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11:40 Titanic’s Evasive Maneuvers

By: Brad Payne

1. A Black Mass (pg. 3) 2. 3 Bells (pg. 3) 3. Telephone (pg. 4) 4. Relay of Lookout's Message (pg. 5) 5. First Helm Order (pg. 5) 6. First Telegraph Order (pg. 6) 7. Possible Evidence of a 'Full Astern' Order (pg. 9) 8. 'Full Astern' Procedures (pg. 13) 9. Effect of the Evasive Maneuver Part 1 (pg. 15) 10. Titanic's Turn To Port (pg. 16) 11. Second Telegraph Order (pg. 20) 12. Second Helm Order (pg. 22) 13. Timing (pg. 28) 14. Effect of the Evasive Maneuver Part 2 (pg. 29) 15. Titanic's Turn to Starboard (pg. 30) 16. Activating the Watertight Doors (pg. 31) 17. Logging the Collision (pg. 32) 18. Captain Smith Comes to the Bridge (pg. 32) 19. Briefing the Captain (pg. 33) 20. Conclusion NOT INCLUDED

The events that took place at 11:40pm, April 14th, 1912 have been told and retold again and again. This constant retelling, for better or for worst, has led to multiple versions of what occurred that night based on the numerous interpretations of the evidence. In 1912, both the US Senate inquiry and the British Wreck Commissioner's inquiry into the sinking would come up with their own summation of the evidence.

At 11.46 p.m. ship's time, or 10.13 p.m. New York time, Sunday evening, April 14, the lookout signaled the bridge and telephoned the Officer of the watch, "Iceberg right ahead." The Officer of the watch, Mr. Murdoch, immediately ordered the Quartermaster at the wheel to put the helm "hard astarboard," and reversed the engines; but while the Sixth Officer standing behind the Quartermaster at the wheel reported to Officer Murdoch "The helm is hard astarboard," the Titanic stuck the ice (pp. 229 and 450). The impact, while not violent enough to disturb the passengers or crew, or to arrest the ship's progress, rolled the vessel slightly and tore the steel plating above the turn of the bilge.

US Inquiry

The ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little before 11.40, one of the look- outs in the crow's nest struck three blows on the gong, (Hichens, 969) which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately afterwards by a telephone message to the bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously with the three gong signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order "Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the

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engine room "Stop. Full speed astern." (Boxhall, 15346) The helm was already "hard over," and the ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side.

Mr. Murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the watertight doors in the engine and boiler rooms. (15352)

The Master "rushed out" on to the bridge and asked Mr. Murdoch what the ship had struck. (Hichens, 1027) (Boxhall, 15353)

Mr. Murdoch replied: "An iceberg, Sir. I hard-a-starboarded and reversed the engines, and I was going to hard-a-port round it but she was too close. I could not do any more. I have closed the watertight doors." (15355)

From the evidence given it appears that the "Titanic” had turned about two points to port before the collision occurred. From various experiments subsequently made with the s.s. "Olympic,” a sister ship to the "Titanic," it was found that travelling at the same rate as the "Titanic," about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard- a-starboard. In this time the ship would travel about 466 yards, and allowing for the few seconds that would be necessary for the order to be given, it may be assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was sighted either from the bridge or crow's-nest.

Wreck Commissioner's Report

Though a brief spec of time within the overall tragedy of the sinking, this moment ultimately is what sealed the fate for those aboard. The question of what was, or what was not, done has become under ever more scrutiny as the tragedy becomes ever more distant into the past. Can a solution be found? Perhaps, but to do so we must take away any preconceived notions and looks at the evidence both individually and as a whole. To do so we will be specifically dealing with testimony from lookouts Fredrick Fleet, Reginald Lee, Quartermaster Hichens, standby Quartermaster Olliver and Fourth Officer Boxhall. With them will be brief testimonies from others, such as firemen Barrett and Beauchamp, and Quartermaster Rowe, in hope to gain a complete understanding of what took place on Titanic's bridge. Let us first set the scene based on all available evidence. Both Fleet and Lee are in Titanic's crow's nest 95ft above the water, with Fleet on the port side1, and Lee on the starboard.2 Quartermaster Hichens is at Titanic's helm inside the wheelhouse. The wheelhouse blinds are closed as they always are after sunset, and therefore he cannot see anything happening outside the wheelhouse.3 Quartermaster Olliver is attending the lights on the compass stand amidships4, 243ft aft of the bridge.5 Fourth Officer Boxhall is around his quarters on the starboard side of the Officer's quarters deck house, 60ft from the bridge. The other witnesses' whereabouts will be addressed when they are brought up.

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A Black Mass

Both Fleet and Lee would state the iceberg was a 'black' or 'dark' mass, or 'black object', when it was first spotted.6 Fleet would state that when he first saw the black mass it was the size of two tables used at the US Senate investigation.7 The New York Herald of April 24th, 1912 gives two sizes for this, one being 10sqft, and the other a diameter of 30ft. Without an accurate picture of what tables Fleet was referring too, the idea of size is open to interpretation, and perhaps pointless to ponder. Lee would state that the berg was roughly a half mile or more away when it was first spotted, thus around 3,038ft or more.8

3 Bells

The only sense of delay that we get from the official inquires between the sighting of the berg and the lookouts signaling the bridge of something ahead comes during the US inquiry, with Fleet stating, “Before I reported, I said, 'There is ice ahead,' and then I put my hand over to the bell and rang it three times...” He would also state during the US and British inquiry that he reported the berg as soon as he ever saw it.9 It's not until author Leslie Reade's suggestion of a lengthier delay, that the excepted short interval between sighting and notification came into question. Reade's suggestion comes in light of an interview he had with Fleet more than 50yrs after the disaster, when Fleet would reminiscence, “I saw this black thing looming up; I didn't know what it was. I asked Lee if he knew what it was. He couldn't say. I thought I better ring the bell. I rang it three times.” From this Reade asks, “How long did this interval last while Fleet questioned Lee?”10 Apparently Reade did not probe Fleet on the matter, for no answer is given. As mentioned earlier, Fleet would ring the bell three times. This was the customary amount rang for something seen ahead. Had something been seen to port the bell would have been struck once, and twice for starboard.11 Fleet would make clear that this bell signified nothing more when stating, “...it just tells them on the bridge that there is something about. That is all we have to do up in the nest; to ring the bell, and if there is any danger ring them up on the telephone.”12 Therefore bells being rung should not be considered a sign of danger, or haste, to anyone besides Fleet and Lee, who were well aware of the situation. Being in a busy shipping route, and coming into an area of reported ice, the bells being rung would not have been out of the ordinary. The bells did not indicate the range of the object seen, only the fact that it was seen, along with its general location. In fact, testimony by Second Officer Lightoller suggests that the bells could be rung over nothing at all, with no consequence, so long as the lookout acknowledged their mistake.13 Could this possible lack in the awareness of danger be part of the reasoning behind future delays of action? The bells would be heard by various people including Hichens in the wheelhouse, “All went along very well until 20 minutes to 12, when three gongs came from the lookout....”14 Quatermaster Olliver, at the compass stand, “When I was doing this bit of duty I heard three bells rung up in the crow's nest, which I knew that it was something ahead; so I looked, but I did not see anything. I happened to be looking at the lights in the standing compass at the time. That was my duty, to look at the lights in the standing compass, and I was trimming them so that they would burn properly. When I heard the report, I looked, but could not see anything, and I left that...”15 Fourth Officer Boxhall would also hear the bells, though his exact whereabouts are a bit harder to pin down. During the US inquiry Boxhall would state, “At the time of the impact I was just coming along the deck and almost abreast of the captain's quarters, and I heard the report of three bells... That signifies something has been seen ahead.” Though Boxhall's statement can be interpreted as him hearing the bells at, or after, having felt the collision, it appears to this author that Boxhall, was merely adding the detail that he heard the three bells, as all other evidence shows that the three bells were rung before any sort of impact. Brad Payne 2020

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Boxhall would clarify this during the British inquiry, testifying that he 'heard the bells first', as he was, “Just coming out of the Officer's quarters.”16 In 1959 Boxhall would state that he had just done a tour of the ship and had just looked into his cabin when he heard the lookouts warning. He would claim that he immediately went on deck again.17 During a radio interview in 1962, Boxhall would claim, “At the time, when the iceberg was reported, from the crow’s nest, when they struck the bells, I was sitting in my cabin having a cup of tea, and immediately got up and walked along to the bridge; about 60ft away on the same deck.”18 As the reader can see, with each progressive telling, Boxhall places himself further inside the ship. One may rightfully ask rather Boxhall could have heard the bells if he was indeed inside the Officer's deck house? Unfortunately, we cannot directly answer this question, though there is no reason to doubt Boxhall's recollection of this matter. As far as his actual location, all that can be truly be ascertained is that he was somewhere around his quarters, either inside or just leaving, when the bells were struck.

Telephone

As Fleet said, all the lookouts had to do was ring the bell, and if they thought there was any danger, contact the bridge via the phone. Fleet would indeed feel it necessary to call the bridge, recalling, “Well, it was so close to us. That is why I rang them up.”19 Lee would place the location of the phone as being in the corner of the nest on the starboard side.20 Fleet would testify during his US interrogation, “I struck three bells first. Then I went straight to the telephone and rang them on the bridge. I got an answer straight away- what did I see, or, 'What did you see?' He just asked me what did I see. I told him, 'Iceberg right ahead'. He said: 'Thank you.'” Fleet would hint during his British testimony of a delay on the receiving end of his call, “I struck three bells. As soon as I saw it. It went to the telephone. Rang them up on the bridge. I asked them were they there, and- they said, 'Yes'. Then they said, 'What do you see?' I said, 'Iceberg right ahead.' They said, 'Thank you.'”21 Fleet would not know to whom it was that he was speaking to.22 Lee, now displaced to the front of the nest, as Fleet was telephoning from Lee's usual area on the starboard side23, would recall, “Three bells were struck by Fleet, warning 'Right Ahead', and immediately he rung the telephone up to the bridge, 'Iceberg right ahead.' The reply came back from the bridge, 'Thank you.'”24 Hichens testified that, “All went along very well until 20 minutes to 12, when three gongs came from the lookout, and immediately afterwards a report on the telephones, 'Iceberg right ahead.'”25 He would tell the British committee that the phone rang 'immediately after' the crow's nest bells. He would also state that he could not 'hear the message', but that he heard Moody's reply, “Thank You.”26 There are two sources that give us another indication of time, besides the use of the word 'immediately'. One is from a paper entitled, ' Account of the Disaster told by the Quartermaster at the Wheel', by Carpathia passenger Howard Chapin, which reads:

At 20 minutes to 12 the lookout in the crow's nest on the foremast rang three gongs, which means danger right ahead and five seconds later he telephoned to the officer on the bridge: “Iceberg dead ahead.27

This is echoed in the New York Herald, April 19, 1912, in which Hichens is quoted as to saying, “It was twenty minutes to twelve and I was steering when there were the three gongs from the lookout. Almost instantly, it could not have been more than four or five seconds, when the lookout men called down on the telephone:- 'Iceberg ahead!'28 If these four or five seconds are to be taken into account, then the question is, what do they relate to? Is the five seconds the amount of time it took Fleet to move from his port side position to the starboard Brad Payne 2020

5 side to grab the phone? Could the five seconds be a lapse on the lookout's part to realize the gravity of the situation, or the time taken to comprehend the gravity? Was it a pause on Fleet and Lee's part in hoping the bells were enough and that a miraculous response time from the bridge and the ship would steer the boat clear?29 Perhaps, or perhaps not, as such a small amount of time seem inconsequential. When asked how long he was at the phone, Fleet would answer, “I suppose half a minute.”30 Hichens would later collaborate this time when answering the question, “ How long was that before the order came 'Hard-a-starboard'?”31 His answer will be looked at shortly.

Relay of the Lookout's Message

Once Moody answered back, “Thank you,” neither Fleet or Lee recall hearing anything else, thus indicating that the phone was most likely hung up. In fact, Lee could only speculate as to what happened afterwards, hinting, “As soon as the reply came back, 'Thank you,' the helm must have been put either hard-a-starboard or very close to it...”32 Hichens would recall that after Moody said, “Thank you,” Moody would repeat the lookout's message of, “Iceberg right ahead,” to First Officer Murdoch.33 Boxhall would recall not knowing what had occurred until, “I heard the sixth officer say what it was.... He said we had struck an iceberg.”34 There is no evidence of Moody ever saying anything more about the iceberg before Boxhall learned what had occurred via First Officer Murdoch's report to Captain Smith. In fact, evidence that will be seen, places Moody going to fill out the ship's log after the collision, leaving no time for Boxhall to have had a private conversation with Moody, especially within Boxhall's own testimonies, in which he states Smith was on the bridge when he arrived. So, either Boxhall is recalling Moody repeating the lookout's message, or he misspoke sixth officer instead of first officer.

First Helm Order

The only establishment of First Officer Murdoch's location prior to collision comes from Hichens, who speculated, “The chief officer35 rushed from the wing bridge, or I imagine so, sir. Certainly I am enclosed in the wheelhouse, and I cannot see, only my compass.”36 It is clear from this statement that it is merely a guess on Hichens' part as to Murdoch's location. Hichens clearly does not state from which wing bridge he is referring to. It could also be that Murdoch was merely on the bridge. Hichens would continue to tell of Murdoch's actions, “He rushed to the engines. I heard the telegraph bell ring; also give the order 'Hard astarboard'...”37 While in Britain he would testify pretty much the same thing, saying that he heard Moody relay the lookout's message to Murodch, and then, “I heard Mr. Murdoch rush to the telegraph and give the order, 'Hard-a-starboard.'”38 Hichens, when asked how long it was after hearing the lookout's bells that he received this order for hard-a-starboard, would answer, “Well, as near as I can tell you, about half a minute.” This half a minute correlates with Fleet's account of the duration of his phone call, thus imposing the fact that Murdoch made the order for hard-a-starboard almost immediately after Moody relayed the lookouts message. However, what this does not tell us is the reasoning for this thirty second delay. Was it because Murdoch could not make out what the lookouts had signaled about? Was he scanning the horizon, not realizing the berg was actually inside the horizon? Was it because Murdoch was trying to figure out the best evasive maneuver? Unfortunately, we will never know. It has also been asked, and should be repeated, as to how literal should we take this half a minute? Could it be merely a passing phrase meaning just a short amount of time? Again, we will never know. Fourth Officer Boxhall testified during the US inquiry that, “Three bells were struck.... That signifies something has been seen ahead. Almost at the same time I heard the first officer give the order “Hard-a-Starboard,” and the engine telegraph rang.” In Britain he would state having heard the bells Brad Payne 2020

6 while he was, “Just coming out of the Officer's quarters,” and then, “...heard the First Officer give the order, 'Hard-a-starboard,' and I heard the engine room telegraph bells ringing.”39 It seems that Boxhall's account is much more condensed than that of Lee, Fleet and Hichens, as there is no room in Boxhall's testimony for a thirty second delay for the telephone call. Hichens would relate that Sixth Officer Moody would repeat the order for hard-a-starboard40, and that he immediately started to put the wheel hard-a-starboard.41 He would recall, “Mr. Moody was standing behind me when the order was given,”42 as, “That was his place, to see the duty carried out.”43 He would tell the US committee, “I heard the bell ring; also give the order ‘Hard-a-starboard,’ with the sixth officer standing by me to see the duty carried out and the quartermaster standing by my left side, repeated the order, ‘Hard-a-starboard. The helm is hard over, sir.’” As the reader may have noted, Hichens adds another character to this moment, that being the quartermaster to his left. Hichens would also speak of this quartermaster at the British inquiry, when asked if any officer witnessed him performing the order to turn the ship hard-a-starboard, replying, “Mr. Moody, and also the Quartermaster on my left. He was told to take the time of the collision.” There were three quartermasters on duty at the time of the collision, Hichens, Rowe -on the poop deck, and Olliver. Olliver never states in his testimony hearing an order for hard-a-starboard, nor does he ever mention hearing the telegraph ring. Within the thirty-five seconds, that it took from the ringing of the bells to the orders for hard-a-starboard, Olliver should not have been on the bridge at this time unless he really hustled for some unknown reason. All Oliver's statements agree with him not being at, or around the bridge as early as the order for hard-a-starboard. Olliver does however, state of a similar situation for another helm order, though that will be looked at later. It is forever unknown why Murdoch ordered the ship to port. Speculating theories suggests that the berg stretched a bit more to starboard, thus making the shortest route around it to the port. Others suggest that, based on a drawing done by Fleet, the iceberg was not directly dead ahead, but in fact slightly to the starboard, thus prompting Murdoch to order the helm to port. Still, another theory has it that Murdoch was actually on the port wing bridge, and his position made him believe that the best route would be to the port. It may just boil down to Murdoch believing he needed to turn the ship one way or the other, with equal chances either way, and for no reason at all, he chose port over starboard.

First Telegraph Order

As read in the previous section both Boxhall and Hichens testify to there being a telegraph order right along with the order for hard-a-starboard. Both men would place this telegraph order happening before any form of shock or collision. Boxhall would put the telegraph and the order for hard-a-starboard 'just a moment before' feeling a shock.44 This 'moment before' would turn into 'a few minutes later', in 1959.45 This short lapse of time between hearing the orders and telegraphs is conducive to where Boxhall claims he was when he felt the shock, which was, “almost on the bridge,”46 or, “... almost abreast of the captain's quarters.”47 This factor would remain the same even in his later recollections, with him placing himself “...about half way between the Officer's Quarters and the Bridge...”48 The distance between his quarters and the bridge was 60ft. With the average walking time of a person being around 3.1 mph (4.6ft per second), we can easily calculate that it would take someone about 13 to 14 seconds to walk that distance if they left immediately, which Boxhall only claims to have done in his later years. This would mean that Boxhall had only been walking for around 6-7 seconds before feeling a 'shock'. Hichens would be a bit confusing on the matter, stating that the ship struck either right when he received the orders for hard-a-starboard, or while the ship was swinging, or after it swung two points, or before he got the helm over, or just barely after the helm was over.49 If the ship did swing two points, as Hichens claims it did on more than one occasion, than we can be assured that there must have been Brad Payne 2020

7 sometime between the orders and collision. The only other witness we have of telegraph order happening before any form of shock comes from trimmer Thomas Dillon, who was in the reciprocating engine room. He would state hearing the telegraph ring two seconds before he felt a slight shock.50 This short interval matches that of Boxhall, and some of Hichens' statements. Hichens being in the wheelhouse could not see the telegraphs, and as such would not be able to relate what orders were rang down. Dillon would also not be able to state what this first telegraph order was.51 The only one who states what this original telegraph order was is Fourth Officer Boxhall, who relates, “I heard the bells ring, but I did not know what the movement was until I got to the bridge,”52 and when he got there, he would see both the emergency and the regular telegraphs put at , “'Full Speed Astern'.” He would make clear that he noticed this immediately after impact.53 Being that Boxhall is the only witness to claim such an order, some have begun to dismiss it, stating that the first telegraph order was in fact 'Stop'. This however may be against other evidence that will be discussed later, in which this first 'Stop' order is more likely the second telegraph order, having taken place at or just after the collision. Others believe that Boxhall was confused, and the telegraphs actually read 'Slow Astern', as such an order would be related by Dillon and Greaser Fredrick Scott, who was located in the turbine engine room.54 Titanic's telegraphs were back lit, however at night these lights would be extinguished as to not impair the vision of the officer on watch, who would also be on the lookout. The telegraph dials were laid out as such.

Full - Half - Slow - Dead Slow - Standby - Stop - Standby - Dead Slow - Slow - Half - Full Astern - - Ahead

Below is a chart that shows the sequences and times of the orders both Dillon and Scott recall:

Dillon Scott Order Time Order Time 1st order 2 seconds before shock Does not state any order before cannot say shock what Stop 1 ½ min. after shock Stop Does not state how long after shock Slow Astern ½ a min. after stopping Slow Ahead 10-15 min. after stop

Stop 2 min. after slow astern Stop 10 min. after slow ahead

Slow Ahead Does not state how long Slow Astern 4-5 min. after stop after stopping Stop 2 min. after slow ahead Stop 5 min. after slow astern

Total Time 6 min 2 sec Total Time 29 min Minimum Based on Based on 35 min Maximum Times Given Times Given Brad Payne 2020

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Below is another chart giving an idea of how the times listed in the chart above roughly relate to ship's time. Dillon states that the first order happened two seconds before the shock, which this author will put at 11:40pm. Also, since Scott does not state at what time his first order to stop occurred, a time of 11:40pm has also been given. In both cases, if not for absolute accuracy, the times listed below at least shows the reader an idea of the times and their differences.

Dillon's Testimony Dillon's Times Scott's Times Scott's Testimony 1st Order 11:40:00 PM Stop 11:41:30 PM 11:40:00 PM Stop Slow Astern 11:42:00 PM 11:50 PM – 11:55 AM Slow Ahead Stop 11:44:00 PM 12:00 AM – 12:05 AM Stop Slow Ahead ? 12:04/05 AM – 12:09/10 Slow Astern AM Stop 2 min after Slow Ahead 12:09/12:10 AM – Stop 12:14/15 AM

It should be noted that both Dillon and Scott's testimonies are compromised. Dillon would make the claim that he did not see the telegraphs, but knew they were sent due to them ringing.55 The ringing itself would not tell anyone as to what order was being rung, though Dillon would have been able to see the engines, and as such determine what they were doing. This can also lead to the speculation that had Dillon, not knowing in which direction the engines were to go, perhaps thought that when the reciprocating engines were going in reverse, they were actually thrusting forward and visa-versa, which could explain the difference in the sequences of orders between him and Scott. It should be noted that it has been written that there was a loud gong as a backup for the telegraphs in the 'Transactions of the Liverpool Engineering Society':

With further reference to safety devices or duplicate devices in the engine room, the White Star liners were all fitted with a loud gong for use in the event of anything going wrong with the ordinary telegraph – one stroke for slow, two for half and three for stop, and the noise made by this gong was so great that in the largest ship there was no difficulty in hearing it at any part of the engine room.56

It is unknown if such a gong was employed that night, but if so, could this have been what led Dillion to believe the movements of Titanic's engines. Scott, being in the turbine engine room, would not be able to see the telegraphs once the watertight door separating the turbine engine room and the reciprocating engine room closed, which, according to his testimony, was after his first order.57 The only way after this that he would have been able to see the telegraphs was if the door was opened, in which fireman Charles Hendrickson would testify was still closed, “...something like three quarters of an hour,” after the collision, so 12:25am.58 The only other possibility is that Scott, who was against the turbine door before the impact59, actually was on the reciprocating engine room side when the doors closed, which could explain his statement, “After that we went up to the turbine room [author's emphasis] and down one of the escapes to let one of the greasers out in the after tunnel.” Scott would make clear in his testimony that he did see the telegraphs.60 Overall, it seems unlikely that Boxhall had mistaken his 'Full Astern' for either Dillon's or Scott's Brad Payne 2020

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'Slow Astern', as both men place their order for 'Slow Astern' much too late in their sequences, and after any form of 'shock'. It also seems highly unlikely that all three men were mistaken on this matter, and that this was indeed the first telegraph order. Even with no lights on the telegraphs, the positioning of 'Full Astern' and 'Slow Astern' were separated enough to not draw into serious question Boxhall's recollections. With that said, is there any evidence that supports Boxhall's claim?

Possible Evidence of a 'Full Astern' Order

Able Seaman Joseph Scarrott, who was underneath the forecastle deck, would recall, “The shaking of the ship seemed as though the engines had suddenly been reversed to full speed astern.”61 At the British inquiry he would also state, “Well, I did not feel any direct impact, but it seemed as if the ship shook in the same manner as if the engines had been suddenly reversed to full speed astern, just the same sort of vibration, enough to wake anybody up if they were asleep.”62 Able Seaman John Poingdestre, also under the forecastle would state to feeling a vibration that he could not say was the ship's engines being put in reverse, but was similar to such a vibration.63 His statement though was based more on his line of questioning, and not necessarily his own recollections. Being that both Scarrott and Poingdestre were at the area in which the iceberg hit should be taken to account. It is entirely possible that both men actually felt the collision and not the engines being set in reverse. Bathroom Steward Samuel Rule in his bunk on the aft port side of E deck would also remember the engines being put astern; though his testimony is a bit confusing on the matter. He states that he was awakened by the stoppage of the engines, and then he felt the engines go full astern, and at the same time he heard the watertight door alarm ring.64 When asked later he would state, “...the stopping of the engines woke me. I got up and dressed immediately the engines stopped. The engines reversed.” When asked when did the ship stop, he would state, “Almost immediately and the electric bells below started ringing, and I dressed and went right up on deck.”65 Quartermaster Rowe on the poop deck would have a close-up personal view of the iceberg. Rounding the poop deck from the port side, underneath the docking bridge, he felt a motion, and then noticed the iceberg. He would state in his later years, but never at the inquires, that at this time the engines were going astern, one time stating that, “...the vibrations on that poop was something terrific.” During the inquires Rowe would state that after seeing the iceberg he went on the port side of the docking bridge and pulled in the taffrail log, though never stating why. If it was to merely read the log, he never reported it to the bridge. During his later recollections he would state doing this because the engines were reversed, and he feared the log would be fouled in the propellers. Being that none of this information was revealed until his later years though, leaves it open for speculation.66 First class passenger Jane Hoyt, in her cabin C-93, would be quoted by the Amsterdam Evening Recorder and the Daily Democrat, on April 23rd 1912, as noticing a sound that, “seemed to indicate that the engines of the ship had reversed.”67 Another first class passenger, May Futrelle, in cabin C-121, would recall, “I had fallen into another sleepy spell when I felt a shock and a kind of shiver of the ship. It was so slight that it did not disturb anything but I sat up in bed. I heard the engines pounding below - reversing. For about twenty seconds, I should say, this pounding continued. Then followed another shock, scarcely heavier than the first."68 This double shock separated by a lengthy pause could also be seen as collaborating evidence. For if the engines were indeed reversed- causing a shock, and then sometime later Titanic side swiped the iceberg, this would cause the sensation that Futrelle speaks of. There are others who speak of the same. In her cabin A-11, which was below the chart room on the boat deck, immediately in the proximity of where Boxhall was, Edith Rosenbaum would relate having felt three jars, the first two slight, while the third made her reach for her bed post. Miss Elizabeth Allen would tell the New York Times on April Brad Payne 2020

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19th, 1912 that, “The first crash came at 11:40 P.M. I am sure of the time.” Her cabin was B-5. Lawrence Beesley, in cabin D-56, would write, “...there came what seemed nothing more than an extra heave of the engines and a more than usually obvious dancing motion of the mattress on which I sat. Nothing more than that – no sound of a crash or of anything else: no sense of shock, no jar that felt like one heavy body meeting another. And presently the same thing repeated with about the same intensity.” Jack Thayer would recount in 1940, “I wound my watch — it was 11:45 pm — and was just about to step into bed when I seemed to sway slightly. I immediately realized that the ship had veered to port as though she had been gently pushed. If I had had brimful glass of water in my hand, not a drop would have been spilled, the shock was so slight. Almost instantaneously the engines stopped. “The sudden quiet was startling and disturbing. Like the subdued quiet in a sleeping car, at a stop, after a continuous run. Not a sound except the breeze whistling through the half-open port. Then there was the distant noise of running feet and muffled voices, as several people hurried through the passageway. Very shortly the engines started up again — slowly — not with the bright vibration to which we were accustomed, but as though they were tired. After very few revolutions they again stopped. “Along with this, there are accounts from survivors as to having felt a shock and having enough time to get from one place to another, while seeing the berg when they arrived. This is significant in that with Titanic's speed of around 37ft per second, Titanic would have passed the berg in roughly 23 seconds, with the damage occurring in roughly the first 7 seconds, thus giving people very little time to make it around the ship in order to see the berg once having felt the shock.” This would be the first time Thayer would speak of hearing the engines stop and start again. What’s to note is that in all his earlier accounts he makes it sound as if he left his cabin immediately after feeling a ‘shock,’ which would mean that this noticing of the engines starting and stopping again happened in a relatively short time. However, the fact that Thayer mentions hearing people hurrying about makes this instance seem to have happened in a much broader timespan. Then there is evidence of people feeling a shock and then having enough time to go from one area of the ship to another in order to witness the berg seemingly alongside the ship. This would be impossible if they felt the actual collision, as the ship would have passed the berg in a rather short amount of time, if this is indeed the case. Trimmer Alfred Shiers would relate during the British inquiry how he felt the shock, got up from his bunk and went underneath the forecastle head and looked out a window. Not seeing anything he went on the starboard side of the forward well deck, and when looking over the side, noticed the berg, “on the starboard quarter, off the stem.” He would put this sight of the berg four or five minutes after feeling the 'striking of the berg'.69 If his four or five minutes is correct than this would actually place the berg abaft the ship, and possibly on the starboard quarter due to Titanic's route around the berg. Scarrott would claim that once feeling the shock he rushed down to call his mate, and then rushed on deck with all those who had turned out. On the starboard side of the well deck was a large quantity of ice. When he looked over the rail the berg he believed they had struck was 'abaft the starboard beam', 'not a ships length'.70 His, 'not a ship's length', also infers that the berg may have been seen abaft the ship off the starboard beam as with Shiers. Fireman Hendrickson would claim to have been asleep in his bunk when the collision, which didn't even wake him, occurred. His mate T. Ford would wake him instead. Hendrickson would make his way on deck, walking up behind the others who were walking up. On deck he would see the iceberg, “...just abaft the engine room.”71 Bedroom Steward Crawford would be getting off duty, on the starboard side of B deck. He would tell the US committee, “I heard the crash, and I went out on the outer deck and saw the iceberg floating alongside. I went back, and there were a lot of passengers coming out.” Brad Payne 2020

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Lastly we have passenger George Rheims who would state in his deposition during the Limitation of Liability hearings, that he was coming out of the bathroom on the forward part of A deck when, “...I felt a slight shock, and I turned to see what had happened and in looking to the right I saw through the window something white; it seemed to pass rapidly; of course at that time I did not know what it was; I now suppose it was an iceberg.”72 It should be noted that there was no porthole immediately to the right of the bathroom in which Rheim's could look out of. To the nearest, and really only, starboard window he could have possibly seen the berg, he would have had to exit the bathroom, go right down a corridor, turn right again and head aft just a tiny bit past a corner, and then look left down another corridor. This is a lot of walking for something that would have happened very sudden. This should not be seen as dismissive of his testimony though, for the drawing Rheims made of this part of the ship, though not completely accurate, is accurate enough, especially being made some time after the tragedy. Another piece of circumstantial evidence is the relating of location that survivors give as to where the shock or feeling occurred. Without getting into too much detail, there is an abundance of testimony in which the survivors believed that something had either gone wrong with the engines, or that the ship had lost a propeller. Though these can be merely written off as guesses, the fact that there are so many of them perhaps paints a different picture. Even Second Officer Lightoller would believe that the ship had lost a propeller blade, though he would say that the sound would naturally make him believe that it had come from the forward end.73 When asked if he could help the British inquiry to ascertain rather or not the engines were put full astern, Lightoller would answer, “No, I cannot say I remember feeling the engines going full speed astern.” Some, unnecessarily, puts this as the nail in the coffin to Boxhall's claim; but even Lightoller would claim that once he made his way on deck, two to three minutes after feeling the shock, the ship was only going around 4-6 knots. This equals to a 16 knot reduction in only 2-3 minutes. As previously read, both Dillon and Boxhall make the shock out to be slight, with Boxhall stating that it did not break his step as he was walking to the bridge.74 In fact, a mass majority of the testimony points to any jolt felt as being slight, and nothing as aggressive as one would believe putting a ship suddenly in reverse would cause. But how much would such a vibration be? Harland & Wolff's designer Edward Wilding would state that had the ship hit the berg head one, those on board would have hardly noticed it.75 Would Titanic's brand-new engines being suddenly put in reversed have the same effect? It's impossible to say with any amount of certainty although many have related personal experiences of being on ship when the engines were reversed. One could reasonably argue that there should have been more survivors to state any vibrations similar to the ship being reversed. One could also reasonably argue that if the ship's collision with the iceberg was slight, what did those aft, such as Scott, Dillon, and Ranger actually feel? Did some feel the engines being reversed and later contribute it to the iceberg, once it was learned they had struck one? Could the reason why there are so little eyewitness accounts because those who would have felt it did not survive? It is easy to make arguments in either one direction and though all evidence should be considered we should be cautious of fitting evidence in either direction. Either way, Titanic's engines, as with any other ship's engines, were tested under such conditions. Concerns of what such an order could have done to Titanic's engines that night were never voiced. In fact, Harland & Wolff would put Olympic's engines under such strain on request of the British inquiry, the results of which will be talked about later. Concerns that such an order was unlikely was also never voiced, nor should they have, for Titanic would not have been the only ship that night to have performed such a maneuver. Captain Lord, of the Californian would relate to the US committee. “...but on seeing the ice, we were so close we had to reverse the engines and put her full speed astern....”76 Mount Temple's Captain Moore would also state to the US committee of a mystery schooner, “He blew his foghorn, and we immediately put the helm Brad Payne 2020

12 hard a starboard, and I ordered full speed astern and took the way off the boat.”77 At the British inquiry, Captain Rostron, of the Carpathia, would relate, “Then I saw the light on my starboard side. I saw the light showing. It was getting close. I went full speed astern.”78 The next issue that should be looked into is that of reaction time. This topic is often spoken of in a manner to dismiss Boxhall's claim. It should be considered though, that in no way does the reaction time of the crew or the ship itself reflect rather or not Murdoch made such an order. For even if he hadn't, whatever order he did make was still not fast enough to save the ship. Therefore, such concerns should not be used to dismiss the possibility that Murdoch could or would have made such an order. Both Boxhall and Dillon claim very short times between hearing the telegraph and shock. Such reaction times seem almost implausible, though not necessarily impossible. Would the engine room crew need any more time to react than that of the bridge crew or the men in the boiler rooms? Again, just because the lookouts rang the bell, this did not mean danger, so up until the phone call, would anyone on the bridge believe there was danger? Even then, nothing was done until Murdoch gave orders, and when he did, both Moody and Hichens acted immediately, both not knowing what Murdoch would have ordered. The men in the boiler rooms once the order came for 'stop', also acted immediately without warning. This should be the same for the engine crew, who would not have known anything until both the emergency and regular telegraphs rang, which should have trigger in their minds (at least one would believe) that something was amiss. Mental chronometry, the study of human reaction time, has shown that visually the average reaction time is 180 to 200 milliseconds, while via sound, the average is 140 to 160 milliseconds. Though there is no way for anyone to truly know the reaction times of every individual needed to put the engines astern, giving the benefit of the doubt to the engineers, they would have promptly carried out the orders without much of a delay, even before the gravity of the situation was realized. Scott would make clear that there were two 'greasers at the bottom', 'close and handy', who would ring back the telegraph order from the bridge.79 This was common practice to have someone else close and handy as noted in the 'Marine Engineers and How to Become One':

Whenever an engineer's duties take him up the tunnel, to the forward stokehole, or anywhere out of the sound of the engine-room telegraph, a greaser or fireman should always be left on the starting platform, to pass the word in case of the telegraph being rung.80

History tells us that Titanic's officers knew that they were entering a region of ice. It would not be unlikely, though there is no evidence to support this, that the engineers, much like the lookouts81, were made aware of this, and as such were keeping an even closer watch on the telegraphs.

He [the engineer] should be especially careful in this respect when running in a fog or during dark night or stormy weather, or in the track of icebergs and on regular steam routes, or on a lee shore, or while approaching land. Even when these conditions do not exist, careful attention to the signals should never be relaxed, as people may jump or fall overboard. When the signal to stop the engine is received while under way at full speed, without first receiving the signal to slow down, especially if the signal to stop is immediately followed by the signal to go astern full speed, it is understood to mean that there is danger ahead or a “man overboard” and that it is extremely important that the signals should be obeyed immediately; and if the signal to go astern or “back strong” should be received while the vessel is under full headway the case is still more urgent and not an instant should be lost in reversing the engine. The engineer of the watch should always be prepared for an emergency of this kind, and he should never forget that prompt action on Brad Payne 2020

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his part at such a time may save his ship or some other vessel from destruction, or save a life.82

Ultimately, though there is much circumstantial evidence that one can say perhaps supports Boxhall's testimony, thought there is no one piece of evidence (a smoking gun so-to-speak) that one can point to that defiantly collaborates Boxhall's claim. That is not to say that Boxhall was wrong, nor is it to say that he was right. Evidence presented does show a telegraph order before any form of shock and as will be seen no other evidence explains what this would have been any better.

'Full Astern' Procedures

When the order was given to reverse the first thing to be done was to cut off the steam supply to the turbine and redirect it to the condensers. The two change over valves were interconnected to a Brown's hydraulic-cylinder reversing gear located on the aft side of bulkhead K, separating boiler room 5 from the reciprocating engine room, and brought down to a lever on the starting platform, next to the main reverse lever. Thus when the order was given to reverse, this lever would be pulled, and with no wait time between, the main reverse lever would be pulled. From there it would be necessary to manage the steam, as noted below:

Reversing Engines.- If the telegraph moves from “Ahead” to “Full speed astern,” run the links over to “Astern,” and then regulate the steam; which generally means opening the valve wider until sternway is got on the ship. All naval engines will stand reversing at full speed without shutting off steam; but the shock of reversal produces leaks and defects, and it should only be carried out in this way at low powers or in cases of apparent urgency.83

As noted above, such maneuvers could cause damage to the ship's engines, however, such damage, as can be read below, should only be of an afterthought in an emergency.

Reversing.- When reversing, the throttle should first be closed, and engine then reversed; but when the emergency signal is received (that is, a signal to back full speed when going ahead), the engine should be immediately reversed, even at a risk of breaking something. This signal should never be given from deck unless it is an emergency signal.84

Now let us examine the reaction times of the engines. During the US inquiry85 Admiral H.I. Cone would give the results of the backing trials of both the Delaware and North Dakota, the results of which are below:

Ship Engine Type Port Engines Starboard Port Engine Starboard Started Engines Backing Hard Engines Backing Started (Min:Sec) Backing Hard (Min: Sec) backing (Min:Sec.) (Min:Sec) Delaware Reciprocating 0:10 0:22 0:60 0:55 North Dakota Turbine 2:14 1:08 3:25 9:35

These tests were done with the ship's heading at 21 knots, with the time between the communication

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14 from the bridge and the engine rooms being less than 10 seconds. In conclusion of the tests, Cone would state that Titanic's engines probably acted more like the North Dakota's. His reasoning being:

The machinery of the Titanic was a combination of reciprocating engines with turbines, with the power distributed on three shafts, the reciprocating engines being located on the outboard shafts and developing approximately 50 per cent at the full power. The backing was accomplished only with the reciprocating engines. If we allow that the backing power of these engines was equal to the ahead power, which is not the case, as on account of the effect of the back of the propellers the backing power is always less than the ahead power, the maximum possible backing power of the Titanic could not have exceeded 50 per cent of the ahead power. This being the fact, her backing possibilities were more nearly like those of the North Dakota, the turbine vessel, than those of the Delaware, the reciprocating engine ship. To this extent Cone's analysis is flawed. Titanic's reciprocating engines were in fact 65% of the total horsepower output of 46,000hp.86 Titanic's turbine was not connected to the boiler feeds, but instead took the low pressure exhaust from the reciprocating engines that would otherwise have been discarded into the ship's condensers. Therefore, having the turbine disengaged would have no effect on the reciprocating engines output, which, in-and-of themselves, could have propelled the ship at around 21 knots.87 In fact, an engineer aboard the 1927 Laurentic, which would have an updated version of the exact same engine set up as Titanic, would state that having the turbine engine hooked up had 'no effect on the speed'.88 To further understand the backing time of reciprocating engines, below is a chart that shows the results of a reversal test done aboard the US Battleship Maine, which had two triple expansion reciprocating engines of around 9,000hp.89 The test consisted, “...of stopping and reversing the engines as quickly as possible, starting with engines going ahead at full speed and noting the time until each stopped, until each started astern and until each was making full speed astern. The time required to pass from full speed astern to full speed ahead was then noted.”90

From To Time (Seconds) Time (Seconds) Port Engine Starboard Engine Full Speed Ahead Stop 9 9 Stop Astern 6 5 Stop Full Speed Astern 55 60 Full Speed Astern Ahead 5 5

Based on this, it can be seen that the engines started astern in around 15 seconds, and roughly a little over a minute was needed for the engines to be going full astern. Henley's Encyclopedia of Practical Engineering and Allied Trades, would explain that, “A reversing engine must be prompt in action, so that the main engines shall be capable of reversal and moving full astern within thirty seconds.”91 However optimistic thirty seconds sounds, tests aboard the Scout Cruiser Birmingham, shows similar results of the US Maine. The Birmingham had two triple expansion engines producing 16,000hp. The test consisted of three runs made at 10 and 16 knots, with two made at 22 knots and one at 24. Only the boilers needed to run at the required speeds were used, with no 'preparatory to backing, and no speeding up of blowers during backing interval'. Pressure in boilers were not reduced to the 'extent as to cause priming'.

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Speed Time Required To Time Engines Time Till Ship Distance Head Reverse Engines Were Backing Stopped Reached In (Seconds) (Min:Sec) (Min: Sec) Ship's Length (423ft) 10 4 1:06.3 1:10.3 1.5 16 4.67 1:16.53 1:21.2 2.6 22 6.5 56.5 1:03 3 24 7 1:02 1:09 3.2 Average time to reverse 5.54 seconds with a average boiler pressure increase of 1.5 at the end of backing.92

A story of a ship (whose name is not given) would be published in the 'International Marine Engineering'. The author would relate how the ship was powered by, '...two triple expansion engines with four cylinders, the arrangement being forward low-pressure, high-pressure and intermediate-pressure, and after low- pressure. The engines were of inverted type, with a combined power of 16,000 horsepower.” While steaming at '70 revolutions', 'something let go in the port high-pressure cylinder'. “The throttle was closed at the first crash and the reversing gear thrown-over, stopping the engine within eight or ten revolutions.”93 What this tells us, is that, if this is indeed a true story, the engines were stopped in around 10-12 seconds, having regulated the throttle, which again was not necessary during an emergency.94 Greaser Fredrick Scott would state that it would take 10 minutes for the steam to run off the engines and bring it to a stop. He would also go on to say that the engines would carry out 5 revolutions. However, this is without a reverse order being given.95 Overall, what the above shows us is that reciprocating engines were indeed fast reacting and could be put astern in a short amount of time, though the engines would not go their hardest astern for somewhere around a minute.

Effect of the Evasive Maneuver Part 1

Once the order was received to go astern, Titanic's turbine would be shut off, with steam instead being directed into the condensers. As such, Titanic's center propeller would eventually windmill to a stop, and Titanic would thus become a twin-screw steamer. From here the initial thrust astern would not be immediately acted upon, for the drag and resistance of the propellers, the resistance of the hull, and the inertia and velocity had to be checked and overcame.96 Therefore, Titanic would still carry a forward motion, with the helm acting as on a ship with such, until power was transmitted sternward. As Titanic's rudder was put to port, Titanic's bow would also swing such. This in effect would cause Titanic's stern to swing towards the starboard, or towards the berg. This swing would not be greater than 75ft.97 This concern was brought up by Senator Burton during the US inquiry, during his individual interrogation98 of Rowe, when asking “Do you think that if the helm had been hard-a-starboard the stern would have been against the berg?” Rowe would reply, “It stands to reason it would sir, if the helm were hard-a-starboard.”99 All evidence shows that Titanic's damage was limited to around the first 317ft.100 Had Titanic's stern swung into the berg than the damage should not have been limited to such an extent but instead, continued down Titanic's starboard side. There is no evidence of damage to the starboard bilge keel or wing propeller on Titanic's wreck showing us that indeed the damage was limited. Rowe also reported that, though he thought the iceberg was going to hit the overhanging docking bridge, it did not, missing it within 10ft.101 Therefore we must come to the conclusion that Titanic's stern was saved from damage

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16 by one or more means. It could be said that Titanic's stern was saved by Titanic and the berg reflecting off one another, or that Titanic damaged the berg, or even still (as this author has proposed) Titanic moved the iceberg.102 Two important things that should be considered are, one: we don't know to what extent Titanic's stern was saved, it could have been merely a half an inch if not more or maybe even less. Two: we don't know what the underwater characteristics of the berg was, therefore, we cannot say with any certainty that any of the above scenarios did or did not happen. What evidence does show is that eventually Titanic's bow began to swing starboard. This would imply that at some point, or in some way, Titanic's turn to port was checked. There are two possible reasons for this, one being that there was an opposite order of the helm, or the reaction of having Titanic's engines astern caused the ship to act in the opposite manner. Captain Charles Johnston would explain the later during the Limitation of Liability hearings103:

Q. If you put the helm a starboard in a twin screw vessel and back both engines, what direction will the bow take?

– The bow will pay off to starboard.

Q. With the helm a starboard?

– With the helm astarboard.

Q. The bow will swing off to port?

– The bow will swing off to port until she gathers sternboard, then it will pay off to starboard.

The following three examples support Johnston's claims:

When backing, the stern of the vessel tends to turn in the direction in which the rudder is put. Thus right rudder will swing the stern to starboard while the bow veers to port.104 ... If a twin-screw boat has considerable headway and its engines are reversed with rudders hard over, the stern will normally swing away from the rudders (to port with right rudder, and vice versa) until the headway is overcome by reversing engines. After it has gathered sternway, the stern tends to work towards the side on which the rudders are set.105 ... As for rudder position: Remember that in reverse the water is hitting the rudder from the back rather than the front, so the rule of opposites applies, the stern will be forced in the opposite direction (i.e., when backing with the rudder hard to starboard, the stern will be forced to starboard and the bow will be forced to port.)106

Titanic's Turn To Port

It is important that we establish the meaning of Murdoch's order for 'Hard-a-Starboard'. In Titanic's era orders were given opposite of the desired direction one wanted to turn. This was a hark back to the days of the tiller, were one would turn the tiller one way, in order to push the rudder the opposite direction. This can be likened to a compass needle, for when the head (the tiller in our case) of the compass goes right, the tail (the rudder) goes left. Therefore, Murdoch's order for starboard, had the intent to go port. This was accomplished like such. The wheel was turned counterclockwise (to port) four times, Brad Payne 2020

17 with the resistance building with each turn. Experts have put the estimate for getting the wheel hard over within a various range of between 4-10 seconds.107 Below is a chart taken from trial tests of various ships, that may give us a better representation of the time it would have taken to get the helm over.

Ship Helm Put Time Hard Over (Seconds) Battleship Nebraskah108 Port 10.4 Battleship Maine109 Port 15 Destroyer Smith110 Starboard 6.4 Destroyer Perry Port 6 “ Starboard 8 Destroyer Preble Port 5.5 “ Starboard 6 Destroyer Paul Jones111 Port 3.5 “ Starboard 4.5 HMS Hermione112 Starboard 7 Average Port 8.08 “ Starboard 6.38 Average Between Both 7.23

As the wheel was turned, the steering engine at Titanic's stern would push Titanic's tiller to starboard, which in turn, would push Titanic's rudder to port. The max angle of the rudder being 40º. Once the turn was initiated, Titanic's bow would begin to swing port. To those aboard Titanic it would appear that the ship was turning from a pivot point roughly 294ft from the ship's stem, or just aft of the 1st funnel. As the bow began to turn to port, Titanic's stern would begin to swing out to starboard, towards the berg, again the maximum amount of swing would be no more than about 75ft. Evidence clearly points to Titanic turning port. Scarrott would see the berg off Titanic's starboard beam.113 Shiers saw the berg, “On the starboard quarter, off the stern.”114 Rowe saw the mass of ice off the starboard side.115 Even Boxhall would see a small black mass a little on the starboard quarter.116 Now the question is, how much did Titanic turn to port? Before we answer that, now would be a good time to talk about 'points'. Points are the measurements used to help determine the bearings of an object in the 360° field of a compass. Running clockwise, the bow was 0°, with the stern being 180°, with the ending at the bow again for a complete 360°. The 360° field is broken up into eight 45° ranges, which is further broken up into quarters of 11.25°. These quarters are 'points' numbered from 0 to 3. Thus 0° is dead head and 0 points; 11.25° is one point off the bow, 22.5° is two points, 3 points is 33.75°, with 0 points being 45°, or broad on the starboard bow. After that we go back to 1 point (56.25°) so on, and so forth.117 Fleet would state that while on the phone, Lee would tell him that the ship began to swing to port; while also noting that nothing was done until after he went to the telephone. Fleet himself, would not see this turn until after he 'got up from the phone'. Based on the evidence already presented, no orders were given until after the lookout's phone call. Brad Payne 2020

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Neither Fleet nor Lee recalled hearing any order given by Murdoch after Moody said, “Thank you,” thus ending the call from the nest. Therefore, either this sudden turn was an optical illusion, wishful thinking, or Fleet was mistaken. It is obvious from Fleet's testimony that he himself did not see the ship swinging until after he got off the phone and 'looked up' or 'over' the nest. Lee in his testimony never backs up Fleet's claim. Instead Lee would state, “As soon as the reply came back, ‘Thank you,’ the helm must have been put either hard-a-starboard or very close to it, because she veered to port, and it seemed almost as if she might clear it, but I suppose there was ice underwater.” Thus it is clear that Lee claims that nothing was done until after the phone conversation. Having rung the bridge Fleet would go back to his position on the port side118 and 'kept the lookout again.'119 According to the story he later told author Reade:120

“We watched the thing. It had a pointed top. We didn't like the look of this thing. I said to Lee, 'You better go down, there's no sense the two of us being up here, if we strike.' He didn't want to go. 'I can't do that,' he said. But I made him and he went down the ladder.”

That, also, was new, though not important, I asked him if he was alone then up there when they hit the iceberg.

“No, he climbed up back. We was up there together.”

Was this piece of information true? Would the much older Lee have listened to the younger Fleet? Regardless, there was not much more the men could do but wait and watch as Titanic's bow swung port, hoping that it would miss the berg. As history would have it, Titanic did not miss the berg, and the bow only swung, according to Fleet, “A little over a point, or two points,” before the collision. During the US inquiry Hichens would state, “Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, sir; the officer in charge. The sixth officer repeated the order, 'The helm is hard astarboard, sir.' But, during the time, she was crushing the ice, or we could hear the grinding noise along the ship's bottom.” During the British inquiry Hichens' testimony would get a bit confusing. Due to this, this author believes it would be best to present a transcript of what was said, instead of a mere summary.

948. Had you had any instructions before she struck? Had you been told to do anything with your helm before she struck?

– Just as she struck I had the order "Hard-a-starboard" when she struck.

949. Just as she struck, is that what you said?

– Not immediately as she struck; the ship was swinging. We had the order, "Hard-a- starboard," and she just swung about two points when she struck.

951. Had you time to get the helm hard a starboard before she struck?

– No, she was crashing then.

952. Did you begin to get the helm over?

– Yes, the helm was barely over when she struck. The ship had swung about two points.

953. She had swung two points?

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– Yes.

954. (The Commissioner.) Do let me understand; had she swung two points before the crash came?

– Yes, my Lord.

957. Before the vessel struck had you had time to get the wheel right over?

– The wheel was over then, hard over.

958. (The Commissioner.) Before she struck?

– Oh yes, hard over before she struck.

999. Then you got the helm right over?

– Right over, Sir.

1000. Then she comes round two points and then strikes. Is that right?

– The vessel veered off two points; she went to the southward of west.

During the British inquiry Harland and Wolff ship designer Edward Wilding would state that tests done on the Olympic, with 74rpms, equating to a speed of roughly 21½ knots, resulted in a 2 point turn in 37 seconds, with a distance of two-tenths of a knot, which equals 1,215ft. These tests were done on May 16th, 1912121 while off of Queenstown, as the Olympic reached the Irish shores an hour early.122 Wilding, who was not present during the testing, would state that he believed that it would be something more than that, “about 1,200 or 1,300ft.”123 During the Limitation of Liability hearings, Wilding would state of tests performed on the Olympic, “To ascertain, if possible, what the advance of lateral movement would be whilst the ship was turning two points under orders assumed to have been given, or reported to have been given at the time of the accident.” He would state that this included the ship going 22 knots, with an order for 'hard-a- starboard' and both engines reversed. He would state that the advance would be 440yrds.124 As the reader has probably noted, 440yrds is 1,320ft, on the high side of what Wilding predicted. 1,320ft, with a ship going 22knts (equaling 37ft per second) would take 36 seconds to cover. This is of course is if the ship actually did turn 2 points, for as read earlier, Fleet would state that the ship moved anywhere from 1 to 2 points. It has been calculated that Titanic would turn 1 point in roughly 23 seconds.125 So rather 23 seconds or another 13 seconds, or somewhere in between, this is more time than what we have established to be the average for how long it would take to put the wheel hard over. Therefore, one must conclude, that had Hichens got the wheel hard over, then it must have been done in plenty of time before any collision. Otherwise, Titanic turned less than both points. It should be noted that there was no way in which Hichens could have seen the berg, and therefore his only knowledge of the collision, or what he perceived to be the collision, came from the 'grinding noise'. One could conclude that perhaps Hichens felt the engines being reversed, but this still puts into question his statements that the ship had turned about 2 points before feeling any crash, and rather the reversing of the engines would produce a 'grinding noise'. Mathematically the two points fits with what we know of distance of the berg and the timing of Brad Payne 2020

20 other events. If the berg was half a nautical mile, or 3,038ft out, and Titanic was going 37ftps, then it should have reached the berg in 82 seconds. Take away the 35 seconds between the lookout's bell and the phone call, this gives us 47 seconds, which is 10 seconds longer than what we have established for a 2 point turn, but close enough considering the half a mile is an estimate.126

Second Telegraph Order

Hichens would recall during the US investigation, “The sixth officer repeated the order, 'The helm is hard astarboard, sir.' But, during the time, she was crushing the ice, or we could hear the grinding noise along the ship's bottom. I heard the telegraph ring, sir.”127 This telegraph order came after the one he had previously said took place with the order for 'hard-a-starboard'. According to Chapin's account, of Hichens' account, there was only one telegraph order, but two shocks:

First officer, Mr. Murdoch, who was then on the bridge, turned to the quartermaster at the helm and ordered “hard a-starboard.” The quartermaster jammed the wheel over as he repeated, “Hard to starboard,” and the sixth officer Mr. Moody, who was at the compass to oversee the ship's course, answered; “Helm hard a-starboard,” thus reporting that the order had been carried out. A light crash followed in two or three seconds, and immediately First Officer Murdoch shouted, “Hard a-port.” The quartermaster twirled the wheel as he repeated “hard a-port,” and the sixth officer answered, “Helm hard a-port,” showing that the order had been carried out. Immediately, a terrible crash ensued, and Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, stopped the engines with a signal, rang the warning bell and pulled the leer when instantly closed all the watertight bulkhead doors.128

Of course Hichens would not be able to see the telegraphs, so Chapin's 'stop', was surmised by either him or Hichens, or from information provided by another source. Hichens when asked how soon he noticed Titanic stopped after the collision would state, “Immediately.”129 It has been pointed out to this author, and again worth repeating, that this second telegraph order heard by Hichens could merely have been the reply from the engine room of the previous telegraph order. As previously seen in the chart of Dillon's orders, he would recall 'stop' as being his second telegraph order. He would place this order a minute and a half after any form of shock. We have already seen that Titanic would turn 2 points in 37 seconds, therefore if Titanic did indeed turn 2 points, and Hichens' recollection of the second telegraph order happened immediately after the collision, then this minute and a half is much too long. Scott would not notice any telegraph order before any form of shock. His first telegraph order is 'Stop', but he does not say how long this telegraph order was after the shock, just that it happened 'after the shock'.130 What is important though is that he noticed this order came down on all four telegraphs, the two main engine telegraphs and the two emergency telegraphs.131 Boxhall, when relating his 'Full Astern' order, also recalled seeing both the main and emergency telegraphs worked.132 Most survivor accounts place the stopping of the engines closely following any form of shock or collision. In fact, many would make the stopping of the vessel as to what aroused their curiosity, more so than any shock itself. Lightoller would be one of these people, stating that it he laid in bed for a few minutes until he felt the ship's engines stop, and then he got up and went on deck.133 During the US inquiry Lightoller would state that he waited two minutes before getting up and going on deck. Once on deck, which he would stay for another two or three minutes134, he would note that the ship was only going 4 to 6 knots.135 Could it be that Dillon's one and a half minutes was actually the time it took for the engines to stop rotating? Scott would say that the engines would stop revolving in about 5 revolutions, between his 'stop' and 'slow ahead' orders.136 It is doubtful that these 5 revolutions would take a whole minute and a Brad Payne 2020

21 half though. Perhaps our best understanding of when the order for stop came is from the men in the boiler rooms. Leading Fireman Barrett located in boiler room 6 would recall, “There is a clock face in the stokehold and the red light goes up for ‘Stop’. I was talking to Mr. Hesketh, one of the engineers, when the red light came up, and I shouted, 'Shut all dampers.' That order was obeyed, but the crash came before we had them all shut.” His testimony, taken aboard the Olympic as it laid docked in New York, would reveal, “ Yes. I was standing talking to the second engineer. The bell rang, the red light showed. We sang out shut the doors (indicating the ash doors to the furnaces) and there was a crash just as we sung out.”137 He would pretty much relate the same during his British testimony, saying that he gave the orders to shut the dampers, and before they got them all shut, the crash came.138 Fireman Beauchamp, located in the same area, would testify during the British inquiry:

661: (Mr. Raymond Asquith-to the witness) Did you notice the shock when the ship struck?

– Yes, sir; I noticed the shock.

662: Was it a severe shock?

– Just like thunder.

663: And immediately after the shock was any order give?

– Yes.

664: What order?

– To standby, to stop. The telegraph went ‘stop’.

665: Did the engineer in you section give you any order?

– Yes; The engineer and the lead stoker shouted together- they said, “Shut the damper”.

Author Richard Kerbrech would describe the dampers (large flaps) as such139:

Coal fires cannot be extinguished, for the main engines might call for a supply of steam at any time. The situation was met by shutting off the air supply or draught, by either the ashpit dampers locally, or for a higher state of emergency the large damper flaps situated in the boiler uptakes at the base of the funnel.

Thus, closing these would ultimately cut off air flow. Safety valves were also put into place to release any extra pressure via the funnels. Therefore, the dampers were used to decrease power to the engines, as noted in the Stokers' Manual.140

When the engines are done with, dampers and ash-pit draught plates are shut to allow fires to die out and boilers to cool down gradually.

If the engines were stopped and the dampers not closed there would be too much pressure built up with

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22 nowhere to go, and the boilers and pipes could spring leaks or explode. Had the engines been put into emergency reverse, the men in the boiler rooms would have had no knowledge of this as steam would have been kept up. As noted in the tests aboard the Birmingham, the boiler pressure actually increased- possibly due to the adjustment of the throttle. The boiler rooms received their orders from the engine room and not directly from the bridge; therefore, the engine room would have received the initial order for 'stop' and would then have to rely it to the boiler rooms. The main difference between Barrett's and Beauchamp's accounts is that Barrett places the shock almost immediately after he gave the order to 'shut the dampers', where Beauchamp places the thunderous shock before the order came down to 'stop'. Perhaps Beauchamp heard the initial collision and that is what he is relating to, and not necessarily the shock of the iceberg piercing into boiler room 6. What can clearly be seen, is that both men's accounts do not allow for the necessary time needed to turn Titanic one or more points, thus preventing this 'stop' order from being the first telegraph order. Boxhall, however, would not recall any telegraph order after seeing the telegraph's at full astern. He would even state, “The engines were going full speed astern for quite a little time.”141 When asked if the engines were still going reverse or were had they stopped when he left the bridge on his initial damage assessment shortly after the collision, he would answer, “I cannot say.”142 Olliver would not recall any order before or any 'stop' order after the collision. He would only note that the whilst he was 'on the bridge she went ahead, after she struck; she went half speed ahead'. He would state that the Captain would give this order. Being that Captain Smith was not on the bridge during the original stop order, or any evasive maneuver orders, this order had to have happened afterwards.

Second Helm Order

As previously read there is evidence that Titanic's turn to port was checked, and the ship began to turn starboard. One possible reason for this (the engines put full astern with a hard to port helm) has already been discussed. However, based on the evidence we have just explored, this original evasive maneuver, if it happened, only lasted for around 40 seconds.143 This would mean that any reverse thrust Titanic initiated would have been very minimal, and as such may not explain the full extent in which Titanic possibly turned to starboard, which will be looked at in the next section. For now, we will explore another possible reason for Titanic's turn to starboard, and that is a reverse helm order from hard-a-starboard to hard-a-port. Like the 'full astern' order, there is only one true eyewitness that claims there was a hard-a-port order, and that is Quartermaster Olliver. Olliver would be questioned independently by Senator Burton, after he had just independently questioned Quartermaster Rowe. As seen earlier, Burton would ask Rowe if it was true or not that Titanic's stern, under a helm order to port, would swing Titanic's stern starboard into the iceberg. Rowe would agree that such was true, and Burton's suspicions were correct- Titanic's stern would indeed have swung into the iceberg under a port helm order alone. However, it does not appear that Burton took into account any effects that a full reversal of Titanic's engines would have had, which up to that point is all Burton had to go off. Burton's suspicions would lead him to ask Olliver the leading question, “Do you know whether the wheel was hard aport then?” Olliver would reply, “What I know about the wheel- I was stand-by to run messages, but what I knew about the helm is, hard aport.” This question is odd in that there would be no indication of a 'hard-a-port' order during the US investigation, at least not until four days later with the questioning of Ismay.144 One could imply that this question was mere slip of the tongue on Burton's part, with Olliver merely agreeing to the answer. This was the case when Burton asked Fleet, “You say it struck the port bow, 50 feet away from the bow,” to which Fleet would answer, “Yes, sir,”145 even though that is not what Fleet had said. Mistake or not, Burton's questioning of Rowe indicates that Burton Brad Payne 2020

23 possibly had the preconceived notion that a 'hard-a-port' order must have taken place. Burton does try to clear up the matter with Olliver, asking, “Do you mean hard aport or hard astarboard?” To which Olliver would reply, “I know the orders I heard when I was on the bridge was after we had struck the iceberg. I heard hard aport, and there was a man at the wheel and the officer. The officer was seeing it was carried out right.” He would further state that the order was given by the first officer, with the sixth officer watching it being carried out, with the berg at this point being 'away up stern'. Oliver would also make clear that this order happened, “After I got there...”146 So from here, it would seem that the next course of action would be to determine when it was Olliver 'got there', or to the bridge. We know that Olliver was trimming the lights to the compass on top of the compass stand 243ft away when he heard the crow's nest bell. He said he peered out but could not see what they were signaling about. He then states that he left. Olliver does not state rather this leaving was immediate, or whether he had to finish his duty before leaving. Again, the bell did not indicate danger, so there would be no purpose for Olliver to either hurry or leave his duty unfinished. Olliver then had to make his way off the compass stand which stood 12ft above the raised roof of the first class lounge, and then off the raised roof, which was 2ft 9in high.147 Not taking into account the short amount of time that would be lost coming down these two sets of stairs, Olliver should have been able to reach the bridge in around 48seconds.148 Not stating what side of the boat deck he went down, Olliver does not recall hearing the order for hard-a-starboard, nor the telegraph ring. Olliver claims that he heard the grinding of the iceberg along the ship and that this was before he saw the iceberg. When asked how far aft the sound went, he would reply, “I could not say how far aft, sir, because I do not know where it started and where it finished. I do not know.” When asked if the rubbing sound happened aft of where he was, he would state, “Not behind where I was. It did not, to my knowledge, rub behind where I was; it was before.” We know that the iceberg caused damage just aft of the bridge, to boiler rooms 6 and 5, with some possible damage to boiler room 4. This would mean that Olliver would have to be aft of this damage when it occurred for the rubbing sound to not have continued behind where he was. It is clear though that Olliver is merely speculating. We know that the rubbing sound happened before he saw the 'tip' of the berg, which makes sense as the iceberg could have protruded forward of its tip. Olliver claims that the berg was 'the height of the boat deck; if anything, just a little higher', and that he saw it not abeam of the bridge, but 'just abaft the bridge'. Looking at photos of both Titanic and Olympic's wing bridge, it would be almost impossible for Olliver to have seen a berg that was just a 'little higher' than the boat deck, abaft the bridge, had he peered from inside the bridge or through the bridge from the port side. From these areas the berg would have been obstructed from view due to the starboard wing bridge, the bulwark, collapsible lifeboat C on deck, and boat 1 hanging in its' davits; coupled with the fact that looking through the bridge is not 'abaft the bridge'. The snag that is often created here is the interpretation of a 'little higher'. Some suggest that the iceberg loomed over the starboard wing bridge, which would make it more than a 'little higher'. Also, this is erroneous in the fact that this would again be abeam the bridge and not abaft. Was the berg tall enough to peak over the lifeboats? Or was the berg a foot or a couple of feet taller than the boat deck? To this author the statement, “The iceberg was about the height of the boat deck; if anything, just a little higher,” must not mean anything taller than Olliver himself.149 It is obvious that he is stating that the iceberg was almost the height of the boat deck, or roughly 60ft. In his evidence Olliver clearly states that he 'was not right on the bridge' when the collision occurred but was 'just entering the bridge'. Not being on the bridge, and just entering the bridge, can sound a bit like an oxymoron statement, as entering the bridge could be interpreted as being 'on the bridge', by some. From his testimony though, it is apparent that he was aft of the entrance. Brad Payne 2020

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The finale piece if the puzzle comes from Olliver's statement about the watertight doors. He would tell Senator Burton, “Because Mr. Murdoch reported, and as I entered the bridge I saw him about the lever.” We also know from his testimony that Murdoch did not start closing the doors until 'just after' the ship 'struck'. We know from the men below that that watertight doors did not start dropping until after the collision, after water started entering boiler room 6, and after the 2nd telegraph order. So if Olliver entered the bridge around this time, that means he reached the bridge about, or just after, the time the iceberg did damage to boiler room 6 and 5, which goes well with his statement that the rubbing sound happened forward of where he was, as it would have just expired by the time he had reached the bridge. Overall, the evidence places Olliver aft of the bridge, on the starboard side, when the collision occurred, and when he saw the iceberg. This is based on the fact that he claims the rubbing sound expired forward of where he was, and we know how far the damage occurred, along with the fact that he saw the tip of the iceberg, that was just a little higher than the boat deck, abaft the bridge, not abeam. Olliver also states that he was not on the bridge but was just about to enter the bridge when the collision occurred, and when he did Murdoch was operating the watertight doors. This would mean that Olliver's hard-a-port order could not have come before the closing of the watertight doors. This is based on the fact that he entered the bridge to see Murdoch at the watertight door lever, which we know occurred after the collision, after the 'hard-a-starboard' order, and after the first two telegraph orders, both of which Olliver never claims to have heard. He also claimed that Murdoch gave the order, which is suggestive that this order occurred before Captain Smith came to the bridge. As read earlier, Hichens would claim that a helm order occurred, and a quartermaster was there to his left to repeat the order. The only difference is, is that Hichens would claim that this occurred during the 'hard-a-starboard' order. If he was mistaken, could it have been a 'hard-a-port' order that this took place. If so, than Olliver must have made his way from the starboard side to Hichens left side, where he claimed the quartermaster was when he repeated the helm was hard over, an event the Olliver never relates happening in his hard-a-port order. Hichens would never claim at either inquiry to have received any other order besides 'hard-a- starboard'. However, the questioning involved leaves an area that one could find room to squeeze in a 'hard-a-port' order. During the US inquiry, Hichens would be asked:

Smith- Is that the only order you received before the collision?

Hichens- That is all sir: then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officer to make a note of that in the log book.

As seen, Smith only asks about orders received 'before' the collision and not afterwards. During the British inquiry Hichens would be asked:

1030: (Hichens) The Captain immediately gave him orders to close the watertight doors. He said, “They are closed.” He immediately then sent for the carpenter to sound the ship.

1040: Did you hear any other order?

- No other order after that. That was the last order I heard with the exception of the boats.

Unlike in the US, here Hichens is asked if he heard any other orders after the Captain came to the bridge. As we have already established, the order for 'hard-a-port' must have been after the collision and before the Captain was on the bridge, as the Captain would have made the order not Murdoch. Coincidentally, this gap left between the two inquires is exactly the area in which we have established Olliver's order Brad Payne 2020

25 must have taken place, had it occurred. During the British investigation though they would make clear with Hichens as to the helm orders:

1314. You were given the order to hard-a-starboard?

– Yes.

1315. Was that the only order you had as to the helm?

– Yes.

Mr. Holmes: Because, if your Lordship will remember, the evidence of the Witness Scarrott on Friday was quite the contrary, when he came up on deck.

The Commissioner: What did he say?

Mr. Holmes: He said that the ship appeared to be under a port helm, and appeared to be going around the iceberg towards the starboard side.

The Commissioner: Did he say so?

The Attorney-General: Yes, I think so.

1316. (Mr. Holmes.) It is Question 354. (To the Witness.) She never was under a port helm?

– She did not come on the port helm, Sir - on the starboard helm.

This last question is inappropriately asked, and could be seen as leading, but the answer to question 1315, is clearly of Hichens' own. This however does not end our investigation into the evidence of Hichens. The article, 'Account of the Disaster told by the Quartermaster at the Wheel', written by Carpathia passenger Howard Chapin, would read:

The quartermaster jammed the wheel over as he repeated, “Hard to starboard,” and the sixth officer, Mr. Moody, who was at the compass to oversee the ship's course, answered: “Helm hard a- starboard,” thus reporting that the order had been carried out.

A light crash followed in two or three seconds, and immediately First Officer Murdoch shouted: “Hard a-port.” The quartermaster twirled the wheel as he repeated “hard a-port,” and the sixth officer answered “Helm hard a-port,” showing that the order had been carried out. Immediately a terrible crash ensued, and Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, stopped the engines with a signal, rang the warning bell and pulled the lever which instantly closed all the watertight bulkhead doors. Thus he kept the ship from sinking immediately.

…

The first officer tried to clear the ship's bow by putting the helm to starboard and then clear her stern by putting the helm to port, but the iceberg extended far out under the water, and there was no chance of not hitting it. The ship struck first lightly on her port bow and crashed heavily with the starboard bow, staving in the forward plates and ripping practically the entire bottom of the boat.150

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This article is not without its flaws, and it is unsure how much of the information actually came from Hichens, for he is never mentioned by name, nor is he ever directly quoted. We know that Chapin talked to other survivors as well, and as such, there are things related in the above article that can be attributed to other survivors. Therefore, it could be a compilation of things heard aboard Carpathia. However, this does not make it necessarily completely dismissive. The only other source that this author has found that states of Hichens and any helm order is The Bangor Daily Commercial, dated Friday April 19th, 1912, which reads:

This was the statement made Thursday night by J.H. Moody, a quartermaster and the helmsmen on the night of the disaster. He said the ship was making 21 knots an hour and the officers were striving to live up to the orders to smash a record.

“It was close to midnight,” said Moody, “and I was on the bridge with the second officer, who was in command. Suddenly he shouted, 'Port your helm'.' I did so but it was too late. We struck the submerged portion of the berg.”

This article is obviously riddled with errors, which makes it hard to except. It is unclear what is meant by the statement, “Port your helm.” This is the unfortunate fact of the helm orders of the day, as it is hard to decipher what is meant - the actual order or the intent of the order. We must also caution against statements interpreted by landlubbers. If Hichens said that the order was for 'hard-a-starboard', and the ship swung port, someone not knowing the operations of ships could easily interpret that as being two separate orders.151 During Ismay's US interrogation, the following would be said:

Senator Smith: You remember, I think, the statement of the wheelman, Hichens, that the last thing he did before striking the iceberg was to so turn his wheel as to avoid contact directly with the bow, the extreme bow?

Ismay: Yes, sir.

Senator Smith: Do you recall that?

Mr. Ismay: I think he said he was told "Hard aport," and then "Hard astarboard," if I remember rightly.

Senator Smith: And then that threw the vessel -

Ismay: (interposing) He wanted to throw his quarter up.

It is clear that Ismay is going off memory here, and that he is unsure of what exactly it was that he heard. It is precarious though, as Hichens never stated anything of a 'hard-a-port' order during his US investigation. So where, when and how Ismay came to claim there was a 'hard-a-port' order is unknown. Was it a private conversation that he had with Hichens, or was it relayed to him second hand from someone else? Or maybe it was a mere guess on Ismay's part, who may have been completely unaware of the events that had taken place on the bridge and was merely interpreting what he believed to be correct. Boxhall’s statements about the subject come from his retelling of Murdoch’s brief to Captain Smith, as to what happened.

Smith- What if anything was said by the captain?

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Boxhall- Yes, Sir. The Captain said, “What have we struck?” Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, said, “We have struck an iceberg.”

Smith- Then what was said?

Boxhall- He followed on to say- Mr. Murdoch followed on to say, “I put her hard-a-starboard and run the engines full astern, but it was too close; she hit it.”

Smith- That was before she struck?

Boxhall- No; after.

Smith- That was after she struck?

Boxhall- Yes.

Smith- He said that he put her hard-a-starboard?

Boxhall- Yes, sir.

Smith- But it was too late?

Boxhall- Yes, sir.

Smith- And he hit it?

Boxhall- Yes, sir.

Smith- What did the Captain say?

Boxhall- Mr. Murdoch also said, “I intended to port around it.”

Smith- “I intended to port around it”?

Boxhall- “ But she hit before I could do any more.”

Smith- Did he say anything more?

Boxhall- “The watertight doors are closed, sir.”

Then at the British inquiry:

15353: And did the Captain then come onto the bridge?

-The Captain was along side me when I turned round.

15354: Did you hear him say something to the first officer?

-Yes; he asked him what we had struck.

15355: What conversation took place between them?

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-The first officer said, “An iceberg, sir. I hard-a-starboard and reversed the engines, and I was going to hard-a-port round it but she was too close. I could not do anymore. I have closed the watertight doors.” The commander asked if he had rung the warning bell, and he said, “Yes.”

Boxhall's statement of intent could be seen as either Murdoch intended to turn Titanic's head to port, by his order for 'hard-a-starboard', or that Murdoch also intended to call a 'hard-a-port' order as well, thus starboarding around the berg, but the ship struck before this order could be done. If one does take this debriefing as Murdoch intending to order a 'hard-a-port' helm, Boxhall's statements seems to incline towards the fact that this order was never given as the berg 'was too close'. The fact that only the forward part of Titanic was damaged, and Murdoch's briefing inclines the intent of porting around was to avoid damage, means that the maneuver was to save the front of the ship, not the stern. If Murdoch's port around maneuver was to save the stern, than the berg was not to close, and he did successfully save the stern; therefore his statement of 'she hit before I could do any more' or 'but she was too close' 'I could not do anymore', makes no sense. One could dismiss Boxhall's briefing as, again, he is the only one to recall such. If done though, than that is one less account to support a 'hard-a-port' procedure. Also, if one dismisses this one account than we must also put into question all of Boxhall's testimony. Boxhall's testimony is riddled with unsupported claims, and to dismiss them all would leave large gaps within Titanic's story. This author cautions being overly judgmental and supports looking at all testimony equally.

Timing

What Olliver's timing of events does allow us is a new clue as to how long it took between the sighting of the berg and the collision. We know from Olliver that once hearing the bells he peered out into the dark to see what the bells were rung about. We don't know how much time this took. If Olliver left immediately afterwards, which there is no way to tell, then between the time he left to when he saw the berg, abaft the bridge, must have been no more than 46 seconds. If one takes into account the 4-5 seconds between the bells and the telephone, and the 30 seconds on the telephone, we have up to 35 seconds. This leaves 11 seconds in between. In this amount of time Titanic would have turned only around 3 degrees.152 Could it be that Hichen's 2 points was actually 2°, which would only have taken 10 seconds? This theory was originally brought up by researcher Sam Helpern.153 It would work out like such. Olliver hears the bells and looks for x amount of time to see what they were rung about. There is 4-5 seconds between the ringing of the bells and the phone call from the crow's-nest to the bridge. We will neglect these times for Olliver looking out into the darkness. Supposing that Olliver left immediately after this we know that the phone call lasted 30 seconds. This would mean that Olliver walked at least 136.5ft, or roughly between forward frame 44 and 45. The average amount of time needed to put the helm over to port we have established as being 8.08 seconds. This would put Olliver having walked 173ft, or roughly between frames 56 and 57. If Titanic only turned 2° than it would strike the berg in ten seconds (2 seconds after our average of putting the helm hard over), just when the report of the helm being put hard over would have occurred. This extra 2 seconds puts Olliver at 182ft or between frames 59 and 60. Then add in 6 seconds until the berg reached the minimum that could be considered to be just abaft the bridge (roughly forward frame 70), this means that Olliver walked 46 seconds, or 209.3ft, or roughly between frames 68 and 69. If Titanic moved more than 2°, or if Olliver saw the tip of the berg any later, this means that Olliver left the compass stand later than immediately. Of course, this does not take into account Fleet's testimony of the ship turning 1 to 2 points. It has been suggested that Fleet and Hichens talked after the disaster, and together got their 'accepted' version of what happened that night straightened out, before Brad Payne 2020

29 going in front of the inquiries. This 'accepted' version of the truth would not only be confusing but also keep both out of blame. The following article though does not support this theory.

"Not a word," replied Fleet, "except that when I get me hands on that guy what gave out the story about me---him as was running the wheel, as he said---why, when I get him he'll be lucky to know if his name's Hitchins or Hawkins. He said he saw me in the crow's nest. Now, there was a cabin in between and he saw nothing of me at all, nothing at all, and what's more, he ain't one of us."154

With no thoughts towards conspiracies, both Fleet's testimony along with the fact that Hichens states twice that Titanic turned 2 points, and agreed to such once, we must unfortunately dismiss a 2° turn, regardless of how well it fits. If Hichens did mean 2°, he does not attempt to correct himself. For the purpose of timing though, we know that 46 seconds was the most minimal amount of time for the collision.

Effects of the Evasive Maneuver Part 2

Turning the helm over from port to starboard would take more time than it took to get it originally over to port. Titanic's helm was spring activated, so that if the helmsman let go of the wheel, it would right itself. This would in effect save some time, as less physical strength would be needed. To gain an understanding of the time needed to reverse the helm, here is an expanded version of the previous chart from section 'Titanic's Turn To Port'.

Ship First Helm Put Time Following Helm Put Time Hard Over (Seconds) Hard Over (Seconds) Battleship Port 10.4 Starboard 16.8 Nebraskah Battleship Maine Port 15 Starboard 20 Destroyer Smith Starboard 6.4 Port 9.0 Destroyer Perry Port 6 Starboard 12.5 “ Starboard 8 Port 12 Destroyer Preble Port 5.5 Starboard 12 “ Starboard 6 Port 12 Destroyer Paul Port 3.5 Starboard 10.5 Jones Starboard 4.5 Port 10.5 HMS Hermione Starboard 7 Port 16 Average Port 8.08 Starboard 14.36 “ Starboard 6.38 Port 11.9

Calculations done by researcher Sam Halpern shows that Titanic's turn to port would be checked in 17 to 18 seconds, and that a turn to starboard would most likely be given at roughly 27.5 seconds after the order was given to port. In Halpern's scenario, this would allow Titanic to swing around 1 point before collision, with a max swing of around 2 points before the turn to port was checked.155 Brad Payne 2020

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Of course with any of the times stated, and the time in which we have established in this paper, the berg would have been almost passing, if not passed, the stern by the time the helm was checked.156 Of course as the late researcher Roy Mengot pointed out, “Getting even partly of a turn in the last 7-10 seconds before the berg went astern of the ship would suffice in clearing the stern.”157 This statement is even truer when we remember that we don't know what the underwater portion of the iceberg looked like, nor do we truly know how far from damage Titanic's stern really was. The next topic that should be discussed is the effect of the telegraph order. The turning of a ship depended on the water flowing past the rudder via the propellers. Once the propellers came to a stop they would not pass the water over the rudder, and as such the rudder would have very little to no effect. It should be noted that if Titanic's engines were put astern the center propeller, connected to the turbine engine, would no longer be active, as Titanic's turbine did not go in reverse. Though this lack of flow from the center propeller would indeed decrease the amount of pressure on the rudder, it most certainly did not disable the turning capabilities of the vessel. Titanic was designed to work as a twin screw vessel up to around 13 knots (50rpms on the reciprocating engines), a speed mostly kept in narrow channels where turning ability was highly needed therefore it would have been a detrimental design flaw on Harland and Wolff's part if Titanic was not nimble under twin screws.158 If Titanic's propellers were indeed put astern and any amount of reversal force was obtained, turning the helm to starboard would have had the opposite effect of swinging Titanic's bow back to port, and it's stern again to starboard. As we have seen in our analysis, the time taken for a ship to be in full reversal was around a minute, and we know that if the ship did turn two points the max time needed between the berg and collision was 37seconds. We can therefore conclude that Titanic did not reach full directional force in reverse before the collision, which goes along with eyewitness accounts, as there is no evidence of Titanic ever loosing forward momentum. We have also seen that the order for stop happened almost simultaneously with the collision. If this was the case than Titanic's propellers would have wind milled to a stop. Scott states that the engines stopped in 5 revolutions, while survivors place the engines stopping either immediately or a couple of minutes after the shock(s). Either way Titanic would carry on forward before eventually coming to a stop. With thrust to its rudder diminishing, it is unclear how effective a hard-a-starboard helm order would have been.

Titanic's Turn To Starboard

Joseph Scarrott would tell the British committee that the Titanic was acting as if it was, “Under port helm. Her stern was slewing off the iceberg. Her starboard quarter was going off the iceberg, and the starboard bow was going as if to make a circle round it.”159 Quartermaster Rowe would also state at the British inquiry that Titanic's stern was swinging 'practically dead south', with 'her head facing north'. “She was coming round to starboard,” he would recall. It should be noted that Rowe speaks of this moment as being the time he saw the mystery light 'half point on the port bow'.160 This light was not seen for some time after Titanic came to a stop. For Titanic's stern to swing 'practically dead south', this would have occurred due to Titanic already turning Northward or a possible current, or both. Some researchers believe to have been a current of around 1 to 1.5knts. Passenger Lawrence Beesley would state that his lifeboat rowed, “...the direction the Titanic's bows were pointing before she sank. I see now that we must have been pointing North West, for we presently saw the Northern Lights on the starboard.” Beesley would not be the only person to use the Northern Lights as a reference, for passenger Major Peuchen would also state, “...we started off from the port side, right directly north, I think it would be, because the northern lights appeared where this light we had been looking at in that direction appeared shortly afterwards,”161 Brad Payne 2020

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Lastly we have evidence given by Fifth Officer Lowe. In May of 1912 he would submit a signed statement to the British Consulate General of New York, in which he would recall seeing a steamer off Titanic's 'port bow', “about 5 miles to the northward of us.” Obviously to be north off the port bow, Titanic had to be facing somewhere around a northeasterly direction, which is in line with Peuchen. Perhaps the most none compromising evidence is the direction in which the wreck lays. Titanic's bow section faces north east, and there is no evidence to suggest that the bow deviated to any great extent from the direction it was facing while sinking. Thus, it is pretty much conclusive that Titanic was facing north to north east when it sank. How far any current turned the ship after the engines came to a standstill is unknown. To further this, there is evidence (as presented earlier) of Titanic moving again after the collision, with an unknown course or time. To what further extent this movement had on Titanic's northward or eastward positioning is unknown.

Activating the Watertight Doors

Titanic's watertight door activation lever was located on the navigation bridge, forward the wheel house, by the ship's main wheel.162 As already seen, Olliver would state seeing Murdoch at the lever when he entered the bridge. Olliver would also state that he heard Murdoch report to Captain Smith, when Smith arrived, that the doors were shut.163 Hichens would not be able to see Murdoch activate the watertight doors, but he would also hear Murdoch report that they were closed. Boxhall would also state that he saw Murdoch closing the watertight doors and he heard Murdoch report to the captain that they were closed.164 Below deck, Barrette would claim during the US inquiry, “We got through before the doors broke, the doors dropped instantly automatically from the bridge.”165 During the British inquiry he would state, “Me and Mr. Hesketh jumped into this section, and the watertight compartment closed up.”166 When asked if he could tell the committee 'whether the rent ran right through No. 10 section', he would answer, “I did not stop to look; I jumped from that section when she struck.”167 Beauchamp would state that, “... immediately the telegraph rang "off" and the order was given to shut up everything the watertight doors dropped.” When asked more specifically about how long he supposed that the watertight doors went after the order for stop came, he would answer, “In less than five minutes.”168 Dillon would state that the watertight doors shut three minutes after the ship struck.169 Scott would state that the next thing that happened after the telegraph went to stop, after the shock, was the watertight doors went.170 Like his 'stop' though, he does not state a time for when this occurred. Looking at the above information, we have Barrette's testimony that shows that he made it into boiler room 5, from boiler room 6, 'before the doors broke' and before 'the watertight compartment closed up'. We have Beauchamp claiming that the doors went within the first five minutes, with Dillon stating that it was three minutes after his shock. We know that it would take the doors between 25 to 30 seconds171 to close due to their closing speed being controlled by cataracts, with the last 18in being free fall.172 We also know that besides the watertight door lever were instructions that read:

In case of emergency, to close watertight doors on tank top, press bell; push ten seconds to give alarm; then move switch to ‘on’ position and keep it there, Note: Doors cannot, however, be operated mechanically whilst switch is on.

Boxhall would be the only person from the bridge to say anything about the alarm. In both the US and British inquiries, Boxhall would say that when Captain Smith came to the bridge, Smith would not inquire anything about the doors except rather the alarm was rang. In both cases Murdoch would answer Brad Payne 2020

32 yes. Neither Barrette or Beauchamp ever state hearing any alarm. Scott clearly states that the doors went without any alarm.173 Trimmer George Cavell, in a coal bunker in boiler room 4 would hear such a bell174, as would Rule175 and fireman Taylor176, who was asleep when the collision occurred. Even Secretary to the Chef Paul Mauge recalled hearing an alarm, though he would erroneously say that this was to alert the passengers177as there was no such alarm on Titanic. If we factor in the 25 to 30 seconds that it would take the doors to closed, and the 10 second alarm, this only gives us 35-40 seconds, which is a long way shy from Dillon's 3 minutes and Beauchamp's 'in less than five'. Looking at the overall timing of Dillon's telegraph orders, we can see that three minutes is half of the time in which he gives for his telegraph orders, which would place the watertight doors closing between his order for 'slow astern' and 'stop'. This could easily lead to the speculation that Dillon had mistaken his telegraph order before the collision, and the actual evasive maneuver sent down was 'Stop' after the collision, 'Slow Astern' and then 'Stop' again. This is a scenario that is commonly spoken of when dismissing Boxhall's 'Full Astern'. However, it plays against the evidence of there being a first telegraph order before the shock, as Dillon, Hichens and Boxhall all recall.

Logging the Collision

Hichens would tell the US committee, “That is all sir: then the first officer told the other quartermaster standing by to take the time, and told one of the junior officer to make a note of that in the log book,” the log book being kept in the chart room. The only quartermaster on the bridge at the time, besides Hichens, would have been Olliver who does not recall this. Being that Boxhall would state that the Captain, Murdoch and himself would make their way to the starboard wing bridge after the collision, it seems more than likely that the 'junior officer' spoken about is Moody, whose activity in the immediate time following the collision is unknown.

Captain Smith Comes to the Bridge

The last sighting we have of Captain Smith before the collision is around 10pm.178 After that we have no concrete evidence to his whereabouts. Hichens would tell the US inquiry, “Just about a minute, I suppose, after the collision, the Captain rushed out of his room...he passed through the wheelhouse on to the bridge.”179 During the US inquiry he would state that he heard the second telegraph ring and the skipper came rushing out of his room. Olliver would merely state that he saw the captain on the bridge after the collision. Boxhall would claim in the US that when he arrived on the bridge he found the 'sixth officer and the first officer and captain' there. During his British testimony Boxhall would state that having seen Murdoch pulling the lever to the watertight doors, “The Captain was alongside of me when I turned round.”180 In 1962, Boxhall would recall, “When I got to the bridge, and the Captain had evidently arrived about the same moment...” So here we have Hichens stating that the Captain did not come to the bridge immediately, but instead in about a minute after the collision. Then we have Boxhall claiming Smith was on the bridge almost immediately after the collision, right when he entered the bridge, which should have been 13 seconds after he left his quarters, which would have put Smith on the bridge before the call from the lookouts to the bridge concluded. Like most of Boxhall's testimony, his timing seems off.

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Briefing the Captain

Looking at Hichens testimony we have Smith coming to the bridge and asking, “What is that,” with Murdoch answering, “An iceberg.” Smith then orders, “Close the emergency doors,” with Murdoch replying that they were already closed. This is followed by Smith ordering the carpenter to be found. This ties nicely with Olliver's testimony, in which he states that Smith came to the bridge and asked what was the matter. Murdoch would state that they had struck an iceberg. Smith then ordered the watertight doors closed, with Murdoch saying that they have been. Smith then orders Olliver to find the carpenter. With Boxhall, during his US testimony, his overall statement would read as such. Captain Smith comes to the bridge and asks, “What have we struck?” Murdoch replies, “We have struck an iceberg. I put her hard astarboard and run the engines full astern, but it was too close; she hit it. I intended to port around it. But she hit before I could do any more. The watertight doors are closed, sir." Smith would then ask if Murdoch had rung the warning bell, to which Murdoch would reply, “Yes, sir.” Then Smith, Murdoch and Boxhall would go to the bridge wing and look for the iceberg. This is similiar to what Boxhall stated during the British inquiry and somewhat to his 1962 interview. As can be seen, Boxhall adds much more of a briefing from Murdoch to Smith. Would Smith have been satisfied with a mere statement that they struck an iceberg as Hichens and Olliver suggest; or would Smith have wanted a full report, as Boxhall recalled? Boxhall's testimonies start off with Smith asking, “What have we struck?” According to some testimony, the feeling of Titanic striking the berg was remenescent of a ship loosing a propeller blade. Would Smith have jumped to the conclusion that the ship had struck something, or would he have made the more general inquiry as stated by Hichens and Olliver, with a simple, what is or was that? Boxhall, gives both of these statements in his 1962 interview. The other difference between Boxhall and the other two witnesses, is the ordering of the watertight doors. Hichens and Olliver both state that Smith ordered the doors shut. Boxhall states that Murdoch volunteered the information that he had already shut the doors, leaving the Captain to only ask whether the alarm bell had been rung. Neither Hichens or Olliver state anything about the alarm bell. Boxhall never states the order for Olliver to find the carpenter, though we know that Olliver was ordered to do such. Was Olliver ordered to find the carpenter after Boxhall left Murdoch and Smith at the starboard wing, or before Boxhall arived? Olliver would make the statement during his interigation that, “It is not our place to go and stand to hear what officers are talking about.” If both Hichens and Olliver were in the wheelhouse, it is possible that the door was shut not allowing the two men to hear Murdoch's briefing. It is also possible that the breifing happened out of ear shoot, as Boxhall does state in his 1962 interview that he left, “whilst the Captain was talking to Murdoch, at the starboard wing of the Bridge.” Could the conversation have taken place on their way towards the wing bridge, or at the wing bridge? Would Smith have known in what direction to have walked in order to look for damage? If this conversation did take place around this point, did Smith order Olliver to find the Carpenter after Boxhall had already left, and while Moody was still filling out the ship's log? Did this order to find the carpenter happen around 5 minutes later, after which Smith, 'looked at the commutator' and notice the 'ship had a list of 5' to the starboard' ? Unfortuantly we have no answers to these matters. This author personally believes that Murdoch would have given a much more detailed briefing, rather than a mere statement that they had struck an iceberg. Perhaps Smith did order the doors shut, and Murdoch also volunteered the fact that he shut the doors, just to inform Smith of the sequence of events. This however is mere specualtion, and with two eyewitnesses claiming similar events, and one eyewitness claiming something different, it is hard to justify such.

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1 WC 17293 2 WC 2396 3 WC 1002-1004 4 US pg. 543 (All page numbers are from digital copies obtained by paperlessarchives.com) 5 Most publications have this being at 250ft, or roughly half of the 498ft long boat deck. The deck, however, was not symmetrical with the after half having 86 frames, and the forward half terminating at frame 80. There were 3ft separation between frames in this area, and the ladder from the compass stand exited at aft frame 1. Therefore 80x3=240ft + 3ft= 243ft. The center of the bridge was around forward frame 77, so 234ft from the end of the compass stand ladder. 6 Fleet US pg. 330, WC 17276, and Lee WC 2441 7 US pg 333 8 This author is assuming Lee meant a nautical mile consisting of 6076ft and not a land mile of 5280ft. 9 US pg. 331, WC 17280 10 The Ship That Stood Still, pg 24 & 25 11 Hogg US pg. 604 12 US pg 332-33 13 WC 14296 14 US pg 465 15 US pg 543 16 WC 15343-44 17 The Titanic: Everything Was Against Us; Simon Angel, pg. 52 18 www.bbc.co.uk/archive/titanic/5049.shtml 19 US pg 333 20 WC 2435 21 WC 17278-86 22 US pg. 331 23 WC 2435-36 24 WC 2420 25 US pg 465 26 WC 978-81 27 The Carpathia & The Titanic; George Behe pg. 36 28 Extra Titanic: The Story of the Disaster in the Newspapers of the Day; Eric Caren & Steve Goldman 29 Passengers aboard Fleet's lifeboat and aboard Carpathia would recall Fleet stating that he had warned the bridge with enough time to avoid the berg. If not merely a ploy to not self-incriminate himself, could Fleet have believed that his bell warning was suffice enough and went to the phone only after realizing the bridge wasn't responding, thus putting in his mind, that he did in fact give the bridge ample warning? 30 US pg 375 31 WC 973 32 WC 2425 33 WC 982-85 34 US pg. 240 35 The use of the words Chief Officer when relating to Murdoch was due to the fact that Murdoch had been Titanic's original Chief Officer until being bumped down in rank due to the arrival of Chief Officer Wilde, fresh from the Olympic .Lightoller who had been First Officer, was made Second Officer. The then Second Officer, Blair, was relieved, leaving all none Senior Officers in rank. 36 US pg. 465 37 US pg. 465 38 WC 982-86 39 WC 15343-46 40 US pg. 470 41 WC 956 42 WC 961 43 WC 1011 44 WC 15346-47 45 The Titanic: Everything Was Against Us; Simon Angel, pg. 52 46 WC 15349 47 US pg. 241 Brad Payne 2020

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48 www.bbc.co.uk/archive/titanic/5049.shtml 49 WC 948-952 50 WC 3715-17 51 WC 3718 52 WC 15568 53 WC 15350-51 54 WC 5513 55 WC 3946-49 56 Transactions of the Liverpool Engineering Society Vol. 33, 1912 pg. 237 (report dated February 21, 1912) 57 WC 5540 58 WC 4937 59 WC 5514-5 60 WC 5824 The question asked, which was in clear reference to Dillon, was, “Did you ever see the dial of this telegraph at all, or are you only going by the rings?” Scott would reply, “No, I saw it.” 61 The Sphere 1912 www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/an-account-of-the-titanic-disaster-by-a-survivor.html 62 WC 339 63 WC 2793-98 64 WC 6382-91 65 WC 9752-58 66 US Inquiry day 7; British Inquiry day 15; letter to author Walter Lord, date unknown, but Lord's return letter was dated 1955 (www.paullee.com/titanic/gtrowe.html); a 1956/7 documentary with survivors (www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVLiZo6Pkak); and letters to Titanic Historical Society's Edward Kamuda dated 1963, 1968 (Titanic Commutator Vol. 25 No. 156, 2001) 67 www.paullee.com/titanic/thecollision.php 68 The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin" of April 29[?] 1912 (www.paullee.com/titanic/thecollision.php) 69 WC 4520-46 70 WC 346-53 71 WC 4843-50 72 L&L November 14, 1913 73 WC 13735 The exact question and answer was, “You could not tell from what direction the sound came from?” “No, my Lord. Naturally I thought it was from forward.” Lightoller would state during the US inquiry, of the 'slight jar' and 'grinding sound', “Well, naturally I should think it was in the front, whether I could tell or not.” To which Senator Smith would ask, “You could not tell exactly?” In response Lightoller would answer, “No, sir.” (pg. 64) 74 US pg. 241 75 WC 20278-82 76 US page 759 In his 1959 rebuttal, Lord would also write that he ordered the helm hard-a-port. Was this order the intent of turn (the ship is ordered hard-a-starboard, to turn port), or the order itself (to turn the ship starboard)? During the US inquiry he stated that the reversing of the engines swung his ship to starboard. Being that the Californian was a single prop ship, the act of turning starboard when astern means that it was a right-handed ship (prop turned clockwise). A right-handed ship under a starboard helm and reverse engines would also turn to starboard. This means that Lord's 'hard-a-port', if it indeed happened, was the order, not the intent (he wanted to too turn starboard, so he ordered hard-a-port). 77 US page 791 78 WC 25473 79 WC 5541-44 80 Marine Engineers and How to Become One, 1906 pg. 195 81 US page 330 & WC 2398 82 Marine-Engine Management; International Textbook Company, 1906 pg. 34 83 Marine Engineering (A Textbook), A. E Tompkins; Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1908 (page 664) 84 Marine Review Vol. 34, 1906 page 29 85 www.titanicinquiry.org/USInq/AmInq17Cone01.php 86 15,000hp per reciprocating engine and 16,000hp, for the turbine. 87 Taking Sam Halpern's formula (V = 0.488 R0.8472) from his article 'Speed and Revolutions:The Development of a Slip Table for the SS Titanic' (www.titanicology.com/Titanica/SpeedandRevolutions.htm) for speeds under 50rpms (the max Bradrpms Payne before 2020 the turbine was engaged) of Titanic's reciprocating engines and applying it to Titanic's reciprocating engines

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max revolutions of 85rpm, we get 21.04, while at cruising speeds of 75rpm we get 18.92. This means that at cruising speeds, Titanic's turbines increased Titanic's speed only by 11%. According to 'Seaton & Rounthwaite's Marine Engineering Pockek-Book' (1922 pg.224) the average percentage gained by on shore instillation of this type was 15-20 percent. It should be stated that the introduction of the center propeller created less slip. 88Haynes RMS Titanic 1909-12 (Olympic Class) Owner's Workshop Manual; David Hutchings and Richard de Kerbrech; Odcombe Press LP, 2011 (pg. 93) 89en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Maine_(ACR-1)#Propulsion 90Forest and Stream Vol. 59, July – December, 1902 page 437 91 Henley's Encyclopedia of Practical Engineering and Allied Trades; Joseph G. Horner; The Norman W. Henley Publishing Company, 1908; page 205 92The Navy Vol. 4 No. 7, September 1910 pg. 11 & Power Vol. 32 August 9th, 1910 (pg. 1441) 93 The Penberthy Engineer & Fireman Vol. 20; January 1913 (page 69) 94 70 revolutions a minutes divided by 60 seconds equals 1.17 revolutions per second. 95 5811-5816 96 Marine Review Vol. 44, July 1914 pg. 276 97 http://titanic-model.com/db/db-02/rm-db-2.html 98 To save time, and to speed up the inquiry, the committee broke up and interrogated eyewitnesses individually, which will be important to note for later. 99 US pg. 539 100 This includes damage done to boiler room 4. 101 US pg. 539 102 www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/community/threads/3-gongs-not-directly-before-collision.35286/ (post 13) 103 http://www.titanicinquiry.org/lol/depositions/johnston4.php 104 Skill in the Surf a Landing Boat Manual - February 1945 (Chpt. 6 pg 27) 105 Chapman Piloting & Seamanship, 65th Edition, Elbert S. Maloney 2006, (pg 215) 106 Motor Boating and Sailing March, 1989 (pg. 38) 107 A mash up of times from the following sources www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/six-seconds-to-disaster-the-death-of- titanic.html, titanic-model.com/articles/Two_Points_in_Thirty_Seven_Seconds/Two%20Points%20in%20Thirty- Seven%20Seconds.pdf and titanic-model.com/db/db-02/rm-db-2.html, and http://titanic-model.com/db/db-02/rm-db- 2.html 108 Marine Review Vol. 34, 1906 pg. 17 109 Royal United Service Institution Journal Vol. 47, 1903 pg. 98 110 Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers Inc. Vol. 22, 1910 pg. 903 111 All info pertaining to the Perry, Preble and Paul Jones from Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers Inc. Vol 14, 1902 pgs. 803, 807, and 811 112 Machinery Vol. 9, 1903 pg. 22 113 WC 351 114 WC 4532 115 US pg. 536 116 US pg. 243 117 To gain better direction, terms such as 'abaft the starboard beam', or 'on the port quarter', were also given. So 225° is 0 points, 'Broad on port quarter', or '3 points on starboard quarter' is 146.25°. 118WC 17294-95 119 WC 17288 120 The Ship That Stood Still pg. 25 121 The Olympic left on its first voyage since the Titanic disaster on May 15th. 122 The American Marine Engineer Vol. 7-8, June 1912 (pg. 20) It would give the description: On the last arrival at Queenstown, says a traveler, the White Star liner Olympic was put through a series of unexpected maneuvers. The previous day we had sailed from Southampton and had crosss the English Channel to Cherbourg, and on the morning of the 16th we arrived off the Irish harbor an hour early in advance of the English-mails. We did not steam into the harbor, as had been expected, but swerved to the west, and from the west to the south, and so round till we had described a complete circle. Thus for an hour, traveling not at full speed, now at half speed, the ship circled this way and that in the water. It described perfect circles; it drew the figure “8” and the letter “S”; she turned upon her trail and met again the line of white water which showed her course like the mark of a skater on ice.... Lord Mersey and Sir Rufus Isaacs have looked at the bulkheads and examined the boats; but for us alone was she facing the Atlantic, steering a southerly course and showing off all her points. Brad Payne 2020

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That is why she went through the maneuvers before Queenstown – to show that she could turn quickly upon her course if ice were seen ahead. 123 WC 25292-93 Wilding would state that he was not present during the tests at the Limitation of Liability hearings, page 190 digital copy. 124 Limitation of Liability page 189-90 digital copy. If these were the same tests as stated to have happened on May 16th, 1912, it should be noted that the eyewitness to those tests, as seen in end note 121 never says anything about feeling the ship being put suddenly in reverse. 125 Turning in Circles: The Turning Characteristics of the SS Titanic; Sam Halpern, 2007 126 If one instead uses land miles, which is 5280ft,we get a perfect match. 5280/2 = 2640/37 = 71-35 = 36 seconds 127 US pg. 465 128 The Carpathia & The Titanic; George Behe pg. 36 129 WC 1021 130 WC 5539 131 WC 5535-37 132 WC 15350 It should be noted there were two main engine order telegraphs that were redundant of one another, located on the extreme ends of the bridge. Boxhall does not state to which main order telegraph he is speaking of. The emergency telegraph was located just port of the helm, which was amidships. 133 WC 13743 134 US pg. 65 135 WC 13760 136 WC 5816 137 US 1210 138 WC 1864-67 139 Down Amongst the Black Gang: The World and Workplace of RMS Titanic's Stokers Pg. 31 140 Stokers' Manual 1912 141 WC 15505 142 WC 15574 143 This includes 37 seconds for the ship to turn 2 points, and the amount of time needed for the ship to receive damage to boiler room 6. 144 US pg. 988 145 US pg. 373 146 US pg. 544 147 From A deck to the boat deck was 9ft 6in, or 114in. From A deck to top of raised roof was 12ft 3in or 147in. 147-114= 33in./12 = 2.75ft. 0.75x12 = 9. Thus 2ft 9in. Measurements from Titanic The Ship Magnificent Vol. 1 pg. 196 148 This is taken from the door to the wheelhouse, which is roughly at forward frame 72. Therefore, 72ft x 3ft = 216 + 3 = 219ft. Average human walking speed is 3.1 mph. 3.1 miles x 5280 ft in a mile = 16368 ft in 3.1 miles / 60min = 272.8 ft a min. / 60 seconds = 4.55 ft per second. 219ft from compass stand to entrance of wheelhouse / 4.55 fps = 48.13 seconds 149 In a photo taken by Father Francis Brown, at the forward end of A deck (just beneath the bridge) is a Quartermaster, who is believed to be Olliver. Knowing the height of the window and railing (both being 42in), this author has concluded that the man in this picture is roughly 5ft 8in.However, this author’s attempt is open for errors. 150 The Carpathia and the Titanic George Behe, pg. 36 151 Such is the case with the lookout's bell. Interpretation aboard Carpathia is that there were three separate warnings of the iceberg, when in fact it was the customary three bells struck to indicate something ahead. So not only was the proper indication misinterpreted, but also the meaning of it, as the ringing of the bells did not mean danger. 152 Turning in Circles: The Turning Characteristics of the SS Titanic; Sam Halpern, 2007 153 http://titanic-model.com/articles/Two_Points_in_Thirty_Seven_Seconds/Two%20Points%20in%20Thirty- Seven%20Seconds.pdf 154 New York Times April 21, 1912 (www.encyclopedia-titanica.org/sealing-the-lips-of-titanics-crew-11703.html) 155 http://titanic-model.com/articles/Two_Points_in_Thirty_Seven_Seconds/Two%20Points%20in%20Thirty- Seven%20Seconds.pdf 156 Titanic was 882.75ft long. At a rate of 37ftps, the berg would have passed Titanic in 24sec. Take away the 6 seconds for the minimum amount of distance that the berg had to travel to be considered abaft the bridge, this gives us 18sec before the berg cleared the ship. 157 http://titanic-model.com/db/db-02/rm-db-2.html 158 It should be noted that studies, even in Titanic's time, have shown an economic, structural and tactical advantage for having three propellers instead of two. A good article can be found in 'The Marine Engineering' Vol. 9, 1904 pgs. 491-494. Brad Payne 2020

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159 WC 355 160 WC 17667-74 161 US pg. 360 162 Pitman US pgs. 297 & 321, Hichens WC 1031-34 163 US pgs. 547-48 164 US pg. 242 WC 15352-55 165 US pg. 1210 166 WC 1905 167 WC 1898 168 WC 667-668a 169 WC 3736 170 WC 5540 171 Wreck Commissioner's Report pg. 17 172 WC 20442 173 WC 5547 174 WC 4219-21 175 WC 6389-91 & 9758-60 176 US pg. 568 177 WC 20086-91 178 WC 15545 179 WC 1025-26 180 WC 15353

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