INTRODUCTION EH Carr Argued That
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Notes INTRODUCTION 1. E.H. Carr argued that 'it would be far-fetched to suggest that it was dogma which drove the politicians to act as they did': 'Revolution from Above: Some Notes on the Decision to Collectivise Soviet Agriculture' in K.H. Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr (eds), The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honour of Herbert Marcuse (Boston, Beacon Press, 1967), p. 316. In contrast, R. Conquest affirmed that 'the communist ideology provided the motivation for an unprecedented massacre of men, women and children': The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (London, Arrow, 1988), p. 344. For the opposing viewpoints see the debate between A. Nove and J. Millar in 'A Debate on Collectivisation: Was Stalin Really Neces sary?', Problems of Communism, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1976). 2. This interpretation is followed in recent publications by the leading Russian historians of collectivization: V.P. Danilov and N.V. Teptsov, 'Kollek tivizatsiia: kak eto bylo', Parts one and two, Pravda, 26 August and 16 September 1988; V.P. Danilov, Kollektivizatsiia: kak eto bylo, stranitsy istorii sovetskogo obshchestva: fakty, problemy, liudi (Moscow, Naukha, 1989); V.P. Danilov and N.A. Ivnitsky (eds), Dokumenty svidetel' stvuiut, iz istorii derevni nakanune i v klzode kollektivizatsii 1927-1932 gg. (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo, 1989), p. 50. 3. This notion originated in the work of the Russian economic historian A.A. Barsov, who asserted that 'the majority of the accumulation needed for the implementation of socialist industrialisation ... was created by the working class': Balans stoimostnykh obmenov mezhdu gorodom i derevni (Moscow, Nauka, 1969), p. 137. It was then developed in J. Millar, 'Mass Collectiv ization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five Year Plan: A Review Article', Slavic Review, Vol. 33, No.1, December 1974, pp. 750-66. See also H. Hunter, 'The Overambitious First Soviet Five Year Plan', Slavic Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, June 1974. 4. In the summer of 1929, Trotsky wrote: 'Finding themselves in an economic cul-de-sac, the Stalinist cadres, against their will, are conducting a leftward zig-zag, which in the process of struggle has taken them further to the left than they wanted': Biulleten' oppozitsii, No. l-2, July 1929, p. 9. 5. I. Deutscher proposed that Stalin's 'second revolution' was initiated in an 'unpremeditated, pragmatic manner' and was 'precipitated' by events in 1928-29: Stalin, A Political Biography (London, Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 318, 322. E.H. Carr rather contradictorily argued that the deci sions were ideologically motivated, 'dictated by the dynamic force inherent in the revolution itself', in Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, Vol. 1 (London, Macmillan, 1958), pp. 174-86; and that they were 'precipitately adopted' and 'something of a puzzle', in The Critical Spirit, p. 313. M. Lewin held that Stalin's concern for a 'short-term policy of moderate aims' was pushed to extreme solutions by the grain crisis, and that 'events drove the Communist Party leadership to embark upon mass collectivization': 'The 218 Immediate Background to Soviet Collectivization', an article of 1965 repub lished in The Making of the Soviet System (London, Methuen, 1985), pp. 98-100, 110, and his Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, A Study of Col lectivization (London, Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 20. 0. Narkiewicz argued that the decisions were taken on 'the spur of the moment': 'Soviet Admin istration and the Grain Crisis of 1927-28', Soviet Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 1968, p. 235. For a Russian version of this analysis see N.A. lvnitsky, Klassovaia bar' ba v derevne i likvidatsiia kulachestva kak klassa (1929- 1932 gg.) (Moscow, Nauka, 1972). 6. R.W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agri culture, 1929-1930 (London, Macmillan, 1980), pp. 116-37; L. Viola, Best Sons of the Fatherland, Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987). 7. Carr held that Stalinist policy was 'essentially impersonal': Socialism in One Country, Vol. 1, p. 174. Nove argued that the policy of collectivization 'cannot be attributed to Stalin personally, and therefore the consequences which flowed from its adoption must be a matter of more than personal responsibility': Was Stalin Really Necessary? Some Problems of Soviet Political Economy (London, Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 24. 8. For a recent collection of essays representing this oeuvre see W.G. Rosenberg and L.H. Siegelbaum (eds), Social Dimensions ofIndustrialization (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993). 9. See H. Kuromiya, Stalin's Industrial Revolution, Politics and Workers, 1928- 1932 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988); S. Fitzpatrick (ed.), Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington, Indiana Univer sity Press, 1978), pp. 17-18, 133-4. Fitzpatrick's hypothesis is that the Stalin revolution was 'the period in which the social and generational ten sions of NEP came to a climax in an onslaught ... on privilege and estab lished authority': ibid., p. 11. A recent study suggested that generational conflict between peasant migrant workers (otkhodniki) and village elders was a more useful explanation of peasant conflict during collectivization. This study was, however, based on the Moscow Region, which was signifi cantly untypical in terms of the close interaction of the peasant economy with the metropolitan economy: David L. Hoffman, 'Land, Freedom and Discontent: Russian Peasants of the Central Industrial Region Prior to Col- 1ectivisation', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 46, No.4, 1994, pp. 579-96. 10. J. Arch Getty, 'The Politics of Stalinism' in Alec Nove (ed.), The Stalin Phenomenon (London, Wiedenfield & Nicholson, 1993), p. 132. 11. R. Tucker pointed to the 'system of obligatory labour and the immobilisa tion of the peasant' as the key institutional developments under collectiv ization which reverted to serfdom: 'A Choice of Lenin's' in G.R. Urban (ed.), Stalinism, Its Impact on Russia and the World (London, St Martin's Press, 1982}, pp. 157-8. 12. N. Mandelstam, Hope Against Hope: A Memoir, trans. M. Hayward (London, Collins and Harvill Press, 1970), p. 13. 13. S. Johnson and P. Temin, 'The Macroeconomics of NEP', Economic His tory Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1993, pp. 750-67. 14. The exception is M. Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (London, Uriwin Hyman, 1958, repr. 1989). Fainsod drew on the materials of the Smolensk Notes 219 Oblast party archive captured by the US anny from the Gennans in 1945. Fainsod devoted only one chapter of twenty-three to collectivization and dekulakization, and, besides, Smolensk was a minor agricultural area: it was neither a grain producing region, nor an area of comprehensive collectiviza tion or mass dekulakization. 15. For the alternate viewpoints see E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century' and 'The Moral Economy Reviewed', Chapters 4 and 5 respectively of his Customs in Common, (Lon don, Penguin, 1993). Chapter 4 is a reprint of an article first published in Past and Present in 1971; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (London, Yale Uni versity Press, 1976); Samuel L. Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979). For a critique see William J. Booth, 'On the Idea of the Moral Economy', American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 653-67. 16. Thompson, p. 188. 17. Scott (1976), p. vii. 18. Barrington Moore, Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (Harmondsworth, Per egrine, 1969), pp. 453-83. 19. Eric Wolf 'On Peasant Rebellions' in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971), p. 272. 20. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 114-15. The leverage was detennined by three factors: the solidarity of peasant communities, peasant autonomy and state coercive sanctions. 21. For these classic fonns of peasant resistance see James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (London, Yale Univer sity Press, 1985). 22. Karl Marx, The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), pp. 159, 302-8; The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bona parte (Moscow, Progress, 1967), p. 106. 23. Robert Redfield, The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971). 24. Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Centwy (New York, Harper Row, 1969), p. 282; Henry A. Landsberger, Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change (London, Macmillan, 1974), pp. 21-2, 49-51. 25. See Teodor Shanin, The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society: Russia 1910-1925 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972). 26. The concept was first applied by Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965). A detailed treatment of peasant collective action was provided by Popkin, especially Chapters 1, 2 and 6. 27. Ibid., pp. 20-3. 28. Ibid., pp. 24-7. The significance of selective incentives in peasant collective action is discussed in Mark Lichbach, 'What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action', World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 3, April 1994, pp. 383-418. 220 Notes 29. Olson, pp. 1-2, 48, 53-4, 60-5. Olson has applied his ideas to contempor ary Soviet-type societies but not to the historical context of Stalinism: 'The Logic of Collective Action in Soviet-type Societies', Journal of Soviet Nationalities, No. 1, 1990, pp. 8-27. 30. Ibid., p. 245. CHAPTER 1 CAPTURING THE PEASANTRY 1. For the growth of grain production in Siberia and the causes of the grain crisis see James Hughes, Stalin, Siberia and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.