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Facts on File News Services Facts On File News Services http://www.2facts.com/PrintPage.aspx?PIN=1982010760 Issue Date: April 09, 1982 Argentine Invasion Force Seizes Falkland Islands; U.N. Demands Pullout; Britain Dispatches Task Force Diplomatic Solution Pursued Details of Invasion Argentine Hold Consolidated The British Reaction Economic Sanctions Imposed Task Force Puts to Sea War Zone Declared U.N. Calls for Argentina to Withdraw World Reaction U.S. Attempts Diplomacy History of the Falklands Diplomatic Solution Pursued Several thousand Argentine troops seized control of the British-held Falkland islands, about 250 miles (400 kilometers) off the Argentine coast in the South Atlantic, the morning of April 2. The British dependencies of South Georgia and South Sandwich islands were also taken over by Argentine military forces, the Argentine military junta announced. [See 1982 Argentina: Falkland Islands Dispute with Britain] The islands had long been a subject of diplomatic contention between British and Argentina. Argentina claimed the islands rightfully belonged to it, but Great Britain refused to cede control of the islands and observed that the inhabitants--who numbered slightly under 2,000--wished to remain a part of the U.K. and were by culture and descent British. Virtually the only economic activity on the islands at present was sheep herding, but the suspected presence of oil the offshore region meant that the islands might ultimately have considerable value. The invasion produced a political crisis in Britain. Parliament met April 3 for its first weekend session since the Suez crisis in 1956, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that the Falklands "remain British territory" and the government would take action "to see the islands are free from occupation." Britain had severed its diplomatic relations with Argentina April 2 in response to the first news of the invasion, and Thatcher told Parliament April 3 that a large naval task force was being dispatched to the islands. Economic sanctions were also invoked. Defense Secretary John Nott vowed April 4 that the government would "restore British administration to the Falklands even if we have to fight." Thatcher and her government came under intense criticism, however, for not having taken measures to forestall the Argentine invasion. Members of Thatcher's own Conservative Party joined in the criticism, and there were calls for the resignation of leading ministers. Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington resigned April 5, acknowledging that Britain had suffered a "humiliating affront." The British task force set sail April 5 from Portsmouth harbor, It would be joined by other British warships at Gibraltar. With the Falklands some 8,000 miles (13,000 kilometers) distant from Britain, the ships would need two weeks or more to arrived at their destination. The two weeks' sailing time left some room for efforts at a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. The United Nations Security Council April 3 approved a resolution calling for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands. Officials of both Argentina and Britain voiced hopes that the issue could be resolved peacefully, and it was announced April 7 that U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig would visit both London and Buenos Aires in an attempt to find a compromise solution. Details of Invasion The invasion was preceded by weeks of increasing tension between Britain and Argentina over the islands. Rex Hunt, the British governor of the Falklands, called an emergency meeting of government and other island officials April 1 at which he said that there was evidence of an Argentine naval task force steaming toward the islands, presumably bent on invasion. After the meeting, the island's contingent of about 80 Royal Marines was deployed at various sites and the hospital was prepared for casualties. The Argentine invasion fleet included an aging aircraft carrier, the 25 de Mayo, and landing craft and destroyers. Some 4,000 to 5,000 Argentine troops took part in the invasion, the actual landing taking place about six in the morning of April 2. The marines put up a resistance, holding out for about three hours with light arms and some rockets. No British casualties were reported, and there was some disagreement over the extent of Argentine losses. Hunt and the marines were repatriated to Britain, and at an April 5 press conference in London a marine officer said that at least five Argentine soldiers were killed and 17 others wounded, In addition, an Argentine armored car with 10 soldiers. inside was destroyed, the marine claimed. Argentina acknowledge 1 of 6 5/26/2011 11:35 Facts On File News Services http://www.2facts.com/PrintPage.aspx?PIN=1982010760 some losses, but fewer than the British claimed. Hunt ordered his forces to abandon the fight at 9:00 a.m. "We were prepared to do what was necessary, But there was no point in waiting for a 300millimeter cannon to blow up Government House when some civilians would have been injured,: Hunt said at the April 5 press conference. There was brief fighting April 3 on South Georgia Island, a dependency of the Falklands about 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) southeast of the Falklands. About 12 to 20 British marines stationed at Port Grytviken were overrun by an Argentine invasion Force. Three Argentine Marines were killed, while the British suffered no casualties. The conquest of the Falklands appeared to enjoy strong popular support in Argentina. (In fact, some observers contented that the Argentine government embarked upon the undertaking partly as a way of shifting public attention away from economic and political discontent.) Lt. Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the ruling junta, was cheered by a crowd of about 5,000 people April 2 after he told of the invasion in a nationwide broadcast. In the broadcast, Galtieri said, "We have regained the southern islands that legitimately form part of our national patrimony-- safeguarding the national honor--without rancor, but with the firmness demanded by the circumstances." The government had decided on the invasion "to put an end to the interminable succession of British evasions and delays designed to perpetuate their dominion over the islands and their zone of influence." Argentine Hold Consolidated The Argentine government announced April 2 the appointment of Brig. Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez as governor of the islands, which Argentine referred to as the Malvinas. Menendez arrived in the Falklands April 45, having told reporters that day in Buenos Aires that "we're going to begin a period of consolidation now in which all military action confronting an English threat is still tremendously important to affirm our hold of the archipelago." In the days following the invasion Argentina continued to dispatch troops and equipment to the islands to fortify them against possible British action. Menendez was formally installed as government of the islands April 7. Interior Minister Gen. Alfredo St. Jean attended the ceremony, and he was accompanied by leaders of the political opposition in Argentina. Criticism of the military junta had temporarily abated in a general upwelling of support for the seizure of the Falklands. Visiting the Falklands with St. Jean were Deolindo Bittel, head of the Peronist party, and Saul Ubaldini, head of the General Confederation of Labor, which had shortly before staged the largest antigovernment demonstrations since the military seized power six years before. [See 1982 Argentina: Protests Against Military Rule] Ubaldini commented April 7, "What we want more than anything is sovereignty over all the nation," while Bittel said he was going to the islands "to ratify the military." The Argentine government had announced April 5 that it was sending education, welfare and legal experts to begin the process of bringing the islands into conformity with Argentine systems. On April 2, the government had promised to "guarantee the safety, lives, property and rights of British citizens and English-speaking Argentines in the islands. The following day, April 3, the government issued orders requiring the inhabitants of the islands to remain indoors. They were instructed to hang a white flag from their windows if they needed help, and they would be provided with assistance by Argentine soldiers. Schools, banks and business were all temporarily shut down. Penalties were announced of 15 days' imprisonment for going outside, 30 days for "inconsiderate" acts toward the military, 60 days for any "irreverent act" toward "the patriotic symbols" of Argentina, and 180 days for disturbing the political order. The foreign ministry announced April 5, however, that the rule against going outdoors had been relaxed. Argentine officials indicated that they would welcome a diplomatic resolution of their differences with Britain, but they also insisted that any British attempt to retake the islands by force would be repulsed. President Galtieri dais April 4 that it should be "made very clear to all the international community, that if the Argentine people are attacked by military, naval, land or air means, the Argentine nation in arms, with all the means at its disposal, will present battle." The British Reaction The Falklands invasion posed the most serious threat to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government since it had taken power three years before, and she responded by taking a firm line that Britain would use military force if necessary to regain the islands. The first wave of popular reaction appeared to favor Thatcher's stand. She and her government nevertheless came in for harsh criticism for having allowed Argentina to seize control of the islands. Lord Wigg, a Laborite, observed April 3, "We have spent 111 billion pounds on defense since the end of the last war and we can't knock the skin off a rice pudding." The criticism came from within the ranks of Thatcher's own party as well.
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