional occupation and moved to the villages, towns, and cities of the Punjab where they sought out new forms of employment, often in the secondary or tertiary sectors of the marketplace. Data collected in Islamabad in 1986 supports the literature in suggesting that the Gujars adopted a number of alternative occupations in response to the reduced demand for their goods and services. Although the causes have shifted from the earlier expansion to the

more recent intensification of agricultural practices (made possible by the increased inputs in technology known as the "green revolution), the result is the same-Gujar pastoralism has been rendered redundant within the village economy.

The social dimensions associated with these economic changes also influenced the

nature of the Gujars’ collective ethnic identity. In addition to the reduced demand for

their traditional services, a strong military presence in the province must have reduced

the perceived and perhaps real threat of Gujar thievery and plundering. The result of

these developments was to lessen the Gujars’ social visibility. Many Pakistanis that I 173 spoke to expressed some surprise upon learning of the large numbers of Gujars who may actually reside in the Punjab. Evidence suggests further that it was during the late-

Victorian era that the defamatory stereotypes of the Gujars-although never totally dominant—gained in currency in the repertoire of ethnic images circulating within the folk culture of the greater Punjab. The increased popularity of these negative stereotypes is, in part, explicable in reference to the administrative history of British rule in the Punjab.

The Organization o f Administrative Rule and Definitions o f Gujar Ethnicity

The comparison of the post-Mutiny experiences of the Gujar and Sikhs recreated above had identified cultural geography as an important factor in determining the distributive application of "martial" or "non-martial" caste labels. As mentioned previously, the Gujars of North India received near universal condemnation for the part they played in the Mutiny. In the Punjab, there was somewhat greater diversity in

British views of the Gujars’ racial character. While a Lamarckian conceptualization of the Gujars’ racial character licensed and made possible these divergent views, their

particular manifestations can only be understood in relation to the organizational nature

of the British colonial state.

The key unit in the British Indian government was the provincial district. The

Settlement and Revenue Officers assigned to the District Deputy Commissioner’s office

brought the British Indian empire into direct contact with its subject populations. As a

prelude to settling the revenue, the District’s Settlement Officers compiled massive 174 quantities of data on the social composition, wealth, industry, customary laws, and so forth of the tribes residing in a particular revenue tract."

The administrative responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Commissioner’s office invested Settlement Officers with a considerable amount of discretionary power. This was especially so in regards to establishing land revenue settlements and collecting taxes

(Kessinger 1974:78-79)." A similar amount of personal discretion was also exercised

by the Settlement Officers who were responsible for assigning a caste to a particular

classificatory category. Given the large element of personal discretion involved in the

process of assigning caste labels, the predilections and biographic background of a

Settlement Officer becomes of no small importance to understanding the diverse nature

of the caste taxonomy developed under the British.

Most of the Settlement Officers in the Punjab received their field training in the

North-West Provinces (Dewey 1991:23; Kessinger 1974:33). Moreover, many were

relatives of givemment functionaries who had been posted to north India during the

" For a succinct description of the land settlement process in the Punjab, see Dewey (1991:21-26).

" In the British Raj, provinces were administratively divided into divisions, sub divisions (districts), thanas (sub-districts), tehsils (village groups) and sub-tehsils. The administrative organization was such that there were perennial power struggles between District Officers and Provincial authorities. Each administrative level had its appropriate administrative machinery. However, Indians filled the offices at the thana and lower levels. The Deputy Commissioner and his staff of Revenue and Settlement officers were thus the line staff of the British Raj. As they were in almost daily contact with the indigenous peoples they tended to share their views and sentiments. The Provincial Lieutenant-Governor, on the other hand, was believed to be the leading spokesperson for the government at the Provincial level. 175 Mutiny of 1857 (see Dewey’s [1991:73-107] "Author Index").*’ This biographical component could not help but reinforce whatever prejudices they may have been exposed to during their training. As these civil servants moved into the province’s districts they undoubtedly carried with them a deep and abiding hatred for the "crimes” the Gujars had committed during the Conflict of 1857. Sir Malcolm Darling’s (Ferozepur Settlement

Report of 1853, p.4, in Darling 1947:62 [1927]) description of the Gujars in his influential book The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt,while based on observations

made before the Mutiny, are indicative of the "official" attitude towards the Gujars.

They [the Dogras, Gujars, and Bhattis] are utterly devoid of energy, and are the most apathetic, unsatisfactory race of people I ever had anything to do with. They will exert themselves occasionally to go on a cattle- stealing expedition or to plunder some of the quiet, well-conducted Arains . . . but their exertions are seldom directed to a better end. They take not the slightest pride or interest in any agricultural pursuit, their fields are cultivated in the most slovenly manner; you see none of the neatly-kept houses, well-fenced fields, fat bullocks, and wells kept in good repair which distinguish the industrious castes; but the hovels in which they live are generally half in ruins; no fences even protect their fields, their cattle are half starved, and their wells often in the most dilapidated condition.

The British view of Gujar incorrigibility, thriftlessness, and immorality exacted

a heavy economic toll. As an "agricultural caste" the Gujars were in theory eligible to

receive land allocations in the canal colonies in proportion to their representation in the

settlers’ districts of origin (Ali 1988:64, 73).'* If statistical representation was the sole

*’ Dewey (1991:9) notes that "from 1849-1906 all but two of the governors of the Punjab belonged to two groups of loosely-linked kinsmen."

'* Hasan (1986:XIII) has noted that in India today, the census includes the Gujars are different categories depending on provincial location. Hence in Uttar Pradesh Uiey are not included in the list of "Scheduled Tribes" or even "Backward Castes." Conversely, in Himachal Pradesh they are considered a "Scheduled Tribe," while in 176 criterion for determining the allocation of land, one should have expected the Gujars to receive awards in direct proportion to their numbers in the central districts. The type, quality, and scale of longitudinal data that would allow one to assess the degree of success the Gujars might have had in attaining titles to land in the canal colonies simply do not exist.'’ Indirect measures, however, do suggest that Gujars did not participate in the canal colony settlements to a level commensurate to the size of their population.

For example, the Gujars do not appear by name in Imran Ali’s (1988:43-61) chapter on the groups involved in the settlement of the canal colonies.^ Statistical support for this argument is provided by comparing the 1931 population rankings of the ten major districts where canals were dug against the district-wise rankings of the Gujars for those same districts (see Table 5).

These statistical measures, unreliable and indirect as they may be, suggest that the settlement policies exacted a differential drain on the central Punjab’s agricultural caste groups. British allusions to statistical parity notwithstanding, it seems that status as an agricultural caste alone was insufficient to ensure selection as a canal colonist. Instead, canal colonists seemed have been recruited from specific groups that were encompassed under the umbrella term of an "agricultural caste." Those more likely to be chosen

Jammu and Kashmir they are listed as a member of the "Backward Classes."

To administer the growing population in the Punjab, new districts were carved out of territory taken from pre-existent districts. As the district was the census tract unit, it is impossible to determine with any measure of accuracy the true nature and extent of population growth and movement.

“ The tables which appear in Ali’s (1988) book. The Punjab under Imperialism, include a "residual" or "other" category. It is possible that the Gujars are lumped with other statistically small populations in this category. 177 Table 5

Population Rankings of Canal Colony Districts

(All-Punjab Population and Gujar Population)

District Ranking of District by Ranking of Districts by percentage of Total percentage of Punjabi Provincial Population Gujar Population Lahore 1 15 Multan 2 24 Lyallpur 4 11 Montgomery 7 20 Sialkot 8 18 Gujrat 11 1 Shahpur 14 23 Gujranwala 19 21 Sheikhupura 20 22 Jhang 22 25

Source: 1931 Census of the Punjab, Pt. 2, Tables I and XVII. 178 were members of particular agricultural caste groups with demonstrable cultivating experience, who owned land and who were considered to be of political importance to the British Indian empire (Ali 1988:13-14)." Thus, in spite of British claims that the irrigation of the Punjab’s western districts would promote overall economic growth and expansion (Ali 1988:13), the data on the Gujars testify to the fact that the selection of canal colonists "involved the reinforcement of the strong, and by implication the further emasculation of the weak" (Ali 1988:37).

The discriminatory settlement practices were reinforced at the level of the canal colony village by the nature of the development of the labor force. After settling the cultivating classes on the land, the British left it to canal colonists to recruit the requisite

number and types of kammis necessary to develop the local economy (Ali 1988:92). As

we have seen previously, Gujar pastoralists were seldom fully integrated into the

seypidari system. Combined with the previously aforementioned reduction in the Gujars’

traditional services, the day when large numbers of Gujars would be brought to the newly

opened canal colonies remained remote indeed.

The effects of these developments spread throughout the Punjab, ultimately

undermining the Gujars’ social status and economic standing even within their home area

in the eastern and central Punjab. According to Zekiye Eglar (1960:4) and others (e.g..

Fox 1975) the socio-economic changes of agricultural commercialization has been very

According to Ali (1988:17) the "rural poor and the landless were excluded from any occupancy share in the new landed resources." 179 uneven. As Eglar (1960:3-4) notes regarding the nature of change in the village she studied:

Not all villages were affected to the same degree in such matters as cultivating cash crops, buying machine-made goods, or entering into new types of activities and new forms of relationships. Depending on their location and the size of the landholding, villages in the part of the Punjab which had long been settled-those, for instance, in the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala, and Sialkot, where land was not abundant and was held in relatively small parcels-were less rapidly affected by change than were the new colonies of Sargodha, Lyallpur, or Montgomery with vast tracts of land and more advanced methods of irrigation.

Thus, as a consequence of an overall inability to participate to any great or meaningful extent in settling the canal colonies, they were locked in a subsistence based economy that was itself undergoing underdevelopment. But there were a handful of Gujar families who did participate more fully in the Punjab’s economic growth.

One such "family" was that of Chaudhri Sultan Ali and his lineal and collateral descendants.^ Documents are available on the Ali family starting as early as 1849.

As his descents occupy influential positions within the local and national Gujar

community, the history of the Ali family is particularly instructive of the ways in which

British colonial practices have contributed to the ethnic-specific forms of socio-economic

organization extant among contemporary Gujar communities.

Chaudhri Sultan Ali was recognized by the British as "the chief of the [Gujar]

tribe [of Gujrat]" at the time of provincial annexation in 1849. "In July, 1854, when

investigations into rent-free tenures were made, Chaudhri Sultan Ali put forward a claim

^ Unless otherwise noted, all data on Chaudhri Sultan Ali and his descendants are derived either from Chopra (1940:188-190) or from material gathered in the field. 180 to the half muafi [revenue tract] of Ajnala amounting to Rs. 325," asserting that he had enjoyed this right from the time of Maharajah Ranjit Singh. British accounts note that

"in 1857, when the Chibs of Deva fell on the village of Doklua, he came forward at the head of 1,000 retainers of his own clan, for whom he refused to accept any pay, and guarded that part of the district which borders on Kashmir. His troops also went to

Delhi and were useful during the siege." In recognition of his assistance, Chaudhri

Sultan Ali’s claims were reviewed and he was granted the entire village of Dhinda Kalan.

The British considered Sultan Ali to be an energetic and exemplary zaildar. He

"distinguished himself by giving valuable aid during the cholera epidemic of 1872" and encouraging "education and vaccination in his ilaqa."

Chaudhri Sultan Ali’s three sons, Muhammad Khan, Ahmed Khan, and Fazl Ali, continued in the tradition of imperial service that established by their father. The eldest son, Muhammad Khan, was recognized by the British as a zaildar. During World War

I, "he subscribed 10,000 rupees towards the War Loan, collected no less than Rs. 8,000 for the same and supplied about 1,000 recruits." He was awarded a sword of honor, a

War badge and a khilat (ceremonial uniform) in recognition of his services. For his assistance in quelling disturbances in 1919, he was given a jagir of Rs. 250 and the title of Khan Sahib. He contributed his time and money to a number of civic and philanthropic projects. He was an Honorary Magistrate, Vice-Patron of the Red Cross

Society and a Councillor of St. John Ambulance Association. Muhammad Kahn died in 181 1927, leaving a minor son, Ata Ilahi, who succeeded him as zaildar when only two years of age.^

Sultan All’s second son, Ahmad Khan, served as regent for the third and youngest of the Sultan’s three sons, Fazl All. He died at the age of fifty-five. Of his two sons,

Sultan-ul-Mulak was appointed a Sub-Inspector of Co-operative Societies, and Khan-ul-

Mulak was awarded an honorary title.

The youngest of Chaudhri Sultan All’s three sons, Fazl All, was inarguably the

most successful of the three brothers in amassing a landed estate. In addition to the land

he inherited when he succeeded his father as zaildar, he received 10 1/2 squares of land

(approximately 275 acres) for assistance he provided to the transport department in

connection with the Chitral Expedition of 1902. Another grant of 250 acres was allotted

to him in 1914 for services rendered to the empire. During World War I, Fazal All

raised over 1,500 recruits, subscribed Rs. 2,0(X) towards the War Loan and collected

over 10,000 rupees. For these he was awarded an honorary title, a sword of honor, a

khilat and a War badge. He was also awarded an additional 600 acres of prime canal-

irrigated agricultural land (Ali 1988:81, n. 51). He received a jagir grant of Rs. 500 in

1928 and another worth Rs. 250 in 1930s.

It is difficult to calculate the total amount of land that Fazl Ali owned at the time

of his death as the rate which his jagir grants were assessed is unknown. Nonetheless,

based only on the land for which we do have figures, it is clear that Fazl Ali had

acquired title to a tract of land that was well in excess of 1,000 acres. Depending on the

2 3 The records to do not indicate who served as the boy’s reagent. 182 amount of land he had inherited from his father, the rate at which the taxes were abated on his jagir properties, and any additional amount he might have purchased it is conceivable that he might have actually owned over twice the amount.

Fazl All’s large landholdings and the cultivating and service dependent upon it, provided the basis for launching and sustaining his public and political careers. He was made a Provincial Darbari in 1896 and a Sub-Registrar of Gujrat, in 1901. He resigned this position on becoming Honorary Magistrate of Gujrat. He was first elected Vice-

President and was later the first non-official President of the Gujrat Municipality and was made a Khan Bahadur in 1921. He resigned the Presidency of the Gujrat Municipality in 1927. He became Chairman of the Gujrat District Board in 1926, having been the first non-official Punjabi to occupy that position.

Like other members of his family, he was heavily involved in various philanthropic activities and civic projects. He started the Co-operative movement in the

Gujrat district in 1906, and became President of the Ajnala Central Co-operative Bank in 1919. He also served as Vice-President of the Punjab Co-operative Union. He was also founder of the Zamindara High School, a Councillor of St. John Ambulance

Association and a patron of the Red Cross Society to which he contributed Rs. 5,000.

Fazl Ali had two sons, Mehdi Ali and Asghar Ali. The elder, Mehdi Ali, was appointed

Tahsildar and was promoted Extra Assistant Commissioner in 1936. The younger,

Asghar Ali, assumed his father’s position as zaildar.

Chaudhury Fazal Elahi (1904-1982), an agnatic relative of Fazl Ali, also

benefitted from British rule. As he was active during the decades immediately before 183 and after partition, his career exemplifies the ways in which colonial favoritism still informs and lends shape to the contemporary socio-economic organization and ethnic space of the Gujar community of Islamabad.

Fazal Elahi first became active in politics in late 1937 when he ran as a Unionist candidate in the elections to the Provincial Assembly. Although defeated, he was subsequently elected on the Muslim League ticket to the Punjab assembly in 1946. After

Partition he served briefly as a member of the Mamdot cabinet. He was elected in 1951 to the Punjab assembly and then to the West Pakistan assembly in 1955, in which he served as speaker. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1962 and again in 1965.

He was elected Deputy Speaker after the 1965 election. In 1970 he transferred his allegiance to the People’s Party and was again elected to the National Assembly. When the assembly convened in 1972 he was elected Speaker and in 1973 was elected President of Pakistan under the 1973 constitution. He remained President until the expiration of his term in 1978 (Ahmad 1985:412, n. 28).

His political connections appear to have been instrumental in allowing Fazal Elahi to arrange a number of lucrative contracts for himself and his relatives. As a favored member of the National Assembly he successfully negotiated with the Pakistan army to

supply some of its basic food stuffs. In the early 1960s, his political connections and

office provided him with the means by which to secure title to a block of commercial

buildings in one of first sectors built in Islamabad. There he located certain business and

commercial institutions in which he and other family members shared important financial

interests. 184 Implications for Contemporary Readings o f Gujar Ethnicity

The descendants of Chaudhry Sultan Ali, along with a handful of families who prospered under the British, are not surprisingly influential members of the Islamabad and national Gujar communities. They are generous in providing employment, financial assistance, and political intercession for the less fortunate members of the biraderi. The community’s ethnic voice, as articulated in their readings of the causes of the Mutiny, although admittedly constructed in partial relation to the interests of the wealthier sectors of the community, does, nonetheless resonate to a number of issues of importance to the whole community. The Gujars’ involvement in the Mutiny of 1857 is invariably stressed as the historical cause for their low socio-economic standing.

These historical narratives, however, present the Mutiny as a confrontation between two imperial people, the British and the Gujars. Such narrative displacements, in which the Gujars are placed on an equal footing with the British, lay the basis upon which community notables rest their claims to leadership. They are champions, patrons, and exemplars of a biraderi that would have, were it not for the fortunes of history, rivalled the British as an imperial power. By a discursive process these historical narratives first link the underlying causes of Gujar poverty to these historical experiences and then, in turn, transform them into those of the entire community. Doing so obviates and obscures the ways in which the support the Gujars provided the British in 1857 provided the economic basis of leadership within some sectors of the community.

From still another perspective, it might be said that the structures of these historical narratives signify the fact that it was landed Hindu Gujars, rather than the 185 nomadic pastoral Muslims who actually rose against the British in 1857. This finding, although in need of further investigation, is indirectly supported by the literature in that the Gujars who rose against the British tended to be proprietary cultivators, rather than nomadic pastoralists (see Stokes 1978). Thus, by underlining the Gujars’ low socio economic status, rather than their religious differences, these historical narratives acknowledge the historical fact that although the Muslim Gujars might not have participated in the Mutiny to the same extent as did their Hindu cousins, they have

suffered the economic consequences of belonging to a despised caste group.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ways in which British colonial practices and ideologies in

interaction with preexisting indigenous social forms and economic organizations inform

contemporary images of Gujar ethnicity. In this discussion, the influence of Islamabad

as an urban space has been avoided. However, developing an understanding of the

contested nature of this urban space is essential to explaining why it is that within

Islamabad specific ethnic images are of a greater appeal for some sectors than for others.

To do so, the context of Islamabad as a planned capital and urban space must first be

considered. PART 3

THE CITY OF TOMORROW:

THE URBAN CONTEXT OF ISLAMABAD

186 CHAPTER Vn

BUnJ)ING ISLAMABAD:

THE CITY AS PHYSICAL SITE

The vast expanse (of the plateau and the surrounding mountains) presents landscape almost painted to perfection by the Master Painter, on a canvas as large as vision can comprehend (Jafti [1964]:2).

Urban problems are social by nature, and their "solution" requires political interventions. Therefore, urban planning should by understood and analysed as technical and ideological activities initiated by those holding power (Bamow 1983:4).

Islamabad-the planned capital city of Pakistan-was founded in the early 1960s. As was briefly mentioned in the "Introduction," and is developed more fully in chapter 11, the

Gujars occupy dwellings throughout the city. Consequently, their ethnic identities are especially prone to influence by the political objectives that are embedded within the city’s Master Plan and Program of Implementation.

Not until chapter ten will the Gujars of Islamabad be again discussed to any great depth. This silence is not meant to imply that the construction of Gujar ethnic identities proceeds independent of and detached from the city’s urban context. Rather, the absence of specific references to the Gujars is a heuristic device that seeks to convey some sense of the Master Plan’s proximate goal, i.e., the destruction of parochial forms of social

187 188 identity and group organization. Later chapters will examine a number of ways in which

Gujar ethnicity is influenced by Islamabad.

By examining the physical features of Islamabad, this chapter develops the groundwork for the subsequent decoding of Islamabad’s political and planning agenda.

The first section examines settlement structure and architecture as each relates to the

city’s Master Plan and Program of Implementation. A second section analyzes the

growth and expansion of Islamabad and its neighboring "twin" city of Rawalpindi. The

latter is a much older city that was developed by the British into a garrison town in the

second half of the 19th century. It therefore shares certain features in common with

other British cantonments built during this period. Of particular interest to the latter

discussion are the ways in which the growth of Islamabad, as a part of and apart from

the general processes of urbanization in Pakistan, is regulated and informed by the city’s

relationship to its neighbor, as it is defined in the Master Plan.

The Master Plan of Islamabad

A Federal Capital Commission (hereinafter FCC) was organized in September, 1959, and

given the responsibility of developing the capital city’s Master Plan and Program of

Implementation. The new city was named "Islamabad," loosely "the abode of Islam"

(Ali 1970:118; Doxiadis Associates 1960b: 410-439). In May, 1960, Doxiadis

Associates, the Greek architectural and town planning firm headed by Constantinos 189 Doxiadis,' was commissioned to draft the Master Plan and Program of Implementation and submit its proposals to the government. After a brief viewing of the site by Ayub

Khan, the Master Plan was approved in principle and construction of the city commenced

(Wasti 1979:11).

The Site

Islamabad is located on the Potwar Plateau, a spur of alluvial land that extends into the northeast comer of the Indus Basin. The local terrain consists of natural terraces and meadows that slope upwards towards the northeast, reaching an elevation of 570 to

670 meters above mean sea level. Within the Potwar Plateau, the Federal Capital is located in a cul de sac of naturally occurring geological features and human-made physical barriers. Along the city’s northwest edge lie the Margalla Hills, a range of hills and low lying spurs 763 to 1615 meters in height. At the eastern end of the city, the

Margallas curve to the south where they link up with the lower ranges of the Murree

Hills. The city’s southeast border encompasses the National Park and the northern edge of Islamabad’s ’’Twin City," Rawalpindi.

"Islamabad" (comprising urban and rural Islamabad) is part of the Federal Capital area, an administrative region approximately 3626 kilometers square and encompassing areas that were carved out from districts along the border separating the Punjab from the

’ Doxiadis name is rendered with various spellings. For the sake of consistency and clarity, the spelling of his name as it appears in the last book he wrote before his death. Building Entopia (1975), is used throughout the dissertation. 190 North-West Frontier Provinces.^ The Federal Capital area encompasses Metropolitan

Islamabad (urban Islamabad and the National Park) and the much older "Twin City" of

Rawalpindi (see Figure 6).

Through the agency of its zoning ordinances and regulations, the Master Plan seeks to structure the local economy, organize the city’s social and political relations, and define innumerable other aspects of city life. To accomplish these objectives a hierarchy of allocations was used as the basis to determine the type, number, and distribution of

the city’s various physical structures (see Doxiadis 1968, 1975:274-276; Doxiadis

Associates 1960b, 1961; 1962a, 1962b, 1963a; 1964:332).

Implementations

The Master Plan’s major components were developed in relation to following

categories: (1) the urban grid; (2) residential sector organization; (3) city architecture;

(4) housing; and (5) the street system. Each of these planning categories are considered

in turn.

The Urban Grid

According to the provisions of the Master Plan, all "residential" and "special

purpose" sectors were assigned an alphanumeric code that located each relative to an

overarching (and austere) rectilinear urban grid (see Figure 6).^ Except for the

^ This area was enlarged in 1966 to a "specified" area and in 1981 metropolitan Islamabad (urban Islamabad and the National Park) was amalgamated with the Federal Capital Area and declared a district (Zubair 1986:8).

^ The past tense is used throughout this component of the discussion to emphasize the extent and nature of the alterations that have occurred in the implementation of the Master Plan. 191

P^esjaanfiai Mansion ^ Constiiution Ave I Qua«3-f*A2 ih an Faisa» Mas|id {National Aval / University

Nonn alpinqi Airport

iCiyaC>an*i-Ouaid ■Azam ( Capitol Avenue)

CiviC'Commerce-Business

^ 0 Admmistraitve Center

^ Whotasale M

n industnal Workshop

Green Areas

I Military Residentia)

r ~ | Residential

Figure 6. The Master Plan of Islamabad 192 special purpose areas (e.g., the administrative sector, national park and so forth) or where there were preexisting structures (e.g., Rawalpindi) and physical features (e.g., the Margalla Hills), each sector was laid out as an orthogonal city block, with dimensions of approximately 2,000 by 2,200 meters. Within the framework of the urban grid, 13 zones are designated for various functions. The administrative sector constitutes the focal point of the city’s main axis. Slightly elevated above the rest of the city, this sector contains buildings of national political importance such as the

Presidential House, the Secretariat, the National Assembly, and Supreme Court. A diplomatic enclave for the chanceries and residences of foreign missions is located in the southeast of the administrative sector. Facing the administrative sector is an area reserved exclusively for economic, political, or cultural institutions of national importance. To the southeast of the city lies the National Park: A rural area reserved for educational, cultural and research institutions such as Pinstech (the atomic research center), Lok Versa (the National Institute of Folk Heritage), the

Olympic Sports Stadium, and the Pakistan agricultural research farm.

The city’s "central business district" is located on the northern side of Capital

Avenue. Often referred to by Doxiadis as the city’s "central core," Capital Avenue is

known either by its official name, "Khyaban-i-Quaid-i-Azam," or more simply as "the

blue zone." Important public buildings, such as Islamabad’s Town Hall, the Central

Bank of Pakistan and so forth, were to be located in this zone. Sectors I-l 1 and 1-12

are also commercial zones set aside for wholesalers who supply goods to Islamabad’s

retail stores. 193 Industrial activity was also provided two separate zones in the Master Plan.

An area for light industries and handicrafts (bakeries, automobile garages, and so forth) was set aside in those portions of the G sectors that were immediately adjacent to the Murree highway. Manufacturing Arms engaged in the production of building materials and supplies are located in those areas of the "I" sectors that are not otherwise designated for wholesaling purposes.

With the exception of the aggregate quantity of land received by the city’s residents, the military was the largest single recipient of land under the provisions of the Doxiadis Master Plan (see Doxiadis Associates 1960b;43S). In addition to the

"O " sectors, and the southern half of the "H" and "N" sectors, a special area in the administrative sector was set aside for military residences or for the garrisoning of troops.

Residential Sector Organization

Most of the land in Islamabad is designated as a residential zone. Aside from those sectors that could not accommodate the Master Plan’s orthogonal provisions

(e.g., those irregular shaped sectors at the foot of the Margalla hills) or for those houses and "apartment colonies" in the special purpose or industrial sectors, each

residential sector was to contain between 30,(XX) to 40,000 people (Doxiadis

Associates 1960b).

Each residential sector comprises a number of smaller residential communities.

The Class V communities, which corresponds to an entire sector, includes 3 or 4

Class IV communities. The latter are roughly equivalent to a quadrant and included 194 within them about 10,000 people each. At the next lower level, one finds the Class

III communities. Numbering between 3 and 4 per Class VI community, each Class III community ideally contains a population of about 2,500 persons. The Class II communities, again numbering 3 or 4 per Class III community, consist of groups of about one hundred people. The Class I communities consist of the family or any gathering of two or three people (Doxiadis Associates 1964:332).

Each residential sector is provided with a complement of municipal offices, civic institutions, businesses, and so forth that varied in number and type according to the size of the community they served. At the center of each Class V community are various civic and commercial institutions, such as a fire and police stations, a post office, a mosque, various food markets, clothing stores, restaurants, and so forth.

The civic and commercial institutions at the Class IV community level consists of a food market, a mosque, a secondary school, a health clinic, a restaurant, a police station, a sub-post office and a municipal maintenance office. The center of the Class

III community included a few commercial establishments, a primary school, a tea house, and a praying area. The services provided at the Class II community center were restricted to a comer shop. Based on its small scale, no civic, public, or commercial institutions were provided for the Class I communities (i.e., families).

The decentralization of civic and commercial amenities was intended to make each sector capable of serving "as many [human] needs inside it as possible"

(Doxiadis 1968:358). This would eliminate the "need for many of its functions to spill over its border line" (Doxiadis 1968:358). The decentralized distribution of 195 civic and commercial amenities, has meant that in Islamabad there is no true central business district. The absence of features one would normally anticipate to find a major city at least in part, accounts for the widely held perception that "Islamabad is flat," and "lacks culture and character."

Public and Domestic Gty Architecture

For the purposes of designing the city’s public buildings (the Presidential

House, National Assembly Building, the Secretariat and so forth), a committee of world renowned European (e.g.. Geo Ponti) and American (e.g., Edward D. Stone) architects were assembled as a team under the direction of Sir Robert Matthew (Wasti

1979:26). In spite of its designation as a "team," Sir Robert Matthew appears to have exercised relatively little authority over the architects assembled under him. In actuality, architects negotiated individually for their government commissions. This contractual arrangement provided architects with the freedom to pursue their own design inclinations (at the same time that it apparently earned the displeasure of

government officials not desirous to see Islamabad become a city of architectural

experimentation). Its effect was to create in Islamabad a skyline that is notable for its

lack of continuity and synthesis.

The architectural designs of buildings located within the administrative sector

testifies amply to the extent of architectural experimentation extant within the city.

The architecture of the Presidential mansion and the National Assembly building

reflect the design conventions of European and American modernists of the time.

Built by the American architect Edward D. Stone, the buildings are symmetrical and 196 their lines are sharp and clear. Exterior ornamentation is sparse and there is a heavy reliance on glass, steel, and concrete. On the other hand, the Secretariat, built by the

Italian firm of Ponti, Famarolli, and Rosselli, strives to synthesize Mughal and

Western architectural styles and conventions. Arches, open courtyards, and water fountains, complement the concrete and glass facades of the adjoining buildings.

Domestic architectural styles vary equally widely. Public housing is available for low income families. The low-income houses built in Islamabad’s older sectors, such as G-6, are small, flat-roof, single story affairs. In design, they are indistinguishable from "internationalist" architectural styles of the post-war Soviet

Union and East European countries. Architecturally, there is a general lack of

ornamentation and stylistic differences. As a early observer quipped, the houses look

as if they were "planted in rows like pavilions at a fair" (Jamoud 1968:956). The

twenty or so years that have elapsed since their construction has allowed families to

add some personal touches to these dwellings. Plants, bushes, bright paint, and so

forth convey a feeling of warmth and comfort. Nonetheless, the austerity of their

design is hard to conceal.

In more recently developed sectors, the government, in seeking to alleviate a

shortage in low income housing, has begun to erect four story tenements. These new

structures embrace with even greater fervor the internationalists’ prescriptions for an

architecture of function, clarity, and economy. Box-shaped, austere, and shoddily

built, these buildings are strikingly reminiscent of the Stalinist housing projects of the

late 1940s and early 1950s. 197 Housing for middle and upper-income groups contrasts markedly with that of the urban poor. Most middle and upper class families lease or own privately constructed dwellings. These are usually tree-standing structures, two stories in height. They often have an attached garage, and a veranda that runs the full frontal length of the building. They are generally constructed of concrete, appointed with a stucco overlay. In many respects, they are reminiscent of the homes one might find among the middle classes of Southern Europe or the American Southwest.

Both lower and upper income housing lack Middle Eastern styles of ornamentation and appointment. In neither type of dwelling does one find a central courtyard. Nor, for that matter, does one generally find arches, arcades, or open- worked screen windows. In place of dwelling units gathered around a central courtyard, as is commonplace in South Asian vernacular architecture, Islamabad’s dwelling structures are organized around an internal corridor or room. This layout feature is common to all of the city’s major classes of housing. In spite of these similarities, differences in architectural design, plot size, and plinth area make it impossible to confuse the residential dwelling structures of the elite with those of the poor.

Income, Housing, and Plot Allocation

Islamabad’s initial Master Plan envisioned the building of nine house types that

were to be allocated on the basis of the occupant’s rank in Pakistan’s National Civil

Service (Meier 1985:213). At the bottom of the hierarchy were the Class A houses

intended for government employees who made up to Rps. 125 per month. These 198 houses were to be built on plots no larger than 110 sq. yds. (plinth area 330 sq. ft.).

Conversely, Class "I" houses were to accommodate senior civil servants who made

Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 3,000 per month. Lavish even by Western standards, the latter were to have an average plot size of 1,500 square yards (see Table 6).

The Federal Capital Commission-the predecessor of the Capital Development

Authority (see below)--recommended a housing schedule that was consistently more liberal in its spatial allocations. In the latter, the plots for the lowest income group was set at 137.5 square yards. Conversely, the wealthy "I" house plots were set at

3,350 square yards. If followed, these recommendations would have been allocated approximately twice the amount of land initially suggested by Doxiadis (see Table 6).

The schedule adopted by the government differs in that it includes two more

categories than either Doxiadis or the FCC had recommended. "A" houses remained

the city’s smallest domestic structures. These houses were built on plots no larger

than 125 sq. yards. They include 2 main rooms, a kitchen, a shower and a water

closet. At the top of the accommodation schedule were the class "K" type houses.

These structures were erected on plots in excess of 3,000 square yards. The dwelling

structure itself includes multiple baths, separate dining areas, kitchens, lounges,

sunken living rooms, private studies, underground or attached garages, separate

quarters for up to four servants, and so forth (see Table 7). 199 Table 6

Average Plot Area By Income Group

Income Annual Family Income Percentage Average Plot Area in

Group Breakdown Square Yards

Limits Average Sugg, by Env. by the

D.A. FCC

A Up to 1,200 800 25% 110 137.5

B 1,200-2,400 1,800 30% 150 167.5

C 2,400-3,600 3,000 18% 180 220.0

D 3,600-4,800 4,200 9% 200 417.5

E 4,800-7,200 6,000 7% 250 565.0

F 7,200-9,600 8,400 4% 360 1,100.0

G 9,600-12,000 10,800 3% 500 1,600.0

H 12,000-24,000 18,000 2% 750 2,100.0

I 24,0(X) & over 36,000 2% 1,500 3,350.0

Average Plot Square Yards 215 402.0

Adopted from: Doxiadis Associates (19605:418). Table 7

Schedule of Housing Accommodations Categ. Income Group Plot Size Accommodation

A Up to Rs. 12S 125 sq. yds 2 rooms, kitchai, veranda, bath & water closet B Rs. 126-250 162.5 sq. yds. 2 rooms, kitchm, veranda, bath & water closet C Rs. 251-375 200 sq. yds. 3 rooms, kitchen, veranda, bath & water closet D Rs. 376-500 250 sq. yds. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 2 bedrooms, water closet, bath, veranda, kitchoi and store E Rs. 501-750 500 sq. yds. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 2 bedrooms, 2 baths, veranda, kitchm, store and servant quarter F Rs. 751-1250 1000 sq. yds. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 1 guest room, 2 bedrooms, 2 baths, 1 kitchen, store, veranda, 1 servant quarter and garage G Rs. 1251-1800 1000 to 1200 sq. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 1 guest room, 2 bedrooms, 2 baths, 1 kitchen, yds. pantry store, veranda, 2 servant quarters and garage H Rs. 1801-2299 1200 to 1500 sq. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 2 bedrooms, 1 guest room, 3 baths, kitchen yds. pantry, veranda, 2 servant quarters, and garage I Rs. 2300-2999 1500-to 1800 sq. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 3 bedrooms, 1 guest room, 3 baths, kitchm yds. pantry, veranda, 2 servant quarters, and garage J Rs. 3000 and 3000 sq. yds. 1 drawing, 1 dining, 3 bedrooms, 1 guest room, 1 study, 4 baths, 3000 above kitchen, pantry, store, veranda, 3 servant quarters, and garage K Ministers 1 lounge, 1 drawing, 1 dining, 1 guest room with bath, 1 study with bath, 3 bedrooms with three baths, 1 dressing room, 1 kitchen, pantry, store, veranda, office space for private secretary with toilet, two guard rooms, 4 servant quarters, and garage

Adopted from: Nilsson 1973:158-159 K) 2 0 1

The houses in sectors E and F occupy some of the most expensive residential property in all of Pakistan. In general they are owned by merchants, business

families, senior civil servants, army personnel, and government officials.

Conversely, the "G" sectors-specifically G-6.1 and the southwest comers of G-6.2

and G-6.4-are the home for many of the city’s low-paid government employees.

At the sector level, Doxiadis encouraged the "inter-mixing" of families from

different income levels. Such explicit prescriptions lead one to believe that the

ultimate goal of the city’s development was the establishment of an egalitarian society

centered around "green areas" and pedestrian shopping malls. In actuality, housing is

strictly segregated on the basis of income even at this level. Ideally, "houses for no

more than four and preferably for three income groups" (Doxiadis Associates

1964:333) were to be located in any particular Class IV community.

Circulation

Two major highways (the Grand Trunk Road and Sharah-i-Kashmir), with

365.8 meter (1,200 foot) right of ways, link Islamabad to the rest of the country (see

Figure 7). "Principal roads" of one hundred eighty meter (600 foot) rights of way

constitute Islamabad’s main thoroughfares. "Major roads," with a 24 foot pavement

profile and 33.6 to 45.7 meter right of way, are multi-functional in that they

demarcate the boundaries of the Class V communities, link sectors to the principal

roads of the city, provide access to the Class V commercial centers, and connect the

roads which emanate from the sector’s Class IV residential areas. "Access" and

"feeder" roads, with 22 and 20 foot pavement profiles respectively, provide access to 2 0 2

Figure 7. Islamabad Road Network showing G-6, G-7, F-6, F-7 and Administrative Sector. 203 the Class IV residential communities. Footpaths and pedestrian walkways, in turn, allow for travel and communication among residential quarters.

The planning objectives of Islamabad’s network of roads are similar to those that inform the layout of the city’s residential sectors. That is to say that the layout and design of the city’s system of roads serve to ’’isolate [sectors] from through traffic as much as possible in order to allow functions within them to develop . . . in a quiet, rather static way" (Doxiadis 1968:358).“* To accomplish this, the road network is purposely designed to impede those who wish to travel through rather than around a sector. To traverse a sector it is necessary to take a "major road" to the Class V commercial center. Once there, one must navigate through the heavy traffic that is disgorged by the three or more other major roads that converge at the sector center.

Thus, in order to drive a distance of a little over 2 kilometers requires one to make up to six separate turns in what is invariably heavy traffic (see Figure 7).

The aim of allowing service and residential functions to develop "in a quiet, rather static way" (Doxiadis 1968:358) also accounts for certain aspects of the road and housing arrangements at Class III and lower community levels.^ Ideally, low income homes were built in a series of parallel rows facing each other across a pedestrian walkway. This established an area of egress, "served by means of a

* While there are specialized sectors for embassies, government offices, hospitals, and the like, in general each sector is functionally redundant.

’ Rocket transport was a fourth type of human movement which Doxiadis mentions. As this was a form of movement he predicted would be important in the future, its impact on the urban plan need not concern us here. 204 network of pedestrian roads which is not interfered with by vehicular traffic"

(Doxiadis Associates 1961:323).

The Development of Islamabad/Rawalpindi

As a document of regional planning, the Master Plan allows for the open-ended

growth of the Federal Capital Region. As it was originally planned, Islamabad was to

be built in a phased sequence of five year plans.* The first five year plan (1960-

1965) dealt exclusively with the development of three sectors: (1) the administrative

sector; (2) the adjoining areas for cultural institutions and various buildings of

national importance (i.e., sectors G-5 and F-5); and (3) the residential sector of G-6.

Subsequent five year plans shifted the focus in relation to the city’s ongoing

development.

To oversee the implementation of the Master Plan a Capital Development

Authority (hereinafter CDA) was formed in June, 1960. The CDA’s authorizing

ordinance was amended in 1966 and the responsibilities of the Authority were

enlarged to those of a municipality (Wasti 1979:14). At the same time, areas

surrounding the city were designated as part of the "specified area" of Islamabad and

placed under nominal CDA jurisdiction (Hasan 1971:1). Administratively, the CDA

* The city’s five year plans are synchronized with Pakistan’s national five year planning schedule, and are referred to in official documents by the national plan to which they correspond. Thus, the city’s first five year plan of 1960-1965 in government publications is referred to as the "second five year plan." Except where noted or made apparent in the text, official usage has not been followed. Instead, Islamabad’s five year plans are referred to in the sequence in which they were introduced. Thus, 1960-1965 represents the city’s first five year plan. 205 is governed by a board of not less than three members (the Chair, the Financial

Advisor, and one other member) appointed by the Central Government (Wasti

1979:12).’

The development of the Islamabad municipal area was to lead to the creation

of what Doxiadis referred to as a "dynapolis" (Doxiadis Associates 1960b). That is to

say, Islamabad’s growth was to occur in direct proportion to the development and

diversification of its administrative, residential, commercial, and other functions.

This development is intended to take a particular geographic expression. As new

sectors developed, the city expands outward from the focal point of the Presidential

mansion. The topography of the Potwar Plateau and promulgation of various zoning

ordinances are critical in dictating the direction and nature of Islamabad’s urban

growth. The hills to the northwest and northeast, and the National Park and

Rawalpindi enclose Islamabad within a "container" that serves to define the physical

dimensions of the city while directing its growth toward the southwest (see Doxiadis

1965:25; Wasti 1979:9, and Figure 8).

Islamabad, and its "Twin City," Rawalpindi, were intended to pass through

three distinct developmental stages. At the earliest stage, Rawalpindi, the larger of

the two cities, would "mother" Islamabad, providing important infra-structural.

’ During the course of fieldwork, the CDA’s administrative powers (especially as regards the allotment of land) was assumed by the federal government under Âe Martial Law Ordinances of President/General Zia ul-Haq. When Martial Law was lifted (December 1985), the government retained control of the CDA’s administrative powers (The Muslim, July 17, 1986). 206

Islam abad

m i

Raw alpindi

Figure 8. Dynapolis showing Planned Growth of Islamabad and Rawalpindi 207 economic, social, and other forms of assistance and support. This relationship was anticipated to last approximately 20 years. The second stage of growth commenced with the establishment of a more equitable relationship between the cities. In the third stage, Islamabad would "take the lead." However, both cities would remain linked through the complementary distribution of services, products, and so forth

(Doxiadis 1968:464-467).

The close nature of the relationship that linked Islamabad to Rawalpindi threatened to disrupt the orderly progression through these three stages of growth. To prevent this, Islamabad was isolated from Rawalpindi both physically and socially.

The sectors along Rawalpindi’s northern boundary (H and 1), for example, were designated as large "green areas," and as sites for the establishment of various manufacturing industries, a sewerage treatment plant, and a municipal graveyard.

With the exception of housing provided for employees of firms located in the I sectors, residential construction is prohibited in these sectors. Other physical barriers included a railway station (located in 1-9) and the provision of army barracks in 1-9 and I-10.

Islamabad’s physical isolation was complemented by ordinances that created the conditions for the geographic expression of a split labor market. Only those light industries whose products citizens required on a daily basis were allowed to be established in Islamabad, and that along the southern edge of the G sectors bordering

on the Murree highway (i.e., as close as possible to Rawalpindi). Heavy industries. 208 the airport, the railway station, a slaughterhouse, and other institutions requiring large numbers of low paid, unskilled laborers were to be located in Rawalpindi/

The control of traffic was another means by which the government sought to institute a split economy that was expressed geographically. Aside from the occasional donkey that is used for purposes of construction, the only types of motor vehicles allowed in the city are motorcycles, trucks, buses, and automobiles. The tongas (horse carts and carriages), bullock carts, motor and bicycle rickshaws, and water buffalo, oxen, and donkeys that provide color to the landscape of the cities of

South Asia, as well as providing for the transportation needs of the poor, are conspicuously absent from Islamabad.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the physical features and structures of Islamabad as they relate to the city’s Master Plan and Program of Implementation. The intentions and motivations embedded in Islamabad’s foundation charter, however, are as much a part of the ethnic context of Islamabad as are the city’s physical structures. The following chapter examines Islamabad as a political document that articulated at the local level, the political practices by which Ayub Khan sought to develop Pakistan’s national

identity.

^ On the basis of location, the heavily industrialized sector 1-13 should be by all rights considered part of urban Islamabad. In conformity with the basis of the segregation of the twin cities, it was instead made part of Rawalpindi. CHAPTER Vm

READING ISLAMABAD: THE DEVELOPMENTAL CITY

[Ayub Khan] dreamed of a new Pakistan but remained a prisoner of his own and his country’s historic legacy (Ziring 1971:1).

We have yet to develop a strong sense of nationalism, which means rising above the personal and the parochial and evolving a mature mode of dealing witli the problems of the country (Mohammad Ayub Khan 1967:IX).

The previous chapter examined Islamabad from the design perspective and implementation strategies of its Master Plan, emphasizing the city’s physical features-its houses, government buildings, commercial establishments, road network, and so forth.

But Islamabad is more than a random collection of physical structures brought together through the cumulative process of innumerable individual acts of construction. Unlike many other cities whose urban space evolves as a consequence of a series of such activities, Islamabad’s design, physical layout, and subsequent development had been foreordained by the Master Plan long before the first shovel of dirt was removed from what was to become sector G-6. Given the Master Plan’s centrality in defining the nature and structure of Islamabad’s urban space, it is imperative that one grasp the nature of the political goals that were to be accomplished by building a new Federal Capital.

This chapter thus seeks to deconstruct Islamabad’s foundation charter. It does so, in order to develop a firmer understanding and grasp of the means by which the city was

209 2 1 0 intended to accomplish its political objectives—topics that are covered in greater detail in the following chapter.

The discussion is carried in two sections. The first section reviews the events surrounding the founding and early history of Pakistan. This period in Pakistan’s history has been examined in some detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Ahmad 1985; Alavi 1983; Jalal

1980; Noman 1988; Robinson 1979; Sayeed 1980; Syed 1984; Yusuf 1980; Ziring 1971,

1980). For this reason, the discussion will be brief, locating and identifying only those

aspects of this history that illuminate the underlying issues that informed the

government’s decision to relocate its federal capital. The second section examines

Islamabad as a symbol, representing in microcosm the political relationships that

constituted and informed Ayub Khan’s program of national reconstruction.

Prelude to Pakistan

Since its founding in 1947, the national history of Pakistan has been characterized by the

absence of those feelings of "deep, horizontal comradeship" that Benedict Anderson

(1983:16) has identified as constitutive of the modem nation-state.* The factors that

have been identified as contributing to the country’s inability to forge a national identity

include the contemporaneous existence of "great" and "little" religious traditions (Baqir

1974), conflicts between religious and secular forms of political organization (Gilmartin

' Scholars (Anderson 1966; Burki 1986; Gardezi and Rashid 1983; Metcalf 1983), journalists (ZiauUah and Baid 1985), and popular writers (Jalibi 1984; Rushdie 1983) alike have been consistent in identifying the absence of a shared national identity as the major stumbling block in Pakistan’s search for a national identity, political stability, and economic development. 2 1 1

1988), the lingering effects of colonial domination (Ali 1988; Gilmartin 1988b), the clash of tradition and modernity (Ahmed 1983; Burki 1986), inter-provincial economic disparities (Baxter et al. 1986), ethno-regional rivalries (Sayeed 1980), cultural values and social norms that promote cultural insularity and political atomization (Kurin and

Morrow 1985) and principles of social organization that foster economic fission

(Lindholm 1977). The coexistence of such disparate and centrifugal political forces can only be understood in relation to the founding and early history of Pakistan.

The Politics of Partition

At its founding the state of Pakistan included Muslims drawn from communities located in three regions of the British Indian Empire: (1) Assam and the eastern half of the British Indian province of Bengal; (2) the north central region of India (consisting of the United and Central Provinces of Uttar Pradesh, the provinces of Bihar and Orissa, the cities of Bombay and Delhi, and numerous princely states); and (3) the western States and Provinces of the Punjab, the North West Frontier, Sind, Baluchistan, and Jammu and

Kashmir. Each of these regions differed in terms of history, social organization, cultural values, economic systems, political structures and so forth.

In northern India, Muslims were a minority population, concentrated in large part in the major towns and cities of the region. Muslim societies in eastern and northwestern

India differed from that of northern India in that they were both rural and Muslim-

majority regions. In spite of the surface similarities of the eastern and western Muslim-

majority provinces, there were important differences between the two regions in terms

of language, politics, economic organization, and so forth. As we have seen, in the 2 1 2 provinces and states of northwest India, the British policy of indirect rule had been used

to great effect in maintaining the loyalty of landed rural magnates. This contrasted with

conditions in Bengal where, due to a long history of occupation, especially in the eastern

districts where Muslims constituted a majority population, the human to land ratio was

high and landlessness and economic deprivation were widespread (Burki 1986:11).

The differences among the societies in each region were sufficiently distinct that

they seemed to preclude the development of an all-India Muslim identity. As a statement

of political purpose, the partition of the subcontinent along religious lines and the

founding of a separate homeland for the Muslims of South Asia was a remote possibility,

entertained by relatively few colonial administrators and perhaps by even fewer Indians,

whether Muslim, Hindu, or Sikh (McCully 1966; Basu 1974). The outcome of the 1937

elections to the provincial assemblies of the British India empire changed all this. The

effects of the elections on the subsequent history of the subcontinent can be best

understood when examined from the perspective of the Muslim league, the political party

which suffered its worst defeat in the elections, but which ultimately drew its most

enduring political lesson.

The Muslim League and Secular Politics

The Muslim League had campaigned in 1937 on a platform whose two major

planks consisted of: (1) a demand for increased Muslim participation in commerce,

government, and the professional fields; and (2) a call for the establishment of an all-

India parliamentary democracy. In regards to the latter, the party’s platform paralleled

that of its rival organization, the Indian National Congress (hereinafter INC). As the 213 party of a minority population, however, the Muslim League departed from the INC in calling for National Assembly seats to be allocated along religious lines (Alavi 1986:38).

In Muslim-majority provinces, the demand for separate electorates meant that

Muslim League candidates would be pitted against other Muslims in competition for the

provincial assembly seats. The nature of this competition effectively prevented Muslim

League candidates from using religious differences to elicit support and gather votes.

The elections of 1937 demonstrated succinctly and unequivocally the weaknesses of the

Muslim League’s secular parliamentary platform. The Muslim league went down to

overwhelming defeat in every provincial election. In the Punjab provincial assembly, the

Muslim League won just one of eighty-six seats reserved for Muslims (Sayeed 1980:10).

In the elections to the Provincial Assembly in the North West Frontier Province’s

Provincial Assembly, the Muslim League fared no better: The only difference being that

here the Muslim league was unable to win even one of the 36 reserved seats (Sayeed

1980:19).

At the all-India level, the Indian National Congress emerged in 1937 as the

preeminent party of Indian politics. The election left the INC in control of provincial

assemblies in seven of the eleven provinces in which elections were contested (Sayeed

1980:10-11). Its success was to catapult it to the forefront of the "Quit India"

movement.

The End o f Rapprochement

For reasons that remain unclear to this day, the leaders of the Indian National

Congress declined to solicit the support of the Muslim League in governing the north- 214 central provinces under its control (Burki 1986:17). Instead, laws and statutes that were silent on the issue of Muslim minority rights and representation were shepherded through the provincial assemblies controlled by the INC. In defense of such legislative actions, leaders of the Indian National Congress argued that in a future all-Indian secular state, a citizen of India would be an Indian first, and a Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Jain, or Christian second. To justify their position further, they also noted that the passing of legislation favoring the interest of one community over those of another would exacerbate communal differences and thereby strengthen the British hand.

The INC’s reluctance to address the underlying economic, social, and political concerns of North Indian Muslims had a sobering effect on the leadership of the Muslim

League. Denied a voice in governing their own community, the Muslim League was left

with relatively few options by which to counter anti-Hindu sentiments that were rapidly

taking root among urban professionals, students, and so forth (Gilmartin 1981). The

exclusion of Muslims from leadership fueled fears that Islam was in danger of becoming

a religion of a persecuted minority-a fact the Muslim League leadership, it was implied,

had ignored in attempting to establish a political modus vivendi with the Indian National

Congress.

In order to retain its credibility, the Muslim League, under the leadership of the

secularist, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, adopted the demand for a separate homeland for the

Muslims of South Asia (Burki 1986:24; Gilmartin 1988b: 182-186). In calling for a

Muslim homeland, the Muslim League embraced as political doctrine and dogma the

"two-nation theory." While Muslims and Hindus had coexisted in India for centuries. 215 the Muslim League now argued that Hindus and Muslims constituted separate nations with distinct cultures, religions, histories, societies, customs, languages, and so forth.

The religious overtones of the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims

of South Asia provided the Muslim League with a powerful tool with which to confront

its political foes. Ultimate and unstinting support for the demand for Pakistan was

required of all those who claimed to be Muslim (Gilmartin 1988b: 146-244). On the

basis of this explicitly communal agenda, the Muslim League coopted the urban-based

revivalist movement, and bound together in common cause the petite bourgeoisie,

agricultural landlords, and agrarian laborers of Muslim India. It did so while refocusing

political debate on the issues of communalism and minority representation and issuing

a subversive critique against the pro-British landed magnates of northwest British India.

To press the issue, Muslim League representatives organized a series of speaking

tours, rallies, and political assemblies. At these public meetings speakers implicitly

attacked the Indian National Congress by exalting the glories of Muslim culture of South

Asia and the Middle East. The message of all this campaigning was abundantly evident:

Muslims could not be guaranteed their political rights nor assured of their livelihood in

a country ruled by the Indian National Congress.

The appeal to a shared religious ideology was, however, insufficient in and of

itself to sway the landed elite to sign on to the idea of Pakistan. To solidify the Muslim

League’s position at the all-India level, the Muslim League was forced to compromise

with the provincial power brokers in the northwest and east of British India, i.e., in the

rural Muslim-majority areas of the subcontinent. In the provinces of northwest British 216 India, Jinnah persuaded Muslim landlords to pledge their support for the demand for

Pakistan in consideration of which he surrendered control of the Muslim League’s provincial, district, and local political organizations (Alavi 1986:39).

At Partition in 1947 upwards to 14 million Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Christian refugees crossed the international border separating the newly founded states of Pakistan and India (International Labour Office 1959:108-111).^ As the Capital of the new nation, Karachi attracted a disproportionate share of the refugee population. As a result,

Karachi’s population swelled from its 1941 figure of 358,000 to 1,100,000 people by

1951. Just ten years later (1961) it had increased to reach the figure of 1,912,598

(Pakistan, Central Statistical Office 1972:24, Table 2.19).

The Conundrum of Pakistani Politics

The demand for Pakistan had required provincial and religious leaders to mute their political differences. Having attained statehood, however, it was inevitable that strife would emerge as competition ensued among different factions vying for control of the state. The Muslim League was perhaps the only institution of sufficient stature that seemed capable of balancing the demands of regional politicians against those of the state

(see Ahmad 1985:163-169).’

^ The figures for this migration range widely. This is undoubtedly a high number. More conservative estimates place the total at around ten million.

’ In the Council session of the All-India Muslim League in 1946, Abdul Hashim had asked the assembled members to consider the idea that the Lahore Resolution endorsed Bengali separatism (Sayeed 1980:66). 217 Perhaps in recognition of the sizeable Hindu minorities that Independence would leave in Pakistan (were it not for the unexpected mass migrations of 1947 - 1951), the

Muslim League presented the nation with a political plan that reflected the party’s background in the secular-dominated political institutions of north India (Burki 1986:42).

Jinnah "preached tolerance to the Constituent Assembly" (Sayeed 1980:27) charged to draft the country’s constitution. In his address to the Assembly’s plenary session, he declared that "you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and

Muslims would cease to be Muslims... in the political sense as citizens of the state"

(cited in Sayeed 1980:27).

Jinnah’s advocacy of tolerance and compromise had an effect opposite of that for which he had perhaps hoped. Religious leaders, hopeful for a bigger say in running the country, and provincial secularists, who had suppressed their personal political ambitions in support of the demand for Pakistan, no longer felt constrained from expressing their views and opinions (see Ahmad 1985:286-293). What reservations they may have had, were totally swept from the table with the untimely death of Jinnah in the summer of

1948, and the 1951 assassination of his closest aid and ally, Prime Minister Liaqut Ali

Khan. Having failed to develop a grassroots political organization, the death of these two men sealed the fate of the Muslim League and, for the foreseeable future, of

Pakistan itself. The country veered widely toward the "big man" politics of reputation, prestige, and court intrigue. Pakistan’s Karachi-based political leaders vied to neutralize or curry favor with regional politicians in East Pakistan, the North West Frontier

Province, Baluchistan, and the Punjab. Throughout the 1950s political alliances 218 constantly shifted among the various groups representing the regional, ethnic, and religious interests of the country (see Ahmad 1985:313 ff; Callard 1959:24-25).

The unceasing political intrigue of the period delayed the Constituent Assembly from drafting a constitution for nine years.^ The document that finally emerged from the Assembly in 1956 seemed to have been written with the express purpose of pleasing no one and offending all. The Assembly members had agreed that Islam would play an important part in the constitutional identity of the nation (Syed 1984:81). To that end, a Directive Principles section advised the promotion of Islamic values, while a repugnancy clause (Article 198) enjoined the promulgation of laws repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as understood in the Qu’ran and Sunnah? (Burld 1986:48; Weiss

1986:8). An advisory commission was appointed to provide consultation to the government regarding the interpretation of Islamic law (Metcalf 1983:179).

Within the Assembly little common ground could be found as to the distribution of power among the various government institutions that would ultimately protect and promote the nation’s Islamic identity (see Ahmad 1985:351-355). Moreover, the right to refuse religious instruction and the freedom to practice the religion of one’s choice were given Constitutional guarantees similar to those that had been extended to Muslims

(Weiss 1986:8).

Until 1956, Pakistan was governed under the ’’constitutional" provisions of the

^ The sunnah, lit. the "way of the prophet," the body of custom derived from the hadis (sayings) of the prophet. 219 Against any standard of measure, the extent to which the constitution provided for the protection and promotion of Islam were quite modest. It did not provide for the establishment of a National Ministry of Religious Affairs in charge of mosques, religious endowments, and Islamic courts; it did not assemble a committee of ‘ulema’ to review and ensure that existing and proposed laws conformed to the shari’at; and it did not allow for the appointment of qazis’ (Islamic jurist) to the various levels of the federal court system (Syed 1984:98).

Nevertheless, with the exception of a few religious scholars who condemned the

Constitution (e.g., Maulana Madudi), most ‘ulema’ seemed willing to accept it as an interim document. While they readily admitted that the Constitution’s Islamic provisions were exceedingly modest, many saw in it the legitimation of their role as trustees of the country’s national religious identity (Syed 1984:95). Other groups, however, seemed less willing to compromise their views or objectives for the sake of the country.

By an act of constitutional legerdemain, the Constituent Assembly had managed to retain control of all legislative powers, ensuring, thereby, that no laws would be passed that were repugnant to the political and economic interests of its members. As

a legislative body, the Constituent Assembly was dominated by those who led the

campaign for Pakistan, i.e., a select group of north Indian Muslims who tended to hold

secular views and opinions on most issues. As refugees themselves, they lacked both

popular and moral basis of support within the country. Without the conceptual and

consensual basis to legitimate their rule, the foundation of the very country was placed

in jeopardy. Secular and religious opposition figures joined with members of the former 2 2 0

Punjab National Unionist Party to denounce the Constitution. Many reminded their fellow citizens that they had questioned the wisdom of partitioning India for the sake of setting up two separate secular states (see Ahmad 1985:351ff; Burki 1986:49; Friedmann

1971).

The years that followed the promulgation of the constitution constitute some of the darkest chapters in Pakistan’s history. Calls for civil disobedience, rebellion, and secession rang throughout the country. Religious leaders and provincial politicians argued that appeals to Islam notwithstanding, the Constitution did little more than provide a political cover for the exploitative practices of secular politicians centered at Karachi.

A consensus developed to the effect that extreme measures must be taken if the country

was to save itself from slipping into anarchy and dissolution (Ahmad 1985:351ff).

Whatever power and authority the Center might still have possessed was quickly

consumed by the endless in fighting and petty squabbling of politicians who seemed

intent on protecting and enlarging their spheres of personal influence rather than

governing the country. In one particularly raucous session, the Deputy Speaker of the

East Pakistan house was actually attacked and murdered in the assembly building (Ziring

1971:9). Local-level political issues in Karachi further undermined popular support for

the constitution and the state. The location of Karachi’s bustis (refugee shanty towns)

in and around the city’s central business and administrative districts (Specht 1983:35)

exaggerated their political importance relative to their actual numbers.

A concern with the radicalization of the muhajir was compounded by the actions

of Karachi’s business community. On more than one occasion business leaders had 2 2 1

"rallied mill workers to march on the National Assembly" (New York Times 1959a:3).

Riots that had been provoked by local issues had also threatened the national government on two other occasions (New York Times 1959a:3).“

By the late 1950s it appeared that Pakistan was well on the way to collapsing into anarchy. It was in an apparent effort to forestall this and to restore a sense of balance to the country that President Iskander Mirza, on October 7, 1958, invited Field Marshal

Mohammad Ayub Khan to become Prime Minister and impose martial law.’ The

significance of this event was to be superseded just twenty days later, when Ayub Khan deposed Iskander Mirza, and installed himself as the country’s first military President

(Ziring 1971:9-10).* It is also with this political turmoil serving as a backdrop that

Ayub Khan, literally within days of taking office, announced that he had formed a special

committee to determine the need and feasibility of relocating the seat of the federal

government (Heinecke 1961).

® Between 1947 and 1955, 614 work stoppages involving 297,344 workers occurred. This resulted in a total loss of 1,024,156 work days (Tayyeb 1966:168).

’ In point of fact, events suggest that Ayub Khan had been laying the groundwork for this "invitation" for some years before die October coup. It was fairly common knowledge among Pakistan’s top bureaucrats that Ayub Khan had been the "man behind the throne" throughout much of the 1950s (Ziring 1971:7). For example, it was Ayub Khan, rather than the Prime Minister or Governor General, who brought Pakistan into the Baghdad (later CENTO) and SEATO mutual security assurance pacts. He arranged for various forms of military and economic aid and assistance, by-passing government intermediaries and negotiating directly with foreign powers (Sayeed 1980:49-50).

* Since 1958, martial law has been imposed on three separate occasions, 1958- 1969, 1971-1975, 1977-1985. In each case the image of a internally weakened Pakistan unable to stave off the depredations of its more powerful neighbor, India, has been invoked to justify the imposition of martial law. 2 2 2 Islamabad: Site of Rupture, City of Consolidation

Given its timing, the symbolism of Ayub Khan’s pronouncement that he was considering moving the federal capital should have escaped no one. Relocating the capital was to render as things of the past the loss of empire, the history of foreign domination, the legacy of bloodshed and communal hostility, and, most importantly, the ethnic, regional, and sectarian differences that had polarized the country. In marked contrast to the country’s tortured history, Islamabad was to be "a visionary capital" (Jamoud 1968) that would usher in a "tomorrow" (Husain 1965) of "independence, hope" (Gordon 1964), and "peace" (Capital Development Authority 1979). To invoke Le Corbusier (1967

[1933]), Islamabad was to be Pakistan’s "radiant city" of the future.

By building Islamabad, the Ayub Khan government stated in both a literal and figurative sense that it was constructing an exemplary city that by virtue of its compelling rationality, would lead the nation into an era of harmony, integration, and national patriotism. To accomplish this, the government had first to confront and then subjugate to its will a welter of competing political, economic, cultural, and religious interests.

The site selection process was critical in laying the foundation for the city’s subsequent symbolic dominance over the nation.

The Site Selection Process

"Scientific* studies conducted by the committee established to evaluate the feasibility and need to move the capital—the Special Commission for the Location of the

Federal Capital-had found Karachi to be deficient as a federal capital. The city’s lack of open space and the overcrowded and dismal living conditions of its inhabitants were 223 mentioned as primary factors determining the outcome of the deliberations. The

Commission further noted in support of its conclusions, that Karachi was a city of refugees and financial and business interests and that it did not therefore "... evoke strong national sentiments" (Stephenson 1968:199). The debilitating effects it had on the civilian bureaucracy were also noted as further justification for its findings (Jamoud

1968:960).

To resolve these issues, the Special Commission recommended that the Federal

Capital be moved to its present site at the Potwar Plateau. According to the

Commission, the benefits of the new site were innumerable and included a more hospitable climate, the site’s open area, its nearness to a developing economic center, its forward position relative to China, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the absence of a strong business community, and so forth.

Form of Rupture

The "scientific" nature of the Special Commission’s deliberations provided the

Ayub Khan regime with various political advantages. As the Site Selection Commission was impartial and non-partisan, it was able to assert that its deliberations were based on the consistent application of rational, objective criteria. Asserting that the selection of the new site for the Capital was based on "scientific study" legitimated the regime’s claim that the new capital would serve as a wellspring of national consolidation. As the

site selection process was unbiased by considerations of political gain and advantage, the

scientific logic inherent to the site selection process would lead inexorably to the creation 224 of a national identity focussed on the Capital in general and on the Presidential mansion in particular.

That the site selection process was "scientific," allowed the government to assert that in its pursuit of economic growth and development it had, in light of its self- proclaimed development mandate (see below), a duty to the country and its people to comply with the Commission’s recommendation, no matter how controversial. Yet, as a government body, the Special Commission’s terms of reference also enabled the leadership to appropriate the city as an exemplar of the government’s national program of economic development. In this latter aspect, Islamabad was both symbol and substance of the means by which Pakistan, under the "able guidance" and "tutelage" of its President, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, would achieve national unity and

integration. On defining this as the preeminent component of Islamabad’s foundation

charter, Ayub Khan (1967:2) was quite clear:

Islamabad has been my dream always; and it is not a dream which is unrealistic or unwanted. The capital of a country is the focus and the centre of the people’s ambitions and drives, and it is wrong to put them in an existing city. It must have a colour of its own and character of its own. And that character is the sum total of the aspirations, the life and the ambitions of the people of the whole of Pakistan.

Capitals are not built, nor do they exist just for the sake of, shall we say, utility. Utility is very important, but at the same time it has to encompass much bigger vistas, and, in a way, give light and direction to the efforts of the people of a country. It must, therefore, be in surroundings suited to this purpose.

With the two provinces of Pakistan, separated as they are from each other, you want to bring the people on a common platform. The thing to do is to take them to a new place altogether. 225 So it is not just the building of a city, it is something that could be more. It is a question binding the people of Pakistan, a question of giving the right sort of environment where they could produce the best results. The Central Government is the thinking and supervisory cell of a country. The very best man-power has to be brought there in order to be able to work for the betterment of the people. They must be given a right environment, a right setting in which they could produce their very best.

Linking Islamabad’s foundation charter to a national program of techno- developmental growth served other less apparent communicative and political purposes.

Emphasizing the scientific process of selecting a site created a sub-text of messages and meanings that sought to define Islamabad as a "modem" cultural space. As such, the city’s foundation charter rendered as politically subversive any forms of regional, ethnic, or sectarian identity, save that of nationalism. The themes upon which this element of the city’s urban discourse drew are apparent in government proclamations. Again, I quote at length;

What is being aimed at is not a city for the present day needs only but a city for the future generations, a city to serve as a focal point and an embodiment of national life to which all of us will belong irrespective of other affiliations (Zamir Jafri, Chairman, Capital Development Authority, [1964]:Foreword).

On achieving independence the country lacked a capital. This drawback proved a blessing in disguise. It has provided an opportunity to shape a national headquarters which would not only be a show place but also a symbol of strength, culture and tradition. The capital of a country is not merely another city, it is a leader among cities. In addition to being an adequate and ideal seat of national administration it is an embodiment of the national life, in its vast and varied dimensions. It is to march with history and inspire the generations. Islamabad is thus springing up as a city predominantly of today and tomorrow and is thus different from the cities which are over shadowed by the past (Mohammad A. Kazmi, Chair, Capital Development Authority, 1979:4). 226 The assertion that the decision to build Islamabad was a conclusion drawn from the findings of a "scientific" study legitimated Islamabad’s credentials not only as a planned city, but also as a rationally designed urban built form. In a manner remarkably similar to the mnenomic operations that foundation myths perform in small scale societies, such proclamations shape public discourse and opinion regarding the city. In discussions about the city, residents frequently allude to Islamabad’s "modem,"

"western," "planned," and "scientific" character. Such observations find resonance and support in the complete absence of colonial architecture within the city.

As a transcendent city of the future, Islamabad was decidedly apart from the past.

As government officials noted:

Islamabad is a city created for the future and its fate is connected with the fate of Pakistan. Together they have to grow continuously into the future. This is the first characteristic of Islamabad-it is a city which is going to live in the future (Jafri [1964]:4).

In respect to defining Islamabad as apart from the events that culminated in Ayub Kahn’s

seizure of power, government propaganda has again been largely successful. As was the

case in defining Islamabad as a city of the future, the official interpretations of

Islamabad’s a-temporality also constitutes a pervasive (if contradictory) motif in

conversations among Islamabad’s residents. In such discussions, Islamabad is frequently

contrasted (unfavorably) against the traditional urban lifestyles found in such cities as

Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Lahore, Multan, Quetta, and Karachi.

The founding of Islamabad, however, was the product of particular sequence of

historical events that culminated in the seizure of power by Ayub Khan. As such, the

city is bound to its past, as much as it is tied to the political forces that supported and. 221 in turn, were protected by the state. Indeed much of the political, cultural, social, and economic planning elements of the city were formulated in relation to the context of the policies that were pursued by the state under Ayub Khan. In order to develop an understanding of the ways in which these political forces find their voice in Islamabad’s

urban architecture and planning, it is necessary to review some of the major elements of

the Ayub Khan program of national reconstruction.

Ideologies of Reconciliation, Practices of Dominance

During his ten years in office (October, 1958-March, 1969), Ayub Khan presided

over a program of capitalist-based industrialization and agricultural development.^

During this period, which Ayub Khan and his supporters liked to call Pakistan’s "decade

of development" (see, e.g., Ayub Khan 1965:90), Pakistan experienced rapid economic

growth and expansion in both agriculture and industry: Annual growth rates for

agriculture averaged two to three times above what they had been in the 1950s. Similar

successes were also recorded in the industrial sector, with average growth rates

exceeding 3% per annum (Ziring 1971:17).*°

The government assumed a leading role in laying the foundations for economic

growth. With the advice of a group of Harvard professors (e.g., Gustav Papanek), the

government enacted a highly centralized program of fiscal, monetary, and trade policies.

Informed by a capitalist theory of economic growth, Pakistan’s advisors envisioned the

’ Ayub Khan was Chief Martial Law Administrator, 1959-1965 and President, 1958-1969.

*° Though difficult to ascertain, financial reports on the city of Islamabad (Khan 1970) suggest that municipal revenues did not increase at the same rate. 228 government establishing the conditions whereby it would become possible for the country to achieve the "critical mass" necessary to allow it to "take off."

In pursuing this growth policy, the Ayub Khan government embraced the proposition that policies favorable to the interests of the rich were of benefit the country as a whole (see Ayub Khan 1965:81-105). It was argued that with sufficient time, the wealth generated by the elite sectors of society would ripple throughout the entire

country, imparting to it "a new outlook towards life and a new sense of national dignity"

(Ayub Khan 1965:91). The eradication of economic inequalities that would result from

such growth, would in turn lead to the consequent elimination of ethnic, regional, and

sectarian-based political differences.

Recipients of government largess were expected to lend support to the regime and

to maintain law and order in the countryside (Sayeed 1980:55). To facilitate this, a

system of political institutions was developed that contained elements strikingly

reminiscent of the system of indirect rule the British had implemented in the Punjab

three-quarters of century earlier. Like the British model, various forms of state

patronage were used to assure and coopt the loyalty and support of landed rural

magnates. The pillar of the political structure was the system of indirect presidential

election legislated under the terms of the 1959 Basic Democracies act.

As a political system, the Basic Democracies consisted of a five-tiered system of

councils in East and West Pakistan. At the top of the ladder were the two Provincial

Development Advisory Councils (in East and West Pakistan). Beneath these units, were

a number of intermediary layers that had an increasingly smaller constituency. The 229 Union Council was the most important of these intermediary administrative structures.

The Union Council committee was made up of representatives who were elected from among the 80,000 "Basic Democrats" designated by the Central Government (Friedman

1961:10).

Urban municipalities were organized along similar lines. Each Urban

Municipality was divided into two or more Union Committees. These were of a stature

equivalent to the rural Union Councils. As in the Union Councils, the chair and

members were elected from among a number of officially designated "Basic Democrats. "

Also as in its rural counterpart, a number of intermediary administrative layers were

inserted between the Union Committee and the Provincial government. Each of these

higher level units consisted of a Committee that was composed equally of representatives

appointed by the government and members drawn from the unit just beneath it. In all

cases, however, the Chair was appointed by the central government (Ziring 1971:202).

Thus, in spite of its allusions to open and free democratic elections, union councilors

(basic democrats)--elected on a non-party basis from government designated candidates-

were small enough "to be kept under the coercive control of the civil servants" (Sayeed

1980:55).

The structure of the Basic Democracies, it was contended, provided a safe arena

for the political participation of the country’s poor and unlettered masses. While they

could vote, they were sheltered from the consequences of their actions. In respect to its 230 political purposes, it can at best be said that the Basic Democracies was an exercise in the practice of benevolent paternalism."

The ultimate consequences of Ayub Khan’s program of national reconstruction can only be understood in light of the combined effects of its economic and political components. The structure of the political institutions established by the state combined with the economic policies it championed to create a form of political society that was at once hierarchical and atomized. Although class was the basis upon which the dispersal of government favoritism turned, it did not perform a similar function in regards to ostensible distribution of political power. That is to say, socio-economic classes were not mobilized in support of the government. Instead, the hierarchical system of Basic

Democracies-in a pattern strikingly similar to that of a military chain of command- linked the state to its citizens through a number of intermediary, increasingly less inclusive layers of bureaucracy. Bringing small groups of individuals into the state’s administrative apparatus in such a manner, imposed a system of political participation that was seen to foster the eradication of horizontal ties and forms of social identity.

In light of the objectives of the Basic Democracies Act, it is of more than passing interest to note that the right to participate in the political training process did not extend

to Islamabad’s citizens. The authorizing legislation of the Capital Development

Authority, which established it as the administrative unit responsible for overseeing the

" On occasion government paternalism even extended to encompass the country’s religious institutions. Addressing a conference of ulema in May, 1959, for example, Ayub Khan "urged them to become acquainted with science, philosophy, economics, and contemporary history" (Syed 1984:123). Doing so, he implied, would provide the ulema with the knowledge necessary to make Islam a viable 20th century religion. 231 implementation of the city’s Master Plan, was amended in 1966: In addition to the added responsibility of an enlarged geographic range of operations (Hasan 1971:1), the

Authority was converted into a municipal government (Wasti 1979:14). However, it was

not part of the urban Basic Democracies scheme. Except when the country has been

under Martial Law, Islamabad has instead been governed by a board composed of not

less than three members (the Chair, the Financial Advisor, and one other member) all

of whom are appointed by the Central Government (Wasti 1979:12).'^

Nonetheless, in spite of its administrative distinctiveness, it can be argued that

Islamabad’s urban design is perhaps the most faithful and enduring rendering of the

major political tenets of the Ayub Khan program of national development. More than

any other institution or structure, it symbolized the new order that the Ayub Khan

government attempted to impose upon the country. The ways in which the urban built

form environment of Islamabad was intended to achieve this goal constitute the subject

matter of the following chapter.

As mentioned previously, the CDA’s administrative powers (especially as regards the allotment of land) was assumed by the federal government under the Martial Law Ordinances of President/General Zia ul-Haq. When Martial was lifted (December 1985), the government retained control of the CDA’s administrative powers (Qureshi, July 17, 1986). CHAPTER IX

PEDESTRIANISM, STRATIFICATION AND VENERATION:

AUTHORITARIAN FORMS IN ISLAMABAD

A Federal Capital could . . . become a symbol of the new state and of the nation towards which the eyes of all people will look for unity and guidance for the consolidation of their new state (Doxiadis Associates 1960b:411; emphasis mine).

The Presidential mansion is the most visually prominent structure of the city (Journal Entry, January 4, 1986).

Within the low income group neighborhood one would hardly need any kind of transport to move about for the essential civic amenities will be available at a few minutes walking distance, in almost every sector (Wasti 1979:57).

The previous chapter assessed Islamabad’s foundation charter in relation to Ayub Khan’s program of national reconstruction and consolidation. This chapter is concerned with developing an understanding of the ways in which Islamabad’s urban design was intended to achieve in a local context the goals that Ayub Khan had set for the entire nation. The city’s Master Plan is the focus of study and discussion. As an introduction, the first section briefly reviews the major tenets of Doxiadis’ philosophy of urban life. This overview sets the stage for a more detailed consideration of the ways in which differential access to the rights to the city translated Ayub Khan’s program of national development into a local statement of dominance and control. The third section examines

232 233 the spatial arrangement of the city’s physical structures as it relates to the Ayub Khan program of national development.

To a certain extent this chapter is autobiographical. It retraces the evolution of my thoughts as I sought in the voluminous literature on Islamabad a key to understanding the ways in which a modem and hence trans-cultural city was to serve as the focal point of national identity.*

Doxiadis’ Theory of Urban Life

According to Doxiadis (1965:1) Islamabad demonstrates "in actual practice, and in the best possible way, the implementation of [my] analysis." The central premise of

Doxiadis’ (1975:25) theory of town planning is his proposition that a town plan, to be successful, must achieve an "ekistic balance" among five "ekistic units" (individual, society, nature, shells [buildings], and networks [streets]).^ Although not explicitly acknowledged, Doxiadis theorizing on the relationships among the five ekistic units make clear the distinction he drew between, on the one hand, "individuals," "nature," and

"society," and, on the other hand, "shells," and "networks."

* * Doxiadis produced an extensive body of work during his lifetime. In addition to overseeing planning projects on five continents (Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America), he wrote numerous articles, edited the town-planning journal Ekistics, authored 23 books, and gave countless lectures and presentations throughout the world. To these one must also add those articles appearing in Elastics under the name of his engineering and town planning firm, Doxiadis Associates. Islamabad’s urban design is discussed throughout this body of literature.

^ For a general definition of "ekistics" see Doxiadis (1968, especially pp. 463-467). 234 According to Doxiadis, pre-industrial cities (such as Athens, Florence, Paris, and

London) managed to serve the needs of the individual, society, and nature because they were built on a "human scale" in which an individual "can reach the centre without walking longer than ten minutes" (Doxiadis 1965:26). The limited urban growth that characterized the ancient world was due to the inherent limitations of the construction practices of the time, the nature and type of available building materials, the absence of public financing, and the restrictions on mobility imposed by animal and human

locomotion. The resulting compactness, in turn, eliminated the need for the imposition

of order on the city’s systems of "shells" and "networks" (see Doxiadis 1975).

The rapid increase in urbanization in the modem world contrasted markedly with

the historical experiences of the ancient cities. Doxiadis (1968:27-31) attributed such

growth to evolutionary forces that had affected human settlements throughout history, but

which had accelerated during the industrial age. Doxiadis’ social interventions were

thereby licensed by his contention that urban growth was an inevitable consequence of

human nature. Doxiadis (1963a, 1966) argued that if urbanization continued

uncontrolled, social pathologies, and human degradation would increase to levels hitherto

unimaginable. Humans were thus confronted with the prospect of two distinct urban

futures: One marked by unregulated urbanization of the world, and the other

characterized by a balanced system of life in which urbanization was controlled,

disciplined, and provided order by the ratio-technical sciences of human settlement.

Doxiadis’ views on urbanization are in the tradition of avant garde critiques of

bourgeoisie architecture and town planning. In this, Doxiadis was one with the great 235 modernists who saw degeneration and decay where cities were prohibited from growing.

He departed from the avant garde modernists, however, in the attitudes he held towards the products of the machine age. In general, the modernists embraced technology as they saw in it a cure for the ills of the modem urban world (see, e.g.. Le Corbusier 1967

[1933]). Doxiadis, on the other hand, was somewhat uncertain as to the value of modem technology, especially the automobile. While he saw the automobile as having an intrinsic functional value, he nonetheless considered it to be a dangerous influence in that

it destroyed the character of the ancient city. Thus automobiles, tmcks, buses, and so

forth were to find their appropriate place in a balanced urban plan. To do so, however,

their use must be strictly regulated so as to contain their deleterious effects (see, e.g.,

Doxiadis 1964b:346, 1975:280-290).

Doxiadis’ views were to find their voice and expression in Islamabad’s urban

design. In regard to the Master Plan, the primary objective was to "isolate [sectors]

from through traffic as much as possible in order to allow functions within them to

develop . . . in a quiet, rather static way like they did in the old city" (Doxiadis

1968:358). Nevertheless, the Master Plan had also to enable and facilitate Islamabad’s

urban growth. In this it had to make efficient and maximum use of the technical

products of the machine age.

Pedestrian Sectors: Non-Ethnic Sites of Association

The interface between the residential sectors and the city’s road network was the site at

which these conflicting needs were to be confronted and ultimately resolved. According 236 to the Doxiadis plan, each of the city’s residential sectors--except those that were not orthogonal-were to contain from 20,000 to 40,000 people" (Doxiadis Associates

1964:332). The physical dimensions of the residential sectors were determined on the basis of human locomotion. Doxiadis reasoned that the longest distance a human can normally walk in 10 minutes "is no more than 2000 yards or about 2000 meters." From this, he concluded that the city’s "basic modulus was to be a square of about 2000 by

2000 yards" (Doxiadis 1965:26). That is to say that each sector approximated the

classical cities of the ancient world in their physical dimensions and population size (see,

e.g.. Figure 286 in Doxiadis 1975:292).

Within Islamabad, growth was to be accommodated within the framework of the

urban grid. As the pace of settlement ebbed in one sector it was picked up by the next.

Thus, although the city consisted "of static cells based on the human scale," the addition

of new sectors allowed the city to "develop dynamically and unhindered into the future"

(Doxiadis 1965:26).

In accord with his theoretical views, the elements of the ancient world had to be

isolated and protected from the debilitating effects of the products of the machine age.

This was to be accomplished by implementing a number of planning conventions. For

example, the zoning regulations and ordinances that situated manufacturing, wholesaling,

and industrial activity in the "H" and "1" sectors, ensured that their effects would be kept

at some distance from the core residential sectors. Similar measures were taken within

each sector. The provision of commercial, civic, and governmental institutions in

sufficient number to satisfy the needs of the various classes of communities residing in 237 each sector eliminated the possibility that a sector’s functions would "spill over its border line" (Doxiadis 1968:358).

The city’s communication network depended entirely on motor-vehicular transportation. Given this, it was inevitable that the city’s residents would be brought into repeated and daily contact with the automobile. It was imperative, then, that the design layout of the city’s road network ensure that humans be isolated from the deleterious effects of the automobile. A number of strategies were adopted to achieve this objective. As mentioned in Chapter 7, the design of the road network discourages through-sector travel. The city’s footpaths were intended to achieve similar objectives.

At the level of the Class III communities, i.e., that is the small group or neighborhood, footpaths were laid out "at right-angles to the motor-roads." Thus, although "doorsteps are quite close to parking areas . . . pedestrian routes from those same doorsteps to the

[Class III and lower] community functions are never crossed by vehicle roads" (Doxiadis

Associates 1961:323). On closer examination it becomes clear that each of these design

conventions had a political component. It is to a consideration of the political agenda

that underwrote these design conventions that I now turn.

Designs of Stratification, Dispersal, and Dominance

In spite of the concern with promoting a "pedestrian" lifestyle and its allusions to

preserving the character of the ancient city, in actuality the Master Plan’s design seeks

to accentuate class differences as a means to establish the basis for a hierarchically

organized socio-political order. To achieve this goal, required that the Master Plan 238 exercise complete and total control over the city’s inhabitants, especially the poor. In advising the urban planners at the Capital Development Authority, Doxiadis was succinct and to the point regarding the need for the maximum intervention possible. In regard to the CDA’s future role in overseeing the growth and development of the city, Doxiadis

"strongly recommended that the intervention should be the maximum possible." If this was not done, he warned that there would be "no hope of achieving the proper scale for public squares, etc." (Doxiadis Associates 1962b: 152).

The control the Master Plan exercises over the rights of access to the city and its

"urban functions" is at a level of inclusiveness that is virtually without precedent in the history of urban planning (Stephenson 1970:330). The degree to which urban growth and development occurs in conformity with the city’s rectilinear urban grid has no counterpart in Pakistan’s other cities. Similarly, public ordinances impose strict regulations on the number and routes of flying coaches (buses), restricts the use of motor rickshaws, and prohibits families in urban Islamabad from owning livestock. Not only has the promulgation of such ordinances made the city a distinctive urban built form, but the absence of features commonly associated with cities throughout the Subcontinent lends support to the commonly held belief that Islamabad was built for the benefit of the country’s elite civil servants, military officers, and industrial/agricultural magnates.

The organization of the city’s street network as it relates to the spatial structuring of economic relations within a residential sector was key to the Master Plan’s effort to create a centrally organized socio-political order. Within the city, the availability of parking space, the spatial organization and layout of various classes of roads, and the 239 designation of rights of way were ostensibly determined in relation to expected traffic flows within the Class HI residential communities. An examination of the statistics appearing in a short article on "Traffic Requirements in G-6" (Doxiadis Associates

1963b) is suggestive of the extent to which income levels (as based on differences in civil service ranking) were used to delineate rights of access to Islamabad.

The number of private cars various family income groups were expected to own by the years 1970 and 1980 are as given in Tables 8 and 9. The disparity between the upper and lower income families in regard to their expected automotive needs is readily apparent. On the basis of computations performed in the early 1960s, families of income categories A and B (Rps 2,120 to Rps 4,180 per annum) were not expected to own any cars by 1970. Conversely, the automotive "requirements" of the families of income group I (Rps 33,1(X) and above per annum) were anticipated to have a "need" of 1.2 cars per family by the same year (see Table 8). Relative to the upper income groups, the

ratios for the low-income groups show some improvement by 1980. For instance, while

income group B (now Rps 3,840 to Rps 7,140 per annum) was expected to have an

average need of .3 cars per family, income group I (now Rps 47,660 per annum) would

still require just a little over one car per family. Nonetheless, based on Doxiadis’

calculations, the lowest income group, i.e., category "A," would still have no automotive

needs. 240 Table 8

Number of Private Cars per Family on the

Basis of 1970 Family Incomes

Income Group Estimated Annual Income Cars per per 5-member family in Family in 1970 1970 in Rps.

A - 2,120 0 B 2,120 4,180 0 C 4,180 6,020 0.3 D 6,020 7,420 0.4 E 7,420 11,180 0.6 F 11,180 14,020 0.7 G 14,020 17,300 0.8 H 17,300 33,100 1.0 I 33,100 and above 1.2

Source: Doxiadis Associates (1963b: 179) 241 Table 9

Number of Private Cars Per Family on the

Basis of Expected 1980 Family Incomes

Income Group Estimated Annual Income Cars per per 5-member family in Family in 1980 in Rps. 1980 A - 3,840 0 B 3,840 7,140 0.3 C 7,140 10,100 0.5 D 10,100 11,320 0.6 E 11,320 17,480 0.8 F 17,480 20,320 0.9 G 20,320 23,040 1.0 H 23,040 47,660 1.1 I 47,660 and above 1.2

Source: Doxiadis Associates (1963b: 179) 242 The spatial distribution of "parking rights" demonstrates the inequality of the allocation schedule (see Table 10). The anticipated transportation requirements indicates that as of 1980, only 294 of the 980 "B" families in G-6/1 would be allotted parking

spaces and commensurate access to the city’s road network. This is just slightly better

than the 534 "A" income families who would receive no parking allocations because they

"needed" no cars. The limited automotive needs of the lower income groups resulted in

a consequent reduction in the number of feeder and access roads that were to be

extended into the city’s poorer sub-sectors.

The figures for Islamabad’s privileged families are in sharp contrast to those for

low income groups. As indicated, sub-sector G-6/3 was to be occupied by 245 families

of income groups "F," "G," and "H." Based on these calculations, parking space would

be allocated for the 243 automobiles it was anticipated these wealthy families would own

by 1980. The number of feeder and access roads that were to be extended into sub

sectors in which they resided would consequently be fairly high. Thus, as with much of

Islamabad’s Master Plan, geographic mobility was "a right" of the elite, and a privilege

which the government bestowed begrudgingly on the office assistants and hall attendants

of the federal bureaucracy.

As in these previous examples, property rights were also allocated on the basis

of income. Regionally, this took the form of segregating the local labor market (see

Chapter 7). This was justified again on the basis of Doxiadis’ assertion that "to merge

both cities into one . . . would have meant that regional functions-marketing, storage,

movement of peasants-would be transplanted into the middle of the national capital. 243 Table 10

1963 Projections of Sector G-6 Traffic Requirements

Sub-Sector Income Group # Families 1970 1980 Anticipated # Anticipated # of Cars of Cars G-6/1 A 534 0 0 B 980 0 294 C 715 214 357 D 101 40 61 Sub-sector 2330 254 712 Total (3-6/2 B 418 0 125 C 440 132 220 D 442 176 268 E 183 109 146 Sub-sector 1483 417 759 Total G-6/3 F 57 39 51 G 142 113 142 H 46 50 50 Sub-sector 245 202 243 Total G-6/4 D 211 84 126 E 319 191 255 F 174 121 156 Sub-sector 704 396 537 Total

Source; Doxiadis Associates (19635:180), 244 which would be wrong!" (Doxiadis Associates 1961:319). The intent of this discriminatory settlement policy was to shelter the privileged from the urban poor inhabiting Rawalpindi.

Within Islamabad, residents belonging to low income groups were initially

allowed to settle in the city because it was they "who were going to build it" (Doxiadis

1965:17). Having completed their assigned task the poor were to be tolerated only in

consideration of the services they would continue to provide in assuring the "comfort to

the higher income classes" (Doxiadis Associates 1964:333).

The differential distribution of power that was underwritten by the Master Plan

is also apparent in the spatial allocations and distribution of residential plots. As

discussed earlier, dwellings were assigned to Islamabad’s residents according to their

rank in Pakistan’s national civil service. At the sector level, the different classes of

government employees were intermixed with each sector containing a combination of

low-paid civil servants as well as government ministers and business families. Such

inter-mixing is again suggestive of an interest in promoting the development of a

classless, egalitarian society. The recommended housing allocations, when examined at

the sub-sector level, demonstrates the misguided nature of such interpretations.

As the poor were the first to settle in Islamabad it would have made sense to build

their dwellings in closest possible proximity to the construction sites in the administrative

sector, that is in sub-sector G-6/3. On the basis of preserving the city’s overall scale

(see below) their dwellings were built in sub-sector G-6/1. The right to settle in sector

G-6/3 was instead reserved for the city’s wealthier families. Thus, business families. 245 senior civil servants, and ministers inhabit dwellings doser to the government’s seat of power, while lower ranked civil servants and families were consigned to living in cramped residential quarters in G-6/1, i.e., in proximity to Rawalpindi, the center of the region’s urban proletariat (see Doxiadis Associates 1960b, 1963c).

The housing policy recommended by Doxiadis was still another means to curtail the poor’s rights of access to the city. Each class IV community (i.e., a sub-sector) was to house "no more than four and preferably . . . only three income groups" (Doxiadis

Associates 1964:333). Again, as in the case of the region’s urban populations, such segregation ensured that the "inter-mixing" was limited to that which occurred within rather than among income classes.

The biased distribution of property rights was justified on the basis of a number of considerations. Parking rights, for example, legitimated the idea of locating the country’s elite senior civil servants close to the country’s administrative seat of power.

As upper class families were more likely to own cars, it seemed a reasonable conclusion that locating their residences close to their place of work would reduce traffic congestion.

The effect of this decision was that the poor would be forced to waste their meager

resources on public transportation, while the elite were saved both the time and expense

of a longer commute. One might also wonder if residential quarters were distributed in

this manner to spare the elite the inconvenience of having to see the squalid conditions

in which many of their office "peons" lived. The need to preserve the city’s scale was

another justification that was invoked to justify the disproportionate allocation of property

rights (see below). 246 Similar considerations informed the proposed distribution of "civic amenities" and

"green areas" (see Tables 11 and 12). Without the benefit of understanding the more general political aspects of the Master Plan, the data in these tables indicate that the

"civic amenities" and "green areas" were to be evenly distributed across the city’s residential sectors. The relative differences in the population size in the various residential class communities exposes the extent to which the distribution of "green areas" and "civic amenities" was skewed in favor of the rich (Table 13). Although it is impossible to calculate—given that the population ratio among sub-sectors varies in relation to differences in income levels-the gross measures of expected populations per sector serve as a fairly reliable indicator of the extent to which the rich would enjoy a greater degree of access to the cities various amenities and green areas. While I have not been able to obtain additional data relevant to this issue, personal observation suggests that within sectors green areas and civic amenities are disproportionately represented in the wealthier sub-sectors.

In addition to segregating the poor from the wealthy, the Master Plan was also designed to ensure that the poor would be relatively isolated from each other. Thus, the city was designed in such a manner that geographic mobility was discouraged among the poor. The two key elements by which this was to be accomplished—the layout of the road network and the disposition of civic, commercial, and public facilities-have already been mentioned. Another aspect of this strategy relates to the cognitive effects that are

achieved by the redundancy of Islamabad’s road network, and the uniformity in

construction of low income houses. These two aspects of Islamabad’s physiography 247

Table II

Proposed Distribution of "Civic Amenities"

Primary Schools Secondary Schools Colleges

G-6 7 4 - G-7 13 5 - G-8 11 6 - G-9 14 5 - F-6 4 3 - F-7 4 2 1 F-8 4 2 1 F-10 5 3 1 E-7 1 -- E-8 3 2 - H-9 - 2 3 H-8 - - 1 1-9 5 2 -

Source: Wasti [1979]:23

Table 12

Proposed Open Spaces in Islamabad

Sector Total Area Roads/Paths Parks and Playground Nullahs and (Hectares) and Parking Gardens Playfield other Open (Hectares) (Hectares) (Hectares) Spaces (Hectares) G-6 285.97 50.54 19.38 2.79 42.15 G-7 285.97 44.58 4.57 3.88 81.5 G-8 285.97 33.46 16.51 6.74 104.13 F-6 283.94 42.93 26.62 1.7 94.26 F-7 265.06 45.30 32.65 3.25 27.13 F-8 265.06 50.22 14.18 1.91 33.62

Source: Wasti [1979]:46 248 Table 13

Planned and Present Population of Developed Sectors and

Residential Densities

Sector Planned Present Planned Gross Net Planned Population Population Density Density Person Per Person Per Acre Acre G-6 24,365 33,670 35PPA 87PPA G-7 29,815 29,170 42PPA 93PPA G-8 34,400 14,750 50PPA 140 PPA G-9 34,555 5,860 48PPA --- F-6 10,125 14,570 14PPA 25 PPA F-7 12,310 6,030 16PPA 32 PPA F-8 13,430 9,750 17PPA 37 PPA 1-9 15,330 5,940 42PPA 105 PPA E-7 3,280 30PPA 47 PPA E-8 5,825 5,730 19PPA 83 PPA

Source: Wasti [1979]:24 249 combine to elicit a sensation of directional disorientation. Such feelings can on occasion afflict even long-term residents. My assistant, Ramzaq Khan, had grown up in

Islamabad. Yet even he on occasion noted that he felt slightly lost when he was in the city’s poorer sub-sectors.

Issues of state security seem also to have been an underlying concern in the development of the Master Plan. The small, cramped houses in the poorer sub-sectors ensure that social gatherings of any appreciable scale (e.g., weddings, political rallies, and so forth) occur in open spaces where they come, obviously, under direct public scrutiny. Moreover, the design of the road network ensures that in the case of a public disturbance, the maximum advantage lies with government forces. Not only are the poor sub-sectors isolated from the administrative core of the city (thus preventing a repeat of the riots which had threatened the government in Karachi),^ but in the case of an uprising, the "major roads" that ring each sub-sector provide the army with the means whereby it can encircle and seal off a residential area. Even in the most densely settled

sectors this would mean that government forces would confront a force of no more than

5,(XX) adults (including males and females).

Still another objective of the master Plan is to preclude the creation or

introduction of the type of parochial identities and atavistic social ties that had plagued

Pakistan’s early history. The key to this was the previously mentioned location of

^ As an indicator of the extent to which this has been effective one need only consider that when "students" burnt the American Embassy in 1979, they had to be bussed to and from the compound. Similarly, when mass radlies were staged by ulema supporting the Shariat Bill, they too had to be bussed to and from the National Assembly. 250 commercial, civic, and public institutions in association with the various Class communities. Although they decreased in range and scope as one progressed to lower level communities, the intent throughout was to provide community services in numbers sufficient to meet the immediate needs of the local community. Consequently, residents were to be left with few reasons to venture beyond the confines of their residential sector.

Related to this issue, it is of more than passing interest that community centers were not to be built among upper-income families or elite military residential sectors

(Doxiadis Associates 1963c: 177). Ostensibly, this was justified on the basis of the relatively small number of families in each of the city’s wealthier sub-sectors. Its practical effect, however, was again to restrict the geographic mobility of the lower

income groups by providing them with few reasons to venture into the wealthier sub

sectors, except when they did so as employees of the city’s wealthier families.

The social isolation that the distribution of these services fostered gained further

support from the dispersed nature of the residential quarters. The breaking up sectors

into ever smaller residential classes was argued to be a means by which to establish

conditions that would promote the development of an inter-ethnic neighborhood identity

(Doxiadis 1963c). By this means, the urban design of Islamabad served political

purposes parallel to those that the Basic Democracies sought to achieve in the country’s

rural areas.^

* The effort to disperse and diffuse corporate identities reached down into the domestic family unit. Young women who reside in the city’s poorer sectors are among those most profoundly affected by Master Plan’s architectural bias against horizontal 251 In practice, then, the zoning ordinances and regulations derived from Doxiadis theory of urban life established a system of structural impediments that together served the interests of the state. Not only did they assure its security, but by facilitating and legitimating the differential distribution of rights of access to Islamabad’s civic, commercial, and public institutions it sought to destroy the preexistent social identities of the city’s residents, especially the poor. On the basis of the evidence presented above, virtually every planning recommendation that Doxiadis claims promotes the "static" and insular quality of a sector, can instead be read as achieving the opposite effect-restricting the geographic mobility of the poor.

Ayubabad: Urban Forms of Exaltation, Praise, and Veneration

In place of the parochial forms of identity and social attachment it sought to destroy, the

Master Plan endeavors to create a consolidated extra-local national identity.^ The means

by which this was to be accomplished were both material and symbolic. In regard to the

city’s occupational structure, the loyalty of the citizenry was assured by the provision that

government employees were overwhelmingly represented within the city. This is

social linkages. The courtyards and entrances of low income houses are open to direct public view. As such they are categorized as part of the male domain. The women who do entertain guest here are invariably mature adults. Young women who do leave their household do so in the company of male relatives to attend school, go shopping or perform some other functional activity. Yet, while they are confined to the house, they lose those many advantages and the companionship that are available within the extended family compound.

^ The similarity between this aspect of the Master Plan and the practices and objectives of military training is in need of little comment. 252 especially so in sector G-6 where Doxiadis had recommended that 90% of the population be comprised of government employees and their families (Doxiadis Associates

1960b:416)/ That the central government was both landlord to and employer of these residents served to ensure the population’s loyalty. But it was in terms of its symbolic imagery that Islamabad was intended to achieve its greatest effects.

Islam in Islamabad

Islamabad’s symbolic relationship to the country’s religious charter can at best be characterized as ambivalent. In part this reflects the political orientation of the city’s founders. Although Mohammad Ayub Khan sought to insulate the Federal Bureaucracy from the corrosive political environment of Karachi, he pursued policies that did not depart significantly from the political views and philosophies of the country’s Aligarh- educated founders. Within one week of assuming power, for example, he dropped the words ”Islamic Republic" from the country’s official name (Syed 1984:121). During the initial years of rule when his programs enjoyed some popularity within the country, Ayub

Khan found it politically expedient to readopt the dogma that Pakistan "was an ideological state, that its ideology was Islam, that the country had come into being to practice the Islamic way of life, and that it could survive only on that basis" (Syed

1984:121). Nevertheless, the policies pursued under his leadership demonstrate that

Ayub Khan was as much a secularist as were the country’s founders and early leaders.

* Though the proportion of government was to decrease as more sectors were opened, the ratio of government employees will remain fairly high well into the 21st century. 253 The diversity of Islamic ritual practices and organizational forms within Pakistan restrained the government from endorsing too strongly the idea that Islamabad sought to consolidate the country’s religious identity. While the promotion of a scripturalist-based religious policy would threaten the country’s landed religious magnates, the promulgation of policies that favored the interests of the latter portended to spread discord and unrest among urban populations. Either option would have placed the government in an awkward position. Rural areas held the bulk of the population and were the chief source

of state revenues, although cities held a minority of the population, their location at the

political choke points of society conferred on them a disproportionate political voice in

the affairs of the state. To avoid the confrontation that would undoubtedly arise from

favoring the interests of either sector of society, government officials chose the only

option they realistically had-they acknowledged the religious character of the country’s

foundation charter, and then proceeded to ignore it.

Doxiadis views of Islamabad’s religious symbolism shows a similar element of

muted ambivalence. To support Islamabad’s claim to possess a religious charter,

Doxiadis suggested that the city’s rectilinear grid captured a "geometry" that lay at the

basis of Islamic culture (Doxiadis Associates 1960b:430). He noted that "every large and

important synthesis of Islamic culture is based on a pure geometry of... vertical axes"

(Doxiadis Associates 1960b:430).

The extent to which Islamabad’s physical layout makes it a particularly "Islamic

city" is debatable given that such urban planning principles have been of a longstanding

tradition in Western planning practices. Aside from the linkage that Doxiadis draws 254 between Islamabad’s urban design and its religious charter, however, there is very little in Islamabad that suggests that it is an Islamic city. The extent to which such a thing as an "Islamic city" even exists is of course highly debatable (see, e.g., AlSayyad 1991).

Nonetheless, the original Master Plan of Islamabad provides little scope for the types of design features that Orientalists such as von Grunebaum (1955:145-154) had identified as characterizing the "Islamic city" in its initial, classic formulation. Indeed the core features of the Islamic city—its Jami’a masjid, public square, and associated markets—are broken up and dispersed throughout the city rather than being located at its center and giving the city its character. As was the case of the government’s claims, Doxiadis’ assertion that Islamabad embodied a particularly Islamic spirit seems, therefore, to be

forced and somewhat contrived.

It is not, however, by virtue of its Islamic spirit that Islamabad was truly intended

to foster national integration. Rather, it is in from within the perspective of the nature

of the city’s relationship to the Ayub Khan program of national consolidation that

Islamabad’s true symbolism is made explicit.

Authoritarianism and Nationalism

In accord with the Ayub Khan program of national development and

consolidation, Islamabad achieves its symbolic effects by employing a diversity of

metonymic devices. The reasoning Doxiadis (1965:6) offered for building Islamabad

resonate to the scientific justifications that Ayub Khan had invoked to legitimate his

decision to relocate the capital (see Chapter 8).

The creation of a capital city of a newly independent county must either take place in an existing city (whose past is of value and it happens to 255 have ample buildings and facilities), or, it this is not the case (and this was not the case with any city in Pakistan), it is better for it to be created without any commitments to the past. If it cannot represent the great values of the past, it is better to open the road for the values of the future.

The ideas that the Master Plan of Islamabad was the product of scientific principles of urban planning has become a central motif of local government rhetoric.

CDA publications almost invariably include some reference to Islamabad’s credentials

as a scientifically conceived and rationally implemented urban built form (see, e.g..

Capital Development Authority [1979], 1986:3).’

In practice, the scientific principles of Islamabad’s urban plan were subordinated

to, and, ultimately subverted by the state’s need to promote national consolidation. In

order to understand how the state’s prerogatives inform the city’s physical structure, it

is beneficial to take a step back and examine the ideological presuppositions that

legitimated, and licensed Doxiadis’ theory of urban and town planning.

While there is a considerable amount of variability in the topics and issues that

Doxiadis addresses, even a cursory review of Doxiadis’ published works provides

sufficient evidence to corroborate the assertion that his theory of the "urban systems of

life" is premised on a visual framework of understanding: Spatial relations among

architectural structures, the visual effects they produce, and their consequent impact on

individual perception constitute Doxiadis’ focal point of analytical reference and

departure. His architectural theories are thus premised an idealist construction. Systems

of visual representation and symbolism rather than material causes determine the extent

’ In this, the government has exhibited a degree of consistency that is remarkable in light of the country’s otherwise tumultuous and tortured history. 256 to which a city is capable of achieving "elastic balance." Thus, the organization of kinship groups, forms of technology and transport, systems of communication, and so forth are subordinated to a visually-based architectural determinism (see Doxiadis 1960).

The extent to which this framework of visual problematization determines

Doxiadis views on the social world are suggested by the ways in which he has dealt with the "problem" of slums and shanty towns. The squalor and poverty associated with squatter settlements, is an "architectural problem" (Doxiadis 1960, 1963a). The factors responsible for the development of shanty towns are therefore neither social, political, nor economic in nature. Rather, in accord with his visual problematization of such issues, he attributes the growth of shanty towns to an architectural profession that is

unable to match supply with local demand (see Doxiadis 1960). As Doxiadis implied-

and as the refugee houses he built outside Karachi and in other sites substantiate

(Doxiadis Associates 1958a, 1958b, 1958c, 1958d, 1959c, 1959e, 1960a)--order had to

be imposed on the chaotic architecture of Third World shanty towns if the urban world

was to be beautified.

Doxiadis’ concern with architectural presentation, perspective, and apperception

was of longstanding interest. His dissertation, Raumordnmg im griechischen Stâdtebau^

(published under the somewhat disingenuously translated title of Architectural Space in

Ancient Greece) was a theoretical treatise on the ordered spatial relations that obtained

' This was the title under which his dissertation was published in Berlin in 1937. It as the second publication in a series of studies published by Kurt Vôwinkel Verlag under the title of Beitrage zur Raumforschung und Raumordnung. Given this, one wonders if the full title of Doxiadis’ dissertation-which I have not as yet been able to obtain-was Lebensraumordnung im griechischen StOdtebaul 257 among the buildings and other physical structures of the sacred precincts of ancient

Greece and Rome. Doxiadis (1972:3) asserts that the "Greeks employed a uniform system in the disposition of buildings in space that was based on principles of human cognition." Moreover, he is "convinced that the system . . . represents a general theory of spatial organization-a theory of city planning" (Doxiadis 1972:3). In this system, "the determining factor in the design was the human viewpoint" (Doxiadis

1972:5). To Doxiadis the architecture of ancient Greece exemplified a visually-based aesthetic of urban planning. Further, as it was structured by human cognitive capabilities, its roots ran deep into the early history of humanity.

Mapping this intellectual genealogy would be of little more than academic interest were it not that Doxiadis’ architectural aesthetic licensed the Master Plan’s social and political practices. A brief consideration of the order to which the building scales was subjected sets the stage for examining how Islamabad’s urban design was to accomplish its national agenda.

Within Islamabad the hierarchy of architectural elevations correlate to a high degree with differences in income levels. The economic gradient that was discussed in previous section again comprises the framework for determining the ordered hierarchy

of elevations. At the base of the slope are those low income houses of G-6/1.’ Next

* In spite of the fact this is the most crowded sub-sector in the city, due to the lowness of the roof they are concealed beneath a boreal canopy. In this regard, Islamabad is deceptive in that the true extent of its poor population is concealed even from the most careful of observers. Indeed, the density of the population only becomes apparent if one regularly visits the families that occupy the residences within the sub sector. Thus, the aesthetic of ordered beauty was implemented in practice by visual concealment. 258 in height are those residential structures of G-6/3 which belong to some of the city’s wealthier families. Higher still are the civic buildings of the Blue Zone. But towering over all of these structures, and thereby constituting the apex of the elevation hierarchy, is the Presidential mansion (Doxiadis Associates 1962b).

The message this visual geometry conveys is unmistakable. On the one hand, the differences in roof elevations constitute a strikingly visual symbolic representation of the

differences in political power and privilege that obtain among the various classes

inhabiting the city. On the other hand, it gives visual expression to a particular political

ideology in which the person of the President-as symbolically represented by his abode—

is seen as embodying the spirit of the state.

It was clear from the founding of Islamabad that the Presidential mansion was to

hold a unique status in the Master Plan." It was the only national monument that was

dealt with explicitly in the original Master Plan." While I do not wish to push the

point too far, the diagrams and illustrations that appear in Doxiadis’ various publications

suggest that the original location of the Presidential mansion was intended to create visual

effects that were similar to those achieved by the spatial positioning of the temples

located on the acropolis in Athens.

" In the light of his role as a cultural mediator and reconciler, it is interesting that the building program for the Presidential house and estate envisioned a total expenditure that would equal the cost of erecting the national assembly building (Khan 1970:11).

" The Shah Faisal Masjid, the Agricultural Development Bank, and other such buildings not explicitly zoned for in the original Master Plan were added to the city skyline since the 1960s. 259 In like manner to the framing effects of the Acropolis’ Lycetteum Hills, the

Margalla Hills form a visual backdrop that accentuates the grandeur of the Presidential palace (Meier 1985:213). Furthermore, Doxiadis’ (Doxiadis Associates 1960b) original prescriptions would have situated the Presidential mansion in a location that was roughly

similar to that occupied by the Erectheum" on the Acropolis, i.e. to the north of

Capitol Avenue." If these design suggestions had been observed, the unobstructed view

of the surrounding countryside provided by such an arrangement would have paralleled

the visual effects achieved by the structures located in the sacred precincts of the ancient

world (see Doxiadis 1972:5)."

Given its central role in the geometric metaphor of national consolidation it would

seem that Doxiadis saw Pakistan’s best hope for achieving national unity to lie in the

visual veneration of the state, as it was embodied in the Presidential abode. As Ayub

Khan’s supporters in the C D.A. claimed at the time, the presidential house was a

consequence of the "national urge for self-expression" (Sheikh 1968:21 cited in Nilsson

1973:179). That the Presidential mansion--and only the presidential mansion-serves this

symbolic purpose is corroborated by its relation to the city’s street system. It cannot be

coincidental that "National Avenue" and "Capitol Avenue" intersect at the base of the

" The mythical founder-king of Athens from whom Doxiadis derived the term Ekistics.

" The Presidential mansion’s current location is due to a modification in the Master Plan that entailed realigning the processional Capitol Avenue (a.k.a. Khyaban-e-Quaid-i- Azam) to a more northern orientation (Nilsson 1982:127).

" Doxiadis theoretical orientation argues against the possibility that these various correlations are coincidental. 260 Presidential acropolis. If building Islamabad was intended to foster nationalism, the cornerstone of the project was the Presidential mansion. As regards the way in which

Islamabad was to foster national integration, the Master Plan is therefore pervaded by a fascist-inspired authoritarian sub-text."

Conclusion

Since its inception, the Master Plan of Islamabad (as well as its associated program of

implementation) has been repeatedly revised." Whatever place it will ultimately come

to occupy in Pakistan’s collective political consciousness therefore remains uncertain.

What is clear, is that by building the abode of Islam, Ayub Khan sought to situate

himself historically, symbolically, and, in the symbolic form of the Presidential mansion,

metaphorically at the nexus of the country’s contested and ill-defined relationship with

its national identity. Having achieved this objective, he would then be able to serve as

" As it stands now, the Presidential mansion is the terminal feature at the eastern end of Capital Avenue. The visual imagery produced by this configuration has been likened by one observer to the "Beaux Arts monumentality" rendered by Lutyens at Delhi, Le Corbusier at Chandigarh, and Kahn at Dacca (Nilsson 1982:127). Other commentators (e.g., Nilsson 1973; Specht 1983) who have not had the opportunity to explore Doxiadis’ educational career and theories, or have failed to comprehend the authoritarian genealogy of the Master Plan, frequently misconstrue the symbolic significance of the original placement of the presidential mansion. In choosing to locate the Presidential mansion to the north of the city axis, Doxiadis sought to link Islamabad to a tradition of architecture and urban planning that traces its intellectual genealogy to ancient Greece through the Volkische movement in German architecture and town planning (see Lane 1968) rather than through Haussman and the École des Beaux Arts (Spaulding m.s.).

" The original Master Plan "provided only an outline and a broad frame of concepts and criteria" (Wasti 1979:12) and did not include sufficient and sufficiently detailed information on "plans, data for labor charges or cost of construction" (Khan 1970:7). 261 mediator, power broker, and magistrate, presiding over the cacophony of interest groups that comprised Pakistan’s body politic. While Ayub Khan sought to claim the right to

Pakistan’s national identity, as a British-trained military officer, he had neither the cultural authority nor, ultimately, the political power to achieve his goal. Thus, while

Islamabad is the "abode of Islam," the national charter that it is said to embody and symbolize has remained as elusive and ill-defined as has the Presidential mansion remained unfinished."

It is not, however, the purpose of this dissertation to examine the ways in which political indeterminacy serves to undermine or subvert the objective and political agenda of the Master Plan. Instead, as a prelude to considering the ways in which history and urban context inform the Gujars’ ethnic identity constructions, the chapters in this section of the dissertation have investigated Islamabad in order to explicate the political underpinnings of the city’s Master Plan and urban design. The following section uses material introduced in this and previous sections to develop an understanding of the ways in which Gujar ethnic identities mediate between history and urban context.

" As mentioned previously, the Presidential mansion was only completed in the mid-1980s. PART 4

THE SITES OF GUJAR ETHNICITY IN ISLAMABAD

262 CHAPTER X

DEMOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTIONS OF GUJAR ETHNICITY

From the village [my family] went to Karachi. I had a job in Karachi and then came to this place when the capital was shifted to this place. I am fifty four (Sher Muhammad Gorsci, July 4, 1986).

The chapters in this section of the dissertation investigate the processes of ethnic identity formation as they relate to the historical and cultural contexts of Gujar ethnicity. Any such endeavor necessarily requires that decisions be made at to what to include in the discussion. In this section of the dissertation, the discussion has been narrowed to a handful of topics that seem to be particularly illustrative of the processes of ethnic identity formation and deployment among the Gujars of Islamabad.

The present chapter is concerned with examining the ways in which the Gujars’ collective migration experiences contribute to community organization and the definition of the Gujars’ ethnic identities. Demographic data collected in the community survey

(see Chapter 1) comprise the basis of the analysis. Subsequent chapters build on this analysis to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of Gujar ethnicity in

Islamabad.

Given the nature of its political agenda, the ways in which the Master Plan of

Islamabad informs Gujar ethnicity will of course be central to some of these discussions.

This is especially so in regards to the two chapters dealing with the Gujars’ settlement

263 264 practices and the development of ethnic social ties. The analysis will consequently serve to assess the effectiveness of the Master Plan. The focus of the discussion is not, however, Islamabad’s Master Plan. Rather, the purpose of this section is to examine how Gujar ethnic identities—as constructed in the interplay of power and aesthetics—serve to confer meaning, substance, and structure to the Gujars’ urban life.

Migration and Gujar Ethnic Identity

The regional background of the Gujar population has been developed in previous chapters. Here additional data and materials are presented in order to fill out the demographic profile of the Gujar community of Islamabad.' Regional differences in migration patterns, age, and so forth are examined in the first section. A second section analyzes the ways in which the general process of urbanization influences the demographic make up of the community.

Moving to Islamabad: History, Poverty, and Opportunity

To explicate the ways in which the history of Gujar migration contributes to their ethnic identity constructions, the data were analyzed from a number of perspectives. The rural and urban proportions for each of the three regions are summarized below (Table

' The analyses in this and the following chapter rely heavily on inferential statistics, but differs from more conventional approaches in that I use statistical methods usually employed to test hypotheses as inductive analytical techniques. This is to say, that these statistics are not intended to test a particular hypothesis. Rather, the statistical test is used as an indicator of "significant" patterns of association extant in the data matrix that comprises the results of the household survey. To refer to these statistics as "tests" is perhaps misleading in this context. However, given tradition, this convention is retained here. 265 14). As these data suggest, a majority (83 %) of the community was bom in villages in

Pakistan and India. The results of the c/ii-square value of .509 (df = 2, p = .7752) indicates that differences in rural background across regional groups is insignificant.

That is to say that community members of both a rural or urban locales are represented equally in each group.

As regards the location of their last residence before relocating to Islamabad, the differences in rural/urban background were significant for the three regional groups ÇO

= 12.646, df = 2, p = 1.795*®). Comparing these different data (i.e.. Tables 14 and

15) indicates that there was an overall shift in the rural/urban proportions of migrants.

Whereas 83% of the sample population were bom in mral areas, only 23% moved to

Islamabad directly from mral areas. In comparison to the central region, a significantly

higher proportion of Gujars of the northem and eastem regions came to Islamabad from

other cities.

This disparity is indicative of the different reasons that have motivated the Gujars

to migrate. The northem Gujars are from a region that has historically recorded a high

rate of population growth and a relatively limited agricultural base. There is

consequently a high rate of out-migration from the area (Qureshi 1986). The limited

range of economic opportunities is compounded in the case of the Gujars by their

ambiguous social status. Migration among this segment of the community seems

therefore to be motivated by these underlying economic factors. In interviews with

northem Gujars an abundance of respondents of the region gave the relative lack of

viable mral employment opportunities as a reason they had left their natal villages. 266 Table 14

Natal Region by Rural/Urban Background

Region Rural (Row) % Urban (Row) % Total Northem 31 79% 8 21% 39 Central 41 84% 8 16% 49 Eastem 61 85% 11 15% 72 Total 133 83% 27 17% 160

Table 15

Natal Region by (Rural/Urban) Last Residence

Region Rural (Row) % Urban (Row) % Total Northem 5 13% 34 87% 39 Central 20 41% 29 59% 49 Eastem 12 17% 60 83% 72 Total 37 23% 123 77% 160 267 Of the thirty-nine Gujars from the northem region, eleven serve as clerics

(Imams, maulvis) in Islamabad’s widely distributed and numerous mosques. The form of "employment" is in keeping with regionally-based sub-cultural traditions. The Gujars of northem Pakistan have traditionally filled important religious roles in the region. For example, one of the most famous figures in the religious history of northem Pakistan, the Akhund of Swat, was a Gujar (Barth 1959).

Another large component of the northem stream are the thirteen Gujars who work at the Agricultural Development Bank (hereinafter ADBP) in G-7. Most have secured their employment with the assistance of an older relative who worked at the ADBP but who has now retired. It is interesting to note that in terms of economics there is very little that distinguishes the members of this sub-group from the Gujar Imams. Most are relatively poor. Moreover, most are either unmarried or have a spouse who has remained in the village.

The motivations underlying the Punjabi Gujars decisions to move to Islamabad differ from those of the northem region. Unlike the overpopulated hilly terrain of the

northem region, the Punjab has prospered during the nearly four decades since

independence. While work-related reasons were frequently given as a reason why they

moved to Islamabad, there were fewer respondents who indicated that mral poverty had

"pushed" them from their home village.

These different sources of motivation are reflected in community members’

migration histories. The low rate of urbanization among the Punjabi Gujars contrasts

with the experiences of the northem Gujars. The majority of the latter only came to 268 Islamabad after a fmrly extensive sequence of intermediary moves. For example, fully

28% of the northem group have at some point lived in Karachi. Conversely, of the three groups the Punjabi Gujars, at 8%, recorded the lowest proportion of members who have resided in Karachi. This is so in spite of the Punjab’s closer geographic proximity to

Karachi.

Still other factors seem operative in influencing the patterns of migration among the eastem Gujars. The partition of the Punjab in 1947 is of course critical to understanding the migratory patterns among the latter group.^ The analyses developed in previous chapters (see Chapters 3-6) suggest that the Gujars who came to Pakistan from the former British Indian Punjab held a number of distinctive cultural traits. Not only were they Muslim, but they were relatively poor and from rural areas in the congested districts of the Central Punjab. As the marital data suggest (see Chapter 5), most were heavily influenced by the Hindu socio cultural milieu in which they lived. As

Gujars, however, their tradition of insularity and aloofness had most likely set them apart

from mral Punjabi culture. In addition, they had not participated in the canal colony

settlement process to any great extent (see Chapter 6). As a consequence, they had

relatively few relatives on whom to call in order to ease their entry into mral social life

of the westem Punjab. These factors not only influenced their decision to move, but

ultimately determined their choice of Karachi as a point of destination.

^ In general, partition had greatly accelerated rates of urbanization within Pakistan. Many refugees fled ancestral farmlands, villages and towns of India and flocked to the major cities of Pakistan such as Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore. By the 1951 census, 48% of the population of the 12 largest cities of the country consisted of refugees from India (Burki 1986:44). 269 Once in Karachi, however, a new set of forces came into play in defining their ethnic identities. The Gujars who came to Karachi did so at a time when the issue of state religion had not percolated down to the grass-roots level. Those inclined towards seeing Pakistan transformed into a theocratic state most likely adopted the stance of

Maulana Maududi (see Chapter 8). That is to say that they would have attempted to influence political decision-making from outside the system, rather than be coopted by it. Those who did take low-level positions in the Federal bureaucracy were undoubtedly more secular in their political attitudes.*

The diverse patterns of migration among community members are suggestive of the ways in which political events have intruded in to the local construction of the

Gujars’ ethnic identities. One of the more indicative measures of these influences are the regional differences in the spacing of intervening moves (see Table 16).

As the data indicate, the Indian Gujars are distinctive in relation to their Punjabi

and northem counterparts. The eastem group moved at an earlier date than the other two

groups (1951 as compared to 1967 for the northem group and 1970 for the central

group). Yet, this group has taken substantially longer to complete four moves (19

years). Conversely, the northem group, at 12 years, falls in the mid-range, while the

central group completes four moves in the shortest period of time (5 years).

As Table 16 suggests, the major contributor to the H values listed in Table 17 is

the eastem region. This is so because many of the eastem Gujars came to Pakistan

* At the very least, they thought religion was a personal matter rather than an issue of public debate. 270 during partition at a fairly young age. During the nearly two decades between Partition and the official opening of Islamabad, many of the latter reached adulthood.

Subsequently, they secured employment in the offices and ministries of the national government. Moving the capital forced these families to confront a decision.

Would they stay in Karachi and face a bleak and uncertain economic future? Or would they move to Islamabad where they knew they had a secure job but few friends or relatives? For many, the choice must not have been easy. Due to the great distances involved and the relatively inefficient modes of transportation then available, those who decided to move with the Capital would be isolated (at least initially) from friends and family in Karachi. Muhammad Yusufs summary of his early experiences in Islamabad are suggestive of the inconveniences that moving to Islamabad entailed for these families.

When we first came to Islamabad [in 1963] it was beautiful. There weren’t many buildings. My job was in Rawalpindi and I had to commute to work for two years before the office was moved to Islamabad.^ After we moved, my wife had to go to Rawalpindi a lot because there weren’t any shops here. Most of my relatives are in Karachi and I didn’t get to see them for a long time after I moved.

But the decision to relocate the capital was not made in consideration of the

inconveniences it posed for the hall assistants of the Federal bureaucracy such as

Muhammad Yusuf. As was its intention, relocating the capital selected for those who

* Rawalpindi and Islamabad are often referred to collectively as either Rawalpindi or Islamabad. This tradition was a source of much confusion in the early stages of my research. 271 Table 16

Average Date of First through Fourth Move by Region of Origin*

Region 1st Move 2nd Move 3rd Move 4th Move Avg. Range Northem 1967 1974 1975 1979 12 yrs. Central 1970 1973 1976 1975 5 yrs. Eastem 1951 1963 1967 1970 19 yrs.

* Averages vary within groups due to the changes in sample size.

Table 17

Results of Kruskal Wallis Test of

Regional Difference for Year of First through Fourth Move

Year of Move H D.F. Probability First Move 76.465 2 3.000*^ Second Move 47.562 2 4.696" Third Move 22.036 2 1.641-®* Fourth Move 4.382 2 .1118 Ill were most likely to remain loyal to the federal government. This was achieved in a number of related ways.

At nearly 1,000 miles from Karachi, the move to the Potwar Plateau effectively severed the ties government employees had with their home kin in Karachi. In so doing, it increased the eastem Gujars’ dependency on the government. The Gujar data indicates that age also played an important role in ensuring the political loyalty of the citizenry.

Most of the eastem Gujars belong to a cohort that had secured employment in the federal bureaucracy in the early 1950s. Thus, when they came to Islamabad they were already fairly mature adults who had at that time invested ten years or more of their lives in their job.

The developmental history of Islamabad served to magnify the eastem Gujars’ dependency on the govemment. When Islamabad first opened, the local labor market

was dominated by the Federal govemment. The effects this had in ensuring the loyalty

of the first inhabitants is suggested by the differences in employment profiles among the

three groups (see Table 18).* As these data indicate, nearly forty-nine percent (.486,

n=72) of the Gujars bom in the eastem Punjab came to Islamabad as govemment

employees. At 18% (n=49), comparable figures are lower for the Punjabi Gujars. At

10.25% (n=39) they are lower still for the northem sector of the community. More

importantly, of the three regional groups, the Indian Gujars have the highest rate of

continuous govemment employment with fully 68% of this group holding the same

* There were elements of dissatisfaction expressed by some. It is interesting to note that in most such cases, such sentiments were expressed by those Indian Gujars who had left the employ of the govemment. 273 Table 18

Employment History of Govemment Employees

Employment History Region Remained at Original Job Left Govemment Job Northem 7 (32%) 15 (68%) Central 8 (27%) 21 (72%) Eastem 36 (65%) 17 (32%) Total 51 53 govemment position as when they first moved to Islamabad. This contrasts with 32% for the northem Gujars and 28% for the Punjabis. The results of the c/ji-square test of independence indicates that these differences are significant at the .001 level (X^ =

15.515, df = 2, p = 4.275-«).

While more difficult to assess, it is my impression that the selective forces that operated during the founding of the country and in the relocation of the Capital have contributed in a myriad of ways to the subsequent construction and deployment of secularly-oriented ethnic identities among the Gujars from the eastem Punjab. Their readings of Gujar ethnic history, their interpretation of the symbolic context of

Islamabad, as well as their contemporary political claims are generally couched in the idiom of secular state polifics. That is to say, their ethnic identities constructions make reference either to the Gujars’ demographic strengths or to the fact that in the past they had mled much of north India.

This group has traditionally seen the Gujar biraderi as an undereducated and poor social group that suffers from a great deal of discrimination. The cause of this lack of 274 status and prestige is assigned to the British campaign of defamation that was initiated against the Gujars’ for their role in the Conflict of 1857. The ameliorative measure they recommend-more govemment jobs and higher levels of enrollment in govemment

schools-are again secular in nature.

The eastem Gujars are among the oldest residents of community (see Table 19).

As a result of their migration experiences when they first came to Islamabad there was

a lack of altemate identity constmctions. Due to the element of historic precedence this

confers on them, the ethnic identities they constructed and deployed seem to have served

as a conceptual point of reference and departure for the ethnic definitions constructed by

more recent migrants.

More recent migrants’ acknowledgement of the preeminence of the ethnic

definition formulated by the eastem Gujars is implied by the status, respect, and prestige

the latter enjoy within the community. Acknowledging this established identity has been

made all the more imperative by the large number of eastem Gujars who work in the

federal bureaucracy. Through the intercession of the latter, more recent immigrants are

able to gain access to govemment jobs or other forms of assistance, aid, and support.

The nature of this cross-regional patronage is critical to deepening our

understanding of the expression of Gujar ethnicity. For example, funds to constmct two

mosques and the political connections that ensured northem Gujars were posted to them 275 Table 19

Community Descriptive Statistics

Category Eastem Central Northem Year of Move to 1970 1977 1976 Islamabad (mean) Std. Dev. 6 yrs. 6 mos. 6 yrs. 1 mo. 6 yrs Age at Arrival to 33 yrs. 26 yrs, 5 mos. 26 yrs, 1 mo. Islamabad (mean) Age (mean) 48 yrs. 7 mos. 35 yrs. 10 mos. 35 yrs. 10 mos. Std. Dev. 10 yrs. 4 mos. 10 yrs. 9 mos. 7 yrs. 8 mos. Family Size (mean)* 7.36 4.89 4.87 Std. Dev. 3.78 2.70 3.43 Family Monthly*’ Rs. 5750 Rs. 7004 Rs. 1971 Income (mean) Std. Dev. Rs. 12,876 Rs. 14,147 Rs. 1,617 Per Capita Family Rs. 1107.86 Rs. 2376.37 Rs. 646.37 Monthly Income (mean) Std. Dev. Rs. 3,917 Rs. 8,388 Rs. 578 Sample Size 72 49 39

* * "Family" is defined as all kin relatives who usually reside in the house. Includes income of all kin relatives who usually reside in the house. 276 were provided by Chaudhry Abdul Khatana, an Indian bom Gujar. Abdul Khatana considers himself to be a devout and pious Muslim. In general he supports the idea that there is a need for greater levels of religious instruction, especially among the younger members of the biraderi. However, his commitment to supporting an explicit religious political agenda stops short of endorsing the idea of transforming Pakistan into a theocratic state. As he said in relation to this issue: religious "schooling, that is one thing, but politics is another."

Given their impoverished background, the northem Gujars in general, and the

Gujar Imams in particular, rely on the beneficence of their regional counterparts to a far greater extent than do the Punjabi Gujars. When there is no overt contradiction, the former seem to accept the interpretations and definitions of Gujar ethnicity that are popularized by the Indian component of the community. Thus, they subscribe to the idea that the Gujars are undereducated, poor, and have suffered from the discriminatory practices of the British and Pakistani govemments. Moreover, they also seem to accept as remedies for these conditions increased rates of education and a greater role in national politics.

The northem ethnic definition departs from that of their eastem cousins in a

number of key areas. First, the ethnic histories they offer tend to locate the origin of the

Gujar biraderi in the mountainous regions of northem Pakistan (see Chapter 3 for a

discussion of the issue of regional origin). Second, many of the northem group,

especially the Imams, assert that educational advancement is best accomplished through

religious training. Third, their call for a greater role in the governing of the nation is 277 based not on demographic factors, but rather on their assertion that Gujars are inherently more devout. Each of these elements of their local identities are in keeping with their occupational and regional sub-cultural traditions.

It is more difficult to identify to any degree of specificity the major elements of the ethnic definitions of the Punjabi Gujars. That this is so may be due to a number of factors. Unlike their regional counterparts from India and northem Pakistan, the Punjabi

Gujars seem to be "pulled" to the city of Islamabad by the prospect of economic advancement presented by the city. Moreover, of the three groups they are the most occupationally diverse. Further, as Punjabis they are not isolated from their natal villages to the same extent as the eastem Gujars, nor are they as impoverished as the northem Gujars. Indeed, a fair number are well educated and lead modest lower middle class lives. Because the central Gujars are advantageously situated, both socially and

economically, they are less in need of the privileges and benefits that a claim to one or

another ethnic identity might confer.

The central group, however, does not exist outside the boundaries of history and

society. Though it is not as explicit as the other groups’ definitions, the central Gujars’

ethnic definition seems to draw on elements from both the eastem and northem

traditions. While the Gujars’ low socio-economic status and levels of education is

acknowledged, so too is the biraderi’s piety. This latter conceptualization is not just the

result of this group’s socio-economic position within Islamabad. Rather, support of this

religious platform seems in large part to be linked to the more encompassing processes

of the govemment-sponsored program of Islamization. This is to say that the Gujars of 278 the central region support this religious program precisely because doing so allows them to continue to use traditional avenues of social and political advancement.

This interpretation finds support in the answers I received to my inquiries regarding the educational plans the middle-class Punjabis had for their sons. While some of the men I interviewed did say that their sons might receive some basic religious instruction, none hoped that their sons would become Imams. Indeed, one Punjabi volunteered his observation that: "most Imams [Gujar or otherwise] come from the

NWFP [North West Frontier Province]."

The geographic location of Islamabad relative to the Gujars’ home area is also significant in determining the nature of the Gujars’ migration experiences and the consequent development of Gujar ethnicity. Islamabad’s proximity to the natal villages and towns of the northem and central regions provides these regional groups greater access than the eastem group to networks of social and economic support. Most maintain close ties to their village relatives, scheduling their vacations to coincide with periods of peak labor demand. Differences in social status that are tied to these diverse migration histories are still another element critical to understanding the construction of the Gujars’ local ethnic identities.

Due to their age, their experiences during Partition,* their established positions

in the labor market, their numerical predominance, their residential locations in the city’s

* To the Indian segment of the community, their history as refugees was a matter of no small pride. References were frequently made to their experiences during this trying time. On one occasion, this "pride* took the form of arranging a meeting with a man who had with his bare hands killed a Hindu refugee fleeing in the opposite direction. 279 core sectors, and their large families, the eastem Gujars enjoy fair measure of status and respect within the community (see Table 18). In keeping with cultural traditions of the society at large, younger men and those of lower status defer to the views, attitudes, and values of the community’s elders. Also in keeping with the cultural traditions of the region, the Indian Gujars—as they are of fairly advanced age—tend to project an air of indifference and reserve. Thus, while their views are well received, they tend to express them less frequently than do their younger counterparts.

Obviously, the impact of age (and status in general) on the creation of Gujar ethnicity is diverse and complex. Suffice it to say here, that the status of community’s elders such as those from India ensures that their views, when enunciated, are well received by the rest of the community.

Intervening Migratory Movements

Since its opening in the early 1960s, Islamabad has been among the fastest growing cities in Pakistan. As of the 1972 census-the first census for which a population count of

Islamabad was taken-the city’s population stood at 75 thousand. By 1981, Islamabad had tripled in size to nearly a quarter of a million (235,000) people, making it Pakistan’s

12th largest city (Pakistan Handbook of Population Statistics 1985). The growth of the

Islamabad Federal region has been no less spectacular. Between the 1972 and 1981

Rawalpindi’s population nearly doubled from 614,809 to 1,080,034 persons (Pakistan

Handbook of Population Statistics 1985). At current rates of growth, there will be over 280 four million people living in Federal Capital region by the year 2001, making the "twin cities" the second largest urban conglomeration in Pakistan (my calculations).

As is the case throughout the Third World, the urbanization of Pakistan is due primarily to the movement of people from the countryside to the city. National statistics demonstrate the extent to which this has been occurring since Pakistan achieved independence. As of 1951, 17% of Pakistan’s population was urban. By 1981, this figure had risen to 28%, representing an absolute increase of 16 million people (Khan

1983).’ Most of this growth is attributable to migration to the cities from the villages and towns throughout the countryside (Khan 1983).

The diverse nature of the impact of urbanization is reflected in the regional patterning of the Gujars intermediary moves. People bom in rural areas have moved an average of 2.6 (n = 133) times. This figure is higher than the 2 (n = 27) moves that were made by Gujars bom in cities. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the difference between these two categories are significant at .05 level (Kruskal-Wallis

H value 6.131, df = 1, p = .0133).

Those who migrate to Islamabad from rural areas record on average only 1.7

(n=37) moves. Conversely, those individuals who come to Islamabad from other cities have on average made 2.8 (n=123) moves. The Kruskal-Wallis test again indicates that the difference between these two groups is significant at the .001 level (H = 26.270, df

’ The pre-1971 figures do not, of course, include the census count for former East Pakistan. 281 = 1, p = 2.970^). Thus, those Gujars who come to Islamabad from rural areas are relatively less mobile.

When contrasted against the higher rates of mobility that were recorded for those of a rural background, such findings suggest the extent and nature of the impact urbanization has had on the patterns of migration among the Gujars. That is to say, that a large segment of the community bom in the villages of the subcontinent were

"urbanized" before they moved to Islamabad. As expected, most of this urban migration has occurred in large part among the northern and eastern regional groups. In the former it is tied to their movement among the mosques and madrassas located in Pakistan’s major cities, especially Karachi, while in the latter, as mentioned, it reflects the events surrounding Partition and the subsequent founding of Islamabad. To speak of relatively limited mobility among those Gujars who were living in a village setting before they moved to Islamabad is then to refer in large part to those Gujars who reside in the

Punjab (see Table 20).

The larger processes of urbanization within Pakistan and throughout the world have also influenced the Gujars’ pattems of international migration. Whereas the northern and eastern groups are overly represented in the migrant stream to Karachi, the central Gujars record the largest number of international migratory moves. Six per cent

(n = 98) of the relocations made by the Punjabi Gujars have been to or in overseas destinations. This compares to four per cent for the eastern Gujars (n = 298) and a complete absence of such international moves for Gujars from the northern region. As one might expect, for both the eastern and central Gujars, travelling for work or to attend 282

Table 20

Residence Prior to Islamabad by Rural/Urban Components

Region Rural % Urban % Total Baluchistan 0 0 2 100 2 NWFP 1 17 5 83 6 Punjab 32 34 62 66 94 Karachi 0 0 46 100 46 Azad Kashmir 4 100 0 0 4 Gilgit Agency 0 0 2 100 2 Foreign Countries 0 0 6 100 6 Total 37 23.12% 123 76.88% 160 institutions of higher education are the two given reasons that were given most often for

such trips.

The contrasting findings on the Punjabis Gujars—one rural the other cosmopolitan-

-are indicative of the class differences that obtain within this group. The implications of

these class differences for the construction and deployment of the Gujars’ ethnic identities

are traced out in subsequent chapters. Suffice to say here that in anticipation of these

subsequent discussions, these sub-regional class differences are reflected in the

community’s settlement pattems, ethnic forms of association, as well as in the

development of Gujar ethnic identities.

Summation

To summarize, the Gujar community of Islamabad, though united through ties to a shared

social identity is, nevertheless, demographically heterogeneous and differentiated into

three distinct groups. The northern group is represented in the community by the 283 smallest number of individuals. As a group, these Gujars score in the mid-range between the eastern and central groups for age at first move, year of first move, and rate of urbanization. However, the northern group completed four moves within the shortest age span. The composite picture is thus one of a migrant stream dominated by young, often unmarried men. Interview data indicates that many had left their natal homes in order to escape the conditions of rural poverty.

For the Punjabi Gujars, the later age at which they made their first move, the low

rate of geographic mobility, the high rate of international migration, and the large rural

component of this group combine to suggest that migrating for the central group,

although certainly not a pastime, is motivated as much by a desire to exploit the

developing labor market of Islamabad or to enjoy its comforts as it is to escape rural

poverty. That is to say, that although rural poverty may be a motivating factor for the

central Gujars, this economic burden may not be as oppressive as it is for the northern

region. This is especially so for those members of the migrant stream who are relatively

wealthy.

Still other attributes are characteristic of the eastern Gujars. They represent the

largest segment of the community. They are also the oldest and most established group.

Moreover, of the three groups they are the most geographically mobile, have the longest

span by years and by age for completing four moves. Furthermore, as a group they

moved to a city at the earliest date as well as at the youngest age for all three groups.

Most of these demographic features can be linked to two major historic events: (1) the

partition of the subcontinent in 1947; and (2) the relocation of the capital. CHAPTER XI

SETTLING ISLAMABAD

It was all jungle when we came here (Chaudhary Ghulam ud-Din, August 22, 1986)

I moved here when I retired from the army . . . because it is the most beautiful city in Pakistan. I wanted to open a carpet shop (Rtd. Lt. Col. Mohammad Unis July 24, 1986).

The previous chapter examined demographic data on the Gujar community in light of the ways in which the community’s collective migration experiences lend shape, form, and substance to their ethnic identities. To do so, a series of statistical analyses were conducted on data collected in the field. This chapter uses similar methods of analyses to identify, locate, and analyze the ways in which history and the urban context of

Islamabad informs the construction of Gujar ethnicity. The site of investigation, however, shifts to the residential sector.

The discussion is presented in three sections. Using differences in length of residence as they relate to residential location as the point of entry, the first section examines the pattems of settlement at the level of the Islamabad community. This is followed by a more detailed consideration of the ways in which differences in regional background influence the residential distribution of Gujars within the city. The latter discussion serves as a springboard to launch into a more sustained consideration of

284 285 Islamabad’s relationship to Punjabi society. A final section examines the ways in which settlement practices relate to issues of kinship, ethnicity, and regionality.

In examining the Gujars’ urban settlement pattems, this chapter serves in a sense to evaluate the extent to which the Master Plan has succeeded in attaining its political objectives. So doing, however, highlights equally the ways in which the Gujars’ ethnic history continues to inform the construction of the community’s ethnic identities. As the data introduced in this chapter will show, the impact of the Master Plan has been pervasive, but not determinative. I commence with a brief review of some demographic data relating to differences in the residential pattems among the Gujars.

Length of Residence and Settlement

Gujars have lived in Islamabad since the opening of the city in 1961. Statistical analyses

reveal a number of pattems in the residential distribution of the Gujar community. In

general, the Kruskal Wallis test of location indicates that within urban Islamabad,

residential location is related to length of residence (H = 48.070, df = 15, p = 2.433'

“ ). This statistical relationship is as expected, given Islamabad’s lineal growth pattem:

Those who move to the city in the early 1960s tend to live in the city’s older sectors

(e.g., F-6 and G-6).

Combined with the regionally-based chronological variations in the migration data

(see Chapter 10) such results further suggest that settlement pattems would reflect

regional differences. At just over 15 years (15.84 years), those Gujars whose natal

villages are now located in India, have lived in Islamabad the longest of the three 286 regional groups. As such, they are found in greater concentrations in the city’s older sectors. These differences are of course related to the ways in which the Partition of the subcontinent and the relocation of the Federal Capital influenced the Gujars’ migration experiences.

The Gujars of northern Pakistan have on average lived in Islamabad a little over

10 years (10.15), while the Punjabi Gujars at 9 years (9.29 yrs) have lived in Islamabad for the shortest period of time for all three groups. The Kruskal Wallis test shows that these differences in settlement history are significant at the .001 level (H = 33.012, df

= 2, p = 6.785"“ ). Relative to the Indian sector of the community, these data indicate that the Punjabi and northern Gujars should both be found in higher concentrations in the more recently developed sectors of the city.

To investigate the extent to which the observed pattems conformed to such expectations, further statistical analyses were conducted. An initial cAi-square test of

association was calculated for the data presented in Table 21. The results of the test

were significant at the .001 level (X2 = 71.987, df= 30, p = 2.618'®*). However,

expected values were too small to ensure reliability. In order to continue with the

analysis, Table 21 was reconfigured. The rows were regrouped into six categories.

Those sectors opened prior to 1972 were retained as individual row entries. Those

sectors officially opened during or after 1972 (E-7, F-7, F-8, G-10,1-8, NIK, Rawal 287 Table 21

Region of Origin by Residential Location

"The sectors completed as of 1986 included E-7, F-5 through F-8, and G-6 through G-9. 2 8 8

Dam, and Quaid-e-Azam University) were collapsed into the "outlier" category (see

Table 22).' The cAf-square value of 48.889 is again significant at the .001 level (df =

10, p = 4.268^.

In order to test further whether this association is the result of the early arrival of the eastern group in what are now the city’s oldest sectors a log-linear model was fit to the three-way table of region of origin, sector and length of residence (Bishop et al.

1976; Sokal and Rohlf 1981). For this computation, length of residence was converted into a five unit discontinuous variable of one six year period (1981-1986), and four five year categories (1961-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980). The likelihood ratio cAf-square value of 48.13 (df = 37, p = .1040) is not significant.

Again, as expected cell values were too small to assure the reliability of the

results. The 16 sectors were therefore regrouped into two categories: (1) those opened

prior to 1972, and (2) those opened during or after 1972 (Table 23). The results of the

statistical analysis are surprising. The likelihood ratio cA/-square value of 7.62 was not

significant (df = 6, p = .2672). As both length of residency and sector location were

associated with regional origin one would assume that given Islamabad’s lineality that the

results of this test would at least lie in the direction of significance. That is to say, that

statistically significant results recorded in these previous tests should have combined to

' This date was chosen as a cutpoint for two reasons: (1) it is convenient in that it permits calibration and comparison with the 1972 national census; and (2) it is an external standard and thus reduces the risk of introducing bias. Although sector F-5 was opened prior to 1972 and thus should be included as a single row entry, it was dropped from the analysis due to its small row value of 1. 289 Table 22

Region of Origin by Residential Location Sector Region of Origin Northern Central Eastern Total F-6 1 9 6 16 G-6 0 7 28 35 G-7 23 14 17 54 G-8 2 1 9 12 G-9 2 7 7 16 Outlier 10 11 5 26 Total 38 49 72 159 290 Table 23

Three-Way Table of Region of Origin,

Length of Residence, and Residential Location

Region of Length of Sectors Opened Origin Residence Before 1971 After 1971 Total Northern A 4 5 9 B 3 5 8 C 12 1 13 D 6 0 6 E 3 0 3 Total 28 11 39 Central A 9 5 14 B 8 3 11 C 10 2 12 D 8 1 9 E 3 0 3 Total 38 11 40 Eastern A 4 2 6 B 8 1 9 C 8 2 10 D 18 0 18 E 29 0 29 Total 67 5 72 Total 133 27 160

K ey A - 1981-1986 B - 1976-1980 C - 1971-1975 D - 1966-1970 E - 1961-1965 291 changes in the composition of the migrant stream as the Gujars occupied residences, should have also been reflected in the latter test. The results of these test combine to suggest that while migration effects are reflected in the settlement data, other factors are apparently intruding into the settlement process. To explore the extent to which settlement pattems are suggestive of regional differences, the outlying sectors were dropped from Table 22 and the cAi-square value recalculated (Table 24). Within the core sectors (F-6, G-6 through G-9) the association of regional origin to sector is significant

(X^ = 41.967, df = 8, p = 1.373-“ ).

The largest absolute positive contribution to the value for Table 24 are the large number of northern migrants living in sector G-7. Except for this cell, the northern group is underrepresented in those core sectors opened before (e.g., G-6), during (e.g.,

F-6), or later (e.g., G-8 and G-9) than the opening of sector G-7. The concentration of

Gujars in G-7 is a statistical reflection of the large number of Gujars from Azad Kashmir who reside at the Agricultural Development Bank’s hostel located in G-7. As mentioned

previously, most of these men are unmarried, or have left their spouses in their home

towns or villages. Their concentrations in such high numbers are due to the fact that they

got their jobs through the intercession of an older relative who worked at the bank.

The second largest absolute positive contribution are those Indian-born Gujars

living in G-6, the oldest sector of the city. This association is an artifact of their time

of arrival and of the lack of alternate housing arrangements and job opportunities. This

is a specific example of the more general pattem for the eastem Gujars. Of 72 292 Table 24

Region of Origin by Residential Location

Sector Region of Origin Northem Central Eastem Total F-6 1 9 6 16 G-6 0 7 28 35 G-7 23 14 17 54 G-8 2 1 9 12 G-9 2 7 7 16 Total 28 38 67 133 residential groups, 93 per cent of the eastem group live in the core sectors of F-6, and

G-6. Comparable figures are 78% for the Punjabis, and 74% for the northern Gujars.

Moreover, among all three groups, the eastem region is over-represented in the older sectors. Fully fifty per cent (n = 133) of the Gujars living in older sectors of the city are immigrants from India. This contrast with the much lower proportion of 18 per cent (n = 27) that was recorded for Indian Gujars within the city’s more recently opened sectors.

Those Punjabi-bom Gujars residing in sector F-6 made the third largest positive contribution to the value. On average, the Punjabi Gujars are among the city’s most recent immigrants (see Table 17, Chapter 10). We should thus expect to see them numerically predominant in the newer sectors of the city. In general this is indeed the case. Aside from the anomalous F-6 category, the central region is underrepresented in sectors G-6 through G-8. It is only in sector G-9 that we see a slightly higher than 293 expected number. As this is the last "core sector" to have opened in the established sectors, these latter results conform to overall expectations.^

Two characteristics unique to the Punjabi Gujars of F-6 explain the departure from the expected residential pattem: (1) The F-6 Punjabi Gujars are fairly wealthy compared to other sectors of the community^; and (2) the majority moved to Islamabad from urban areas. At a micro-level, then, the central stream consists of two sub groups— one wealthy and urban, the other poor and rural. Such findings are indicative of the ways in which the Master Plan seeks to inscribe a hierarchical order on Islamabad’s social body.

Class and Regionality in the Practices of Gujar Settlement

Previous discussions of Islamabad’s physical lay out, its urban design, and its relationship to its "Twin City," Rawalpindi, drew attention to the role income differentials played in the organization of the city’s Master Plan. Within the city, there is a socio-economic gradient within and among sectors. In general, the poor occupy dwellings that are to the

south, either within the city in general, or in particular sectors. Conversely, wealthy

^ Other regional influences on residential location were not significant. For residential location, the rural/urban area of origin (X* = 9.591, df = 15, p = .8446) as well as mral/urban area of last residence (X? = 18.869, df = 15, p = .2197) were both nonsignificant. Similar results were obtained for the various collapsed tables. Conversely, region of last residence by residential location, was significant ÇX} = 135.699, df = 90, p = 1.330^). However, as expected values were too small, and the categories for last residence could not be meaningfully regrouped, these data cannot be analyzed.

^ Six respondents’ incomes are above the median income of Rps. 1,130 per month that was recorded for the entire community. 294 families generally reside to the north of each sector, or within the city in general. This means that the most expensive residential properties in the city hug the Margalla Hills, while those dwellings that house the city’s poor are increasingly built in proximity to the

Islamabad/Rawalpindi border. This has a distinct impact on the city’s social topography.

Instead of the city growing unilineally as a merged cohesive unit, the socio economic gradient that the Master Plan imposes on the city has actually contributed to the creation of two distinct developmental tracks, one dominated by the poor and the other by the rich and powerful.** As the city spreads on to the plains to the southwest, these differences will become more pronounced. In the case of the Gujars, its effect is to support and give geographic expression to the class differences within the community.

But as indicated, these class differences have a regional basis. As such they are directly tied to economic developments that transcend the local confines of Islamabad, but which in the end have a pronounced impact on the city’s social life in general, and the Gujars’ ethnic identities in particular. These changes are ultimately tied to the economic changes that were set in motion by Ayub Khan’s program of national development.

** ** The effects of this bilineal pattem of growth on Islamabad’s urban development are already observable. Looking back from a prominence to the west of the city’s developed sectors one can readily observe that while there is a good deal of construction activity along the Margallas and near Rawalpindi, there is a absence of development occurring in those sectors that straddle the city’s axial Khyaban-i-Quaid-i-Azam. 295 Islamabad in a Pui^abl Context

As the Gujar data suggests, the regional composition of Islamabad’s urban society has increasingly assumed something of the ethnic character of the Punjab/ Changes in the regional composition of the nation’s Civil Service have occurred concomitantly with the development of Islamabad’s regional character. The numerical breakdown of civil servants occupying key positions in the central secretariat under Ayub Khan reveals the extent to which power was to became concentrated in the hands of a limited sector of the society. From 1965 to 1969, for example, the representation of Punjabis in influential positions in the CSP was never less than 60% (Sayeed 1980:72, Table 4.1). Using this as a basis of power and support, Punjabis had, by the 1980s, been able to secure complete dominance of the government’s bureaucratic apparatus (Alavi 1986:46, n. 4).

The ethno-regional composition of the army supported the political ascendancy of the Punjab. Though all of the country’s major ethno-regional groups are represented in the army, Punjabis numerically predominate among the ranks of the commissioned officers and enlistees, with perhaps as 60% of Pakistan’s army composed of "ethnic

Punjabis" (Sayeed 1980:71).

Developments in the agricultural sector also promoted the socio-economic ascendancy of the Punjab. Aside from Karachi, those parts of British India that went to

Pakistan at Partition where dependent upon an agrarian economy. In the country, the

* The overwhelming dominance of Punjabi and Urdu-speaking families currently living in the city (73% and 18% respectively), reveals the extent to which the government has been incapable or unwilling to achieve even this modest piece of social engineering (1981 Census of Islamabad, Population Census Organization of Pakistan 1983:126, Table 25). 296 two regions of East Pakistan and the Pakistan Punjab made the largest contributions to

GNP. The economic balance between the provinces began to tip in favor of the Punjab by the late 1950s. Ecological differences, larger irrigation capacity, greater levels of agricultural mechanization, the "successful" introduction of the new seed, fertilizers and pesticides of the "green revolution," variations in land tenure and population density, combined with government-sponsored development programs enacted under Ayub Khan, tipped the balance of power in favor of the Punjab.

By the late 1960s, the 1968 Survey of Farm Mechanization Report showed that the Punjab accounted for 91.2 percent of the country’s 75,700 tube wells (cited in Sayeed

1980:56). Similar disparities were evident in the concentration of tractors. Again, the

Survey o f Farm Mechanization reported that 13,800 of West Pakistan’s 16,600 tractors were found in the Punjab (cited in Sayeed 1980:56),

Even within the Punjab the distribution of wealth was skewed in favor of the landed magnates, including some Gujars. For example, while eighty to ninety percent of all tube-wells and tractors in the Punjab were found on farms over 25 acres in area

(Sayeed 1980:57), subsistence farmers saw reductions in their average land holdings during the same period (Gotsch 1982).

Industry also benefited from the dynamism Ayub Khan’s growth policies brought

to the province’s rural areas. Medium owner-cultivators in possession of 25 to 50 acres

of land and large scale agricultural capitalists controlling 50 acres or more enjoyed

greater returns on their investments from decreased labor costs and increased yields. The

reliance on mechanized agriculture generated a demand for medium scale industries 297 producing water pumps, tractors, spare parts, and so forth. Processing industries such as cotton milling also showed impressive rates of growth (see Waseem 1990).

Although the Punjab as a whole prospered, there were numerous pockets that were resistant to the spread of the new technologies. Economies of scale, ecological variations, access to reliable sources of irrigation and the variegated systems of land tenure in the province were important factors that led to the concentration of wealth in the hands of rural magnates. On the basis of such differences, Hamza Alavi (1982) has divided the agrarian economy of the Punjab and its adjacent areas into four distinct agricultural zones, each of which differed in relation to their ability to adsorb the technologies of the green revolution. The northem Punjab consists of what Alavi refers to as the "Old Settled" districts. Throughout the area, farmers depend to different degrees on rainfall to irrigate their crops. This has resulted in continuous settlement since a very early time. The extreme length of occupation has resulted in immense population pressure on the land and the excessive fragmentation of land holdings.*’

On the basis of the relative availability of irrigation water, Alavi further

subdivides the region into (1) the "Poor Old Settled" districts, and (2) the "Rich Old

Settled" districts. The Poor Old Settled Districts include all of Rawalpindi Division,

Mianwali district within the Punjab and Abbottobad and Manshera districts of the

neighboring NWFP. Within this region, agriculture is wholly dependent upon the timely

arrival of the summer rains. The unevenness of the terrain makes digging canals

*’ Except where noted, the following discussion is based on material presented in Alavi's (1982) widely read chapter "The Rural Elite and Agricultural Development in Pakistan." 298 financially prohibitive. In addition, the deepness of the aquifer requires substantial inputs of capital to sink wells to a depth sufficient to tap the water table (Alavi 1982:132-137).

As the rains are relatively unpredictable, farmers in the Poor Old Settled districts have suffered throughout history from grinding poverty. They thus do not have sufficient financial resources to sink deep tube wells and cannot risk using HYV seeds for fear that the rains may arrive late or not at all.

In the northem district of the Rich Old Settled Districts, canals are also rare.

However, the water table is shallow and the terrain is flat. Irrigation water is therefore relatively accessible. In the Rich Old Settled District’s southern reaches (i.e., Lahore,

Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Gujranwala) farmers use both tube wells and canals as sources of irrigation water. Thus, while landholdings are relatively small in both the northem and southem sections of this zone, sufficient irrigation throughout the villages located in

the zone has allowed farmers to adopt the technology of the green revolution.

As one moves to the south of the Old Settled Districts, precipitation levels drop

sharply. This region constitutes Alavi’s "Canal Colony" districts. The benefits of the

technological innovations of the green revolution are most readily apparent in the districts

of Sargodha, Multan, and Bahawalpur Divisions (excluding Minawali). Sufficient land

and capital and ready access to irrigation facilitated the rapid adoption of the technology

of the green revolution.

The arid districts in the West lying along the province’s border with the North

West Frontier Province, constitute the contemporary remnants of the arid zone that once

stretched across the Punjab from Lahore to Baluchistan. Here precipitation is minimal. 299 the water table deep or non-existent, and canals have yet to be extended to the region.

As a consequence there is little agriculture and the region is sparsely populated and poor.

The differences among these four agricultural zones—especially as they relate to their ability to absorb excess labor-are important to understanding the development of

Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad as they have a direct impact on the composition of the migrant stream. Within those areas that benefitted most directly from the introduction of the green revolution, i.e., the Rich Old Settled Districts and the Canal Colony

Districts, there exists a distinct class-based distribution of wealth. On farms less than

25 acres in size, economies of scale limited the ability to reap the benefits of the green revolution.

In spite of laws intended to protect peasants (such as the Land Reform Act of

1959; see Ahmad 1977), the conditions of the rural masses have deteriorated from the combined effects of the green revolution and the entrenchment of an agricultural market.

Saghir Ahmad (1977:58-59) reports that the threat of a more stringent observance of land

reform measures further undermined the economic interests of various peasant classes.

In the village of Sahiwal where he conducted his research, Ahmad (1977:59) observed

that landlords responded to this potential threat by diversifying their interests into

industrial and business activities. To raise capital for these ventures, landlords became

more involved in farm management, often demanding that cultivators plant cash crops

such as sugar cane, rather than those that provided for the subsistence of the community,

such as wheat and fodder. The consequent loss of decision-making had reduced small

landholders and their dependent kammis to rural laborers (Ahmad 1977:60-64). 300 In his study, Ahmad (1977:67) further notes that mechanization and advance forms of agricultural technology were adopted on large farms. Yet, many big landowners did not dispossess their tenants. Instead, to accommodate these developments, landlords decreased the sharecroppers’ average plot size. This allowed

them to dedicate sufficient quantities of land to mechanization, while maintaining the

same number of tied agricultural dependents.

Ironically, the same set of factors that had led to the initial dispossession of

tenants was ultimately to provide employment for rural laborers. The increased yields

and cropping intensity has patterned the labor market to respond to seasonal labor

demands. Labor shortages during harvesting and planting became an even more critical

concern for landlords as their harvests (and potential losses) have increased. Thus, while

they exhibit some hesitancy to establish new sharecropping and other tenurial

arrangements there is, nevertheless, ample if episodic work to keep local labor employed

on a piece work basis (Ahmad 1977:68).

The reluctance of large landowners to dispossess their former tenants was based

on a number of considerations. Traditional norms and mores that bound landlord to

cultivator, detined for each a specific set of responsibilities and duties. Landlords had

a moral obligation to protect and tend to the political, social, and economic needs of their

dependents. Outright disenfranchisement would have been a breach of this moral

contract. Political reasons may also explain why landlords have maintained these

modified tenurial arrangements. Maintaining a large force of tied labor made political

sense in that it provided a landlord with a substantial base of political support (Alavi 301 1982:41-49). For example, given that 12.5 acres is the average amount of farmland necessary to support a family of 5.2 individuals (and attached artisan and laboring groups), a agricultural magnate in control of 2,000 acres of land could support upwards to 1,(XX) individuals.’

Agriculturalists of sufficient resources and wealth were invited to participate in these various types of industrial growth. Compensation given to large landlords under

Ayub Khan’s land reforms, were directed into agricultural and export industries by the provision of large subsidies, various types of tax breaks, and other financial incentives

(Sayeed 1980:56). Towns near major agricultural belts prospered in response to the ensuing changes in their agro-industrial bases. The rapid rates of industrialization occurring in and around such cities as Lahore, Multan, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, and

Wazirabad had "remade" the Punjab (Weiss 1991:11).

At first these changes were confined to agriculture-related industries such as

cotton milling, textiles, food processing, and so forth. Subsequent developments

witnessed a shift towards manufacturing in medium and heavy industries such as

pharmaceutical, steel re-rolling, and sporting goods equipment, "with each representing

a different aspect of the import/export regulations the Ayub Khan government used to

control the direction and development of industry" (Weiss 1991).

’ By national standards this may appear to be a small constituency. However, Pakistani politics are highly factionalized. They are thus liable to be influenced by events occurring within a local context. Moreover, if one calculates the political capitd accrued by securing political favors for the relatives and fnends of dependents as well as the income such land provides one can easily see how possession of such agricultural estates has provided many rural magnates with the wherewithal to diversify into industry, trade, commerce, and government. 302 Kinship as a Site of Integration: First Approximations

The agricultural and political developments of the 1960s and 1970s served to increase the numerical and political predominance of Punjabis in the higher ranks of the military, in the industrial sector of the economy, and in the government. Many medium and large scale landowners used the increased wealth and power afforded by the government to invest in the alternate forms of socio-economic advancement offered by the modem nation-state. With sufficient capital to relieve them of the responsibility to manage the family’s land, the scions of large landlords became free to pursue other careers as professionals, army officers, commercial traders, industrialists, or politicians.

In the individual pursuit of these career paths, a highly ramified network of kin ties

spread among agriculture, industry, the military, and government (Sayeed 1980:73).

As these kin networks developed, the national decision-making processes

increasingly came under the influence of the newly enriched families of the Punjab (Alavi

1985 : 46, note # 4). Kin ties were especially important in ensuring one’s economic or

political success. Ayub Khan’s son, for example, amassed a large fortune in private

business during the 1960s. Khalid bin Sayeed (1980:73), similarly reports that in 1965

and 1966, Pakistan’s secretary of foreign affairs, its ambassador to Washington, and the

country’s secretaries of Home and Kashmir Affairs, and of the Ministry' of Economic

Affairs were close relatives. Kin-based ties to industrial connections also became

important in determining political success. A past Prime Minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif,

was the son of one of the founders of the second largest steel re-rolling mill in Punjab

(Weiss 1991:105). 303 The urban growth that accompanied this spreading industrialization was promoted, in part, by the changing nature of the rural economy. Small scale farmers and artisans from throughout the region, but especially in the Old Settled Districts, found themselves occupationally redundant and unable to compete efficiently in the modem agricultural market. Of insufficient scale to risk purchasing the "modem" farm technology, dispossessed farmers and artisans began to drift to the towns and cities in search of work, to enlist in the armed forces or, starting in the 1970s, to secure passage to the oil fields of the Gulf States (Waseem 1990).

Thus, while one segment of the Punjabi Gujars has witnessed a slow deterioration in their socio-economic standing, another has benefitted from the Punjab’s economic growth. This has had a direct effect on the development of Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad.

While the poor Punjabi Gujars come to Islamabad to exploit its more open labor market, others have been invited to enjoy the benefits the Master Plan provides the city’s elite

families.

The Punjab in Islamabad: Residential Sites of Engagement and Support

The three pillars of political support in the Ayub Khan govemment—the civil

service, the military, and the agricultural/industrial bourgeoisie-were invited to

participate in the economic development of Islamabad. The Gujars are represented

among all three of these sectors of Islamabad’s urban economy. It is therefore

worthwhile to consider the nature of the invitations that the govemment extended to its

political supporters. 304

The National Gvil Service

Ayub Khan had called on the Civil Service of Pakistan (hereinafter CSP) to implement and oversee the development programs of the state and its international sponsors (see Callard 1959:22; Ziring 1971:114-141). Through such agencies as the

Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation the govemment targeted specific industries for training, development, and capitalization. Partly in recognition of their support and partly to remove the Federal bureaucracy from the morally corrupting influences of

Karachi, it was decided that National Secretariat would be the first govemment building erected in the city. At the Potwar Plateau, the Federal Capital would be, as Ayub

Khan’s supporters in the CDA put it, "braced by Islamabad’s morally and physically

healthier environment" (Jamoud 1968:960).*

Relocating the Capital provided more benefits that just that of protecting the CSP.

The Plateau’s "open spaces" provided the govemment with financial benefits it would not

otherwise enjoy in the congested urban confines of Karachi where business, commercial

and financial firms were well organized and wielded considerable political clout. In

contrast, the Potwar Plateau was a land populated mostly by small-scale peasant farmers

and agro-pastoralists. The latter were placed at a distinct political disadvantage vis-à-vis

the bureaucratic state. Though politically astute in inter-personal dealings, most had

neither the knowledge nor contacts necessary to influence the state’s decision-making

* As part of an overall program of national development, moving the Capital complemented other efforts to "cleanse" the administration of corrupt officials. Shortly after coming to power, Ayub Khan had appointed a Screening Committee and Specif Police Establishment to investigate and punish judicial and civil officers guilty of corruption, misconduct, subversion or inefficiency (Ziring 1971:12). 305 processes. As a consequence, Potwari villagers, including a fair number of Gujars, were forced to sell ancestral farm lands at rates favorable to the govemment.

The plan the govemment settled on was to prohibit cultivators with land holdings over 1/2 acre from working for the govemment or settling within city limits (Khan

1970:14). Some were "retired" to urban colonies in the Federal Capital Area. The majority, however, were relocated on farmlands in the central districts of the Punjab at some distance from the Federal Capital (Jafri [1967]:27; Khan 1970:14).® In defense of this rather drastic measure, the govemment argued that it did not consider it

"advisable to disturb their original occupation and to expose them to the poor chances

of finding employment in Rawalpindi, which is neither a commercial nor an industrial

city" (Jafri [1967]:27). It should also be mentioned that doing so reduced the former

inhabitants’ ability to sue the govemment for rights to the land.

By eliminating competition for land, the state bureaucracy ensured that "... the

increased value of the surrounding area [of Islamabad’s land] would go to the

govemment-which would initiate action and investment—and not to those who happened

to be land-owners near the new govemment developments" (Doxiadis 1965:5). The

prices at which the land was sold seems just above the cost of purchase. The income

made by the sale of state lands thus seemed marginal—especially considering the capital

inputs that had been needed to develop each sector (compare the tables and figures

appearing in Doxiadis Associates 1960b, 1962a, 1962b, 1963a, 1964).

8,417 families had been relocated by 1970. 306 The savings entailed in building the capital on an "open space," represented a rather substantial windfall for the government civil servants (and others) who had sufficient financial resources with which to buy land (see Doxiadis 1965:5). On the basis of this evidence, the relocation of the capital at the Potwar Plateau can therefore be seen as a means by which the civilian bureaucracy (as well as the landed elite and the military) sought to enrich themselves, their dependents, and their constituents.

Government land acquisitions in the years immediately following the relocation of the capital demonstrate the extent to which securing this advantage informed the decision to relocate the capital. The city’s first "five year plan" (Khan 1970:7) allocated funds sufficient to purchase 25,000 acres of land. This was more than 10 times the

2,370 acres the Doxiadis plan (Doxiadis Associates 1960b:418) called during the first five year plan of implementation.'" Indeed, it was more land than was required for the city up to the end of its second five year plan of growth (see Doxiadis Associates

1960b:418; Khan 1970:9). Yet, as if to make its intentions clear, the government made still another "land acquisition" of 43,000 acres in the mid-1960s (Khan 1970:7). This left the government holding sufficient land to provide for the growth of Islamabad into

the late 1980s.

In both cases, the acquisition of land was justified on the basis of the

government’s putative need to derive the maximal "economic benefit of the land pricing

formula, to stop speculation in land prices and to safeguard the interests of Islamabad"

The first five year plan for Islamabad corresponds to Pakistan’s second national five year plan (1960-1964). 307 (Khan 1970:9). Yet, by making these land purchases the government was forced to retrench its expenditures on development of the city’s infrastructure: Funding allocations for essential services such as water, sewerage, and drainage were reduced by as much as fifty percent (see the unnumbered Table appearing in Khan 1970:7). As a consequence of reduced funding, Islamabad’s growth has slowed over what it might otherwise have been (Khan 1970:13). Government land purchases made in the 1960s remain undeveloped in the mid-1980s and the day when water, gas, electricity, and sewerage services will be extended to these western sectors seems rather remote.

Military Entrenchment

The invitation the Ayub Khan government extended to the military also took the form of favorable consideration in the allocation of land. According to the original

Master Plan drafted by Doxiadis (Doxiadis Associates 1960b), the military was to be given access to properties located in the sectors along Islamabad’s southern border. In addition, a residential sector for high ranking officers was set aside in the administrative sector and at the base of the adjacent Margalla Hills. At some point during the development of the program of implementation, these initial provisions were modified and the army relinquished its claim to land in the "I” sectors and the administrative

sector. In return, E-8 and E-9 were redesignated as "military residential" sectors.

Ostensibly, this was done because the Master Plan had over-accommodated land for

military purposes (see Khan 1970).

The nature of the modifications in the Master Plan appear to be the result of a

concession on the part of the government to the military’s demand for more favorable 308 consideration. While not precise, the comparison of the original and revised land allotments of the Master Plan suggests that the military benefited by these changes in the city’s Master Plan. In terms of its total allocated acreage, the military zone in the administrative sector, while admittedly a prime piece of property, could not possibly provide sufficient land to meet all of the senior officers’ housing needs. Moreover, whereas ample land was available in the "I" sectors, this area had to be considered

something less than desirable as a residential location. Situated along Islamabad’s

southern border with Rawalpindi, it suffers from the pollution, noise, and unsanitary

conditions of the area. The value of this land would have also depreciated from the

railroad track that was to run through the "H" sectors parallelling the proposed military

residential sectors. Thus, while the military gave up a small piece of land in the

administrative sector-over which competition would have been undoubtedly severe and

disruptive-it benefitted by trading an otherwise undesirable allocation for what is now

some of the most expensive property in the country.

The Local Bourgeoisie

Through the selective targeting of public investment in public works projects

(e.g., public housing), that would otherwise provide private capital a marginal or

negative return, the government sought to recreate in Islamabad an environment that

would induce the introduction of private capital (see Tables 25 and 26). Such policies

foster the growth of the local economy while it spurred the regional growth of the

surrounding areas (Specht 1983:35-37). 309

Table 25 Yearly Breakdown of Government and Private Investment

For the First Five Year Plan

ITEM Expenditures in lakhs of Rs.*

1960-1 1961-2 1962-3 1963-4 1964-5 Total

Purchase of Land 111 — — —— 111

Class V Communities Total 50 80 130 280 348 888 Private 0 10 30 70 150 260 Private as % of total 0 12.5 23.1 25 43.1 29.2 Government 50 70 100 210 198 628 Government as % of 100 87.5 76.9 75 56.9 70.8 total

Functions of Class V & VI Communities Total 0 5 20 50 68 143 Private 0 0 0 15 22 37 Private as % of total 0 0 0 30 32.4 25.9 Government 0 5 20 35 46 106 Government as % of 0 100 100 70 67.6 74.1 total

* One lakh equals one hundred thousand

Source: Doxiadis (1960b:422) 310 Table 26 Relation of Government and Private Investment

in Islamabad

Investment Government Private Total Crores 5-Year Program Rs. Period Rs. % Rs. Crores % Crores* 1st 1960-65 29 82 6.5 18 35.5 2nd 1965-70 40 67 20.0 33 60.0 3rd 1970-75 40 56 32.0 44 72.0 4th 1975-80 40 51 38.0 49 78.0 Total 149 61 96.5 39 245.5

Source: Doxiadis Associates (1960b:421)

* One crore equals ten million 311 The scheduling of public financing as it relates to creating conditions favorable to the investment of private capital is, therefore, another way in which Islamabad dispenses it lessons in civics: As the city grows, and its population matures the activities and areas for the investment of private capital are increasing liberalized. To ensure the support and compliance of the city’s bourgeoisie, "the original provision of the master plan for industrial area was amended by the Authority in that more land would be set aside for industrial and a wider range of industries would be admitted to Islamabad"

(Hasan 1971:19).

Collectively, Islamabad’s elite Gujar families serve as bridge linking Gujar populations located in the countryside and in the city. The nature of their integration in

the region’s agrarian economy (as scions of rural magnates in absentia), the local

economy of Islamabad (as professionals, merchants, military officers, and bureaucrats),

and the Gujar community (as "notables") is suggestive of processes that might be

occurring in the larger society.

Aside from those few community members who own business requiring

substantial amounts of labor or who are well placed in the federal bureaucracy, most of

these large landowners are unable or have been reluctant to bring their poorer relatives

to Islamabad. Islamabad’s Punjabi Gujars of the lower socio-economic classes instead

tend to originate from among the indebted agro-pastorlists who come from Alavi’s (1982)

"Poor Old Settled districts" or from that class of villagers who have not participated in

the agricultural prosperity of the past three decades. 312 Strategies of Subversion and Compliance

Only a minority of Gujars have been able to participate in Islamabad’s development and growth. The vast bulk of the population is relatively poor and live in sub standard government housing in sectors G-6 through G-9. They therefore symbolize in microcosm the target population of the Master Plan’s program of political subjugation and control.

On the surface, it would seem likely that the Master Plan (in combination with exogenous developments in the world capitalist market) would create among its citizens a class of what Andre Gunder Frank (1967) has referred to as the ’’lumpenproletariat." In this, one might further assume an absence of the type of interlocking familial relationships that link the civil servants, military officers, and industrial and agricultural magnates. The

Gujar data, however, suggests this is not the case.

As have other low income families, the Gujars have developed some fairly simple

but relatively effective strategies to circumvent the intent of the Master Plan’s agenda of

control. Private ownership of a car remains prohibitively expense for most low income

families (although the lack of parking space is undoubtedly a contributing factor also).

In their place, bicycles are used to travel to work, visit relatives and friends, or to attend

various social functions." Motorcycles see a similarly wide range of uses. Unlike

cars, motorcycles can be driven directly to a house where they may be kept in a

relaüvely secure and easily accessible location. As they are capable of carrying much

larger loads for far greater distance than a bicycle, motorcycles are often called to

" On any given workday, one can see a stream of bicyclists on Capitol Avenue travelling to and from the secretariat and other administrative offices located in the administrative sector. 313 transport large numbers of people. It is not an uncommon sight to see a family of three, four, or even five members nimbly negotiating heavy traffic on a small motorbike (100

C . C . ) . In this practice, Islamabad’s Gujar residents are in keeping with a widespread tradition of the Subcontinent.

Settlement Practices and Reglonality

As mentioned previously, civil ranking served as the criterion to determine the housing allocations, property ownership, and so forth. The result of the use of this criterion was that a formal hierarchy developed in the city whose structure paralleled that which obtains among the military ranks (see Meier 1985:213). As in the military, promotion to a higher civil rank meant that an individual had to cut ties of friendship and camaraderie with one’s old friends and neighbors. In terms of settlement patterns, the

intention was to require the city’s inhabitants to shift their residents constantly as they

moved up in civil service ranking. With each promotion, city residents were expected

to change houses and settle among a higher socio-economic class (Jamoud 1968:958).

This constant reshuffling is still another aspect of the Master Plan’s effort to break up

corporate identities.

Unfortunately, when I was in the field I had not fully realized the political agenda

and associated planning practice of the Master Plan. I therefore did not collect

quantitative data relating to the issue of intra-city mobility. Qualitative observations of

the residential distribution of Gujars, however, suggests that intra-city mobility has

actually served the counter-purpose of increasing the density of related Gujars living in

a particular sub-sector. In three separate instances that I know of, low income families 314 had exchanged residences in order to live in close proximity to their relatives. It is

interesting to note that in each of these instances, the families involved in the exchange

were of different ethnic backgrounds. It is also interesting to note that in two of the

three instances, the exchange of dwellings, by bringing relatives in closer prximity,

facilitated various economic activities of the community. Thus the Master Plan’s

objective of creating neighbor ties has been effective, but only to the extent that it has

allowed families to identify "neighbors" who are willing to exchange their houses.

The social geography that has resulted from these settlement processes are not

unlike those in villages of the Punjab (Eglar 1960): While there are small pockets of kin,

seldom does one find a quarter in a village that is known to be the exclusive territory of

one biraderi. The mohallas (neighborhoods) that develop as a consequence of these

strategies do not, therefore, qualify as urban villages. The cross-biraderi socio-economic

ties of rural settlements are absent in this urban setting. Conformity to community

standards cannot, therefore, be ensured."

Developing Forms of Integration

The insulated nature of these social networks and the lack of cross-cutting ties

increases inter-ethnic social distances as it promotes the lateral extension of biraderi ties.

Relative to their interaction with biraderi mates throughout the city, the Gujars appear

to have relatively little interaction with their non-Gujar neighbors (although they did have

wide ranging inter-ethnic visiting circles). It is of more than passing interest to note in

" Sylvia Vatuk (1972:200) notes that in urban India "residents tendency to form semi-exclusive social networks means that effective control of behavior is commonly insulated within these networks, rather than responsive to any overall mohalla standard." 315 regard to this point that it is the Master Plan which facilitates and provides the forum in which Gujars are able to establish contact with their more geographically distant biraderi mates within the city. Continuing a tradition of social maximization that stretches as far back as the early Mughal period (see Chapter 4), it is a practice among the Gujars to seek out and establish contact with their biraderi mates. In terms of the work place, new employees, especially those working in the federal bureaucracy, search for biraderi relatives among more senior employees, while those of a more established status, similarly endeavor to incorporate new employees into the work-based network of biraderi contacts. Thus, in regards to its goal of establishing a national identity, the centrality the Master Plan confers on the government and its bureaucratic offices provides the forum by which its principles, purposes, and intents are subverted.

The political intentions of the Master Plan and Program of Implementation also

figure in the geographic expression of the social relations that develop out of the initial

contacts made at the workplace." In the established sectors of the city an individual’s

network of biraderi contacts assumes a radial distribution. That is to say that the social

networks of the community’s older families extend throughout the city. Conversely, the

social networks of recent immigrants who occupy dwellings in the city’s outskirts are

more lineal in nature in that they either extend into the city’s older residential sectors

(and, by proxy only, to the Presidential Mansion) or into Rawalpindi.

" This became evident at an early stage of the research. The network methodology used in surveying the community provided evidence that corroborated the differences in these types of contact networks. 316 The changing nature of the local economy and labor market further affects the spatial nature of these contact networks. As mentioned, the older sectors are populated with employees of the federal bureaucracy. Conversely, in the more recently developed sectors there is an increased scope for private investment and the development of a free market. Recent immigrants to the city do not therefore have the advantage of establishing and maintaining contact with fellow biraderi members as is the case with those who work in the offices (and halls) of the federal bureaucracy. Indeed, the information they have about the Gujars who live in other parts of the city has been most likely been acquired by attending the meetings or reading the publications of extra-local biraderi associations (anjuman).

Residential localization is also important to the processes of ethnic group formation. Although the biraderi as a social category extends throughout the region and the country, the biraderi kin groups that are engaged in various focal activities are much less expansive (see Chapter 12). In general they comprise a group of variously related

kin whose residences are interspersed among those of other biraderis. These social ties

thus serve to integrate individual families into the larger community. But they do so, not

as a seamless and unified whole, but as a congeries of variously defined social groups.

That is to say that developing an understanding of the nature of kinship within the

Islamabad community is critical to explicating the social forms of association that inform

and pattern the distribution of power within the community. The various types of social

relations extant within the community cannot, therefore, be ignored as they play a critical 317 role in influencing the deployment and distribution of ethnic identities within the community. It is to an examination of the social forms of association that I now turn. CHAPTER X n

SOCIAL FORMS: MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, AND ASSOCIATION

The Shah Faisal Masjid is one of the more the more visually striking structures in the city. It is as prominent as the Presidential mansion, although it is only visible from the road leading up to it from Rawalpindi (Journal Entry, January 22, 1986).

A Joint Secretary came to me and said "I have a piece of work in the military hospital. Do you know anybody there?" I said yes, I know a Brigadier Doctor who is from our tribe. He said "Okay I want to visit him." I said all right. We went to him. He did accommodate us despite the fact that we were not knowing him. Gujarism—You know "ism"? Gujarism, that’s there (Mohammad Arshad Gujar, April 19, 1986).

According to the society’s program, some importance will be given to the villages in the suburbs of Islamabad to develop some more political, social, and economic advancement (Chaudhary Masood Hamayun, June 20, 1986).

This chapter examines the nature of Gujar ethnic social organization. The first section of the chapter uses data collected in the field to examine inter-generational changes in

Gujar marital patterns. The primary objective here is to develop some sense of the ways in which the common perceptions of an Islamic code of life are articulated in the diverse forms of community social organization. The second section introduces case study materials on three focal kin groups in Islamabad. The third section examines materials presented in the case study in light of the community’s overall social organization.

The analysis of the material presented in the case studies-individually, in comparison to each other, as well as in relation to the larger community-seeks to achieve

318 319 a number of goals. At its niost basic, its findings are intended to suggest the nature, range, and scope of the social relations extant within the community. In this, the analysis also seeks to illuminate the ways in which vertical and horizontal forms of integration enter into, are engaged with, and lend shape to the Gujars’ ethnic identities.

Related to these other objectives, the third purpose of this analysis is to investigate the extent and range of variability in community organization from the perspective of regional, economic, and other sources of social diversity. A final objective is to explicate the ways in which cultural definitions of social power influence the deployment and circulation of historically resonant and contextually relevant ethnic motifs within the

Gujar community of Islamabad. In effect, this brings the discussion to a close. A final chapter concludes with a brief consideration of the findings of this study and its research

implications. 1 turn first, however, to a consideration of the marital data.

Marriage and Kinship among the Gujars of Islamabad

A previous chapter (Chapter 5) introduced the "formal" principles of kinship organization

of the Gujar biraderi. To reiterate briefly here, among the Gujars, descent is reckoned

patrilineally. Lineage segments are unranked and, with the exception of those large

landholders, are in general only of a few generations in depth. At more inclusive levels,

patrilineages are grouped into named patricians.

In regard to their marriage practices, previous discussions had sought to

demonstrate the ways in which conversion to Islam was mediated by the historical and

cultural contexts of the Gujars’ home area. However, as a source of social change, Islam 320 did not appear once for a brief period in the history of South Asia then disappear never to return again. Although its visibility has historically waxed and waned since its advent in the Subcontinent over a millennium ago, Islam has throughout been a consistent cultural feature of South Asian society. By comparing marital practices of second generation immigrants against those of their parents, this section seeks to explicate the ways in which Islam continues to inform Gujar ethnicity.

Marriage Practices among 2nd Generation Gujar Immigrants

To examine the ways in which the Gujars’ perception of Islamic doctrine and dogma informs Gujar urban society, marital data were collected for 55 married children of the Islamabad Gujar community. Correspondence analysis was again used to compare martial data (see Chapter 5).' These data and their position on the axes relative to the data presented in chapter 5 (see pp. 131-145) are as shown in Tables 27 and 28 and

Figure 9, respectively.

' One of the strengths of correspondence analysis is that new data can be added to an original matrix as a supplementary row or column without reorienting the position of the axes (Greenacre 1984). This feature of correspondence analysis allows one to consider the differences and similarities between new and old data by comparing their relative positions. 321 Table 27

Second Generation Marital Patterns by Region

Region Marriage Type Lineal Kin Biraderi Exogamous Total Northern 3 1 0 1 5 Central 10 0 0 0 10 Eastern 7 17 13 3 40 Total 20 18 13 55

Table 28

Correspondence Coordinates of Second Generation Immigrants (F)

Region Coordinate Northern .94 Central 1.29 Eastern -.20 322 P Eastern F Eastern F Northern F Centra: P Northern P Central

Kin marriage Biraderi exogamy Biraderi endogamy Lineal endogamy

Figure 9. Display of Correspondence Analysis of Table 28

The results of these calculations indicate a substantial inter-generational change in marital strategies. As Figure 9 shows, all three second generation groups are to the right of their respective parental group. That is to say that these data indicate a more pronounced preference for lineal endogamy among second generation urban immigrants than among any of the parental groups.

The inter-generational shift in martial practices among the Gujars poses some rather interesting research questions. Do marriages among second generation immigrants reflect the influence of factors that differ from those that Chapter 5 identified as informing marital strategies among the parental generation? If so, what are these factors?

What are their implications for social organization? And, more centrally, how do they affect the Gujars’ ethnic identities?

The elevated rates of lineal endogamy observed among second generation

immigrants reflect various factors impinging upon marital decision-making in the urban

context of Islamabad. Among these, three factors seem critical to explaining the inter- 323 generational shift in marital practices: (1) the need and desire of urban Gujars to symbolize their inherent religiosity; (2) government sponsored policies of "Islamization;" and (3) the political, social, and economic context of Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad.^

Briefly, it seems that within the Gujar community of Islamabad, the adoption of a distinctively Muslim way of life is at least in part symbolically expressed through a change in marital practices/ That is to say that the elevated rate of lineal endogamy among this cohort reflects just one of the diverse ways in which commonly held perceptions of Islam achieve symbolic expression. In a sense, the idea that "we marry our cousins," as it was stated to me, demonstrates Gujar piety and devoutness. This symbolic act has, of course, historic roots and rural precedents. Contemporary observations throughout Pakistan indicate that marriage to a cousin, especially a lineal cousin, is perceived to be an Islamic cultural ideal (Alavi 1976, Aschenbrenner 1967;

Das 1973; Donnan 1988; Pastner 1979). Historical evidence introduced in chapter five further suggests that such marital arrangements are a longstanding practice, at least among the Gujars.

But lineal endogamy is more than just a symbolic expression of Muslim piety.

It is also a comment on the relationship of the Gujars to the nation-state of Pakistan: A country founded as the homeland of the Muslims of South Asia. Conformity to lineal

^ Ninety-four percent of the marriages among these second generation migrants were arrangeai.

^ A shift in the direction and tempo of change caused by similar events has been observed among the Meos of Bombay (Aggarwal 1966). In this regard, Aggarwal (1966:159-160) notes that "it is not an exaggeration to say that the Meos have adopted more of Muslim practices in the last 17 years than they had in the previous 450 years." 324 endogamy can thus be seen as a political statement that expresses and defines as one’s own, the central raison d’être of Pakistan as a nation state. It is interesting to note in this regard, that the Punjabi Gujars, who represent the most prosperous segment of the community, also record the highest rate of lineal endogamy (see Table 27).

The higher rates of lineal endogamy among second generation immigrants alone

would seem to suggest the development of a segmentary form of social organization that

is somewhat similar to the kinship groupings said to typify the Muslim Middle East. As

Murphy and Kasdan (1959) suggest, lineal endogamy promotes social fissioning and

consequently restricts the political and economic ties a person can call on in times of

need or crisis. Such structural arguments seem to suggest that the adoption of lineal

endogamy entails political and economic risks that would seem to militate against its

complete adoption, even within an urban context, and especially among the urban poor;

The need for a wide-ranging kinship network is as imperative within the city as it is in

the countryside.^

The preexistence of the biraderi, however, is a major distinction between

Pakistani society and those of the Middle East. Its organizational implications, in effect,

precludes the development of a segmentary kinship system. First, unlike the Muslim

Middle East, genealogies within the biraderi are fairly shallow. Second, there still

remains a high rate of non-lineal biraderi marriages. Indeed, a majority (55 %) of the

second-generation marriages are arranged between non-lineal kin or among biraderi

* This organizational implication of lineal endogamy may account for its low frequency in the cities and towns of the Middle East (see Barth 1954; Khuri 1970). 325 mates. Third, biraderi ties are important means whereby individuals gain entree into urban society. Fourth, as urbanization has progressed, the Gujar biraderi has increasingly assumed an ethnic-like character: Community members use biraderi connections to gain access to government patronage, to organize and gather financial support for a business, to find a job, to secure a loan, to find housing and so on.

In the city, the horizontal ties provided by the idiom of biraderi brotherhood are necessary for the successful dispensation of these many functions. If I understand

Murphy and Kasdan correctly, without the preexisting framework of the biraderi, the conditions of urban life would promote a lower rate of lineal endogamy in the city:

People would be compelled to establish a wider range of contacts through the strategic apportioning of marriages. It is an irony of history then that the legacy of Hindu South

Asia facilitates the expression of Muslim piety in the urban context of the planned capital of Pakistan. Thus, in regards what constitutes the boundaries of the Gujar biraderi, and hence the limits to which feelings of brotherhood are extended is as much a product of history, context, and volition as it is of the formal principles of social structure and social organization.

Alone, enunciations of the formal principles of social organization thus shed little light on the ways in which kinship is envisioned and articulated, especially in the urban context of Islamabad. Innumerable are the instances in which such principles of social organization are modified, ignored, or subverted, or are challenged by social forms that arise as a consequence of other antecedent variables. Given such diversity, it is impossible to identify the total number of biraderi kin groups extant within the Gujar 326 community of Islamabad. Indeed, the practices of kinship reckoning and marriage sketched above make it possible to argue that aside from siblings, each and every Gujar has a unique constellation of kin relations. The biraderi kindreds, as I refer to them, at least in theory extend to the boundaries of the biraderi. It is therefore patent that only a limited segment of the total number of possible relatives might cooperate in any particular venture.

When biraderi kin ties are of no immediate use to an individual they remain latent and socially unmarked. Although this is itself a comment on the relative value of kin ties, such observations do not contribute much to our understanding of when and under what conditions community members consider it appropriate and necessary to use biraderi kin ties (see Combs-Shilling 1981). It is only when real and fictive kin actively cooperate in a focal activity such as arranging a marriage, or engaging in some corporate function, does it become possible to discern how kin ties are used in a concrete active sense. In order to explore the dynamics of using biraderi kin ties in the urban context of Islamabad, I present in the following section a description of three kin groups.

Gujar Kin Groups in Islamabad

The first case study is based on data collected from 11 maulvis (religious functionaries)

who serve in varying clerical capacities in mosques distributed throughout Islamabad.

The second case study examines data relating to a small dairy business that seven Gujars

operate out of their homes in Islamabad. In the third case study, the organization and 327 operation of a full-time dairy located in the National Institute of Health (NIH) colony constitutes the primary focus of analysis.

The criteria I have used to select the individuals included within each group are necessarily arbitrary as it is impossible to delineate a fixed kin group given the principles of descent, kinship, and marriage sketched above. The objective in this section is therefore twofold: (1) to explicate the role biraderi ties play in organizing Gujar social life; and (2) lay the groundwork for examining the social dynamics involved in the creation and deployment of Gujar ethnic identities.

These kin groups have been selected for three specific reasons. First, each represents one of the three regional sub-groups of the Gujar community of Islamabad.

Selecting these three kin groups thus fills out in greater detail the more abstract statistical description provided in previous chapters. A second reason for selecting these three kin groups is that the level of economic investment of group members in the focal activities around which their kin ties are organized varies widely. For example, for the maulvis of Islamabad (case 1) their focal activity (religious cleric and preacher) is their primary source of income and it has been so since they first came to the city. For the Gujars of the urban dairy (case 2), on the other hand, their focal activity is a part-time job used to supplement the income they earn as full-time government employees. For the NIH

Gujars (case 3), the economic importance of the shared focal activity has changed over time. While the dairy was founded as a source of extra income, for some groups members it has become their primary occupation. The third reason for selecting these 328 three kin groups is that they highlight the organizational influences that the cultural values of hierarchy and egalitarianism exert on the gujar community.

Case 1: The Rector of Rawalpindi and the Gujar Maulvis of Islamabad

Maulana Abdul Rasheed is the rector of a madrassa in Rawalpindi. He is also the benefactor to a number of maulvis working in Islamabad. As such, he is considered a man of considerable prestige within the local Gujar community. While his reputation is in large part based on the large number of favors he bestows upon community members, his exemplary life as a politician and religious cleric are equally important in the consideration of his status and prestige.

Like many Gujars from his region, Maulana Abdul Rasheed was bom to a relatively poor farming family in a village in Mansehra district of northern Pakistan.

Until he was a young man. Sahib Rasheed worked with his father and brother on a small farm raising buffalo and selling dairy products. His spare time was spent at a local madrassa. In his late teens Abdul Rasheed was sent by his father to Deoband, the famous seminary of north India. Here the rector received the bulk of his religious education. He returned to Pakistan during Partition and immediately became involved

in politics, in which he was fairly successful. In the 1970s he was elected to the

National Assembly of Pakistan and was later returned as a member of the Senate.

Throughout his life, the rector has consistently championed the economic,

educational, and social causes of the Gujar biraderi. He has for long advocated increased

enrollment in religious schools as a primary means to advance the social welfare of the

Gujars. Accordingly, he has been educating Gujars at his Rawalpindi madrassa since its 329 founding in 1965. The madrassa is a four story structure that encloses a large open-air courtyard on three sides. Class space is available for approximately 120 students on the first floor. Living quarters on the second, third, and fourth floors house up to 200 people. These apartments are used by students, teachers (and their spouses), distant relatives, pre-school dependents, an occasional guardian accompanying a younger student, and various visitors who come to stay at the madrassa for varying lengths of time.

Maulana Abdul Rasheed’s religiously-based educational program has a direct influence on the patterns of migration among the Gujars (Spaulding 1987). The majority of the students at the madrassa come from the region of Pakistan where Maulana Abdul

Rasheed was bom and raised. For many of these students, the move to Rawalpindi is the first step in a chain of moves that will take them to a number of mosques distributed throughout Pakistan.

When a student graduates from the Rawalpindi madrassa, it necessarily entails a

reduction in the frequency of personal contact with the Maulana. However, such a

change does not necessarily translate into a diminution of the dependency relationship

that exist between the rector and his former students. Indeed, quite the opposite is the

case. The relationship that is forged between student and rector continues long after the

student graduates from the Rawalpindi madrassa; Graduates are often called upon to

teach younger students, or to administer examinations. Membership in religious political

parties and attendance in various meetings and rallies further cement the kinship-based

ties that link the rector to his former students. The nature of the ties as they influence 330 the definition of Gujar ethnicity is revealed in the employment histories of the Gujar maulvis of Islamabad.

On one of my many visits to the madrassa, Maulana Abdul Rasheed provided me with a list of eleven of his graduates who were working in masjids (mosques) in

Islamabad. Although he declined to provide me with the specifics, he did note that he considered all of these maulvis to be his relatives. Maulana Abdul Rasheed’s list differed slightly from data I had collected independently. Some maulvis I interviewed claimed to have a close personal relationship with Maulana Abdul Rasheed. However, the rector had not mentioned these maulvis to me previously. As the list the rector provided was assembled from recall, some omissions should be expected. However, given the social prestige of the rector, it is equally possible that such claims are attempts by maulvis to enhance their own social standing by claiming a close relationship to a notable figure of

the community. I should also note that such claims may further reflect a desire by the

maulvis to provide answers they thought I expected or desired.

I was able to interview nine of the eleven maulvis that Maulana Abdul Rasheed

listed. These interviews were of varying length. The shortest session lasted a brief

thirty minutes, while the longest consisted of a series of interviews conducted over a six

month period. In these interviews, I often received changing and conflicting answers to

my questions. The responses given by the interviewees reveals that a number of different

interpretations of the relationship between the rector and his reputed students are

possible. 331 Of the nine maulvis I interviewed, five stated that they were from the same area of northern Pakistan as the Rawalpindi rector, were related to Maulana Abdul Rasheed, had graduated from the Rawalpindi madrassa, and were in almost daily contact with the rector. Of these five, four acknowledged further that the rector’s assistance had been instrumental in securing their job. The fifth maulvi asserted that he had obtained his job on his own. However, as all maulvis must be approved by the Auqaf* Department of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it is not necessary that the rector arrange the initial employment. Rather, his major contribution is the work he is able to do Ixhind the scenes in swaying the opinion of the Auqaf committee.

Four of the maulvis objected to having their names appear on the list the rector had provided. Cross-checking the list against data that were provided by other maulvis and community members confirmed the overall accuracy of tiie rector’s list. So doing highlighted the following components of the relationship that existed between the

Maulana and his former students: (1) all were related to the rector: (2) all were from the same region of northern Pakistan as was the rector; (3) all had graduated from the

Rawalpindi madrassa; and (4) all had been in contact with the rector.

Case 2: The Urban Dairy

The second case study is of a small group of Gujars who operate a small dairy business from their homes in the city of Islamabad. Most members of this group were bom in rural India, lived for some time in Karachi, and then came to Islamabad as part

’ Auqaf (sing, waqf) are the pious religious endowments established through donations to worthy religious causes, people, or institutions. 332 of the transfer of government offices (see Table 29). As they had arrived in Islamabad in 1964, they are among the city’s oldest residents.

Their dairy business is operated at their houses in sector G-6. As such it is not a very time-consuming nor exceedingly complicated business. Milk is purchased daily from a dairy in the rural southeast sector of Islamabad, brought to the home of one of the partners, and there divided with the assistance of the women of the house into portions needed for each milk route. Aside from the containers used in transporting the milk and a small motorcycle, the capital needed to maintain the solvency of the business is minimal.

As Table 29 and 30 show, the homogeneity that exists on some demographic dimensions is matched by an equal amount of diversity. Whereas most of the members of this group came to Islamabad from Karachi in 1964, important differences in employment histories, migratory motivations, age, and dependency status at the time of arrival in Islamabad are nonetheless apparent.

Many of the demographic aspects of this group are a function of the differences in age among the seven informants. All four informants 50 years of age or older came to Islamabad as the heads of their residential groups and have maintained the same

government employment as when they first arrived. Younger informants, on the other

hand, came to Islamabad either as dependents (cases 3 and 4) or as unaccompanied adult

(case 7). 333 Table 29

Demographic Features of Urban Biraderi Kin Group 2

Case Year of Move Natal Rural/Urban Rural/Urban to Islamabad Region of Natal Origin Last Residence Origin 1 1964 Eastern Rural Urban (Karachi) 2 1964 Eastern Rural Urban (Karachi) 3 1964 Eastern Urban Urban (Karachi) (Karachi) 4 1972 Central Rural Rural 5 1964 Eastern Rural Urban (Karachi) 6 1964 Eastern Rural Urban (Karachi) 7 1964 Eastern Urban Urban (Karachi)

Table 30

Employment and Additional Demographic Data on

Urban Biraderi Kin Group 2

Case Age Age at Move with Dependency Government Move to Family Status* Transfer Islamabad 1 55 33 Yes 1 Yes 2 62 40 Yes 1 Yes 3 39 17 Yes 2 N/A 4 30 16 Yes 2 N/A 5 56 34 Yes 1 Yes 6 61 39 Yes 1 Yes 7 47 25 No 3 No

* Dependency status codes: 1 - head of residential group, 2 - dependent, 3 - independent. 334 The kinship diagram (Figure 10) below shows the genealogical ties linking the seven partners of the dairy firm. As this diagram shows, two of these milkmen (1 and

6) were incapable of establishing direct genealogical ties with each other or to the other five partners. Nonetheless, the partners used kinship terms in addressing each other.

Those of a more senior rank were referred to and addressed by younger relatives as ceca

(father’s younger brother), while those of roughly the same age addressed each other as bhai (brother).

The partner’s commitment to the business seems to range rather widely among group members: Some exhibit little interest in the firm’s daily activities, while others are deeply involved in seeing to its success. The variable interest taken in the firm is understandable given that the investment is small, and the returns relatively meager. The

"partnership" thus appears to serve as a support network that can be called on in times of need. Nonetheless, it is the case that more active partners derive greater profits from the proceeds of the business, while less active partners often serve as a reserve labor force.

An overlay of a kinship chart of relatives involved in other economic activities with the kinship chart of these seven partners would reveal that the kin ties activated at any given time vary in relation to the nature of the focal activity. These partners

employed a different set of relatives to obtain their government jobs and still another set

of kin to supervise the small farm plots owned by some of the partners. 335

À 1

KEY o - female û - male ▲ - milkman

Figure 10. Kinship of Urban Dairy Kindred Group 336 Case 3: The National Institute of Health (NIK) Dairy

The third biraderi kin group consists of six Gujars and their dependents who cooperatively own and operate a dairy farm in the National Park located in southeastern metropolitan Islamabad. The six partners had lived and worked in Islamabad for many years-most arrived in 1964-before they decided to start a dairy business. The idea to build a dairy farm in Islamabad was inspired in part by the partners’ realization of the that milk sold for twice as much in Islamabad than it did virtually anywhere else in

Pakistan.'" By 1982 the six partners had raised sufficient capital to purchase land and to build the first two of six planned cattle sheds (dera).

The dairy achieved solvency fairly rapidly. Plots of land for four additional cattle sheds were purchased soon after the start of operations. The sixth and final shed was built shortly after I began doing research. I was therefore able to observe firsthand the initial stages of the fissioning of a corporate kin-based enterprise. One of the interesting aspects of this process relates to the ways in which segmentation affects visiting patterns.

That is to say, that friends who had formerly visited the partners jointly, now visited each singly. My impression was that this shift in visiting patterns had accompanied a diminution in the feeling of camaraderie among the partners. This was also related to changes that were simultaneously occurring in the economic organization of the firm.

Erecting the sixth and final shed conferred on each partner the freedom to exercise a

greater amount of personal discretion in decisions regarding the management of the dairy.

^ The price of milk in Islamabad is Rps. 6 per liter, while the average price throughout most of Pakistan is Rps. 3 per liter. 337 The six partners maintain close family ties to their relatives in their natal villages in Sheikhupura district. Mating, calving, and tending to sick cattle occurs in the villages rather than in Islamabad. As a result, livestock are constantly being reshuffled, with only healthy lactating cows kept in Islamabad.

The dairy, as it was initially envisioned, was to supplement income the partners earned from their principal jobs. Increasing labor demands, however, required one partner to leave his government job to manage the enterprise’s various operations.

Younger relatives from the villages have also been brought to Islamabad for additional

labor.

The NIH dairy is a family-owned and operated business. Like other family

businesses of South Asia, strong social norms dictate that it function largely without

benefit of financial records. Keeping records suggests a lack of faith in the reliability

and trustworthiness of one’s partner. The negative evaluation of one’s honor implied by

record keeping would be especially egregious among close relatives where the norm of

generalized reciprocity among "brothers" dictates that goods and valuables circulate

freely.

Kinship ties were important in the founding of the dairy (see Figure 11). As in

the previous two case studies, all six partners belong to the Gujar biraderi. Nonetheless,

only five of the six partners have demonstrable genealogical ties. And of these only two

are actual brothers. The recognition of the true nature of these genealogical ties was

unexpected as I had been told initially that all six owners were brothers. Also, as is the

case with the previous groups, the selection of different focal activity would entail the

cooperation of different set of kin. 338

û û o û û

r aOO û Aô OOûô o

KEY O - female û - maie ▲ - milkman

Figure 11, Kinship of NIH Dairy Kindred Group 339 Discussion

The material introduced in these case studies emphasizes the need to recognize that the

Gujars engage in a large range of focal activities. The kin relations that are involved in these various social, economic, and political functions vary in relation to the nature of the focal activity. It is therefore the focal activity in which the kin group is engaged, rather than the formal principles of kinship, that provides the organizational basis for corporate activity. In effect, the principles of kinship are not antecedent to social organization. Rather, they are one of many factors that inform, define, and lend

meaning and substance to the ethnic social practices in which the Gujars engage. The

choice of materials that were introduced in the previous section was to a large extent

determined by my analytical interests and the quality and quantity of the data. That is

to say, that a chzuige in focus to another focal activity-say marital arrangements—would

have highlighted other kin relations while downplaying those introduced here.

Nonetheless, the case material says something about the nature, type, and extent

of the "adjustments" that have occurred as the Gujar biraderi adapts to the urban social

life of Islamabad. It is to an examination of the processes of accommodation, adaptation,

and coaptation that I now turn.’

’ I should note one difference between the data I use for this analysis and the descriptive data I had introduced in the previous case studies. The data on which the economic analysis is based are derived from my survey of eleven Gujars maulvi residential groups. Of these eleven, only five maulvis are bom fide members of the rector’s biraderi kindred. Although I interviewed nine maulvis, I was able to survey only five of the maulvis mentioned in the case study. The reason for the absence of these four maulvis from this economic analysis was the emerging perception shared by some members of this segment of the community that I was going to "give a news conference." This emerging perception was indeed touched 340 Forms of Economic Organization and Integration

In terms of their economic organizations, regional differences in income were recorded among the three kin groups. At Rps. 2669 per month the urban dairy has the highest family income.* This is followed by the NIH kin group’s average family income of Rps. 2588 per month. Conversely, the maulvis, at a family income of Rps. 1303 per month, have the lowest family income of all three groups.’

These figures, however, are slightly misleading in that family income represents the total income of all employed residential group members. The urban kin group at 2.6 employees per residential group also happens to have highest number of employed residential group members. This contrasts with the 2 employees per residential group for the NIH kin group, and the 1.3 employees per residential group that was recorded for the maulvis.

The average number of genealogically related residential group members is 8.57 for the urban dairy group, 5.667 for the NIH Gujars, and 5.09 for the Gujar maulvis.

Thus, per capita monthly income of genealogically related residential group members is

Rps. 305 for the urban kin group, Rps. 552.5 for the NIH kin group, and Rps. 494.4 for the maulvis.

off in part by the very process of surveying the community. Eliciting economic, social and other more personal information in a systematic format and then recording this information on a form seemed to upend the delicate balance I had been attempting to achieve.

* In 1986, Rps. 16.5 equalled 1 U.S. dollar.

’ As used in this context "family" refers to all relatives, employed or otherwise, living at the residence of the respondent at the time of the interview. 341 With an average dependency ratio of .2897, the partners of the G-6 dairy support the largest number of dependents per employee.*® The NIH dairy group at .4464 has the second highest dependency ratio. The maulvis' dependency ratio of .5193 indicates that this group supports the fewest number of dependents per employee.

The differences among these various economic measures are suggestive of the regionally based economic differences that exist within the larger Gujar community of

Islamabad. The maulvis’ high dependency ratio coupled with their low family income are consonant with the economic profile one would expect for a male-dominated rural to urban labor migrant stream. While the maulvis have a high dependency ratio, (i.e., they support the fewest dependents) they score in the mid-range for average income per family member and are the lowest for family income per residential group. The financial circumstances of the urban dairy group, on the other hand, are affected by their demographic profile. Although they have the highest family income, the money is spent on the largest number of dependents with their family size again a artifact of the group’s more advanced age. For both dependency ratios and family income the NTH kin group falls between the other two groups. Their per capita income, however, is the highest of the three groups.

*® Yanagisako (1979:167) defines dependency ratio as "the number of consumers divided by the number of workers." While the image this definition invokes of a worker figuratively supporting and at the same time burdened by the demands of a burgeoning Third World population is intuitively attractive it is in actuality exceedingly difficult to use. Although the difference between four dependents supported by two workers as opposed to one is easily conceptualized this is not so when comparing the ratios say of 5:2 and 7:3. For this reason, I have inverted the ratio with die number of workers divided by the number of dependents. This provides a proportional statement that is more amenable to statistical manipulation. 342 Each case study reveals different aspects of the nature of the Gujar integration into the socio-economic organization of Islamabad’s urban society. Sufi Ahmad, one of the founding partners of the NIH dairy, is employed in the National Institute of Health.

In addition to the earnings from his full-time employment and the money he makes at the dairy, extra income is earned from selling excess milk to non-landowning Gujars in

Islamabad. The money he earns from these various ventures is "invested" in a range of other activities, some of which provide still further profits. Some money is remitted directly to village relatives who oversee the land and livestock of which Sufi Ahmad is part owner. These relatives are also recompensed for the services they provide the

Islamabad dairy. In addition to the dairy farm and his modest house, Sufi Ahmad is part owner of a rental property in Rawalpindi. The patterns of Sufi Ahmad’s business activities support the general observation that Punjabi Gujars are exploiting the economic possibilities presented by Islamabad’s expanding marketplace.

Conversely, data on the maulvis are indicative of the ways in which their cultural traditions combine with their economic conditions and the lineal growth pattern of

Islamabad. Of the three kin groups (and of the community in general), the Gujar maulvis are the least residentially localized. Indeed, each of the eleven maulvis that appeared on the list provided by the Maulana, live in different sectors. This residential pattern reflects the maulvis’ ongoing integration into the developing occupational and residential structure of the city: As a sector is completed, new positions in local mosques become available. 343 The relative economic deprivation of the Gujar Imams reveals another aspect of the nature of the Gujars’ integration into Islamabad’s urban society. While they are poor, as Muslim clerics they enjoy a measure of status and respect within the society in general, and the community in particular. In this it is religiosity, rather than wealth, that determines the individual’s social status.

It is also critical to recognize the ways in which such social forms of integration complement and gain further support from the government’s program of Islamization.

In this respect, the Gujar Imams achieve a measure of respect that is denied to the dairy groups, especially the NIH dairy that is located in Islamabad’s rural area rather than within the "urban" Islamabad."

Social Practices of Association and Integration

These case histories are instructive as to the ways in which urbanization influences the nature and organization of social relationships. The case study materials indicate that genealogy and geography play mutually reinforcing roles in the social organization of the kin groups. The members of each group trace their ancestry to the same region of the country. However, in terms of kinship, some group members were unable to demonstrate the existence of the social ties that linked group members. Indeed, the "kin" engaged in these various economic activities not infrequently include representatives from two or more clans. Moreover, many male informants could not remember their clan name, frequently having to seek out their (female) relatives for such information. In

" Metropolitan "Islamabad" consists of two separate areas, "urban" Islamabad (consisting of the residential sectors, the administrative sector, and so forth) and "rural" Islamabad (comprising the National Park and other surrounding green areas). 344 each case, however, the kin groups consist of Gujars who are of the same regional background. Moreover, they also claim to be related through some distant, but now forgotten ancestor.

Pronounced organizational flexibility is another attribute of these kin groups. No single criterion alone determines group membership. Whereas some non-specified relatives are included in these groups, other close relatives are not. Moreover, the boundaries of these kin groups shift in accordance with the focal activities in which individual members are involved.

The difficulty that respondents had in specifying the intermediary kin ties that link them to other members of the kin group poses a potential problem for the Gujars; Social groups founded exclusively on the basis of demonstrable kin ties would be too small to accommodate the multitudinous and diverse demands and needs of the community. The fictive nature of biraderi-based kin ties, however, provides a ready answer to this potential difficulty. The materials presented in the case studies draw our attention to the fact that all three groups include individuals who genealogical relationship to other group members was unclear. The Gujars who operate the NIH dairy are particularly illustrative of the ways in which fictive kin ties integrate individuals into the larger community.

Initially I was told that the dairy had been founded by six "brothers." An inspection of the kinship chart for this group (Figure 11) suggests this is not so. Of the six partners only two are indeed brothers. Moreover, although it was known that some generations past there was a common ancestral tie, the exact genealogical relationship to one of the

remaining four partners could not be specified. In such cases, then, fictive kin ties 345 to incorporate (or perhaps reincorporate) individuals into a more closely knit and cohesive social group. The practices of fictive kinship are therefore important as they allow individuals and groups to bring kinship into conformity with the social and economic realities of everyday life.

Clearly, however, there is more to these fictive kin terms than a simple case of expediency. These kin terms, in their non-fictive sense, refer to specific sets of relatives and, thus, define more or less a kinship based system of rights and responsibilities. The fictive aspect of these terms are emphasized in those instances where genealogical relatedness is not demonstrable, but where specific rights and responsibilities are nonetheless implied. Thus, Sufi Ahmad refers to his business partners as bhai, although they are not his real brothers. In this, then, he is using the term in its fictive sense.

Similarly, the non-Gujar (Rajput) land speculator from whom Sufi Ahmad and his five

"brothers" had purchased the land for their dairy is referred to by all partners as bhai.

In this instance too, bhai is used in its fictive sense.

In spite of the connotative similarity, however, the actual meanings and associated sentiments and feelings assigned to the term differ in relation to changes in context and

meaning. The six partners are not brothers, but they are biraderi. The social tie created

by this fictive kin term among the partners serves to reinforce and play upon the feelings,

sentiments and beliefs associated with the putative agnatic kin ties linking all Gujars.

Conversely, fictive kin terms do not have the same effect in the absence of a shared

biraderi identity. In these instances, the social tie constructed by a fictive kin term

stands alone, and is itself in need of reinforcement. 346 Social unity among group members is therefore not determined exclusively on the basis of the community’s ability to demonstrate genealogical relatedness. Rather, it is achieved as much by the a prior assumption that members of the biraderi are "brothers" first, and then, and only then, descendants of an apical ancestor. Conceptually foregrounding fictive fraternal ties averts the fissionary pressures that inhere to shallow family genealogies. At the same time, it introduces an element of social flexibility that allows personal preference, intention, and individual desire to play a far greater role in determining the organizational nature of social relationships than might otherwise be the case.

As mentioned previously, these semantic nuances influence the formulation and implementation of marital strategies. As shared biraderi affiliation prefigures those social ties based on fictive kinship, Gujars do not need to reinforce kin ties through the creation of marital alliances. Indeed, the marital data analyzed in a previous section of this chapter suggests that the shift towards lineal endogamy within the community is at least in part made possible by the social preexistence of the Gujar biraderi.

The fictive nature of kinship reckoning within the Gujar biraderi creates an conceptual environment of indeterminacy and ambiguity that indelibly influences the

definitions of group morphology. As such, social unity may ultimately rest on one or

more of a large number of possible conceptual bases. To summarize, in an analytical

sense, kinship is reckoned on the basis of an ego-centered perspective, with relatives

categorized according to their social distance. The most exclusive domain of kinship is 347 that of the immediate family." When "biraderi" is used in to refer to this group of kin, it connotes the agnatic and affinal relatives who are now or have been in the past part of the nuclear, joint, or extended family. This kin grouping is the locus of domestic life and the primary unit of consumption. It therefore serves as the most fundamental and dependable source of economic, political, and social support.

At a more inclusive level, "biraderi" refers to a kindred group comprised of consanguines, affines, and fictive kin who share descent from a putative founding ancestor. Within these groups, genealogical ties are blurred, imprecise, and frequently fictive. At the edge of this groups, exact relationships are lost to memory, and individuals are merged imperceptibly into the third category of kin, that of the categorical biraderi."

As the discussion of the case studies suggests, the "biraderi kindred groups" are the linchpins of community organization. They bridge the conceptual space that exists between demonstrable family relatives and fictive and unknown kin of the more inclusive

" The description of the Gujars’ social organization differs from that of Hamza Alavi (1971, 1976) and Wakil (1972) who argue that biraderi social organization consists of four genealogical spheres: (1) the biraderi of category, (2) the regionally-based biraderi of recognition, (3) the biraderi of participation, and (4) the residentially localized biraderi.

" By this discussion 1 do not mean to imply that biraderi affiliation is the sole and exclusive criteria used in determining group membership. Gujars are not naive as to the political, social and economic realities of their lives. They are aware of the fact that their relatives, no matter how broadly defined, are often incapable of providing all the services and support they may require. Thus, Gujars often include non-Gujars in their circle of friends. Most, if not all social networks thus consist of a mix of Gujar and non- Gujar. Biraderi affiliation is thus the most prominent criteria, among many, for determining group membership. 348 categorical biraderi. As the case studies further indicate, they are frequently serve as the units of economic cooperation within the community.

Visiting and the Importance of Social Networks

Visiting plays an important role in the formation and maintenance of these urban biraderi kindreds. Given the economic importance of these social ties it is not unexpected that the highest frequency of visiting tends to occur among friends and family who are economically interdependent. Visiting is also important, however, for establishing new social relationships. At least initially, the economic aspects of new social ties are latent, or are at least not symbolically recognized.

An analysis of visiting at Sufi Ahmad’s dairy exemplifies the social dimensions of this strategy as they exist in their latent stage. At the dairy farm there is a constant flow of family and friends with the length of a visit varying widely. Some guests stop by for a brief chat and a cup of tea. Other guests, however, stay longer and have become more or less permanent residents. For example, during the seven months I conducted research at the farm, there was a young man from the village boarding with

Ahmad’s family. The young man was to continue to live at the dairy until he found other work and more permanent living arrangements.

In addition to its social role, visiting is also plays a critical role in the community’s political life. Within the community, a person’s political worth is demonstrated as much by the size of one’s retinue of dependents as it is by one’s wealth and material possessions. As such, for those who wish to gain the respect and status of the community, it is necessary to have a large network of contacts. An experience I had 349 while in the field is suggestive of the degree to which the extent of a social network determines one’s political worth. On this occasion I had the opportunity to drive three men to their home village south of Gujranwala. Accompanying me on the trip was

Mohammad Arshad, a young man of about 25 years of age.

Mohammad is widely known throughout the community as a "very active member of the biraderi." Although we had established a tie of friendship and comradeship, I had not been able to determine what made Mohammad a "very active member of the biraderi." When he was not working, I could generally rely on finding Mohammad at the Rawalpindi office of the Gujar Youth Forum, a "young man’s" Gujar ethnic association of Rawalpindi and Islamabad. Mohammad did not hold an association office nor did he intend to run for one in the future. Further, neither the association in general, nor Mohammad in particular were engaged in any major fund raising drive, charitable events, or social activities. Moreover, Mohammad was not a member of the wealthy or elite classes of Islamabad, although he maintained close contact with them. Before taking the trip, 1 had been somewhat perplexed as to what constituted the basis of his reputation.

He was a young man, was unmarried, had no children, and belonged to the city’s lower- middle class.

It was during the trip to Gujranwala, that I was to realize that Mohammad’s reputation was based at least in part on the extent of his contact network. It seemed that

Mohammad was able to identify at least one prominent Gujar who lived in every village through which we passed. In addition, he was also able to provide some basic biographical data (age, office or posting, family connections and so forth) on the 350 prominent Gujars located in a particular village. The long list of names he supplied- each one invariably prefaced with "you have to meet"-was indicative of a rather remarkable memory.*^

Such information, however, is of limited use if it is not put to the service of creating and sustaining social relationships. Mohammad’s job as a tax assessor provides him with the freedom to circulate widely within the community and to manage his contact network. As it was that I too was developing my own social network, although for quite different purposes, it was not an uncommon event for me to call on a Gujar only to find

Mohammad was there, or that he had just left. By these repeated visits, Mohammad converts his personal knowledge into culturally legitimated social and political capital.

While Mohammad may be somewhat atypical as to the amount of energy and interest he expends in this effort, the fact that he is considered by many Gujars as "very active" in the affairs of the biraderi suggest that his behavior is not considered outside the community’s accepted social norms. Indeed, his activities typify perhaps to an exaggerated degree, a widespread social practice based on a particular understanding of the nature of society and social relations.

" I discovered later that Muhammad’s extensive storehouse of knowledge was based on rote memorization. During a visit to the Rawalpindi office of the Gujar Youth Forum, I happen to find Muhammad busy setting pictures of prominent Gujars into a photograph album. It seems that Muhammad and his friends (his "lieutenants" as he referred to them) visit prominent Gujars throughout the country with the intent of taking their picture and recording some basic biographical information. Those data not directly gathered by Muhammad are forwarded to him by his assistants. Muhammad, in turn transcribes the biographical data onto the reverse side of the picture. He then proceeds to commit to memory both the picture and its associated biographical data. In effect, the entire process is reduced quite literally to an exercise in memorizing flash cards. 351 Visiting is thus important for a number of reasons. First, the friendships that develop out of these initial contacts often become sources of deep emotional attachment and satisfaction. As such, friendship exists over and above the proximate material concerns. Related to this, and deriving its symbolic resonance from it, is the idea that all important economic transactions be enmeshed in the idiom of friendship and camaraderie. To this day, even within the Islamabad’s modem urban context, most major purchases-especially those between families-are defined as a social event rather than as an economic transaction. A meal or at least a serving of tea and cookies accompany virtually every such transaction. Third, visiting biraderi relatives establishes

social relationships that may prove to be economically and politically useful at some later point in time. Fourth, through repeated visits, an individual maintains a support network

that can be called on for aid and assistance during times of need or crisis.

The ties of friendship (and patronage) that develop out of such activities cut across

regional, sub-cultural, and class boundaries. By his own admission, Mohammad is more

likely to cultivate a friendship with a Gujar from a different region of Pakistan than he

is to befriend a non-Gujar who may, nonetheless, share a similar socio-cultural

background. The social networks so created therefore play a critical role in facilitating

the nature of the Gujars’ engagement with Islamabad. It is through such social ties that

individuals gain access to economic and political resources. But visiting is also liable to

create the conditions necessary for the development of hierarchical social relations. It

is on the basis of the favors conferred on such ties that the Gujar builds a reputation 352 within the community. And it is through the accumulation of prestige that the egalitarian friendships are transformed into those of patron and client.

Prestige and Status: "Notability" as a Site of Power

Field observations suggest that the return on the investment in developing a widely ramified social network frequently takes the form of the intangible but highly valued cultural ideal of izzat (honor),That is to say, that a patron’s honor is enhanced with every request acknowledged and each favor granted.'* Nonetheless, while such acts of intercession are necessary to earn izzat, they are alone insufficient as a means to earn status and respect within the community. To paraphrase Orwell, "All favors are created equal, but some are more equal than others." Favors bestowed upon close family members, for example, do little to enhance one’s prestige. Strong cultural norms prescribe the support of close relatives, especially in times of need or crisis. Indeed, those who do not do so are looked down upon.

The favors Maulana Abdul Rasheed bestows upon his close family members, because they are expected, do not therefore draw the attention of the larger community.

Rather, his reputation rests on the favors he has provided dependents from outside this

The role of izzat in South Asian and the Middle Eastern societies has attracted much attention in the literature (see, e.g., Peristany 1965; Gilmore 1987 for the Middle East; and Mandelbaum 1988 for South Asia).

'* Hamza Alavi (1971:117) has made a similar observation about the role of these achieved criteria in the determination of community leaders in rural areas. He notes that "The members of the panchayat (lineage, not village council) are not elected, and are not identified purely by ascription. They emerge as effective leaders in the course of time by virtue of their participation in the affairs of the lineage and of other members’ tacit recognition of their role." 353 circle of close kin such as, for example, the maulvis of Islamabad. The composition of

Maulana Abdul Rasheed’s dependency group is suggestive of the criteria used to determine who shall receive a favor (see Spaulding 1987). At the top of the list are those close relatives who are from the rector’s home town or adjacent villages. More distant relatives from villages of the same or nearby areas follow closely behind. At a somewhat greater distance from the top of the list are those Gujars from other regions of the country.

Although its surface manifestations may seem little more than a system of descent reckoning writ large, the priority list is embedded within a culturally specific context that informs and justifies the patron’s actions. These contextual considerations result in many exceptions to the expected pattern of favoritism. On occasion non-Gujars are promoted to the top of the list either to repay or to create a political debt. Candidate qualifications and capabilities are also weighed by Maulana Abdul Rasheed. Assignment to an urban mosque, where many parishioners are literate and well versed in Islamic doctrine and law, imposes certain expectations that may be absent or muted in rural settings. Not only must the Imam be religiously knowledgeable, but he must also demonstrate competence in presenting the practice of Islam in a clear, coherent, and persuasive

fashion. This is an important qualification that has not escaped the notice of the

Maulana. While some of the maulvis seem to be slightly deficient in their knowledge

and capabilities, my impression was that overall most were well informed and highly

motivated. Personality traits as they influence the compatibility of teacher and student 354 are still other factors influencing the dispensation of favors: Even among close family members personality differences may give rise to friction.

The nature of the relationship of patrons to local, regional, and national communications systems is still another influence informing the nature of Gujar patronage. As the Maulana once suggested, if they are not to have a short political life, national politicians must patronize individuals from a large number of biraderis.

Although contemporary population counts are unavailable, it is widely known that there is no single majority biraderi in Pakistan. Thus, overt biraderi favoritism would invariably draw the attention of the national media and thus alienate and galvanize a formidable opposition force. As a consequence, politicians dispense their political patronage judiciously and, although a large percentage of political favors are earmarked for one’s own biraderi, some patronage is set aside for the benefit of other biraderis.

As a private citizen, a different set of considerations inform a patron’s decision-

making processes. Removed from public scrutiny, patron’s are able to favor their

relatives over the members of other biraderis. These conflicting considerations are

reflected in the pattern of Maulana Abdul Rasheed’s patronage. As a Member of the

National Assembly and later as a Senator, the rector’s reputation as a man of honor

transcended the boundaries of biraderi and locality. His presence at the center of

national politics dictated that he appear impartial in dispensing government favors.

Maulana Abdul Rasheed acknowledges that while Gujars received the lion’s share of the

favors he conferred during his time in office, a fair number of non-Gujars also benefitted

from his intercession and aid. As a private citizen the rector exercises greater discretion 355 in the selection of his clients. Consequently, he has tipped the balance of favors in the direction of the Gujars. For example, the student body at the Rawalpindi madrassa consists almost exclusively of Gujars from northern Pakistan.

Biraderi-based kin ties also constitute the means of communication necessary to the successful circulation of gossip. The distribution of favors among an unrelated and socio-economically or geographically dispersed clientele would dilute the effects such acts of beneficence might otherwise have on reputation and status. In the absence of such ties, the circulation of favorable gossip would be impeded. The nature of kin ties within the biraderi is therefore critical to understanding the patterning of patronage within the community.

But biraderi kindred are more than a preexistent communication network committed to gathering, organizing, and disseminating gossip. Acts of favoritism in and of themselves have the effect of defining the social morphology of the group. In other words, the simple act of selecting a client has the concomitant effect of denoting the recipient of one’s favors as a member of a kindred group.

Egalitarianism and Hierarchy: Competing Forms of Community Integration

As the material discussed above indicates, the nature of the social relations that obtain within the biraderi kindreds range rather widely. In the urban dairy, power and

authority are rather diffuse entities. The partners consider themselves equals and refer

to each other as bhai. So doing, foregrounds the ideology of biraderi egalitarianism and

friendship. As noted above, the partners’ financial investment is modest and their

commitment to the success of the business subdued. As a consequence there is very little 356 economic interdependency among group members. Moreover, for this group, economic cooperation does not carry overtones of competition for limited resources. The lack of competition in concert with the economic organization of the business promotes balanced reciprocal social relations among group members.

The social organization of NIH dairy is similar to that of the uiban dairy. The founding of the dairy suggests that at least initially, none of the founders enjoyed much social preeminence over the other partners. As mentioned previously, the six partners had contributed equal amounts of money in order to build the first two cattle sheds. The economic history of the dairy business is suggestive of the conflicts that arise as different sets of ideals vie for symbolic dominance. Biraderi relatives are considered by many to make the best business partners because they are trustworthy and reliable, share similar customs and traditions, and are able to interact in a congenial and magnanimous fashion.

The ethos of brotherhood and egalitarianism has been instrumental in maintaining a at least a modicum of economic interdependence among the partners. Each partner’s share of the start-up capital invested as well as the additional capital, time, and effort needed to make the business a success has never been calculated. To ask for such an audit of the group’s assets would risk damaging irrevocably the ties of "brotherhood" that link these partners. Indeed, asking for such an accounting would almost inevitably lead to this break. It is almost impossible that two or more partners could arrive amicably at an agreed upon figure in the atmosphere of tension such a request would generate.

The rapidity of the building process (all six sheds were built within four years), however, indicates, the partners’ desire to transcend the social restrictions inherent to 357 their economic interdependence. Indeed, the dairy’s economic success seems to have begun to shift social relations from an egalitarian basis to a more hierarchical arrangement. This change has shaded the social relations among the partners.

The appearance of economic stratification within the collateral group has enunciated a change in the character of the social relations among the parmers.

Differential economic success implies that the other "brothers" are subservient to and dependent upon the largess of the more successftil partners. In the case of the dairy, the partners are, therefore, caught between the ethos of egalitarianism and trustworthiness

associated with the idiom of "brotherhood" on the one side and the non-egalitarian

relations that economic interdependence promotes on the other.

In contrast, within a patron-dominated kin group such as the maulvis, status

differentials assume a more central role in the organizational definition of the group.

That is to say, community notables serve as organizational linchpins in patron-dominated

kin groups. In return for the granting of favors, patrons expect to receive the respect,

deference, and loyalty of their clients. The organization of these kin groups thus

resembles more closely a faction than it does an egalitarian kin group. Yet, even here,

the organizational strength of these factions are mediated by the conceptual and social

context of the local community.

Of the three kin groups, status differentials are, of course, most pronounced

among the maulvis. Maulana Abdul Rasheed commands the respect of his clients and

the larger Gujar community. His prestige is continually revalidated by the honorifics

with which he is addressed, the deferential behavior of his subordinates, as well as by 3 5 8 the flattering stories about him that circulate within the larger community. Maulana

Abdul Rasheed’s prestige, however, does not necessarily translate into absolute control of the actions and activities of his dependents.

Instead, his dependents exercise a fair amount of discretion in pursuing their own individual career goals. For example, for reasons that were never made clear to me one of the Gujar maulvis apparently severed his relationship to the Maulana. Yet, he had managed to keep his position as the head Imam at the Class V community mosque located in F-6. It is obvious then, that the Maulana lacks complete control over his former students. This is in large part reflective of the nature of the political and economic contexts within which the rector dispenses his patronage. To do so, the rector must work through the intermediary bureaucracy of the Auqaf Department. This serves to delineate the limits of the rector’s ability to discipline his clients. While he has many inducements to promote compliance with his wishes among his dependents (e.g., free housing, telephone service, arranging for a State-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca), he is

relatively short-handed in the options he has by which to punish transgressors. Aside

from group ostracism, which a break with one’s patron not only implies, but indeed

achieves, there are relatively few sanctions the rector can invoke to ensure the

compliance of his clients.

To force a maulvi to resign, however, is considered something of a last resort.

Vast amounts of political capital would have to be expended in order to have the

labyrinthine bureaucracy of the Auqaf Department remove the maulvi from his position,

especially if he is well-liked by the local parishioners. Moreover, such an act would mar 359 the rector’s reputation. Community members would see such an act not as a sign of strength but rather of weakness. Many Gujars would question the rector’s authority and ability to control his clients. Moreover, as community members suggested, such an act would be politically unpopular as it would give an unfavorable impression to the larger non-Gujar community. In this regard, the Gujars are like most ethnic minorities in that they prefer not to publicize community dissension and discord.

In those instances when a patron exercises complete and total control over the source of his patronage, his clients are by definition more directly dependent on him.

They are therefore, more liable to conform to his wishes. The relative differences in the ability of a patron to regulate a dependent’s activities became apparent during the course of the fieldwork. The success I had in interviewing the Gujar maulvis contrasts sharply with my experiences in trying to interview the employees of a privately owned Gujar bakery located in G-7. I was told by other community members, that most of the employees were Gujars who had been brought to Islamabad by the brothers who owned the bakery. Moreover, they lived in a hostel located on the second floor of the bakery and also owned by the brothers. For whatever reason, the owners of the bakery had prohibited their dependents from speaking to me. The patron’s control of his clients was complete and absolute: In spite of repeated attempts, I was never once able to interview a single Gujar who worked at the bakery. Although I was never able to document it, one

can surmise that the implied or even stated threat of dismissal from work was a sufficient

deterrent to ensure that the employees would not allow themselves to be interviewed.

Conversely, it seems that I was able to conduct research among the Gujar maulvis of 360 Islamabad because Maulana Abdul Rasheed, had he wanted to, would have been unable to prohibit his students from being interviewed by me.”

In summation, although people indeed seek out relatives in order to augment their wealth and political power, this is not the only reason that cooperation occurs among biraderi friends. The quest for social recognition and prestige is of equal or greater force than the acquisition of rewards financial or otherwise that group participation may confer.

The recognition and prestige accruing to an individual is mediated by the organization of the kin group which is itself influenced by such exogenous variables as age, access to power, wealth, and so forth. In those instances where group members share equally in

the determination of group goals, are responsible for the activities and actions of all

members, and equally divide the spoils of their labor, rank and prestige differentials are

less pronounced and, I should add, more openly contested.

The Giyar Biraderi Anjumansz Ethnic Associations as Sites of Integration

Similar observations regarding the conflicting ideologies of egalitarianism and

hierarchy can be made about the organizational structures of the Gujar biraderi

associations of Islamabad and Rawalpindi. At the time of the fieldwork, there were no

fewer than six different associations with chapter offices located either in Islamabad or

Rawalpindi. In similar fashion to the ways in which kinship served to integrate the

members of the case studies, these various associations draw upon the idiom of

” I should note that although Maulana Abdul Rasheed did not directly intervene on my behalf, he was, nonetheless, favorably deposed to the purposes of my research. 361 brotherhood to justify their existence, to recruit members, and to solidify their position within the Gujar community in particular and the larger society in general."

A key component in this effort to tie the local community to the larger national biraderi are the large variety of published materials—pamphlets, newsletters, posters, telephone directories and so forth-that circulate widely within the community. The various ethnic newsletters are particularly instructive as to what issues are considered important to the community, or at least to those who contribute the funds which make their publication possible. The articles appearing in these newsletters—often published under pseudonyms-are written in an editorial style. They cover topics such as Gujar history, the status of Gujar employment (especially in the federal bureaucracy), the need for higher levels of education, the role of the Gujars in state building and so forth. They also include commentaries on important current events. Invariably, these newsletters highlight the good deeds of the community’s elite benefactors.

In similar fashion to role gossip plays within the kindred groups, the reporting of the good deeds of the community’s various patrons serve to demonstrate the extent to which leaders actively participate in the affairs of the biraderi. As such it verifies their social worth and their right to lead. In this, numbers are important-how much money was donated to a charitable (Gujar) cause, how many trips a person had made to Mecca and the Middle East, and so forth. These statistics are essential for the determination of a person’s social value, of a person’s izzat.

" Bhatt (1980:41) and Kolenda (1985) note similar processes of association occurring in India among both Hindus and Muslims. 362 Such ethnic publications are also serve as a means whereby lower status Gujars are able to identify potential benefactors within the community. In this, they draw the same idioms of biraderi kinship that are employed by the members of the various kindred groups discussed in the case studies. A major difference is that these printed materials

circulate among a much wider audience. They are thus an element in the means by

which the local community is integrated into the larger national biraderi community. A

telephone directory published by the Gujar Literary Club is especially instructive on this

point. It reads literally as an index of prominent Gujars who might potentially provide

for the specific needs of the community. In addition to a listing of names and telephone

numbers, the directory also includes the profession and current occupation of prominent

Gujars. What is significant about the lists appearing in the directory is that it includes

Gujars who live throughout Pakistan as well as in foreign countries.

By addressing the needs of the community, by providing a forum for the display

of status and presüge, and by giving voice to various interpretations of Gujar ethnicity,

these ethnic associations make use of a variety of metonymic and practical devices to link

the local community with Islamabad’s developing role in the world’s political economy.

The community, however, is not brought into relation with these higher levels of

integration as some seamless whole. Rather, the nature of the community’s integration

is informed by the historically based and contextually mediated nature of ethnic identity

and social association that define Gujar ethnicity within Islamabad. That is to say, that

as migration has brought together in Islamabad a congeries of regionally differentiated 363 social groups, so too do these ethnic associations and their various publications reflect the inchoate, but putatively unified nature of Gujar ethnicity and ethnic identity. CHAPTER X m

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

I went to Pakistan equipped with a research strategy designed to examine the interaction of ethnicity and migration in Pakistan’s planned, modernist capital city (Spaulding 1994:10).

I left Pakistan eleven months later girded with the materials I had collected during the time, knowing that there existed within these data a great deal of inconsistency and contradiction (Spaulding 1994:34).

This dissertation has focused on ethnic identity formation processes among the Gujars’ of Islamabad. As such it has sought to identify, describe, and analyze the processes of ethnic identity formation in a complex society. In order to develop an understanding of the ways in which the Gujars’ ethnic identities are created and deployed in Islamabad’s urban context required the discussion to range widely across time, space, and disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, it has discussed topics and raised issues relating to the social processes of conversion, the social impact of Islam, the nature and practices of British imperialism and colonial rule, the practices, principles, and ideologies of urban planning, the relationship of demographic variation to ethnic identity, the practices of subversion, compliance, and subjugation, and the nature of ethnic forms of marriage, kinship, and association. The research problem-to investigate how ethnicity is expressed and influenced in a planned modernist capital-occasioned the need for casting such a wide

364 365 net. More importantly, it also created the need to evaluate traditional theoretical treatments of ethnicity and ethnic identity formation.

Concluding Remarks

Islamabad presents an ideal setting in which to assess the applicability of the conventional theoretical treatments of ethnicity. As an urban context, Islamabad was intended to eradicate primordial forms of social identity. In their place, the city was further designed

to implant and consolidate a national identity. Islamabad thus represents in a material

microcosm the larger theoretical confrontation between the two major theoretical

paradigms of ethnic studies-the primordialist and circumstantialist schools of thought

(see Chapter 2).

The findings of the research indicated that Islamabad’s political agenda exerts a

profound impact of Gujar ethnicity. The context of the city is a pervasive influence that

lends structure to the Gujars’ settlement patterns, enhances and accents class differences,

organizes their economic relationships, gives geographic expression to their ethnic social

ties, influences the substance and implications of their ethnic identity definitions and so

forth.

Nonetheless, the city is not determinative of Gujar ethnicity. Indeed, if it were,

then it would be impossible to speak of Gujar ethnicity in the first place. This

dissertation has instead documented the historical influences that have carried over and

entered into the local definitions of the Gujars’ ethnic identities: Gujar settlement

patterns, the class differences which obtain within the community, the form and structure 366 of their ethnic forms of association and so forth all reveal the extent to which the "past is present" (Webber 1991) in the community’s expressions of Gujar ethnicity.

To adopt the terminology of the hard sciences, the ethnic experiences of the

Gujars in Islamabad therefore falsifies both the circumstantialist and primordialist paradigms. While it has been transformed by the urban context of Islamabad, Gujar ethnicity continues to inform the lives and experiences of community members. The analysis has thus remained consistent in that it has adopted as an axiom the proposition that the inherent essentialism of both the circumstantialist and primordialist paradigms render them particularly unproductive for understanding and explicating the nature and

range of diversity in social forms and ethnic identities that are extant within the urban

community.

In place of these two paradigms the dissertation, has sought by invoking the

Euclidean trope of the "site," to highlight the ways in which cultural aesthetics and social

power mediate between history and context. In relation to aesthetics it endeavored to

explicate the historical and contextual basis which determine: (1) the credibility of an

ethnic identity as a reading of history; (2) its relevance to and practicality within the

larger cultural and political context; and (3) the degree to which it is consonant with tlie

perspectives and experiences of individual community members. In regard to the nature

of social power the dissertation has similarly investigated the historical basis and

contemporary understandings of the nature of power, documented who has it, and how

they got it, and, having once obtained it, how they have gone about augmenting, or

retaining it. 367 The genesis of this analytical model can be traced ultimately to an attempt to reason through and arrive at a point that reconciled my views of the anthropological mission, on the one hand, and the idea of ethnic incongruity, on the other hand.

Underpinning the analysis, and licensing the particular mode of anthropological analysis pursued in the dissertation, is a specific view of the ontological nature of the people who have constituted the subject of study-the Gujars of Islamabad.

The Gujars’ ethnic identities, the egalitarian society they suggest, give voice to differentially shared and particularistic interpretations, while implying the existence of a uniform, non-differentiated ethnic space. As they slide effortlessly and imperceptibly between the particular and universal, and as the ethnic identities they present change in relation to contextual variation, the Gujars exhibit little dissonance. In this the Gujars’ exhibit the human capability to sustain and express divergent, changing, and ambiguous ideas, beliefs, and concepts. It is in developing an understanding of the Gujars’ human nature as it facilitates their ethnic practices wherein lies perhaps the greatest lessons of

Gujar ethnicity.

The Gujars share with all humans an ability to conceptualize and invest emotionally in what are believed to be distinct and putatively complete social reference groups. In doing so, the Gujars project an "illusion of wholeness" (Fernandez 1986; the quote is from Ewing 1990) onto what is, as this dissertation has documented, a contradictory, fragmented, and inchoate ethnic identity. However, it is not the

recognition of this capability alone that constitutes the greatest challenge that Gujar

ethnicity poses for traditional theoretical treatments. Rather, what is central is that the 368 Gujars are able to navigate through the maze of contradictory and conflicting images and associations that constitute their collective ethnic identities without experiencing what

Leon Festinger (1957) has referred to as "cognitive dissonance."

It is, consequently, suggested here that through the use of a variety of psycho- cognitive processes (e.g., sublimation), the Gujars’ are able to retain and act in accord with constellations of ideas that when contra-posed are found to be inconsistent,

incongruous, and conflictive. From the vantage provided by this inherently evolutionary

perspective, it also becomes possible to assert further that the Gujars are able to

assimilate beliefs, ideas, and concepts that are inherently conflicting without necessarily

having to resolve their inherent contradictions. That is to say, that the contradictions of

Gujar ethnicity--of which the Gujars are fully cognizant--do not psychologically

immobilize them. Instead, the Gujars, rather that sinking into a quagmire of endless

deliberation, are able, as the colloquial expression goes, "to get on with their lives."

Directions for Future Research

This dissertation has undoubtedly raised more questions and issues than it has addressed.

This is, of course, as it should be. The materials introduced in the dissertation bring to

mind a number of research problems. The analysis in certain parts of the discussion

(especially that dealing with the Gujars’ early history) were constrained by the relative

paucity of historical data. As the analysis was based on insights drawn from more recent

historical and ethnographic studies, the findings should be seen as hypotheses in need of

further historical or cross-cultural testing. The discussion of the Gujars under British 369 Imperialism rests on a more solid foundation of historical data. Nonetheless, as this is

to my knowledge the first study to assess the impact of British imperialism in relation to

an inter-provincial population, it too is in need of further refinement, adjustment, and

perhaps refutation. The analysis of this phase of the Gujars’ history nevertheless

foregrounds issues related to the nature and practices of imperialism in general, and the

British colonization of India in particular. The extent to which British imperialism had

a similarly diverse impact on other regional populations perhaps even in other continents

is just one of many research questions that arise from this review.

The examination of Islamabad’s political agenda raises similar research questions.

The comparison of the experiences of Islamabad’s ethnic communities to those of other

capital cities that were planned and built in the twentieth century (e.g, Ankara and

Brasilia) is again just one of the many topics of research that might be considered. In

relation to Islamabad, detailing the intellectual genealogy of the city’s Master Planner

would also seem to be particularly illuminative on the ideological presuppositions that

underpin, license, and legitimate the profession of architect and town planner.

Perhaps the richest source of ideas for further research is of course the Gujar data

itself. In spite of the length of this dissertation there remains a good deal of material-

indeed the majority-that has not yet been subjected to analysis (see Chapter 1). Further

investigation of genealogies, interview materials, survey data, and so forth would help

fill out the picture of Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad. Topics to which the data speak

(e.g., the nature of family organization), but which were considered to be beyond the 370 strict scope of the dissertation have similarly not been included in the analysis. These, of course, constitute a potentially rich source of material for further analysis.

In regard to the data that were presented in this dissertation, they too bring to mind a number of subsequent research problems. A comparison of the Gujar material with that gathered from other ethnic groups living in Islamabad would undoubtedly shed further light on the extent and nature of the Master Plan’s impact on the ethnic social life of the city’s resident ethnic communities. At the same time, such types of comparison

would simultaneously serve to illuminate those aspects of Gujar ethnicity that the

community shares with other groups, as well as bringing into sharper focus what is

distinctive about Gujar ethnicity in Islamabad. A comparison of Gujar communities

residing in other urban settings would also be instructive of the differences and

similarities which Islamabad’s Gujar community share with other urban communities.

In regard to its theoretical implications, much has already been said about the Gujar data.

Suffice it to say here, that the analytical model of Gujar ethnicity used to investigate the

Gujar data and the conceptualization of human nature which informs it may have wider

applicability and implications. To assess the extent to which it does illuminate some

wider aspect of the human condition, I defer to the judgement of the reader. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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COMMUNITY SURVEY FORM

410 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Could you please list Relation to Sex Place of Was this Age Marital Status Years eveiyone presently living in household head 1. Male Birth residence 1. Never married Married the household. Include (see codes at 2. Female Country District Tehsil 1. Rural 2. Married everyone who USUALLY bottom of 2. Urban 3. Widowed sleq>s here and eats together page). 4. Divorced evai if not in the house at S. Sqiarated present. Include servants, lodgers, and friends.

Codes for question 2: 1. Respondent 10. Sister of reqxmdatt 2. Reqxmdait's wife 11. Brother’s wife 3. Reqmndent’s father 12. Sister’s husband 4. ReqMndeot’s mother 13. Servant 5. Wife’s mother 15. Secrmd wife 6. Wife’s Auher 16. Friraid 7. children of reqxmdait 17. Member of biraderi 8. Spouse of child 18. Other (q)ecify) 9. Brother of respondent Serial (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) No. Biraderi Sub-biraderi Able to read Able to write Curraitly in Highest education Latest working 1. Gujar 1. Yes 1. Yes school 0 to 11 (see codes status 1 to 6 (see 2. Others list and go 2. No 2. No 1. Yes at bottom of codes at bottom to question 10. 3. DK 3. DK 2. No page) of page) 3. DK

1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

7. 8.

Codes for question 14: Codes for question 15: 0. No education 6. B.A./B.Sc. 1. Employer 1. Primary or below 7. M.A./M.Sc. and above 2. Employee (Govt.) (go to ques. 2. Middle 8. B.Sc. (Eng) and above 21) 3. Matriculate 9. MBBS/BDS and above 3. Employee (Priv.) (to ques. 4. Intermediate 10. LLB and above 21) 5. Certificate/Diploma 11. Others 4. Self-Employed (go to ques. (undergraduate) 21) 5. Unpaid Family worker (go to ques. 21) 6. Not employed (go to ques. 21)

K > Serial (16) (17) (18) . (19) (20) (21) (22) No. Number of Number of family Number of Gujars Co-owner Co-owner’s Most recent Present monthly Enq>loyees members woiking working for 1. Yes biraderi primary income from for reqxmdait respondent 2. No (go to ques. 21) occupation primary occupaticMt

2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8.

w Serial (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) No. Most recait Present monthly Preset monthly Relation to Is family income Who decides how secondaiy occupation income from income from respondait of each pooled money is q»eot secondary occupation transfer of wealth primary contributor 1. Yes from other family 2. No members 3. DK 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. >7. 8. Serial (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) No. Is land owned by any Acres (total) Location (of largest plot) Who supervises Land is used for; housdiold members: District Tehsil (relation to respondait) 1. Agriculture 1. yes 2. Dairy 2. No (go to ques. 34) 3. Rent 3. DK (go to ques. 34) 4. Other (specify) 1.

2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

8. RESPONDENT’S MIGRATION HISTORY

(34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) Starting with the most Was this Year First living Rented from Owner’s Migrate Did you Relation of iec«it first, list your four residatce of accommodations 1. Private biraderi with move in each previous residmces. Do 1. Rural move 1. Raited 2. Govt, (go to 1. Gujar family with other housdiold not include moves within 2. Urban 2. Owned (go ques. 40) 2. Other 1. Yes people head to city or village. to ques. 40) 3. DK (go to (q>ecify) 2. No 1. Yes reqiomdent Country, District, Tdisil 3. Free (go to ques. 40) 3. DK 3. DK 2. No ques. 40) 3. DK

5 \ 417

43. Did close family relations live here (Islamabad) before your arrival? Yes___ No (go to question 46) DK (go to question 46)

44. Relation to reqmndent of those relatives living in Islamabad prior to his/her arrival (list head of each household). 1. 2. 3. 4.

45. Were your plans discussed with them before moving? 1. Yes, 2. No, 3.DK

2 .___ 3 .___ 4 .___

46. Were your plans to move to Islamabad discussed with non-relatives? Yes No DK ___

47. Did you visit Islamabad prior to moving here? Yes___ N o (go to question 50) D K (go to question 50)

48. Frequency of visits? Often ___ Occasionally ___ Seldom ___ Rarely___ Once ___

49. Reason for these trips? W ork___ Pleasure ___ Visit Friends ___ Visit Family___ Attend Marriage ___ Shopping (buy tractors etc.)___ Govt, dealings ___ Other (qrecify)___

50. Who was the first person you contacted when you moved to Islamabad? Name______Relation ______

51. Was this arranged before your arrival Yes N o DK ,

52. Primary occupation before moving to Islamabad? ______418

S3. Monthly income from primary occupation?

54. Primary occupation after moving to Islamabad? ______

55. Monthly income from primary occupation? ______

56. Why did you move to Islamabad?

57. The information you had about Islamabad came from what source?

58. How did you get your first employment in Islamabad?

59. Where do you usually qxnd the Bid holidays?

60. Where did you spend the Eid holidays this year?

61. Do you belong to a political party? Y es N o____

62. Which political party? ______

FAMILY SOCIAL BACKGROUND

63. Wife’s relation to respondent before marriage. ______

64. Was respondent’s marriage arranged? Yes___ N o___ DK___

(65) (66) (67) Starting with the oldest first list Daughter-in-law’s sub- Relation of daughter-in-law daughter-in law’s biraderi (whether in biraderi to respondent before housdiold or not) marriage

6. 4 1 9

(68) (69) (70) Starting with the oldest first list son-in Son-in-law’s sub-biraderi Relation of son-in-law to law’s biraderi (whether in household respondent before marriage or not)

71. Do you know of any Gujar association? Yes______N o______(go to question 79)

72. Are you a member of any of these associations? Yes_____ N o______(go to question 75)

73. In addition to membership fees do you make other contributions to any Gujar associations? Yes_____ N o (go to question 75)

74. Association to which contribution is made Amount ______Reason for contributing ______

75. Have you ever attended a meeting of any of these associations? 1. Yes 2. No 3. DK

76. Did you know of these associations before coming to Islamabad? Y es___ No ___ DK __

77. How did you come to know of these associations?

78. What services have the association(s) provided to you or your family? 4 2 0

79. Compared to other biradeiis the political representation of Gujars is Excellent___ Good ___ Fair___ Poor___ N.O.__

80. Compared to other biraderis the educational achievements of Gujars are: Excellent ___ Good ___ F air___ Poor___ N.O.__

81. Compared to other biraderis the economic achievements of Gujars are: Excellent ___ Good ___ F air___ Poor___ N.O.__

82. It is good to consult the biraderi in matters o f ______?