Number 18, June 2012 briefing paper

Exchanging People for Money: Bread for the World Institute Remittances and Repatriation in Central America www.bread.org Abstract Immigrants from , El Sal- vador, and sent home more than $10 billion in remittances in 2011— almost all of it from the . Re- mittances comprised 17 percent of GDP in Honduras, 16 percent in , and 10 percent in Guatemala and they dwarf both foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance. Remit- tances reduce poverty and help millions of families that receive them obtain food, clothing, education, housing, and health care, but they can also create provides dependence policy analysis on hunger and strategies to end it. REUTERS/Eliana Aponte on the . Their greatest potential— Thefueling Institute productive educates investment its network, that generopinion- leaders, policy makers and the public about Key Points ates jobs and income and reduces immi- hunger in the United States and abroad. • Part of the $10 billion sent annually in remittances to Central America gration pressure—is often untapped. could be harnessed to support productive projects in migrant-sending In addition to the flow of money back communities, but the current lack of a policy framework and technical to Central America, in recent years the know-how are barriers. U.S. development agencies are well positioned to number of immigrants returning from facilitate the productive uses of remittances at both the policy and pro- gram levels in cooperation with host governments and the private sector. the United States to their home countries has increased. During fiscal year 2011, the by• According Andrew Wainer to its own cost estimates, the Department of Homeland Secu- rity (DHS) spent approximately $1 billion apprehending, detaining, and United States deported a record 396,906 deporting 76,000 Central Americans in 2010. Surveys indicate that, part- unauthorized immigrants, including ly because of the lack of long-term reintegration assistance, 43 percent more than 76,000 Central Americans. of deportees intend to return to the United States within a year. U.S. and Central American governments are un- Central American observers state that the percentage of return migrants prepared for these returned migrants. is larger. U.S. development policies in Central America should include Many deportees end up re-migrating to programs to help returned migrants support themselves and contribute the United States because of the lack of to economic development in their home countries. opportunities in their native countries. Andrew Wainer is the senior immigration policy analyst for Bread for the World Institute. Introduction: Figure 1 “The Northern Triangle” Crossroads of the Western Hemisphere The movement of people Guatemala and money between Central and Honduras North America dates back at least to the 12th cen- tury when maritime Mayan traders transferred obsidian, 1 cotton, and slaves along the Gulf Coast of Mexico. Dur- ing the 16th century, the Spanish Conquest transformed El Salvador the isthmus into a key link in a colonial empire stretching from to California. In the early 20th century, the Canal made Central America the primary ship- authorization. According ping link between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Today to the Pew Center, Central America remains a corridor for the movement of there were 2.4 million North- people and goods—both legal and illegal. For nations like ern Triangle immigrants in Panama Panama, this geography contributes to a booming economy the United States in 2009, compris- and improving socioeconomic indicators. Five percent of ing about 6 percent of the total U.S. for- all global trade transits the canal, and Panama has one of eign-born population of 38 million.5 Other the fastest growing economies in the world. In 2008, for estimates place the number of Northern Triangle example, in the midst of a global recession, the Panama- immigrants at more than 3 million6 (see Table 1). nian economy grew by almost 11 percent.2 Between 2006 Immigrants from this region are more likely than the av- and 2010, Panama reduced its poverty rate by 10 percent- erage U.S. immigrant to be unauthorized. Thus, they are age points.3 overrepresented among unauthorized immigrants, compris- But in the “Northern Triangle”4 nations of Guatemala, ing 15 percent of the total in 2011 (see Table 2).7 Despite Honduras, and El Salvador, geography has been a mixed the Northern Triangle’s relatively small population (27 mil- blessing and made them the target of centuries of foreign lion), there are more unauthorized immigrants from this intervention (see Figure 1). Unlike Panama and Costa Rica, region than from China and India combined, which have economic progress in the Northern Triangle has been un- a combined population of more than 2.5 billion.8 Starting even and poverty rates remain high. To escape poverty, around 2006, migration from the Northern Triangle began millions of Central Americans have taken advantage of its proximity to the world’s largest economy to seek oppor- Table 1 Northern Triangle Immigrants in the U.S., 20091 tunity. These migrations have helped Central Americans feed, clothe, and educate their families. But it’s also created Total number of Expatriates as a immigrants percentage of native a dependency on the diaspora. in the U.S. population

The Source of Unauthorized Central American Migration El Salvador 1,150,000 19% Unlike people in Africa or South Asia, Central Ameri- Guatemala 799,000 6% cans who are unable to meet their material wants at home Honduras 468,000 6% have the option of migrating to the United States. In recent decades, they have done so by the millions, usually without Total/Average 2,417,000 10%

Table 2 Unauthorized Northern Triangle Immigrants in the U.S., 2011

Number of Unauthorized as Percentage of Percentage change Ranking as source unauthorized percentage of total total unauthorized in unauthorized of unauthorized immigrants1 immigrant population2 population3 population 2000-20114 immigration to the U.S.

El Salvador 660,000 46% 6% 55% 2nd Guatemala 520,000 60% 5% 82% 3rd Honduras 380,000 68% 4% 132% 4th Total/Average 1,560,000 58% 15% 90% -----

2 Briefing Paper, June 2012 to drop, falling sharply during the U.S. status than they had at home, Central Figure 2 San Marcos, Guatemala recession, but migration flows have American immigrants experience more stabilized since 2009. Over the past de- poverty than the overall U.S. popula- cade, immigrants from this region were tion. In 2009, about a quarter of Hon- among the fastest-growing foreign-born duran and Guatemalan immigrants Tacaná populations in the United States — in- to the United States lived below the creasing by 90 percent between 2000 poverty line. Salvadoran immigrants, and 2011.9 who are more likely to have authorized San Marcos Northern Triangle immigration has status, had an 18 percent poverty rate. a variety of causes but is driven primar- All three rates were higher than the ily by the combination of immigrants’ general U.S. poverty rate, which was 14 inability to satisfy their economic as- percent (see Table 3).10 pirations in their countries of origin, Guatemala and conversely, labor opportunities in the United States. The jobs are mostly Part One: Remittances in construction, maintenance, food Weathering Hurricane Stan from Abroad service, and agriculture. Migration is also to some degree self-sustaining—as In October 2005 Hurricane Stan hit mountains immigrants become established in the Guatemala for days, pouring 20 inches and volcanos.12 United States, they can facilitate mi- of rain, flooding rivers, and knocking The indigenous gration by family members and others out roads and bridges.11 Entire villag- village of Panabaj, near from their home communities. es were buried under torrents of mud Lake Atitlán, was so com- In spite of a higher socioeconomic and rock that fell down the slopes of pletely inundated that relief efforts were ended several days after Table 3 Socioeconomic Status of Northern Triangle Immigrants, 2009 the storm—despite the fact that hun- dreds of residents were still missing. Median individual Percentage living Percentage without income1 below poverty-line2 high school degree3 The mayor declared the village a mass 13 grave. The department of San Mar- El Salvador $19,715 19% 53% cos, which borders Mexico in the coun- try’s southwest, was among the most Guatemala $17,497 26% 55% damaged by Stan (see Figure 2). Even Honduras $16,723 27% 49% before the storm, San Marcos was one of the most impoverished regions of the Total U.S. $28,900 14% 13% country: 85 percent of the population lived in poverty, while 62 percent lived in extreme poverty.14 San Marcos also suffered from economic inequality: 47 percent of the department’s land was held by 1 percent of the population, while smallholder producers possessed only 3 percent of the department’s total land.15 These economic realities meant that emigration was a longstanding tradition in San Marcos. So when the storm hit, San Marcos native Isaías had already been living in the United States for three months. While he was in the States, Isaías learned that his father had

Andrew Wainer Andrew been killed in a landslide during Stan. Isaías immigrated twice to the United States to support his family in the department of San Marcos, He was desperate to return home, Guatemala. He worked as a greens-keeper on a golf course in Florida where he learned about large irrigation systems, a skill he has been unable to transfer to his own agricultural production because of but weighing his economic prospects a lack of local technology and know-how. in the United States and in Guatemala,

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 3 Isaías continued to work as a greens-keeper at a Florida golf have drawbacks. They can facilitate governments’ passing the course for two more years. By staying in the United States cost of public services—services that the state should be pro- and sending home his earnings, he could provide more for viding—to the diaspora. In Mexico, where remittances total his family than if he went home. He returned to Guatemala more than in any other country in the Western Hemisphere, in 2008, where he now works the plot of land financed by his research indicates that remittances reduce extreme poverty, work as an immigrant, growing potatoes, beans, and corn. but are typically not effective in building livelihoods that lift Migration to the United States helped Isaías and his families completely out of poverty.24 Perhaps most relevant family economically, but the impact of his years abroad— in terms of migration, remittances reinforce the idea among although important—is limited. As a greens-keeper, Isaías Central Americans that the United States—not their home learned how to operate large irrigation systems. He’d like countries—is the place to realize one’s economic potential. to be able to use this knowledge in Guatemala to grow pota- toes on a scale large enough to make money, not just to feed Remittances and Development his family. ”I learned a lot but there’s no possibility to do it The greatest untapped potential of remittances is per- here,” Isaías said. “There are no resources, machines. The haps their ability to create the jobs and sources of income things they have there, they don’t have here.” in recipient communities that could provide an alternative to unauthorized migration. While remittances are certainly Remittances in the Northern Triangle effective in improving recipients’ socioeconomic well-being, they are rarely used in productive investment25 (see Table Immigrants from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 5). One barrier to productive investment is that some remit- 16 sent home more than $10 billion in remittances in 2010— tance recipients who would like to invest in small businesses 17 almost all of it from the United States. That year remit- do not know how to do so. tances were 17 percent of GDP in Honduras, 16 percent Some analysts and advocates working in Central America 18 in El Salvador, and 10 percent in Guatemala (see Table with the families of migrants believe that wealth-generating 4). Remittances dwarf both foreign direct investment and enterprises are beyond the scope of remittances. But devel- 19 overseas development aid. In 2008 El Salvador received opment agencies and multilateral organizations that have $3.8 billion in remittances, $800 million in foreign direct in- implemented and studied remittance projects for more than 20 vestment, and $200 million in development assistance. As a decade cite their productive potential.26 U.S. development one Salvadoran analyst put it, “If you took away remittances agencies and the Northern Triangle nations themselves there would be a major crisis.” have not prioritized productive uses for remittances in the Remittances are important at both the macro- and micro- Northern Triangle even though it’s the largest source of un- economic levels, but the major socioeconomic impacts of authorized immigration to the United States after Mexico. remittances are felt in households, among the families that Although they are more engaged than bilateral agencies, receive them. Remittances are proven poverty-reducers that multilateral banks and institutions have also invested little in help millions of families obtain food, clothing, education, productive remittance projects in the Northern Triangle as housing, and health care.21 A 2008 World Bank report found compared to other regions. IFAD is one of the few agencies that in , a 10 percent increase in the remittanc- that have worked on productive development of remittances in es-to-GDP ratio resulted in a 3.7 percent decrease in moderate the region, but today it directs just 11 percent of its $20 million poverty and a 2.9 percent decrease in extreme poverty.22 The fund for global remittance project investment to Latin Ameri- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) ca.27 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has spent states, “Families receiving remittances are—by virtue of the more than a decade on remittance projects targeting produc- remittances—no longer among the poorest of the poor.”23 tive development in Latin America, but few of these projects But in spite of their socioeconomic benefits, remittances are aimed at the Northern Triangle-United States migration

Table 4 Remittances in the Northern Triangle

Country Remittances Foreign direct ODA Remittances as Ratio of Size of in 20111 investment in 20103 a percentage of remittances to remittances as a 20102 GDP 20094 FDI 20095 % of ODA, 20096

El Salvador $3.7 $0.08 $0.3 19% 2.4 4,211.6 Guatemala $4.5 $0.7 $0.4 10% 5.9 945.6 Honduras $2.9 $0.9 $0.6 15% 3.2 565.4

Note: All money amounts in billions of US dollars

4 Briefing Paper, June 2012 Table 5 Household Use of Remittances

Country Average amount Percentage of families Percentage of remittances saved or Percentage of remittances sent per month1 that receive remittances spent on a business or agriculture spent on consumption

El Salvador $339 22%2 6.1%3 80.5%4 Guatemala $363 30%5 18.3%6 49.4%7 Honduras $225 32%8 8.2%9 8.2%10 corridor.28 Using remittances for economic development in mi- rare. The Salvadoran government has a long history of work- grants’ countries of origin is not an easy or simple proposition, ing with the diaspora on projects like roads and schools, but but it deserves more exploration by policymakers and practitio- they have not been as engaged in projects that generate in- ners. The development community can play a role assisting the come and jobs. The most recent administration, which took diaspora and remittance receiving communities organize and power in El Salvador in 2009, states that it wants to provide implement “collective remittance” investments and provide al- potential migrants with alternatives to migration. But on the ternative uses for individual recipients. ground, change has been slow. “There is no government… Veteran staff of some foreign assistance organizations policy,” Merlos said. “Only very small projects.” working in Central America are skeptical about remittanc- The governments of Guatemala and Honduras are even es’ current impact. “Some NGOs have decided that they flat- less involved in working with migrants and their families. out can’t work in areas with high remittance flows because “There is no administrative capacity” in San Marcos, said people don’t want to do anything productive,” said Catholic Guatemala Catholic Church leader Enrique González. Relief Services (CRS) El Salvador Country Representative “[We] need training, orientation on economic issues, sus- Erica Dahl-Bredine. “People don’t want to do anything ex- tainability, how to capitalize.” González said that most mi- cept receive remittances.” This perspective is shared–to an grants in his community leave the country without finishing extent—by some Central American nongovernmental orga- high school. In the United States they may earn and save nizations and analysts. Enrique Merlos, a program coordi- money, but they often don’t know how to use it for the long nator with the Salvadoran organization FUNDE, said that term. “When they come back…they lack an academic for- currently, remittances are limited to helping the families of mation,” González said. “They just go looking for money migrants survive. “It’s not creating economic impacts,” Mer- but they lack other important elements.” In short, in spite los said. “It’s not creating jobs or increasing incomes.” Mer- of their formidable volume, remittances have not changed los said there was a dearth of both collective and individual the socioeconomic conditions that caused millions of young remittance wealth-generating projects. He said that the Central Americans to leave their countries to seek opportu- amount of remittances invested into sustainable enterprises nity abroad, usually without authorization. is small “due to the lack of mechanisms and policies…If I [a remittance recipient] am not conscious of how to invest I’ll “The Northern Triangle” just buy things. There needs to be training and programs for productive investment.” The Northern Triangle is one of the poorest regions in Even in El Salvador, which has the largest and best-or- the Western Hemisphere—the economic growth other Latin ganized Central American diaspora, government-supported American economies experienced during the 2000s largely efforts to channel remittances to productive investment are bypassed these countries (see Table 6). According to the

Table 6 Northern Triangle Economic Growth and Poverty

Annual GDP GDP per Poverty rate 2011 Human growth 20101 capita 20102 20093 Development Index ranking of 187 nations4 El Salvador 1.4% $3,426 38% 105 Guatemala 2.8% $2,862 51% 131 Honduras 2.8% $2,026 59% 121

United States 3.0% $47,199 15%* 4 *The U.S poverty rate is for 2010 and uses a different measure than the other nations in this table which are from the World Bank. In 2010 the poverty line for a family of four was $22,314.

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 5 World Bank, all three Northern Tri- Table 7 Northern Triangle Education and Citizen Security angle nations are lower middle-income countries. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Population 20101 Average years of 2010 homicide Honduras are also, respectively, the sec- schooling 20112 rate per 100,000 inhabitants3 ond, third, and fourth largest countries of origin of unauthorized immigrants El Salvador 6,192,993 7.4 66.0 in the United States29 (see Table 7). El Salvador is the wealthiest of the Guatemala 14,388,929 4.0 41.4 three nations, with a per-capita income Honduras 7,600,524 6.4 82.1 of $3,426. Although it reduced poverty United States 309,050,816 12.4 5* during the 1990s in the aftermath of its civil war, which ended in 1992, El *U.S. homicide rate for 2009. Salvador’s economy stalled during the lower HDI ranking.34 the rural areas where most immigrants 2000s and was hit hard by the 2008 Honduras is the poorest of the originate, further discourage economic recession—due in large part to its re- Northern Triangle nations, with a per- investment. “The security of the coun- liance on the U.S. economy. Poverty capita GDP of $2,026 and 60 percent tryside affects migrants directly,” said now stands at about 38 percent of the of its population living in poverty. In Delbert Field, Guatemala chief of mis- population, roughly the same level as a region characterized by low levels of sion for the International Organization in 2000.30 political legitimacy and respect for the for Migration. “If you have someone Guatemala, as Central America’s rule of law, Honduras is perhaps the most populous nation and its undisput- abroad, you suffer more from extortion. least politically stable of the three na- ed cultural capital, exemplifies the re- You have to do what consumption you tions. It is still recovering from a 2009 gion’s socioeconomic injustices. Guate- have with very low visibility.” Valdette military coup d’état.35 mala has a per-capita income of $2,862, Wileman, a Scalabrini nun who works and 51 percent of its population lives with returned migrants in Honduras, in poverty. But the poverty rate—as dire Challenges to the Productive also said that crime and extortion were disincentives to investing. “If they [re- as it is—doesn’t adequately describe Investment of Remittances the level of degradation facing broad mittance recipients] create a business swaths of the population.31 (Dis)Enabling Investment Environment they have to pay a ‘tax,’” Wileman said. “So they prefer to spend the money.” In recent decades, there have been All three Northern Triangle na- Even those motivated to try to over- few countries in the world, and cer- tions score below average on the World come such barriers and invest in a small tainly no others in the Western Hemi- Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business In- business or agricultural enterprise have sphere, that have lost as much ground dex.”36 For unauthorized migrants, to hunger and malnutrition as Gua- who tend to come from families with few models of success. “There are vari- temala. Between 1990 and 2008, the lower socioeconomic status, the bar- ous examples of people who have come number of malnourished Guatemalans riers to entrepreneurship are even back from the United States with a lot increased from 1.4 million to 2.9 mil- larger.37 With corruption, extortion, of capital to create a business and after lion. That is an increase of 113 percent. and a generally shaky environment for a couple years it fails and they go back,” During the same period, Latin Amer- the rule of law, returned migrants and said Rolando Ovalle Barrios, mayor of ica as a whole lowered its number of remittance recipients are hesitant to Salcajá, Guatemala. Salcajá has a dias- malnourished people by 17 percent.32 invest their foreign earnings in wealth- pora in Trenton, New Jersey, among In 2007, UNICEF reported that Gua- generating enterprises. The general other U.S. localities. “They are not pre- temala had the fourth-highest percent- economic challenges these countries pared, they haven’t studied the market. age of chronically malnourished girls face, including a large informal sector In a few years the capital disappears.” and boys in the world and the high- and a lack of access to financial ser- Vincent Ruddy of the U.S. Millen- est in Latin America. Nearly half of vices make any attempt at business-cre- nium Challenge Corporation (MCC)— Guatemalan children under age 5 are ation daunting. “They don’t trust the which is finishing a five-year, $460 malnourished.33 The 2011 Human De- system,” said Borys Chinchilla, former million development program in El velopment Index (HDI) ranked Guate- Guatemala country director for Mercy Salvador in 2012—said people seeking mala at 131 out of 187 nations, between Corps. “That’s why we are losing a lot to invest remittances in El Salvador Morocco (130) and Iraq (132). In the of potential to do something bigger.” confront problems similar to those in Western Hemisphere, only Haiti had a Crime and violence, particularly in other developing nations. “One of the

6 Briefing Paper, June 2012 typical problems you see… is often just a low capacity to it superfluously,” said Honduran immigrant organizer Mal- identify business opportunities and develop bankable proj- via Rivas. “[They spend it] on children’s education, on health, ects,” Ruddy said. “The businesses are sort of limited to very on housing, on things that their family needs, on medicine.” ad-hoc things by family and friends. They really don’t have Although it is difficult to measure which is the larger obsta- the capacity to formalize things, which is what you need to cle, both poverty and consumerism are clearly barriers to the do if you want to start institutionalizing things in a more productive investment of remittances in the region. significant way into productive investment. That stands as “The question is: Is it allowing people to invest in activities a big challenge.” in things that will be sustainable?” CRS’ Erica Dahl-Bredine said. “I think the evidence is pretty limited.” For its part, Consumerism and Survival MCC El Salvador is aware of the limitations on how much Analysts also cite a “culture of consumerism” that has tak- remittance money can be channeled to income-generating en hold in areas affected by migration to the United States, or job-generating activities. “It’s really tough when you don’t even remote rural settings (see Table 4 above). If the local have the conditions that are appropriate for investment,” economy does not offer productive channels for investment, said Vincent Ruddy, MCC country representative for El Sal- then remittances will be spent in other ways. Remittance vador. “Most people are just sending money back trying to usage can lead to conflicts between the migrants who send help their families survive.” money and their families at home that spend it. “There’s But if the Northern Triangle nations provided basic ser- an awful lot of frustration that it’s really difficult to work vices to its citizens, remittances could be invested different- with those communities that for 20 years now have been re- ly. “The books that the country ought to be providing for ceiving remittances and [engaging in] a lot of conspicuous your kids you’re able to provide because you’ve got someone consumption,” said CRS’ Erica Dahl-Bredine. “[Some re- living abroad,” one analyst in Guatemala said. “The health mittance recipients have] really nice houses, some of which care that you are providing for your wife, and that the gov- don’t even have latrines or running water.” ernment is not providing, you are able to provide because of Observers state that low levels of formal education and remittances.” As the World Bank states, “It is best to think of the ubiquity of consumer advertising also reduce the poten- migration and remittance practices as the outcomes of the tial for productive investment. “Part of the problem is self- failure of national economic policy to address public needs.” esteem,” said Guatemalan remittances analyst Sonia Ma- ria Pellecer. “People don’t have the ideas. The population The Policy of No Policy doesn’t have a lot of education.” For a variety of reasons, Central American countries’ stance on migration and the notion of investing isn’t even “on the radar” of many development has been comparable to that of Mexico dur- remittance recipients—while the incentive to spend on con- ing the 1970s and 1980s—a posture that has been called “the sumer goods is ubiquitous. “They don’t use remittances for policy of no policy.” This stance allowed Mexico to “reap the anything that’s going to help them in the long term, only for economic benefits of emigration without having to acknowl- their immediate needs,” said Linda Fortin of the Hondu- edge its development failures.”39 In 2011, U.S. development ran Association of Banks, which works with immigrants and agencies invested a total of about $243 million in foreign their families on remittance investment. assistance in the three Northern Triangle countries.40 There Although there is evidence of remittances being used for is an opportunity to begin to measure the impact of U.S. conspicous consumption, they are typically used for surviv- economic development projects on these migration-intense, al. Research indicates that a majority of remittance recipi- high-poverty nations and explore how the $10 billion in re- ents use the money for necessities like food and clothes. In mittances might be better used to provide jobs and income El Salvador, one study found that 81 percent of remittances in these communities. were spent on food and utilities (see Table 4 above).38 “In a There is major research on the role of remittances in country with so much poverty, the first thing people want to financial inclusion and social investment in churches, clinics, do is buy things they never had,” said Lizette Montoya, who roads, and education, and a number of projects are being works with the Irish Catholic aid agency Trocaire in Hon- implemented in these areas.41 But programs to facilitate duras. “There’s no consciousness…to say ‘OK, I’m going to investing remittances in small businesses and agricultural invest this in something productive.” enterprises in Central America are much less common. A In 2010, Northern Triangle immigrants sent home aver- 2005 report on remittances in Guatemala, submitted to age amounts that ranged from $225 to $363 per month (see USAID by Chemonics International, Inc., stated, “Although Table 4). With so many unmet basic needs and a limited a number of donor institutions consider the migration- amount of remittance funding, there is not much money left development nexus important—and see remittances at the for long-term income generation projects. “They don’t spend intersection—there is currently no foreign assistance to

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 7 implement any program of this nature in Guatemala.”42 the Central American diaspora in the United States is about Seven years later, USAID-supported remittance projects twice as large as the African diaspora.46 But USAID’s en- focusing on productive investment in the region are still rare. gagement with the U.S. Latin American diaspora may be Among U.S. development agencies, the Inter-American changing (see New Ideas below). Foundation (IAF)43 is in the vanguard when it comes to recognizing the links between migration and development “No Country Likes to Lose Its People” in the Northern Triangle. The IAF is already working spe- At a September 2011 event on migration and remittances cifically on linking the diaspora to productive development convened at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, projects, and is planning to integrate migration into pro- Pablo Rodas, Chief Economist at the Central American gram evaluations in countries such as El Salvador. The Mil- Bank for Economic Integration, said, “No country likes to lennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which finished a lose its people.”47 But Northern Triangle governments and $205 million four-year compact in Honduras in 2010 and U.S development agencies could do more to help provide is finishing its compact in El Salvador in 2012, also recog- alternatives to unauthorized migration and to reintegrate nizes the link between migration and development, but it returned migrants. “The assumption here is—and it’s proba- has yet to integrate migration into compacts in the region. bly the same in the other Triangle states—is that the country “It wasn’t one of our specific purposes…but…we’d like to find needs this kind of [unauthorized] migration,” one analyst a way to establish a foundation for people to stay in their homelands,” said MCC El Salvador deputy resident country director Kenneth Miller. MCC El Salvador country repre- sentative Vincent Ruddy said that although remittances are not an official part of the MCC compact in El Salvador, they are a de facto part of the development landscape because of MCC’s work with small- and medium-size farmers. “Our compact…is already leveraging remittances,” Ruddy said. “A good portion of those investments [by farmers they work with] in [higher value crops or horticulture crops] are being financed by remittances.” USAID’s engagement with the migration/development connection and the creation of alternative uses for remit- tances in Central America is limited. One USAID official said, “At this point, our activities are ad hoc. Working with is like climate change 15 years ago—conscious- ness needs to be built up.” USAID does, however, state the importance of diasporas in development on its website: “Although diaspora community engagement with home countries is substantial, the developmental potential for this group remains largely untapped. USAID recognizes that by not engaging with this community, we are missing out on an opportunity to increase our development impact signifi- cantly.”44 USAID has also hosted a series of diaspora confer- ences in the United States and shown increasing interest in this component of development. But as yet, there has not been a significant translation of research and dialogue with diaspora communities into diaspora-focused productive de- velopment projects in Central America. Most of USAID’s diaspora-focused economic develop- ment programs are part of its African Diaspora Marketplace Andrew Wainer Andrew program. This initiative links U.S.-based African diaspora A woman feeds chickens as part of a diaspora investment project in Verapaz, entrepreneurs with businesses in Africa, with the goal of El Salvador. The project includes support from the Ford Foundation, the Los 45 Angeles, California Salvadoran diaspora, and local NGOs and government generating economic growth and employment. USAID has agencies. The goal is to provide alternatives to unauthorized migration in not taken this approach in Central America, even though the climate vulnerable region.

8 Briefing Paper, June 2012 Figure 3 San Vicente, El Salvador Guatemala Honduras

El Salvador San Vicente in Guatemala said. “There’s an Verapaz acceptance of irregular migration being fundamental to the economy.” Central American ana- institutions to channel remittances to lysts generally agree. “[The Guatema- development. But these efforts have lan state] hasn’t seen with clarity the been almost exclusively for infrastruc- links between rural development and ture projects, such as schools, recre- migration,” said Álvaro Caballeros of ation facilities, and health centers, that Rafael Landívar University in Guate- don’t provide long-term private-sector mala City. employment. There have also been El Salvador Some see a deliberate strategy by projects supported by the Salvadoran Northern Triangle elites of “exporting government, U.S. NGOs, and USAID people” for development in the absence that help remittance recipients pur- to unauthorized migration. of other sources of foreign exchange chase homes.49 All these projects have The project is a small work in prog- (U.S. dollars). “As primary export pric- the potential to improve community ress. But its partnerships and explicit es decline, and non-traditional agricul- well-being—the problem is that none use of remittances for productive in- tural exports and assembly production of them engage the main reason mil- vestment make it worth consideration fail to fulfill their promise…exporting lions of Salvadorans leave the coun- by U.S. development policymakers people has become an increasingly try: the lack of labor opportunities.50 and practitioners. One of the most viable strategy to recruit foreign ex- In Guatemala, the largest recipient of important aspects of the project is the change, reduce poverty, and inject new remittances in the Northern Triangle, fact that it started with the Salvadoran capital into the financial sector,” econo- the government is even less engaged. diaspora in the United States—initi- mist Sarah Gammage wrote about El “There are no state policies on how ated by the interest of people from Salvador in 2005. Gammage states that to educate people on the good use of the diaspora in supporting projects to the policies promoting unauthorized remittances,” said Pedro Pop Barillas, stimulate the rural economy. “The mi- migration and increasing the volume executive director of the Guatemalan grants are critical of [remittances be- of remittances reduced poverty—at development organization FUNSALI. ing used only for consumption],” said least during the 1990s—but they also “But there are many banks that have Enrique Merlos of FUNDE. “They “do not acknowledge the enormous commercials on how you should use work two jobs, three jobs, four jobs [in human, social, and economic costs of their banks to receive remittances.” the United States]…They are tired that migration.”48 the money they send isn’t having any Enrique Merlos of FUNDE in El Sal- A Golden Egg? economic impact.” vador said that although there is more A possible example of the potential The Los Angeles diaspora organiza- government engagement with remit- for productive remittance projects in tion that is supporting the project—the tances in his country, there are still few the Northern Triangle lies in a chicken Emergency Committee for Aid to El productive projects. “The diaspora has coop in Verapaz, El Salvador, about 30 Salvador (known by its Spanish acro- only been seen as a source of money,” miles east of the capital city of San Sal- nym, CEAES)—was inspired to help Merlos said. “This…has limited the gov- vador (see Figure 3). Here in the Valle victims of Tropical Storm Ida, which ernment’s ability to take advantage of del Jiboa (Jiboa Valley), a partnership hit Central America in November [their] potential. They could create a that brings together the Salvadoran 2009. The Jiboa Valley was one of the fund to [work with] migrants where both government, the Ford Foundation, the hardest-hit regions of the country.51 groups invest in development projects. Salvadoran diaspora in Los Angeles, The Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign [But] there hasn’t been interest here.” and the Salvadoran NGO FUNDE is Affairs and FUNDE facilitated the Historically, the Salvadoran gov- supporting an economic development diaspora group’s assistance to this ernment has been in the vanguard project with an uncommon design: us- poor, high-migration, and climate-vul- in engaging the diaspora. In the late ing remittances specifically to generate nerable region. The project began in 1990s, the government updated state employment and provide alternatives 2010 with the participation of the local

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 9 government and the Ministry of Agriculture. The project ment projects is not a panacea for the Northern Triangle’s is managed by 15 women from Verapaz who maintain the socioeconomic problems, but it could be a more effective chicken coop; gather, clean, and package the eggs; and sell part of the solution. Northern Triangle governments lack them at a local market. Participants said the eggs generate a policy framework to maximize the impact of their own about $44 a day, or $1,300 a month. They earned a small resources by combining them with remittances into produc- profit in 2011, but in order to make the project sustainable tive investments. As mentioned earlier, recipients who want for all 15 participants it needs to expand. Given El Salva- to invest in businesses and agricultural production often dor’s average per-capita monthly income of $282 in 2010,52 don’t know how to do so. U.S. development assistance could the proposal for the second phase states that in order to help build capacity and a policy environment that empha- provide an alternative to unauthorized immigration, the sizes productive channels for remittances. The discussions project needs to enable each participant to earn at least surrounding potential renewal of the MCC compacts in El $300 monthly. Salvador and Honduras come at an opportune time to con- This is not the only project of its kind in El Salvador. Di- sider the possible inclusion of remittances in development aspora groups and individuals have invested in a few other plans. The Feed the Future programs in Guatemala and projects aimed at producing jobs and income. But the Sal- Honduras could also formally include alternative uses of vadoran government and major U.S. development agencies remittances in their rural development plans. are usually not involved with their creation and operation. Former Salvadoran-American Chamber of Commerce Pres- New Ideas ident Elmer Arias, who came to the United States in 1980 when he was 19, has been supporting diaspora investment For U.S. development agencies, the main challenge re- in his native country for decades. Today his Virginia-based lated to remittances is still how to convert analysis and NGO is working with the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) dialogue in the United States to on-the-ground programs and to promote productive agricultural projects. Half of the in immigrants’ countries of origin. This process may be project funds come from the IAF, 20 percent from the dias- starting, however. In late 2011, the U.S. State Department, pora, and 20 percent from the community. Arias is working the Inter-American Development Bank, the Overseas Pri- to raise 10 percent from the private sector. This model for vate Investment Corporation, and other organizations an- financing development in Central America could be sup- nounced funding for a competition, the “ American ported at a much higher level in partnerships with U.S. de- Idea,” to foster “collaboration between entrepreneurs in the velopment agencies. United States and Latin America with the goal of expand- The Northern Triangle nations will need to design their ing innovative businesses that will generate employment 55 own alternative uses of remittances, but neighboring Mexi- and economic growth.” The initiative’s website states that co offers an example of how remittances might be used for the competition will launch in mid-2012, with awards to be productive investment. Mexican government programs that granted in November 2012, but also indicates that the Lati- match immigrant remittances with government funds for no American Idea continues to seek financial support from social development have a long history with a mixed record public and private partners. Furthermore, in July 2012, US- of success. Particularly relevant to the Northern Triangle AID and the State Department will host the second Global environment is an effort called the 4X1 program, which Diaspora Forum, which provides another opportunity to leverages investments from people in the diaspora with emphasize the importance of using remittances produc- matching funds from the Mexican government and Western tively and explore ideas for doing this. Union. The project is explicitly aimed at engaging the dias- Researchers have been studying issues related to remit- pora, the host country government, and the private sector tances for years, but now there is a new contour to the to promote local economic growth and support the creation broader dynamic of Central American workers going north of jobs to reduce the need for unauthorized migration.53 An and their earnings returning south. Northern Triangle evaluation of the program found that it “spurred employ- immigrants themselves are now being returned south in ment and generated commerce…where the investment took increasing numbers. Between 2002 and 2010 the number place…but did not establish a foundation for sustainability.” of Northern Triangle deportees from the United States in- The evaluators found that one of the major missing com- creased by almost 500 percent.56 These deportations result ponents for sustainability was technical assistance. This is in declining remittances, since as immigrants are deported, a gap that could be filled by a U.S. development agency if fewer people remain to send money home.57 The increas- it was brought in as a partner working in cooperation with ing number of deportations also strain Central American local governments and NGOs.54 nations that are largely unprepared to reintegrate tens of The increased use of remittances for productive invest- thousands of returned migrants every year.

10 Briefing Paper, June 2012 Table 8 Number of Removals* from the United States and Mexico to the Northern Triangle, 2011

Number of FY 2011 Percentage of all FY 2011 Number of removals from Total number of involuntary removals United States involuntary Mexico 20113 returnees for 2011‡ from the United States1 removals for FY 20112

Guatemala 33,324 8 31,042 64,366 Honduras 23,822 6 18,746 42,586 El Salvador 18,870 5 8,809 27,679

Total 76,016 19 58,597 134,631 * “Removals” is a term used by the Department of Homeland Security and is similar to the more commonly used “deportation.” ‡ Includes involuntary removals from the United States and Mexico. Total numbers are an approximation because Mexico and the United States use different time measures for number of removals (calendar year versus fiscal year). Part 2: Repatriation States, since Mexico deports Central American migrants ap- prehended in transit to the United States with increasing fre- The socioeconomic disadvantages of living and working quency. In 2011, Mexico repatriated almost 58,600 Northern as an unauthorized immigrant in the United States have Triangle migrants (see Tables 8 and 9).63 been shouldered by Central American newcomers for de- cades, but migrants continued to travel north. Today, how- Rough Landing ever, unauthorized residents face new obstacles. During fiscal year 2011, the U.S. Immigration and Cus- Returnees’ journeys back to their country of origin are toms Enforcement’s (ICE) Office of Enforcement and Re- typically more organized and safe than their travel north. moval Operations removed58 396,906 unauthorized immi- From the United States they are flown to their home coun- grants from the United States—the largest number in the try on “ICE Air”—an airline contractor hired by the Depart- agency’s modern history.59 Guatemala was the destination ment of Homeland Security (DHS) to return deportees to of the largest number of air repatriations of any country in their native country. Likewise, returnees apprehended in the world (Mexico had more total repatriations, but many Mexico are sent back by bus to the Northern Triangle, cour- deportees are sent back by land since there is an extended tesy of the Mexican government. DHS Guatemala Country border with the United States). Attaché Angel L. Ortiz said the deportations are conducted Under the Obama administration, deportations (or “re- humanely. “You are better off than flying [a commercial movals” as they are termed by the Department of Home- airline]; they get food on the plane,” Ortiz said. “The repa- land Security), have increased by 30 percent annually com- triation model we have in Guatemala is the example we try pared to the administration of President George W. Bush.60 to replicate everywhere else [in the world].” But the process After Mexico, which had 73 percent of all deportees in 2010, ends when the plane lands in Central America. “By law our the next largest sending countries of deportees were the process stops once these Guatemalans step foot in Guate- Northern Triangle nations: Guatemala, Honduras, and El mala,” Ortiz said. Salvador combined were the destinations of 19 percent of When the U.S.-run process stops, there’s almost no one all deportees.61 In 2011 there were 76,000 deportees from and nothing to continue the reintegration process. Many re- the United States to the Northern Triangle.62 But many oth- turnees have been out of Guatemala for years; some don’t er would-be immigrants didn’t even make it to the United speak Spanish. “Most of them [returnees] don’t have a clue

Table 9 Number of Removals from the United States and Mexico to the Northern Triangle (2008-2010)

Total number of removals from Total number of deportees from the Total number of removals Mexico (2008-20111) United States (2008-20112) (2008-20113)

Guatemala 129,741 119,890 249,631

Honduras 94,262 104,611 198,873

El Salvador 42,266 79,578 121,844

Total 266,269 304,079 570,348

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 11 about what they are going to do with their lives,” Ortiz said. Table 10 Northern Triangle Deportees Removed As Ortiz’ comments indicate, the U.S. government is aware on Criminal Grounds, 2010* of the long-term reintegration problems facing Northern Triangle deportees who return home to nations with few Total number Percent removed on jobs and high rates of poverty and violence. The existing deported in 2010 criminal grounds program in Guatemala—the Guatemalan Repatriates Proj- 1,150,000 19% ect—provides immediate assistance free of charge: hygiene El Salvador supplies, phone calls to family, and either a bus ticket to Guatemala 799,000 6% their home town or a stay at a migrant shelter. The program Honduras 468,000 6% is funded by USAID and operated by the International Or- * Criminal deportees have been convicted of a crime in the United States that ganization for Migration. It has a tent inside the Guatemala makes one eligible for deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Not City airport, as do NGOs that provide services to returnees. all individuals who have been deported on criminal grounds are gang members or violent criminals. Low level drug convictions and some non-violent offenses Since the Repatriates Project was launched in June 2011, may result in a removal on criminal grounds. Non-criminal deportees have been it has provided basic communication and health services, removed because of a status violation (e.g. being in the country illegally or working transportation, and shelter to about 23,000 Guatemalan re- without authorization). turnees. Another goal of the program is to help returnees “Welcome Home” program was initiated by Catholic Re- find jobs. But it is not as successful at providing this long- lief Services and then transferred to the Salvadoran gov- term integration assistance—so far, only four returnees have ernment. Like the programs in Guatemala and Honduras, found jobs through the program. “Welcome Home” provides returnees with basic, immediate Experts say that, with scarce opportunities for reinte- services but has no effective plan for long-term reintegra- gration and work, most deportees intend to return to the tion of deportees. “No one is doing [reintegration] in any United States. According to a 2010 survey conducted by organized way,” said CRS El Salvador’s Erica Dahl-Bredine. IOM in Guatemala, 68 percent of all returnees were forc- With so many other socioeconomic problems, Northern Tri- ibly returned (deported) and, of these, 43 percent said they angle governments simply do not offer long-term assistance. intended to return to the United States within 12 months.64 U.S. program budgets are also limited, but there may be an On-the-ground professionals like IOM’s Delbert Field said opportunity for an expanded reintegration program. “If we that in Guatemala, more than half return. “If you see the op- find the right NGO to work with, I don’t see why we couldn’t eration at the airport and also at the land borders, the coy- expand that program,” DHS’ Ortiz said. otes are waiting at the door to get them back up to Mexico,” Some deportees have criminal backgrounds and would Field said. “They are literally ready to ferry them back up. likely pose difficulties for their home governments under Even on some of the [deportation] flights you can tell there any circumstance. Part of this problem can be addressed are people ready to step into that role the moment they get through better information sharing between ICE and local out of the airport. People who come off the flight, their co- security agencies on deportees with criminal histories.65 But horts are waiting right outside the door at the airport. [On this is only part of the reintegration problem—most Central land borders] they pose as money changers right outside the American deportees are not criminals (see Table 10). migration office.”

Sister Valdette Wileman, who leads the Center for the The Cost of Deportation Returned Migrant in Honduras with the support of the Honduran government, the Catholic Church, and the U.S. In his January 2011 testimony before the U.S. House Sub- embassy, said that almost all of the returnees she works with committee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, ICE plan to go back. “They have a lot of shame of having failed,” Deputy Director Kumar Kibble said that it costs $12,500 to Valdette said. “Their goal was to send money here from the “arrest, detain, and remove an individual from the United United States.” Interviews with Honduran deportees in Jan- States.”66 Although this is certainly an average cost that uary 2011 revealed little appetite for settling down at home. depends on many variables, calculations using this figure A returnee who had worked as a mechanic and welder in indicate that the U.S government spent $950 million to ap- Florida said, “As an immigrant the idea doesn’t go away. prehend and remove 76,016 Northern Triangle migrants I’m going to spend some time with my family here and then in 2011 (see Table 10). Since these are repatriations by air go back.” Not surprisingly, when family is left behind in the rather than by land, the cost may be even higher. While the United States, the desire to cross the border again is even primary responsibility for providing long-term reintegration stronger. “I’m not leaving my family alone there,” one re- assistance rests with the deportees’ countries of origin, ICE turnee said. spending on removals is wasted if large percentages of de- El Salvador has a similar program for returnees; the portees return to the United States after deportation. For

12 Briefing Paper, June 2012 deportees to build new lives in their home countries, they immigrants about $6,000 to illegally enter the United States, need more long-term reintegration assistance. half of it to be paid upon arrival. Therefore there are incen- One of the major barriers to reintegration is the attitude tives for both the coyotes and the migrants to try again to of Northern Triangle societies to returnees. “They don’t reach the United States, particularly if migrants cannot find have a chance,” Sister Valdette Wileman said. “First of opportunity back home. “The great majority of people try all, Honduran society doesn’t accept the deportees. Most to return,” Pineda said. “People always have the hope to get people think that the deportees are criminals.” Cecelia there and reach their dream.” Ramirez, who started a program for returnees with Cath- olic Relief Services in El Salvador, said that people who The Migrant’s Friend have been deported—some of whom left their native coun- try as children—experience reverse culture shock upon re- Like productive investment of remittances, long-term re- turn. “Sometimes they deport people that have been in the integration programs for Northern Triangle returnees are United States for 25 years,” Ramirez said. “The country rare. But also like remittances, there are incipient public- [El Salvador] has changed so much.” Honduran and Gua- private partnerships seeking to provide returnees with alter- temalan returnees experience similar vertigo. “Those that natives to additional unauthorized journeys to the United States. In 2011 the Honduran Association of Banking Insti- come back are not American but they’re also not [Gua- tutions (known by its Spanish acronym, AHIBA) created a temalan],” Guatemalan analyst Pedro Pop Barillas said. program called “Friend of the Migrant” aimed at provid- “They’re a hybrid.” ing training and education to returnees. “We want them to Many returnees left before completing their studies in stay here and use everything that they learned in the United their homeland and immediately began working in the States…as micro-entrepreneur so that they can generate jobs United States. Ironically, this means that they may both lack for others too,” said Liana Fortin of AHIBA. the educational qualifications to find jobs and, at the same AHIBA is partnering with the Honduran National In- time, be unable to use the skills they learned working in the stitute of Professional Training (known by its Spanish ac- United States. “There are many people that worked there ronym, INFOP) to offer training in auto mechanics, hospi- [in the U.S.] for 20 years, 15 years [in building trades] with tality, carpentry, electrician skills, English, computer skills, technology they don’t even have here,” said Jorge Pineda, and customer service. All courses will be taught to return- who works for the Salvadoran government’s migrant return ees with the explicit goal of helping them find work in their program. Pineda also said that coyotes usually give migrants home country so they do not have to re-migrate to the Unit- two or three opportunities to cross into the United States if ed States. Fortin said the goal is to support small business they are caught and deported. He said it costs Salvadoran creation. “We want to teach them the entrepreneurs’ men- tality,” she said. The courses will be taught at INFOP and funded by AHIBA. The agreement between AHIBA and INFOP was signed in May 2012 and is still untested. But it is notable for its recognition of the long-term problems facing re- turnees and the economic potential they bring home with them because of skills they learned as workers in the United States.

Settling Down Without provisions for reinte- gration, Northern Triangle return- ees face difficult futures. Some returned migrants “end up in the street,” IOM Guatemala attorney Susie Mendia said. But there are iStock/John Moore iStock/John An Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer prepares an undocumented Salvadoran immigrant for options for long-term reintegration a deportation flight bound for on December 8, 2010 in Mesa, Arizona. of returnees. Although it is not yet

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 13 Conclusion The United States has mul- tiple development programs in the Northern Triangle: Honduras and El Salvador re- ceived Millennium Challenge Compacts—both expected to be renewed in 2012—while Guatemala and Honduras are two of the 20 Feed the Future focus countries, the U.S. government’s primary global food security program (see Table 11 on next page). In November 2011, it was also announced that El Salvador would be one of only four na- tions worldwide to participate in the State Department’s Partnership for Growth, in- tended to “accelerate and sus- tain broad-based economic

Andrew Wainer Andrew 67 This small farmer in the high-migration department of Morazán in El Salvador is working with the Millennium growth.” No major U.S. de- Challenge Corporation to increase his agricultural production through improved irrigation and other techniques. velopment program explicitly includes migration measures an official part of the compact, the MCC’s work with small in these high-intensity unauthorized migration nations. and medium farmers has effectively provided opportunity to This is a missed opportunity that incurs costs to migrants, deportees who return to the regions where the MCC is work- their families left behind, and the effectiveness of U.S. im- ing. Oscar Armando González lived in the United States for migration policy. 10 years before he was deported back to El Salvador in 2010. The economic causes of migration could be explicitly ad- “The first months you feel sad because there you earned dressed by host governments, development agencies, and more and you could help your family [with remittances],” multilateral institutions. Migration variables could be ex- plicitly measured and integrated into development program- González said. But through a farmers’ association working ming in the region. Migration from Central America to with the MCC in the northeastern department of Morazán, the United States will continue, but ideally it will become González is settling back into a life growing tomatoes, cu- a choice conducted through legal means that are more effi- cumbers, and . cient, humane, and beneficial to migrants, the host country, Although he misses the wages he was making in the Unit- and the countries of origin. As Enrique Merlos of FUNDE ed States and his ability to send money back home, González said, “We want people who go abroad to do so because they has found that there are advantages he didn’t possess as an want to, not because they have to.” unauthorized immigrant in the United States: proximity to his children and parents, and the ease with which he can live and work in El Salvador. “You have fun working here,” Recommendations González said. “There when you don’t have papers at any Remittances moment they can knock on your door looking for you.” His Measurement and Evaluation: In nations with migration siblings in the United States are still sending money, and levels as intensive as the Northern Triangle, U.S. development González said he is using some of it to make his plot of land programs should include migration propensity as a specific more productive using the irrigation techniques he learned variable they measure. The Inter-American Foundation through the MCC. González said that he now doesn’t want is a leader among U.S. development agencies in making to go back to the United States. “I’ve adapted to working the connections between migration and development in here,” he said. “We are going to try to start a new life.” countries of origin. The MCC and USAID could incorporate

14 Briefing Paper, June 2012 migration as an evaluation Table 11 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Northern Triangle variable in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and other nations Total U.S. social and Total per capita Major U.S. with high levels of unauthorized economic foreign foreign assistance, development initiatives migration to the United States. assistance, 20111 20092 El Salvador $97.1 million $45 Millennium Challenge Remittance policy framework: Corporation; Partnership Creating alternative options for for Growth the use of remittances would be facilitated by the creation Guatemala $92.4 million $27 Feed the Future of national policy frameworks. Honduras $54.3 million $61 Millennium Challenge U.S. development agencies and Corporation; Feed Northern Triangle governments the Future can collaborate with immigrants, Latin America $1.45 billion $16 ----- the development community, and civil society in building these frameworks. MCC’s upcoming Threshold Program in expanded programs focused on long-term reintegration for Honduras would be a timely vehicle for policy and institutional deportees. reforms on remittances. Standard MCC compacts, such as the one being renewed in El Salvador, and the Partnership Immigration Policy Reform for Growth are other opportunities to craft remittance policy Northern Triangle migrants in the United States are an frameworks. The Latino American Idea (discussed above) important resource for the economic survival of their fami- is a development program where remittance policy can be lies and communities back home. While reducing unauthor- showcased. ized immigration should be the long-term goal of countries Productive investment programs: One of the missing pieces of origin, in the medium-term both the United States and in connecting remittances to sustainable development in host countries could benefit from immigration reform that Central America is training recipients on how they might includes legal avenues for migration and guest workers in use their remittances for wealth-generating projects. The the United States. The DREAM Act, AgJOBS, and broader Inter-American Foundation is a leader in this regard. U.S. legalization proposals would all aid immigrants as well as development agencies have the capacity and presence their families in Central America. on the ground in the Northern Triangle to support this training. The Feed the Future programs in Guatemala and Extending Temporary Protective Status Honduras operate in rural communities and offer excellent Immigration reform has proven difficult in recent de- opportunities to include remittances in rural development cades and there is no certainty it will occur in the near fu- efforts. Since USAID is already working with multilateral ture, but there are short-term means to ease the burdens for organizations, such as IFAD, that have deep experience with Northern Triangle immigrants. About 217,000 Salvadorans remittances, there is a strong foundation for incorporating the and 66,000 Hondurans are living legally in the United States use of remittances in USAID’s sustainable rural development under the Department of Homeland Security’s Temporary strategy in the Northern Triangle. Protected Status (TPS) program. TPS provides a safe hav- en for citizens of foreign countries fleeing potentially dan- Repatriation gerous situations. It has been granted to Salvadorans and Support Long-Term Reintegration for Returnees Hondurans due to a series of natural disasters but is set to expire in 2013. Given the poverty and violence in their home USAID, IOM, and some Northern Triangle governments countries—and the lack of programs for long-term reintegra- are already providing immediate assistance to deportees. tion—TPS should be extended for those Northern Triangle To this should be combined with a long-term reintegration groups it currently covers. In lieu of a more extensive legal- program in partnership with the government of the send- ization, an extension of TPS would allow these groups to ing country that focuses on job training and placement. The continue working and supporting their families. IOM operates these types of programs in other parts of the world. Development organizations such as Catholic Relief For more information on Bread for the World Institute’s research on Services also have experience working with migration and migration and development, please contact Senior Immigration Policy development and could serve as partners and operators for Analyst Andrew Wainer at [email protected] or (202) 688-1074.

www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 15 Endnotes edu/hazards/research/qr/qr182/qr182.pdf 30 The World Bank. Data. “Poverty headcount 15 1 Ibid. ratio at national poverty line (% of popula- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Associa- tion).” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ tion. May 18, 2011. “NOAA and Partners 16 In this report, we use the International Fund for Agriculture Development’s (IFAD) SI.POV.NAHC/countries/SV?display=graph. Explore the Hidden World of the Maritime Accessed December 27, 2011. Maya.” http://researchmatters.noaa.gov/news/ definition of remittances as “a private flow Pages/MayanMariners.aspx of funds between family members. The term The World Bank. Data. “GDP per capita (cur- rent US$).” http://data.worldbank.org/indica- 2 Canadian Foundation for the Americas. is used colloquially to describe transfers of funds from migrants to families or friends in tor/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. Accessed December December 2010. “The Case for the - 27, 2011. Panama Free Trade Agreement.” http://www. the communities of origin.” This can include 31 The World Bank. Data. Guatemala. Ac- iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/07644.pdf money transfers, migrant philanthropy, and 3 migrant investment. The FFR Brief: Five Years of cessed December 27, 2011. http://data.world- CIA World Factbook. “Central America and the Financing Facility for Remittances. 2012. Rome: bank.org/country/guatemala Caribbean: Panama.” https://www.cia.gov/ International Fund for Agricultural Development. The World Bank. Data. “GDP per capita (cur- library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ http://www.ifad.org/remittances/pub/fiveyears.pdf rent US$).” http://data.worldbank.org/indica- pm.html 17 tor/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD Accessed December 4 Multilateral Investment Fund. 2011. “Remit- The Northern Triangle refers to Central tances to Latin America and the Caribbean 27, 2011. American nations with the highest levels of in 2010: Stabilization after the Crisis.” http:// 32 Food and Agriculture Organization of the unauthorized migration to the United States idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument. United Nations. 2011. “The State of Food In- and some of the highest levels of poverty and aspx?docnum=35788832. Inter-American security in the World: How does international inequality in Latin America: El Salvador, Development Bank. price volatility affect domestic economies and Guatemala, and Honduras. These nations 18 El Consejo Monetario Centroamericano. food security?” Annex Table, pg. 47. http:// and their migrants are the focus of this report. www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e.pdf “Northern Triangle” and “Central America” Secretaria Ejecutiva. http://www.secmca.org/. Accessed, March 14, 2012. Accessed December 27, 2011. are used interchangeably in this report except 33 when otherwise explicitly stated. 19 The World Bank. 2010. “Migration and Nybo, Thomas. February 18, 2009. “Fight- 5 Remittances Factbook 2011, 2nd Edition.” ing Chronic Malnutrition among Impover- Pew Hispanic Center. 2011. “Statistical ished Children in Guatemala.” UNICEF. Portrait of the Foreign-born Population in the http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/ Resources/Factbook2011-Ebook.pdf http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guate- United States, 2009.” http://www.pewhispanic. mala_48087.html org/files/2011/02/2009-FB-Profile-Final.pdf 20 Ibid. 6 21 Millennium Development Goal Achievement Orozco, Manuel. September 17, 2007. Fajnzylber, Pablo and J. Humberto Fund. “Combating Child Malnutrition in “Central America: remittances and the mac- López. 2008. “Remittances and Develop- Guatemala.” http://www.mdgfund.org/coun- roeconomic variable.” http://76.12.148.244/ ment: Lessons from Latin America.” The try/guatemala/story/Combatingchildmalnutri- PublicationFiles/central%20america%20remit- World Bank. http://www.oecd.org/datao- tioninGuatemala tances%20report%20iadbmif.pdf ecd/39/24/42716118.pdf 34 United Nations Development Program. 7 22 Hoeffer, Michael, et al. 2012. Ibid. 2011. “Human Development Report 2011: 8 The Economist. April 14, 2011. “The drug 23 International Fund for Agricultural Devel- Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future war hits Central America.” http://www. opment. February 2012. “The FFR Brief: Five for All.” http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/ economist.com/node/18560287 Passel, Jeffrey Years of the Financing Facility for Remit- HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf and D’Vera Cohn. September 1, 2010. “U.S. tances.” http://www.ifad.org/remittances/pub/ 35 The World Bank. Data. Guatemala. http:// Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down fiveyears.pdf data.worldbank.org/country/guatemala. Ac- Sharply Since Mid-Decade.” Pew Hispanic 24 Campos-Vásquez, Raymundo and Horacio cessed December 27, 2011. The World Bank. Center. http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/ Sobrazo. April 2012. “The Development and Data. “GDP per capita (current US$).” http:// reports/126.pdf Fiscal Effects of Emigration on Mexico.” data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. 9 Hoeffer, Michael, et al. 2012. Migration Policy Institute. http://www. PCAP.CD 10 Rosenblum, Marc and Kate Brick. August migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-fiscaleffects- 36 The World Bank. Doing Business. Economy 2011. “U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/ emigration.pdf Rankings. http://www.doingbusiness.org/rank- Central American Migrant Flows: Then and 25 In this report, “productive investment” is ings. Accessed March 12, 2012. Now.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www. defined as income-generating or job-creating 37 Vargas-Lundis, Rosemary (2004). Remit- migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-regional- investment in activities like a small business tances and Rural Development. International flows.pdf or agricultural production. Fund for Agricultural Development. Paper 11 Thomas, Kedron. Winter 2007. “Hurricane 26 International Fund for Agricultural Devel- prepared for the Twenty-Seventh Session Stan and Social Suffering in Guatemala: The opment. February 2012. of IFAD’s Governing Council, Rome, 18-19 Social Course of Natural Disaster.” http:// 27 Ibid. IFAD. February 2006. “Remittances: February 2004. www.drclas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/ spreading the benefits.” http://www.ifad.org/ 38 Gammage, Sarah. July 2007. “Country view/912 newsletter/update/2/2.htm Profile: El Salvador: Despite End to Civil 12 Lange, Jason. October 10, 2005. “Death 28 Hall, Joan. January 2010. “Ten Years of War, Emigration Continues.” http://www. Count from Hurricane Stan Rises in Mexico, Innovation in Remittances: Lessons Learned migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display. Central America.” http://www.catholicnews. and Models for the Future.” Multilateral In- cfm?ID=636 com/data/stories/cns/0505719.htm vestment Fund. Inter-American Development 39 Rosenblum, Marc. April 2011. “Obstacles 13 Dartmouth Flood Observatory. “Tropical Bank. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocu- and Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: Storm Stan - Central America and Southern ment.aspx?docnum=35163520 The U.S.-Mexico Case.” Migration Policy In- Mexico Landslide Detection Using ASTER in 29 Hoeffer, Michael, et al. 2012. “Estimates stitute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/ Guatemala and El Salvador.” http://www.dart- of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population USMexico-cooperation.pdf mouth.edu/~floods/2005139Landslide.html Residing in the United States: January 2011.” 40 http://justf.org/All_Grants_ 14 Hinshaw, Robert. January 2006. “QUICK Department of Homeland Security. http:// Country#econaid. Economic and Social Aid, RESPONSE REPORT: Hurricane Stan Re- www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publica- all programs. Accessed April 9, 2012. sponse in Guatemala.” http://www.colorado. tions/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf 41 The World Bank. Migration and Remit-

16 Briefing Paper, June 2012 tances. http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ competition for Hispanic entrepreneurs in Table 2 EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPEC the U.S.” http://www.iadb.org/en/news/news- 1 Pew Hispanic Center. May 26, 2011. “His- TS/0,,contentMDK:21121930~menuPK:31454 releases/2011-11-14/idb-partners-establish-la- panics of Honduran Origin in the United 70~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSite idea-competition,9681.html States, 2009.” http://pewhispanic.org/files/ PK:476883,00.html. Accessed May 29, 2012. 56 Office of Immigration Statistics. August 42 factsheets/78.pdf; Dockterman, Daniel. May Orozco, Manuel and Eve Hamilton. (2005). 2011. “2010 Yearbook of Immigration Sta- 26, 2011. “ of Salvadoran Origin in Development and Remittances to Guatemala: Issues, tistics. Department of Homeland Security. the United States, 2009.” http://www.pewhis- Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Cooperation. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ panic.org/2011/05/26/hispanics-of-salvadoran- 43 The Inter-American Foundation (IAF) is an yearbook/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf origin-in-the-united-states-2009/; Dockterman, independent U.S. government agency created 57 Orozco, Manuel. May 2012. “Future Trends Daniel. May 26, 2011. “Hispanics of Guatema- in 1969 to channel development assistance in Remittances to Latin America and the lan Origin in the United States, 2009.” http:// directly to the organized poor in Latin Caribbean.” The Inter-American Dialogue. www.pewhispanic.org/2011/05/26/hispanics-of- America and the Caribbean. The IAF works 58 The terms “deport” and “remove” are used guatemalan-origin-in-the-united-states-2009/ with grassroots groups and nongovernmental interchangeably in this report. 2 Dockterman, Daniel. May 26, 2011. organizations in response to its annual call for 59 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce- 3 proposals. It encourages partnerships among Dockterman, Daniel. May 26, 2011; U.S. community organizations, businesses, and ment. October 18, 2011. “FY 2011: ICE Census Bureau. April 20, 2010. “Census Bu- local government directed at improving the announces year-end removal numbers, high- reau Reports Nearly 6 in 10 Advanced Degree quality of life for poor people and strengthen- lights focus on key priorities including threats Holders Age 25-29 Are Women.” http://www. ing democratic practices. to public safety and national security.” http:// census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/educa- 44 www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washin tion/cb10-55.html Office of Innovation and Development gtondc.htm. Accessed December 28, 2011. Alliances. “Diaspora Engagement: Beyond Re- 60 López, Mark Hugo, et al. December 28, Table 3 mittances.” http://idea.usaid.gov/gp/diaspora/ 1 Hoeffer, Michael, et al. 2012. “Estimates diaspora-engagement-beyond-remittances. 2011. “As Deportations Rise to Record Levels, Most Latinos Oppose Obama’s Policy.” Pew of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Accessed March 15, 2012. Residing in the United States: January 2011.” 45 Hispanic Center. http://www.pewhispanic.org/ African Diaspora Marketplace. About files/2011/12/Deportations-and-Latinos.pdf Department of Homeland Security. http:// ADM. http://www.diasporamarketplace.org/ Seelke, Clare Ribando. January 3, 2011. www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publica- about-adm. Accessed May 3, 2012. tions/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf 46 “Gangs in Central America.” Congressional Passel, Jeffery and D’Vera Cohen. January Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 2 Brick, Kate, et al. June 2011. “Mexican and 9, 2012. “U.S. Foreign-Born Population: How row/RL34112.pdf Central American Immigrants in the United Much Change from 2009 to 2010?” http:// 61 López, Mark Hugo, et al. December 28, States.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www. www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/01/Foreign- migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MexCentAmim- Born-Population.pdf 2011. 62 migrants.pdf 47 The Brookings Institution. September 29, McCombs, Brady. October 27, 2011. “Most 3 deported illegal immigrants from 4 Latin Hoeffer, Michael, et al. 2012. 2011. “The Future of Central America: Chal- 4 lenges and Opportunities of Migration and American countries.” Arizona Daily Star. Ibid. Remittances.” http://www.brookings.edu/~/ http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/most- Table 4 deported-illegal-immigrants-from-latin-amer- media/Files/events/2011/0929_central_ameri- 1 The World Bank: Migration & Remittances. ca/20110929_central_america.pdf ican-countries/article_2943c31c-00d0-11e1- aca9-001cc4c03286.html#ixzz1uPExYJQH Annual Remittance Data Inflows. http://econ. 48 http://noapparentmotive.org/papers/Gam- worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXT- 63 Secretaria de Gobernación. Instituto Nacio- mage_Exporting_People.pdf DEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMD nal de Migracion. Boletín Estadístico. http:// 49 Orozco, Manuel and Mariellen Malloy K:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:6416502 www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/Boletin_Es- Jewers. 2011. “Trends and Policy Issues Af- 6~theSitePK:476883,00.html tadistico_2011 fecting Mexico and Central America. Briefing 2 Economic Commission for Latin America 64 International Organization for Migra- Paper prepared for Security and Migration in and the Caribbean. 2011. “Foreign Direct tion. March 6, 2011. “IOM Helps Guate- Mexico and Central America, July 14, 2011. Investment in Latin America and the Carib- malan Migrants Returned from U.S. and 50 Gammage, Sarah. May 2005. “Export- bean.” http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/ Mexico.” http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/ ing People and Recruiting Remittances: A xml/0/43290/2011-138-LIEI_2010-WEB_IN- media/press-briefing-notes/pbnAM/cache/ Development Strategy for El Salvador.” http:// GLES.pdf offonce?entryId=29748 noapparentmotive.org/papers/Gammage_Ex- 3 65 Shifter, Michael. April 2012. “Counter- Organization for Economic Co-operation porting_People.pdf and Development (OECD). Development 51 ing Criminal Violence in Central America.” Ledwith, Tim. December 11, 2009. “Salva- Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) doran floods test resilience of families and Council on Foreign Relations. 66 http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349, effectiveness of humanitarian aid.” UNICEF. Committee on the Judiciary, House of en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/elsalva- Representatives. January 26, 2011. “ICE 4 WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT—UP TO World Bank. 2011. “Migration and Remit- dor_52082.html tances Factbook 2011.” http://siteresources. 52 The World Bank. Data. El Salvador. http:// THE JOB?” http://judiciary.house.gov/hear- ings/printers/112th/112-2_63875.pdf worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Fact- data.worldbank.org/country/el-salvador book2011-Ebook.pdf 53 67 U.S. Department of State. November 29, Orozco, Manuel and Katherine Scaife Diaz. 5 United Nations Development Programme. 2011. “Partnerships at Work: Western Union’s 2011. “Partnership for Growth.” http://www. state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177887.htm Human Development Report 2009. “In- 4x1 Experience in Mexico.” Washington, DC: ternational financial flows: remittances, Inter-American Dialogue. Table 1 official development assistance and foreign 54 Ibid. 1 Brick, Kate, et al. June 2011. “Mexican and direct investment.” http://www.undp.org.tr/ 55 U.S. Department of State. “Unleashing Central American Immigrants in the United publicationsDocuments/E%20Internation- Ideas.” http://www.laidea.us/ States.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www. al%20financial%20flows%20remittances,%20 Inter-American Development Bank. Novem- migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MexCentAmim- official%20development.pdf ber 14, 2011. “IDB, partners establish new migrants.pdf 6 Ibid. www.bread.org Bread for the World Institute 17 Table 5 Table 6 3 Secretaria de Gobernación. Instituto Nacio- 1 1 nal de Migracion. “BOLETÍN MENSUAL DE Data for 2010. Orozco, Manuel and Mariel- The World Bank. Data, GDP Growth (An- ESTADÍSTICAS MIGRATORIAS 2011. III. len Mallory Jewers. July 2011. “Trends and nual %). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ EXTRANJEROS ALOJADOS Y DEVUEL- Policy Issues Affecting Mexico and Central NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG TOS. Cuadro 3.2.5. http://www.inm.gob.mx/ America.” 2 The World Bank. Data. Per Capita GDP index.php/page/Extranjeros_Alojados_y_ 2 Data for 2004. Gammage, Sarah. July 2007. (Current US$). http://data.worldbank.org/ Devueltos_01 “El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emi- indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 3 Rounded to the nearest percent. Guatemala Table 9 gration Continues.” http://www.migrationin- 1 formation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=636 poverty data from 2006. The World Bank. Secretaria de Gobernación. Instituto Nacio- nal de Migracion. “BOLETÍN MENSUAL DE 3 Data for 2004. Includes the categories “agri- Data. Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population). http://data. ESTADÍSTICAS MIGRATORIAS III. EX- cultural inputs” and “savings.” Ibid. worldbank.org/country/el-salvador. Source for TRANJEROS ALOJADOS Y DEVUELTOS. 4 Data for 2004. Consumption includes goods U.S. poverty rate: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Cuadro 3.2.1. “Eventos de extranjeros devuel- such as food, utilities, clothing, etc. Ibid. September 13, 2011. “Income, Poverty and tos por la autoridad migratoria mexicana, 5 Data for 2008; includes percentage of total Health Insurance Coverage in the United según continente y país de nacionalidad.” population. Center for Latin American Mon- States: 2010.” http://www.census.gov/news- http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/Ex- etary Studies. World Bank. 2010. “Program room/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb11- tranjeros_Alojados_y_Devueltos_01. Excel 157.html sheets for years 2008-2011. for Application of General Principles for 2 Latin American and Caribbean Remittance 4 United Nations Development Programme. Department of Homeland Security, Office Markets.” http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/get- Country Profiles and International Human of Immigration Statistics. August 2011. “2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.” http:// document.aspx?docnum=35434997 Development Indicators. http://hdr.undp.org/ en/data/map/ www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/year- 6 Data for 2010. Includes the category “Start book/2010/ois_yb_2010.pdf a business.” UNICEF and IOM. March 2011. Table 7 3 McCombs, Brady. October 27, 2011. “Most “Encuesta sobre remesas 2010: Protección de 1 The World Bank. Data. Population, total. deported illegal immigrants from 4 Latin la Niñez y Adolescencia. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. American countries.” Arizona Daily Star. 7 Data for 2010. Includes food, clothing, trans- TOTL http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/most- portation, home appliances, etc. UNICEF and 2 United Nations Development Programme. deported-illegal-immigrants-from-latin-amer- IOM. March 2011. International Human Development Indica- ican-countries/article_2943c31c-00d0-11e1- aca9-001cc4c03286.html#ixzz1tXW4DTGn 8 Data for 2008. Orozco, Manuel. June 2008. tors. Public Data Explorer. http://hdr.undp. “Sinopsis de los resultados de la última org/en/data/explorer/ Table 10 encuesta sobre remesas y migración realizada 3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 1 Seelke, Clare Ribando. January 2012. “Gangs en Junio 2008.” http://www.thedialogue.org/ Global Study on Homicide, 2011. http://www. in Central America.” Congressional Research PublicationFiles/Encuesta%20de%20Reme- unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/ Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ sas%20a%20Honduras%202008_08.pdf statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homi- RL34112.pdf 9 Data for 2011. Includes the categories “sav- cide_2011_web.pdf Table 11 ings” and “investment.” Banco Central de Table 8 1 Washington Office on Latin America. “Just Honduras. January 2012. “Encuesta Semes- 1 McCombs, Brady. October 27, 2011. “Most the Facts: A Civilian’s Guide to Defense and tral de “Remesas Familiares enviadas por deported illegal immigrants from 4 Latin Security Assistance in Latin America and the hondureños residentes en el exterior y gastos American countries.” Arizona Daily Star. Caribbean.” Economic and Social Aid, All Pro- efectuados en el país durante sus visitas.” http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/most- grams, Entire Region, 2008-2013. http://justf. http://www.bch.hn/download/remesas_famili- deported-illegal-immigrants-from-latin-amer- org/All_Grants_Country ares/remesas_familiares_012012.pdf ican-countries/article_2943c31c-00d0-11e1- 2 World Bank. Data. Net ODA Received Per 10 Data for 2011. Includes food, transport, aca9-001cc4c03286.html#ixzz1tXW4DTGn Capita (current US $). http://data.worldbank. clothing and other basic necessities. Ibid. 2 McCombs, Brady. October 27, 2011. org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS

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