DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Civil Nuclear Sector

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Civil Nuclear Sector OCCASIONAL PAPER 2102 China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords? Edited by Henry D. Sokolski March 2021 Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Copyright © 2021 by Henry D. Sokolski Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Arlington, VA 22209 www.npolicy.org Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writting from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Cover images, from top left clockwise: 1) China’s first experimental fast breeder reactor under con- truction in Tuoli, China in June 2004; 2) an enlarged satellite image of the demonstration reprocess- ing plant on March 12, 2020, in Jinta, Gansu Province; 3) the People’s Republic of China showcasing new Dong Feng 41 (DF-41 / CSS-X-10) missiles at its 70th anniversary military parade; 4) operators of China National Nuclear Corporation’s (CNNC) large-scale demonstration centrifuge project at the Hanzhun fuel facility in Shaanxi province. China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords? Edited by Henry D. Sokolski Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Occasional Paper 2102 March 2021 Series Editor: Henry D. Sokolski Nonproliferation Policy Education Center The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization, is a nonpartisan, educational organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists, and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them. For current publications of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, please visit www.npolicy.org. Contents Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................... ii Preface Christopher Ford and Thomas Countryman ................................................................................................1 Introduction: China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords? Henry D. Sokolski ........................................................................................................................................3 Chapter 1: How Many Nuclear Warheads China Might Acquire by 2030 Thomas B. Cochran and Henry D. Sokolski ................................................................................................6 Chapter 2: China’s Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Recycling 2020-2040: Current Practices and Projected Capacities Hui Zhang ..................................................................................................................................................25 Chapter 3: China’s Current Stocks of Separated Plutonium and Possible Growth to 2040 Greg Jones .................................................................................................................................................54 Chapter 4: Projecting Plutonium Stocks to 2040 Frank Von Hippel .......................................................................................................................................65 Chapter 5: Does China Need to Fuel its Power Reactors with Plutonium? David Von Hippel .......................................................................................................................................87 Appendix A: Can the IAEA Safeguard Fuel-Cycle Facilities? The Historical Record Alan J. Kuperman, David Sokolow, Edwin S. Lyman ..............................................................................133 Appendix B: Review: Why Marginal Improvements in Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Facilities Are Unlikely Ever to Be Enough Ryan A. Snyder .........................................................................................................................................150 About the Authors ..................................................................................................................................155 i Acknowledgments This volume of research was supported by grants from the MacArthur Foundation, the Scaife Founda- tion, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the US Department of State’s Bureau of Arms Control Verification and Compliance. Brooke Buskirk is responsible for the volume’s formatting and assembly. The research, of course, would not have been possible without the contributions of the volume’s authors. ii Preface This is an important and worrying report. It is widely known that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons, which at this point even its own diplomats do not much trouble themselves to deny. What is less clear, however, is how fast this build-up is occurring and – most critically – how long and to what level Beijing intends to continue this expansion. This new NPEC Occasional Paper on “China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?” does not answer those questions. It does, however, provide new insight into the degree to which China’s current trajectory in the civil nuclear arena will have the result of placing enormous additional quantities of weapons-usable plutonium into the hands of the Chinese government as that country moves into large- scale plutonium reprocessing in order to produce fuel for a new generation of plutonium-fueled breeder reactors. The two of us served consecutively as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, and we both for a time additionally fulfilled the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. We have worked long and hard for presidents who could hardly be more different, we support opposing political parties, and we most assuredly disagree about many of the more important issues in American foreign and national security policy today. Yet despite our very different perspectives, we agree – as foreign policy and national security profession- als – that there is essentially nothing good that can be said about the prospect of the PRC acquiring an ad- ditional 1,440 additional kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the two “civilian” breeder reactors it is presently constructing – nor about the additional 110 kilograms of plutonium that China could recover by processing material from its small experimental fast breeder reactor. This expanding Chinese reprocessing program is especially problematic, not to mention hypocritical, in light of China’s own oft-expressed security concerns about the very large plutonium stocks still held by its neighbor Japan. After more than 40 years of pursuing the plutonium option for power generation, Japan is still far from making it economically competitive with other nuclear and non-nuclear options, and has accumulated many tons of plutonium, the disposal of which in non-breeder reactors would take decades to accomplish, even assuming its whole reactor fleet still returns online. China claims to see that stockpile as a potential threat, even though Japan would have to work quite hard (as well as break its treaty commit- ments) to convert such material into nuclear weapons, since, thankfully, it lacks both a nuclear weapons production infrastructure and systems for delivering any such weapons to their targets. China, however, lacks neither of those things, and is moreover presently engaged in a large nuclear weapons build-up that U.S. intelligence officials publicly estimate will result in at least a doubling (or more) of the size of Bei- jing’s nuclear arsenal – which today is only a small fraction the size of the U.S. or Russian arsenals – over the course of the next decade. 1 China’s Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords? To be sure, there is at present no evidence that China intends to divert its potential new plutonium horde to weapons use, though Beijing continues to be rather conspicuous in its refusal to adopt a moratorium on fissile material production for weapons purposes and has collaborated with Pakistan for many years to pre- vent the U.N. Conference on Disarmament from negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Our concern and that of this study is not that Beijing necessarily intends to divert these huge quantities of plutonium to weapons, but that it could do so and might yet choose to – and that China’s civil-nuclear excursion into the “plutonium economy,” an effort that is neither technically necessary nor likely to be economically worthwhile, represents a colossal global security liability. As this report makes clear, if China opted to di- vert its burgeoning civil-nuclear plutonium program to weapons purposes, it could increase the size of its operational nuclear arsenal to a level approximating those of the United States or the Russian Federation. China’s determination to pursue plutonium reprocessing and breeder reactors seems to be driven by its de- sire to dominate the future’s cutting-edge technologies, as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s broader agenda of making the PRC the pre-eminent world power by 2049 – the centennial of the Party’s seizure of power. Most technically capable countries, however, have correctly concluded that fueling fast reac- tors with plutonium is better described as “pipe dream” than “cutting-edge.” As this report demonstrates, creating more plutonium (beyond the c.500 tons humans have created since the 1940s) will not solve the essential problem: plutonium is a product of negative economic value, the very existence of which creates unnecessary
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Nuclear Safeguards Regulations 20
    Draft Regulations laid before Parliament under sections 113(2)(a) and (aa) of the Energy Act 2013 and section 2(5) of the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018, for approval by resolution of each House of Parliament. DRAFT STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 20-- No. ENERGY The Nuclear Safeguards Regulations 20-- Made - - - - *** Coming into force - - *** The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 74(3), 75, 76, 76A(1)(a) and (b), 76A(2), 76A(3), 76A(6), 113(7), of and paragraphs 2 to 16 of Schedule 2 to the Energy Act 2013(a) and by sections 2(1) and (3) of the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018, makes the following Regulations: In accordance with section 113(2)(a) and (aa) of the Energy Act and with section 2(5) of the Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018, a draft of these Regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Citation and commencement 1.—(1) These Regulations may be cited as the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations 20--. (2) Subject to paragraph (3), these Regulations come into force on **** 20--. (3) Regulations [ ] come into force on [ ]. Interpretation 2. In these Regulations— “Additional Protocol” means the Protocol dated [ ], entered into between the United Kingdom and the Agency which is additional to the Agreement with the Agency; “adjustment” means an entry made in an accounting record or a report, which is required by these Regulations, and which shows a shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for; “Agency” means the International Atomic Energy Agency; (a) 2013 c.32.
    [Show full text]
  • The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier Wai Kit Wicky Tse University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian History Commons, Asian Studies Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Tse, Wai Kit Wicky, "Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 589. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/589 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/589 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier Abstract As a frontier region of the Qin-Han (221BCE-220CE) empire, the northwest was a new territory to the Chinese realm. Until the Later Han (25-220CE) times, some portions of the northwestern region had only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its coalescence into the Chinese empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest, which arguably defined the egionr 's military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural environment of the region, only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the region fostered vigorous warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured prominently in this highly militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the imperial center that promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater degree of transregional integration. As this project shows, it was the northwesterners who went through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han times played a harbinger role of the disintegration of the empire and eventually led to the breakdown of the early imperial system in Chinese history.
    [Show full text]
  • Chemical and Morphological Studies Could Be Made of Polysomes of Lymphoid Tissue Cells During Response to Antigen Injection
    THE NA TURE OF POLYSOMES ISOLATED FROM SPLEEN CELLS OF RATS STIMULATED BY ANTIGEN* BY MARIANO F. LA VIA, t ALBERT E. VATTER, WILLIAM S. HAMMOND,t AND PATRICIA V. NORTHUP DEPARTMENT OF PATHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO MEDICAL CENTER, DENVER Communicated by Paul R. Cannon, November 7, 1966 Kern and co-workers' were the first to examine the molecular mechanism of im- munoglobulin synthesis and concluded that this process is similar to the synthesis of other proteins. Recently, lymphoid tissues have been studied by more refined electron microscopic2' I and biochemical techniques4- in an effort to examine details of the mechanism of synthesis of antibody. The data presented in many of these studies are difficult to reconcile with present models of polypeptide synthesis on polysomes. The current hypothesis is that the size of a fully functional polysome should be compatible with the size of the product of synthesis.7 Thus for L and H chains one would expect polysomes in the range of 7 and 15 ribosomes, respectively. The examination of polysomal units of immunoglobulin synthesis isolated from lymph node and spleen homogenates has been complicated by the presence of high- activity ribonucleases (RNases). These tissues seem to lack the RNase inhibitors present in liver cells.8 The contradictory results of experiments in this field might be due to endogenous RNases. On the other hand, synthesis of an antibody mole- cule might proceed differently from the model proposed for other polypeptides. The work reported here is the result of efforts to develop a system in which bio- chemical and morphological studies could be made of polysomes of lymphoid tissue cells during response to antigen injection.
    [Show full text]
  • Study on Japan's Nuclear Materials
    Study on Japan's Nuclear Materials China Arms Control and Disarmament Association China Institute of Nuclear Information and Economics September 2015 Foreword The nuclear accident in March 2011 in Fukushima, Japan brought a disaster to the safety of local residents and to the environment of surrounding regions. However, the Japanese government failed to inform the international community of the accident in a timely, accurate, and comprehensive manner. The accident's consequential impacts still linger on today, and the international community is still highly concerned about the safety of Japan’s nuclear facilities. In early 2014, media reports held that around 331 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium had been stored by Japan for years. And in fact, Japan has stored a lot of sensitive nuclear materials for a long time, which far exceeds its actual need. The imbalance between supply and demand of nuclear materials in Japan has given rise to the concern of and questions raised by the international community. Why does Japan store nuclear materials in such a large amount? How to ensure their safety? How to effectively prevent disasters similar to the Fukushima nuclear accident from happening again? How to ensure that these materials will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes? What measures should be taken to solve this serious imbalance of supply and demand of nuclear materials in Japan? These are questions that are often raised. Regretably, the Japanese government has yet to answer these questions. In September 2015, the Japanese Diet ratified the new bills. In recent years, right-wings forces in Japan have kept denying the history of aggression of Japan and advocated the revision of Japan's "Peace Constitution", Which have aroused vigilance among all peace-loving people.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Fissile Material Production and Stockpile
    China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile Hui Zhang Research Report No. 17 International Panel on Fissile Materials China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile Hui Zhang 2017 International Panel on Fissile Materials This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution – Noncommercial License To view a copy of this license, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 On the cover: The map shows fissile material production sites in China. Table of Contents About IPFM 1 Overview 2 Introduction 4 HEU production and inventory 7 Plutonium production and inventory 20 Summary 36 About the author 37 Endnotes 38 About the IPFM The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) was founded in January 2006. It is an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from seventeen countries, including both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. The mission of the IPFM is to analyze the technical bases for practical and achievable policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched urani- um and plutonium. These fissile materials are the key ingredients in nuclear weapons, and their control is critical to nuclear disarmament, halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and ensuring that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of fissile materials have to be addressed. The nuclear weapon states still have enough fissile materials in their weapon and naval fuel stock- piles for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. On the civilian side, enough plutonium has been separated to make a similarly large number of weapons. Highly enriched ura- nium fuel is used in about one hundred research reactors.
    [Show full text]
  • Systematic and Dramatic Tuning on Gas Sorption Performance In
    Communication pubs.acs.org/JACS Systematic and Dramatic Tuning on Gas Sorption Performance in Heterometallic Metal−Organic Frameworks † ‡ † † † Quan-Guo Zhai, Xianhui Bu,*, Chengyu Mao, Xiang Zhao, and Pingyun Feng*, † Department of Chemistry, University of California, Riverside, California 92521, United States ‡ Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, California State University, Long Beach, California 90840, United States *S Supporting Information challenge is how to deal with the infinite possibilities, and more so ABSTRACT: Despite their having much greater potential the perceived impossibilities, of combining metals to create high- for compositional and structural diversity, heterometallic performance materials. Prior to this work, there were few, if any, − metal organic frameworks (MOFs) reported so far have high-performance CO2 capture materials based on heterometallic lagged far behind their homometallic counterparts in terms MOFs. of CO2 uptake performance. Now the power of We are particularly interested in the integration of chemically heterometallic MOFs is in full display, as shown by a dissimilar metals, as such combinations are more likely to lead to series of new materials (denoted CPM-200s) with superior much greater variations in properties. Heterometallic MOFs 3 CO2 uptake capacity (up to 207.6 cm /g at 273 K and 1 containing similar metals (e.g., many combinations of 3d metals, bar), close to the all-time record set by MOF-74-Mg. The any combination of 4f metals) are not uncommon. In addition, a isosteric heat of adsorption can also be tuned from −16.4 number of heterometallic MOFs containing dissimilar metals kJ/mol for CPM-200-Sc/Mg to −79.6 kJ/mol for CPM- (e.g., In and Co) have also been reported.4 In general, dissimilar 200-V/Mg.
    [Show full text]
  • ET 200S Interfacemodule IM 151/CPU
    Important Notes, Contents 1 SIMATIC Product Overview Addressing 2 ET 200S Interface Module ET 200S in the PROFIBUS Network 3 IM 151/CPU Commissioning and Diagnostics 4 Functions of the IM 151/CPU 5 Manual Technical Specifications 6 This manual is part of the document package with the order number: 6ES7 151-1AA00-8BA0 Cycle and Response Times 7 Getting Started 8 Configuration Frame and Parameter Assignment Frame for the ET 200S A Instruction List B Execution Times of the SFCs and SFBs C Migration of the IM 151/CPU D Glossary, Index Edition 05/2000 A5E00058783-01 OChapter Safety Guidelines This manual contains notices which you should observe to ensure your own personal safety, as well as to protect the product and connected equipment. These notices are highlighted in the manual by a warning triangle and are marked as follows according to the level of danger: Danger ! indicates that death, severe personal injury or substantial property damage will result if proper precau- tions are not taken. Warning ! indicates that death, severe personal injury or substantial property damage can result if proper precau- tions are not taken. Caution ! indicates that minor personal injury or property damage can result if proper precautions are not taken. Note draws your attention to particularly important information on the product, handling the product, or to a particular part of the documentation. Qualified Personnel Only qualified personnel should be allowed to install and work on this equipment. Qualified persons are defined as persons who are authorized to commission, to ground, and to tag circuits, equipment, and systems in accordance with established safety practices and standards.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Iran a Glossary of Terms
    Nuclear Iran A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen Policy Focus 121 | May 2013 Update HARVARD Kennedy School A COPUBLICATION WITH BELFER CENTER for Science and International Affairs Map: Nuclear installations in Iran. TURKMENISTAN TABRIZ Bonab Lashkar Abad TEHRAN MASHAD Karaj Marivan Parchin Fordow Arak QOM IRAQ Natanz AFGHANISTAN Isfahan Ardakan Saghand Darkhovin Yazd IRAN KUWAIT SHIRAZ Bushehr PAKISTAN Gchine BANDAR ABBAS BAHRAIN SAUDI ARABIA QATAR © 2012 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy UAE OMAN Map: Nuclear installations in Iran. Nuclear Iran A Glossary of Terms Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen Policy Focus 121 | May 2013 Update HARVARD Kennedy School A COPUBLICATION WITH BELFER CENTER for Science and International Affairs n n n The authors extend special thanks to Mary Kalbach Horan and her editorial team at The Washington Institute. n n n All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2012, 2013 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Copublished in 2012 and 2013 in the United States of America by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036; and the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 79 JFK St., Cambridge, MA 02138. Cover photo: Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visits the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility.
    [Show full text]
  • Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance
    OFFICIAL USE ONLY - DRAFT GLOSSARY OF TERMS APPENDIX F GLOSSARY OF TERMS Accountability: That part of the safeguards and security program that encompasses the measurement and inventory verification systems, records, and reports to account for nuclear materials. Assay: Measurement that establishes the total quantity of the isotope of an element and the total quantity of that element. Atom: The basic component of all matter. Atoms are the smallest part of an element that have all of the chemical properties of that element. Atoms consist of a nucleus of protons and neutrons surrounded by electrons. Atomic energy: All forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. Atomic weapon: Any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transportation or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device. Blending: The intentional mixing of two different assays of the same material in order to achieve a desired third assay. Book inventory: The quantity of nuclear material present at a given time as reflected by accounting records. Burnup: A measure of consumption of fissionable material in reactor fuel. Burnup can be expressed as (a) the percentage of fissionable atoms that have undergone fission or capture, or (b) the amount of energy produced per unit weight of fuel in the reactor. Chain reaction: A self-sustaining series of nuclear fission reactions. Neutrons produced by fission cause more fission. Chain reactions are essential to the functioning of nuclear reactors and weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Richard Bland College Old Dominion University Course Equivalency Table
    Richard Bland College Updated 5.2020 Old Dominion University Course Equivalency Table RBC RBC RBC RBC ODU EQUIVALENCE SUB NUM TITLE CREDITS ART 101 Basic Design I 3 ARTS 202 ART 102 Basic Design II 3 ARTS 203 ART 103 Beginning Drawing I 3 ARTS 1ELE ART 104 Beginning Drawing II 3 ARTS 1ELE ART 201 Art History Survey I 3 ARTH 211 OR FPAP ART 202 Art History Survey II 3 ARTH 212 OR FPAP ART 221 Intermediate Drawing 3 ARTS2 ELEC ART 231 Art Appreciation 3 ARTH 121A ART 292 Portfolio Development 3 ARTS2 ELEC BIO 101 General Biology (Lecture) 3 BIOL 121N-122N BIO 102 General Biology (Lecture) 3 BIOL 123N-124N BIO 108 Intro to Ecology 4 UNDER REVIEW BIO 110 Contemporary Biology BIOL1 ELEC BIO 111 Medical Terminology 2 BIOL1 ELEC BIO 291 Stream Ecostream Assessment 4 UNDER REVIEW BIO 101L General Biology (Lab) 1 BIOL 108N IF BOTH BIO 102L General Biology (Lab) 1 BIOL 109N IF BOTH BIO 108L Intro to Ecology Lab 0 UNDER REVIEW BIO 151/L Biological Science I 4 BIOL 115N BIO 152/L Biological Science II 4 BIOL 116N BIO 205/L Human Anatomy & Physiology 4 BIOL 250 BIO 206/L Human Anatomy & Physiology 4 BIOL 251 BIO 211/L Microbiology 4 BIOL 103 BIO 104 Environmental Science UNDER REVIEW BUS 104 Introduction to Business 3 BUSN 110 BUS 201 Principles of Accounting I 3 ACCT 201 BUS 202 Principles of Accounting II 3 ACCT 202 CHEM 101 General Chemistry (Lecture) 3 CHEM 121N CHEM 102 General Chemistry (Lecture) 3 CHEM 123N CHEM 110 Concepts of Chemistry 4 NSCP 1REQ CHEM 230 Organic Chemistry 4 CHEM 211, 212 CHEM 101L General Chemistry (Lab) 1 CHEM 122N CHEM
    [Show full text]
  • Gastroenterology®
    World Journal of Supported by NSFC Gastroenterology 2005-2006 Volume 11 Number 23 ELSEVIER June 21, 2005 National Journal Award Contents 2005 LIVER CANCER 3491 Hepatitis B and alcohol affect survival of hepatocellular carcinoma patients Wong LL, Limm WM, Tsai N, Severino R 3498 Overexpression of Bax induces apoptosis and enhances drug sensitivity of hepatocellular cancer-9204 cells Zheng JY, Yang GS, Wang WZ, Li J, Li KZ, Guan WX, Wang WL VIRAL HEPATITIS 3504 Effective inhibition of expression of hepatitis B virus genes by DNAzymes Wo JE, Wu XL, Zhou LF, Yao HP, Chen LW, Dennin RH 3508 Pancreatic involvement in chronic viral hepatitis Katakura Y, Yotsuyanagi H, Hashizume K, Okuse C, Okuse N, Nishikawa K, Suzuki M, Iino S, Itoh F Helicobacter pylori 3514 Direct measurement of gastric H+/K+-ATPase activities in patients with or without Helicobacter pylori-associated chronic gastritis Thong-Ngam D, Tangkijvanich P, Sampatanukul P, Prichakas P, Mahachai V, Tosukowong P 3518 Patients with Helicobacter pylori positive and negative duodenal ulcers have distinct clinical characteristics Chu KM, Kwok KF, Law S, Wong KH 3523 Distribution of Helicobacter pylori in north China Gong YH, Wang Y, Yuan Y 3528 Helicobacter pylori specific immune response induced by conservative flagellin linear B-cell epitope Ji WS, Hu JL, Wu KC, Qiu JW, Han ZY, Ding J, Fan DM BASIC RESEARCH 3533 Glutamine is highly effective in preventing in vivo cobalt-induced oxidative stress in rat liver Gonzales S, Polizio AH, Erario MA, Tomaro ML 3539 Effects of Changtai granules,
    [Show full text]
  • GOVERNMENT of the DISTRICT of COLUMBIA Executive Office of the Mayor OFFICE of PARTNERSHIPS and GRANTS DEVELOPMENT
    GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Executive Office of the Mayor OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIPS AND GRANTS DEVELOPMENT THIRD QUARTER REPORT ON DONATIONS APPROVED BY OPGD FOR FY 2003 Pursuant to Mayor’s Order 2002-2 dated January 11, 2002, the Director of the Office of Partnerships and Grants Development (OPGD), in consultation with the Office of the Corporation Counsel’s Ethics Counselor, is publishing the District’s Third Quarter Report on Donations for Fiscal Year 2003. The Order requires the OPGD Director to review all requests by District officials to solicit or accept donations and approve or disapprove such requests as appropriate in accordance with the Rules of Conduct Governing Donations (Mayor’s Memorandum 2002-1) and Section 115 of the 2003 D.C. Appropriations Act. This report includes data on all donation requests submitted to the Director for the period beginning April 1, 2003 and ending June 30, 2003. During this period, the OPGD Director approved the solicitation and/or acceptance of $142,991 in donations of which $2,265 represented financial contributions, and $140,726 represented in-kind contributions. Please contact the OPGD Director at (202) 727-8900 for more details on the report. District Recipient Donor Donation Information Approval Date Child and Family Washington Metro Area CFSA will begin soliciting donations to Authority to solicit the Services Agency Transit Authority support the FY 2004 annual Project Harvest donation approved on and the holiday gift drive. 6-30-03 Child and Family Victoria Perry, An in-kind donation of 80-100 pieces of Authority to accept the Services Agency Pam and Ruth Summers luggage valued at $300 that will be used by donation approved on children to transport belongings between 6-26-03 placements.
    [Show full text]