RECONCILING NIKEPHOROS BRYENNIOS' MATERIALS for a HISTORY a Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillme

Home , Alexiad, Alexios I Komnenos, Bardas Skleros, Basilakes, Battle of Manzikert, Born in the purple

THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME: RECONCILING NIKEPHOROS BRYENNIOS’ MATERIALS FOR A HISTORY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of Humanities

JAMES GILMER M.A., American Public University System, 2012

2019 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL

[August 22nd, 2019] I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY JAMES GILMER ENTITLED The Song Remains the Same: Reconciling Nikephoros Bryennios’ Materials for a History BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF HUMANITIES.

Jeannette Marchand, PhD Thesis Director

Valerie Stoker, PhD Director, Master of Humanities Program

Committee on Final Examination:

[Jeannette Marchand, PhD]

[Paul Lockhart, PhD]

[Aaron Wolpert]

[Valerie Stoker, PhD]

Barry Milligan, PhD Interim Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT

Gilmer, James. M.Hum. Graduate Program, Wright State University, 2019. The Song Remains the Same: Reconciling Nikephoros Bryennios’ Materials for a History.

The following thesis presents new perspectives on the representation of Byzantine generals during the eleventh century, focusing specifically on parallel representations of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. I will argue that Byzantine chroniclers routinely employed the language of Byzantine military manuals as a template to describe the generals who populate the pages of their works. This tendency created a shared language of praise and censure which chroniclers applied to the generals whose reputation they sought either to exalt or to tarnish. The career of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder as it is presented in the History of Michael Attaleiates and the Materials for a History of Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger vividly demonstrates this tendency as Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger attempts to salvage the reputation of his grandfather. Contents

Introduction ...... 1 Argument ...... 5 Chapter I: Byzantine Historiography ...... 7 Byzantine Military Tradition ...... 7 Leo the Deacon: ...... 16 John Skylitzes: ...... 24 Chapter II: Other Voices ...... 33 Michael Attaleiates: ...... 33 Chapter III: Reinterpreting the Hyle Historias ...... 51 Bryennios the Elder: ...... 53 Alexios Komnenos: ...... 56 Conclusions ...... 78 Bibliography: ...... 81 Primary Sources: ...... 81 Secondary Sources: ...... 82 Appendix A: Translated materials ...... 85 The Battle of Manzikert: ...... 85 Alexios vs. Roussel ...... 90 Nikephoros Bryennios’ Illyrian Campaign ...... 91 Alexios vs. John Bryennios ...... 93 Alexios’ advice to Michael VIII ...... 94 Alexios vs. Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder...... 96 Alexios vs. Basilakes ...... 103

Introduction

In the late eleventh century, the Byzantine Empire nearly collapsed. After the

catastrophic defeat suffered by the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, a series of civil

wars wracked the empire and paved the way for the loss of Anatolia to the Turks – a loss of

nearly half the empire’s territory. The events of this period are the focus of the Hyle Historias,

an oft-overlooked chronicle written by Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger. The husband of Anna

Komnene Porphyrogenite1 – the daughter of the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081 – 1118) – and therefore a Byzantine prince, Nikephoros Bryennios was also the grandson of Nikephoros

Bryennios the Elder, a high-ranking Byzantine general-turned-rebel. Alexios Komnenos had defeated Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder when the latter rebelled against the throne in the late

1070s, before Alexios himself had risen to the imperial power. Despite the rich historical information that can be gleaned from the Hyle Historias, there is at present no English translation of this work in its entirety – the production of which served as the primary motivation of this thesis project.

In spite of the complex relationship between Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger and his father-in-law Alexios I Komnenos, the Hyle presents a heroic account of both the career of

Nikephoros Bryennios’ grandfather and of his father-in-law. Alexios Komnenos and Nikephoros

Bryennios the Elder share the spotlight as Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger casts both men in a well-established template for the ideal Byzantine general – in the process contradicting rival historian Michael Attaleiates. The result is a sketch of both men’s careers which fits a paradigm well-established by Nikephoros’ forerunners, the chroniclers Leo the Deacon, John Skylitzes, and

1 “Purple-born;” a child born in the ‘purple room’ of the palace in Constantinople to a reigning Emperor. This title emphasized the legitimacy and standing of the child.

Michael Attaleiates. Each constructs an image of the perfect general: a man who enforces rigid

military discipline, upon himself and the troops under this command; a strategist who possesses an encyclopedic knowledge of the entire range of Byzantine military manuals and the tactics contained therein; someone with a penchant for cunning stratagems and indirect tactics; and, most importantly, a general who possesses a high degree of tactical awareness and employs the correct tactical arrangements for each military situation he finds himself in.2

Byzantine military theory recommended a wide range of indirect methods of fighting as

the most efficacious way to win battles and preserve resources. These included flanking maneuvers, concealed ambushes, feigned retreats, and stratagems. Walter Emil Kaegi notes that the object of Byzantine warfare “is the defeat and disruption, not necessarily the slaughter, of the enemy” – a distinct change from traditional Roman practice and a characteristic feature of the transition from Roman to Byzantine Empire.3 The Byzantines, like the Romans, relied

upon highly trained and disciplined soldiers; however, unlike the Romans the Byzantines faced a

perennially short supply of such soldiers. John Haldon notes that this shortage of resources was

a defining feature of Byzantine warfare, which “alone meant that the casual expenditure of such

a valuable resource was, whenever possible, to be avoided. Hence the Byzantines’ reputation

for clever diplomacy and…cunning and deceitfulness…Fighting was to be avoided at all costs.”4

2 “Tactical awareness” is here defined as a general’s faculty at understanding his situation on the battlefield and reacting appropriately, e.g. fortifying his camp in hostile territory or planning an ambush against a numerically superior foe. This quality is based upon the recommendations of the Emperor Maurice, who advised his generals to be ever vigilant, for it is better to be prepared for any stratagem of the enemy; a “general should not have to say: ‘I did not expect it.’” Maurice, Strategikon, Trans. George T. Dennis, Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), VIII.36; 86. 3 Walter Emil Kaegi, Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy, Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic College Press, 1983, 10; Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, 56-58. 4 John Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, (Arcadia Publishing, 2001), 9. There is considerable disagreement as to whether the Byzantines actively avoided fights at all costs, however, with Theocharis Alexopoulos arguing persuasively that the Byzantines excelled in – and therefore sought out – pitched

This meant that the characteristic features of Byzantine military theory included the following: a preoccupation with discipline, scouting, and caution; a predilection for indirect fighting, flanking maneuvers, and a disdain for frontal charges; and a fondness for ambushes, feigned withdrawals, and night raids. As such it has been noted that “the use of stratagems and subterfuge in order to wear a stronger opponent down and postpone the battle until circumstances become more favorable is one of the most characteristic features of Byzantine military tradition.”5 Kaegi, elaborating on this trend, notes that Byzantine generals employed a

“grand strategy” built around “a readiness to exploit uncertainties while minimizing one’s own casualties” and that they preferred “a combination of artifices, diplomacy, delay, dissimulation, sowing dissension, corruption, and above all, employing caution and the indirect approach to warfare, in an effort to reduce risk and gambling to a minimum in warfare.”6

The goal was perennially to do much with little, exploiting the superior discipline and cohesion of Byzantine troops against the often-superior numbers and inferior discipline of

Byzantium’s enemies. Just as military writers were cognizant of writing within an ancient and well-established genre and modelled their works after ancient precedents, Byzantine chroniclers were likewise very conscious of working within a tradition and reinforced their continuity by deliberately overlapping and recapitulating each others’ work.7 Consequently, the manner in

battles. His argument is strengthened by the existence of protocols for engaging in battle in both the Praecepta Militaria and the De Velitatione Bellica of Nikephoros Phokas, serving as a sort of ‘rules of engagement.’ Theocharis Alexopoulos, “Using Ancient Military Handbooks to fight Medieval Battles: Two stratagems used by Alexios I Comnenos against the Normans and the Pechenegs,” Eoa kai Esperia 8, (2012), 48. 5 Alexopoulos, 63. 6 Kaegi, 10. 7 C.M. Roueche, “Byzantine Writers and Readers: Storytelling in the Eleventh Century,” In R. Beaton, The Greek Novel, AD 1 – 1985, Routledge, 1988. 127.

which generalship and battle are portrayed in the chronicles is guided by the dictates of the

genre – a genre to which each chronicler would have felt obligated to conform.

Byzantine chroniclers provide a lively and relatively thorough account of the history of

this period. Byzantine military theory is equally well documented, with five surviving military

treatises providing insight into changes in military tactics and outlooks during the tenth and

eleventh centuries. The first of these is the Taktika, promulgated by Leo VI “the Wise” (r. 886 –

912).8 The Taktika is primarily a paraphrase uniting the Strategikon of Maurice (r. 582 – 602) and the Strategikos of Onasander.9 The Taktika nevertheless presents some new insights and is especially significant in that its promulgation was instrumental in reviving the tradition of military manual writing in Byzantium. The anonymous Sylloge Tacticorum expands upon the military system presented in the Taktika while adding some new features – notably new equipment that suggests changes in infantry tactics.10 Byzantine military theory changed significantly under the guidance of Nikephoros II Phokas, developing more aggressive and direct tactics that corresponded to a series of major campaigns of (re)conquest. The Praecepta

Militaria, promulgated by Phokas, details changes in army composition and tactics, while the De

Velitatione is primarily concerned with defensive tactics.11 The final iteration of this tendency toward military manual writing is the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos. Characterized by Frank

Trombley as the last expression of Byzantine encyclopedism, the Taktika is a collection of earlier military manuals arranged and edited by Ouranos for ease of use and simplicity of language. The

8 Leo VI “the Wise,” Taktika, Trans. George Dennis, The Taktika of Leo VI, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2010). 9 McGeer, “Military Texts,” In The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, edited by Robin Cormack, John Haldon, and Elizabeth Jeffreys, 907 – 914, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 911 10 Anonymous, Sylloge Tacticorum, Trans. Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris, A Tenth- Century Byzantine Military Manual: The Sylloge Tacticorum, (New York: Routledge, 2017). 11 Phokas, De Velitatione; Phokas, Praecepta Militaria, Trans. Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2008).

Taktika also demonstrates continued evolution of tactics, containing a revised version of the

Praecepta Militaria with updated infantry tactics.12

Argument

The Hyle Historias provides a glimpse into a chaotic period of Byzantine history during which one could reasonably expect the professional standards of generalship and military theory to break down. Yet as Nikephoros Bryennios builds his chronicle around the confrontation between his grandfather Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder and Alexios Komnenos he describes the clash of two generals who have mastered the Byzantine art of generalship and who deploy all of the expected tactical maneuvers as they are described in the military manuals.

Bryennios deliberately builds tension throughout the Hyle by focusing the bulk of his narration on events that directly involve the two men, and by choosing to highlight the talented leadership of both generals he heightens the drama of their inevitable clash. When the chronicle finally reaches this confrontation, the Battle of Kalovrye, the reader has a strong sense of the command ability and martial character of both Alexios Komnenos and Nikephoros Bryennios the

Elder, men who are framed as relatively equal in skill. In doing so Nikephoros pointedly argues against fellow chronicler Michael Attaleiates’ portrayal of Bryennios the Elder as a careless coward and an overly ambitious pretender to the throne. The way Nikephoros describes the generals who populate his chronicle and the qualities he chooses to applaud demonstrate the breadth of Nikephoros’ reading and inspirations and suggest a deep knowledge of Byzantine historiography and the Byzantine military tradition. Nikephoros is primarily motivated by a desire to restore his grandfather’s tarnished reputation and repudiate Michael Attaleiates’

12 Nikephoros Ouranos, Taktika, Trans. Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2008).

5 caricature of Bryennios in the History, an objective Nikephoros seeks to accomplish by elevating the military exploits of his indirect patron Alexios Komnenos.

Chapter I: Byzantine Historiography

Byzantine Military Tradition

Byzantine military manuals have a complex relationship with the Greco-Roman

tradition, with scholars generally agreeing that a selection of influential classical precedents

shaped Byzantine thought. Byzantines chroniclers routinely borrowed from the military manuals

when describing the tactical arrangements of Byzantine generals, resulting in a significant

amount of overlap between the ideal general presented in the military manuals and the

qualities ascribed to the best generals in the chronicles. The military manuals established the

language of description utilized by chroniclers and shape the actions for which chroniclers

offered praise or blame, often utilizing texts drawn from Greco-Roman antiquity. Denis Sullivan highlights the influence of antiquity on Byzantine military manuals in the following way:

“…the works with significant influence on Byzantine manuals are the On Machines of Athenaues Mechanicus (first century AD) and the Poliorketika of Apollodorus of Damascus (second century AD), both dealing primarily with offensive siege machinery; Onasander’s (first century AD) treatise On Generalship, which the author characterizes as a “training school for generals”; Aelian’s Taktika, (first to second century AD) on the Hellenistic phalanx; and a Taktika attributed to a certain Asclepiodotus (second century AD).”13 These works were widely known, recopied, and quoted from in Byzantine chronicles. The famous courtier and philosopher Michael Psellos (1017 – 1078), e.g., asserts that the Kaisar John

Doukas (f. 1074 – 1088) was well-versed in military lore by stating that he had “acquired a knowledge of the (military) science of the ancients comparable to that of the famous Caesars themselves” which Doukas had not acquired “spontaneously, nor by chances but from the

13 Denis Sullivan, “Byzantine Military Manuals: Prescriptions, practice, and pedagogy,” In The Byzantine World, edited by Paul Stephenson, 149 – 161 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 149-150.

reading of books on tactics and strategy and siegecraft, from the works of Aelian and

Apollodorus and their disciples.”14

Aelian and Apollodorus are not the only ancient authors of military handbooks who

were well-known and well-respected in Byzantium. Nor were they the most influential on

Byzantine military thought – a fact which accentuates Psellos’ praise of John Doukas, as it highlights the wide breadth of the Kaisar’s learning – as that distinction should be reserved for

Polyaenus and Onasander. Polyaenus’ Strategemata, a collection of military tricks and cunning tactics, is recommended reading in the Taktika of Leo VI. Furthermore, the Strategemata was widely known and popular, a fact which is “attested by its frequent abridgement in extant manuscripts.”15 Between the sixth and ninth centuries “Polyaenus’ cumbersome scheme” of organization within the Strategemata “was rearranged into 58 discreet categories” to make it simpler to reference, a fact which demonstrates strong interest in the treatise and in the variety of cunning stratagems contained within it among both those at court in Constantinople and among the Byzantine military elite and which likely encouraged chroniclers to highlight victories won through cunning and guile.16 The revised edition of Polyaenus’ work then formed the basis of the stratagems section of the tenth-century Sylloge Tacticorum, as well as chapters 123 – 171 of Ouranos’ eleventh-century Taktika.17 Onasander’s On Generalship was similarly influential,

forming the basis of the Taktika of Leo VI – a work which Eric McGeer has described as a

“paraphrase uniting the Strategikon of Maurice with Onasander’s” Strategikos.18 Nevertheless,

14 Michael Psellos, Chronographia, Trans. ERA Sewter, Michael Psellos: Fourteen Byzantine Rulers, (London: Penguin Classics, 1979), VII.16; 376. 15 Sullivan, 156. 16 Frank Trombley, “The Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos and Military Encyclopaedism,” In Pre- modern Encyclopaedic Texts: Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996, 267. 17 Kyle James Sinclair, “War Writing in Middle Byzantine Historiography: Sources, Influences and Trends,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2012), 312-313. 18 McGeer, “Military,” 911. Denis Sullivan agrees that the work is a fusion, primarily of Onasander and Maurice, but argues that the compiler has deliberately compiled the pieces of each which he found

McGeer lauds the Strategikon upon which the Taktika is based as “the single most important

Byzantine treatise.”19

McGeer presents the collection of ancient military treatises which the Byzantines inherited and preserved in five subgenres: taktika, which outline military deployment and maneuvers; strategika, which present principles of generalship; poliorketika, which describe

methods both of laying siege to a fortified place and defending a fortified place against a siege;

naumachika, which describe naval warfare; and strategemata, collections of tricks, ruses,

maxims, and general military lore.20 Within these categories “certain authors came to be regarded as authoritative” and thus “Byzantine military science developed” around the works of

Aelian, Onasander, and Polyaenus; “in fact, much of what we call ‘Byzantine’ military literature is the continuation of the ancient tradition in the form of copies, excerpts, and paraphrases, with the result that Byzantine military works tend to be derivative rather than original in content.”21

Nevertheless, while Byzantine authors were careful to write within the constraints of

their chosen genre, it was still possible to present innovations as ‘rediscoveries’ of ancient wisdom, allowing for considerable innovation. Thus, while the influence of Greco-Roman military manuals upon their Byzantine equivalents is considerable, Byzantine authors worked with a vast collection of materials, and they deliberately selected and molded what they perceived to be most useful from the classical inheritance. This had a significant impact on the

most efficacious and relevant. Leo also includes examples of contemporary practice, primarily the deeds of the general Nikephoros Phokas the Elder against the Arabs. Sullivan, 153. 19 Ibid., 910. The Strategikon is written in a deliberately simple style and is replete with words of Latin/non-Greek origin, suggesting that the treatise’s intended audience was the officers of the army rather than court officials. Walter Emil Kaegi views the Strategikon as the core of Byzantine strategy, preserved and updated in the form of Leo’s Taktika. Kaegi, 10. 20 McGeer, “Military”, 907. 21 Ibid.

9 language used by chroniclers to describe military encounters, and the characteristics for which

Byzantine generals were praised. Byzantine military manuals were not simply stale copies of earlier works but represented a creative effort within the constraints imposed by a society that revered the customs of its ancestors. Compilers like Leo VI and Nikephoros Ouranos actively reshaped the materials with which they worked, incorporating contemporary realities into ancient texts and levelling the linguistic profile of the compilation into even, simple Greek – a practice which emphasizes the wide audience these treatises were intended to reach.

Moreover, the similarities in style and form of Byzantine manuals to their classical precedents highlights a fundamentally similar strategic outlook. Kaegi observes that Byzantine military thought owed a great debt to classical models, one which goes beyond “counsel to seek to avoid the risks of battle except under the most favorable circumstances, and to use every conceivable nonmilitary device to improve the likelihood of accomplishing one’s purposes with the minimum of losses.”22 He argues that Byzantine military strategy derived from ideas expressed by Greek strategists of the Hellenistic and Roman periods:

“These attitudes to warfare did not suddenly appear in the seventh, ninth, or tenth centuries…These counsels, including how to sow dissension among one’s enemies, the role of treachery and plots and factional alignments in creating decisive turns or opportunities for military success, were a continuity; an inheritance from the Greek strategists of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. They represent a genuine strand of continuity of Hellenic thought and tradition in the Byzantine thought-world. Thus the extensive resort to craft, cunning, and indirect warfare, with the aim of winning without risking much decisive blood combat, typified in the Italian campaigns of Belisarius, in much of the wisdom of the anonymous strategists of the sixth century, and the Strategikon of Maurice, is not an anachronistic return by an adaptation of very old Greek strategists’ counsel about avoiding pitched battle to the austere realities of the sixth and early seventh centuries [but rather] an element of continuity in Hellenic strategic thinking [which] was not merely in its specific borrowings of injunctions and details of maneuver, but in attitudes of caution, prudence, cunning, and awareness of

22 Kaegi, 12. For a similar view, see John Haldon, A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI, Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2014, 17.

one’s own limitations and of the possibility of risk and the random role of accidents in decisive combat; in short, in ways of thinking about waging war.”23 Byzantine military thought thus represented a refined, evolved stage of the Greco-Roman tradition and Byzantine military manuals and strategic ideals shaped their approach to warfare.

This was warfare of a different kind and with different agendas than that practiced in the Roman

Empire.

Like the Sylloge, the tenth century Praecepta Militaria is a highly pragmatic and focused text with none of the dramatic tensions of the Hyle Historias. The Praecepta Militaria presents advice to the general in the form of several ‘battle-paradigms’ which are completely unique among Byzantine military manuals outside the works of Phokas; the De Velitatione Bellica likewise presents a series of practical recommendations to the commander in the form of prescriptive suggestions – if the enemy does this, you should do this in response – which reflect the body of experience upon which the author of both treatises drew. The De Velitatione in particular demonstrates Phokas’ singular approach of “distilling personal observations and experience into a set of tactical guidelines [which] is without parallel in Byzantine military manuals and which marks Nikephoros Phokas as one of the few truly innovative figures in the long tradition of classical and Byzantine military theory.”24 We are thus left with a set of manuals detailing a series of reforms at precisely the moment when Byzantine armies began to demonstrate a greater efficiency in battle and focus upon the infantry tactics necessary for taking and holding territory, tactics which the Byzantines then successfully employed against their traditional rivals. The reformed Byzantine Army fought with an efficiency and aggression which translated into conquest and a zenith of Byzantine military power, strongly suggesting a

23 Kaegi, 13. 24 Sinclair, 190.

correlation between Byzantine military theory and practice as the reforms coincide neatly with

renewed territorial expansion.

This argument draws strength from a perceived dissonance between ‘Constantinople’ – the Emperor, his court, and the government – and ‘the periphery’ – the local military aristocracy, particularly that of Anatolia.25 This view provides a convenient explanation for the outlook of the military manuals as representative of ‘Constantinople,’ rather than of the aristocratic periphery. However, Kyle James Sinclair has recently challenged this view of aristocratic Byzantine culture. His work traces the development of “aristocratic promotional literature” as a distinct genre of Byzantine writing which came to prominence in the middle of the tenth century. Sinclair argues that aristocratic promotional literature – chiefly in the form of accounts of brave deeds, both in the form of family and general chronicles – serves to present

“the subject as a brave combatant as well as a skilled commander, principally through his use of innovative stratagems and his textbook application of military theory.”26 The audience of aristocratic promotional literature is assumed to be the court at Constantinople as well as other aristocrats. The intent of this type of writing was to enhance the reputation and prestige of successful generals whose deeds are recounted therein. Two of the principal Byzantine historians of the tenth century, Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes, represent this genre, with

Leo the Deacon long being associated with what Alexander Kazhdan described as “chivalresque historiography.”27

25 See also: Steven Runciman, The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus & His Reign: A Study of Tenth- Century Byzantium, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Eric McGeer, The Land Legislation of the Macedonian Emperors, (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2000). 26 Sinclair, 23. Emphasis mine. 27 Alexander Kazhdan defined this as a type of history which gave primacy to military virtues and the heroic presentation of great warriors; Alexander Kazhdan and Epstein, Ann Wharton, Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, University of California Press, 1985. Sinclair, 47.

That ‘official’ historians associated with the imperial court wrote in the style of the military aristocracy and espoused their values is indicative of the degree to which the Byzantine military aristocracy shaped Byzantine culture in the period we are studying. This is particularly evident in the ways in which the image of the Emperor changed over time. Sinclair demonstrates convincingly that, prior to the tenth century, the Byzantines did not place an especially high value upon the military role or prowess of the reigning Emperor. The Vita Basilii, for instance, contains only a limited discussion of the campaigns and military victories of Basil

I.28 Yet from the middle of the tenth century, Sinclair argues, “the warrior image…was propagated by the publicists of prolific soldier emperors Nikephoros II Phokas, John I Tzimiskes, and Basil II [and] the return of the warrior ideology in imperial bulletins and panegyric, not to mention historiography, was brought about by the spread of aristocratic military values to

Constantinople as early as the mid-tenth century.”29 The tenth century was a period of increasing militarization in Byzantine culture. It is no coincidence that the majority of the military manuals date to this period, nor that the penetration of aristocratic military culture into mainstream political thought begins in this period. Military works in general were becoming more popular with the educated populace at large, and one of the most popular was the frequently abridged Stratagems of Polyaenus.30

The permeation of aristocratic ideals that laud the use of military cunning and indirect

fighting is especially apparent in the De Velitatione of Nikephoros Phokas. Although this is also a military treatise, Sinclair argues persuasively that the intended audience of this work would

The same impulse is evident in the heroic/romantic poem Digenes Akrites, which likely existed in an oral form in this period as it was well-known by the Komnenian period. 28 Sinclair, 35 – 46. 29 Ibid., 266. Emphasis mine. 30 Sullivan, 156. That the Stratagems, a work which collects examples of military trickery and cunning for emulation by the reader, was so widely copied and read in Byzantium says much for the value placed upon these forms of fighting in middle-Byzantium.

have been Phokas’ peers among the military aristocracy rather than the learned civilian

administration.31 The work therefore serves a dual purpose: it is at once a handbook on military tactics and a form of propaganda. As propaganda, the De Velitatione serves as a “promotional tool for the Phokades, an explicit reminder of their great deeds at a time when they were still vying for the throne.”32 This cannot have been the case, however, if Neville is correct and the

Byzantine aristocracy favored a form of fighting which emphasized agonistic combat and straightforward tactics; moreover, if the Byzantine aristocracy truly embraced a Roman ideal which denigrated military trickery and cunning, then Phokas’ manual would not make sense as a work of self-promotion. However, there is considerable evidence that the Byzantine military aristocracy of the tenth and eleventh centuries would have appreciated and respected the victories and tactics espoused in the De Velitatione.

Katakalon Kekaumenos, a contemporary of Nikephoros Bryennios and Anna Komnene and fellow military aristocrat, provides a useful glimpse into the mindset of the military aristocracy. In the Strategikon attributed to him, Kekaumenos has clear views on the style of fighting which is preferable in general, noting that “I praise the brave man, but the cunning schemer surpasses all, for he is useful not only to himself but also to many others.”33 There is a similar emphasis running through the chronicle of Skylitzes on acts of military daring and cunning. Sinclair notes that Skylitzes presents Eustathios Daphnomeles as “daring and

31 Other scholars have suggested that the military manuals were a purely literary construction, intended for other classical scholars as a ‘game of words’ intended to flaunt a writer’s command of Atticisms and classical references. Cf. Catherine Holmes, “Byzantine Political Culture and Compilation Literature in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries: Some Preliminary Inquiries,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 64 (2010), 61. 32 Sinclair, 272. This view is echoed by Jean Claude Cheynet, The Byzantine Aristocracy and its Military Function, Routledge: Variorum Collected Studies Series, 2006. 33 Paul Magdalino, “Honour among Romaioi: the framework of social values in the world of Digenes Akrites and Kekaumenos,” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 13, no. 1 (1989), 210. Emphasis mine.

cunning…in an episode recounting how he crept into the stronghold of the hardy Bulgarian

nobleman Ibatzes and blinded him.”34 What is striking about this episode is that, like the De

Velitatione, it is intended to receive acclaim from the chronicle’s audience of the imperial court and the military aristocracy. Catherine Holmes argues that “the great families who comprised

Skylitzes’ [and both Phokas’ and Kekaumenos’] audience wished to read about the valour and cunning of past heroes, many of whom belonged to families who remained influential during the reign of Alexios I Komnenos.”35 These stories and other preserved in the chronicles “satisfied the

great Byzantine fondness for trickery and stratagem, for surprise attack and avoidance of

pitched battle.”36

Aristocratic promotional literature, then, was written by aristocrats and primarily intended for consumption by fellow aristocrats; the notions of heroism and the exaltation or vilification of indirect fighting and military cunning which are presented within these chronicles are indicative of the values of the Byzantine military aristocracy. As I will demonstrate below, the chronicles accord beautifully with the value system and military priorities expounded by the

Byzantine military manuals – not surprising, given that Nikephoros II Phokas, the author of two of the most prominent military manuals, was himself drawn from the Byzantine military aristocracy – and thus serve to demonstrate both the practical applicability of the military manuals and to refute Neville’s argument that military cunning and trickery were denigrated in middle-Byzantium. McGeer, in arguing for the practical applicability of the manuals of

Nikephoros Phokas, makes the following observation:

“That Phokas and other soldiers translated their own knowledge and experience into a series of practical handbooks says much about the systemic approach the Byzantines

34 Sinclair, 275. Skylitzes, XVI.41; 341-343. 35 Catherine Holmes, Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976 – 1025), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 171 – 239. Emphasis mine. 36 Sinclair, 312.

took to warfare – among other things – during the tenth century; in turn, that the men who commanded Byzantine expeditionary forces along the eastern and western frontiers of the empire could consult the guidelines of seasoned peers and predecessors does much to account for the overall effectiveness of the Byzantine army of the time.”37 Accordingly, John Haldon explains the success of the Byzantine army during this period to close adherence to the military manuals and a sense of historical precedent, both of which “could explain those achievements as the results of Roman order, discipline and tactical cohesion, [and] good logistical arrangements [which] kept the precepts set out in the tactical handbooks in mind.”38

Byzantine chroniclers were well aware of this military tradition and employed the

terminology of the military manuals and promotional literature in their works. Consequently,

chroniclers and the compilers of military manuals praise the same sets of military virtues: rigid

discipline, wide-ranging knowledge of tactics – particularly ambushes, feigned withdrawals, and

other indirect methods of fighting – and a keen awareness for the best tactic for any given

situation.

Leo the Deacon:

Leo the Deacon, a Byzantine churchman with a strong classical education, was a

member of the palace clergy during the reign of Basil II (r. 976 – 1025) and witnessed some of

the events he describes firsthand.39 He was well-read, making frequent reference to Homer,

Prokopios, and several other earlier writers.40 Leo’s work is part of a wider revival in classical forms of history writing, notably his organizational decision to frame his chronicle around the

37 McGeer, Sowing, 191. 38 Haldon, Wars, 145. 39 Leo the Deacon, History, Trans. A. M. Talbot & D.F. Sullivan, The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2005). 40 Talbot, 9-10.

lives and campaigns of emperors.41 His history is characterized by extravagant accounts of personal combat replete with gratuitous and vivid descriptions of violence, and as such deliberately evokes the Homeric tradition.

Leo the Deacon’s template for the ideal Byzantine general is built around two individuals: Nikephoros II Phokas and his brother, Leo Phokas. Leo idolizes these two commanders and consistently highlights their military genius. An analysis of the History of Leo the Deacon reveals three characteristics which typify Leo the Deacon’s ideal general: insistence upon rigorous military discipline; adherence to the advice of Byzantine military manuals; and keen tactical awareness.42 These characteristics – with one addition, as we shall see below – are the defining traits of the ideal general across the works of each Byzantine chronicler in the period under review. The perfect general was a man who could instill iron discipline in his troops through rigorous drills and march to battle confident in victory; he was a man with an encyclopedic knowledge of tactical maneuvers, precedents, and stratagems; and, most importantly, he simply knew which of a myriad of tactical options to employ to attain victory on the field. These traits are, not coincidentally, the same ones espoused in contemporary military manuals and demonstrate both the widespread knowledge of these texts and the values of the military culture that produced them. The military manuals thus provided a template which chroniclers could apply to the conduct of a general they wished either to praise or to censure.

41 Leonora Neville, Guide to Byzantine Historical Writing, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 124-125. Cf. the eighth century chronicle of Theophanes, which is subdivided by year. 42 This quality is based upon the recommendations of the Emperor Maurice, who advised his generals to be ever vigilant, for it is better to be prepared for any stratagem of the enemy; a “general should not have to say: ‘I did not expect it.’” Maurice, Strategikon, VIII.36; 86. The Strategikon, as noted above, formed the basis for the Taktika and as a result the precepts established by the Strategikon would still have held force, even three centuries after it was first promulgated.

For Leo the Deacon, the perfect general was Nikephoros II Phokas. Leo consistently

highlights the discipline instilled in the armies under Phokas’ direct command against the

incompetence of his peers. As an example, Leo records that Phokas summoned all the “servants

and household retainers in attendance upon him” in preparation for a campaign:

“He then gave them military training…through intensive daily drills, to draw the bow unerringly, and to pull the arrow to the chest, and to aim precisely at the target, and to brandish and twirl spears easily this way and that, and to wield swords in the air accurately, and to vault nimbly onto horses, so that at the time of battle they should not appear inferior to their enemies, especially since they ought to bear the brunt of the danger and maintain their ranks in formation.”43 Leo is particularly impressed by the breadth of Phokas’ drills. These include extensive training on two weapon sets: the bow and the spear. Both would have been an essential part of the panoply of Phokas’ medium cavalry, as outlined in the Praecepta Militaria.44 Leo’s careful description of the army’s training regimen is meant to evoke comparison to the precepts established by Phokas in the Praecepta Militaria – precepts to which Phokas is conspicuously adhering. Phokas’ training regime corresponded to a period of aggressive expansion by the

Byzantines; the success of the army during this period of expansion reflected well upon Phokas’ reforms, a point that Leo is at pains to emphasize.

The conquest of Crete in 960-961 is a perfect example of the expansion made possible by Phokas’ reforms, and Phokas’ encyclopedic knowledge of military tactics. Leo records that

Phokas disembarked “when it seemed to be an opportune moment” and “displayed in deed the experience he had in military affairs. For he had brought ramps with him on the transport ships, which he set up on the beach, and thus transferred the army, fully armed and mounted, from

43 Leo the Deacon, III.9; 100. 44 Phokas, Praecepta, IV.3; 39-41.

the sea on to dry land.”45 Deploying mounted cavalry directly onto the beaches was no simple feat, nor would it have been expected by the defenders. The operational surprise attained by this tactic greatly facilitated Phokas’ success and is highlighted by Leo’s account of this phase of the campaign. Leo adds that after landing Phokas “ordered the triremes and other cargo ships to anchor all together in a safe harbor and control the sea, and, if they should see any barbarian transport ship sailing out, they were to pursue it and incinerate it with liquid fire.”46 Leo’s

account of the expedition to Crete emphasizes the care and discipline with which Phokas

deployed his forces and the security of the camp that was established as a result.47

Immediately after recounting the successful landing of the main expeditionary force, and Phokas’ signature injunction to his men to “be vigilant and sober,” Leo counterposes an example of poor discipline and carelessness in the defeat of Nikephoros Pastilas.48 Leo includes this incident to highlight Phokas’ inspired leadership; Pastilas serves as an ‘anti-template’ – what not to do. That Leo is using Phokas’ treatises as a template to both praise Phokas and censure

Pastilas heightens Leo’s praise for the soldier emperor. Leading a detachment of soldiers in a foraging expedition, Pastilas – who “should have observed the warnings of [his] general, as was fitting” – abandoned military discipline and “indulged in indolence and luxury. The barbarians, lurking in very advantageous positions in dense mountain thickets, saw the Byzantines’ lack of

45Leo the Deacon, I.3; 61. Deploying cavalry on horseback directly from transports was a difficult feat which would have required advance planning before the expedition ever departed from Byzantine lands. However, the shock value of such a tactic facilitated Phokas’ smooth advance against the Cretans. 46 Leo the Deacon, I.3; 62. Emphasis mine. Note the concern in both instances with the possibility of a counterattack by the besieged Cretans. Leo the Deacon adds that Phokas instructed his men to “be vigilant and sober,” an injunction that appears frequently in Leo the Deacon’s chronicle and is perfectly in accord with the spirit of the military manuals, although that precise phrase does not appear in any of the manuals but is drawn instead from Thessalonians 5:6, 1 and Peter 5:8. 47 For other instances of chroniclers praising commanders for fortifying their camps according to the precepts of Byzantine military theory, see also e.g.: Leo the Deacon, IV.3, ; Michael Attaleiates, VII.5, 59; XVII.20, 219; XX.13, 275. 48 Leo the Deacon, I.3; 62. E.g. Leo VI, Taktika, XI.2, 195; Anonymous, Sylloge, XXII.4, 39; Phokas, Praecepta, V.3, 53; Phokas, De Velitatione, XV, 199.

discipline and precautions.” Taking advantage of the Byzantines’ lack of cohesion and discipline,

the Cretans launched and ambush and killed Pastilas in an intense battle; the remaining

“Byzantines turned to flight, and were slaughtered by the barbarians like cattle, so that only a

very few men…returned safe to camp.”49 In Leo’s eyes, failing to observe the proper level of

discipline was the hallmark of a poor general.

To further emphasize the disparity between Nikephoros Pastilas and Nikephoros

Phokas, Leo the Deacon presents an account of an ambush planned by Phokas in the aftermath

of Pastilas’ defeat. Leo describes Phokas in glowing terms: Phokas is “shrewd and energetic, the most clever of any man we know at grasping the best solution and carrying it out…he was skillful at making the proper use of opportunities and events” and an exemplary general.50 This lavish

praise is occasioned by Phokas’ decision to lead a division of troops on a night raid to chastise

the Cretan forces that had ambushed Nikephoros Pastilas. Thus, “in the dead of the night,

accompanied by a selected group of young and vigorous soldiers” Phokas departed in the

evening, lead by native-born guides. Moving swiftly but silently, Phokas assembled his men at

the base of the hill upon which the Cretans were encamped and soundly sleeping. “The

barbarians, who were unarmed and unprepared when they heard the clangor of weapons, were dumbfounded at the unexpected attack” having failed to post guards. Thus, “in a short time the entire host” was destroyed and Phokas returned to his camp triumphant.51 Leo’s presentation of these events emphasizes Phokas’ astute sense of tactical awareness: he excels at “grasping the best solution and carrying it out” effectively.

49 Leo the Deacon, I.4; 63. Emphasis mine. 50 Leo the Deacon, I.5; 64. Emphasis mine. 51 Leo the Deacon, I.7; 66-67. Emphasis mine. Note Leo’s critique of the Cretans’ failure to post guards – they are just as culpable for their failure here as Pastilas had been when these same Cretans got the drop on him.

Leo’s description of Phokas’ campaign against Tarsos provides an excellent example of

the general-turned-emperor’s adherence to Byzantine military manuals and keen tactical awareness. Concerned by the possibility of ambushes from the defending garrison, when Phokas arrived in the vicinity of Tarsos “he pitched camp there and surrounded it with a palisade” in exact accord with the recommendations of the military manuals; he “then ordered his men to clear-cut and mow down thoroughly the fields and meadows…so that he could launch an attack in the open, and it would be impossible for any of the barbarians to set up an ambush in thickly grown areas, and attack the Byzantine army from a concealed spot.”52 As a result of his precautions, neither the Byzantine siege camp nor the foragers dispatched from the camp to

‘collect’ supplies were harassed by the defending force.

While Leo the Deacon consistently valorizes the deeds of Nikephoros Phokas, his chronicle is not merely an imperial panegyric dedicated to the general-turned-emperor. Leo is equally effusive in his praise for Nikephoros’ brother, Leo Phokas. The two military men provide a multi-faceted set of virtues with which to round out Leo’s conception of the ideal general. Leo is a daring, cunning commander willing to take risks; however, his canny sense of tactical awareness ensures that his gambles pay off and his gambits become the basis for much of

Byzantine military theory.

As an example, Leo Phokas’ ambush of the army of Sayf ad-Dawla, Emir of Aleppo, on its return home from a raiding expedition in Byzantine territory provides the textbook example of

52 Leo the Deacon, IV.3; 106. Emphasis mine. Phokas’ decision to clear-cut the area is indicative of the level of concern that savvy Byzantine generals held for the well-planned ambush. A besieging army was often dependent on foragers to gather supplies, and these small divisions of the main army were easy prey for a well-placed ambush force. A not-unwelcome side-effect at Tarsos would have been the destruction of lucrative property in the form of fruit trees, a move that may have contributed to the Tarsians’ otherwise unwise decision to engage Phokas’ forces in open battle. Furthermore, a tenth century force has been ambushed in the wooded areas around Tarsos, encouraging Phokas to cut down the trees surrounding the city to prevent the same from happening to his troops.

this set of tactics at work.53 Leo the Deacon records that Leo Phokas – who was commanding a small army, as the bulk of the available Byzantine forces were engaged in the expedition to

Crete under Leo’s brother Nikephoros Phokas – decided “not to expose the army to certain danger, nor to face the barbarian host in the open. For they had won a good many victories, and were exultant over their unexpected good fortune…while he was leading a small and weak army, which was terrified” at the scope and experience of their adversary’s army.54 The Taktika notes that “frequently enough, successful persons turn out to be rather lazy about protecting themselves.”55 Leo, aware that the Arabs would be less cautious as a result of their so-far- successful campaign, decided against a direct confrontation and opted “instead to occupy the most strategic positions on the precipices, to lie there in ambush and guard the escape routes, and then confront the barbarians at the most dangerous and perilous sections of the path.”56

Leo’s speech to his men is illustrative:

For wars are usually won not so much by pitched battle, as by cautious planning and victories won with cunning at the opportune moment…Therefore, inasmuch as we are Romans57, we must prepare and plan properly, so as to find a good solution to a difficult problem, and choose an expedient rather than a dangerous course of action. So let us not rush headlong into certain disaster with a reckless assault and hazardous endeavors. For an unbridled act of daring usually thrusts one into danger, whereas a reasoned delay can save the lives of those make use of it.58 In the event, an ambush was the perfect solution to the problem of Sayf ad-Dawla’s large and over-confident raiding party. Leo positioned his men on either side of a ravine to await the

53 “Textbook example” in this case is a literal; Nikephoros Phokas cites the actions of his brother against the Arabs in this encounter, and others like it, in the De Velitatione. See also Sullivan, 157. 54 Leo the Deacon, II.2; 72. 55 Leo VI, Taktika, XVI.13; 389 56 Leo the Deacon, II.2; 72-73. 57 As the Byzantines would have self-identified. However, contra Leonora Neville, Heroes and Romans in Twelfth-Century Byzantium: The Material for History of Nikephoros Bryennios, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, there is a tremendous cultural gulf between the “Romans” of the Roman Republic and the “Romans” of the middle Byzantine Empire. 58 Ibid., II.3; 73. Emphasis mine.

arrival of the Arab army. When the enemy were well within the ravine, Leo “ordered the

trumpets to sound the battle charge to make his troops spring from ambush and attacked the

barbarians. Everyone…drew [his sword] and slaughtered on all sides their opponents, who were

wearied by their march, whereas the attacking Byzantines were fresh.”59 Sayf ad-Dawla’s army was annihilated, with the emir himself and a few retainers escaping the carnage on horseback by dropping coins and other treasures to encourage pursuing Byzantines to stop and loot rather than attempt to capture them.

The campaign of Leo Phokas against invading Magyar tribesmen in 960 provides another excellent example of the praise showered upon generals who employed the tactics recommended in the military manuals by Byzantine chroniclers. The Taktika recommends that a strong foe might be overcome “if the opportunity presents itself, on a moonlit night two or three hours before daybreak, make your attack against them. Archers are particularly useful, essential in fact, at times like this.”60 The anonymous Sylloge Tacticorum expands upon this

recommendation, noting that “the best time for a night battle is two or at most three hours

before dawn and when the night is full of stars or the moon is full. For in this way, the army will

conduct the nocturnal assault in light without harm to itself” but also contradicts the Taktika,

arguing that “throughout the course of night battle, combat is always conducted hand-to-hand.

The masses of the so-called lightly-armed [infantry], namely the archers and slingers, [are]

useless here, because everybody is fighting in the melee.”61 Faced with just such a strong foe,

59 Ibid., II.4; 74. 60 Leo VI, Taktika, XVII.5; 395. 61 Anonymous, Sylloge, IIL.6-7; 81. Cf. W. McLeod, “The Bow at Night: An Inappropriate Weapon?,” Phoenix, 42 no. 2, (Summer, 1988), 124. McLeod argues persuasively that the bow was actually an ideal weapon for the night ambush, as an army undertaking a night march rarely lit torches for fear of giving away their position. They would therefore be cloaked in darkness while their adversaries were illuminated in the torchlight of their camps, making them easy to target. The recommendation in the Sylloge can be interpreted to mean that archers and other ranged fighters are inappropriate for night raids once a melee has begun and it becomes difficult to differentiate between friend and foe.

Leo the Deacon records that Leo Phokas, unable to face the invading Magyars “in a pitched

battle because the enemy enjoyed vastly superior numbers of troops, decided not to expose

himself and his men to certain danger, but rather to attack the Scythians62 unexpectedly, accomplish a brave and courageous feat, and acquire glorious fame for himself.”63 Leo

consequently sent out scouts under cover of darkness to reconnoiter the Magyar camp; finding

that it was vulnerable, “in the dead of the night he divided his army into three sections and

attack the Magyars; and by his sudden attack he wrought so much slaughter in a short time that

only a few of the untold multitudes escaped.”64 In this way, an invading force which could not have been overcome in a straight fight was easily decimated and forced into flight, with the

Byzantines sustaining limited casualties. Leo the Deacon draws attention to Phokas’ canny use of an appropriate set of tactics, ideal for the circumstances and indicative of a high degree of tactical awareness.

John Skylitzes:

John Skylitzes is the second major source for this period. Skylitzes served as the

droungarios of the watch in the 1090s; he was therefore an active member of the imperial government and achieved the high rank of Kouropalates under Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081-

1118). The Synopsis Historiarum is a collection of other histories assembled by Skylitzes; he takes as “his task…to rewrite the works of his predecessors, combining, harmonizing and

62 An archaism which the Byzantines used for any nomadic horseman from north of the Danube, and which here refers to the Magyars 63 Leo the Deacon, II.2; 72. Emphasis mine. 64 Ibid. That Leo attacked with three divisions suggests that he attacked the enemy camp from three sides, not four. This was also standard Byzantine practice, as it prevented the enemy from fighting in desperation and encouraged them to flee. Leo VI advised that “It is the mark of a prudent general to guard against the enemy fighting out of despair. Desperation only makes the emergency more acute and makes combatants braver and bolder,” making Tzimiskes’ decision a calculated risk designed to cripple the enemy’s ability to resist. Leo VI, Taktika, XX.146; 587.

abridging them.”65 His work is noteworthy for its focus on military campaigns and battles, providing rich material for the analysis that will follow below.

Skylitzes is more effusive in his praise for commanders who follow the ‘standard practice’ and encamp with caution and discipline than Leo the Deacon, as Skylitzes’ argument throughout the Synopsis Historiarum is that carelessness in war brings terrible consequences.

Like Leo the Deacon, Skylitzes utilizes the military treatises of promulgated by Nikephoros II

Phokas and his predecessors to establish a template that he applies to the generals whose conduct he wishes either to praise or to censure. His emphasis on the enforcement of discipline transcends borders and applies to Byzantium’s enemies as well, many of whom are overcome by astute deployment of Byzantine troops in ambushes, flanking maneuvers, and other indirect forms of warfare. Skylitzes’ ideal general is a man who can assess a military situation quickly and accurately, displaying a high level of tactical awareness; a man who can then utilize cunning tactics drawn from the full range of maneuvers expounded in the military manuals; and a man with a fondness for stratagems, which Skylitzes presents with equal measures of approval and fascination.

Like Leo the Deacon, John Skylitzes idolizes Nikephoros Phokas. He notes that when

Phokas embarked for Crete at the head of an expeditionary force in 960, the general “made the passage to the island and immediately on disembarkation became embroiled with the

Hagarenes who were there and offering him resistance. These he put to flight and safely disembarked both himself and his army. Then he set up a strong palisade surrounded by a deep ditch fortified with stakes and staves.”66 Skylitzes presents Phokas’ tactical arrangements at this

65 John Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, Trans. John Wortley, John Skylitzes: A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811-1057, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), ix-xii. 66 Skylitzes, XII.4; 240.

stage of the invasion of Crete in a manner which deliberately evokes the language of the military

manuals, highlighting Phokas’ penchant for strict discipline and textbook campaigning.

Skylitzes employs parallel descriptions of similar events in much the same manner as

Leo the Deacon, providing a negative template first and then providing an example of excellent

generalship immediately after. Thus Skylitzes records the failure of the expeditionary army sent

to Crete in 949 – eleven years prior to Nikephoros Phokas’ successful campaign – under the command of Constantine Gongylios immediately prior to his above description of the successful landing of Phokas in Crete. Skylitzes records that the expeditionary force under Gongylios’ command was considerable, but that the commander was “an effeminate, sedentary fellow with no experience of war, one of the eunuchs of the bedchamber at the palace” chosen for his loyalty rather than his military talents. When “he got to the island…he did nothing worthy of a general. He failed both to make a secure encampment and also to post a guard and watch as protection against attacks by the barbarians; hence, he fell into severe danger.”67

Unsurprisingly, the Cretans launched a ‘surprise attack’ and destroyed the expeditionary force.

Gongylios himself was able to escape, although this does him no credit.68

Skylitzes’ account of the failure of a strong expeditionary army solely through the incompetence of its commanding officer supports his wider argument, which is a lament for the consequences of carelessness in war.69 His argument is especially compelling, counterposed as it

67 Skylitzes, XI.15; 237. Emphasis mine. Note how establishing a fortified camp and posting a guard are taken to be the absolute basic skills ‘worthy of a general.’ As much as the chroniclers praise establishing a secure camp as a hallmark of competence, failure to prepare in this most basic way is almost invariably presented as a sign of gross incompetence. 68 C.f. the aftermath of the Battle of Cannae, in which the Roman commander Gaius Terentius Varro was praised by the Senate for surviving the battle and refusing to despair of the Roman cause. 69 See also Sinclair, 65-66. While Sinclair is quoting Stamatina McGrath, “The Battles of Dorostolon (971): Rhetoric and Reality,” In T. Miller & J. Nesbitt, War and Peace in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, (Washington D.C.: S.J., 1995), 157-158, the point is generally valid of Byzantine chronicles. Chroniclers are quick to point out when a general falls victim to ambushes through

26 is with his account of the successful expedition to Crete led by Nikephoros Phokas just eleven years later. The only substantial difference between the two expeditionary forces is the competence of the senior commander of each, with Phokas’ calculated approach to warfare being deliberately contrasted to Gongylios’ ineptitude. Skylitzes’ point is abundantly clear: a proper Byzantine general is aware of his adversaries’ movements, cautious, disciplined, and precise in his own preparations for war, and employs the most effective tactics possible in confronting the enemies of the Byzantine Empire.

Often, the most effective tactical solution to a military problem involved pitting strength against weakness. Leo the Deacon highlights this precise aspect of Byzantine military thought, as explored above: ambushes, and the commanders who successfully ensnare their adversaries in them, are praised effusively. John Skylitzes is equally laudatory toward indirect and cunning tactics. He praises John Tzimiskes’ use of an outflanking maneuver during the assault on the city of Preslav, which provides an excellent example of these tactics in action. Tzimiskes arrived unexpectedly on the plains outside the city of Preslav in 971.70 His sudden arrival “surprised eight thousand five hundred fully-armed men engaged in training outside the city; these resisted for a short time but then, overcome, turned and fled.” The city garrison rallied to the defense of their routed comrades, but “the Byzantines met them as they advanced, disorganized and well spread out, and they massacred them. The foe was unable to resist even for a short time, but turned in flight. However, a detachment of Byzantine cavalry ran ahead of them and closed off

failing to send out scouts, post guards, or fortify a camp; commanders who are surprised by the enemy and fall in battle while drunk are particularly censured for their reckless lack of caution.. 70 Tzimiskes’ unexpected arrival capitalized on assumptions that the pious Byzantines would not march until they had celebrated Easter; in a broader strategic sense, then, Tzimiskes employed deceptive strategies similar to those recommended on a tactical level to attain operational surprise and dislocate his adversaries.

the path leading to the city.”71 Within a short time the Byzantines were before the walls of

Preslav, facing a demoralized and bloodied enemy force, which they quickly overcame. Skylitzes

highlights Tzimiskes’ tactical awareness and planning in this passage, noting with approval the

effectiveness of Tzimiskes’ cavalry detachment. Tzimiskes’ decision to send these men in an

encircling action, positioning them between the Byzantines’ advancing main force and the city of

Preslav, effectively guaranteed the annihilation of the enemy force and was instrumental in the

fall of Preslav shortly thereafter.

Skylitzes’ account of the Battle of the Spercheios River in 997 highlights the

effectiveness of a general with a keen sense of tactical awareness and the praise which

chroniclers reserved for generals who demonstrated this quality. The Bulgarian Tsar Samuel had

led a substantial and successful raiding party deep into Byzantine territory, as far as the

Peloponnese. Basil II dispatched Nikephoros Ouranos to intercept Samuel on his return to

Bulgarian territory; the two armies met in Thessaly on the banks of the River Spercheios:

“There was torrential rain falling [and] the river was in flood and overflowing its banks so there was no question of an engagement taking place. But the magister [Nikephoros Ouranos], casting up and down the river, found a place where he thought it might be possible to cross. He roused his army by night, crossed the river and fell upon the sleeping troops of Samuel, taking them completely by surprise. The better part of them were slain, nobody daring even to think of resistance.”72 Ouranos was completely successful, utterly decimating the invading Bulgar force and reclaiming all the booty and prisoners which the Bulgars had taken in their raid. Furthermore, his success

71 Skylitzes, XV.9; 282. The aggressiveness of this move, which prevented the enemy from having any real recourse to flight, was discouraged in Byzantine military theory but seems to have reflected Tzimiskes’ style and personality. See above, note 64. 72 Skylitzes, XVI.23; 324. Emphasis mine. Note that the Bulgars apparently encamped carelessly, without posting guards, confident that the flooded river presented an insurmountable boundary between them and the Byzantines under Ouranos’ command.

on the battlefield was universally praised and translated in short order into an important

provincial governorship and the favor of the reigning emperor, Basil II.73

Skylitzes’ account of the Battle of Arcadiopolis provides a textbook example of another popular Byzantine tactic, the Scythian ambush, at work.74 The Rus had invaded Thrace with a considerable force which included Bulgarian and Pecheneg contingents. Bardas Skleros commanded the Byzantine defense with a substantially smaller force. When “Skleros realized how short he was of men…he decided to gain the upper hand over so great a number by skill and dexterity, which indeed he did.”75 Skleros fortified his position and “stayed where he was, giving the impression that he was afraid – and watching the enemy doing whatever they liked.

This behavior earned the great contempt of the barbarians” as he feigned weakness and acted as though “he dare not come out.” Discipline in the Rus army began to wane as they underestimated their adversary; they “passed their nights in drinking and drunkenness…with not a care for the precautions which ought to have been taken. Bardas seized the opportune moment.” A small contingent under the command of John Alakasseus was dispatched with orders to “give battle, but as soon as blows were struck he was to turn his back and give the impression of running away. He was not to flee at full tilt…but gently and without breaking ranks.” They were to continue this maneuver until the enemy “was well within the ambushes and traps; at that point they were to retreat in disorderly and headlong flight.” The Rus fell for the trap, not expecting any resistance from the apparently cowardly Byzantines. When the Rus

73 Holmes, 165; 196; 349. 74 Cf. Phokas, De Velitatione, XI; 185: ”That officer, meanwhile, shows his experience by continuing to fight against the enemy. At times he charges into them, at times he begins to run away, and he provokes them into pursuing. If they pursue up to that place in which the infantry is concealed and some of the enemy pass right by them, then our men should charge out of their hiding places and check the pursuing enemy, who will be repelled. The enemy who do make their way through our infantry will fall right into the ambush set up by our cavalry and will be annihilated.” 75 Skylitzes, XIV.5; 276-277. Note that Skleros’ use of a feigned withdrawal, duplicity and military cunning are described as ‘skill and dexterity’ by Skylitzes.

were in position, however, Skleros sprang his trap: the Rus “fell right into the trap; the two

wings cam together again, which mean the enemy were perfectly surrounded. They resisted for

a short time and then surrendered; almost all of them were slain.”76 The Byzantine victory was complete.77

Skylitzes regarded the clever use of stratagems as another manifestation of a general’s

tactical awareness and overall skill. George Maniakes’ defense of the city of Telouch in August,

1030 is an example of this tendency and, although a relatively minor engagement, Skylitzes

chooses to highlight incorporate this event into his general chronicle as a tribute to Maniakes’

good qualities. Telouch is located near Aleppo; immediately following the failed invasion of Syria

by Romanos III, a small force of Arab tribesmen marched on the city of Telouch and demanded

its surrender. They claimed that “the emperor was taken and the entire Byzantine army

completely destroyed; [Maniakes] need not deliver himself into such obvious danger. As soon as

day broke, he and those with him would be encircled and mercilessly destroyed.” Ever cunning,

Maniakes sent emissaries discussing terms of surrender and seemed to comply with the Arabs’ requests. He “sent a plentiful supply of food and drink out to them, telling them to rest awhile for at daybreak he and those with him would surrender themselves and make the Arabs masters of Telouch.” The Arabs, overconfident as a result of their victory over the ill-led forces of

Romanos III, were “deceived by his words and deeds and…gave themselves up to drinking and drunkenness, passing the night without the least concern or provision for their safety.” With the

76 Skylitzes, XIV.5; 276-277. Leo the Deacon provides a similar account: Leo the Deacon, VI.12; 158-159. 77 For other instances of night raids, see also e.g.: Leo the Deacon, I.7, 66-67; V.4, 132-134; Skylitzes, XVI.5, 304. For other instances of prepared ambushes, see also e.g.: Attaleiates, VII.5, 59; VII.7, 63; VII.11, 69; XVIII.20, 249-251; Skylitzes, XI.9, 233-234; XVI.4, 302. For other instances of ambushes of sudden arrival, see also e.g.: Leo the Deacon, VIII.2-3, 177- 179; Skylitzes, XV.9, 282; XVI.30, 328; XVI.35, 330-331. For other instances of Scythian ambushes, see also e.g.: Skylitzes, XV.5, 276-277.

enemy now at his mercy, Maniakes “attacked them and slew them all…In approval of what he

had done the emperor designated him katepan of Lower Media.”78

Skylitzes’ account of the civil war against Bardas Skleros during the reign of Basil II

provides several examples of Byzantine commanders on both sides attempting to gain an

advantage through the use of stratagems. Bardas Skleros himself, faced with a large imperial

army sent to quash his rebellion, “outmaneuvered his enemy by preparing a great amount of

food as though he were going to give a banquet for his army. Thus he deceived his adversary

into thinking that he would not instigate a battle that day, whereupon they too gave themselves

to feasting.” With his enemy now unprepared and off-guard, Skleros “suddenly sounded the attack and fell on the enemy soldiers as they feasted.” Although not taken completely unawares, the imperial forces were sufficiently put off balance that Skleros was able to outflank and overcome them.79

Not to be outdone, the imperial forces were able to outfox Skleros at a later point in the rebellion. Imperial forces under Manuel Erotikos were besieged in the city of Nicaea, with

Skleros’ forces hoping “to reduce the city by depriving it of the necessities of life. The siege went on for some time and those within ran short of grain.” Manuel was unable to resupply the city, as Skleros’ forces kept the city under close siege. Skylitzes highlights Manuel’s cunning tactics in describing his response in the following way:

“Manuel decided to outwit Skleros with a trick. He had the granaries of Nicaea filled with sand in secret and then a little grain was spread over the sand, enough to deceive the eyes of the beholder. Then he summoned some of the enemy they had taken prisoner, showed them the granaries and sent them back with orders to say: ’I have no fear of the siege causing famine, for I have enough supplies of food for two years and the city is impregnable by assault. But I am really on your side; I am prepared to

78 Skylitzes, .6; 361-361. Emphasis mine. 79 Skylitzes, XVI.4, 303.

surrender the city to you if you will engage yourself by oaths to let me and those with me go free wherever we choose.’”80 Manuel proceeded to march out of Nicaea with all his men and arms; Skleros’ men occupied

Nicaea but quickly discovered that they had been duped.

A concern for proper discipline and caution is a recurring theme in Skylitzes’ chronicle and in his portrayal of the ideal general. Skylitzes is keenly aware that proper discipline is the result of relentless training honed by a razor-sharp tactical awareness. A general who is aware of his adversaries’ movements and how to respond to them has all but won the battle; he needs only to compel his troops to enact his vision for success and victory will be his. Skylitzes’ accounts of battles emphasize the link between these pillars of military success: a general needs to train his army, instilling the discipline necessary to enable complex tactical maneuvers and ensure the steadiness of his men’s resolve. Yet, good troops are not the only ingredient in victory – as Skylitzes’ repeated employment of parallel accounts of victory and defeat emphasize. Skylitzes sought to emphasize that these outcomes are often separated by no more than the talent and tactical awareness of senior generals, as the radically different outcomes of the campaigns of Romanos III Argyros and Constantine Gongylios, on the one hand, and George

Maniakes and Nikephoros Phokas, on the other, demonstrate.

80 Ibid., XVI.7; 307.

Chapter II: Other Voices Michael Attaleiates:

Michael Attaleiates was a high-ranking legal official and member of the

Constantinopolitan court. He served as the army’s judge during the campaigns of Romanos IV

Diogenes (r. 1068 – 1071), and in this capacity was an eyewitness to the events surrounding the

Battle of Manzikert in 1071. Attaleiates’ History may have been composed as a response to the characterization of Romanos Diogenes presented in Psellos’ Chronographia.81 The History is written in an attempt to explain the near-collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the decade between the Battle of Manzikert and the rise of Alexios I Komnenos in 1081. Written slightly before Komnenos took the throne, the History is dedicated to Nikephoros III Botaneiates (r.

1078 – 1081), a fact which often clouds Attaleiates’ objectivity, especially when describing rebels who challenged Botaneiates’ throne.

Michael Attaleiates shares with John Skylitzes a high regard for the importance of military discipline in ensuring the success of Byzantium’s armies. The History crafts a model of the ideal general that reflects the dire straits into which the Byzantine Empire had fallen by the end of the eleventh century. Attaleiates exalts military discipline, especially in the face of reversals. He presents Romanos Diogenes and Nikephoros Botaneiates as paragons of this crucial virtue, and both receive considerable praise despite suffering major reverses on the battlefield which ultimately crippled the Empire. Michael’s focus on training exercises takes center stage in his description of the preparations undertaken by Romanos Diogenes before his

81 Michael Attaleiates, History, Trans. Anthony Kaldellis & Dimitris Krallis, The History, (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2012). Cf. Dimitris Krallis, Michael Attaleiates and the Politics of Imperial Decline in Eleventh-Century Byzantium, (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2012).

1068 campaign against the Seljuk Turks. According to Attaleiates, these were intended to

replenish the diminished ranks of a neglected army:

“Romanos conscripted soldiers for the army and recruited young men from every region and city, encouraging them with positions and gifts. In a short time the units were brought up to strength and the most competent commanders were carefully placed over each of them…he had in a short time organized a combat ready army, and with this force he marched against the Seljuks with greater confidence.”82 Romanos – and Michael Attaleiates, the chronicler of his deeds – firmly believed that diligent training was the key to success in battle, even against numerically superior foes.83

Romanos’ efforts to drill his troops in advance of battle paid off; Michael Attaleiates notes tersely that the emperor arrived “in the late afternoon” during his eastern campaign of

1068 and “set up camp before the city of Hierapolis and, following standard practice, had a ditch dug and a palisade erected.”84 As a direct consequence the army weathered a concerted effort

by the local garrison to repel the Byzantines. A lesser general – a Constantine Gongylios, for instance, or a Nikephoros Pastilas – would not have taken this precaution and would have been ambushed in the night and driven back with heavy losses. Michael’s praise for Romanos in this passage is hardly effusive but it is effective in shaping the template which emerges of a successful, knowledgeable, disciplined general whose sole aim was the preservation of the

Byzantine Empire – a presentation which draws upon the characteristics established in earlier military manuals to associate Romanos positively with more successful figures like Nikephoros II

Phokas and John Tzimiskes.

82 Attaleiates, XVII.3; 191. 83 For other examples of Byzantine drill and training, see also e.g.: Leo the Deacon, II.1, 70; II.6, 76; III.1, 87; III.9, 100; IV.1, 105; IV.6, 112; VII.3, 166; VII.9, 174. 84 Attaleiates, XVII.7; 199.Emphasis mine. Note that the ‘standard practice’ of establishing a fortified camp, complete with a ditch and a palisade, was sufficiently well-established that even nonmilitary personnel were aware that this was expected of a competent general.

The 1069 campaign of Romanos against Turkish raiders in Anatolia highlights the value

Michael placed upon the use of ambushes in gaining every possible advantage over Byzantium’s enemies. Romanos “pursued the enemy with all the cavalry. They traveled many of the highest mountains in Tephrike and he intended to fall upon the enemy at an angle.” The Emperor’s

“unexpected appearance shocked the enemy and they were quite paralyzed by the news of the emperor’s arrival. A great massacre of the enemy thus took place” and the remaining raiders were scattered. As Ouranos had done at the Spercheios River, “all the booty, from men to beasts, was freed.” Michael Attaleiates remarks that “it was truly admirable and memorable that the emperor…should relentlessly pursue the foe without his own supplies, with only his own band of soldiers, for eight whole days, through unknown and inaccessible places, and not miss his target.”85 Romanos was able to achieve operational surprise through forced marches that placed his army in an advantageous position opposite a surprised and unprepared adversary. Although the tactical value of this ambush was likely small, Attaleiates seizes this opportunity to present the emperor as a skillful tactician and emphasizes his victory over the

Empire’s foes, however minor.

Victories, after all, were few in this period. Michael Attaleiates’ account of the 1064

Pecheneg invasion of the Balkans highlights the qualities that the Byzantines respected and sought to encourage, even in defeat. Nikephoros Botaneiates commanded the Byzantine defense and initially attacked the invading Pechenegs; his efforts, however, were unsuccessful.

As the remainder of the Byzantine army turned to flight, Botaneiates rallied his men into a square marching formation, compelling the cavalry to dismount and move their horses into the protected center of the formation. From this position no man could run; the Pechenegs circled

85 Attaleiates, XVII.5; 195. Emphasis mine.

the retreating Byzantines and showered them with arrows. Any man who attempted to break

formation and run alone would be cut down with ease. Botaneiates correctly inferred that the

only possible way to extricate his men would be to move in rigid, disciplined formation.

Attaleiates reports that Botaneiates’ soldiers were terrified by the relentless pursuit of the

Pechenegs and that their discipline wavered, but that they “looked up to their commander and

were amazed at his valor and leadership, drawing strength from it and no small relief in the

midst of all that immense toil and continuous fighting.”86

Attaleiates’ account of Botaneiates’ tactics accords perfectly with established Byzantine

military tactics and reinforces Attaleiates’ presentation of Botaneiates as an effective general.

There was an established protocol to follow when an army had been worsted on the battlefield,

established by Leo VI in the Taktika. Leo advised the general who has been defeated by a force

consisting mostly of infantry to withdraw in good order and with celerity. Against an enemy

force that consists mostly of cavalry, however, his advice is as follows:

“…if the enemy are horsemen, you must disregard superfluous and cumbersome property and horses. Except for a small mounted force, all should take their stand on foot in two phalanxes or formations or in one four-sided, rectangular formation. Place the horses and the baggage train in the middle with the soldiers lined up on the outside, as described, and the archers in front of them. In this way the army can safely change location.”87 This is precisely what Botaneiates has done and Attaleiates praises him by presenting an account of his actions that closely adheres to Byzantine military procedure.

After Botaneiates’ men had withdrawn a fair distance under constant harassment, they managed to capture a few horses on the third day of the retreat, as mentioned above. What

86 Attaleiates, VII.14-15; 73. 87 Leo VI, Taktika, XIV.20; 301-303.

follows is an exchange reported by Attaleiates which deliberately evoked memories of the conduct of Alexander the Great in the Gedrosian Desert:

“after marching for three days on foot under these conditions…killed many of the enemy who engaged in close combat and captured three horses. These they led to him (Botaneiates) and implored him to mount one himself, give the others to two bodyguards, and entrust their salvation to their swift hooves. But he absolutely rejected this and refused to even listen to the notion that he might show himself to be craven in battle; in fact, he informed them that he would rather die before any of his men than break his promise to firmly stand by their side and fight. With his own hands he then cut off the horses' feet, and exhorted all the men to fight to for the sake of their souls, to repel the enemy, and not to break from the formation he was leading.”88 What is most striking about this passage and the way in which it is presented is that Botaneiates lost the battle; he withdrew from the battlefield with his forces relatively intact but failed to overcome his adversaries. Michael highlights the discipline necessary to successfully complete this difficult maneuver and emphasizes the courage it took for a commander to elect not to escape on horseback when the opportunity was presented to him. Furthermore, this vignette highlights the value which the Byzantines placed upon the lives of trained and disciplined soldiers. These were, mutatis mutanda, a valuable resource that could not easily be replaced.89

It was far more efficient for a Byzantine commander to withdraw from the field of battle with

his army relatively intact than to squander a scarce resource in the stubborn belief that

discipline alone would eventually carry the day. The Byzantines simply could not afford the

excesses of ‘Roman grand strategy’, as has been argued extensively elsewhere.90

Michael Attaleiates’ account of the 1071 Battle of Manzikert highlights an important aspect of Byzantine historiography: chronicles were often written to advance a political agenda,

88 Attaleiates, VII.15; 73 89 For Byzantine concern for the preservation of the lives of trained soldiers as well as Byzantine civilians, cf.: Phokas, De Velitatione, Proemion, 147; VIII, 165; XII, 187; XII, 189; XIV, 195; XVII, 207; XX, 221; Leo VI, XII.107-108; 275. 90 Cf. Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.

to refute another chronicler’s presentation of events, or both. In this instance Michael

Attaleiates is responding to the work of a peer, Michael Psellos, to redeem the image of

Romanos IV Diogenes.91 The Battle of Manzikert was an unmitigated disaster that began a decade-long period of strife and collapse, yet Attaleiates portrays Romanos Diogenes, the man betrayed and defeated at the Battle of Manzikert, as a hero. Psellos is highly critical of Romanos’ preparations for battle, suggesting that the Emperor meandered about the eastern provinces with no clear direction while the Turks proceeded to plunder and invade at will.92

In contrast, Attaleiates directly challenges Psellos’ critique of the emperor’s strategic judgement. Krallis argues that “there is a direct correspondence between Psellos’ ‘advice’ to

Romanos and Attaleiates’ presentation of Diogenes’ Asia Minor campaign. Psellos advised

Romanos to proceed on campaign only after he had recruited more soldiers, created new military rolls, and added mercenaries,” a correspondence of presentation that emphasizes the fact that Attaleiates is directly addressing Psellos and the Chronographia as he crafts his own account of Romanos’ reign.93 Attaleiates relates that Romanos intended to occupy both

Manzikert and the nearby city of Chliat. Attaleiates contends that Romanos was informed that the Sultan Alp Arslan and the main Turkish army were not a threat as both were believed to be too far away from the area to arrive before the cities of Manzikert and Chliat fell. Nevertheless,

91 Dimitris Krallis argues that Psellos would certainly have been known to Attaleiates, and therefore his Chronographia would have served as a natural influence upon Attaleiates’ History. Krallis, “Attaleiates as a Reader of Psellos,” 168. 92 “At all events, he left the city with all his army and advanced against the barbarians, not knowing where he was marching nor what he was going to do. He wandered over the countryside, planning to go one way, marching by another, traversing Syria, as well as Persia - and all the success he met with was to lead his army into the interior, establish his men on some high hills, bring them down again, cut them off in narrow passes, and suffer heavy casualties through his maneuvering. However, he returned, still to all appearances victorious. Neither from the Medes nor from the Persians did he bring us any spoils of war. One thing alone satisfied him: that he had marched against his foes. Therein lay his first excuse for vainglory.” Psellos, Chronographia, VII; 352. 93 Considerations that Romanos took under advisement, as Attaleiates stresses in the History; see above, n 82; Krallis, 173.

Attaleiates praises Romanos’ caution and seeks to emphasize that the emperor had developed a sound plan by noting that “if the army should unexpectedly find itself attacked, he could send out swift messengers to recall his armies which would not be far away… For this reason, then, his unit of the army was not unreasonable nor inconsistent with strategic reasoning.”94

Attaleiates no doubt has Psellos in mind when he quips that “the majority of people, ignorant of

the reason for which he divided the army, blame him for not making the division of the army in

the proper way, while they take no account, either with their minds or with their hearts, of the

cause;” his rhetorical attack is all the more poignant in light of Psellos’ avowed mastery of

military science.95

Although the division of the army was undertaken for sound strategic reasons – chiefly the difficulty in provisioning a large force in hostile territory – Romanos’ decision rendered the

Byzantine expeditionary force vulnerable. Sultan Alp Arslan capitalized on this vulnerability, advancing far faster than expected to engage the Byzantines in battle near the city of Manzikert.

The vanguard of the Sultan’s force engaged Byzantine foragers shortly after the Byzantines captured Manzikert. Romanos, believing these to be local troops, dispatched Nikephoros

Bryennios the Elder to reconnoiter with the Turks:

“Bryennios took his stand in the front lines and attempted some missile skirmishing and cavalry fighting, but with uncertain results, for they were fighting each other in small groups. In this confusing melee, the Turks were shooting from a distance, wounding many Romans and killing others… Finally, the general I just mentioned became so

94 Attaleiates, XX.12; 275. 95 Attaleiates, XX.12; 275; Krallis, 177-178. Cf. Psellos, VII; 353. “He agreed that in all matters connected with literature he was my inferior (I am referring here to the sciences), but where military strategy was concerned it was his ambition to surpass me. The knowledge that I was thoroughly conversant with the science of military tactics, that I had made a complete study of everything pertaining to military formations, the building of war-machines, the capture of cities, and all the other things that a general has to consider, this moved him not only to admiration, but also to envy. So far as he could, he argued against me, and tried to outdo me in these debates. Many of those who shared that campaign with us will know that this description is not exaggerated.” Emphasis mine; Attaleiates’ version of the events of Romanos’ eastern campaigns is surely a direct response to the final line of the quote cited above.

frightened that he asked the emperor for reinforcements. But he, unaware of what was really going on, accused Nikephoros of cowardice and sent no additional men.”96 Although Romanos initially refused to send reinforcements, he eventually relented and dispatched the magistros Nikephoros Basilakes to relieve Bryennios’ position:

“Basilakes joined Bryennios and, for a while, took part in the skirmishing. When the soldiers agreed to follow along behind him, he promised to lead them personally in the fighting and immediately led the charge. The enemy turned their backs and he pursued. Bryennios followed along in pursuit with the bulk of the army but then he gave the signal to his men to rein in and turn back. Basilakes, however, was not aware of this and so he was left to keep up a mad pursuit for a long distance but only with the men under his immediate command.97 Basilakes’ forces advanced bravely, but ultimately came upon the Turkish camp. There they were easily surrounded, overpowered, and Basilakes himself was captured after his horse had been wounded.

In the wake of Basilakes’ defeat and capture by the Turks, Romanos sent messengers to recall the second half of his army that he had dispatched against the nearby city of Chliat under the command of Joseph Tarchaneiotes. Thus, although the army had found itself unexpectedly under attack, Romanos already had a plan in place – recall the larger portion of the expeditionary force and defeat the Turkish army by weight of superior numbers. Attaleiates presents this in contrast to Psellos’ alleged ‘aimless wanderings’ and highlights the treachery/cowardice of Tarchaneiotes, who was nowhere to be found – having withdrawn before the approach of the Sultan’s army.

Forced into battle against an army that was roughly as large as his own, Romanos nevertheless advanced with good order and confidence. However, the Byzantines were unable to force the Turks into a decisive melee engagement and were unable to match them in archery.

96 Attaleiates, XX.15; 281. Emphasis mine. Note Attaleiates’ negative portrayal of the magistros Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. 97 Attaleiates, XX.16; 283. Emphasis mine.

After a full day’s pursuit, Romanos commanded an orderly withdrawal: an order which was

deliberately misinterpreted by Andronikos Doukas, Romanos’ rival and kin to Psellos’ patron, the

Kaisar John Doukas. Andronikos spread a rumor that the emperor had fallen, precipitating a

route.98 Attaleiates relates that Romanos nevertheless fought on alone as his army melted around him:

“[Despite surrounding him], the Turks did not find it easy to capture him quickly, for he was an experienced warrior and general who had faced many dangers. He vigorously defended himself against his attackers and killed many of them, but in the end he was wounded on his hand by a sword. His horse, moreover, had been shot with many arrows and he was fighting on foot.”99 Psellos, conversely, discounts reports that Romanos was betrayed (by Psellos’ benefactors, the

Doukai) and instead emphasizes the captured emperor’s tactical mistakes. Despite this, Psellos is forced to grudgingly offer his respect for Romanos’ conduct at Manzikert:

“Although I cannot applaud his subsequent behavior, it is impossible for me to censure him. The fact is, he bore the whole brunt of the danger himself. His action can be interpreted in two ways. My own view represents the mean between these two extremes. On the one hand, if you regard him as a hero, courting danger and fighting courageously, it is reasonable to praise him; on the other, when one reflects that a general, if he conforms to the accepted rules of strategy, must remain aloof from the battle-line, supervising the movements of his army and issuing the necessary orders to the men under his command, then Romanos’ conduct on this occasion would appear foolish in the extreme, for he exposed himself to danger without a though of the

98 Attaleiates’ account of the rout itself is schematic: there is no indication as to which divisions broke first, nor on the tactical maneuvers of the Turks. The contrast with a parallel account by Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger is significant and will be explored below. 99 Attaleiates, XX.25; 297. Emphasis mine. Romanos’ penchant for leading from the front is also on display in the initial siege of Manzikert, during which the emperor “rode around the city to look for the best place to launch an assault on the walls and move up his siege towers,” a measure recommended by the military manuals and attributed to Nikephoros Phokas. Attaleiates, XX.13; 275; Leo VI, XV.6; 353; Cf. the Siege of Antioch described by Leo the Deacon: “This was the emperor's speech; then he put a rock on his shoulder (for he was of humble nature and did not disdain to do such things), and climbed up the hill, ordering all the army to do the same. Thus one could see built on the hill in three days a town that was well-walled and very secure. He left behind in the fortress a unit of five hundred cavalry and a cohort of a thousand infantry, furnishing them with sufficient provisions, with orders to attack Antioch every day, and to put to the sword or plunder anything that came their way.” Leo the Deacon, IV.11; 125. Note also the similarity in the manner in which both Basilakes and Romanos are abandoned by their compatriots and subsequently captured; Attaleiates, as a partisan of Nikephoros III Botaneiates, resented Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder for the latter’s failed attempt to seize the throne from Botaneiates.

consequences. I myself am more inclined to praise than to blame him for what he did.”100 Sinclair argues that Middle Byzantine views on the role of the general derive from the

“Hellenistic vision of command, which perceived the commander as ‘arrayer, trickster, and fighter, all at the same time.’” Acts of daring, such as Romanos’ last stand at Manzikert, were

“fueled by a desire to emulate the heroic deeds of Homeric epic.”101 Romanos can thus be reasonably held accountable by Psellos for his failure to adhere to proper Byzantine military tactical procedures; he can also reasonably be praised by Attaleiates for his heroic personal conduct, despite losing the battle.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Manzikert the Byzantine Empire descended into a decade of near-constant civil war. Romanos Diogenes was declared an outlaw by his stepson

Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071 – 1078); in the civil war that followed Romanos was outmaneuvered, defeated, and blinded. The instability brought about by the civil war invited settlers and warbands to occupy Byzantine Anatolia as central authority collapsed. The situation in Byzantine Amaseia is illustrative of this collapse: the Frankish mercenary Roussel, commander of Romanos Diogenes’ Latin mercenaries, occupied the citadel of Amaseia and governed the city and its environs in his own name, carving out an independent fiefdom.102 The

Emperor Michael Doukas marshalled an army under the command of his uncle, the Kaisar John

Doukas – an army which Roussel soundly defeated in battle at the River Zompos.103 Then, in a

100 Michael Psellos, Chronographia, Trans. ERA Sewter, Michael Psellos: Fourteen Byzantine Rulers, (London: Penguin Classics, 1979), VII.12; 355-356. Emphasis mine. 101 Sinclair, 373. 102 “Latin” in this instance refers to both the language spoken by the mercenaries and their customary equipment and battlefield role; these would have been heavy cavalrymen who employed the couched lance technique in shock tactics. Attaleiates, XXIII.10; 347. 103 Attaleiates, XXIII.3-6; 335-339.

strange turn of events, Roussel acclaimed John Doukas Emperor.104 This was a direct challenge to Michael and would presumably have allowed Roussel to rule through John. Michael, through judicious bribery of marauding Turkish warbands seeking territory in Anatolia – but not the throne – turned his two enemies against one another. The Turks, however, ransomed both men:

John to Michael in Constantinople, and Roussel to his wife in Metabole. Thus, Roussel escaped

Michael’s grasp.105

Attaleiates’ account then introduces a figure who would become far more famous in

later chronicles: Alexios Komnenos. When Attaleiates was composing his chronicle, however,

Komnenos’ fame was on the horizon: thus, while the History presents Komnenos favorably,

Attaleiates’ praise for the future emperor is less effusive than that of later chroniclers. Roussel, having escaped captivity and regathered his scattered forces at Amaseia, continued to be a thorn in Michael’s side. The emperor “used many stratagems and sent messages to the Turks with promises in case they managed to capture him. He also dispatched a man from among those holding high office, a soldier young in age but inferior to none in intelligence and courage, the proedros Alexios Komnenos. He reached the city of Amaseia where he waited for events to unfold.”106 We are not told exactly how Komnenos managed to capture Roussel, only that his operations were successful and that he “had cunningly apprehended Rouselios in the Armeniac thema and safely brought him to the Reigning City.”107

104 “Rouselios, for his part, departed from Chrysopolis and retreated in haste to Nikomedeia. He planned to suborn the Roman soldiers and thus to increase his own army into a huge force. For this reason he released the Kaisar from his bonds and, ameliorating against all expectation his earlier maltreatment with friendly overtures, proclaimed him emperor of the Romans, ostentatiously investing him with power along with imperial acclamations and insignia.” Attaleiates, XXIII.9; 343-345. 105 Attaleiates, XXIII.13; 351. 106 Attaleiates, XXV.2; 363. 107 Attaleiates, XXXIV.4; 527

Attaleiates’ silence on the tactics employed by Komnenos may on the surface seem

strange and could be perceived as a critique on Komnenos’ methods. The brevity of Attaleiates’

account is typical of the chronicler’s approach to battles, however: Attaleiates spends

considerable effort setting up the character of each commander, often comments on the

preparation for battle, but rarely provides detailed information on tactical dispositions.

Nevertheless, Attaleiates’ praises Komnenos’ cunning and efficacy in this brief passage. Michael

Doukas apparently concurred: Komnenos next appears in the History commanding an

expeditionary force sent from Constantinople to attack the rebel John Bryennios after the latter

had failed to take Constantinople and install his brother, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, as

Emperor. John Bryennios withdrew with his forces to the nearby town of Athyra; “when the

news was announced that Bryennios’ brother had dropped his guard while billeted at Athyra, it

was decided to attack him suddenly, with the proedros Alexios in command along with

Rouselios, leading the soldiers from the Imperial City.”108 The divided command structure is significant: Komnenos is placed in joint command with Roussel, whom he was responsible for

capturing in Anatolia. We can surmise that Michael Doukas did not fully trust Roussel, and that

by placing him under Komnenos’ watchful gaze the Emperor sought to control the talented but

insubordinate mercenary. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the timeframe in which Attaleiates’

chronicle must have been composed that Komnenos is portrayed as anything but the

mastermind behind the complex maneuvers that were to follow.

Komnenos and Roussel intended to launch an ambitious combined arms surprise attack

on John Bryennios at Athyra. The commanders outfitted a naval contingent including elements

of the Varangian Guard and mustered a force of garrison troops: the former were to coordinate

108 Attaleiates, XXXI.11; 461-463.

44 their arrival by sea with the advance of the garrison forces. Attaleiates describes this joint operation as follows:

“When the Varangians deputed to the naval assault gave the signal to the soldiers on land to attack Athyra early in the morning, so that by blocking their opponent inside with all his supporters, overcoming and routing them, they would with their own hands either capture or kill them all, as if they had cast a net. And the plan was solid, tactically sound, and appropriate to the prey, but by not being carried through to its conclusion it marred the benefits of victory: for as the infantry and naval forces came together, the soldiers of the infantry units arrived first before the city but were distracted at that point by scouting and…they missed that other target and failed in their plan, and so did not join up with the Varangians when they attacked Athyra. The Varangians, however, forced the gates and hurled themselves inside the city in full gear, and so defeated Bryennios’ forces while it was still morning. The latter, being cavalry, jumped on their horses and rushed into flight, and as the ground forces were not there to meet and confront them, they evaded total defeat. Then, as Rouselios appeared along with the proedros Alexios, they gave chase, for they wished to press the rout and kill many of the enemy who were shaking in fear and were in headlong flight. They were, however, not heeded by their own soldiers, who still feared the outcome. Some of the Macedonians were killed by the Rus’ in the fort, while others were taken alive. Likewise with the cavalry. Loot was thus gathered from their baggage train as well as the green carts, weapons, and standards of Bryennios’ brother.”109 Attaleiates’ account of this engagement leaves many things unclear: who was responsible for planning this operation? Whose fault was it that the operation was only partially successful?

Komnenos and Roussel clearly commanded the division of ground forces drawn from the garrison of Constantinople; the assault on Athyra failed to destroy John Bryennios’ army largely because the ground forces were not in position when the Varangians launched their assault.

Psellos’ account of the revolt of Leo Tornikes provides compelling evidence that the garrison troops were not accustomed to battle, were likely poorly trained, and lacked discipline:

Attaleiates’ account above supports this interpretation, as both Alexios and Roussel are

109 Attaleiates, XXXI.12; 463-465. Emphasis mine.

45 commended for their bravery and willingness to engage the enemy while their men are clearly less confident of victory and too undisciplined to obey their commanders’ orders.110

Komnenos’ use of a cunning dawn raid to entrap John Bryennios’ forces may not have succeeded completely, but the raid was a success. John’s forces were bloodied and, perhaps even more importantly, had lost supplies, weapons, standards, and momentum. Komnenos was promoted for his efforts to defeat John Bryennios in battle.111 Although Michael VII Doukas was overthrown in 1078 by Nikephoros III Botaneiates, Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder remained in rebellion against the throne – a decision for which Bryennios was harshly criticized by

Attaleiates. Regarding the mood in the palace at Bryennios’ refusal to accept Botaneiates’ government, Attaleiates writes the following:

110 During Tornikes’ revolt Constantinople came under siege. In response, the reigning Emperor “Constantine's next step was to enroll in what was left of his army a mob of ordinary citizens. They were quite numerous, volunteers who fooled at war as if it were just another of their games. Throughout that night the digging went on at a ditch to encircle the city, and a palisade was set up in front of it. At dawn, before the enemy presented themselves to our view, he drew up in order of battle the elite of our troops and got them into position exactly opposite the enemy. They were partly composed of squadrons of cavalry, partly of companies of light-armed soldiers, all protected by defensive armour. He arranged the whole force in battalions, and then, seating himself a second time on a high vantage-point, he decided to watch what happened from a distance. The enemy knew nothing of these preparations. When they approached and found our battalions massed in their path, they immediately drew rein, judging it wise to find out first whence all this army of ours had been collected. What they feared was that some contingent from the east had come to our aid. However, when they discovered that the defenders were merely a pack of vagabonds and saw the ditch was shallow and easy to cross, they laughed the emperor to scorn. for his folly. Here, they decided, was the chance they were seeking. So, in close order, shield to shield, and howling their war-cry, they made a concerted attack in full force on horseback. The ditch was cleared without the slightest difficulty and the defenders, who until that moment had kept their ranks, were at once put to flight. The enemy then worked round to their rear and wiped them out to a man, some by the sword, others with their spears. Actually the majority were jostled by their own comrades, slipped off their horses, and were trampled to death on the spot. Nor were those who had gone outside the city the only ones to run away: their example was followed by all those who chanced to be standing near the emperor. They believed the rebel was on the point of entering the city and all of them would be destroyed.” Psellos, VI; 214-215. Those who remembered Tornikes’ attack on Constantinople – the event would have been within living memory – may well have remembered the rebel’s use of a Scythian withdrawal to lure the garrison into a slaughter the day before this engagement, which may explain the caution of Alexios’ victorious troops in pursuing seemingly defeated enemies. Psellos, VI; 213. 111 He is next referred to in the chronicle as nobellisimos, a higher rank than proedros. As no significant engagements are recorded in between, the promotion is most likely connected to Alexios’ (partially) successful expedition against John Bryennios. Attaleiates, XXXIV.4; 527.

“…all those in office were also outraged over Bryennios’ inhumanity and undiscerning judgment, for he recognized neither the nobility of the emperor’s ancestors, nor their virtue, which shone upon them from above in their martial exploits and their struggles and contests against the enemy, nor the emperor’s own brilliance and superiority in offices and martial contests, and the ignobility of his own clan and relatives. For while the Botaneiatai had held the office of doux in the west and were famous for the way they had exercised its authority, his own ancestors could not compare to them even in their capacity as servants, for they were unknown and did not hold even the most petty ranks in military orders.”112 Attaleiates’ criticism should be taken with a grain of salt: after all, he was a member of

Botaneiates’ government and considered Botaneiates the best candidate for the throne.

Nevertheless, John Bryennios’ foray against Constantinople examined above was coolly rebuffed by the citizens of Constantinople, who preferred the unpopular Michael VII Doukas to

Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. Thus Botaneiates, surely cognizant of Komnenos’ success against John Bryennios in the Athyra expedition, “thereby determined that the nobellisimos

Alexios Komnenos was worthy of this command, he who had cunningly apprehended Rouselios in the Armeniac thema and safely brought him to the Reigning City. Appointing him domestikos, he sent him out with his own forces. He was young in age but mature in mind and steady of thought, reliable and unbeatable in battles and war, and so loyal and deferential to the emperor that he would not hesitate to take deadly blows on his behalf.”113 Botaneiates mustered troops from Crete and a division of Turkish mercenaries “ferried…across the straits and enlisted…among his own soldiers, those whom the previous emperor Michael had failed to persuade to be ferried across to the western parts despite his many promises and countless gifts.”114

With this small army Komnenos departed from Constantinople and sought to check the advance of the Bryennioi. Encamping at Kalovrye, Alexios dispatched scouts – in accordance

112 Attaleiates, XXXIV.3; 523-525. 113 Attaleiates, XXXIV.4; 527. Note that Alexios is explicitly praised for his cunning tactics. 114 Attaleiates, XXXIV.4; 525.

47 with the recommendations of the military manuals – who discovered Nikephoros Bryennios the

Elder’s army marching toward Constantinople from Mesene. Realizing that his forces were outnumbered, Komnenos “dispatched some Turks at night with orders to appear before the enemy during the day and put fear into them, to rattle them by giving their scouts the impression that they were seeking battle, and in this way to shake the enemy's morale and fill their army with commotion, as it was marching without suspecting that the enemy were nearby.”115 Komnenos further commanded his Turkish outriders to “turn back without giving battle, unless they should happen upon any detached units…When this happened, the soldiers of Bryennios were in fact thrown into disorder and their morale was shaken, while the Turks eliminated many of them who were detached from the main army, thereby disrupting the supporters of Bryennios.”116

With battle imminent, Attaleiates recounts that Komnenos mustered his men into a

“strategic battle order;” he then gives this account of the battle that follows:

“he marched with the army in formation. And when the standards appeared to both of them and the battle cry was raised from the two sides, a strongly contested and glorious battle was joined, as the emperor’s men with boldness and an eager spirit scorned the great number of the enemy and held them of lesser account, while those with

115 Attaleiates, XXXIV.4-5; 527. Note Attaleiates’ critique of Nikephoros Bryennios’ generalship: while Alexios has deployed scouts per protocol, Bryennios either has not or his scouts are of inferior quality as Alexios’ vanguard is easily able to ambush Bryennios’ forces. 116 Cf. Phokas, De Velitatione, II; 153: “We must, then, rely on spies for information about the movements of the armies. Select some good, courageous trapezites, those whom the Armenians call tasinarioi. These men should be sent out constantly to charge down on the lands of the enemy, cause harm and ravage them;” also Phokas, De Velitatione, VI; 163: “Finding a good location to conceal himself and his men, he should send out mounted scouts in all directions. When he has obtained information about them and they have been observed riding out and scattering all over, then, while they are disorganized, he should march out after them, and he should have no difficulty in defeating them.” Cf. Phokas, De Velitatione, IX; 173: “If he does not feel confident enough to attack the battle line directly, inasmuch as he notices that it is very strong, significantly stronger than his own, then he should move off at a distance to the side by a good, but secret, road and with due speed reach the enemy soldiers who are dispersed about. During the whole day he should charge in upon them and fight them, as they are scattered all around and, with God on his side, he will accomplish memorable deeds.”

Bryennios, being many times more numerous, rivaled each other in resistance. As a result, there was much killing on both sides and great terror everywhere.”117 As the tide of battle began to shift in favor of Komnenos and the imperial troops, Bryennios’

Scythian mercenaries abandoned the field and in a stroke of unexpected good fortune for

Alexios, the retreating Scythian regiments “looted and plundered the tents of the Macedonians.

When Bryennios saw the defeat of his regiments, their confusion, and perilous situation, he took

the best of his units and the units that attended him and personally rushed to join in the battle

over the ultimate prize.” With Bryennios himself actively engaged in the melee, Attaleiates’

account of this crucial battle emphasizes Komnenos’ adherence to established Byzantine

military doctrines:

“Komnenos gave a signal to his unit of Turks, whom he had kept in reserve for use in a moment of need, ordering them to assist his men. They suddenly appeared on a hilltop, pouring down on the enemy while shooting their arrows from a point on the hill where the ground cut it at a right angle, and, along with the Romans who were fighting with them, caused a rout. At that point Bryennios was captured alive while those around him scattered, and the outcome was for them as bad as for their leader, for many fell and no fewer were captured, especially those who were higher ranked.”118 Commanding the smaller force, Komnenos relied upon shock tactics designed to erode the morale of Bryennios’ forces. Before battle had commenced, Komnenos gained an early advantage when his Turkish outriders evaded detection by Bryennios’ scouts and managed to harry Bryennios’ foragers. Skirmishing in this way was a calculated risk: Komnenos’ forces were already outnumbered and could ill afford losses that would make the numerical disparity even

117 Attaleiates, XXXIV.5. Emphasis mine. Byzantine military doctrine advised avoiding battle against a foe with greater numbers, unless that foe has already been defeated in skirmishing operations. Phokas recommends at least three small victories before engaging in a general battle; cf. Phokas, Praecepta, IV.19; 51: “If the enemy force far outnumbers our own both in cavalry and infantry, avoid a general engagement or close combats and strive to injure the enemy with stratagems and ambushes. The time to seek general engagements with the enemy is when, with the help of God, the enemy has fled once, twice, or three times and are crippled and fearful, while on the other hand our host is obviously confident and their thoughts of valor have been awakened.” 118 Attaleiates, xxxiv.4-6; 527-531. Emphasis mine. Note that Alexios deploys a division of Turkish mercenaries deliberately, having kept this division concealed and in reserve.

greater. Conversely, gaining any victory over Bryennios’ large army – no matter how small – would provide a psychological edge to Komnenos’ emboldened troops and unsettle Bryennios’ forces.

Attaleiates’ portrayal of the major players of late eleventh century Byzantine politics is colored by his partisanship for Nikephoros III Botaneiates. While this is immediately evident in his characterization of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder as an incompetent and timid commander and equally evident in Attaleiates’ lionization of Nikephoros Botaneiates as the only competent general in the room, his presentation of generals outside the competition for the throne – at least at the point in time in which the History was composed – has not been adequately considered. To do so, it will be necessary to compare Attaleiates’ portrait of Alexios Komnenos against another, near contemporary chronicler – Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger – an analysis which will follow below.

Chapter III: Reinterpreting the Hyle Historias

Thus it is the highly negative portrayal of his grandfather crafted by Attaleiates – as a

careless general with no concern for the safety of his comrades in arms, defeated in the

skirmishing before Manzikert, defeated at Manzikert, rebuffed by the citizens of Constantinople

in a vain bid for power, and finally crushed in a decisive battle by a much younger and less

experienced general despite enjoying every possible tactical advantage – that Nikephoros

Bryennios the Younger works so diligently against. Nikephoros does not deny that any of these events took place. The Hyle also relates that Bryennios the Elder was defeated in a skirmish prior to the Battle of Manzikert; Bryennios was also defeated at Manzikert; he was rebuffed by the citizens of Constantinople; and he was defeated in the Battle of Kalovrye by a much younger and less experienced general, Alexios Komnenos. Nikephoros does not alter the outcome of any of these events: his talents as a writer are on display, however, in the manner in which Nikephoros reconstructs the character of his grandfather as a noble, knowledgeable, and cautious commander whose troubles stem from the whims of fate and the superior skills of those he battled against.

The Byzantines, however, readily assigned blame to their defeated generals – thus necessitating Bryennios’ apologetic portrayal of his grandfather and invalidating the notion that the Byzantines perceived defeat along Roman lines. Why was this so? The avowed goal of each chronicler was to seek the causes of events, a goal that follows a pattern established by

Thucydides and which came to define the genre of history. Byzantine writers were especially conscious of writing within the constraints of their chosen genre, as we have seen above in our discussion of the military manuals. Thus chroniclers like Michael Attaleiates and Michael Psellos sought to establish the causation of events through rational processes. This aim is guided by the

idea that “causation is used to expose the true reasons behind historical developments so as to

instruct future generations. For Attaleiates this has been the central occupation of wise men;

prudent people who can advise on the proper course of action.”119

Yet as we have seen above, establishing fortified camps and maintaining strict discipline are both hallmarks of the Byzantine military tradition. Every Byzantine military manual advises the general to establish a secure camp, including palisades, trenches, and caltrops.120 Leo the

Deacon, John Skylitzes, and Michael Attaleiates each lavish praise upon commanders who exhibit concern for these qualities in their troops and in their campaigning and provide cautionary tales of generals whose lack of caution and discipline bring about their ruin – and often the destruction of their armies. Nikephoros Bryennios’ presentation of his grandfather thus conforms closely to the template for a ‘good general’ established by the Byzantine military manuals and actively seeks to subvert Attaleiates’ portrayal of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder as an incompetent and careless commander.121

In addition to personal bravery and displays of manly virtue on the battlefield,

Nikephoros consistently praises his grandfather and other Byzantine commanders for their understanding of military theory. The first passage of Nikephoros’ chronicle is a paean to Basil II for fostering the young Isaac and Manuel Komnenos and teaching them military strategies:

“…and to equip themselves both good-naturedly and with a shield and to look to the strikes of opponents and to wield a lance and to ride well and to hurl a javelin against a shield and, that which I might say was the most important, that they might be able to know both how one ought to arrange a phalanx and how to choose captains, and also to

119 Krallis, “Attaleiates as a Reader,” 189. 120 This quality is based upon the recommendations of the Emperor Maurice, who advised his generals to be ever vigilant, for it is better to be prepared for any stratagem of the enemy; a “general should not have to say: ‘I did not expect it.’” Maurice, Strategikon, VIII.36; 86. The Strategikon, as noted above, formed the basis for the Taktika and as a result the precepts established by the Strategikon would still have held force, even three centuries after it was first promulgated. 121 Recall that Bryennios is ambushed twice in Attaleiates’ History: in the skirmishing leading up to the Battle of Kalovrye, and at the Battle of Kalovrye itself. See above, n. 115, 118.

encamp both quickly and to plant stakes and other needful things so that they taught them tactics thoroughly.”122 In doing so Nikephoros establishes that his chronicle will place a high value upon men who

demonstrate similar knowledge of military theory; he is establishing his template for the ideal

general, and the portrait is not one of a Republican Roman commander.

Bryennios the Elder:

In the late 1070s Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder led a long and nearly successful

rebellion. He initially rebelled against Michael VIII Doukas (r. 1071-1078), but his rebellion continued after Nikephoros Botaneiates seized the throne. Consequently, Bryennios is portrayed poorly by Michael Attaleiates – who is a partisan of Botaneiates. This may have inspired Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger – the grandson of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder – to write his own chronicle, the Hyle Historias. His account melds elements of Michael Psellos’

Chronographia, a lost history of John Doukas, and the Synopsis Historiarum of John Skylitzes with personal recollections.123 The Hyle does not yet exist in a full English translation – in fact, as stated above the preparation of such a translation provided much of the impetus for this thesis.

Consequently, all translations of material from the Hyle cited in this document are my own.

The Hyle is a work centered around the heroic exploits of two individuals: Nikephoros

Bryennios the Elder, and Alexios Komnenos. Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger constructs a vivid characterization of the ideal Byzantine general in his portrayal of these two men and seeks to heroize both. Working within the same tradition as the chroniclers reviewed above,

Nikephoros crafts a history which exalts the same four virtues: strict military discipline; wide- ranging knowledge of Byzantine military tactics as espoused by the military manuals; clever

122 Bryennios, I.1. 123 Neville, Guide, 170.

stratagems; and a keen awareness of the most appropriate and efficacious tactic to employ in a

given military situation.

The campaigns of Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder while serving as Doux of Epirus provide a perfect example of a general employing the caution and discipline that permeates the

Byzantine military tradition. The campaign began after Bryennios was assigned the post of Doux of Epirus by Michael VII. “Bryennios came to Dyrrachium and the natives gladly welcomed him; for he was a most charming and liberal man”124 He proceeded to campaign against the

Diocleians and Croatians, and “set up camps around the most fortified places of those people and made haste to subdue their difficult lands.”125 The heavily forested region invited ambushes, a tactic which the Slavic natives were renowned for. Aware of this danger, Bryennios

“ordered the natives carrying long axes” as well as his own infantry “hewing down obstacles and clearing the roads. When this had been done, the soldiers eagerly advanced against the enemy,” confident that they would not find the way home barred against them.126 Confronting the

Croatians and Diocleians in open battle, Bryennios “triumphed by strength” and bound the

defeated natives to him “by treaty.”127 Bryennios curtailed subsequent issues with Italian

pirates, who were “destroying merchant ships and evilly behaving” when he “placed a watch to

repel their inroads… he equipped triremes against them. After sinking many of the pirate vessels

124 Nikephoros Bryennios, Hyle Historias, III.3; all translations are my own, and are included in full as an appendix to this work. 125 Bryennios, III.3. For Byzantine injunctions to fortify camps, especially those in hostile territory, see also: Leo VI, XI.2, 195; Anonymous, Sylloge, XXII.4, 39; Phokas, Praecepta, V.3, 53; Phokas, De Velitatione, XV, 199. 126 Bryennios, III.3. Clear-cutting an area to prevent the enemy from using wooded areas as a convenient place to launch ambushes from is not explicitly recommended in the military manuals but has precedent in the Tarsos campaign of Nikephoros II Phokas. See below. 127 Bryennios, III.3.

54 and capturing not a few;” the remaining pirates avoided Byzantine territory for the duration of his tenure as Doux.128

Bryennios’ campaign is an example of textbook generalship; his decision to fortify his camp in his march into Illyria reflects tactical advice provided in each of the Byzantine military manuals.129 In describing his grandfather’s military expedition in these terms, Nikephoros crafts a calculated image of Bryennios the Elder that aligns well with the paradigmatic “good general”

Nikephoros Phokas as he is described by Leo the Deacon, John Skylitzes, and Michael

Attaleiates. Furthermore, Bryennios’ decision to clear the roads into Illyria with axe-men demonstrates an awareness of Slavic tactics derived from Leo’s Taktika.130 To combat this, Leo mad this recommendation:

“If you intend to lead an army of infantry on an expedition against hostile territory that is dense, very rugged, and with narrow passes, or to launch assaults on them in such places, you must not have many cavalry or wagons or a large baggage train or much heavy armament, such as body armor, helmets, cuirasses or anything of that sort. The heavy-armed troops should carry only large shields, short spears, swords, and axes. The so-called light-armed troops should have smaller and lighter shields, bows with quivers, throwing spears, short javelins, axes, and anything else light and serviceable like these. They definitely must have extra axes that can be carried by the pack animals until needed.”131

128 Bryennios, III.3. Bryennios’ tactics against the pirates follow those suggested by Leo in the Taktika: “But if you approach enemy territory or if you expect the enemy to be in the vicinity, it is absolutely necessary for you to station scouts at some distance, both on land and on sea. You must persevere in your vigilance, remain secure, and be ready to get into formation. For the schemes of the enemy are many. If they are on land and find you lying at anchor, they will overpower you and, if they find the opportunity, they will burn your ships. If they should appear at sea, they will launch an attack by night or day. If the enemy finds that you are not as well prepared as you should be, they will have the advantage over you. But if they find you prepared, their scheme will end up accomplishing nothing.” Leo VI, Taktika, XIX.33; 517. 129 E.g. Leo VI, Taktika, XI.2, 195; Anonymous, Sylloge, XXII.4, 39; Phokas, Praecepta, V.3, 53; Phokas, De Velitatione, XV, 199. Furthermore, Bryennios’ camp is not even the only fortified encampment mentioned in the Hyle; Basil II instructs the young Isaac and Manuel Komnenos while they are his wards in the art of fortifying a camp quickly and surrounded by stakes, while he describes Romanos Diogenes’ camp as surrounded by both stakes and a palisade. Bryennios, I.1; I.14. 130 Leo VI, Taktika, XVIII.101; 475. 131 Leo VI, Taktika, IX.56; 177. Bryennios followed these recommendations exactly, employing his re-equipped heavy infantry as auxiliary axe-men to clear any wooded cover the Diocleians and Croats may have otherwise used to set up ambushes along the path.

Byzantium’s European adversaries, the Bulgars and Slavs, had developed a technique of blocking

mountain passes using timber palisades. These could be constructed quickly and were difficult

to penetrate, especially when garrisoned.132 Nikephoros presents his grandfather as a knowledgeable and cautious commander by emphasizing Bryennios’ knowledge of Byzantine military tactics. His presentation accords well with the methodology of other chroniclers in constructing a positive image of a general whom they might wish to praise by drawing upon the authority of the military treatises.

Alexios Komnenos:

Nikephoros is likewise at pains to portray Alexios Komnenos as a master of Byzantine

military tactics. The Battle of the Vardar River against the rebel Nikephoros Basilakes

demonstrates Komnenos’ consummate mastery of Byzantine generalship as Nikephoros

employs a wide range of references to military theory and rhetoric designed convince the reader

that Alexios Komnenos is the best general of his age. This characterization stands in stark contrast to the respectful but muted acclaim for Komnenos in Attaleiates’ History. The battle commences after Komnenos encamped his army on the bank of the Vardar River, planning to march at night against Basilakes:

“[Komnenos] orders that all the men should dine for the remainder of the day to regain their strength so that they might be prepared either to pass a sleepless night or to rest in arms. For being both a sharp-witted man and having enough experience to draw upon from his earlier great deeds he suspected that his enemy would attack by night.

132 The abortive invasion of Bulgaria by the Emperor Nikephoros I at the Battle of Pliska in 811 provides the most famous example of this tendency. Nikephoros’ forces successfully stormed the Bulgar capital, but became bogged down in the forest; the way home was blocked by a timber palisade, and the army was ambushed and annihilated. The victorious Bulgar Khan turned Nikephoros’ skull into a drinking goblet. Clearing the forest paths was a sensible approach, intended to avoid the infamous fate of the fallen Nikephoros I. Theophanes, Chronographia, trans. Harry Turtledove, The Chronicle of Theophanes: Anni Mundi 6095-6305 (A.D. 602-813). 490-491; 170-171; Paul Stephenson, “About the Emperor Nikephoros and How He Leaves His Bones in Bulgaria": A Context for the Controversial "Chronicle of 811," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 60, (2006). 87-90.

Therefore, Alexios prepared beforehand and sent forth scouts in all directions. Meanwhile Basilakes, since one of Komnenos’ companions deserted to him and told him of Alexios’ plans, urged Basilakes to attack Alexios. The deserter offered to betray Alexios while he was sleeping in his tent, and with no one ordering all the men to arm themselves straightaway all (of Basilakes’ men) would be in arms. When the sun was passing toward the West Basilakes went out from the city signaling his departure with trumpets.”133

Komnenos’ employment of forward scouts is in perfect accord with the recommendations of the military manuals.134 One of Komnenos’ scouts, “Tatikios established that he heard Basilakes’ voice setting his phalanx in order and the men giving commands to follow and that he shot missiles at that man with his bow. Then straightaway he ordered to signal the departure with trumpets and he ordered the lamps and candles to be extinguished at once by the men around his own camp.”135 That Tatikios is able to approach so closely to Basilakes’ forces strongly implies that Basilakes had not set watches or sent out scouts, cardinal sins in Byzantine military thought that suggest a careless/reckless commander – which accords well with other accounts of Basilakes’ recklessness and serves to immediately frame Basilakes’ failings as a general for a reader who is familiar with the military treatises.

133 Bryennios, IV.19. Neville has interpreted Bryennios’ confused account as an effort to displace credit for the subsequent victory from Alexios, but this interpretation is unconvincing. Alexios orders his men to prepare for a night battle, then a ‘deserter’ appears in in Basilakes camp, prompting Basilakes to march against Alexios and into a trap. This is hardly coincidental, and Bryennios seems simply to have misunderstood the intricacies of Alexios’ ruse. For a similar ruse later in Alexios’ career, see also Anna, Alexiad, XIII.4 ;236; Neville, Heroes, 101-102. 134 Leo VI, Taktika, XVII.77; 425: ” Be well aware that it is the specific task of competent scouts, intelligent and alert men, to observe closely the positions and movements of the enemy.” Also Leo VI, Taktika, XIV.42; 241: Scouts required to “Both before and during the battle and until its final outcome, in their own locations and in the places in which they are stationed at intervals, their duty is to observe, so the army will not suffer an attack from ambush or some other trick of the enemy.”; Phokas, De Velitatione, VI; 163: “Finding a good location to conceal himself and his men, he should send out mounted scouts in all directions. When he has obtained information about them and they have been observed riding out and scattering all over, then, while they are disorganized, he should march out after them, and he should have no difficulty in defeating them.” 135 Bryennios, IV.20.

Komnenos, aware that Basilakes is on the march, abandons his camp leaving torches

blazing as a beacon for Basilakes to find. Bryennios’ account of this tactic appears to be based

upon a modified stratagem drawn from two recommendations made by Leo VI in the Taktika:

Whenever the time is right for you to elude the enemy, you may escape without danger by setting many fires in one place and by lying low in another place. The enemy will be deceived and head toward the fires and so, as we explained to you elsewhere, you will attain your objective” and “if you intend to transfer the army from the camp to another location and you wish to do so without the enemy finding out about it or if you choose to occupy strong points beforehand or if you wish to abandon such places because of damage inflicted by the enemy and if you do not want to be forced into offering battle, light many fires and then withdraw. When the enemy see the lights, they will believe that you are still inside the camp, and you will be able to carry out your plan.136 Komnenos, in this instance, is using the blazing torches not as a cover for his escape, but as bait;

Komnenos has used his camp in much the same way that a small detachment was used to affect a ‘Scythian withdrawal’ and draw a larger force toward an ambush. This is tactically brilliant and reinforces Nikephoros’ portrait of Komnenos as a worthy adversary, emphasizing that

Bryennios’ defeat by such a man is no mark against him.137

Basilakes, with his penchant for reckless charges, is easily duped and drawn into the trap; Nikephoros mocks the rebel, portraying him as a bumbling fool.138 However, Alexios

Komnenos is portrayed by Nikephoros as a master of stratagems, military cunning, and indirect

fighting and is ultimately successful in every military endeavor he undertakes in the Hyle. His

136 Leo VI, Taktika, XX.21, 545; XI.21, 203. 137 Neville argues that Bryennios is hostile to Alexios and seeks to denigrate him, which seems unlikely as this would reflect negatively upon Bryennios the Elder as well. I am more inclined to accept the arguments of Vlada Stankovich that “Nikephoros Bryennios grants Alexios Komnenos the essential legitimacy of his accession to the throne by connecting him closely with the only holder of imperial legitimacy, Konstantios Doukas… Although the possibility that Bryennios distorted or invented some circumstances in order to stress Alexios’ right to the throne cannot be completely excluded, it seems more likely that he had before him some older source or sources.” Vlada Stankovich, “Nikephoros Bryennios, Anna Komnene and Konstantios Doukas. A Story About Different Perspectives,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 100, no. 1, (2007), 174. 138 C.f. Bryennios, IV.22. Basilakes hubris and subsequent downfall fit well within Greek rhetorical traditions, making this another example of Lilie’s historiographical trope of sensationalism and overdramatization; Lilie, 176.

appearance early in the Hyle is marked by his mastery of the traditional Byzantine defensive tactics outlined in Nikephoros Phokas’ De Velitatione. Komnenos campaign against the Latin rebel Roussel opened with Alexios “Crossing into Paphlagonia by the Pontus,” and arriving at

“Amaseia Alexios found a handful of Alans who had escaped death – a company 150 strong – and with this force he repelled the enemy many times, attacking and then withdrawing before the enemy.” Phokas recommends exactly this mixture of attack and withdrawal for a defending force that is outnumbered and outclassed by an invading force.139 Komnenos is able through this tactic to stem the raids of the Latin troops under Roussel’s command. As his troops began to feel more confident, Komnenos “no longer just watched over their inroads, but nearing the fortresses which were being held fast by Roussel, he placed ambushes and sent forth some men to plunder the majority of the forts; with the enemy going out and pursuing the men plundering, he himself marched out from ambush and seized the men bearing provisions into the forts by the roads and blocked the men pursuing from the entrances to the forts; and it came to pass that all but a few were taken prisoner, so that the men taking provisions to the forts by the roads were ambushed.”140 Komnenos’ battle plan is again one of dislocation; he is attempting to force his adversary to fight at home and divert forces that were engaged in plundering of

139 “That officer, meanwhile, shows his experience by continuing to fight against the enemy. At times he charges into them, at times he begins to run away, and he provokes them into pursuing.” Phokas, De Velitatione, XI; 185. 140 Bryennios, II.20.

Byzantine territory, a technique recommended by Leo VI in the Taktika.141 Roussel was compelled to withdraw his raiding forces in order to protect his forts.142

Komnenos, taking advantage of the concentration of his adversary’s forces in one place, was able to intercept Roussel’s foraging parties and supply convoys, with the following result:

“Over time Alexios led the barbarian Roussel into shortage; for he, having a battle-ready force, wanted the matter against him settled with one battle, while Alexios the Stratopedarches, because he lacked a strong force, made haste to outgeneral the barbarian. Whenever Roussel gathered his own army, the Alexios feigned quietude, but after a few days he would go out secretly and set up traps not far from Roussel. Alexios frequently laid ambushes and captured the men supplying Roussel’s army with necessities. As these things were announced to Roussel, soldiers were sent out from there to give aid, but they fell into snares and ambushes and all but a few were taken wholly by traps and carried off…”143 Komnenos’ tactics against Roussel are well attested in the military manuals. Leo VI advises the general “that you will be more successful in destroying the enemy’s force by hunger and frequent raids than by attempting to overturn them with weapons,” while Nikephoros Phokas notes that “the general ought to send a sizeable force to…attack and harass [the enemy] here and there in order to prevent them from gathering food. When food becomes scarce, they may be compelled to turn back.”144 Komnenos’ tactics worked splendidly, and Roussel was reduced

141 “Therefore, General, when you are at a loss about how to injure the enemy with stratagems and ambushes, because they are very cautious and guard themselves carefully, or if, on the other hand, it is because your forces are not up to facing them openly in battle, then this is what you ought to do. Either you march quickly against the lands of the enemy, leaving the most responsible of the other generals behind, with enough troops for skirmishing and for the security of the themes. Or else, if you carry out the skirmishing, then send your best general, well known and esteemed for his courage and vast experience, with a significant force of cavalry and infantry down to the country of the enemy. He should stay there a while, burning, destroying, besieging fortified towns. When the enemy hear of this, they will force their leader, even if he is unwilling, to get back to defend their own country.” Leo VI, Taktika, XVII.65, 419; Cf. Phokas, De Velitatione, XX; 221. 142 Contrast Attaleiates’ rather vague assertion that Alexios was dispatched to Amaseia by the Emperor Michael Doukas and “waited for events to unfold.” As Alexios was subsequently placed in command of the army dispatched against Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder for his cunning handling of Roussel, Nikephoros’ version of events is preferable. See above, n. 106; 107. 143 Bryennios, II.20. 144 Leo VI, Taktika, XX.86 , 567; Phokas, De Velitatione, XVII; 211. See also Phokas, De Velitatione, XXII; 227: “As an intelligent and alert commander he should ceaselessly inflict damage on the enemy

to impotence as his forces were unable to force Komnenos to engage them in a set piece battle.145

Komnenos’ cunning use of hunger as an ally in his encounters with Roussel served him

well in later battles. Nikephoros records that while John Bryennios – Nikephoros Bryennios the

Elder’s brother – laid siege to Constantinople on behalf of his brother, Alexios Komnenos and

Constantine Doukas were entrusted with the defense of the city. They rallied a small and

inexperienced force of men who happened to be in the city and relied heavily upon the city’s

massive fortifications and their own vigilance:

“On one of the hours that Alexios Komnenos was keeping watch he spotted men departing from Bryennios’ camp on a foraging expedition. When these men were coming back again to their camp, Alexios gathered a few men as a retinue and threw open the gates. Alexios and his party marched out and attacked the foraging party; they captured twenty men and before the others knew of the deed they brought their captives back with them into the city. At once the virtue of Alexios was much spoken of by all men.”146 Komnenos is praised for his keen tactical awareness and boldness in leading a sally; his actions undermine the morale of the besieging army and are partly responsible for John’s decision to lift the siege and unite his forces with those of his brother. Komnenos is employing traditional defensive tactics, notably the recommendations of Phokas; the goal of such tactics is to prevent the enemy from collecting supplies and compel them to withdraw due to scarcity.147

when they come out to plunder. As a result they should be afraid to ride out far from their own army to obtain food. This will cause them to be very hard pressed for food.” 145 Nikephoros is unique in presenting Alexios’ methods for accomplishing the defeat and capture of Roussel in full; both Anna Komnene and Michael Attaleiates gloss over the skirmishing and focus solely on the intervention of the Turks. 146 Bryennios, III.13. 147 See also: Leo VI, Taktika, XX.86, 567; Phokas, De Velitatione, 185; XVIII, 211; XXII, 227; XXI, 225: “Putting your military experience to good use, then, you should be able to cause them harm by ambushes and put them to flight. The result should be that the scarcity of food will compel them to lift the siege.”

Attaleiates reduces the heroic clash described by Nikephoros to a few short lines, noting

of John’s men only that “when a few of them were injured, they retreated and approached

other sections of the walls, but here they heard the citizens issuing insulting cries and violent

taunts, and they were driven away with javelins and stones.”148 The decisive clash occurs after

John has withdrawn from the siege; he and his forces are pursued by a detachment of the

Varangian Guard and troops of the garrison under the joint command of Alexios Komnenos and

Roussel. The expedition is a complex joint assault by land troops and naval forces, which

Attaleiates describes as “solid, tactically sound, and appropriate to the prey” and which he likens to casting a net. The attack is poorly timed, however, and while the Varangians successfully rout John’s forces, Komnenos and Roussel arrive too late to capitalize on their adversary’s discomfiture and the attack is less damaging than it would otherwise have been.149

Attaleiates notes that this expedition was a partial success but that it was not an unqualified

success due to the indiscipline of garrison troops under the joint command of Komnenos and

Roussel. As we have seen repeatedly above, when a commander failed to enforce rigorous

discipline on his army, it was invariably the fault of no one but that commander. Attaleiates’

account is therefore a thinly veiled critique of Komnenos’ generalship, made slightly less stinging

by Attaleiates’ praise for Komnenos’ personal bravery.150 In comparison, Nikephoros’ account highlights the tactical prowess and boldness of Alexios Komnenos and is used to explain his connections with the Kaisar John Doukas, who took note of the young commander as a result of his bold raid on John Bryennios’ forces. Nikephoros’ goal, therefore, is to enhance the image of

Komnenos by expanding his role and highlighting his tactical skills.

148 Attaleiates, XXXI.9; 457-459. 149 Ibid., XXXI.12; 463. 150 See above, n. 109; 67.

In contrast to Komnenos, the Hyle portrays Bryennios’ peer and fellow general

Nikephoros Basilakes as a bold, physically imposing warrior with little regard for the finer points of military tactics. At the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, Basilakes leads the first charge against the approaching Turkish army of Sultan Alp Arslan. Nikephoros relates that the Sultan baited

Basilakes into a reckless attack:

“The Sultan sought to lead the Emperor into the plains nearby and draw the Byzantines into a trap, so he sent forth raiders who ran ahead of the main army. These men ran up to the very ramparts of the Byzantine camp, breaking off and pretending to flee just before reaching the camp. By this tactic the Turks had often ensnared generals. The first commander to fall into their trap that day was Basilakes. This man was convinced that the Turkish army was not there and that the men attacking the camp were not the vanguard of the main Turkish army, but rather natives of Chliat. He demanded that they surrender, and he and his men departed from the imperial camp. Basilakes drew his sword and spurred his horse, charging carelessly. His men followed around him without any formation, but each man where he happened to be. Basilakes was unconcerned by the irregular formation of his men and the Turks, perceiving this, pretended to flee; but when the Turks saw that the Byzantines had marched away from their camp, they wheeled about and struck the scattered Byzantine forces. The Turks prevailed over the scattered Byzantines and many Byzantine fell and after a short while not even a messenger, as the saying goes, was spared from this misfortune. And thus Basilakes was captured.”151 Nikephoros, in narrating this passage, is well aware of the Turks’ penchant for executing a

‘Scythian withdrawal;’ this tactic is extremely well attested in Byzantine military manuals, and is

one which Basilakes should have been cognizant of and for which he should have been

prepared.152

Nikephoros’ account of this battle is therefore highly critical of Basilakes’ recklessness, which led to unnecessary losses and inspired both confidence among the Turks and dismay among the Byzantines. This is in direct contrast to the sort of valuation of military boldness and

151 Bryennios, I.14. Emphasis mine. 152 Leo VI: “Be very cautious when you see the enemy withdraw and take flight. Do not race after them intemperately, because they are likely to set traps for you. Rather, pursue them in good order until you receive definitive information that your victory is assured.” Leo, 293.7. Contrast Bryennios’ careful leadership below.

heroics that Neville would have us expect from Nikephoros’ description of this battle. She

argues that “efficacy, as measured by preservation of life, was not part of classical Roman

evaluation of success.”153 In contrast, concern for the preservation of life is demonstrably

exhibited in Byzantine military manuals, and in accounts similar to the one cited above in the

range of Byzantine chronicles. The Byzantines avoided frontal charges when possible in order to

minimize casualties; their defensive tactics were also specifically constructed to protect the

peasantry and avoid civilian casualties.154

Although Basilakes was captured by the Turks at Manzikert, he was released and a decade later he rebelled against the crown. In the Hyle Alexios Komnenos, fresh from his victory at the Battle of Kalovrye over Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder, is tasked with suppressing

Basilakes’ insurrection. He encamps on the bank of the Vardar River and, informed by his scouts that Basilakes is on the march and nearby, he lays a trap for him. With the trap set, Bryennios provides this account of what happens next:

“Basilakes came near to the encampment, and when he saw that it had been despoiled by his own men, he himself seized the tent of the Domestic of the Schools. Basilakes supposed that all that remained to be accomplished was to capture Alexios himself from some part of the camp and to make him a captive and lead him away. Just as Basilakes was considering the whole camp, he saw it was deserted save for the monk lighting lamps. At this the pretender arrogantly said: “where is the lisper? – for his voice was not precisely right – “lead me away to that man.” Having heard this, the monk denied on oath that he had seen anyone come, acting as if beguiled both in spirit and in wit and laughing sardonically, as the saying goes. The monk laughed even as Basilakes ordered that the tent be hewn down by the men under him. This having come to pass, Basilakes enjoined the men stooping under the bed of the Domestic to investigate whether he had hidden himself anywhere. As Alexios was nowhere to be found, Basilakes ordered that the chests placed there be overturned; his disdain for Alexios destroyed all the wisdom of his soul…at that point joy had been exchanged for pains for him, and often striking his thigh he said: “Woe is me, I have been beguiled by the lisper.” For having no

153 Neville, Heroes, 94. 154 E.g. Phokas, De Velitatione, Proemion, 147; VIII, 165; XII, 187; XII, 189; XIV, 195; XVII, 207; XX, 221; Leo VI, XII.107-108; 275.

other way to mock such a man, he brought up again and again that smallest quirk of Alexios’ voice.”155 Basilakes’ approach to the battle is simple, straightforward, and direct: exactly what

characterizes Roman martial virtue as characterized by Neville, and as demonstrated (though

with more grace) by Romanos Diogenes and John Doukas, figures who are presented favorably

in the Hyle. However, Basilakes is not being presented as an exemplar to be emulated; rather,

he is being caricatured as foolish and inept – looking under the bed for his adversary – while

Komnenos and his intelligent use of stratagems are portrayed favorably.156

In contrast, the Hyle portrays Nikephoros Bryennios as a cautious and disciplined general along Byzantine lines. His awareness of military theory is demonstrated by the textbook military tactics he employs at Manzikert, Dyrrachium, and during his rebellion against

Nikephoros Botaneiates. Indeed, Nikephoros exalts tactical skill, discipline, and knowledge of

Byzantine military tactics throughout the Hyle, with Nikephoros Bryennios and Alexios

Komnenos providing the best examples of this.

Nikephoros’ description of his grandfather’s exploits at the Battle of Manzikert

immediately follows Basilakes’ ignominious capture by the Turks. Romanos Diogenes, fearful

that Basilakes might have run afoul of trouble, thus dispatches Bryennios with a relief force

“So that if anything terrible had happened to Basilakes Bryennios might come to his aid and deliver him relief; for already the Emperor began suppose that Basilakes had come to some evil. Bryennios therefore departed and led out his forces from the camp. After he departed he saw no-one, friend or foe, and he began making haste towards the place where Basilakes had been fighting. Bryennios saw that the enemy had already formed ranks upon the hills; and so after a short while he encountered corpses and wounded men and was at a loss as to when Basilakes had been there. Happening upon a soldier who still alive, Bryennios asked where Basilakes might be and what great and terrible

155 Bryennios, IV.22. Emphasis mine. 156 Contrast this with Neville’s argument that there is a “strong pattern running through Nikephoros’ history [of] a contrast between the valorization of straightforward fighting in well-ordered battle formation and actual victories given to those who fight by trickery and stratagems” with the latter being implicitly denigrated and linked to the Empire’s enemies. Neville, Heroes, 91.

things had happened there. And while the soldier reported back what had occurred, the Turks began arriving from everywhere and attempted to encircle the formation. Perceiving this, Bryennios called on his soldiers to prove their worth, struggle bravely, and be good Romans. Then, turning the formation so that he was advancing with good order toward the camp, Bryennios ignored the attackers. Thus when he had come near to the camp, he took up a portion of the phalanx and, commanding the others to wait, he turned against the men pursuing him suddenly and easily scattered them. And when Bryennios saw the remaining men regrouping, he turned back toward his own formation killing many of the enemy as he went. While the Turks were running after him and circling around him, he wounded them with his spear against their chests, while arrows rained against the backs of the retreating Romans. Bryennios, struggling heroically, brought his men safely home and reached the camp with his formation intact.”157 Nikephoros’ account of Bryennios’ foray against the Turks emphasizes first and foremost

Bryennios’ ability to maintain discipline under fire. His account reflects Bryennios’ awareness of the proper tactical procedures for withdrawing under fire as they are described in the military manuals and it reads like a compressed version of another: Michael Attaleiates famous account of Botaneiates’ fighting withdrawal.158

The Hyle Historias of Nikephoros Bryennios has not inspired the same interest as other middle Byzantine chronicles. Nikephoros’ theme – the rise of the Komnenoi and the turmoil that beset the Byzantine Empire in the years surrounding the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 – overlaps that of two better known chroniclers: Michael Attaleiates, whose History has recently been translated into English by Dimitris Krallis and Anthony Kaldellis; and the Alexiad of Anna

Komnene, Nikephoros’ wife and the daughter of Alexios I Komnenos. Leonora Neville, working with Nikephoros’ oft-neglected chronicle, has recently suggested that Nikephoros Bryennios wrote the Hyle from a classical Roman perspective. According to this reading of the text,

157 Bryennios, I.15. Emphasis mine. 158 Leo VI: “If the victorious foe consists mostly of infantry, do not remain there but make haste to withdraw in good order with your horses or safely move your camp elsewhere. But if they are horsemen, you must disregard superfluous and cumbersome property and horses. Except for a small mounted force, all should take their stand on foot in two phalanxes or formations or in one four-sided, rectangular formation. Place the horses and the baggage train in the middle with the soldiers lined up on the outside, as described, and the archers in front of them. In this way the army can safely change location.” Leo VI, Taktika, XIV.20; 301. See also Attaleiates, VII.14-16; 71-75.

Nikephoros deliberately exalts Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder – Nikephoros’ grandfather – as

well as John Doukas and Romanos IV Diogenes as tragic heroes who embraced good Roman

values but fought unmanly foes and lost.159 Neville further argues that Nikephoros should be taken as representative of wider Byzantine views on martial virtue, claiming that Byzantine views were shaped by Roman precedents. Consequently, Nikephoros’ presentation of Alexios

Komnenos – the penultimate Byzantine trickster general – takes on a decidedly negative tone.

This interpretation is flawed, however, as Nikephoros records a cast of generals who obey the precepts of Byzantine military theory and who exemplify the wide range of military tactics and stratagems which the Byzantines practiced.

Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder is portrayed as a knowledgeable Byzantine general in the Battle of Kalovrye, his struggle with Alexios Komnenos. Nikephoros notes that Bryennios fortified his camp and set watches per the recommendations of the military manuals; he also deploys his troops at dawn and intends to pin Komnenos’ line against his more experienced and disciplined veterans while effecting a flanking maneuver with his Scythian mercenaries.160

Norman Tobias notes that Bryennios’ tactical disposition, both at Kalovrye and in his campaign for the throne generally, seek to create a sense of dislocation in his adversary. In occupying

159 “The nostalgic Roman valuation of honor, even above success, provided a cultural framework in which Romanos, Bryennios, and John were heroes in that they were personally courageous and fought with honor. In addition to exonerating them for their failures, the appeal to Roman standards of virtue codes these gentlemen as truly Roman. They are shown to fully participate in the same conception of proper political conduct, and masculinity, as the great military heroes of old Rome.” Neville, Heroes, 138. 160 For Byzantine recommendations on camps and watches, see above, n 129. The use of outflankers is recommended in Maurice’s Strategikon, as well as later manuals; e.g. Phokas, Praecepta, IV.12, 47: “The outflankers should perform the same maneuver and encircle the enemy. The kataphraktoi and the two units on either side of them must remain in formation and so should the rest of the units trailing them;” also Leo VI, Taktika, XII.21; 227: “To the side of the right division post one or two banda of archers, known as outflankers, who should be prepared to encircle the enemy;” Maurice, Strategikon, III.14; 49-50. The fact that neither Alexios Komnenos nor Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder exactly follow the precepts of the military manuals has been cited as indicative of the basic historicity of the events as they are related in the Hyle. Chatzellis, Byzantine, Kindle Edition, Loc. 4560.

Thrace, his forces challenge Botaneiates’ economic and psychological resources; Bryennios’

strategy is designed to throw Botaneiates off balance. Bryennios battle plan at Kalovrye also

accords well with Byzantine military theory, as Tobias highlights:

“The tactics which Bryennios chose were in keeping with standard Byzantine practice, according to which the main army would advance in an extended line and fix their adversaries. Then when a signal was given, the Scythians (Pechenegs) would fall upon the rear of Alexios’ army and harass it with a continuous shower of arrows. According to the Taktika of Leo, such a unit was called the Hyperkerastoi…or outflanking wing. Such movements and ambushes were traditional practices of the Byzantine army.”161 Nikephoros’ focus in his description of Bryennios’ preparations for battle is the tactical skill

leveraged by his grandfather against Alexios Komnenos. Lilie argues that this type of

characterization by deeds – i.e. fortifying a camp, enforcing military discipline, adopting traditional Byzantine tactics – reinforces an image and characterizes the general described in this fashion as a “good Byzantine general.”162 The details are in some respects unimportant; all

“good generals” fortify their camps and restrain the reckless impulses of their troops, while all

“bad generals” fail to set watches and leave their camps unguarded.

Nikephoros’ description of Alexios Komnenos’ preparations for the Battle of Kalovrye demonstrate many of the same efforts at characterization, albeit with greater nuance.

Komnenos chooses not to fortify his camp; on the surface, this is the hallmark of poor generalship.163 However, Komnenos is consistently portrayed throughout the Hyle as a knowledgeable general who acts deliberately to manipulate his opponent’s reactions. His initial intention – to scout for Bryennios’ forces and engage them in skirmishes – accords well with the

161 Norman Tobias, “The Tactics and Strategy of Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae, 1078,” Etudes Byzantines 6, (1979), 201. 162 Ralph-Johannes Lilie, “Reality and Invention: Reflections on Byzantine Historiography,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 68 (2014), 168. 163 Skylitzes, XI.15; 237.

68 advice provided by Nikephoros Phokas for challenging a numerically superior foe.164

Furthermore, dispensing with fortifying a camp is within the realm of Byzantine military theory, provided the enemy is known to be far off or if the general intends to preserve the strength of his men by sparing them the hard labor of digging trenches.165 Komnenos, aware that he was facing a large and disciplined force led by a competent general, “although his army was inferior to the multitude arrayed against him, planned to outgeneral the enemy by daring, care, and shrewdness” and sought to avoid tiring his men. To ensure that he would not be ambushed, he sent “out scouts, [and] learned that the men around Bryennios were encamped on the plains down by Kedoktos.”166

At this point Nikephoros’ account diverges from that of Michael Attaleiates. While

Nikephoros records that Bryennios managed to capture Komnenos’ scouts, interrogate them, and as a result was well-informed of the disposition of Komnenos’ forces while Alexios himself remained in the dark, Attaleiates describes Komnenos’ Turkish scouts as making a successful night raid against Bryennios’ forces and rattling their morale.167 This tactic is consistent with the

164 “If the enemy force far outnumbers our own both in cavalry and infantry, avoid a general engagement or close combats and strive to injure the enemy with stratagems and ambushes. The time to seek general engagements with the enemy is when, with the help of God, the enemy has fled once, twice, or three times and are crippled and fearful, while on the other hand our host is obviously confident and their thoughts of valor have been awakened.” Phokas, Praecepta, IV.19, 51. Additionally, Michael Attaleiates is full of praise for the tactical skills of Alexios Komnenos, noting he was “young in age but mature in mind and steady of thought, reliable and unbeatable in battles and war, and so loyal and deferential to the emperor that he would not hesitate to take deadly blows on his behalf.” Attaleiates, XXXIV.4; 527. 165 “If there is reason to be wary of the enemy, it is necessary to dig a trench (what we call a chandax) outside the infantry around the whole encampment, but if on the other hand there is no concern about the enemy and the army does not intend to remain for long in the same place, there is no need to tire out the host with this task.” Phokas, Praecepta, V.6; 55. 166 Bryennios, IV.5. 167 “As he was resting the army at a place named Kalovrye, he learned from his scouts that Bryennios and his entire army were approaching, having departed from Messene. He dispatched some Turks at night with orders to appear before the enemy during the day and put fear into them, to rattle them by giving their scouts the impression that they were seeking battle, and in this way to shake the enemy's morale and fill their army with commotion, as it was marching without suspecting that the enemy were nearby. But then they were to turn back without giving battle, unless they should happen

69 goals ascribed to Komnenos by Nikephoros, although Nikephoros credits his grandfather with deflecting the foray. Regardless of the success of the attempt, Komnenos is following established Byzantine military tactics in attempting to disrupt his adversary’s morale.168

Likewise, Komnenos’ decision to personally survey the battlefield while concealing his forces follows the advice presented by Nikephoros Phokas in the De Velitatione.169

Komnenos’ observations of the battlefield encouraged him to conceal a portion of his army in the hollows with the intention of launching a sudden ambush on Bryennios’ approaching army.170 Tactically, this was a sound move and Komnenos was successful in concealing his forces and springing an ambush; however, the ambush does not turn out as planned:

“When Bryennios’ army came through the hollows, Komnenos unveiled the men arrayed against the right wing and ordered them to march against their enemies with violent force. This attack fettered Bryennios’ men as if by snares and many were struck down by this unseen blow. After a short while Bryennios’ men turned toward in retreat, until their leader, John Bryennios, drew his sword and threw down the first of the

upon any detached units, in which case they were to act as circumstance required.” Attaleiates, XXXIV.4, 527. 168 “The general must make it one of his highest priorities and concerns to launch secret and unexpected attacks upon the enemy whenever possible. If he is successful in this sort of operation, with only a small group of men, he will put large numbers of the enemy to flight.” Phokas, De Velitatione, IV; 157. 169 “Finding a good location to conceal himself and his men, he should send out mounted scouts in all directions. When he has obtained information about them and they have been observed riding out and scattering all over, then, while they are disorganized, he should march out after them, and he should have no difficulty in defeating them,” and “The commander of the unit ought to go into a watch post high up and personally observe and look for clouds of dust raised by the enemy and smoke.” Phokas, De Velitatione, VI, 163; VIII, 165. 170 Tobias notes that Alexios’ tactics were in accord with those recommended by Leo: “Alexius laid his plans. As he was inferior in men and his army lacked experience, he resolved to seek victory by what can be described as a strategy of the indirect approach. This is confirmed by both Anna Comnena and the historian Bryennius. The former writes of Alexius' plans: "Because he was on the point of fighting with inexperienced [troops] against seasoned veterans, and with a few against many, he abandoned the idea of making a bold and direct attack, but decided to gain his victory by cunning. Bryennius corroborates this: "For this reason the Domestic of the Schools, inferior in numbers, wished to defeat the enemy, not by daring but by the preparation of a plan and cunning." Alexius was, therefore, continuing a tradition outlined centuries earlier. Note the words of Leo the Wise: "To master the enemy, wisdom and generalship [ i.e., strategy] are preferable to open attack." Tobias, 200. Cf. Leo VI, XX.12; 541.

Athanatoi who was approaching him. His companions (did likewise to) their counterparts and he galvanized his whole phalanx and turned back his rivals.”171 When this stratagem fails, Komnenos’ men begin to flee the field. He despairs of achieving victory through combat, and resolves instead to charge headlong at Bryennios himself to resolve the battle through a personal duel.172 This seemingly desperate tactic has precedent in Phokas’ injunctions in the Praecepta Militaria to prioritize attacks on the enemy commander as the

Achilles’ heel of an opposing army, and has historical precedent in the civil wars of the late tenth century.173

Komnenos is dissuaded from leading a personal charge against Bryennios by his companions; however, he is later able to turn the tide of the battle by capturing Bryennios’ warhorse:

“[Withdrawing back to his own lines] Alexios…sent out the horse with a herald shouting loudly that Bryennios had fallen. This persuaded many of his fleeing men to remain, and some to turn back; for it came to pass that after the Scythians looted Bryennios’ camp and departed no-one was pursuing Alexios’ defeated forces. Alexios Komnenos’ retinue did not flee far, but rather wandered at a loss nearby such that after the Scythians departed, Alexios showed both the horse and the scimitars and announced clearly the capture of Bryennios, and all his men rallied.”174

171 Bryennios, IV.8. Tobias notes that the battleground chosen accords well with the recommendations of Leo’s Taktika. Tobias, 202; Cf. Leo VI, Taktika, XIV.42. Likewise, Leo recommends the use of ambushing forces; “To the extreme left of Alexius' wing, hidden in a hollow, was placed a detachment with the express orders to fall on the insurgents’ right wing. Leo's Taktika calls such a division of troops, the enedroi…the lying-in-wait or ambushing wing.” Tobias, 202. Cf. Leo VI, XII.34; 237. 172 Incidentally, this is exactly the sort of overt direct fighting that Neville claims represents Roman martial virtues and therefore the sort of detail a concerted attack on Alexios’ character would have omitted, were Nikephoros making such an argument. Attaleiates does not include this episode in his account; Anna Komnene does, but may be following Nikephoros’ version in doing so. The plan is tactically sound in the desperate situation Alexios finds himself in; it is also incredibly dramatic and may be an invention of the chronicler. Cf. Lilie, 176. 173 When planning an attack, Phokas recommends that “before all else, to check and see in what place the enemy commander happens to be and aim the triangular formation of kataphraktoi directly at him.” Phokas, Praecepta, IV.12; 47. For an account of personal duels in the civil wars of the tenth century, see also: Skylitzes, XVI.9; 309. 174 Bryennios, IV.9.

Komnenos’ use of stratagem is based on the advice of Leo’s Taktika, itself drawn from

stratagems included in the works of Polyaenus. Leo records this ruse in the following passage:

“Once, during a battle in which the enemy held the advantage, a person made use of falsehood. He cried out: “The enemy general is dead.” This cry was made at a critical moment and did not allow everyone to think quickly about what they had to do. Some of the enemy were at a distance from their own general and some of them despaired, whereas those with the general who had shouted the cry took up courage again, the rumor to be true, and they continued the struggle in excellent spirits. Thus, the man shouted and achieved victory on the strength of a fabricated rumor. By shrewdly taking timely advantage of the situation, a stratagem has frequently out- generaled the adversaries.”175 Several aspects of these passage are striking. First is the use of the verb katastratgew to

describe Komnenos’ ruse. This is precisely the same verb employed by Nikephoros in describing

Komnenos’ plan to overcome his grandfather’s army not through strength and experience, but through cunning. Second, this passage reflects a common trope of the “riderless horse” in

Byzantine battle rhetoric. Lilie argues that this trope is an example of dramatization in Byzantine historiography and questions the reality of such incidents.176 Taken together these factors bring the reality of the events being described into question, as Nikephoros has described an event in the battle that would have been outside the purview of what his grandfather could have known

– it is a description of Alexios Komnenos’ actions and thought process. Furthermore, Nikephoros has employed the exact terminology used in the military manuals – suggesting that he is deliberately evoking the manuals, which his reader would likely have known. He is therefore presenting his subject, Alexios Komnenos, as a particularly knowledgeable and cunning general through his association with the prescribed tactics of the Taktika. Whether the events took

175 Leo VI, Taktika, XIV.97; 345. 176 Nevertheless, he notes that “the claim about the runaway horse can, of course, be true. In decisive battles Byzantine armies would often panic after the death of their commanders and be defeated.” The most famous example of a Byzantine army turned to flight by the supposed death of its commander is the 917 Battle of Anchialous against the Bulgars. Lilie, 179-180. It is perhaps noteworthy that Michael Attaleiates does not record this event, though his account of the battle is brief and generalized; cf. Attaleiates, XXXIV.4-6; 527-531.

72 place as described is secondary; Nikephoros is clearly and deliberately evoking a Byzantine tactical template, rather than a Roman model of generalship.

This is especially significant as it demonstrates Nikephoros’ familiarity with Michael

Attaleiates’ work, which would have been promulgated in the 1080s. Nikephoros Bryennios and

Michael Attaleiates both describe the events of the Battle of Manzikert and are remarkably similar in their accounts of the famous battle.177 Attaleiates, however, is a partisan of

Nikephoros Botaneiates – a man against whom Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder rebelled.178

Consequently, Attaleiates’ accounts of Bryennios are highly critical. In contrast, the Hyle exalts the skill and good qualities of Bryennios the Elder, as Nikephoros seeks to praise his grandfather.

The similarities in the two men’s accounts of the battle highlight areas where they diverge; the most notable is the sequence of events leading to Basilakes’ capture.179 Attaleiates argues that

Bryennios, not Basilakes, was the first to engage the Turks and that it was his request for aid that prompted the Emperor to dispatch Basilakes to support his forces. Bryennios is censured for not supporting Basilakes’ reckless charge against the Turks.180 In Nikephoros’ account, it could be

177 Cf. Attaleiates’ account of the fall of Romanos IV Diogenes with that of Bryennios; Bryennios, I.17; Attaleiates, XX.25, 297. Both describe the Emperor’s last-ditch efforts, surrounded by Turks; both ascribe his defeat to an injury of the hand and the fall of his horse. The wording is similar enough to suggest the two men shared a common source, or that Bryennios used Attaleiates’ account as his source. 178 Krallis describes the History of Attaleiates as a search for the man who could best engineer a Byzantine restoration and stem the tide of barbarian invasions; “this agonizing search is reflected in the History, a narrative of the imperial decline of his times, which he eventually dedicated to Nikephoros III Botaneiates, the elderly general who toppled Michael VII.” Krallis, ix. 179 This largely follows the rhetorical pattern that Attaleiates’ himself employs in subverting the work of Michael Psellos and exalting Romanos IV Diogenes. Attaleiates “held both Michael VII and Psellos, his apologist, responsible for the blinding of Diogenes. As a consequence, his use of the Chronographia changes after the reign of Constantine X Doukas. He no longer sympathetically nods at Psellos’ narrative, but rather consciously subverts it.” Krallis, “Attaleiates,” 171. 180 “As the battle was heating up, the emperor also dispatched the magistros Basilakes, the katepan of Theodosioupolis, with some local soldiers, since the others were with Tarchaneiotes at Chliat. He joined Bryennios and, for a while, took part in the skirmishing. When the soldiers agreed to follow along behind him, he promised to lead them personally in the fighting and immediately led the charge. The enemy turned their backs and he pursued. Bryennios followed along in pursuit with the bulk of the army but then he gave the signal to his men to rein in and turn back. Basilakes, however, was not aware of this and so he was left to keep up a mad pursuit for a long distance but only with the men under his

73 argued that Bryennios’ decision not to charge the Turks represented sound tactical judgement and that Basilakes’ decision to charge alone was reckless; however, Attaleiates seems to be implying instead that Bryennios’ decision not to support his comrade led directly to Basilakes’ capture by the Turks. This is made especially damning as Basilakes had ridden out in support of

Bryennios’ beleaguered position and is in effect rescuing him; Bryennios is then portrayed as coldly allowing Basilakes to fail and as abandoning his men.181 Nikephoros’ account is radically different and highlights Bryennios’ tactical good sense – arguably still on display in Attaleiates’ account but suppressed by Attaleiates’ sequencing of events – as well as his personal bravery and commitment to preventing Byzantine losses on the field.182

Nikephoros’ account of the critical moment of the Battle of Manzikert – in which

Romanos Diogenes orders a withdrawal and is abandoned by Andronikos Doukas’ rear-guard – provides a suggestive narrative in which Nikephoros argues that Bryennios was unable to come to Romanos’ aid because the rear-guard withdrew. The absence of the rear-guard allowed the

Turks to surround the left flank, which was commanded by Bryennios, preventing him from protecting the emperor.183 While Attaleiates does not provide any details beyond the failure of

immediate command. As they came to the enemy camp, Basilakes’ horse was wounded and he fell to the ground, dragged down by the weight of his armor. The enemy surrounded him and took him alive.” Attaleiates, XX.16, 283. 181 However, Byzantine military manuals expressly discouraged attacking horse archers with melee troops; Nikephoros Phokas advises that “the Arabitai will encircle our four-sided formation in a swarm, as they usually do, confident in their horses. There is no need for the cavalry to head off in pursuit of them because of the speed of their horses, for when pursued they are not overtaken and, aided by the speed of their horses, they quickly counterattack and strike against our men. It does no good at all to go chasing after them,” and again “If the enemy brings along a great many Arabitai and they attempt to surround our units, it is necessary to make the order clear to the host that they are not to go chasing after them at all, but should fend them off with arrows from the archers to drive them away.” Phokas, Praecepta, II.10, 29; IV.17, 49. 182 It is significant that Nikephoros chooses to portray his grandfather employing solid Byzantine tactics, recommended in the military manuals. Good generalship meant following the manuals and fighting with discipline. 183 “Straightaway the men of the rearguard withdrew and the Turks, encircling the Emperor, struck from all directions. And the Turks prevented the left flank from charging to his aid; for the Turks coming against the rear of the army circled about and compelled that force to flee.” Bryennios, I.17.

the rear-guard to remain on the field, Nikephoros seems to be reacting to a charge that

Bryennios abandoned his fellow soldiers, either at the Battle of Manzikert proper or in the skirmishes that led up to Manzikert. It is impossible, however, to determine which account to trust; we can only be sure that Nikephoros was seeking to restore his grandfather’s reputation, which had been sullied by at least one contemporary chronicler.

Nikephoros and Attaleiates likewise describe the rebellion of Nikephoros Bryennios the

Elder in radically different ways. For Attaleiates, the rebellion was a personal affront to the magnanimity of Nikephoros III Botaneiates. He casts Bryennios as motivated chiefly by pride, recording that Bryennios rejected Botaneiates’ offer of the rank of Kaisar, and painting this portrait of him:

“[Bryennios was] stubborn, immovable, and arrogant, and would not renounce the imperial position, sending many threatening and soul-wrenching letters in return, since he wanted to settle the dispute through the spilling of Christian blood. For he preferred to make for himself imperial regalia of human flesh and to shake the whole of creation to its foundations rather than appear to be in second place after this most noble and most brave emperor. He prepared arms and made ready for battle, storing up harsh rewards for the citizens, and thought to overturn the entirety of the Roman world in a barbaric fashion.”184 The rank of Kaisar ranked second to that of Emperor and served as the heir apparent in the

absence of imperial children. Botaneiates was elderly and had no children, thus making this

offer essentially a deferred promotion to the throne. Attaleiates is at pains to make Bryennios’

reply to this offer unreasonable, as he is working to portray Bryennios in exactly the terms

Neville describes: “As the leader of a damaging and costly revolt in a time of deep crisis for the

Empire, Bryennios could have gone down as one of the chief villains of Byzantine history.”185 It is

184 Attaleiates, XXXIV.1, 521. 185 Neville, Heroes, 121.

exactly this characterization of his grandfather that Nikephoros is working diligently to counter

in the Hyle.

The task of suppressing this damaging and costly revolt fell to Alexios Komnenos. Neville

argues that Nikephoros deliberately portrays Komnenos as an underhanded, unmanly, and un-

Roman commander and denigrates his character. However, this characterization hinges upon a

reading of the Hyle based on outdated Roman concepts of martial virtue, which the Byzantines

simply did not employ in this period. Byzantine chroniclers were not impressed by bold and

reckless charges devoid of tactical finesse; hence Basilakes is relegated to the status of a

bumbling secondary character in the Hyle. Examples of this tendency in other chronicles have been explored above. Instead, a close reading of the Hyle demonstrates that Nikephoros – like

Leo the Deacon, John Skylitzes, and Michael Attaleiates before him – was aware of the precepts of Byzantine military theory and that he portrays generals he wishes to cast in a positive light as adherents of established Byzantine military traditions.

An overriding feature of Byzantine histories from this period is the degree to which each of the later authors of this period seems to be directly responding to the critiques of his predecessor. Michael Attaleiates, therefore, sets out to ‘set the record straight’ about the

Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes, who had been slandered by Michael Psellos as a reckless and arrogant general. Attaleiates points out that Romanos was betrayed by Psellos’ patrons, the

Doukai, at Manzikert and likely would have won a fair fight against the Turks. However,

Attaleiates, as a devotee of Nikephoros III Botaneiates, is obliged to criticize the conduct of

Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder. As Bryennios rose in rebellion against both Michael VIII Doukas and his successor Nikephoros III Botaneiates, Attaleiates must tarnish the military reputation of his patron’s adversary. Bryennios is thus cast as overly timid – to the point of cowardice at

Manzikert – yet brash and arrogant enough to claim the throne and undertake fratricidal strife to sit upon it.

Conclusions

When Nikephoros Bryennios the Younger began composing the Hyle Historias, he set

out with the objective of restoring the reputation of his grandfather, Nikephoros Bryennios the

Elder, and of exalting the house of his patron, his mother-in-law Eirene Doukaina. As a result, the Hyle Historias is written with a clearly discernible bias. However, this is not at all unusual of

Byzantine chronicles; Attaleiates’ History and Psellos’ Chronographia, works which overlap with the Hyle, are similarly biased. As I have demonstrated above, Nikephoros utilized a familiar constellation of good qualities that formed a well-established template to describe those he respected and sought to aggrandize, a template forged in the recommendations of the military manuals. Whether these recommendations were followed on the battlefield or not is irrelevant: the military manuals provide paradigms for the expected behaviors of a general, both on and off the field of battle. The military manuals circulated widely enough that the language used to describe good generals and the tactics they were expected to employ permeated Byzantine written culture. Thus chroniclers began to describe battles in the same terms and with generals employing the same tactics that are recommended in the military manuals – either an instance of praxis following theory very closely, or of description following theory very closely. Which is irrelevant – we can deduce that Nikephoros sought to utilize this well-known and oft-used method of description to place his grandfather firmly in the ranks of the “good generals” by utilizing the language and rhetorical devices familiar within the genre and ultimately originating in the military manuals.

One of the most striking features of the Hyle is the dissonance between the portrayal of

Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder in this work and Bryennios’ portrayal in the History of Michael

Attaleiates. The skirmishes leading up to the Battle of Manzikert in particular demonstrate the

dangers of blindly trusting either chronicle: both are biased, and both present a different

sequence of events which either damn or exonerate the conduct of Bryennios the Elder. The

treatment of the Battle of Kalovrye in the Hyle is more nuanced: Nikephoros expands considerably on the details glossed over in Attaleiates’ account, emphasizing the close struggle involved and how close his grandfather came to victory.

Nikephoros’ treatment of Alexios Komnenos mimics Bryennios’ characterization of his grandfather; the Hyle consistently presents Komnenos’ exploits in a very positive light and praises his cunning. From a narrative perspective this is necessary: the Battle of Kalovrye becomes a dramatic conclusion to a building conflict in which the good qualities of each commander are on full display. The action is presented in alternating sequences that highlight the drama of what was likely not a particularly closely contested battle: Michael Attaleiates’ account emphasizes the deliberate deployment of Turkish mercenaries by Alexios Komnenos in a planned ambush, a tactic which decided the outcome of the engagement and which

Nikephoros attempts to suppress as a chance event and stroke of unexpected good fortune for

Komnenos. Yet it is essential for Nikephoros’ narrative that the contest be as closely fought as possible: if Alexios Komnenos was the best general of the age and was nearly beaten by

Bryennios the Elder, then ipso facto Bryennios the Elder must have been a talented general.

Was Alexios Komnenos the best general of his age? He certainly defeated every opponent he campaigned against. Michael Attaleiates History glosses over many of Komnenos’ deeds, attempting instead to highlight the generalship of Attaleiates’ patron Nikephoros

Botaneiates. Yet the evidence of Komnenos’ success is still present even in Attaleiates’ slanted account in the promotions that accrue to the young general and the consistency with which he is deployed against the enemies of two different emperors. Furthermore, if we discount

Nikephoros’ version of the Battle of Kalovrye, Komnenos’ tactics are as strikingly consistent in

his approach to various enemies as they are successful. Regardless, the Hyle Historias is

consistent in portraying the deeds of Alexios Komnenos and Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder in the highest terms of praise possible. Both men are presented as consummate tacticians who are keenly aware of the expectations of Byzantine military science as it is presented in the military manuals. Nikephoros carefully constructs a resume of military competence for both men, even in failure – Bryennios the Elder comes across as a cautious and disciplined commander even in the debacle of Manzikert, in stark contrast to Attaleiates’ caricature of him, while Alexios

Komnenos simply travels from one impressive victory against long odds to another. The Hyle

Historias, then, represents a skillful piece of rhetoric designed to exalt both Nikephoros

Bryennios the Elder and Alexios Komnenos as the two best generals of their age and serves as a lament for the lost greatness of the former and panegyric for the talent of the latter.

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

Anna Komnene. Alexias. Trans. ERA Sewter, The Alexiad. London: Penguin Classics, 2009.

Anonymous, Sylloge Tacticorum, Trans. Georgios Chatzelis and Jonathan Harris, A Tenth-Century Byzantine Military Manual: The Sylloge Tacticorum. New York: Routledge, 2017.

John Skylitzes, Synopsis Historiarum, Trans. John Wortley, John Skylitzes: A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811-1057. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Leo the Deacon, History, Trans. A. M. Talbot & D.F. Sullivan, The History of Leo the Deacon: Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2005.

Leo VI “the Wise,” Taktika, Trans. George Dennis, The Taktika of Leo VI. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2010.

Maurice, Strategikon, Trans. George T. Dennis, Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984.

Michael Attaleiates, History, Trans. Anthony Kaldellis & Dimitris Krallis, The History. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2012.

Michael Psellos, Chronographia, Trans. ERA Sewter, Michael Psellos: Fourteen Byzantine Rulers. London: Penguin Classics, 1979.

Nikephoros Bryennios. Materials for a History. Trans. P. Gautier, Nicephori Bryennii, Historiarum Libri Quattuor. Brussels: Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, 1975.

Nikephoros Ouranos. Taktika. Trans. Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2008

Nikephoros Phokas, De Velitatione, Trans. George Dennis, Three Byzantine Military Treatises. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2009.

Nikephoros Phokas, Praecepta Militaria, Trans. Eric McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2008.

Theophanes, Chronographia, trans. Harry Turtledove, The Chronicle of Theophanes: Anni Mundi 6095-6305 (A.D. 602-813). University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982.

Secondary Sources:

Alexopoulos, Theocharis. “Using Ancient Military Handbooks to fight Medieval Battles: Two stratagems used by Alexios I Comnenos against the Normans and the Pechenegs.” Eoa kai Esperia 8, (2012): 47-71.

Chatzellis, Georgios. Byzantine Military Manuals as Literary Works and Practical Handbooks: The Case of the Tenth-Century Sylloge Tacticorum. Routledge, 2019. Kindle Edition.

Cheynet, Jean-Claude. The Byzantine Aristocracy and its Military Function, Routledge: Variorum Collected Studies Series, 2006.

Haldon, John. A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2014.

Haldon, John. The Byzantine Wars. Arcadia Publishing, 2001.

Holmes, Catherine. Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976 – 1025). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Holmes, Catherine. “Byzantine Political Culture and Compilation Literature in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries: Some Preliminary Inquiries.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 64 (2010). 55-80.

Kaegi, Walter Emil. Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy. Brookline, Mass.: Hellenic College Press, 1983.

Kazhdan, A. P. and Epstein, Ann Wharton. Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries. University of California Press, 1985.

Krallis, Dimitris. “Attaleiates as a Reader of Psellos,” in Reading Michael Psellos, ed. Charles Barber and David Jenkins. Brill, 2006. 167-192.

Krallis, Dimitris. Michael Attaleiates and the Politics of Imperial Decline in Eleventh-Century Byzantium. Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2012.

Lilie, Ralph-Johannes. “Reality and Invention: Reflections on Byzantine Historiography.” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 68 (2014): 157-210.

Luttwak, Edward. The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.

Magdalino, Paul. “The Pen of the Aunt: Echoes of the Mid-Twelfth Century in the Alexiad.” Anna Komnene and Her Times. Ed. Thalia Gouma-Peterson. Garland Publishing, Inc. 2000: 15 – 44.

Magdalino, Paul. “Honour among Romaioi: the framework of social values in the world of Digenes Akrites and Kekaumenos.” Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 13, no. 1 (1989): 183-218.

McGeer, Eric. “Military Texts,” In The Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies, edited by Robin Cormack, John Haldon, and Elizabeth Jeffreys, 907 – 914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

McGeer, Eric. Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century. Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, 2008.

McGeer, Eric. The Land Legislation of the Macedonian Emperors. Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2000.

McGrath, Stamatina. “The Battles of Dorostolon (971): Rhetoric and Reality,” In T. Miller & J. Nesbitt, War and Peace in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis, Washington D.C.: S.J., 1995.

McLeod, W., “The Bow at Night: An Inappropriate Weapon?,” Phoenix, 42 no. 2, (Summer, 1988): 121-125.

Nakada, Kosuke. “The Taktika of Leo VI and the Byzantine Eastern Frontier During the Ninth and Tenth Centuries,” Spicelegium, (2017).

Neville, Leonora. Guide to Byzantine Historical Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Neville, Leonora. Heroes and Romans in Twelfth-Century Byzantium: The Material for History of Nikephoros Bryennios. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Roueche, C.M. “Byzantine Writers and Readers: Storytelling in the Eleventh Century.” In R. Beaton, The Greek Novel, AD 1 – 1985, Routledge, 1988. 123 – 133.

Runciman, Steven. The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus & His Reign: A Study of Tenth-Century Byzantium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Sinclair, Kyle James. “War Writing in Middle Byzantine Historiography: Sources, Influences and Trends.” (PhD Dissertation, University of Birmingham, 2012).

Sinclair, Kyle. “Some Observations on Biographical Compositions and Egodocuments of the Middle Byzantine Military Aristocracy (c.900 -c.1200).” Lecture, Medieval Reading Group, King’s College London, May 2012.

Stankovic, Vlada. “Nikephoros Bryennios, Anna Komnene and Konstantios Doukas. A Story About Different Perspectives.” Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Vol. 100 No. 1 (Jan. 2007): 169 – 175.

Stephenson, Paul. “About the Emperor Nikephoros and How He Leaves His Bones in Bulgaria": A Context for the Controversial "Chronicle of 811," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 60, (2006): 87-109.

Sullivan, Denis. “Byzantine Military Manuals: Prescriptions, practice, and pedagogy,” In The Byzantine World, edited by Paul Stephenson, 149 – 161 (New York: Routledge, 2010).

Tobias, Norman. “The Tactics and Strategy of Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae, 1078,” Etudes Byzantines 6, (1979), 193-211.

Tougher, Shaun. The Reign of Leo VI (886 – 912): Politics & People. Brill, 1997.

Trombley, Frank. “The Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos and Military Encyclopaedism.” In Pre- modern Encyclopaedic Texts: Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996. 261-274.

Appendix A: Translated materials

The Battle of Manzikert: Book I.14

(In the previous passage, a military council has just decided to march against the Turks).

After this had come to pass, Basilakes set out to meet the enemy at Manzikert commanding a not-insubstantial army of Syrian and Armenian troops. Basilakes – as he was strong, noble- handed, daring, hard-to-restrain, and willing to flatter the Emperor – declared that nothing sound had been debated in the council. After all, the Vestarches Leo Diabatenos had sent letters to the Emperor which said that the Sultan, upon learning of the Emperor’s march east and in fear of the Byzantine army, had abandoned the land of Persia and departed for Babylon. The

Emperor was persuaded by Basilakes’ words and decided to split the army into two divisions. He held back one portion of the army for himself and sent forth the other against the city of Chliat, appointing the Magister Joseph Tarchaneiotes to command this force. Tarchaneiotes, a man who was terrifying for his cunning plans and stratagems, was completely unwilling to go and instead urged the Emperor to hold back the army. Tarchaneiotes was unable to persuade the

Emperor, however, and thus he received the soldiers sent to him by the Emperor and pressed on towards Chliat. The city of Chliat remained under Turkish control, however, with a citadel full of Turkish soldiers. For three days the Turks harried the men sent out to forage for grain, slaying some and taking others prisoner. On account of this a messenger was sent to the Emperor and

Basilakes was recalled straightaway. The Emperor dispatched Basilakes against the Turks so that he might know who these men were and where they had come from. Basilakes, with his habitual daring, threatened to bring the men of Chliat to destruction. Thus, the Sultan’s movements went unnoticed by the Emperor; the Sultan was managing his campaign well and was not far from the imperial camp. The Sultan sought to lead the Emperor into the plains

nearby and draw the Byzantines into a trap, so he sent forth raiders who ran ahead of the main

army. These men ran up to the very ramparts of the Byzantine camp, breaking off and

pretending to flee just before reaching the camp. By this tactic the Turks had often ensnared

generals. The first commander to fall into their trap that day was Basilakes. This man was

convinced that the Turkish army was not there and that the men attacking the camp were not

the vanguard of the main Turkish army, but rather natives of Chliat. He demanded that they

surrender, and he and his men departed from the imperial camp. Basilakes drew his sword and

spurred his horse, charging carelessly. His men followed around him without any formation, but

each man where he happened to be. Basilakes was unconcerned by the irregular formation of

his men and the Turks, perceiving this, pretended to flee; but when the Turks saw that the

Byzantines had marched away from their camp, they wheeled about and struck the scattered

Byzantine forces. The Turks prevailed over the scattered Byzantines and many Byzantine fell and

after a short while not even a messenger, as the saying goes, was spared from this misfortune.

And thus Basilakes was captured.

Book I.15

When it was reported to the Emperor that Basilakes was recklessly departing from the camp against the enemy he struck camp. He recalled Bryennios, the Domestic of the West, who was at that time commanding the right flank, and he sent Bryennios forth with the forces under his command ordering them to make haste, so that if anything terrible had happened to

Basilakes Bryennios might come to his aid and deliver him relief; for already the Emperor began suppose that Basilakes had come to some evil. Bryennios therefore departed and led out his forces from the camp. After he departed he saw no-one, friend or foe, and he began making haste towards the place where Basilakes had been fighting. Bryennios saw that the enemy had already formed ranks upon the hills; and so after a short while he encountered corpses and

wounded men and was at a loss as to when Basilakes had been there. Happening upon a soldier who still alive, Bryennios asked where Basilakes might be and what great and terrible things had happened there. And while the soldier reported back what had occurred, the Turks began arriving from everywhere and attempted to encircle the formation. Perceiving this, Bryennios

called on his soldiers to prove their worth, struggle bravely, and be good Romans. Then, turning the formation so that he was advancing with good order toward the camp, Bryennios ignored the attackers. Thus when he had come near to the camp, he took up a portion of the phalanx and, commanding the others to wait, he turned against the men pursuing him suddenly and easily scattered them. And when Bryennios saw the remaining men regrouping, he turned back toward his own formation killing many of the enemy as he went. While the Turks were running after him and circling around him, he wounded them with his spear against their chests, while arrows rained against the backs of the retreating Romans. Bryennios, struggling heroically, brought his men safely home and reached the camp with his formation intact. He then set off toward the Emperor, relating the things which had occurred. The Emperor commanded that he be brought to his tent and that his wounds be treated, and for Bryennios to remain in his tent.

Book I.16

And with the day just then smiling and the sun rising over the horizon, Bryennios was called back again by the ruler and he departed immediately, disregarding his wounds. As council was advanced either to fight or to hold back the army, one the one hand he judged, too shrewdly for them, that it was best to remain in the camp while the forces from Chliat were sent for, while on the other hand the opposite was said by the flatterers. Yet whether they truly thought thus, I cannot say; for a time it seemed that even worse plans would prevail again.

Therefore it came to pass that the army was to march out. And the Turks again overcame the

Romans and came upon them with the greater part (in) hand-to-hand combat; and while the

Turks attacked these men and, battle being joined, many of the Turks fell, nevertheless more of

the Romans fell; and Bryennios himself, being wounded in many places, nevertheless being

clever regarding stratagems he brought through danger the majority of his phalanx unharmed,

and the Emperor, seeing the Turks pursuing him, himself marched out the army so that they

stood prepared for war before the camp; and Alyates led the right flank, a Cappadocian man and

relative of the Emperor, while Bryennios himself led the left, and the Emperor held the middle;

and the son of the Caesar, the Proedros Andronikos, was arrayed to lead the rear-guard, having squadrons of household followers and archons/nobles, and himself being a man both noble of origin and clothed in all good things; for he was more endowed with prudence than all others and more manly than any other, and he was practiced in the best military drills, yet he did not hold much love toward the Emperor.

Book I.17

And the Turks, seeing the Emperor preparing his army, remained arranged neither by phalanx nor by lance – for they did not want to come into melee with the Romans; but the

Sultan, standing ahead, stood prepared for war, and the command (great things) were held by a certain eunuch, whose name was Taranges, from the Sultan and, transferring the majority of the army he appointed that man Lord of War. Dividing the army into many formations he both set ambushes and arranged his army, organizing snares and placing the men around the formations of the Romans so that they might be assailed with arrows from everywhere. And the Romans, their horses being struck, were compelled to follow and while they followed, they thought to flee; and falling foul of the ambushes and snares they came to great harm. And the Emperor, wanting to take upon himself the danger looming over all, advanced step-by-step expecting to find a phalanx of Turks and to break it into pieces and thus the course of the war would be decided, yet the Turks scattered everywhere; until, turning back with a violent charge and a

88 shout, advancing against the Romans they turned the right flank. Straightaway the men of the rearguard withdrew and the Turks, encircling the Emperor, struck from all directions. And the

Turks prevented the left flank from charging to his aid; for the Turks coming against the rear of the army circled about and compelled that force to flee. And the Emperor, being forsaken of aid and altogether abandoned, bared his sword against and let loose against his many enemies and slew many, and he compelled them to flee for a time; but being encircled by a multitude of enemies, his hand was wounded, and this being understood by his attackers he was beset from everywhere within a circle, and as his horse was shot by arrows and fell, throwing down itself and the fighting man atop it, and the Emperor of the Romans became a captive in that manner and was brought before the Sultan as a prisoner, and I know not with what words this bit of

Divine Providence was related. And the Sultan captured not a few of the remaining division of household troops; and the men made short work of the remainder with their sabers, while some

Romans made their way safely through; and the Sultan captured both the whole camp and the

Imperial tent, and both the goods and Imperial insignia, in which was even that most well- known pearl, which was left and orphan. And the men who came safely through the battle dispersed to any land other than that one, making sufficient haste to abandon their own country.

Alexios vs. Roussel Book II.20

Alexios therefore gladly accepted the Emperor’s opinions. His mother, however, hearing

news of these events…said that Alexios did not lack the vigor of mind or body for the campaign against Roussel, and that he was a brave man who knew many things and could achieve much.

Yet while she was saying this, the Emperor invoked an obligation, persuading her that Alexios would depart being furnished with her own prayers, but neither taking money from the Emperor to cover the expense of the war nor an army sufficient for the task. Alexios crossed into

Paphlagonia via the Pontus and came to the city of Amaseia. Arriving there, Alexios found a handful of Alans who had escaped death – a company 150 strong – and with this force he repelled the enemy many times, attacking and then withdrawing before the enemy. As a result he reined in the attacks of the Latins. Afterwards he no longer just watched over their inroads but neared the fortresses which were being held fast by Roussel and placed ambushes them.

Alexios sent forth some men to plunder the majority of the forts; when the enemy marched forth and pursued his men, Alexios himself rode out from ambush and seized the men carrying provisions into the forts by the roads and trapped the men pursuing from returning by the roads to the forts. As a result of his efforts all but a few were taken prisoner, so that the men carrying provisions to the forts by the roads were scattered. Over time Alexios led the barbarian Roussel into shortage; for he, having a battle-ready force, wanted the matter against him settled with one battle, while Alexios the Stratopedarches, because he lacked a strong force, made haste to outgeneral the barbarian. Whenever Roussel gathered his own army, Alexios feigned quietude, but after a few days he would go out secretly and set up traps not far from Roussel. Alexios frequently laid ambushes and captured the men supplying Roussel’s army with necessities. As

these things were announced to Roussel, soldiers were sent out from there to give aid, but they fell into snares and ambushes and all but a few were taken wholly by traps and carried off, for…

Nikephoros Bryennios’ Illyrian Campaign Book III.3

When Bryennios arrived, the Emperor Michael transferred the watch to him as he wanted Bryennios to be assigned as Dux of all the Bulgarian lands so that through him he might repulse the Slavs who were gaining dominion there. When Bryennios came into Bulgaria, in a short span of time he humbled the Slavic people and brought them to such a state that he made them subject to the Roman yoke once more and…he mastered the country. And since the Croats and Diocleians were evilly abusing Illyria and the Franks were gaining dominion over Italia and

Sicily and planning dreadful things against the Romans, the Emperor Michael wanted to transfer

Bryennios from Bulgaria to Dyrrachium, which is the mother-city of Illyrikon. Therefore he sent letters to Bryennios straightaway, not commanding but rather requesting that he transfer himself to Illyricum. Bryennios came to Dyrrachium and the natives gladly welcomed him; for he was a most charming and liberal man. After spending a short time there preparing for war, he campaigned against the Diocleians and Croatians. Bryennios set up camps around the most fortified places of those people and made haste to subdue their difficult lands. He armed soldiers before he crossed the passes – for the army feared the hard-to-reach places in which to be routed – and he ordered the natives carrying long-axes to follow from the rear hewing down obstacles and clearing the roads. When this had been done, the soldiers eagerly advanced against the enemy. They descended to the place where the army facing them was located and struck against them. Though the battle was intense, Bryennios triumphed by strength. He bound all the cities he had subdued by treaty to the Romans – just as they had been formerly – and both taking pledges and leaving a sufficient garrison over each place he returned to Dyrrachium.

Meanwhile, since pirate ships were being sent from Italy destroying merchant ships and

behaving evilly, Bryennios posted a watch to repel their inroads. To ensure that he could repel the pirates’ assault quickly, he equipped triremes against them. After sinking many of the pirate vessels and capturing not a few, the remaining pirates cowered and shortened sails in Italy.

Alexios vs. John Bryennios Book III.13

The Emperor set up a watch of the walls by the Chersonese, installing Constantine the

Porphyrogennitos and Alexios Komnenos as commanders. The two men compelled some of the new recruits whom they chanced to meet to go up onto the walls. They also outfitted their own retainers and kept watch, patrolling the city. On one of the hours that Alexios Komnenos was keeping watch he spotted men departing from Bryennios’ camp on a foraging expedition. When these men were coming back again to their camp, Alexios gathered a few men as a retinue and threw open the gates. Alexios and his party marched out and attacked the foraging party; they captured twenty men and before the others knew of the deed they brought their captives back with them into the city. At once the virtue of Alexios was much spoken of by all men.

Constantine was pricked by envy, so much so that he reviled Alexios even to his face, and held that man not to be a companion in their work. Nevertheless the Emperor wondered at Alexios’ deeds and openly expressed his gratitude to him. The Caesar, discovering that the author of that deed was Komnenos, sought to arrange a marriage alliance between Komnenos and his granddaughter. He sough to create a bond of friendship through this marriage and he brought this about swiftly, for the city was released from siege. Such were events in this place.

Alexios’ advice to Michael VIII Book III.19

And that man, departing from them sent a letter concerning himself to the conspirators, making known to them that, if indeed he should be captured, it would not be possible to bear being a whipping boy or to endure punishments of torturers, and that he would point out his companions. “And he took care to plan keenly for you, it is said, concerning what comes to pass.” As a result the man saying these things was led away to the Logothete and he made known everything which he knew; and the Logothete brought all these things to the Emperor.

Alexios Komnenos, being present, encountered the Emperor and was asked to provide his opinion. Alexios contributed his best council, saying that it was necessary that soldiers be sent out to arrest the men leading the plot. And while this plan seemed best to the Caesar and the

Logothete, it was not acceptable to the Emperor; for already the hour was late, and it seemed that tumult and disorder had begun in the city. Then, at least, with this forethought they ignored the opinion of the Emperor and they guarded into the morning the areas disclosed by the man taken captive. All the men supporting Michael’s rule gathered at first light in the Church of the

Wisdom of God. They opened the prisons in the city and equipped the condemned, so as to have a force sufficiently loyal and servile, and warned the men holding office who were not involved in the plot of the conspirators threatening to burn their houses if they should not gather beside them but instead make common cause with the rebellion. Bringing together the men living there he wrote letters thus: “The most holy Patriarchs, Synod, and council call you together around this place, the Church of the Wisdom of God.” And they came – some willingly, some unwillingly.

Book III.20

After these events had been announced to the Emperor, Alexios Komnenos was sent for

and the Emperor asked him (again) what ought to be done concerning the revolution. And

Alexios offered exceedingly good and useful advice: for he said that the greater part of the multitude gathered were unwarlike and would not be able to wait in ambush for soldiers approaching well-equipped and prepared for battle; “Therefore it is necessary to send out the

Varangians (axe-wielding guards of the Emperor) with a general.” And the Emperor, hearing these things being said, turned aside his advice. Michael was either gripped by fear or by the highest excess of virtue, having endured the things which had already come to pass, I know not which. Meanwhile, at least…. … and so, the Emperor was unwilling.

Book III.21

Komnenos beseeched him again and urged him in every possible way to act, until he had listened to the Emperor jeering at Komnenos’ cruelty against him. In the end the Emperor said these things to Komnenos: “My aim was long ago to be removed from the imperial power; which indeed I am about to be and willingly so, unless providence has reckoned itself unwilling, and gladly I will depart; and you, should you wish it, should establish my brother Constantine in my place.” The Emperor said these things and sought to bind Komnenos by oath the arrangements which he had written and ratified with his seal. Straightaway he marked the letters with his seal, in an offhand way, and the Emperor then went back to the Church of the

Mother of God in Blachernae. Meanwhile Komnenos took up the letters and went to

Constantine. The two men invoked the imperial power Michael had cast aside to follow toward imperial things; yet Constantine, casting this power aside, halted a little with youthful words and knew that everything would turn out nobly if Botaneiates should become empowered with both scepters. Consequently, Constantine crossed the Strait of the Pontus toward Botaneiates to await that worthy man…

Alexios vs. Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder Book IV.5

Alexios Komnenos joined with the others who were departing and encamped beside a river - which I do not know how it was named from the beginning on account of the majority of the names of places being changed. This river had flowed down from the Thracian Mountains up to this time and is called the Halmyros by the locals. There was also a fort built on a nearby crest; the name of this place was Kalovrye. Arriving in that place Alexios made camp. He neither dug a trench nor placed stakes, for he wanted to watch over the approach of the enemy himself and to steal the victory if it were possible, for he was about to do battle with a few men against many generals both brave and highly experienced, of whom nevertheless Bryennios reigned like the sun over the stars. On account of this the Domestic of the Schools (Alexios), although his army was inferior to the multitude arrayed against him, planned to outgeneral the enemy by daring, care, and shrewdness. He dispatched scouts and learned that the men with Bryennios were encamped on the plains down by Kedoktos.

Book IV.6

Meanwhile, Bryennios spent the evening in the Church of the Mother of the Word of

God and attended to the likely things, since he had learned that his rivals were encamped around Kalovrye. He learned this because some of the Turks in Komnenos’ army had marched out at night toward Bryennios’ army to spy on him and had fallen in with his scouts. The Turks were captured and being vexed (tortured) confessed all. Rising at dawn, Bryennios ordered his entire army to be armed and ready. He arranged his forces by companies in this formation: The

Kouropalates John, a kinsman of Bryennios, commanded the right wing, a man whom Bryennios made Domestic of the Schools. The men who filled out this phalanx were both the Franks who accompanied Maniakes from Italy and many of the horsemen from Thessaly. They were not the

smallest division of the picked men from his companions, altogether not being less than five

thousand men. And the right wing was arranged like so. Katakalon Tarchaneiotes commanded the left wing, a man honored for his way of life, sound reason, and practiced generalship, and this phalanx was filled out by divisions of Macedonians and Thracians, being reckoned at three thousand men. And Bryennios himself commanded the center of the formation, in which he arranged the guard and all the (remaining) Thracians, Macedonians, and so many of the picked horse of the Thessalians. And beyond the left wing he placed the allied Scythian contingent, marching ahead at an interval of two stades. Bryennios arranged the army thus, stretching the phalanx out to its full length. He exhorted them that, should the enemy appear and the horn should sound the battle, that the Scythian contingent might make an attempt upon both sides of the opposing force with a clamor and a shout and come against the rear of the enemy. And thus he instructed his commanders.

Book IV.7

When Alexios Komnenos learned through his scouts that the enemy was already approaching, he concealed his whole army in the hollows and, going up onto a crest, surveyed the doings of Bryennios’ men. When he saw how many men were arrayed against them he considered whether or not his men might send the enemy into flight, and he considered what would be the best plan for him to employ. It was at the same time the worst – that he might conceal the enemy from his army. But he was afraid to engage in battle on that day contrary to the judgment of the Emperor; for it is said that on the evening before this letters were sent to him from the Emperor commanding him not to wage war, but rather to await the coming of an allied contingent already sent from the Turks. Nevertheless, battle could not wait for war was indeed nigh at hand, with Bryennios’ forces already coming onto the field. To withdraw without a fight seemed unworthy to Alexios; therefore he decided that his options were either to

conquer, to die fighting, or both sordidly and unmanfully to stand back on account of his fear of

the Emperor. When he surveyed the land and he saw it spreading out with convenient crests and valleys, from which he might be able to keep hidden from Bryennios’ phalanx, he planned to appear (suddenly) in ambush. Thus he equipped the army and divided it into two divisions. He himself commanded the Athanatoi and Franks, while he established Constantine Katakalon in command of the Chomatenes and the Turks, whom he deployed to face the phalanx of the

Scythians.

Book IV.8

When Bryennios’ army came through the hollows, Komnenos unveiled the men arrayed against the right wing and ordered them to march against their enemies with violent force. This attack fettered Bryennios’ men as if by snares and many were struck down by this unseen blow.

After a short while Bryennios’ men turned toward in retreat, until their leader, John Bryennios, drew his sword and threw down the first of the Athanatoi who was approaching him. His companions (did likewise to) their counterparts and he galvanized his whole phalanx and turned back his rivals. The Athanatoi all fled from that place; and Alexios Komnenos, coming around behind the enemy and expecting the men to come to grips with his own phalanx, struggled valiantly and threw down the men he chanced upon. And since he saw that his own phalanx had turned to flight, he encouraged his own men – for he had with him six of his own noble soldiers

– and he considered a daring plan: that he should come from behind Bryennios’ army and, mingling with that Bryennios’ men, to approach him alone. Should Alexios and his companions come near Bryennios they would draw their swords and kill him; and should this come to pass, though they might fall as well that might be a better thing than to endure the Emperor’s judgement and to be punished for Alexios’ disobedience to that man. But Theodotos, of whom this story has made mention before, discouraged Alexios from undertaking such a plan. He said

that such a plan was recklessness and simple-minded, and that fleeing from the army of the enemy was now necessary and that they should withdraw toward their surviving forces and join with them. In so doing, they would taking shelter by joining with those men and thus to withdraw from danger. And thus matters on the right wing had such an end.

Book IV.9

Meanwhile on the left wing the Scythians around Katakalon Tarchaneiotes saw the

Chomatenes and straightaway charged forth against them with a great shout and a war cry; they then turned away swifter than thought, breaking their pursuit. Just as quickly, they turned back in good order against those guarding the rear of Bryennios’ army. The Scythians surged forth with great spirit and despoiled Bryennios’ camp and, taking their horses and spoils, they left the battlefield. Confusion spread through the ranks as a result of this, so that Bryennios’ men were fleeing in fear into one another around the formation called by the Romans the ‘touldon’ (the rearguard) and the Scythians and banners were becoming entangled. Alexios Komnenos, observing this – for he still lingered around the army of Bryennios – concealed his face with his helmet and … his breastplate, threw down one of Bryennios’ horse-grooms, and dragged off one of Bryennios’ ‘imperial’ horses. He took one (which was) adorned with a purple mantle and a golden bridle, and the scimitars associated with imperial men out of habit. Alexios secretly exited Bryennios’ army, and after he had come out of any danger, he sent out the horse with a herald shouting loudly that Bryennios had fallen. This persuaded many of his fleeing men to remain, and some to turn back; for it came to pass that after the Scythians looted Bryennios’ camp and departed no-one was pursuing Alexios’ defeated forces. Alexios Komnenos’ retinue did not flee far, but rather wandered at a loss nearby such that after the Scythians departed,

Alexios showed both the horse and the scimitars and announced clearly the capture of

Bryennios, and all his men rallied.

Book IV.10

Alexios chanced upon one force and another, large division of Turks which had just been sent by the Emperor according to the alliance. The Turks saw men fleeing and sought out

Alexios. They came into his presence and urged him to take heart. The Turks sought to observe the enemy, and so the leader of those men gathered them on the crest of a certain hill from which they expected the enemy to be quite visible and from which they (themselves) might be hidden from them. And they saw the phalanx confused and withdrawing with no order, moving forward so sluggishly and coming to ruin – for all the men were without concerns, just as if they had already conquered and routed their enemies. Amidst the chaos Botaneiates’ Franks had all bent the knee to Bryennios and dismounting from their horses, they were placing their hands into his hands, as is their fathers’ custom, becoming the spectators of men doing great things.

When the leaders of the Turks saw these things, they came down from the hill and divided their own formation into three parts, and they sent out two divisions in ambush and commanded the other to go forward against the enemy, not by line, but rather in small bodies of troops. They scattered about according to plan and planned to assail the horses too with arrows, and to shower many missiles down upon them.

Book IV.11

Alexios Komnenos accompanied them, rallying as many of his men from the rout as the sword had spared to that moment. Some of the Athanatoi ran towards the Turks who had been within the army of Bryennios and one of them struck Bryennios in the chest with his spear. But

Bryennios drew his sword from its sheath and cleft his attacker’s spear into two parts and striking down against the collar bone Bryennios struck the man’s shoulder and breastplate and severed right through them. Straightaway the Turks unleashed a shower of missiles with a war-

100 cry and Bryennios’ officers were struck down by the suddenness of this deed. Although the captains were likewise terrified by the warlike deeds of the Turks, they attempted to set the phalanx into order. they called upon their own men to be noble, for by conquering the Turks they would win great fame and as the edge of the moment had come, they should stand in order and nobly march forth against the Turks.

Book IV.12

The Turks withdrew from this attack, drawing their attackers towards the men waiting in ambush. After Bryennios’ advancing troops reached the ambush point, the fleeing Turks wheeled about and their comrades leapt out from the ambush point and struck Bryennios’ men with arrows from all quarters and they ravaged both men and horses. When Bryennios’ men began fleeing the battlefield, the Kouropalates and Domestic of the Schools John Bryennios, whose story has already been told above, sent a large division of reinforcements. On their arrival, the men around Bryennios marched more boldly against the Turks. The Turks wheeled around again and fled until they reached their comrades waiting in a second ambush point.

Bryennios’ pursuing soldiers fell into a second ambush and all the men turned to flight, and many of the men around Bryennios fell. During this encounter Bryennios attempted to swiftly render aid by himself, for he rallied many of the men fleeing and called upon his men to stand fast. Yet the ambitions which he had sought for himself had fallen into vanity; for all his men abandoned him except his son and brother. Bryennios and his kinsmen remained, struggling valiantly and striking down many of the Turks; yet when they saw that the whole formation was dispersed, they wheeled about and they themselves turned to flight, and the Turks pressed close upon them. The Bryennioi turned about often and drove back their pursuers, until

Bryennios’ horse was not able to flee any farther. This coming to pass, he went on step-by-step, while his kinsman and his son, turning back often, held back the Turks.

101

Book IV.13

Because the men pursuing the Bryennios were not yet a great multitude, the retreat was well-run. However, after many men gathered together to join the pursuit and after

Bryennios’ horse had grown weary from running and was useless, his enemies formed a circle facing toward him and attacked him and his kinsmen. Both groups of men surged forth against their foes with great force and Bryennios’ group killed two of the Turks and compelled the others in front to flee. After withdrawing for a bit, the Turks turned back again with the greater part of their comrades and violently pressed upon the Bryennioi; but Bryennios’ group repeated what they had done and with great enthusiasm charged against the Turks. And it came to pass that the enthusiasm of their deeds waned. In the fighting John, felling one of the Turks, had struck against another and the horses of both men had fallen among the fighting men.

Bryennios’ son came into the front of the pursuit and struck down one of the Turks. He became separated there in the midst of the Turks and no longer marched with his father but attempted many times to join them. The Turks, taking the opening, pressed on against Bryennios more violently. One of them drew his sword and charged forth boldly against that man. Bryennios struck the man, turning about with his sword cutting off his hand. He prepared to jump down to the ground with his short sword. The remaining Turks attempted to form a circle around him, but he nobly defended himself. Thereafter he ran against the Turks and was struck with a spear; the spear, being entangled, he cut through, but the Turk whose hand had been cut off dismounted his horse and set upon Bryennios from behind. Bryennios was not able to strike the man who was hiding behind his back. The remaining Turks dismounted and beseeched him not to throw away his life, but rather to yield to a truce. And up to that point his hand had not grown weary, he had not yielded, and he had both struck and been struck; but since he was

102 already exhausted, he gave way unwillingly to the exhortations of his enemies and agreed to be taken prisoner.

Alexios vs. Basilakes Book IV.19

The Vardar River flows down from the mountains of new Mysia and passing through

Skoupos goes down between Strumica and Stypion, cleaving the mountains in twain. From there it advances a short distance separating the lands of Berroia and Thessalonica and flowing out towards the sea. In times past the river had turned away from its own course and moved to the other side, not quite two or three stades away from its former passage, so that very recently it came to pass that the former path of that river cut through its natural (course). Alexios

Komnenos encamped between both riverbeds, giving orders that all the men should dine for the remainder of the day to regain their strength so that they might be prepared either to pass a sleepless night or to rest in arms. For being both a sharp-witted man and having enough experience to draw upon from his earlier great deeds he suspected that his enemy would attack by night. Therefore, Alexios prepared beforehand and sent forth scouts in all directions.

Meanwhile Basilakes, since one of Komnenos’ companions deserted to him and told him of

Alexios’ plans, urged Basilakes to attack Alexios. The deserter offered to betray Alexios while he was sleeping in his tent, and with no one ordering all the men to arm themselves straightaway all (of Basilakes’ men) would be in arms. When the sun was passing toward the West Basilakes went out from the city signaling his departure with trumpets. He left behind the straight road after he had come to the river which the natives call “Gallikos,” then crossed through that place near to the fort which is called “Aetos” and from there went over the river bank and across the plain.

Book IV.20

103

Basilakes did not, however, escape the notice of Alexios’ scouts. Indeed, as Basilakes departed from the city Alexios’ scouts noted his departure by the dust of the host and reported these things to the Domestic of the Schools. Alexios ordered all the men to arm themselves and, readying their horses, to await his signal; and he sent out one after another to learn more about the enemy. Next, one of Alexios’ household came, whom he trusted as both a comrade and mess-mate – Tatikios was that man’s name – declaring that the enemy were not far. Alexios asked that man whether he himself discovered Basilakes’ going, and Tatikios related that he had heard Basilakes’ voice setting his phalanx in order and the men giving commands to follow and that he had shot arrows at that man with his bow. Then straightaway Alexios ordered the departure to be signaled with trumpets and he ordered the lamps and candles to be extinguished at once by the men around his own camp.

Book IV.21

There was inside Alexios’ own tent a man acquainted with him, a eunuch, whose foresight his mother trusted so that he moved about freely. Alexios left that man behind with orders not to extinguish the lamp through the whole night. He ordered the monk to do the same in the other tents, and to light both lamps and torches and keep them burning until dawn. And

Alexios, with all his men-at-arms, departed from the encampment and arranged his men in a thickly covered place.

Book IV.22

Basilakes came near to the encampment, and when he saw that it had been despoiled by his own men, he himself seized the tent of the Domestic of the Schools. Basilakes supposed that all that remained to be accomplished was to capture Alexios himself from some part of the camp and to make him a captive and lead him away. Just as Basilakes was considering the whole

104 camp, he saw it was deserted save for the monk lighting lamps. At this the pretender arrogantly said: “where is the lisper? – for his voice was not precisely right – “lead me away to that man.”

Having heard this, the monk denied on oath that he had seen anyone come, acting as if beguiled both in spirit and in wit and laughing sardonically, as the saying goes. The monk laughed even as

Basilakes ordered that the tent be hewn down by the men under him. This having come to pass,

Basilakes enjoined the men stooping under the bed of the Domestic to investigate whether he had hidden himself anywhere. As Alexios was nowhere to be found, Basilakes ordered that the chests placed there be overturned; his disdain for Alexios destroyed all the wisdom of his soul…at that point joy had been exchanged for pains for him, and often striking his thigh he said:

“Woe is me, I have been beguiled by the lisper.” For having no other way to mock such a man, he brought up again and again that smallest quirk of Alexios’ voice.

Book IV.23

Next, Basilakes shouted: “Commanders, exit the camp; the enemy is outside.” For his battle cry was far-reaching so that the whole phalanx was thrown into confusion from one exclamation. While Basilakes departed the camp, his soldiers were occupied by their spoils.

Meanwhile, the noble Alexios emerged in front of the phalanx with a few men and marching ahead of his own phalanx. He looked down upon Basilakes’ phalanx as it came together into order and planned to strike against Basilakes. Straightaway Alexios marched out against him and drew his sword. Alexios struck an enemy against the right hand, still fending off his spear, and cut through three of his fingers; he then prepared to fall by the spear with his men. This greatly disordered Basilakes’ phalanx and one man pressed the other down to take flight; and the men, going around in circles, became entangled with one another.

105

Book IV.24

And one of the men under the command of Alexios, a Kappadokian man with the surname of Goules, recognized Basilakes and struck that man upon the helmet with his sword; but with his sword shattered near his own hand and fell. Komnenos thoroughly reproached him that he should have let the sword fall from his hand with contempt, and straightway Goules hid the handle and set himself free from blame. Next, a certain Macedonian man named Petros

Tornikios marched into the middle of the enemy and threw down many of them. The phalanx followed, unaware of events; for in the gloom of the close combat of battle it is said that a man does not see the things happening to other men. And Komnenos again advanced against those of the Basilakes’ men who were still forming ranks, striking and felling those coming into reach and then turning back toward his own men. One of the Franks from Alexios’ own phalanx, looking on at him as a spectator marching out from the middle of the enemy mistook him for an enemy and planned to march out against him. This man struck with his spear and Alexios would have fallen himself in a short while, if he were not a most securely seated horseman. Then, the

Frank turned back towards him and he advanced with his sword; and straightaway Komnenos found that the man was a pitiable suppliant, maintaining strongly that he marched against him more from ignorance than malice. Thus that noble Alexios dismissed the charge from him.

Book IV.25

With the enemy still forming ranks Alexios made haste, as much as possible, to scatter the formation of his remaining adversaries. He dispatched from his own formation a company, ordering them not to delay, but to pursue the enemy most swiftly. Deeds of such a sort were done in the night with a few men. While the sun rose and the men forming up against Basilakes made a trial of their strength against his men and were encouraged. As this this was happening,

106 some of the men from Basilakes’ phalanx abandoned their comrades. These men, seeing some of the men from the phalanx of Alexios, the Domestic of the Schools, turning back and charging against them, came into their hands and were easily routed. Many were capture alive, and the formation returned to its post.

Book IV.26

Meanwhile Basilakes’ brother, Manuel, came up to a crest and began rallying the wavering formation, expressing clearly that the victory and the day were won. Seeing this the kingly Kourtikios, a Macedonian of the household of Bryennios, rode his horse toward Manuel.

Manuel drew his sword against him, but Kourtikios struck him against the helmet and straightaway Manuel fell from his horse and was led away fettered toward the Domestic of the

Schools, the noble Alexios. With this coming to pass Komnenos’ troops appearing, the still- reforming phalanx surrounding Basilakes prepared to flee. Basilakes himself fled, making haste to take a nearby city, but Komnenos pursued him. Then a man might link the things that happened there to Homeric epic, that which Homer said concerning Achilles and Hektor: before a good man fled, a much better man pursued him, for that man was also noble both in deed and spirit, for he was also from a well-born nature joined with brave deeds into great fame.

107