Air University Review: January-February 1968 Volume XIX, No. 2
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
0 STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND: .. ■'"'«•// A. INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968 AIR UNIVERSITY EW the professio n a l jour na l of the united st a t es air force SAC: An Instrument of National Policy.................................................................................... 2 Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, usaf Count ehinsur gency from 30,000 Feet —the B-52 in Vie t n a m ................................................10 Robert M. Kipp T he KC-135 in Southeast Asl a ........................................................................................................... 20 Maj. Frank H. McArdle, usaf Computer-Gen er a t ed Map Data—an Aid to Co mma n d and Control..............................34 Maj. John A. Wohlman, usaf W hat Is an O per a t io n a l Requiremen t ? ..........................................................................................44 Col. Geoffrey Cheadle, usaf Internal Defen se and Devel o pmen t —“ I deal ism” or “R ea l ism”? ....................................51 Cdr. Roger J. Miller, usn Military Affairs Abroad T he Contrast in Chinese and Soviet Mil it a r y Doctrines..........................................57 Col. William F. Scott, usaf T he Air Forces of Tropical Africa .......................................................................................... 64 Dr. Ross K. Baker T he Great Japanese Balloon Offen sive.......................................................................................... 68 MSgt. Cornelius W. Conley, usaf Books and Ideas F rom Chaos to Confusion: T he Chinese Red Army in the Last Forty Yea r s...................................................................................................................84 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting Myt h of the Monolith............................................................................................................. 88 Maj. Nicholas P. Vaslef, usaf The Contributors................................................................................................................................... 94 the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- “By mixing our strategic force, ... we take sity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max advantage of both [manned aircraft and guided well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed by missile] systems and can cover the entire spec Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Subscriptions are sold by Air University trum of strategic requirements." Thus two hats, Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base, those of the flying crew and the missileman, Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 denote the Strategic Air Command. In this cents. USAF recurring pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. issue of the Review, General Joseph J. Nazzaro, SAC Commander in Chief, and three mem bers of his command present an inside view Vol. XIX No. 2 January-Febr ua r y 1968 of SAC‘s global mission and operations. V SAC: A N IN STR U M E N T OP NATIONAL POLICY Gener a l Joseph J. Nazzaro STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 3 E IN Strategic Air Command world, either independently or in cooperation have always believed that a full w’ith land and naval forces . to conduct Wunderstanding of the capabilities maximum range reconnaissance . to provide of the command is essential to those we wish combat units ... to train units and personnel to deter, as well as to our own citizens. Any ac in maintenance of the strategic forces in all tion or counteraction directed by our national parts of the world . .” authority and taken by the command demon That statement and the implementing strates to the world sa c s role as an instrument directive heralded the beginning of sa c and of national policy and as a deterrent to war. assigned to the command some of its duties. Faced with the militant threat of world Actually, the sa c capabilities for strategic Communism, the Free World cannot afford aerospace conflict have developed until they to base its plans for survival on wishful think apply across the warfare spectrum. These ap ing or hopes for a better world. Instead, to plications could include a “show of force” or counter this threat and assure that the posi demonstration of intentions during the cold tion of the United States is maintained, sa c war; long-range, all-weather conventional operates from a strategy of deterrence—one bombing support in limited warfare; and the which requires a strong force in being. While deterrence of any aggressor from escalating to our opponents are the only men in the world general war. A study of the record will show who know’ what level of superiority will deter that sa c has been pre-eminently successful in them, to date our decisive—if not overwhelm- meeting its stated and implied responsibilities ing—capability has prevented a nuclear con in each of these categories during the past 21 frontation. years. Superior, flexible offensive systems, with Although our bombers have always had the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, are the ability to deliver conventional weapons the vital ingredients of this force. This is the or “iron” bombs, the current use of B-52s in first principle involved in deterrence. Second Southeast Asia has focused increased interest ly, to a nation w'hich shuns initiation of hos and emphasis on that capability. We effec tilities and is disinclined toward pre-emption, tively employ the B-52s, originally designed the survivability of this force is basic. A third for a high-altitude nuclear role, in high-density element of this strategy is command and con bombing of South Vietnam areas that are con trol. This force would fail to fulfill its mission trolled by the Viet Cong. Targets are nom if we could not—or the Communists thought inated by the Commander, Military Assistance we could not—maintain command and control Command, Vietnam, approved by the Joint of the force under the w'orst possible situa Chiefs of Staff, and executed by sa c . tions. With these three elements of a deter It is important to understand that sa c ’s rent force in mind, I would like to discuss the conventional capability is not considered a re Strategic Air Command as it is postured today placement for, or in competition with, theater and touch on a few of our interests in the forces available to commanders, sa c is there future. to combat the enemy with a concentration of The mission of the command has been firepower that cannot be supplied in any other stated in a number of ways throughout its 21- way. Although many observers point out the year history, but it remains essentially the rather unusual application of heavy bombard same: the deterrence of general war. In fact, ment units in a guerrilla warfare situation, the just before the War Department published use of the large-payload, all-weather capabil the official directive establishing the command ity of strategic bombers in support of ground in 1946, the aaf Commander, General Carl forces is certainly not new. Spaatz, in a note to the Commander, Conti In 1944 we used hundreds of B-17s to nental Air Forces, wrote: “The Strategic Air “carpet bomb” before Saint-Lo and assist with Command will be prepared to conduct long- the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. range offensive operations in any part of the In Korea we used B-29s to support front- Anyone doubting the role of strategic bombers in guerrilla warfare has perhaps forgotten the carpet-bombing missions of World War 11. To assist the Allied advance from the Normandy beachhead, entire wings of B-17s streaked across the Channel and saturated enemy-held areas. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 5 line troops and saturate enemy buildup areas. In nine days after being alerted, sa c bomb groups flew their first mission against the Com munists. These units took just three months to destroy every strategic industrial target in North Korea—with conventional bombs. With no industrial targets left, B-29 bombers system atically destroyed transportation lines, enemy airfields, and even flew close support missions. Today, in Southeast Asia, when the re quirement arises for a large concentration of bombs, accurately delivered, under any weath er conditions, the employment of sa c bombers offers the best solution. The B-52 raids have been cited by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors as the “most feared” combat capability employed against them.This is understandable when one considers that each B-52 can deliver up to a 60,000-pound bomb load at any range, through the use of air refueling. In terms of bombs, this amounts to eightv-four 500-pound bombs or forty-two 750-pound bombs stored internally and twenty-four 750-pound bombs carried ex ternally on racks under the wings. Contrast this with the maximum 20,000-pound capacity of the B-29 in Korea and the 3000- to 4000- pound load of the B-17 in Europe. While our contribution to conventional warfare in Southeast Asia is made entirely by manned aircraft, sa c ’s primary mission of de terrence of general war is best accomplished by a mixed force of bombers and interconti nental ballistic missiles. It should be recog nized that both bombers and missiles are ex cellent weapon systems and that each has unique capabilities lacking in the other. In the overall sa c deterrent mission each system plays a complementary, not a competitive, role. A quick enumeration of the advantages of each system will illustrate this point. Manned bombers best meet the requirement for flexi- bility. While an ic bm, by definition, follows a ballistic path to its target, the manned system can vary tactics, axis of attack, altitude, and penetration corridors and can circumnavigate known or detected concentrations of defense. (Continued on page 8) Mixed Strategic Force Among the deterrent forces of the Strategic Air Command are manned aircraft and guided missiles in several configurations. At a Montana Minuteman site a SAC maintenance technician (opposite) climbs down to check out a component of the silo-stored intercontinental ballistic missile. B-52 Stratofortresses, armed with 60 tons of bombs and Hound Dog missiles, probe deep into enemy territory, routing the Viet Cong and keeping them on the move.