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STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND: .. ■'"'«•// A. INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1968

AIR UNIVERSITY EW the professio n a l jour na l of the united st a t es air force

SAC: An Instrument of National Policy...... 2 Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, usaf

Count ehinsur gency from 30,000 Feet —the B-52 in Vie t n a m ...... 10 Robert M. Kipp

T he KC-135 in Southeast Asl a ...... 20 Maj. Frank H. McArdle, usaf

Computer-Gen er a t ed Map Data—an Aid to Co mma n d and Control...... 34 Maj. John A. Wohlman, usaf

W hat Is an O per a t io n a l Requiremen t ? ...... 44 Col. Geoffrey Cheadle, usaf

Internal Defen se and Devel o pmen t —“ I deal ism” or “R ea l ism”? ...... 51 Cdr. Roger J. Miller, usn

Military Affairs Abroad

T he Contrast in Chinese and Soviet Mil it a r y Doctrines...... 57 Col. William F. Scott, usaf

T he Air Forces of Tropical Africa ...... 64 Dr. Ross K. Baker

T he Great Japanese Balloon Offen sive...... 68 MSgt. Cornelius W. Conley, usaf

Books and Ideas

F rom Chaos to Confusion: T he Chinese Red Army in the Last Forty Yea r s...... 84 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting

Myt h of the Monolith...... 88 Maj. Nicholas P. Vaslef, usaf

The Contributors...... 94

the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- “By mixing our strategic force, ... we take sity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max­ advantage of both [manned aircraft and guided well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed by missile] systems and can cover the entire spec­ Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Subscriptions are sold by Air University trum of strategic requirements." Thus two hats, Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base, those of the flying crew and the missileman, Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 denote the Strategic Air Command. In this cents. USAF recurring pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. issue of the Review, General Joseph J. Nazzaro, SAC Commander in Chief, and three mem­ bers of his command present an inside view Vol. XIX No. 2 January-Febr ua r y 1968 of SAC‘s global mission and operations. V SAC: A N IN STR U M E N T OP NATIONAL POLICY

Gener a l Joseph J. Nazzaro STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 3

E IN Strategic Air Command world, either independently or in cooperation have always believed that a full w’ith land and naval forces . . . to conduct Wunderstanding of the capabilities maximum range reconnaissance . . . to provide of the command is essential to those we wish combat units ... to train units and personnel to deter, as well as to our own citizens. Any ac­ in maintenance of the strategic forces in all tion or counteraction directed by our national parts of the world . . .” authority and taken by the command demon­ That statement and the implementing strates to the world sa c s role as an instrument directive heralded the beginning of sa c and of national policy and as a deterrent to war. assigned to the command some of its duties. Faced with the militant threat of world Actually, the sa c capabilities for strategic Communism, the Free World cannot afford aerospace conflict have developed until they to base its plans for survival on wishful think­ apply across the warfare spectrum. These ap­ ing or hopes for a better world. Instead, to plications could include a “show of force” or counter this threat and assure that the posi­ demonstration of intentions during the cold tion of the United States is maintained, sa c war; long-range, all-weather conventional operates from a strategy of deterrence—one bombing support in limited warfare; and the which requires a strong force in being. While deterrence of any aggressor from escalating to our opponents are the only men in the world general war. A study of the record will show who know’ what level of superiority will deter that sa c has been pre-eminently successful in them, to date our decisive—if not overwhelm- meeting its stated and implied responsibilities ing—capability has prevented a nuclear con­ in each of these categories during the past 21 frontation. years. Superior, flexible offensive systems, with Although our bombers have always had the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, are the ability to deliver conventional weapons the vital ingredients of this force. This is the or “iron” bombs, the current use of B-52s in first principle involved in deterrence. Second­ Southeast Asia has focused increased interest ly, to a nation w'hich shuns initiation of hos­ and emphasis on that capability. We effec­ tilities and is disinclined toward pre-emption, tively employ the B-52s, originally designed the survivability of this force is basic. A third for a high-altitude nuclear role, in high-density element of this strategy is command and con­ bombing of South Vietnam areas that are con­ trol. This force would fail to fulfill its mission trolled by the Viet Cong. Targets are nom­ if we could not—or the Communists thought inated by the Commander, Military Assistance we could not—maintain command and control Command, Vietnam, approved by the Joint of the force under the w'orst possible situa­ Chiefs of Staff, and executed by sa c . tions. With these three elements of a deter­ It is important to understand that sa c ’s rent force in mind, I would like to discuss the conventional capability is not considered a re­ Strategic Air Command as it is postured today placement for, or in competition with, theater and touch on a few of our interests in the forces available to commanders, sa c is there future. to combat the enemy with a concentration of The mission of the command has been firepower that cannot be supplied in any other stated in a number of ways throughout its 21- way. Although many observers point out the year history, but it remains essentially the rather unusual application of heavy bombard­ same: the deterrence of general war. In fact, ment units in a guerrilla warfare situation, the just before the War Department published use of the large-payload, all-weather capabil­ the official directive establishing the command ity of strategic bombers in support of ground in 1946, the aaf Commander, General Carl forces is certainly not new. Spaatz, in a note to the Commander, Conti­ In 1944 we used hundreds of B-17s to nental Air Forces, wrote: “The Strategic Air “carpet bomb” before Saint-Lo and assist with Command will be prepared to conduct long- the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. range offensive operations in any part of the In Korea we used B-29s to support front- Anyone doubting the role of strategic bombers in guerrilla warfare has perhaps forgotten the carpet-bombing missions of World War 11. To assist the Allied advance from the Normandy beachhead, entire wings of B-17s streaked across the Channel and saturated enemy-held areas. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 5

line troops and saturate enemy buildup areas. In nine days after being alerted, sa c bomb groups flew their first mission against the Com­ munists. These units took just three months to destroy every strategic industrial target in North Korea—with conventional bombs. With no industrial targets left, B-29 bombers system­ atically destroyed transportation lines, enemy airfields, and even flew close support missions. Today, in Southeast Asia, when the re­ quirement arises for a large concentration of bombs, accurately delivered, under any weath­ er conditions, the employment of sa c bombers offers the best solution. The B-52 raids have been cited by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese defectors as the “most feared” combat capability employed against them.This is understandable when one considers that each B-52 can deliver up to a 60,000-pound bomb load at any range, through the use of air refueling. In terms of bombs, this amounts to eightv-four 500-pound bombs or forty-two 750-pound bombs stored internally and twenty-four 750-pound bombs carried ex­ ternally on racks under the wings. Contrast this with the maximum 20,000-pound capacity of the B-29 in Korea and the 3000- to 4000- pound load of the B-17 in Europe. While our contribution to conventional warfare in Southeast Asia is made entirely by manned aircraft, sa c ’s primary mission of de­ terrence of general war is best accomplished by a mixed force of bombers and interconti­ nental ballistic missiles. It should be recog­ nized that both bombers and missiles are ex­ cellent weapon systems and that each has unique capabilities lacking in the other. In the overall sa c deterrent mission each system plays a complementary, not a competitive, role. A quick enumeration of the advantages of each system will illustrate this point. Manned bombers best meet the requirement for flexi- bility. While an ic bm, by definition, follows a ballistic path to its target, the manned system can vary tactics, axis of attack, altitude, and penetration corridors and can circumnavigate known or detected concentrations of defense.

(Continued on page 8)

Mixed Strategic Force Among the deterrent forces of the Strategic Air Command are manned aircraft and guided missiles in several configurations. At a Montana Minuteman site a SAC maintenance technician (opposite) climbs down to check out a component of the silo-stored intercontinental ballistic missile. . . . B-52 Stratofortresses, armed with 60 tons of bombs and Hound Dog missiles, probe deep into enemy territory, routing the Viet Cong and keeping them on the move. ... A KC-135 takes off for a refueling rendezvous... . Aboard an EC-135C airborne command post, the SAC airborne battle staff checks a communications system. The aircraft contains four UHF transmitter-receiver systems and four single side-band units, which can be used in pairs or all together for monitoring various channels. 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The manned bomber can seek out targets the war-making ability. To accomplish this, it is precise locations of which are not known, de­ sa c ’s task to ensure, within the limits of the termine if they have been neutralized by pre­ resources provided by Congress and the ex­ vious strikes, and attack as necessary. With ecutive branch of the government, the maxi­ our missile systems, the exact geodetic infor­ mum survivability of its force-in-being at any mation for the target must be known, and given moment. success or failure of a missile strike must be In an age of ic bm’s able to strike halfway determined by an outside reconnaissance ef­ around the world within a half hour, only fort. wide dispersal and a quick-reaction posture The missiles, on the other hand, are un­ assure the survival of our manned systems. In questionably superior in their “quick kill” ca­ October 1957 a limited number of sa c bomb­ pabilities. Their fast reaction of one minute or ers and tankers at U.S. and overseas bases less, plus the unprecedented speeds, enables went on ground alert, and since early 1961 we them to destroy targets approximately thirty have maintained approximately half our bomb­ minutes after decision to launch. This speed er and tanker force on ground alert. Dispersed of application is far beyond that of our pres­ at many operating locations, they are ready to ent or foreseeable manned strike systems. react well within the warning time provided By mixing our strategic force, then, we by the North American Air Defense Com­ take advantage of the superior features of mand Ballistic Missile Early Warning System both systems and can cover the entire spec­ (bmew s). Operation of a ground alert of this trum of strategic requirements. magnitude demands a professional force of sa c ’s mixed force today is composed of crews and support personnel, with crews av­ some 600 B-52 and B-58 bombers supported eraging a 74-hour duty week. by a similar number of KC-135 jet tankers, to As a further step we have tested and insure adequate range extension for complete proved the concept of airborne alert with sev­ target coverage. The missile force numbers eral thousand training sorties. Under this con­ more than 1000 Titan II and Minuteman I and cept, now known as the airborne alert indoc­ II intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is trination training mission, a percentage of the the hardware employed by the command. command’s B-52s remains continuously air­ But for many years in sa c we have func­ borne, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. This tioned under the established principle that the tactic would assure the survival of a portion most important part of an in-being capability of the command’s retaliatory striking power is people and that personnel proficiency and even under an all-out missile attack executed dedication are primarily responsible for our in total surprise. It was during the highly vola­ day-to-day capability, sa c ’s present position tile Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 that can be equated to the ingenuity and drive of sa c first conducted an actual airborne alert, its professional manpower over the years. In­ the first in the history of air power. This was tensive training, great responsibility, frequent maintained throughout the period of confron­ hardships, and intensive quality control have tation, convincing the Soviet leadership that made the men of sa c the most professional its offensive missiles should be removed. In military organization in history. the face of this, plus other demonstrated This continuous program of training, “no American military strength, the missiles were notice” operational tests, and improvements withdrawn from Cuba. to tactics and techniques assure the capability Because ic bm’s, unlike bombers, cannot of this force to carry out its mission. be recalled once they are launched, the sur­ Survivability, the second requirement vival considerations of this part of the mixed mentioned earlier, means that a credible de­ force are quite different from those of the terrent force must be able to survive the initial bombers. The missiles must ride out an enemy strike by an enemy and still deliver an unac­ attack and then function in the environment ceptable level of damage upon him and his of a nuclear exchange. Our Titan II and Min- STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 9

uteman silos are widely dispersed, at least one bomb apart, so that one enemy weapon could not destroy more than one of our silos. I have br ief l y described the essentials of a In addition, they are hardened to withstand deterrent force and how sa c fulfills these re­ anything but a direct nuclear hit. Missile com­ quirements at this time. We are convinced that bat crews carry the same alert responsibilities maintaining strategic superiority is one of the as their aircraft counterparts: to be prepared most critical defense problems the United 24 hours a day to respond to national com­ States faces today and in the future. We be­ mand authority. lieve our national strategic military effort The quick reaction of our manned air­ should continue to develop the mixed force. craft and the hardening of the missile sites, First, we should retain the flexibility tested coupled with the wide dispersal of both sys­ and demonstrated in manned bomber systems. tems, give us a high degree of confidence in The bomber version of the F-lll will become our ability to survive an enemy’s first strike. operational in the sa c inventory in the late The third essential of the sa c force is 1960s. In conjunction with the newest model command and control. Our national authori­ B-52s, the FB-111 will give us complete target ties must have not only day-to-day control of coverage through about 1975. By that time, the strategic forces but positive communica­ even the newest B-52s will be nearing obso­ tions and execution in wartime. lescence, and we see the need then for a larger The sa c force is controlled from the aircraft than the FB-111 to cover the deeper underground command post at Offutt afb near targets. Such a system, the Advanced Manned Omaha. From this command post our world­ Strategic Aircraft (amsa), is being evaluated wide command and control communications today. network maintains instantaneous contact with Second, we should continue to improve all sa c units as well as with the National Mili­ our missile capabilities. This we are doing. tary Command Center and other unified com­ Through force modernization, the Minuteman manders around the world. Our three num­ I is giving way to the improved Minuteman II, bered air force headquarters maintain alter­ and a further development called Minuteman nate command posts that could take over III will continue to expand and upgrade our should sa c headquarters be destroyed. missile capabilities. A further backup is provided by another With the deterrent force I have described sa c innovation, the Airborne Command Post. now in being, our government has considerable Since 3 February 1961, we have had an Air­ freedom to use diplomatic, economic, and po­ borne Command Post aircraft continuously air­ litical instruments in international affairs as borne, complete with communications equip­ well as support our allies in limited wars or ment and manned by an experienced team of contingency operations. As a result of this cur­ controllers. The availability of this airborne rent capability, our primary concern is not so control team, headed by a sa c general officer much for today as for the continuation of this designated as airborne emergency actions offi­ capability into the future. cer, gives further guarantee of effective control of the sa c force. Hq Strategic Air Command

COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM 30,000 FEET

THE B-52 IN VIETNAM Robert M. Kipp

You don't fight this fellow rifle to rifle. You locate him and back away. Blow the hell out o f him and then )>olice up. Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker, ADC, 4th Inf Div

1 RATEGIC AIR COMMAND always has possessed a capability to deliver conventional bombs. A number of bomber crews were scheduled to make an actual drop of high-explosive ordnance during each training period. The command did not accord the program much priority, however, until the early 1960s. The Kennedy Administration placed renewed emphasis on im­ proving the abilities of the nation’s armed forces in limited-war situations that did not call for the use of nuclear weapons. The first sa c operations plan to specify units and the number of aircraft that might be called upon for limited-war operations using conventional ordnance was prepared to meet a requirement expressed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Strategic Capabilities Plan. Completed in late total capacity to 51. In a more realistic test of 1961, this contingency plan remained in effect capability, a B-52 flew 5200 miles from Cali­ until early 1963. Succeeding plans in 1963 and fornia to the Mariana Islands, dropped a full 1964 were different only in the units desig­ bomb load, and landed at Andersen afb, nated and number of aircraft. It should be Guam. Through the late months of 1964 test­ understood, however, that these early plans ing of contingency units continued to insure represented a kind of on-call capability. The that they could move quickly should they be command’s responsibilities in limited war were so ordered. The year 1964 had seen substan­ still largely undetailed, and to the middle of tial improvement in sa c ’s ability to deliver 1964 similar plans prepared by theater com­ conventional bombs. General Power in a sense manders included no explicit provision for sa c summed up the importance of this not newly conventional weapons support. acquired but lately polished capability in a In early 1964 a definite acceleration in sa c speech in October: contingency planning took place. The worsen­ It is not generally known that sa c also has the ing situation in Southeast Asia and the con­ capability to deliver conventional weapons, and tinued national policy emphasis on flexibility it can do so on short notice, accurately, and of arms to counter aggression at any so-called from bases far beyond the reach of any limited- threshold of violence had convinced General war opponent. Therefore, strategic airpower is Thomas S. Power, then Commander in Chief, an invaluable tool in limited war.2 sa c , that his bombers should play a more prominent role in limited conflicts. He told the No forces were deployed until early in president of rand Corporation that “ . . . ex­ February 1965. Then, as part of a series of ploitation of sa c ’s potential for engaging in any actions to expand U.S. strength in the western level of conflict . . . would result in a greater Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered to economy in our national defense posture, pro­ Guam those forces which the contingency plan duce more positive results, and increase na­ specifically assigned to the Far East. On 11 tional prestige by a clear demonstration of na­ February bombers and tankers from Mather afb, California, and Barksdale afb, Louisiana, tional resolve.”1 The cincsac received encour­ agement in the development of his plans from left for bases in the western Pacific. There they the then Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were to wait for several months before being General J. P. McConnell, and from Secretary called into service. After several months of study it was de­ of Defense McNamara. On 1 July 1964, sa c published its most comprehensive contingency cided that the B-52s could be used most effec­ operations plan to date. It provided for a range tively in the Vietnam war against enemy logis­ of alternatives for delivery of conventional and tics centers. The reputation of the Viet Cong nuclear weapons under conditions of limited as a skilled sapper was well deserved. In the war. Of particular interest, in light of subse­ jungles of War Zones C and D, in the Iron Triangle, and in numerous less-well-publicized quent events, was the provision for operation of a force of B-52s and tankers to support parts of South Vietnam, the vc had located his Commander in Chief, Pacific. supply caches, training centers, hospitals, and communication centers. Facilities were widely In the spring of 1964, bomb wings desig­ dispersed. The tree canopy hid them from nated as having a contingency mission began aerial observation. Tunnels, trenches, bunkers, an extensive testing program to verify and im­ and caves honeycombed the areas. For years prove their ability to deliver conventional these sanctuaries had been virtually inviolable munitions. They continued the tests in May from attack. Joseph Alsop has described their and early June, using a B-52F modified by importance in the guerrilla’s strategy: affixing two sets of multiple-ejector external bomb racks to the wing pylons. This modifica­ Two or three night marches out from the base, tion permitted the B-52 to carry 24 additional one or two days fighting at the scene of his 750-pound demolition bombs and increased the regiment’s operation, and two or three night COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM 30,000 FEET 13

marches back to his regimental main-base area bomb-bay doors malfunctioned. The tragedy —that was about the maximum effort that was of the lives lost and the destruction of the air­ normally required each month. The balance of craft tended to overshadow all else, especially every month was spent resting, training, absorb­ since ground reconnaissance teams could find ing replacements, and doing meticulous sand- little evidence that the strike had caused any table exercises to prepare for the next sally vc casualties or significant damage to facilities. against a government post. And all these weeks between operations were passed in the absolute As might be expected, sections of the security of a main base, with its simple but com­ press were critical of what seemed to be an fortable barracks, its reassuring fortifications, unorthodox use of strategic aircraft ( the anal­ and its food caches.3 ogy- of using a sledgehammer to kill gnats found its way into print again), but attention From these secure bases the vc lately had focused on the costly accident and the con­ been emerging in battalion strength to chal­ trasting small loss to the enemy. The military lenge the government of South Vietnam. Con­ command in Saigon chose to evaluate the strike sequently, General William Westmoreland, within the context of the Vietnam war itself, Commander of United States Military Assist­ which by its very nature permits few spectacu­ ance Command Vietnam ( comusmacv), as­ lars, even when using B-52s. The ordnance got signed a high priority to attacking them with to the target as planned, ground troops were air power. Tactical aviation had proved un­ able to penetrate, without loss, an area hereto­ suitable for the job because precise informa­ fore considered unassailable, and coordination tion regarding elements within the target area of the mission had been excellent. Those re­ necessary for pinpoint bombing was not avail­ sponsible for running the war in the theater able. The B-52 seemed the ideal means to de­ felt the B-52 strikes should continue. If the vc liver a large amount of high explosives in a was not home today, he would be home to­ short period of time on these area targets. The morrow. The B-52’s mission would be to harass bomber’s all-weather capability also would be the enemy, disrupt his normal activities, per­ valuable during the seasonal monsoon weather. mit him no respite from attack even in his The jc s and Secretary of Defense agreed that jungle redoubts, and wear him down psycho­ the B-52s should be committed. Mr. Mc­ logically. The accomplishment of these objec­ Namara explained later: " . . . the military- tives pointed to a long campaign, the end of commanders felt—and I believe that this was which could not even be predicted. It was a proper use of the weapon—that these strikes within this context that the first B-52 mission would destroy certain of the Viet Cong base assumed its proper perspective. areas . . . there is no other feasible way of After one mission in June and five in July- doing it.”4 1965, B-52 conventional bombing activity ac­ The target selected for the first B-52 strike celerated during the next five months in pro­ on 18 June 1965 was a typical Viet Cong jungle portion to expansion of U.S. participation in sanctuary, measuring two by four kilometers, the war. By the end of the y-ear missions were in the Ben Cat Special Zone, Binh Duong Prov­ being flown almost daily. The bombers ranged ince, northwest of Saigon. From this area the from Quang Tri, South Vietnam’s northernmost vc had been launching attacks against traffic province, to An Xuyen, its southernmost prov­ on nearby Route 13. Intelligence indicated ince. Over 1500 sorties were effective over the that troops were massing there for a suspected target. Forces used ranged from 30 to 6 air­ offensive. The mission of 18 June was not an craft per mission. The standard ordnance auspicious beginning. Two bombers collided dropped was the 750-pound bomb, although during the refueling phase of the mission and late in the year sa c began to use the 500-pound crashed into the South China Sea off the bomb in the bomber’s internal bays. Almost Philippines. Another aborted prior to reaching 26,000 tons of high explosives were dropped the target. Twenty-seven B-52s reached the during the first six months of operations. target, but one did not bomb because its (Continued on page 16) ... a day’s work Although accounts in the public press may sometimes smack of high drama, usually to the men on the ground and to those at the controls a B-52 bombing mission against the Viet Cong is all in a day's work—servicing the mighty Strutofortress, stoking her with bombs, and easing her aloft for flight to the appointed objective. Yet routine though the job may seem overhead, there’s plenty of “action” below, where SAC’s B-52 with its 60,000-pound bomb load has become the “most feared’’ threat to both the Viet Cong and its North Vietnamese supporters. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

It was admittedly an expensive operation. by ground commanders), hitting suspected Secretary of Defense McNamara estimated enemy strong points and reported troop con­ that the cost of the bombs alone was $30,000 a centrations. By December 1966 it was esti­ sortie.5 But the Secretary had also said earlier mated that more than half the strike requests that what the U.S. sought in South Vietnam came from field commanders. Such targets de­ was a limited objective, and it would be ac­ manded immediate response. Beginning in complished with the lowest possible loss of July 1966 sa c designated a portion of the lives and not necessarily with the lowest ex­ Guam bombers as a quick-reaction force. This penditure of money.” force used preplanned routes to the target The magnitude of operations continued for bombing close to friendly troops. Thus to increase during 1966. Twice as many sorties planning was reduced to the minimum, and were flown in the first half of the year as dur­ reaction time was little more than the time ing the last six months of 1965. In number of required to fly to the target. sorties launched, which is a more accurate In the 18 months from June 1965 through measure of activity than mission totals, the in­ December 1966, sa c B-52s in Southeast Asia crease was more than 700. Also a greater vari­ dropped more than 130,000 tons of high ex­ ety of ordnance was carried, and heavier ton­ plosives on nearly 800 missions. During this nages were dropped after the B-52F was time almost 98 percent of all bombers launched replaced by the B-52D, which had been modi­ dropped their bombs over the target as fied with a high-density, internal bomb bay planned. The B-52 proved a very reliable in­ capable of holding a maximum load of eighty- strument for delivering high explosives. Air four 500-pound bombs. Add to this the 24 and ground crews displayed a high degree of bombs carried externally, and the total load professional skill in accomplishing their tasks. became one hundred eight 500-pound bombs. No less a standard had been expected when As for targets, there was no change in the sa c was called into action, and, indeed, this overall priority. The vc encampments con­ was part of the reason why it was called. What tinued to receive the most attention. Addition­ sa c had done, it had done well. But what had al strikes were made against targets previously it done? hit or in areas adjacent to prior targets. As a General Westmoreland has emphasized direct result of improved intelligence, more in­ on a number of occasions his satisfaction with formation was received of particularly worth­ the results of the air campaign to date. The while targets, usually of troop concentrations, heavy bombers provided him with the means which had to be struck quickly for maximum to lay down a concentration of firepower on results. When this happened, previously relatively large target areas during day or planned missions were delayed. night and in all kinds of weather. He did not In April 1966 B-52s hit North Vietnamese have this capability before. He was convinced territory for the first time. Two missions struck that the cumulative results of such missions the Mu Gia Pass, a natural supply interdiction would prove the concept valid. That troops point on the Laos-North Vietnam border. In were able to penetrate areas previously in the the summer months, as infiltration of North sole possession of the vc was itself significant. Vietnamese troops increased, particular atten­ Westmoreland took personal interest in the tion was given to targets in the vicinity of the selection of B-52 targets to insure that the Demilitarized Zone separating North and bombers were being used profitably. He also South Vietnam. Increased direct support of visited Guam in June 1966 to talk to bomber crews and explain how their efforts fitted into ground troops also was given. In late 1965 sa c bombers twice had assisted infantry actions, the bigger picture of the war. in Operation Silver Bayonet (Battle of the la Drang Valley) and Operation Harvest Moon. W rra the limited amount of infor­ In this capacity the heavy bombers performed mation available to date, it is not possible to as long-range artillery ( an analogy often used arrive at a substantive conclusion regarding COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM 30,000 FEET 17

bombing effectiveness, but some observations a “smell of death” which lingered in the area. can be made, based on what has been learned. The Viet Cong were usually quite thorough in Aerial photography, the most common carrying off their wounded and dead or bury­ means of accounting bomb damage, followed ing them in the interval between the end of each mission, but the character of the terrain the bombing and the arrival of troops. and the enemy’s tactics of tunneling and un­ It was equally difficult to assess the im­ derground storage made assessment of dam­ mediate effect of B-52 bombings on enemy age by this means alone unreliable. Ground morale. Because many strikes were in areas exploitation was considered the best means of tightly controlled by the vc, people with assessing bomb damage. More than once knowledge of the strikes were difficult to find troops combing the target area found supplies in any number. Still, with time, prisoners, de­ and facilities that had not been detected in fectors, and refugees did provide some infor­ photographs. During the first months of B-52 mation of what it was like to be on the receiv­ operations there were relatively few U.S. ing end of what one vc soldier-poet called troops in South Vietnam, and they were need­ “the chain of thunders.” Most discouraging to ed on higher priority missions. Also, many of the vc, it seemed, was the effect of delay-fuzed the targets were deep in vc-controlled areas bombs oil their cave and tunnel complexes. and thus inaccessible. By the end of 1965 only General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the jcs, about one-third of the targets had been ex­ has said: “ . . . the weight and acceleration of ploited by ground troops. When infantrymen the 750 and 500-pound bombs are such that did go in, the chances of their finding that the they will penetrate deep into the ground be­ strike had been effective were about fifty-fifty, fore they go off, and then will collapse the according to General McConnell. Half the tunnels and cave complexes which the Viet time the enemy camps were where intelligence Cong had been led to believe were absolutely said they would be, and the vc were hit hard; invulnerable from any sort of bombing.”* The the other half, intelligence was faulty, and the vc took measures to mitigate the effects of the camps were either not there or the vc had not strikes—more frequent movement, wider dis­ been in the target area when the bombs fell.7 persal when in bivouac, and deeper tunnels. The number of ground follow-ups increased But perhaps the most realistic response to the with the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. B-52s was the one explained by a former vc Continued emphasis was given to improving platoon leader: “All of us, including our su­ the quality and increasing the number of periors, have been instructed to run as soon Army observations. as we heard the roaring from the high sky . . . Those entering a typical B-52 target area no matter how deep the tunnels.”9 General found the landscape tom as if by an angry Westmoreland has said that prisoners and de­ giant. The bombs uprooted trees and scat­ fectors list the B-52 as the most feared of all tered them in crazy angles over the ground. weapons arrayed against them.1" The tangled jungle undergrowth was swept Not surprising, then, by the end of 1966 aside around the bomb craters, sometimes re­ more than half of all calls for B-52 support in vealing previously hidden field fortifications Vietnam came from field commanders. These and openings to tunnel systems. The holes were given first priority because the requesters blasted in the jungle canopy made convenient were usually in contact with the enemy. The landing zones for helicopters supporting the unparalleled, lavish use of firepower as a sub­ advance of the infantry. Upon occasion caches stitute for manpower is an outstanding char­ of enemy materiel (rice, salt, clothing, am­ acteristic of U.S. military tactics in the Viet­ munition, weapons, medical supplies, and nam war. Israeli General Moshe Dayan, who documents) were located and either con­ visited the country in the fall of 1966, wit­ fiscated or destroyed. Only rarely were any nessed its application: enemy dead found, although reports often The Americans carry out their counterattacks spoke of trails of blood, used bandages, and and pursuits in the jungle not with infantry but

4 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

with firepower . . . These B-52 strikes are of incalculable value . . . The problem faced by an American infan­ They do tremendous damage to enemy installa­ try unit engaging the Vietcong is not how to tions and base facilities; they destroy enemy storm the enemy positions but how to discover fortifications; and most of all they constitute a where they are. The storming and assault will Sword of Damocles over the heads of vc field be done by the 155s and aerial bombs. These commanders that must enter into any of their are not restricted to jungle paths and are not plans that would call for massing units prepara­ vulnerable to ambush. tory to a large scale attack.14 The most effective weapons the Americans have for this function are their heavy bombers It seems reasonable to suggest that the and they can operate no matter what the weath­ main contribution of B-52s to date in the Viet­ er or visibility.111 nam war has been the constricting effect the bombings have had on the enemy’s freedom of Reporting on this kind of support during movement and range of action. Emphasis then Operation Harvest Moon, Major General L. W. focuses on the psychological effect on the ene­ Walt, Commander of the Third Marine Am­ my of being bombed—or what is perhaps al­ phibious Force, described the effect of a B-52 most as disturbing, the threat of being bombed strike as “awesome to behold” and added that —and its debilitating effect on enemy plans for as a result: “The enemy has abandoned his major operations. There is increasing evidence prepared positions and much of his equipment that the bombings are lowering enemy morale in great confusion, and this is making our part and, according to General Westmoreland, have of the job easier.”12 Brigadier General Ellis W. “ . . . fre q u e n tly resulted in the enemy being Williamson, Commander of the 173d Airborne thwarted in his plans for an offensive and his Brigade, emphasized the precision of the being prevented from massing and carrying strikes: " . . . I have observed several dozen, out his planned maneuver. ”15 This kind of the strike comes in at the appointed moment total pressure, for which the B-52 is uniquely and it hits exactly where we asked it to. They qualified, is calculated ultimately to destroy are accurate. They’re extremely good.”13 Per­ the cohesion of the enemy’s organization. To haps Major General F. C. Weyand, Com­ date, success in this endeavor has been en­ mander of the First Field Force during Opera­ couraging. tion Attleboro, best summed up what the heavy bomber strikes mean to the infantry: Hq Strategic Air Command

1 Notes S». 1. Ltr, General Thomas S. Power to Mr. ^rank R. Cell- “Fiscal Year 1966, Supplemental Authorization for Vietnam,” bohm, 17 June 1964. ^ ' •• before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representa­ 2. Address by General Power at the anniversary banquet tives, 89th Congress, Second Session, p. 4930. of the Strategic Industries Association, Los Angeles, 17 October 9. Quoted in UPI dispatch, Omaha World Herald, 6 1964. February 1966. 3. Joseph Alsop, “Why We Can Win in Vietnam,” .10. Interview with General Westmoreland in U.S. News Saturday Evening Post, 4 June 1966, pp. 83-84. and XVorld Report, LX1, 22 (28 November 1966), 46, 49. 4. Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 11. Diary’ of Major General Moshe Dayan, published in in Hearings, “DOD Appropriations for 1966,” before the Sub­ Washington Post, editorial section, 16 October 1966. committee on DOD Appropriations, Committee on Appropria­ 12. Msg. CG III MAF to CINCSAC, 13/1 113Z Dec 65; tions, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, First Session, Part 2, p. 794. msg, CG III MAF to CINCSAC. 15/0130Z Dec 65. 5. Ibid., p. 824. 13. Statement by Brigadier General Ellis W. Williamson 6. Secretary McNamara in interview on Columbia Broad­ at press conference upon his return to the U.S., 8 March 1966, casting System, 8 February 1965, quoted in Air Force Policy appearing in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Letter for Commanders, 15 February 1965. Commanders, April 1966, No. 4-1966. 7. Interview with General McConnell by William Randolph 14. Ltr, Major General Fred C. Weyand to Major General Hearst, Jr., et at., appearing in New York Herald Tribune, 20 W. C. Cmmm, Commander, Third Air Division, 11 August 1966. March 1966. 15. Msg, 27473, COMUSMACV to CSAF, from West­ 8. Testimony of General Earle C. Wheeler in Hearings, moreland to McConnell, “B-52 Strikes," 09/0346Z Aug 66. Basis of Issue of A ir University Review USAF Recurring Publication 50-2

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y THE KC-135 — —— IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Major Frank H. Mc Ardle ii L THE KC-135 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 21

URING the early morning hours of 18 and managerial functions were expanded to June 1965, B-52s struck Viet Cong allow additional uses of the sa c tanker force D targets in South Vietnam in their first while maintaining its primary mission of sup­ actual bombardment mission. This date is gen­ porting the manned bomber portion of sa c ’s erally considered as the entry of the Strategic deterrent strength. .Air Command into the conflict in Southeast The Boeing KC-135 is a high-speed, high- Asia. But it was not. altitude airplane capable of offloading any During the year before, sa c had used the part of its 200,000-pound fuel capacity. Oper­ KC-135 to support fighter deployment into ating throughout the world under a variety of forward operating areas and had been refuel­ conditions, in climates ranging from the frozen ing fighter strikes as early as January 1964. arctic to the hot, humid tropics, this tanker This employment of the KC-135 has been also can transport 83,000 pounds of cargo, 80 marked not by any one great dramatic action passengers, or any combination of the two. A but by consistently excellent performance team of four highly trained individuals com­ while refueling over 167,000 aircraft and off­ prises the small crew of this large multiengine loading 1.7 billion pounds of fuel in support­ aircraft. Crew integrity is a command policy ing B-52 and fighter operations through June and plays an important role in the successful 1967. employment of the KC-135. The mission of the Three very broad areas of operations are aircraft and size of its crew demand that each involved in sa c ’s refueling responsibilities in member be skilled in a variety of tasks; there­ the western Pacific: fore, duties normally performed by flight en­ 1. Supporting the deployment of tactical gineers, loadmasters, and others are divided fighters across the Pacific to forward operating among the four crew positions. In addition to bases. normal duties the two pilots are responsible 2. Refueling support for Tactical Air Com­ for environmental control, electronics, hydrau­ mand strikes in combat operations against tar­ lics, engine performance, and fuel manage­ gets in North and South Vietnam. ment. The latter duty includes distribution 3. Providing air refueling to western Pacific and balance of as much as 100 tons of fuel based B-52 combat operations. and safely offloading some of it to receiver The KC-135 was designed and built to aircraft. provide refueling support of sa c ’s deterrent Navigation and electronic rendezvous with forces and primarily had been engaged in receivers are the tasks of the third member of these strategic operations when tac began the crew, the navigator. He is assisted in part phasing out its propeller and jet-augmented by the boom operator, who makes celestial KB-50 in 1964. sa c had become the single observations using a periscopic sextant. The manager of all Air Force KC-135 refueling in boom operator is also the weight and balance 1960. The command’s mission was broadened technician, but his principal task is flying the to include refueling support for the Tactical 47-foot boom into the receptacle of the re­ Air Command, sa c began adapting its train­ ceiver aircraft to permit fuel transfer. This op­ ing and crew procedures and allocating its eration is usually performed silently, but often tanker resources to provide the fighters of the the boom operator talks the receiver pilot into general-purpose forces with efficient and effec­ position in much the same way a radar con­ tive refueling. To the strategic environment troller directs a landing by use of the ground- within which sa c tanker forces operated was controlled approach technique. added a new and different medium of opera­ Skill levels required- of sa c tanker crew's tion: the tactical environment. Resources for are maintained through constant and exacting this increased responsibility came from sa c ’s training missions, which are designed to pro­ forces in-being, with no degrading of its deter­ vide each crew with a continuing variety of rent structure or lessening of its Single Inte­ conditions in which to operate and which very grated Operations Plan capability. Scheduling closely duplicate actual combat missions in A KC-135 Stratotanker refuels F-4C Phantoms en route to a bombing mission over North Vietnam. From his position below the tanker empennage, the boom operator guides the 47-foot extensible boom into the receptacle of the receiver aircraft, sometimes talking the receiver pilot into position.

duration and objectives. These missions pro­ quires a network of bases, extensive communi­ vide excellent experience, realistic training, cations, supply and maintenance facilities, and and a firm foundation of fundamental tactics a vast amount of detailed planning and pro­ and procedures. Rigid training requirements gramming. Fighter deployments and daily com­ for all tanker crews are identical throughout bat refueling of strategic and tactical aircraft the command and are accomplished by using utilize common resources of planes, crews, and standardized procedures. Uniform quantity support facilities and are centrally commanded and quality of flying training and combat­ and controlled. These operations are carried readiness levels are maintained through real­ out at changing levels of intensity and involve istic exercises. Objective evaluations of the every sa c base in the zone of interior, thus ex­ exercises enable measurement of crew and tending the operation halfway around the unit capability and have provided the basis world. For clarity and exposition, the three re­ for an effective and efficient transition from a fueling functions will be described separately, training environment to actual combat refuel­ although actually certain sa c organizations ing missions. This transition, managed with no serve all phases of tanker operations in the significant changes in operation or employ­ Pacific, and the mission assigned to flight crews ment principles, was guided by sa c ’s tactical may involve any one of the three on a given day. doctrine and demonstrated the soundness of To handle the steady stream of traffic into training procedures and techniques developed the Pacific and to maximize the benefits gained by the command for its tanker forces over a through repetitive operations, two bases are period of years. utilized as staging areas through which flow , almost without exception, all westward tanker deployments. Refueling support for fighter fighter deployment movements originates from March Air force Providing effective and timely response to Base, California. A task force organized for this operational commitments in Southeast Asia re­ specific purpose is the briefing and planning

Gas Station in the Sky With the intensification of our effort in Vietnam, extending aircraft range and time aloft has become increasingly vital. The KC-135 Stratotanker has been indispensable in its role of refueling tactical fighters during trans-Pacific deployment as well as fighter and bomber aircraft engaging in combat op- erations. Shown taking advantage of the airborne service station are (1) F-105 Thunderchiefs, (2) a camouflaged B-52 Stratofortress, (3) an F-100 Super Sabre, (4) an F-105 Thunderchief, and (5) an F-104 Starfighter, refueling en route to Southeast Asia. agency for sa c . It coordinates with tac agen­ Hawaii the mission ceases to be “training.” cies all fighter movements into the area. Tanker Navigation and fuel now become the cen­ crews, on temporary duty for about ten-day ter of interest, and the KC-135 provides both periods, arrive at March the day before sched­ critical items. Celestial navigation is the pri­ uled departure for specialized route briefing. mary means of directing the flight to destina­ Normally two fighters are programmed against tion. The navigator is assisted in this task by a single tanker for the deployment across the the boom operator, who alternates duties be­ Pacific, but often two or more tankers escort tween the front and rear of the plane: forward and refuel a cell of fighters. In this case a task he obtains the celestial observations necessary force commander is assigned to the operation for precise navigation; in the rear, from his and acts as the single point of contact for such position beneath the empennage, he directs items as scheduling briefings and enroute the receiver into position and performs the support. hook-up that allows fuel to be transferred and At Hickam afb a permanent sa c staff and the mission to continue. 24-hour command post assist all operations Shortly after level off the first fuel is off­ passing through this Hawaiian base. The sa c loaded to check out receiver refueling systems Current Operations Section provides mission and top off tanks. If all is in order, the mission briefings and communications assistance and continues; if not, the mission returns to base. arranges crew rest facilities and maintenance The single most important item to the success support with the host base, also working hand- of missions over long stretches of the Pacific in-hand with tac’s aircraft delivery group in is the fuel remaining in the fighters’ tanks. Each preparation for the 3300-mile flight from Ha­ overwater leg is divided into several decision waii to Guam. After launch, the fighters, which points. At these points fighters must have a may have departed from another base, rendez­ prescribed amount of fuel “in tanks”: the vous with the tanker off the California coast, amount that will allow the fighters to return and the formation is joined for the overwater or divert to a designated base or continue to flight. At this point the techniques and proce­ their destination with no further refueling. dures developed through countless training Planners, experienced in the aircraft being de­ missions begin the payoff on their investment ployed, carefully calculate these bingo points cost. Once over the water on the long leg to and bingo fuel requirements, as they are 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW known. At these bingo points the decision be­ fighters. As the lone KC-135 leaves its forma­ comes one of the “either-or” variety, and the tion, the flight of fighters and remaining tank­ final decision rests with the flight leader, the ers continue westward over the Pacific toward tanker commander. Either the fighter has the Guam. The tanker whose mission is completed required minimum fuel remaining in his tanks provides planners with a resource capable of to continue to destination, or he turns around. producing dividends from several promising Any malfunction in either the tanker or receiver alternatives: the KC-135 may return directly which delays a refueling beyond a bingo point, to Hickam for further employment; it may re­ even if it is of a temporary nature, such as a cover into Wake Island for servicing and a faulty circuit breaker that could be corrected turnaround mission refueling eastbound or within five minutes, causes the mission to re­ westbound aircraft; or, if the tanker’s deploy­ turn to base. These refuelings allow but one ment mission is complete, the aircraft and course of action up to a certain point in the crew may be returned directly to its home flight plan, then immediately change to an­ base in the United States. The use of an other, now a committed course of action, with augmenting tanker in and out of Wake the assurance that the fuel in tanks will be Island is an example of matching command sufficient to reach the landing base safely. requirements with the potential of the KC- Missions of this nature require close co­ 135. High-frequency radio communications ordination and communication between the and position reporting to traffic control facili­ tanker and its receivers. Usually there is little ties are provided by the KC-135. These long- idle conversation, not because of any dictate range communications greatly enhance the but because crews are deeply occupied with efficiency of the operation and provide com­ the business at hand. Fuel bookkeeping is mand control of the deploying force and its maintained by the KC-135 copilot and naviga­ response to mission needs, sa c radio networks tor, who monitor and adjust bingo points and furnish direct air-ground communications be­ fuel for winds and weather, constantly cross­ tween the enroute tankers and the control checking to avoid any possible error and ad­ agency to provide information on mission vising the receiver pilots of fuel status and progress, crew status, and maintenance re­ mission progress. Flight profiles are a compro­ quirements. mise between the respective optimum altitudes At Guam the mission is almost complete and speeds of the receiver and the tanker and except for final delivery of the fighters to are planned to provide the maximum fuel off­ their destination. Essentially the same pre­ load capability, thereby providing quantum mission events take place as before: briefings increases in fighter range and significantly re­ on communication procedures, enroute weath­ ducing time en route. Once radio and radar er, and emergency procedures. The next day contact is established with Honolulu Center, the tanker-fighter combination departs Guam the fighters come under its control and precede for the final stage of its flight. Somewhere the tankers for landing. The first leg of the over the western Pacific the fighters leave their mission is completed. tanker escort, which, after many hours of The number of fighters involved in the close flying, has become a familiar and trusted movement and the length of the leg from friend. Assured through the KC-135’s high- Hawaii to Guam sometimes require the use frequency radio of favorable landing condi­ of augmenting tankers. The addition of even tions and weather en route, the fighters con­ a single tanker to a flight greatly increases tinue to their destination, and the tankers re­ range capability and assures fuel reserves for turn to Guam. The fighter deployment is now all aircraft well above the minimum accept­ complete, and the tankers have accomplished able. Offloading all transferrable fuel from the their task. They have escorted and refueled augmenting KC-135 first, before any other fighters that may have started their journey tanker is used, leaves the remaining tankers halfway around the world. The fuel trans­ with practically a full supply for the deploying ferred by the tankers has extended the range THE KC-135 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 27

of the fighters almost to the physical limits of bomber receivers also are capable of rapid their human crew. response to tactical situations, but their refuel- No longer responsible for the fighters, the ing environment changes little, if at all. tanker and crew must now return to the KC-135s are employed in supporting B-52 United States. Flying east from Guam, the strikes, illustrating sa c ’s application of air re­ plane usually carries a mix of cargo and pas­ fueling to the contingency mission. The tanker sengers, fully using its large interior and pro­ force and flight crews are usually from the viding the command with fast return of same organization as the bombers they sup­ high-value items to repair depots and a source port, since bombardment wings with their of transportation for cargo and passengers. integral tankers are deployed overseas on temporary duty for periods of about six months. Entire aircraft maintenance organiza­ two operating environments tions, armament and electronic technicians, One important portion of sa c ’s tanker mis­ ground refueling specialists, and all essential sion has been described. Now let us turn to support skills accompany aircraft and crews the actual combat employment of the KC-135. forward and come under the operational con­ The mission of this airplane can be simply trol of the 3d Air Division headquartered on stated: it refuels bombers and fighters. The Guam. The forward bases are staffed by per­ way in which it is employed in these two roles manent party to assist these temporary units reveals the effectiveness of this aircraft. The in getting established. Phase-in of arriving or­ distance of targets from the refueling area and ganizations is done gradually, on a carefully the range of receivers are two marks differen­ controlled basis, to allow an overlap of tactical tiating the fighter and bomber refueling mis­ combat qualified crews. This system is com­ sions. In one, the targets are close, minutes mand policy and has been used over a period from final fuel transfer and sometimes within of years to provide an orderly flow of units sight of the tanker crew; in the other, targets from the zi to overseas bases while sustaining are distant, unknown to tanker crews, and required combat potential. By the time a often hours from refueling. The bomber mis­ bomb wing’s last crew arrives forward, weeks sion is characterized by exacting and manda­ after the start of the operation, the organiza­ tory timing requirements, precise airspeed and tion has gained a large reservoir of mission altitude schedules, prescribed navigation, de­ experience, and newly arrived crews are ab­ tailed flight plans, and large offloads. The sorbed into the operation with no decrease in mission is flown in radio silence. Missions mission effectiveness. flown in support of fighters are also minutely Refueling large numbers of B-52s engaged planned and carefully flown, using established in actual bombardment posed familiar prob­ procedures for each phase of flight; but the lems but on a daily basis and much larger tactical fighter environment is characterized scale than training missions. Rendezvous, navi­ by the tanker’s reaction to the needs of the re­ gation problems, and myriad other considera­ ceiver. These needs are the distinguishing fea­ tions all add to the difficulties encountered on ture of this environment, for missions change any one mission, in fair weather or foul, day daily, hourly, and often after takeoff, necessi­ or night. B-52 missions are flown under ab­ tating quick changes in timing, routes, and re­ solute radio silence. Tiffs demands precise fueling areas. If the tactical situation dictates scheduling, exact timing, and thorough crew rapid changes for fighter missions to exploit knowledge of mission flight plans and objec­ an unanticipated advantage or in response to tives. ground support needs, it follows that the sa c Before flying their first mission, sa c tanker tanker force must also respond and be just crews are thoroughly briefed on the general as flexible. In fact, much of the rapid response support of B-52 operations. Mission construc­ of fighters is dependent upon assured refuel­ tion, tactics, and flight plans are systematically ing. It is well to point out that strategic analyzed during two days of intensive study 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of preplanned or “canned” missions. Staff offi­ missed approaches can slow the entire re­ cers and specialists in each crew position su­ covery effort. pervise the study periods, answer questions, The flight is complete upon landing, but and assist crews. Comprehensive written ex­ the mission is not. Aircraft must be inspected, aminations are administered, to evaluate crew serviced, repaired if necessary, and prepared preparation and knowledge and to assure that for the next mission. Flight crews are de­ they are completely prepared. briefed by a team of specialists. Equipment If one were to fly aboard a KC-135 as an discrepancies discovered during flight are dis­ observer during a B-52 mission, one charac­ cussed in detail with the crew, much as a doc­ teristic of the flight would be most apparent: tor discusses symptoms with a patient. The the radio silence. The entire mission is per­ lessons learned are analyzed, and any weak formed that way—engine start, taxi, takeoff, area in crew or aircraft performance, mission assembly, enroute formation, and refueling. structure, or tactics is investigated and cor­ Weather obstacles such as tropic storms are rected. Only after all paperwork is complete circumnavigated silently, each plane following is the mission concluded. Critiques provide in­ its predecessor by means of radar station­ formation essential to continue a successful keeping at the planned altitude and at an and increasingly effective operation. exact distance behind the flight leader, who is responsible for navigation and timing. Time may be gained or lost as necessary, and flight plans provide for this contingency. Crews fol­ low their flight leader while maintaining their own navigation data. Thus each knows ex­ actly how much time must be lost or gained and anticipates spacing turns and maneuvers accordingly. Rendezvous is scheduled for an exact time and precise coordinates. It is ef­ fected hours after takeoff, without any verbal contact between the aircraft. Proper join-up of programmed tanker-receiver combinations is accomplished by means of coded electronic signals. Bomber streams are staggered into planned refueling areas and altitude blocks so as to provide a safe, steady flow of movement through this critical phase of flight and to allow reassembly, once refueling is complete. Actual hook-up and fuel transfer are rou­ tine, for each crew has performed this maneu­ ver hundreds of times in the past. In the radio silence, the only conversation heard is inter­ phone communication among the crew. Tank­ ers need only provide the briefed fuel to com­ plete their mission. Once fuel transfer is com­ plete, tankers reform into enroute formation and proceed to destination. At a planned dis­ tance out from the recovery base, radio silence is finally broken to facilitate the landing phase of the operation. Even this phase is critical, for often large numbers of tankers recover in a relatively short span of time, and delays or THE KC-135 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 29

refueling fighter missions Examination of the areas in which opera­ tions against North Vietnam are conducted Hundreds of training missions have pre­ reveals that airspace over the land mass of pared the tanker crews for refueling combat- Southeast Asia is limited by sovereign borders. bound B-52s. At their home base, before each Over international waters, it also is severely ground alert tour, tanker crews receive com­ restricted in certain regions. This limitation prehensive briefings and study their portion on freedom of movement is a significant con­ of sa c ’s emergency war orders. They study the straint in fighter refueling operations. The tactics and employment of the KC-135 in stra­ number of fighters involved is another factor tegic operations. As has been shown, refueling that produces changes in flying tanker mis­ a B-52 in Southeast Asia is an extension of the sions. Obviously the fuel capacity of the KC- strategic mission, modified very slightly and 135 enables it to handle several fighters, and adapted to that situation. However, refueling when refueling near the target area the tanker a variety of tactical fighters dictates marked is capable of handling many. Performance of changes in tanker operations, for most of them are weighted down with externally mounted fighters also influences the employment of weapons and refueling takes place close to the the KC-135, particularly in low-level fighter area of conflict. operations directed against northern targets.' 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

These factors alter the employment of the Traffic control is complicated because of the KC-135 and provide a frame of reference for number of flights which must be refueled in discussing its role in tactical fighter operations. minimum time and because one tanker is sched­ Manning for this phase of sa c ’s refueling uled for multiple flights of receivers and pro­ commitment is supplied from the zi on a tem­ ceeds back and forth over the area several porary basis. Flight crews and maintenance times, dropping off receivers and picking up teams are tunneled through Castle Air Force new ones while other tankers do the same. Base, California, to Thailand, for periods of Altitude differentials provide vertical separa­ about 60 days. A cadre of permanent party is tion, while timing and scheduling assist in thereby augmented by a programmed selec­ maintaining the horizontal distance between tion of maintenance skills on a sustained basis. flights. Radar controllers act as coordinators Managing the operation this way (rather than and assist the orderly flow of traffic in each with all permanent party) is profitable be­ area. cause it provides many maintenance and flight Another difference in the tactical situation crews experience in combat refueling, valu­ is the number of fighters involved in the re­ able maintenance data on aircraft and systems fueling effort, since the smaller fuel capacity reliability, and a continual source of organic of fighters allows a higher ratio of receivers transport of supplies and personnel to and to tankers. Fighter strike missions consisting from the United States. This logistical effort of multiple waves can often be handled by carried 24,000 tons of cargo and transported just a few tankers; ratios of 16:1 are common 40,000 individuals in 1966.2 and do not tax the fuel offload capability of When crews arrive in Thailand, they are the KC-135. Changes in fighter tactics have briefed on all aspects of fighter refueling op­ produced consequent changes in the employ­ erations. They spend a full day in specialized ment of the sa c tanker force. Response to low- preparation and general study before flying level operations of tac fighters resulted in actual missions. Before each mission, the brief­ lowering refueling altitudes, which, prior to ing covers coordination for refueling fighter operations in Vietnam, were conducted above strikes, radio frequencies to be used, and call 25,000 feet. Normally refueling takes place at signs, and each crew is given composite mis­ altitudes near the optimum for each of the sion sheets of the day’s activity, to enable it aircraft involved, and benefits from this type to fly all or any part of another refueling mis­ of operation are obvious when considering sion without further briefing. The missions fuel economy and range. Lowering the refuel­ flown in several refueling areas are almost ing altitude to between 10,000 and 20,000 feet, identical, and a crew needs only the infor­ with much of the refueling done at the lower mation contained on the composite sheet to levels, has only slightly diminished the tank­ fly either solo operations or as part of a for­ er’s effectiveness. However, the fuel-economy/ mation of tankers in any refueling area. A altitude trade-off is considered insignificant significant aspect of refueling fighters in South­ because of mission duration and capacity of east Asia which has been influential in chang­ the tanker, and it is mentioned only to provide ing tanker tactics is the relatively narrow an accurate account of the changes in em­ confines within which refueling takes place. ployment dictated by the environment. The necessity of respecting international Weather is an important part of any flight boundaries, always allowing a buffer zone, environment and is especially important over considerably narrows the overwater corridor Southeast Asia. Moist air is present, and thun­ within which the KC-135s and receivers regu­ derstorms and rain are a daily occurrence ox er larly operate. The same general situation exists most of the area. The conditions add to the in airspace over land areas and poses similar list of factors already mentioned which influ­ restrictions on freedom of movement. ence tanker operations. The weather phenom­ Sustained operations place large numbers ena most likely to hamper refueling operations of aircraft in refueling areas at any given time. occur at the lower levels. Although refueling THE KC-135 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 31

is routine in most kinds of weather and cloud offload and timing or delayed refuelings. Nat­ formations, the clouds present in these areas urally, the mission is paramount, and changes and altitudes are the cumulus type, often with are coordinated with the ground controller. hea\y rain and turbulence which hinder jet This leads to an unusual amount of interphone fighters carrying external ordnance and hamper and radio communication. While altitude and the tanker pilot working to hold a stable re­ heading changes are being coordinated with fueling platform. Refueling can be accom­ the ground controller, the boom operator may plished at these altitudes, but tactics employed be talking a receiver into position, and the by the sa c tanker force are varied to adapt second flight of fighters is probably airborne to the situation and provide effective support and identifying themselves to the controller of the tactical fighter. and asking vectors to their tankers. The full panorama of the tactical refuel­ Distance-measuring equipment in the ing environment now begins to come into aircraft is an excellent help in establishing focus. A mission directed to refueling tactical position, particularly because of the extensive fighters in Southeast Asia may have any or all maneuvering required. Airborne radio direc­ of the following characteristics: a high ratio tion-finding equipment is used to assist ren­ of fighters to tankers, low-level operations in dezvous. Both these kinds of equipment have tropic weather, multiple tanker-receiver com­ proven valuable in tactical operations; and binations. and limited airspace. Once en with airborne radar they are effective and are route to a refueling area, a solo tanker or the used extensively in getting the receiver mated leader of a formation of tankers contacts the with the correct tanker. Time intervals be­ ground controller responsible for radar moni­ tween receiver flights depend upon tactical toring of all aircraft in a particular section. requirements. Often these intervals are very Coded messages are exchanged and authenti­ close, with one flight cell waiting in position cated to establish identity, and the rendezvous for the other to clear the boom so it can begin begins under radar direction. Initial join-up refueling. is made under the direction of the ground con­ While refueling is in progress and ma­ troller, who is intimately aware of the day’s neuvering is taking place, tanker crew mem­ activities and thoroughly experienced with bers are busy with their respective profes­ speed differentials, turn ranges, and aircraft sional specialties. Each one performs a part performance. of the entire operation, all the coordinated Flight identity is established by use of parts together making up the employment of radar transponders, and cell join-up is then a single KC-135 in the tactical environment. effected. Receivers form off the tanker’s tail and The navigator is busily keeping track of slightly to one side while awaiting their turn on the aircraft position relative to end-refueling the boom. During the offloading process the points, control times, and international bound­ tanker proceeds on course to the end-refueling aries; the copilot is managing and balancing or drop-off point. Often a drop-off control the fuel load while pumping it to the receiver time is required for tactical reasons, which and monitoring the radios; the boom operator necessitates maneuvering by the tanker. This is engaged in the most important job at hand, must be coordinated with the radar controller, getting the boom into the receiver for the fuel for there are limits to the maneuvering air­ transfer; and the pilot is monitoring the entire space. Other tanker-receiver combinations also operation on radio and interphone, following may be altering course for the same reason the directions of the navigator and ground con­ or to avoid heavy cloud formations, whose troller, talking with the receiver, and eval­ turbulence can upset timing by bouncing re­ uating the weather conditions for possible ceivers off the boom or making hook-up diffi­ maneuvering. cult. An altitude is assigned to each tanker, Formations of tankers are handled in but often changes of one or a few thousand much the same manner. However, the forma­ feet make the difference between successful tion required for fighter aircraft differs from 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the bombardment formation. Again, response However, such concern may be a significant to the operating environment dictated the factor if the tanker remains on station for change, and tankers generally refuel in-trail, random post-strike refueling. In this case it offset from the leader only a few degrees. may reach bingo fuel while fighters are exiting Strategic operations make freer use of offset the target area. The situation poses no serious procedures and increase the distance between problem because the multiple tankers in­ tankers. In each environment, vertical separa­ volved are always capable of fulfilling the tion is maintained for safety. In strategic op­ needs of returning fighter aircraft, which may erations the aircraft do not generally require need only partial refueling to keep landing much maneuvering; however, in tactical op­ weights within limits. If post-strike refueling erations the limited airspace, weather at lower is programmed or appears necessary, a full altitudes, and control time problems require tanker is dispatched for that specific purpose. considerable maneuvering, even with large If it is not used, nothing is lost, and the trade­ numbers of aircraft. This is done safely by off is well worth the small price: fuel ex­ freely using radios and following the flight pended versus assured refueling and recovery commander s and ground controller s instruc­ of valuable aircraft and crews. tions. Weather encountered during refueling The excellent capabilities of the KC-135 is more restrictive than prohibitive in nature are clearly demonstrated in its employment in and poses no serious navigation or flight­ rescue missions. Much has been written of the following problem. Spacing of tankers is main­ lengths to which the Air Force goes in rescu­ tained by means of aircraft radar. Fighters, ing downed pilots, so this aspect need not be accustomed to close formation flying, move reviewed here. A network of communications, in closer to maintain visual contact during an airborne command post, poised helicopters, weather penetration, keeping the formation and tactical fighter cover all contribute to this intact. Airborne and ground radar, visual ob­ vital operation. Contributing equally, although servation, and pilot reports help the crews to more remote from the dramatic scene, are sa c remain clear of turbulent areas. Once receiv­ tankers which quietly provide fuel to fighters, ers are off the boom and until the next flight allowing a protective cover to be flown over of fighters is in position, the tankers are some­ the downed airman. what less concerned with the weather, al­ When a pilot is down in hostile territory, though weather never ceases to be a factor. air cover is an immediate necessity, and there Speed and flight path are adjusted to make can be no delay in organizing his rescue. If he good the next control time or rendezvous is spotted by his wingman or other aircraft, point, and the cycle of hook-up, offload, and half remain in the area, flying cover, while the maneuver begins anew. others leave and call for rendezvous with a Bingo fuel is an item of critical interest tanker. The events which then rapidly take in deploying fighters across the Pacific. In place make full use of the assets of the KC-135 tactical operations, the situation is reversed, in the tactical environment. Radar controllers and bingo fuel becomes the concern of the query tankers in the area as to their fuel tanker. Refueling many fighters, coupled with status, and replies are given in "Bingo plus higher fuel consumption at the lower alti­ — pounds of fuel.” This provides controllers tudes, can deplete the tanker’s fuel supply with vital information and provides a priority more rapidly. Consequently each refueling of tanker selection to handle those fighters area has its own bingo fuel limit for a tanker. which need fuel because of maneuvering over When fuel “in tanks” reaches bingo, the tanker the downed pilot. Rendezvous is made by the is cleared from the area by the ground con­ quickest means (usually a combination of troller and climbs to optimum altitude for the radar, radio direction-finding, and distance­ flight to its recovery base. The chance of fuel measuring equipment), and fuel is offloaded reaching bingo level is not a concern on out­ to the fighters who know the exact location bound missions because of known adequacy. of the downed pilot. When refueled, they be­ THE KC-135 IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 33

gin a shuttle between the tankers and the fifty-one fighters with almost empty tanks w'ere scene of action, relieving those planes which saved by KC-135s.3 remained and are now in need of fuel. When A comment is in order about refueling w’ord of a possible rescue operation is re­ areas. They are busy, crowded at times, and ceived, a tanker on ground alert for this spe­ some of them are confining. A question often cific purpose takes off with full tanks and asked is: “Why not get more?” The answer is heads for the rendezvous area. Ground radar not more refueling areas; it is to make better controllers position the KC-135 in an orbit use of those already in existence. This is done at the best location for refueling the fighters, through advanced and changing tactics and w'hich shuttle back and forth, providing con­ effective response to the situation as it exists stant protection for the airman and communi­ in daily operations. To do so any other way cations with his rescuers en route. Rescue would upset the priority of principals, sa c operations begin without any immediate fore­ does not dictate to pa c a f when and where to cast and develop rapidly, despite all the con­ refuel because sa c does not determine the straints and problems inherent in the tactical fighter missions’ requirements. An analysis of environment, sa c KC-135 tankers respond sa c tanker operations in the tactical environ­ with their full capability and play a distant ment can best be summarized by stating that but important role in the drama. Fortunately, the KC-135 is employed in a way which maxi­ not all damaged planes are lost; some fighters mizes its operational capabilities, overcomes the consume much fuel in maneuvering or dog­ disadvantages of use at low altitude, and, most fighting and require emergency refueling to important, satisfies the needs of the consumer. insure a safe return to base. During 1966 Travis Air Force Base, California

Notes

1. Major General George B. Simler, “North Vietnam’s —4252 Strategic Wing," Combat Crew, XVIII, 3 (April 1967), Air Defense System," Air Force and Space Digest, L, 5 (May 19. 1967), 82. 3. Ibid. 2. Major General George B. Simler, “Wing of the Month COMPUTER-GENERATED MAP DATA

An Aid to Command and Control

Major John A. W ohlman

ITH the issuance of the initial order by a caveman to a receptive Windividual who thus became sub­ ordinate, the concept of command and control was bom. As people began to congregate for mutual aid and protection, $ie necessity for a hierarchy of authority became apparent. Though survival of the fittest was often the criterion, for selecfcfflh of a leader, the tribal chief, once recognized, was responsible for de­ cisions until he was challenged and over­ thrown by an ambitious follower.

r

36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The inception of a quasi-military organi­ coupled with nuclear warheads, and warning zation magnified the requirement for command times diminishing to a matter of minutes, to­ and control. In early times, a chief or com­ day’s commander must have immediately mander encountered relatively simple prob­ available and in usable form the pertinent in­ lems, though they were nonetheless significant formation upon which to base his decisions. to him. He predicated his judgment on a strat­ The volume of raw data supporting these egy the sum total of which he carried in his decisions has become of such magnitude that head or pocket. His area of immediate con­ it is often humanly impossible for an individual cern was often entirely within eyesight. With to manipulate it in the allotted time. Gone are a properly positioned peripheral guard, he the days when a commander could recall from had sufficient warning of an enemy threat to memory the particulars concerning available give him adequate time to prepare a defense forces which might be applied to a specific or counteroffensive for employing his forces. operation. In-commission rates, weather, and However, as methods of transportation and numerous other factors change daily or even communication improved and weapons be­ hourly. To keep abreast of these criteria man­ came more sophisticated, the potential battle­ ually has become an insurmountable task. The field grew proportionately. Commanders soon large-scale, high-speed digital computer with realized that they needed a staff to provide in­ its associated equipment has alleviated this formation upon which to base decisions. problem to a degree, but future developments From the earliest recorded history, mili­ in the field of cybernetics must keep pace with tary leaders have exercised command and advances in the other sciences lest we en­ control. Yet in today’s space age this term has counter a time gap. suddenly acquired a mystical connotation. In his Maxims, Napoleon wrote, “Commanders- SAC Automated Command Control System in-chief are guided by their own experience and g e n iu s.T h is axiom is as valid today as in Within the Strategic Air Command, the the era of Alexander the Great. However, the potential of automated data processing as an advent of electronic devices has seemingly in­ effective aid for control of the force was rec­ troduced the notion that command and con­ ognized as early as 1954. A closed-circuit color trol is now suddenly emitted from a magical television network was first utilized as an in­ black box. In reality, the employment of me­ terim display facility. After a computer was chanical devices to aid in computation has put to use in 1957, the main functions were been traced back thousands of years. Whether resolution of time-over-target conflicts, moni­ gleaned from advance scouts of yesteryear or toring the status of the force, flight-following extracted from the puzzling innards of today’s Emergency War Order ( ew o ) missions, and computer, the information obtained is merely peacetime exercises. The need for even more the essential data upon which a commander rapid transmission, processing, and automated determines a course of action—a means to an presentation of information ultimately led to end. Thus, command and control may be de­ the development of the sa c Automated Com­ fined as an interaction of man and machine mand Control System ( sa c c s). to provide for the collection, processing, stor­ The key to the success of sa c c s is com­ ing, and retrieval of information and its ap­ munication, speed, and flexibility. With warn­ plication by a commander in making timely ing time of an impending nuclear attack having decisions. been reduced to a matter of minutes, sa c c s The compression of time and space stem­ was designed as a real-time system. A real­ ming from the continual improvements in aero­ time computer system has been defined as space technology and the sophistication of one that controls an environment by receiving weaponry has simultaneously reduced availa­ data, processing them, and returning the re­ ble reaction time. In an age of supersonic sults quickly enough to affect the functioning aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles of the environment at that time.2 COMPUTER-GENERATED MAP DATA 37

The sa c c s was delivered to Strategic Air Central is initially primed with information Command by the contractor in March 1965. on current force structure, requirements, facili­ Programming problems generated largely by ties and base status, and other pertinent in­ an inability to keep pace with the dynamic formation, which constitute a data base. In the sa c environment resulted in the system s not event the computer is destined for planning being functionally usable. Continued debug­ purposes, the data base includes climatological ging by sa c and contractor programming per­ and weather data, aircraft performance charac­ sonnel led to a limited usable product by July teristics, intelligence information, force pos­ 1965. ture, etc. An integral part of the initiation of The sa c Automated Command Control the system is the loading of groups of instruc­ System performs in seven significant areas of tions, called programs, which dictate how the operationally interdependent functions: plan­ raw data received should be processed. ning, force readiness, force exercise, alert and Communications equipment known as Re­ execution, force control, command data ex­ mote Communication Central ( rcc) directly change, and continuity of command.3 The connects sa c bases throughout the world to sa c c s is composed of three subsystems: the Data Processing Subsystem via a complex ( 1 ) Data Transmission Subsystem, which network. Each site is capable of inputting provides the communication network between precisely formatted messages on a variety of the bases, the Data Processing Subsystem, and subjects; e.g., alarms, weather, force generation the Data Display Subsystem; and execution, materiel status, and flight plans. (2) Data Processing Subsystem, which is Message traffic is routed through an Electronic composed of three large digital computers Data Transmission Communications Central known as Data Processing Central ( dpc); (3) Data Display Subsystem, which em­ bodies four data display centrals to provide multicolored screen projections and black- and-white printer displays. A requested printer display. Forced displays are similar In actual operation, the Data Processing but are automatically generated when conditions warrant. 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

( EDTeej, one of which is located at Hq sa c Center under Cheyenne Mountain portray and at each sa c numbered air force. The edt c c , significant aircraft activity. Identified but not itself a large computer primarily designed as processed for display are the thousands of a traffic routing and switching device, analyzes military, commercial, and private flights that the input, determines the destination from traverse the country daily. All unidentified header information, and dispatches it to the flights are monitored continuously, however, dpc for further processing. until positive identification or interception has At the dpc the input is ingested and com- taken place. Flights of special interest are also pared/evaluated with the previously estab­ monitored on the huge maps. lished data base. Inputs of a routine nature The raw data utilized by the computer result in a mere update of the data files. in generating these displays originate from a However, if manipulation of the data reveals multitude of radar sources, such as bm ew s, a condition that warrants immediate Head­ Dew Line, etc. Within minutes, the various quarters consideration, a display is forced. inputs are transformed into meaningful data, Displays may also be requested, when de­ which are then properly positioned and dis­ sired, bv using one of numerous display re­ played. quest devices. The familiar theory that one picture is Displays are either output on impact worth a thousand words was applied in the printers, which print in a typewriter mode at designing of the sa c Control System. Though the rate of 800 lines per minute, or are opti­ the majority of displays may be achieved in cally projected on screens in one or more of tabular form, it was desired that sa c c s also the sa c command posts. Printers are strate­ provide certain information in pictorial fashion gically located throughout the command, a on map backgrounds. Evolvement of map minimum of one being associated with each displays was realized in early 1967, and a flight request device. Projection screens for wall profile capability should ultimately be displays are installed in each of sa c ’s num­ achieved. Further exploration of the map me­ bered air force headquarters. Each command dium is under way, with intelligence displays post screening room consists of from four to and expanded flight-following capabilities on six 16' by 16' projection screens capable of the horizon. accommodating a display of similar size or Let us suppose that from any one of a from one to four 8' by 8' displays simultane­ variety of causes—weather, runway repair, sus­ ously on each screen. pected sabotage—eight air bases within the continental United States are unavailable for operations at a given time. Certainly a com­ computer-generated map data mander is cognizant of the exact location of Computers are being utilized in ever in­ his installations, and a tabular display listing creasing numbers to produce map data as an the unusable bases by name could provide the aid to command and control. At Headquarters essential information. However, a map display North American Air Defense Command of the U.S. reflecting a legend-defined red svm- ( noradJ, giant screens stand ready to accom­ bol at the geographical location of each un­ modate a variety of map displays. In the event available base would better provide the same of an apparent attack on the U.S., a computer­ information. Immediate attention would be generated map will show the probable launch­ drawn to a pattern that conceivably might be ing sites of incoming missiles. Nearby, a pro­ developing or the fact that an excessive num­ jection of North America will reflect computer- ber of bases in one sector of the country were predicted impact points. ( A similar bomb and nonoperational. missile alarm map is located in the office of Or consider a tabular listing of flight plan the President of the United States and at sa c route points for a particular aircraft sortie headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska.) Other dis­ compared with a map display of the same play boards at norad’s Combat Operations flight plan. Comprehension of the intended A

A A A

A A A A A A A A A A & A A A A » A A A A A aa A » A A A t a 1 E A H . Aw A* A 'l'A A A A*' ‘ A A A ‘A A A A A A A

Computer-generated map showing SAC bases, represented by tri- angles. Unavailable bases would be in red. Reason for closure is indicated by: "W”—weather; bomb symbol—nuclear detona- tion; * — alarm. The circle of x’s denotes hurricane Hazel.

flight path is immediate when the flight plan map display is viewed on the map display. A map display consists of a static map Weather information also readily lends background over which is superimposed vari­ itself to map presentation. Of particular value ous dynamic information. This is accomplished are displays of severe weather areas outlined by means of two types of optical projectors. in colored symbols. For example, hurricanes The first is known as a projector, still picture and typhoons appear as red circles and are ( psp), for projecting the background map, identified by their code name. Tornadoes are and the second is a Group Display Generator displayed as red polygons and thunderstorms ( cdc) for display of the dynamic overlay in­ as yellow polygons, each marked by its storm formation. The psp is not unlike an ordinary identification. slide projector and may operate either inde­ Obviously, certain information, such as pendently or in association with a cdc. T o dis­ numbers of alert aircraft available or vehicles play the dynamic information, the Group deadlined, is not suitable for map presenta­ Display Generator receives from the Data tion. Consequently the map capability within Processing Central digital data which it con­ sa c c s thus far has been limited to display of verts to alphanumeric characters and symbols, data relative to alarm, weather, operations, which are positioned on a charactron tube. and materiel and various combinations thereof. The character image is transferred to a nega- A display of bom ber and tanker sortie routes reflects live data: aircraft position, direction of flight, deviant flight path, etc.

tive film, from which a film positive is made modes of projection and positioned for optical projection in the Screen projection of a tabular display is gdc. The entire operation requires approxi­ accomplished in typewriter mode with the mately 15 seconds. normal 8' by 8' screen quadrant accommodat­ A gdc is subdivided into four positive film ing 48 lines of information, each line with a stations, each of which projects a display onto maximum length of 72 characters. Individual an 8' by 8' quadrant of the screen. Symbols character positions are broken down into 70 are projected or lines traced by means of se­ small squares, 7 units wide and 10 high. In this quential positioning of a given symbol. The mode, actual character styling occupies only gdc is also capable of generating display data 5 of the 7 horizontal and 7 of the 10 vertical in any of seven colors, thus permitting place­ spaces, the remainder providing for automatic ment of color coding emphasis on significant character and line spacing. items. Red appearing in a display indicates For map presentation, the placement of an emergency or alert condition, while green dynamic display data is by position mode. means a satisfactory situation or completed Each of the 70 squares constituting one charac­ action. Other colors are representative of ter position in typewriter mode is singularly marginal conditions, exercise data, war gam­ addressible in the position mode. Thus the 48 ing, etc. vertical lines expand to 480 positions ( 10 X COMPUTER-GENERATED MAP DATA 41

48), and the 72 horizontal lines expand to 504 and longitude of the 2 points used in deter­ positions (7 X 72). Placement of a character mining the distance. for a map display is determined by computing For the Lambert conformal projection, addi­ the x,y coordinates, x being one of the 504 tional information must be provided: possible positions along the horizontal axis and y one of the 480 locations along the verti­ Reference longitude—value of any longi­ cal axis. tude contained on the map The current sa c c s map library contains at Standard parallels used in the source map least one slide of each geographical area of from which the slide was made. interest or concern throughout the world. With And for the polar stereographic: three types of maps—polar stereographic, Lam­ bert conformal, and Mercator—the slide inven­ Angle from the “new x axis” (horizontal tory normally consists of multiple coverage of edge) of the slide to the Greenwich merid­ known or potential trouble areas. Considerable ian, measured counterclockwise. research went into the development of the With these reference data and utilizing for­ basic paper charts from which the map slides mulas provided in part by the Aeronautical were ultimately generated. Ideally, areas of Chart and Information Center, St. Louis, Mis­ water would be blue in color, land masses souri, the map’s computational program trans­ brown, and Communist-dominated areas red. forms the latitude and longitude of the dyna­ A problem arose, however, in maintaining mic map data to x,y coordinates and rotates color consistency in dynamic overlay data these computed coordinates for proper posi­ when the data extended over more than one tioning on the selected map background. background hue. For example, a red line changed in tone as it passed from a brown land mass through a red Communist area and slide selection over a blue-shaded ocean. In calling for a map display, the requester To permit conversion of input latitudinal may specify a particular map background, or and longitudinal reference points to the x,y he may elect the option of having the comput­ coordinates for subsequent projection on a er program determine the most appropriate map background, certain information pertinent slide. A desired map is designated merely by to each map slide must be available. There­ including, as part of the display request, the fore, stored in the computer data files and id of that particular slide. Once the geographi­ referred to as “parametric data” is the follow­ cal coordinates of all dynamic overlay data ing common information for each slide: have been determined, the reference paramet- Type of projection rics for the specified slide are recalled from Legend position indicator data base storage to enable translation. Map boundaries—the two extreme lati­ In the event the requester fails, either by tudes and longitudes that encompass the oversight or choice, to specify a background map area projection, specialized coding is activated and Comer point—latitude and longitude of a slide is automatically selected. Following the extreme upper left comer of the back­ compilation of the latitudes and longitudes ground map, expressed in radians of all the dynamic data to be displayed, a search of the slide library is initiated. Each Rotation angle—the angle of rotation re­ shde capable of accommodating within its quired to position the displayed information boundaries all data requested automatically correctly, expressed in radians becomes a candidate for slide selection. Final Distance—the distance, in inches, between selection goes to the slide with the largest 2 points on the same longitude scale. Only Mercator and polar stereographic Distance reference points—the latitude projections are considered for automatic slide 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW selection, as the scale for Lambert projections be slightly lengthened, but overall lapsed time differs, thus prohibiting comparison. for a “batch” of programs is significantly re­ duced, there being no lost time in the central the future processor. Larger core storage and expanded supervisors0 are other areas currently under The machine cycle time of a current- study and development. generation computer is measured in micro­ Although the computer, as it is known seconds, and memory transfers occur in terms today, is comparatively new, third-generation of nanoseconds. (A nanosecond is one thou­ machines are in production. As in the field of sandth of a microsecond or 10 a second.) Yet radio and television, such words as “micro­ a concerted effort is continually being ex­ miniaturization” and “integrated circuitry” are pended by manufacturers to reduce total becoming commonplace. Where once an im­ processing time, the slowest factor being in- mense console, with hundreds of flashing lights put/output (i/o). One proffered solution is and alarms, was thought essential for monitor­ the concept of multiprogramming, under ing the wizardry of the computer, there now which several programs reside in the computer stands a simple panel easily operated and concurrently. When the highest-priority job monitored by one or two individuals. encounters a requirement for i/o, control Within the realm of maps, we find three- passes to a second program, which operates dimensional stereoscopic application on the until the i/o operation for the first is termi­ horizon, as well as increased use of cathode- nated. Should this task likewise encounter a request for i/o, a third program is initiated. °An expanded supervisor is a control program with in­ Total processing time for a particular task may creased capability to determine sequence of operation. |» character l«f*------characters 2 thry 72 ------

Computer-generated tabular material is dis- played on the screen by character mode, the characters being placed in the spaces somewhat as a typewriter does. For map presentation, the dynamic display data are positioned in the spaces according to computed x,y coordinates.

ray tubes. Preliminary use of scanning tech­ data. More and more emphasis is also being niques indicates a possibility of computer-gen­ placed on adoption, if not development, of a erated map displays containing both static common language for command and control and dynamic information. This would elimi­ systems. As more systems come into being, the nate the need for a background projection need for system compatibility becomes in­ such as is currently provided by the psp. creasingly evident. The search for increased speed and em­ As I said, the need for command and con­ phasis on accessibility and retrievability of trol existed long before computers were even data are of particular interest to the pro­ a figment of man’s wildest fancy. This need ponents of computer command and control will prevail as long as a requirement exists to real-time systems, which are among the most maintain a force to achieve our national policy complex data communication and processing and objectives. systems in existence. High on our list of As for future potential, the major limita­ “wants” is development of a query language tions to areas of computer application are the and data base organization that will grant imagination of the user and financial resources. wider latitude to a commander in retrieving Htf Strategic Air Command

Notes

1. From Maxim 77, as quoted in Thomas R. Phillips (e d .), 2. James T. Martin, Programming Real-Time Computer Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Publishing Co., Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 4. 1940). 3. DODOD Programmer/Operator Manual, Vol. I, Hq SAC, 7 March 1966. T has been almost seven years since Sec­ WHAT IS AN retary of Defense Robert S. McNamara I first introduced his “economic" approach OPERATIONAL to force structure and weapon system plan­ ning. This way of doing Defense business no REQUIREMENT? longer inspires the agonized, last-ditch resist­ ance from the military leaders that it used to. The expressions “cost effectiveness,’ "margi­ nal utility,” and “systems analysis” are less Colonel Geoffrey Cheadle often used with disdain or contempt by ser­ vice staff officers. Some guerrilla warfare still continues, but the more recent confrontations have been concerned with how to implement the McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven-Anthony man­ agement concepts rather than with question­ WHAT IS AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT? 45

ing their inherent applicability. Thus, the mil­ factors as cost effectiveness, alternative ap­ itary services tend now to incorporate, almost proaches, and so forth. automatically, cost-effectiveness studies and By now, of course, the osd staff members systems analyses as backup documents in all generally understand what the military person new weapon system proposals. Current argu­ means by his “operational requirement,” and ments concern inputs and assumptions. The the expression is just filtered out of their con­ accommodation that the services have made to versation. the new management doctrine, however, has in Obviously, communication between osd one respect been superficial rather than fun­ and the services which depended in any way damental: “So they want a cost-effectiveness on this key expression was sure to break down. analysis. So give them a cost-effectiveness And break down it did, particularly on the analysis!” That this is the case can be seen in many occasions when the beleaguered service the attitude of the services toward what are staff man answered a penetrating question as called “operational requirements.” to the why of a certain system approach by To a military service staff officer, an “op­ saying, “But this is an operational require­ erational requirement” represents a new kind ment” or, even more often, “This is what’s of weapon system or equipment needed by an called for in so r 123.” “operator” (that is, the commander of an op­ The smarter staff officers in the services erating unit in the field) to do his job ade­ early came to understand that to have an “op­ quately. Often with little or no consideration erational requirement” is no argument with the of economic, political, and technical factors, it civilians in either osd or the secretarial offices is alleged that there is an indisputable military of the departments themselves. There has per­ “requirement” for the new gear. The claim is sisted, nevertheless, a feeling that “operational usually established as a service “position” and requirements” are good things to establish in some military services is still formally docu­ and use internally in the services themselves. mented as a Specific Operational Requirement This explains the fact that organizational en­ ( so r ).1 There is an implication that upon pub­ tities still exist in each of the services for lication of the Requirement (now spelled with handling “operational requirements,” and the a capital “R”) the burden shifts from the op­ business goes on apace. erator (and his service headquarters staff ad­ In one sense the Air Force is an excep­ vocates) to the program, budget, and technol­ tion to this statement. Beginning in June 1966, ogy agencies, whose function is to finance, the Air Force adopted a new and radically dif­ develop if necessary, and procure the desired ferent approach toward “operational require­ end item. ments.” The rather straightforward instru­ In the early McNamara days, the staff of ment of this change is Air Force Regulation the Office of the Secretary of Defense ( osd) 57-1, “Operational Requirements: Policies, Re­ reacted to the expression “operational require­ sponsibilities, and Procedures for Obtaining ments” with great annoyance. After all, they New and Improved Operational Capabilities,” reasoned, an operational requirement was 17 June 1966. This regulation came about clearly nothing more than the responsibility through a working group set up by Major Gen­ devolving upon a military leader in the field eral Jack J. Catton, then Director of Opera­ to accomplish a certain task in order to fulfill tional Requirements and Development Plans his mission—an operator might have an opera­ under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research tional requirement, for example, to blow up a and Development. General Catton directed his certain bridge, take a certain hill, or move working group to examine the handling of some cargo from A to B. The decision as to operational requirements in depth, to work what new weapon system or equipment the out improved policies and procedures, and to operator might profitably be given to fulfill initiate staff actions to implement the new this operational requirement would naturally procedures (upon their approval) Air Staff­ be subject to scrutiny at all staff levels for such wide and Air Force-wide. By late 1965 the Air 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Force had obtained a few years’ experience in unified and specified commands) for informa­ doing “requirements” business in the new ci­ tion and recommendations as to what force vilian management environment. The working and equipment resources are needed, now group was able to draw on considerable exper­ and in the future. By smart management and tise in its deliberations, notably on that of effective staff action, the service headquar­ Major General Glenn A. Kent, then Deputy ters obtain approval from their departmental Director for r & d Analysis, dcs/ r & d , Hq usaf. secretarial staffs and from osd for the re­ Almost all consultants confirmed the group’s sources necessary. It is the obtaining of the analysis that a bold departure was essential. necessary new kinds of systems and equip­ The end product was a regulation which took ment for the “equip” function that gives rise the bull by the horns—it abolished the ven­ to the operational requirements process. This erable so r as a way of doing business and process must be responsive to the real needs implemented a management philosophy which (not necessarily all the requests) of the op­ is both conceptually sound and eminently erators on the one hand and effective in nego­ pragmatic. tiations with the approval authorities for the new resources on the other. Let us see how this has been working in the past. W hat is it all about? As I have stated, the operational require­ the traditional way ments process in the military services has to do with selecting and successfully proposing Until recently the three military services new weapon systems and equipment for de­ went about the operational requirements busi­ velopment and/or procurement. Even a su­ ness in remarkably similar manners. If I may perficial glance reveals that many commands, reduce the official procedures to their essen­ agencies, and offices will be involved in this tials and generalize quite a bit, the process process. What are the specific responsibilities was supposed to go like this: An operator of each? What are their necessary inputs and would forward a formal requirements docu­ desired outputs? Where does one agency’s ment, usually called a Qualitative Operational responsibility end and the next one’s begin? Requirement or qor, to his higher headquar­ To what extent must the process be formal­ ters. The qor would describe a needed new ized, or to what extent can it be left to judg­ system or item of equipment, going into con­ ment in individual cases? All these questions siderable detail on its required or desired must be answered before one is assured that characteristics, intended use (“operational con­ the right people are working the right prob­ cept”), plus more or less of collateral justifica­ lems with an acceptably high expectation of tion in terms of the threat, relationships with success. other forces, time period of interest, etc. The For the military services the responsibility service headquarters would be expected to for something like an operational require­ evaluate the qor and approve or disapprove ments process stems from public law. Under (very few disapprovals!). The headquarters Title 10, U.S. Code, the services are required would then be expected to make the neces­ by law to “organize, train, and equip” forces sary consultations with its r &d support agen­ —aerospace, naval, or land forces, depending cies, get the necessary funding, and direct the on the service. Those forces are to be used by implementing action. Only first, before imple­ the unified and specified commands. The mili­ mentation could begin, the requirement re­ tary service headquarters in the Pentagon are ceived from the field had to be blessed as a not in the chain of command; they do not tme military service Requirement (capital “R”) operate the forces they are required to orga­ by the headquarters. This meant that the weap­ nize, train, and equip. The service headquar­ on system and the corresponding forces had ters must rely on their subordinate combat to be factored into the appropriate long-range commands (which are the components of the and mid-range plans ( if they affected force WHAT IS AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT? 47

structure), and a formal service position had A sequential approach is generally inef­ to be taken and published, usually in the form fective because of the nature of research and of a Specific Operational Requirement or so b. development and the way new programs are Then, by some completely undefined continu­ considered and approved in osd and the de­ ation of the process, the sendee headquarters partmental secretarial staffs. There are always was supposed to convert the so r into reality. “happenings” going on in r &d —the atmosphere It must be apparent to the perceptive is consistently one of quick change, often rad­ reader that certain aspects of that official pro­ ical change. Getting good new systems and cedure were either at variance with the real equipment from r & d calls for a willingness to Pentagon world or at best contributed only change system specifications, even basic sys­ accidentally to the fulfillment of the services tem approaches, right up to the time of pro­ legal responsibility' to “equip” the forces. Any posal to osd—and even after, if important part-time student of management would pre­ enough. Also, as Secretary McNamara has dict that the individuals on the operational made very explicit, the decision-making on requirements staffs of the operating commands high is not limited to a mere approval or dis­ would tend to concern themselves excessively approval of a single proposed approach. There with the documents involved—both their crea­ must be a consideration of alternatives, even tion and their proper routing and coordinating. alternatives not envisioned by the original That there was much such business occupying proposing agency in the field or in the service Pentagon staff officers is beyond dispute. As headquarters. The sequential approach, be­ to whether it was excessive or not depends on ginning with the qor and proceeding in a step- the point of view. by-step well-defined fashion, fails because the The realities of the situation as perceived qor pre-empts too many decisions on system by General Catton and his working group characteristics, even overall system type, at too were sad. Their conclusions: Not only did early a time and at too low an organizational people spend much time creating and amend­ level. The qor becomes a command “posi­ ing formal documents after the fact to con­ tion” by its very formality, resisting future form with what is going on “where the action change with a certain amount of bureaucratic is,” but—and this is worse—the documents, inertia of its own. All this is not to say that once created, fooled the writers into thinking the operators should be excluded from the they had achieved the goal. The staff officers operational requirements process. In general most knowledgeable about a certain need in they have an expertise and a firsthand knowl­ the field would sit back and rest on their so b edge of the needs of their cinc’s which cannot just when the really productive work of get­ be duplicated. They must be brought into the ting approval and funding of the implement­ process at all stages, not just at the kickoff. ing project should have begun. In the mean­ The same should be said at this point while a more enterprising and less inhibited concerning those agencies which do the r & d group of staff officers was getting things done for the services. The sequential approach, if by “wiring around” the official process, using followed rigidly (and it is often followed rig­ a great variety of nonstandard but effective idly), keeps the r & d experts in their laboratory procedures. cubbyholes during key periods, isolated from the operators, to the detriment of the final flaws in the approach product. Strange as it must sound, the most ef­ fective operational requirement process is not There were fundamental flaws in the sequential but can best be described as tenta­ whole traditional approach, flaws which even tive, a guided sort of muddling through, in­ the most conscientious and energetic staff volving much backing, filling, and evolving. could not surmount. The traditional process The operational requirements business is a failed because it was sequential, formal, and kind of problem-solving, working on detailed defensive. versions of the problem: What are the best 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

new weapon systems and equipment items for would be indefensible in practice because it the future? This point of view makes the fol­ would divert so much staff energy and exper­ lowing observation most appropriate: “In an tise from the real business to be done. important sense a rational problem solver wants what he can get and does not try to get what he wants except after identifying what he W hat is the real requirements business? wants by examining what he can get.”2 What is, then, the real business of opera­ The military services have also hurt their tional requirements? How should it be ap­ operational requirements processes by formal­ proached? As I have suggested, the opera­ izing them, or at least by formalizing them in tional requirements process must serve to the wrong places. In a game where flexibility identify qualitative materiel needs (or opera­ is essential, the formality of the qor and so r tional deficiencies) of the operators and to restricts one’s freedom of movement. A service achieve the approval and funding of the ap­ “position” may not count for much with the propriate programs or projects to fulfill the decision-makers in osd, but it certainly is a need (or eliminate the deficiency). However or sacred cow in the service itself. It takes a very by whomever the needs are identified, the ser­ wise (and brave) junior staff officer to nego­ vice responsibility to equip the forces calls tiate with osd a piece of a program that is at for the approval and funding of programs or variance with an existing “position.” No an­ projects. As we shall see, some of the projects archy is suggested here—it is well known that call for development, some for modification, many “positions” existing on paper (particu­ some for procurement. Once approved and larly in documents such as so r ’s ) are not in funded, the projects proceed in accordance the best interests of the service as time goes with fairly well-defined directives and proc­ on and situations change. Further, nothing is esses in the r &d , modification, or procurement to be gained by excessive formality. True, area. It is the achievement of this crucial ap- some directives for getting action accom­ proval and funding of the right hind of pro- plished must be issued in such format as to gram or project which should he the goal of command the necessary respect and adher­ the operational requirements process. Proce­ ence, but traditionally so r ’s have not been di­ dures, documents, and formalities are only rectives in that sense. Since the services are useful, even tolerable, insofar as they contrib­ probably the worst bureaucracies in the gov­ ute to achieving this goal. The way to the goal ernment for overformalizing activities, a cer­ in any particular instance varies with the sys­ tain deliberate restraint is always in order. tem, the status of r & d , the urgency of the need, Many service staff officers see require­ the time of year, the availability of kinds of ments documentation as necessary defensive funding—with a whole host of factors. The hedges against an unfavorable future for the effective staff officer keeps the goal in sight proposed system or equipment. If, they think, and pursues whatever intermediary activities because of politics, niggardliness, or whatever appear to hold the most promise of contribut­ other ignoble reason motivates the decision­ ing. The effective official requirements process maker he will decide against the require­ is one which permits, even encourages, latitude ment, at least the service has publicly stated of specific approach by the staffs at all levels, its needs, and therefore the blame is on the while making crystal clear what the staff re­ decision-maker for not following through. In sponsibilities are in general. this reasoning, so r ’s have been viewed as a sort of collective “Pearl Harbor File” which could be used to show the general public that the alternatives it is not the service’s fault that the country cannot be defended with adequate weapon The very organization of the service head­ systems and equipment. This defensive atti­ quarters staffs tends to fragment or com­ tude would be bad enough in principle, but it partmentalize proceedings. If an operational WHAT IS AN OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTY 49

requirements matter is given to an r &d man tional requirement can be validly satisfied by to handle, for example, one can expect an direct procurement (and usually testing and r &d answer, even though a modification or evaluation) of the equipment, repackaged as an off-the-shelf procurement might really be necessary. This often happens with small more appropriate. There is a fundamental equipment items that have civilian counter­ problem here, which suggests that we look parts (survival equipment, communication sets, closely at the alternatives available to a man etc.). For the big weapon systems and support trying to satisfy an operational requirement. systems, like aircraft, missiles, and ships, de­ Basically, as stated often by General Catton, velopment programs are called for. Even in there are three av enues of effort for the elimi­ r &d there is much range of choice that must nation of an operational deficiency: tactics, be considered. A study under exploratory de­ modification, or new equipment. velopment may be appropriate to produce The use of new tactics with existing design characteristics for the “next generation” equipment is an obvious first step available system. An advanced development will serve to the operational commander. Witness the to lessen the technical risk for a later engineer­ air tactics used by our jet fighters in South­ ing development by providing operationally east Asia to avoid the sa m’s . Tactics can be sized and shaped equipment for test and changed quickly and locally, but ultimately evaluation. An engineering development or an tactics are constrained by the limiting char­ operational system development (the latter if acteristics of the weapon systems and equip­ follow-on production for inventory has already ment (or personnel) involved. Because of been approved) serves to put the technological their local operational nature, tactics are not idea into final military configuration using the considered as solutions to operational re­ latest available technology, for possible quan­ quirements as we are discussing them here. tity production and operational use. It is some­ The modification of existing (or already times quite clear into which development in-production) systems, on the other hand, is category a project will suitably fall, but often a valid and often very rewarding course of considerable judgment and negotiation are action to satisfy an operational need. This is necessary. In some fields, such as advanced the quickest, and usually the cheapest, way to aircraft, there are contributory activities going achieve a truly new equipment capability. on in many development areas at once. There is almost no kind of operational re­ There is a need for the military service quirement for which some modification could requirements staff officer to have full freedom not be reasonably proposed as a solution. and encouragement to consider all these ap­ Naturally, there are limitations; no one can proaches, in modifications and new equipment, make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, although to do his job properly. The situation is akin what the Air Force has done with the stately to the job of repairing a piece of furniture— old C-47 airplane comes close. One does not it will get fixed the best if the repairman is make a quantum jump with a mere modifica­ permitted to use any tool available ( to borrow tion, but the value of modifications in general a figure of speech from Major General Otto J. can be seen by the very many different models Glasser, Assistant dcs/r &d , Hq usaf). of weapon systems now in use: F-4B, F-4C, F-4D, F-4E, just to give one example. The the Air Force approach time comes, of course, when a completely new system is called for. The current Air Force approach, em­ New technological advances are usually bodied in afr 57-1, recognizes the limitations best exploited in new equipment rather than of previous Air Force procedures and encour­ in modification of older gear. Sometimes such ages a change of modus operandi in Air Force new equipment comes already developed (by headquarters and pertinent field agencies. The a different service, by commercial in-house word “encourages” is used advisedly rather than R4rD, etc.), in which case the matching opera­ “requires” or “directs” because of the nature 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

of the problem. It is one thing to lift the bur­ tell. This is the sort of thing that people will den of stultifying documentation off the staff never agree on, even after the smoke clears. officers’ backs; it is another to change their old It takes a year to two years for everyone habits and rationalize an old mythology held around the circuit to get the new message. dear by many. Some will never change, but Nevertheless, it is possible to see some en­ those who would like to change will at least couraging signs. At least the one swallow is find the law on their side. there! A few straws in the wind: What, specifically, does the new Air Force • More bounce to the manpower ounce Regulation 57-1 change? First, it abolishes all noted in the Air Staff Operational Require­ so r ’s and similar types of document as a way ments Directorate. of doing business. Second, it states philosophy concerning sendee responsibilities, objectives, • A new wave of end-objective-minded- alternative approaches, and flexibility in much ness sweeping over the Development Plans the same terms as I have described. Third, it organization in Headquarters Air Force Sys­ prescribes a new, very flexible document tems Command, which is responsible for oper­ called a "Required Operational Capability” ational requirements business in that com­ mand. A recent document issued by General ( roc), to be used by service field commands as inputs. Fourth, it prescribes a new type of Kent as Dcs/Development Plans, entitled “The afsc Planning Process: Policies, Procedures, document to be issued as necessary by Head­ and Terminology,” bodes well to do for the quarters usaf to direct action to be taken by the field on any operational requirement mat­ Systems Command what afr 57-1 does for the ter. Called a "Requirements Action Directive” Air Force as a whole. ( rad), this document serves to emphasize cer­ • Considerable evidence of increased tain important directives that would otherwise mutual cooperation between the Air Force be issued in ordinary letter form. The rad Systems Command and its “customers,” the avoids the undesirable features of the so r by operating commands. being a temporary action item of purposely restricted scope; it does not therefore become O nly so muc h can be done by changing the an albatross of "position" around the staff’s official procedures. The smart manager tran­ neck. Fifth, afr 57-1 provides for a number of scends the regulations themselves. In my judg­ special cases calling for nonroutine procedures ment, however, an official mechanism has been (operational requirements in support of South­ created which will remove all unnecessary ob­ east Asia, for example). All in all, the Air stacles to the smart manager and still give the Force has put into a single regulation its entire most productive guidance possible to the less new framework for handling operational re­ favorably endowed. If the twin benefits can quirements. be attained of more efficient use of staff ener­ gies on the one hand and more effective ful­ Does it work? fillment of the “equip” responsibility on the other, then the change will not be in vain. Admittedly, one regulation, like one swal­ The new Air Force approach appears to score low. does not make a summer. The big ques­ well on both these counts. Let us hope that tion is, Does it work? It is really too early to time serves to confirm this favorable estimate. Hq Air Force Systems Command

Notes 2. Albert O. Kirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Eco­ 1. There are variations in nomenclature for some types of nomic Development, Research and Development, Policy Mak­ operational requirements in some services. Generally, however, ing: Some Convergent Views,** RAND Paper P-1982 (Santa they are all handled as described here. Monica: The RAND Corporation, 4 May 1960), p. 16. INTER NAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT- "IDEALISM” OR "REALISM”?

1/ Co mma n der Roger J. Mil l er , U.S. Navy

URING the past two decades there has servers who are critical of this policy as it is been an increasing awareness within currently explained, maintaining that the pol­ D the United States of the importance icy is out of line with the realities of today’s of events and trends within the developing world. One of these critics, George F. Kennan, countries.1 This awareness has resulted in has expressed his belief that this policy is widespread agreement that these nations will founded on “slogans and semantic symbols of play a significant role in future world affairs. the past.”2 Yet United States policy towards the develop­ It appears reasonable, then, that this in­ ing countries has been the subject of severe quiry into the nature of the current policy and continuing controversy, based on con­ should initially examine the impact which such flicting views of rationality. “slogans and semantic symbols of the past” Soon after World War II considerable have had on the policy’s formulation and confusion existed in the United States, with its evolution. newly attained world power status, regarding its role and responsibilities in the less-devel­ oped sectors of the world. A great deal of con­ An Extension of Containment fusion remains today. Thus, to raise the subject of current United States policy towards these In retrospect, it seems clear that United countries—broadly described by Administra­ States policy towards developing countries has tion spokesmen as “internal defense and de­ been largely shaped by this country’s broader velopment’’—is to trigger expressions of a wide lines of policy towards the Communist states. range of views and resulting disagreements. It is not mere coincidence that a decided There are more than a few informed ob­ change in United States attitudes concerning 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the so-called Third World closely followed the them credit for. Effective Communist penetra­ breakdown of great power unity after World tions there were limited, and many of these War II and the resulting development of the governments exploited their increased maneu­ strategy of Communist containment. vering room between East and West. Onto The general nature of the policy that this scene was thrust the growing influence of would evolve was indicated by President Tru­ the Chinese Communists. man’s pronouncement of United States support Mao Tse-tung’s strategy and guerrilla tac­ and assistance to Greece, which was threat­ tics that had proven successful in the take-over ened by Communist guerrilla activity in 1947, of China were soon applied by indigenous Com­ and in his 1949 inaugural address proposal of munist elements in Indochina, Malaya, and a “bold new program for making benefits of the Philippines. Though the Communists w’ere our scientific advances and industrial progress defeated in the latter two countries, it was available for the improvement and growth of quite evident that other developing countries underdeveloped countries.” Humanitarian mo­ —plagued by economic stagnation, social in­ tives no doubt had some influence on the justice, and political instability—were ripe for formulation of the proposal, but it is evident similar subversive or insurgent attempts. The that the principal objective was to extend the danger emphasized by the Communist take­ Communist-containment strategy to the under­ over of Cuba, followed by “Che” Guevara’s developed regions by exerting United States espousal of Mao’s tactics and his application influence there. Then, during the 1950s, it of them to conditions in Latin America, was became increasingly popular within both aca­ apparent to the United States public and demic and governmental circles to support the policy-makers. Then the increasingly critical thesis that closely linked the economic and Southeast Asian situation, accentuated by the social development of these countries to growing Vietnam conflict, was deemed to be United States security.3 yet another example of Mao’s “wars of libera­ The success of Truman’s early policy in tion.” preserving the independence of Greece and In 1961 President Kennedy stressed the Turkey from the Soviet threat is well known. need to develop additional capabilities to de­ The post-Stalin era, however, created new feat this “new type of warfare.” In response problems as the Soviets attempted to estab­ to this “new” threat, the traditional economic- lish inroads into the developing countries military assistance policy line was redefined, through their own aid programs, coupled with and reorganization efforts were commenced propaganda campaigns branding United States in an attempt to carry out the policy more assistance as only a new form of colonial effectively. During this period it was fre­ domination. quently reiterated that ( a ) the security of the During this period the implementation of United States and its fundamental values United States policy was hindered by frequent could best be preserved and enhanced within lack of direction and coordination. It was not a community of free developing nations; (b) unusual to find numerous semiautonomous ec­ assistance and encouragement in the process onomic and military entities plus representa­ of development and nation-building would be tives of several United States governmental afforded the developing countries by the departments and agencies in a developing United States; and (c ) when requested, the country. The occasional press reports of aid United States would assist developing nations mismanagement created periodic embarrass­ to prevent or defeat Communist inspired, ment and concern within this country regard­ supported, or directed insurgency which ing the government’s ability to promote na­ threatened their freedom and independence.4 tional security through economic and military This definition remains applicable today. assistance programs. Nevertheless, this policy has become the Yet nations of the Third World proved subject of open and severe examination in more adept than many observers had given recent months. In the opinion of some observ­ INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 53

ers, its rigidity has committed the United D efender of the status quo. A second basic States to the Vietnam conflict—a dreaded land criticism of the policy is that, contrary to war in Asia—contrary to the interests of this idealistic pronouncements, it has in reality country. Thus, criticisms of this policy have transformed the United States into an anti­ attacked its basic premises as well as its im­ revolutionary power. As viewed by these plementation. critics, the United States, which was born in insurgency, will actively oppose any insur­ gency which is Communist inspired or sup­ ported or which may ultimately be exploited basic criticisms by Communists. Thus, it follows that Wash­ A moral crusade. Some critics of the policy ington’s principal objective is to defend the believe that, unwittingly, an unrealistic ideo­ status quo. logical revolution has occurred in the defini­ These critics point to the authoritarian tion of United States national interests. In character of many regimes in the Third World their opinion, this country has become one in which are recipients of United States assist­ pursuit of a broad universal interest framed ance and note that this support aids in the primarily in terms of Communist contain­ suppression of legitimate as well as Com­ ment. Thus, they maintain that Washington munist insurgencies. In their opinion, the policy-makers tend to define international United States has assumed a reactionary role events in terms of a moral crusade against in a revolutionary age. Supporting this view, Communism. This, in their view, has resulted Senator Frank Church has stated, “I cannot in unwarranted unilateral interventions in the remember many revolutions that have been affairs of other nations by the United States. fought in splendid isolation . . . it seems to These observers point to the increased me that the Communists have not changed volume of Administration policy statements the rules of revolution by meddling in them, which interpret national interests in terms of regardless of how much we disapprove of total world involvement and world responsi­ their goals.”0 bilities as indications that the United States is The changing nature of Communism. attempting to define and protect the virtue of Several critics argue that this policy, initially all nations. They view the stated objective “to formed to counteract a monolithic ideology in build an orderly world community” to be a bipolar world, is no longer appropriate in a overly idealistic and moralistic; they compare world of growing polycentrism. They note that the global nature of this objective to the ex­ the monolithic Communism of the 1940s and pansive character of Communism itself. Simi­ 1950s no longer exists; that there are many larly, they claim that a policy which seeks a diversities between Russian and Chinese Com­ “world order which is free from aggression” is munism and between these and the increas­ out of line with reality in this revolutionary ingly national-oriented Communist movements age. Thus, they view as unrealistic those Ad­ of eastern Europe and Asia. They view na­ ministration statements that have tied United tionalism as a force of greater impact than States fighting in Vietnam or intervention in Communism and believe that there is a high the Dominican Republic to stopping Com­ probability that future revolutions in devel­ munism throughout the world. As stated by oping countries will be primarily nationalistic Professor Hans Morgenthau, a foremost in character even though there may be varying spokesman of this group, “a foreign policy degrees of Communist involvement in them. that takes for its standard the active hostility These observers lean toward the view to a world-wide political movement, such as that current United States policy is an over­ . . . Communism, confuses the sphere of reaction to Soviet and Chinese espousal of philosophic or moral judgment with the realm “wars of liberation.” They point to the ap­ of political action and for this reason is parently “mellowed” nature of Soviet Com­ bound to fail.”5 munism and to the formidable domestic and 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

foreign obstacles plaguing the Chinese Com­ trations, has contributed to the illusion that munists as evidence of the practical limita­ problems of poverty, ignorance, social stag­ tions confronting their support for such nation, and poor government in the Third so-called "just” wars. In addition, it is argued \\ orld can be solved by military means. This, that the deepening schism between Moscow in their view, ignores the real sources of in­ and Peking may be lessened and that, in the stability in the developing countries and in­ long run, Communist unity may be restored volves the United States in costly, unproduc­ by our pursuing a policy which opposes Com­ tive conflicts abroad. munism per se. Extending this argument, some critics Power limitation. These critics stress the maintain that the cost of United States mili­ requirement that a successful policy must bal­ tary involvements abroad has restricted vital ance "means” (elements of power) with “ends” domestic economic and social progress and (goals). They argue that the United States has thereby limited this nation’s ability to simply lacks the power to police the world provide more appropriate overseas economic and that any attempt to do so is a fruitless, assistance. In their opinion the changing na­ never-ending task. ture of world conflict has reduced the im­ In this regard Administration statements portance of military power while economic which pledge the United States to oppose strength has become the most effective force “illegal support for so-called wars of libera­ in promoting national interests.7 tion” in order to build an "orderly world community” are viewed as indicating a faulty analysis by policy-makers of United States "Idealism” or "Realism”? power. These critics maintain that policy limits must be narrower and that each situation These criticisms are, of course, interre­ should be analyzed on its own merits with lated. A careful review of the writings and respect to the means available and the ends pronouncements of the more prominent critics, desired. both within and outside the government, in­ A logical extension of this argument is th dicates that most subscribe to all five of these acceptance of major powers’ natural spheres basic arguments. of influence. Walter Lippmann, who has com­ It is my contention, however, that these pared China’s destiny in Southeast Asia to criticisms contain two fundamental flaws. that of the United States in Latin America, has First, they tend to underrate the impact ot a been a leading exponent of this view. nation's domestic ideals and values on its Military excess. The criticism of excess foreign affairs. Second, they overestimate the stems from the conviction that current internal expansive nature and discriminate application defense and development policy too heavily of the policy of internal defense and develop­ stresses the military component while the real ment. sources of unrest within developing nations Labeling this policy as an idealistic, are largely ignored. Such denunciations have crusading attempt by the United States to intensified with the military escalation of the expand its standards and values in the de­ Vietnam conflict, which is often cited as an veloping world ignores reality. It is unrealistic example of an attempt to solve by military to believe a nation's foreign policy can be means problems that are social, economic, and divorced from standards and values which political in origin. These critics point to the exist within that nation’s society. Since foreign possibility that current policy will lead to policy is, in the final analysis, a projection of similar developments elsewhere. domestic interests abroad, it is only natural In the opinion of these observers, the that a nation’s domestic ideals and values increased conventional and unconventional would have an impact on its foreign affairs. warfare capability of the United States, de­ Similarly, no nation can realistically separate veloped by the Kennedy and Johnson Adminis­ its foreign policy from its preference of one INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT 55

tvpe of international society over another. It sponsored or supported by Red China in therefore does not seem unrealistic that United developing countries. States policy towards developing countries The intent of our current internal defense would be framed in pursuit of such long-term and development policy is to frustrate such goals as “self-determination,” “a stable inter­ Communist designs in developing countries national society," “a world free from aggres­ while offering them assistance to progress in sion,” or “universal human progress,” even independence and diversity. That the policy though the attainment of these objectives may is based upon this nation’s preferred view of be unlikely in the foreseeable future. international society does not seem overly There is little doubt that the formulation idealistic. Similarly, this attempt by the of this nation’s containment strategy was in­ United States to influence the developmental fluenced by its ideals, values, and societal process in the Third World hardly deserves preference. The nature of Communism has the label of a status quo policy. undergone a considerable change during the Criticisms which imply that our policy past decade, and a significant factor influenc­ of internal defense and development is overly ing this change has been the success of the expansive and indiscriminately applied are. in containment strategy in limiting overt Russian my judgment, based upon an excessively rigid Communist expansion. Yet the degree to which interpretation of the policy. In this respect. the expansionist motives of Soviet Communism Administration spokesmen have frequently have “mellowed” is questionable. During the reiterated that the United States neither de­ January 1966 Havana Tricontinental Confer­ sires to become an international policeman ence, the U.S.S.R. apparently emerged as the nor intends to impose a Pax Americana on the controlling force of an organized movement to -world. They have often noted, however, that coordinate and control subversive and insur­ the United States has treaty commitments to gent operations in Africa, Asia, and Latin assist in the defense and development of some America. At this conference all pretense of developing countries. The importance of sup­ nonintervention in the affairs of other nations port and assistance to additional countries is was dropped, and the 513 delegates from 83 also frequently stressed in terms of the United countries openly committed themselves to the States’ interests. Here it has been pointed out overthrow by violence of all governments that that such assistance is selective. As expressed do not meet with their approval.' by Secretary Rusk, “We support that policy Another change in the nature of Commu­ in different ways at different times and under nism has been the emergence of an increas­ different conditions.”9 ingly militant and potentially aggressive Com­ Nevertheless, the criticisms include some munist China. Though the Peking regime has elements which must be considered, weighed, had serious foreign policy setbacks during and debated within the policy-making appara­ the past two years, recent official Red Chinese tus of government. It is quite clear that there forecasts of a “new revolutionary storm” with­ are few discernible doctrinal guidelines for the in the developing world indicate that Mao has implementation of the policy. In part, this is not abandoned his quest for ultimate world because of the unique nature of and relation­ revolution based upon the projection of his ships between developmental and defense strategy abroad. Indeed, one of the causative problems within each developing country. In factors behind these foreign policy reverses addition, divergencies of opinion have existed fas well as the current leadership turmoil) has within the United States government itself re­ doubtless been the relative success of United garding the implementation of the policy. States policy towards developing countries. While these are based on conflicting views of Recognition of the serious obstacles con­ technical problems which are beyond the fronting Peking, however, hardly leads to the scope of this article (e.g., the unstabilizing rational judgment that we should decrease effect of economic development, how best to efforts to contain subversion or insurgency combat insurgency in a given situation, etc.), 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

two basic aspects of the policy appear to re­ environment within which development can quire further exploration and definition if con­ occur; and the development-oriented people, fusion among both policy-makers and critics who stress the need for economic, social, and is to be lessened: political improvements which, when attained, • The establishment of priorities. Since would lessen the root causes of insurgency. the redefinition of this policy by the Kennedy Thus, the policy concept should be clarified Administration in 1961, there has been a con­ in a manner which places the missions of the tinuing need to establish priorities among the several implementing components more clearly developing countries. The Senior Interdepart­ in perspective at varying levels of development mental Group (sic), recently established to and conflict. While it is recognized that each assist the Secretary of State in carrying out threatened country presents a unique problem interdepartmental activities overseas, has been in this respect, it seems that a general clarifica­ charged with “assuring a proper selectivity of tion of concept would enable the various de­ the areas and issues” to which the government partments and agencies involved to more effec­ applies its resources.10 Hopefully, this reasoned tively plan and implement their contributions selectivity will result. Here, the short-term and to the internal defense and development effort. long-term interests of the United States and the immediate and long-range threat pertain­ I n su m , then, the goals of “internal defense ing to each developing nation must be con­ and development” and the policy itself seem sidered along with each nation’s objective and to be framed in the context of the realities of subjective characteristics. This is a continuing today’s world. Though there may be some and complex task but one which must be ac­ degree of idealism in this attempt to influence complished if the nature of the current policy developing countries to progress along lines is to become more coherent and if its imple­ favorable to this nation’s preferred view of mentation is to avoid the aura of crisis- international society, it seems only in line with management. reality that the wealthiest and most powerful * Clarification of concept. The terms nation in the world would make such an at­ “internal defense and development” and tempt. Nevertheless, criticisms such as those “counterinsurgency” have been used inter­ cited point up the imprecise and elusive nature changeably within some government circles. of this policy, and in this respect they suggest Yet there are many who believe the latter a need for more specific policy guidelines. term to be too restrictive in concept.11 Essen­ They also describe significant pitfalls which a tially, these varying views center around two successful policy of “internal defense and de­ poles: the defense-oriented people, who em­ velopment” must avoid. phasize the need for maintaining internal stability in a threatened country, to provide an U.S. Army W ar College

Notes 7. Sec, for example, James M. Gavin, “Military’ Power: 1. Admittedly, the term “developing countries” is a mis­ The Limits of Persuasion,” The Saturday Review, 30 July 1966. nomer, as it includes many countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin pp. 18-22, 64. America that are not now developing. Since the term is currently 8. United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The in vogue, it is used here synonymously with "less developed” or Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American “underdeveloped,” generally to indicate countries with annual Peoples (A Staff Study) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing per capita incomes roughly less than S500. Office, 1966), pp. 1—2. 2. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 9. Hearings, p. 9. Hearings on Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966 10. U.S. Department of State, Direction. Coordination and —V i e t n a m (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas, Foreign 1966), p. 358. ( Hereafter cited as Hearings.) Affairs Manual Circular No. 385, 4 March 1966, p. 2. 3. See, for example, Max F. Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, 11. Problems of concept and semantics are both involved A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: here. As approved for interdepartmental usage, “counterin- Harper & Brothers, 1957). This thesis has been supported suc­ surgency” is defined as "Those military, paramilitary, political, cessively by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a govern­ 4. For a succinct discussion of the redefined policy, see ment to defeat subversive insurgency." (Italics added.) Subver­ Dean Rusk, "Problems of Development and Internal Defense,” sive insurgency is defined as that which is “primarily commu­ Foreign Service Journal, July 1962, p. 11. nist inspired, supported, or exploited.” (From Dictionary of 5. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Globalism: Johnson’s Moral U.S. Military Terms For Joint Usage, 1 December 1964.) Yet Crusade.” The Sew Republic, 3 July 1965, p. 21. counterinsurgency is frequently interpreted as a purely military 6. Hearings, p. 9. concept. Military Affairs Abroad 1

THE CONTRAST IN CHINESE AND SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINES

Colonel Wil l ia m F. Scott

hebe was a time when war was war, Chinese, on the other hand, claim that “peo­ fought according to universal concepts ple’s armed forces, beginning with only primi­ Tof doctrine and strategy. Students of tactics tive swords, spears, rifles and hand grenades, paid little attention to situations that differed have in the end defeated the imperialist forces from the norm. Weapon systems were devel­ armed with modem airplanes, tanks, heavy oped to be used against a probable enemy who artillery and atom bombs.”3 was but a mirror reflection of one s own forces. The military professional of today must be Opposing generals had read the same text­ able to bridge mentally the gap between the books—Napoleon’s dictums, Clausewitz’s On effects of an antiballistic missile ( abm) sys­ War, Mahan’s concept of the superiority of tem on an enemy’s first strike and the number sea power, Douhet’s heretical belief that com­ of men required to carry supplies on their mand of the air would suffice. A tactical in­ backs to supply a guerrilla force five hundred structor from Saint-Cvr would be at home in miles away. War-gaming techniques and com­ a classroom at either West Point or Sandhurst. puter models to determine the effects of a Throughout the major armies and navies of second strike in an abm environment may have the world there was a common understanding little applicability in determining how to com­ of the manner in which war would be waged. bat an enemy whose sharpened bamboo spike Today there is no such certainty. A strat­ makes an effective weapon. egy and a weapon system to meet one threat The cardinal sin in military leadership is may be of little value against another. The the failure to understand the nature of your Soviets speak of their protivo kosmicheskaya opponents. In regard to both the Soviet Union oborona (anticosmic defense force)1 and of and Communist China, such misunderstanding military-technical superiority, which they con­ on our part would be inexcusable. Marshals, sider as “the quantity and quality of nuclear generals, and military theoreticians of these weapons and their means of delivery.”- The two nations have stated again and again their 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW respective military tactics and strategies. In The development of modern military af­ our concentration on the war in Southeast Asia fairs demonstrates the failure of theorists who and with our attention focused, in the main, consider, it is said, even the most powerful on forces and hardware for that war, we must weapons useless in the struggle against the take cognizance of other possible threats. masses of the people. . . . During the Great Patriotic War [World War II] the outstanding On most issues of strategy, tactics, and soldier with the grenade could still face an weapon systems, the Soviet Union and Com­ enemy tank, but in the event of the use of the munist China have diametrically opposite nuclear rocket weapon, one cannot wage a vic­ views. An analysis of these views should be of torious struggle with the enemy without hav­ particular importance at this time. These two ing the most modem and powerful technical nations are influencing the war in Vietnam, means.5 and their efforts also are likely to be found in These opposing views, as to whether any other trouble spot in the world. An ap­ properly indoctrinated masses of people or preciation of the total nature of the military technology is superior, have a far-reaching im­ threat is impossible without knowing the mili­ pact. They spell out the difference between tary doctrines of the two competing powers. the “people’s war” advocated by the Commu­ nist Chinese and the “wars of national libera­ a contrast in tactics and strategy tion” supported by the Soviets. They are the basis for the “protracted war” thesis about The Soviets maintain that technology is which Mao spoke some thirty years ago;11 and the key to military' power. The Communist also for the nuclear rocket war envisaged by Chinese leaders claim that masses of people, Soviet military leaders at the present time, of properly indoctrinated, are the decisive force. which it has been said: There is a contradiction, of course, between the stated Chinese view and the effort that The special characteristics of nuclear nation is exerting on nuclear weapons and weapons let us conjecture that world nuclear missiles. These opposing beliefs of the Soviets war will be short and swift-moving, in which and the Chinese are their most significant the most decisive impact on its course and out­ difference, insofar as warfare is concerned, come will be rendered by the results of the and are a major issue in the striving of each armed combat in the beginning period.7 nation for leadership in the Communist World. Their polemics clearly define the differ­ technology—the basis of Soviet ences. Lin Piao, the Chinese Minister of De­ strategy, doctrine, and tactics fense and heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung, has stated: The Soviet view of war is exemplified by the phrase, “revolution in military' affairs,” The Khrushchev revisionists assert that which is found in almost every' speech or nuclear weapons and strategic rocket units are article written by Soviet officers in which mili­ decisive while conventional forces are insignifi­ tary strategy, doctrine, or tactics are discussed. cant, that a militia is just a heap of human flesh. This phrase has been used in the titles of many . . . Their theory of military strategy is that articles and for at least one book.8 The revolu­ nuclear weapons decide everything. tion “is primarily connected with the creation The authoritative Communist of the of the nuclear rocket weapon.”" although it Armed Forces, the Soviet military publication embraces all activities of the Soviet Armed that speaks for both the Communist Party and Forces. the Ministry of Defense,4 appears to reply to Many Soviet writers divide the revolution Lin Piao’s assertion in an article entitled “Mili­ into three phases: the first the development of tary-Technical Superiority: The Most Im­ the nuclear weapon, the second the combining portant Factor of the Reliable Defense of the of the nuclear weapon with the ballistic mis­ Country”: sile, the third the creation of the control and MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 59

guidance system. The third phase, sometimes active operations of the forces of the fleet on called the “cybernetics revolution/' is still con­ the ocean and sea theaters, will find a use, although the modes of their use have been ba­ tinuing.10 sically changed, insofar as here the main prob­ The Soviet Ministry of Defense compiled lems also will be solved by nuclear strikes.ia a selection of articles into a book entitled. Problems of the Revolution in Military Affairs, Soviet military theoreticians emphasize and one of the articles asserts: “the beginning period of the war" and the possibilities of “frustrating” the aggressors' Thus, the revolution in military affairs is attack. For example, the political instructors an accomplished fact. It led to basic quanti- tative and qualitative changes in the military- of the Soviet Armed Forces are directed to technological base of the armed forces and in present the following doctrine: its structure. It m arked a revolution in the The result of using nuclear weapons might methods of waging war, a revolution in the be so effective that the aims of the war will be theory of military art and in the actual com- achieved in this [beginning] period. The im­ bat training of the troops.1 ‘ (Emphasis in orig­ perialists are counting on a snip rise attack in inal Russian text.) their aggressive plans for unleashing a war One of the many results of the revolution against the u ssr and other countries of the in military affairs has been the reorganization socialist camp. However, the Soviet Armed of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Strategic Forces are able to frustrate the aggressor’s attack and carry to him shattering blows.-0 Rocket Troops are regarded as their "main service.12 The Troops of National pvo (air The same doctrine, presented by Marshal defense) normally are listed in second place, Sokolovsky in 1966. becomes even more pvo now includes two additional components, thought-provoking: pr o (antirocket defense) and pk o (antispace The beginning period of nuclear rocket defense).13 pr o has been referred to as the war. in our opinion, consists of the segm ent of primary component of pvo.14 After these two time from the moment of the breaking out of services the Soviets list their conventional war to the fulfillment of the basic military, po- Army, Air Forces, and Navy, each of which is litical and strategic missions. Making a retalia­ also armed with nuclear weapons.15 tory nuclear strike is its main content, one In April 1966 Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, which might be directed at frustrating a nu­ well known in the United States as the editor clear attack, disorganizing governments and of Military Strategy,™ stated the Soviet con­ military administrations, and the destruction cept of their strategic offensive forces: of the economic forces and armed forces of the aggressor. As a result of the retaliatory nuclear In nuclear rocket war, an aspect of stra­ strikes to the aggressor, such a defeat might be tegic action, new in principle, moves out into inflicted after which he could not continue ag­ the forefront—the strike of the strategic nuclear gressive actions.21 (Emphasis in original Rus­ forces on military, economic and political tar­ sian text.) gets of the enemy, that is, the action of the Strategic Rocket Troops, atom submarines and The theme of Soviet military spokesmen long range aviation.17 on strategy, doctrine, and tactics, whether they be senior commanders or military theoreti­ In this same article, which apparently cians, is overwhelmingly nuclear. This is was carefully studied in Europe and the stressed not only in the official Ministry of De­ United States,18 Sokolovsky makes an interest­ fense newspaper, Red Star, and in the official ing point on the possible uses of nonnuclear journal of the Main Political Administration of forces in any future war: the Soviet Army and Navy, Communist of the It is completely probable that in nuclear Armed Forces, but also in the widely publicized rocket war the previous forms of strategic ac­ “Officer’s Library,” a series of seventeen books tions, such as strategic attacks in ground the­ on military tactics, strategy, law, and similar aters, defense in certain sectors, and also the subjects.22 For example, one of these books, 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW entitled Tactics,-' is reviewed in Red Star as When such statements as these are made, being the first publication of this nature in 25 they generally are but one paragraph in an years.24 An examination of the book itself dis­ entire article dealing with nuclear doctrine closes an almost total nuclear orientation—an and strategy. Any actual discussion of the apparent assumption that any future war will possibility of a nonnuclear war is difficult to involve the use of nuclear weapons. As should find in Soviet military writings. The thrust of be expected, both the Soviet reviews and the Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and tactics book refer to the "revolution in military affairs” is nuclear and technological. which prepares the Soviet Armed Forces for future warfare. tactics and strategy of the Chinese People’s Army There are many tasks in the Soviet scheme of things for which nuclear weapons would be The Chinese concept of warfare, as ex­ inappropriate. Among these might be the pounded today, is the complete antithesis of necessity to quell a second “Hungarian Upris­ the Soviet concept. Lin Piao concisely sums ing” or fight a border skirmish with Commu­ up the main points of difference: nist China, of the type which already have In other words, you rely on modern weap­ been reported on numerous occasions. Another ons and we rely on highly conscious revolu­ use might be to seize and occupy territory for tionary people; you give full play to your su­ later inclusion within the socialist camp. While periority and we give full play to ours; you constantly emphasizing the decisive role of have your way of fighting and we have ours. nuclear weapons, the Soviets also must justify their maintenance of nonnuclear forces. There­ In the Chinese view, a war passes through fore, almost invariably, doctrinal writings are three stages: “the strategic defensive, the stra­ concluded with some such statement as tegic stalemate and the strategic offensive.”29 Instead of a “short, swift-moving war,” so .. . victory over the enemy can be achieved much discussed by the Soviets, the Chinese by the united efforts of all the services and think in terms of a protracted war. As Lin Piao branches of the Armed Forces.-5 indicates: At least once each year a few Soviet writ­ . . . the growth of the people’s revolutionary- ers hedge about the possibility of a nonnuclear forces from weak and small beginnings into war. This was noted in 1962 in Sokolovsky’s strong and large forces is a universal law of Military Strategy and has since continued on development of class struggle, a universal law about the same scale. In 1965 one stated: of development of people’s wars. . . . [In war, Mao emphasizes that] the contest of strength In war that is not nuclear rocket, com­ is not only a contest of economic and military bined arms battle will be carried out as before, power, but also a contest of human power and with conventional means.26 morale. . . .That the war will be protracted is In 1966 another theoretician noted: certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this de­ The Soviet Armed Forces must be ready pends entirely upon the degree of the change to guarantee the defeat of the enemy not only in the balance of forces. . . . The enemy ad­ in conditions of the use of nuclear weapons but vances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we also with the use of just conventional methods harass; the enemy' tires, we attack; the enemy of struggle.27 retreats, we pursue. And for 1967 a similar caveat is given: Thus, the Chinese military theoreticians anticipate reverses in the initial periods of war What kind of Armed Forces are necessary and call upon the people to make exceptional for waging present-day war? This question may be briefly answered thus: for waging modem sacrifices. There is no expectation of quick war such Armed Forces are demanded as victory. The basic tactics of guerrilla warfare, would be able to wage both nuclear war and as described by Mao and Lin, are simple. any other war.28 However, guerrilla war in itself is not expected MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 61

to bring about the final defeat of the enemy. nist World. The Chinese are blunt and more As “the balance of forces” changes, purely outspoken than the Soviets. Lin Piao calls for guerrilla warfare is supplemented by mobile a people’s war on a broad scale: warfare/10 Comrade Mao Tse-tung’s theory of the The objective in battle is not simply to establishment of rural revolutionary base areas rout the enemy. The decisive factor is a battle and the encirclement of the cities from the of annihilation, which produces an immediate countryside is of outstanding and universal impact. As Lin Piao so eloquently stated: “In­ practical importance for the present revolu­ juring all of a man’s ten fingers is not as effec­ tionary struggles of all the oppressed nations tive as chopping off one, and routing ten and peoples, and particularly for the revolu­ enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilat­ tionary struggles of the oppressed nations and ing one of them.” In the war of annihilation, peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America Chinese military doctrine emphasizes that the against imperialism and its lackeys. first attacks should be on dispersed or isolated Lin Piao argued that many of the nations in enemy forces. Some cities and even some dis­ these continents had political and economic- tricts must be abandoned to the enemy in conditions similar to that which had existed in order that he be lured deep within the country. old China. The nations that have predominant­ Then, says Lin, the final blow is administered ly peasant populations are in a position to use after the enemy “becomes elated, stretches out the countryside as broad areas where revolu­ all his ten fingers and becomes hopelessly tionaries can maneuver. With this rationale, bogged down.” he developed his theme of North America and If masses of people filled with revolu­ Western Europe being the “cities of the world” tionary zeal are the decisive factor, then the and Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the types of weapons used are of little importance. “rural areas of the world.” According to Lin: “The opposing side is the principal source of In the final analysis, the whole cause of world weapons, equipment and ammunition.’”” One revolution hinges on the revolutionary strug­ of the purposes of fighting the battles of an­ gles of Asian, African and Latin American nihilation is, according to Lin, that “our army peoples who make up the overwhelming ma­ is able to . .. capture weapons from the enemy jority of the world’s population. in every' battle, and . . . our weapons become better.” An army that simply is routed in Many governments of the world were alarmed battle may keep its own weapons during the by Lin’s call to arms: retreat. Today, the conditions are more favora­ In a remark directed at the so-called “im­ ble than ever before for the waging of people's perialistic powers,” Mao Tse-tung sums up his wars by the revolutionary peoples of Asia, strategy and tactics: Africa and Latin America . . .

You fight in your way and we fight in Instead of the “people’s war” as advocated ours; we fight when we can win and move by the Chinese, the Soviet Union supports away when we can’t. . . . When you want to “wars of national liberation.”™ However, the fight us, we don t let you and you can’t even Soviets are vague as to how such wars should find us. But when we want to fight you, we be fought and what kind of aid might be given make sure that you can’t get away. . . . *- to the nation or group concerned. Some reasons for the Soviet reticence are competition for Communist leadership fairly simple to understand. The Chinese claim that the Central Asian Soviet Socialist Repub­ The military writings on doctrine and lics are in reality colonies and as such should strategy by both the Soviets and the Chinese throw off the yoke of their Russian conquerors. are directed not only for internal consumption This would be a war of national liberation in and to each other but also to establish their the Soviet sense. The problems the Soviets had respective claims to leadership in the Commu­ with their wars of national liberation attempted 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in are doing their utmost to spread all kinds of 1956 are well known. arguments against people’s war and, whenever Soviet writers are careful not to place wars they can, they are scheming to undermine it of national liberation into any one category: by overt or covert means. . . . The Khrushchev revisionists insist that a nation without nuclear The forms of national liberation struggle weapons is incapable of defeating an enemy of oppressed peoples are sufficiently diverse, with nuclear weapons, whatever methods of from a national armed uprising, for example, in fighting it may adopt. . . . Isn’t this helping the Algeria and Angola, to a comparatively peace­ imperialists in their nuclear blackmail? Isn’t ful achievement of independence of the for­ this openly forbidding people to make revolu­ mer French colony of Guinea.34 tion? Any commitment by the Soviet Union to Ridiculous as this statement is, the Soviets any nation engaged in a war of national libera­ seem compelled to make similar charges: tion also is indefinite. To paraphrase a certain former well-known industrialist and United Speaking of the help of the Socialist coun­ States Secretary of Defense, “What is good tries to the Vietnamese people, one cannot pass over in silence that pernicious role which the for the Soviet Union is good for the rest of the Peking leadership is playing in this business. socialistic-communist nations.” Through Soviet . . . With their adventuristic internal and ex­ eyes, it is natural that: ternal policies they have complicated all the By providing the most favorable inter- political conditions in Asia and have stabbed the struggling people of Vietnam in the back. national conditions for the building of com- In spite of wordy statements, the practices of munism in our country and the building of the Chinese leaders have played into the socialism in the countries of all the socialistic- hands of the American aggressors. The world communist nations, Soviet foreign policy thus makes its own contribution to the common rev- press unanimously reports that the present policy of Peking has eased the Pentagon’s re­ olutionary cause of all nations.15 (Emphasis in sumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.37 original Russian text.) The concept of a Soviet shield is stated This competition between the Soviet by Marshal N. I. Krylov, Commander in Chief Union and Communist China, the two giants of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Troops: of the Communist World, is a contradiction of Marxism that would not have been dreamed The main role in defending the peace and of a decade ago. It is one of the significant the socialist gains of nations belongs to the events of this century. To the military pro­ Soviet Union, the stronghold of social progress. fessional, it is a phenomenon that must be Under the leadership of the Communist Party clearly understood. the Soviet people have created such military power which serves as an insurmountable block on the path of the aggressive aims of imperial­ T here is a danger that our perceptions of mili­ ism.30 tary doctrines, strategies, and organizations of In the struggle for leadership of the other military forces could revolve around our Communist World, accusations between the own “blue team and red team concept. In our two nations take a remarkable turn: each ac­ planning, war-gaming, maneuvers, and so on, cuses the other of cooperating with the United we tend to match the blue team against the States in Vietnam. The Chinese accusations red team, and the two sides generally are are direct, while the Soviets are a bit more identical in organization, composition, and subtle. To quote Lin Piao: types of weapons available. The moves of each are “rational,” and rationality means the same The Khrushchev revisionists have come to the rescue of United States imperialism just to both sides. Hence we may find it difficult, when it is most panic-stricken and helpless in in actual situations, to understand why the its efforts to cope with people s war. Working opposing side does not react to our military hand in glove with the U.S. imperialists, they moves as we expect. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 63

This brief analysis indicates there is little image of our own. This is but another reflec­ similarity between the military forces and tion of the nuclear age, in which the tactics doctrines of the two major Communist powers. and strategies of past eras have little meaning. Furthermore, each is far from being a mirror Have we really faced up to the problem? Hq United States Air Force

Votes entitled Soviet Military Strategy, were available in the United States in 1963. 1. Explanatory Dictionanj of Military Terms (Moscow: 17. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky and General Major M. I. Military Publishing House, 1966), p. 348. 2. Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, “Military- Cherednichenko, “On Contemporary Military Strategy," Com- munist of the Armed Forces, No. 7, April 1966, p. 64. Technical Superiority: The Most Important Factor of the Reli­ able Defense of the Country,” Communist of the Armed Forces, 18. Wing Commander J. F. L. Long, RAF (Ret), “Shifts in No. 17, September 1966, p. 9. Russia’s Strategic Posture,” Royal Air Force Quarterly, Winter 3. Lin Piao, Minister of Defense, Communist China, in a 1966, p. 299. speech “Long Live the Victory of the People's W ar," 2 Sep­ 19. Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko, p. 64. tember 1965. (All the following quotations of Lin Piao are 20. Colonel S. V. Malyanchikov, “The Character and taken from this speech.) Features of Nuclear Rocket War,” Communist of the Armed 4. Communist of the Armed Forces is the official publica­ Forces, No. 21, November 1965, p. 71. This article was listed tion of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and in the "Political Studies Department" of the magazine, and Navy, which has "the rights of a department of the Central political instructors were to devote six hours to the study of the Committee." See I. Butsky, Political Work in the Soviet Army particular theme. Moscow: Progress Publishers, n.d.), p. 23. 21. Sokolovsky and Cherednichenko, p. 65. 5. Bondarenko, p. 8. 22. Publication of these books by the Military Publishing 6. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War (Peking: Foreign House began in 1965. As of April 1967 only nine of the an­ Language Press, 1966). This book is a reprint of a series of nounced seventeen volumes had appeared. lectures delivered by Mao during the period 26 May to 3 June 23. General Major V. G. Reznichenko (ed.). Tactics 1938. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966, first printing 40,000 7. General Colonel Nikolai A. Lomov, “The Influence of copies, cost 1 ruble 61 kopeks [S1.77J), 408 pp. Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of Military Art,” 24. General Lieutenant V. Davidenko, Red Star, 14 Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 21, November 1965. p. December 1966. 16. (General colonel is roughly the equivalent of three-star rank 25. Colonel V. V. Larionov, “New Weapons and the in the U.S. armed forces.) Duration of War,” Red Star, March 1965. 8. For example, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the 26. Colonel A. A. Strokov (ed.). The History of Military Task of the Military Press” by Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky and Art (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966), p. 616. The “The Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Results” by General manuscript of the book went to press in 1965. The book is one Lieutenant N. A. Sbitov, both included as selections in Problems of the “Officer’s Library” series, with a first printing of of the Revolution in Military Affairs compiled by the Soviet 35,000 copies. Ministry of Defense (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1965). 27. Colonel I. P. Prusanov, “The Work of the Party in 9. Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 393. the Strengthening of the Armed Forces in Terms of the Revo­ 10. General Major N. Ya. Sushko and Colonel S. A. lution in Military Affairs,” Communist of the Armed Forces, Tyushkevich (eds.), Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army No. 3, February 1966, p. 10. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1965), p. 247. (A Soviet 28. General Lieutenant I. G. Zavyalov, “On Soviet Mili­ general major roughly corresponds to one-star U.S. rank.) tary Doctrine,” Red Star, 30-31 March 1967. 11. General Lieutenant N. A. Sbitov, “The Revolution in 29. Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War- Military Affairs and Its Results,” a selection in Problems of the fare (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 21. Revolution in Military Affairs (Moscow: Military Publishing 30. Ibid., p. 20. House, 1965), p. 89. 31. Ibid., p. 24. 12. Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 383. 32. Quoted by Lin Piao, op. cit. 13. Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (Moscow: Military’ 33. Sushko and Tyushkevich, op. cit. Chapter Two of the Publishing House, 1965), p. 181. book is entitled “The Social Character and Types of Wars in 14. Ye. K. Bragin and A. G. Kubarev, Anti-Missile the Modern Era,” pp. 69—113. Also see V. V. Zagladin, "The Defense (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1966), p. 3. Leninist Course of Foreign Policy of the USSR," Communist 15. General Major K. S. Bochkarev (ed.), The Program of the Armed Forces, No. 9. May 1966, pp. 12-20. of the CPSU on Defending the Socialist Fatherland (Moscow: 34. Sushko and Tyushkevich, p. 104. Military Publishing House, 1965), p. 114. 35. Zagladin, p. 13. 16. Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy, 36. "Reliably Guarding the Achievements and Security appeared in Moscow bookstores in August 1962, about two of the Nations," Red Star, 9 May 1967. months before the Cuban missile crisis. English translations, 37. “The Cause of Vietnam Is Just,” Izvestia, 24 Febru­ ary 1967. v/ THE AIR FORCES OF TROPICAL AFRICA

j Dr . R oss K. Baker

onsiderable effort has been expended re­ flict. In mid-August 1967, the balance of air cently on analyses and descriptions of power drastically changed in favor of the Fed­ theC armies of Tropical Africa.1 There has not, eration when it acquired 2 Mig-15s and 8 Mig- however, been any extensive treatment of the 17s from the Soviet Union and 6 Delfin L-29 air forces of these new states. The reason for jet trainers from Czechoslovakia. In the con­ this has undoubtedly been that Tropical Afri­ tinuing strife in the Congo, the decision by can air forces, virtually without exception, are the U.S. government to supply logistical sup­ weak and essentially embryonic components port in the form of three C-130s to the Kin­ of a military establishment dominated by the shasa government for the purpose of ferrying army. In Tropical Africa only Ethiopia, Ghana, troops has proved to be a major military and and most recently Nigeria have air forces of morale factor in combating mercenary and any size. It is understandable, then, that ob­ separatist forces. servers should consider only the armies. Re­ That so few aircraft should have such a cent events in Africa, however, have indicated considerable impact is indicative of certain that the role of air power may not be as negli­ military realities in Tropical Africa. Initially, gible as was once assumed. ground communication and transportation are In the Nigerian civil war, for example, the intermittent and unreliable. Long rainy sea­ presence of two B-26s in the air force of the sons and the lack of hard-surfaced roads secessionist state of Biafra was, at the outset, mean that military operations must come to a a major psychological weapon. Opposing Bia­ virtual halt after the dry season. Road and rail fra, the Federation of Nigeria initially em­ networks are not extensive and do not ade­ ployed its German Do-27 trainers and German- quately cover most countries. Few intercolony trained pilots to some advantage in the con­ roads were built by the Europeans, who were MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 65

more concerned with internal traffic than with arms suppliers that expensive, high-perform­ access to neighboring colonies. Airports, on ance military aircraft are not suitable or de­ the other hand, are usually well dispersed and, sirable for African states. The principal excep­ although subject to the vagaries of weather tion to this is Ethiopia, where the U.S. has pro­ and lack of navigational devices, can be used vided significant training and equipment to by light planes and medium transports most the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force ( ie a f ). Aside months of the year. Modifications on aircraft from the recent shipment of Migs to Nigeria, are usually required, however, in order to surprisingly few Soviet military aircraft have allow them to operate from dirt or grass land­ appeared in Tropical Africa, although this sit­ ing strips. uation is not expected to continue.3 The level of military training and disci­ Another factor militating against large pline varies from country to country, but as a and powerful African air forces is that while rule standards are not high. Most enlisted men most former colonies inherited armies, there are country people with no combat experience, were no colonial air forces per se to be trans­ and for them to face something as terrible as ferred from colony to independent state. It aerial bombardment (even on a modest scale) was not until several years after independence is likely to be demoralizing and destructive of that Ghana, for example, created an air force, discipline. although the colonial army, the Gold Coast Air power in .Africa, as modest as it is, has Regiment, became the Ghana Army upon the far outpaced air defense. Even those countries attainment of independence. Given the choice involved in conflict have been hard pressed to of building up either military and police units come up with a meaningful civil defense pro­ or air forces, most African leaders opted for gram in the urban areas. Some states, notably the former. Nigeria, possess antiaircraft batteries, but mili­ The problems of pilot training and air­ tary’ procurement as a whole has been charac­ craft maintenance also work against the terized by the acquisition of mortars, fight growth of Tropical African air forces. A man artillery, and ordinary automatic weapons. An reared in a basically nontechnological culture aircraft, once aloft and competently piloted, has difficulties in apprehending the sophis­ has virtual sanctuary' in the sky. ticated scientific principles involved in piloting Given these obvious advantages which a modern aircraft. Principles of physics to accrue to air power, why have the air forces which most Americans and Europeans are ex­ of Tropical Africa been of limited size and posed at an early age are unfamiliar and be­ importance? A number of factors contribute wildering to a young man reared in a rural to this situation. First, aircraft are costly and African village. That there is a significant most African states cannot afford them. Even number of African pilots is a tribute to the in­ prestige-conscious leaders have thought twice telligence and ingenuity of those who have before buying military aircraft. As a prestige overcome these cultural limitations.4 The same symbol, the airplane frequently loses out to problems that cause difficulties in pilot train­ the aluminum plant or the hydroelectric facil­ ing also hinder standards of maintenance, ity. Second, several African states, notably the which as a rule are not high. This deficiency former French colonies, have entered into bi­ too can be overcome by patient but ambitious lateral and multilateral defense agreements training of ground personnel. with their former metropolitan power to pro­ Despite the factors operating against vide military assistance in the event of invasion large sophisticated air forces, some small, use­ or internal unrest.2 ful air forces have evolved. These air forces Third, the main aircraft producers and are based primarily on fight short-takeoff-and- vendors have been fairly restrained in their landing ( st o l ) aircraft, training planes, and sales activities in Africa, and military aid in medium transports, almost all piston-driven. the form of aircraft has not been notable. The main exceptions to this are Ethiopia and, There seems to be a tacit agreement among to a lesser extent, Ghana. 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Cameroon has several small Broussards and Ethiopian Air Force has sent graduate pilots a C-47. — Congo-Brazzaville has several single­ to the East African Locust Service, and it par­ engine aircraft, a DC-3, and a helicopter; and ticipated in the Somali Flood Relief Operation its neighbor, Congo-Kinshasa has about 6 in 1961. The air forces could also be used to DC-3s and a half-dozen light aircraft. — Ethio­ carry livestock to market. In many African pia, with 70 aircraft, has a large inventory by states the cattle-raising areas are remote from African standards: a squadron of F-86s, 5 the main population centers where most beef T-33s, 10 C-47s, 7 F-5s, and 20 Saab-17s and is consumed. Cross-country cattle drives in the 91s. — Gabon has a helicopter, a DC-3, and dry season through areas infested by tsetse several Broussards. — Ghana has more than 70 flies decimate the herds. Livestock lifts on a aircraft, mostly of Commonwealth origin: over large scale, however, would be difficult in light 25 Beavers and Otters from Britain and Can­ of the number of aircraft now available. The ada, 8 Caribous, 12 Chipmunk trainers, 1 small air forces could also be used for disaster Heron VIB, a half-dozen Westland Whirlwind relief and relocation of game animals threat­ helicopters, and several Wessex and Hughes ened by fire and flood. There is a significant helicopters. In the early 1960s when an Indian role for the Tropical African air forces, and it mission was training the Ghana Air Force, a need not be a combat role. number of Hindustan HT-2 trainers were ac­ In the event of conflict, however, there quired. Eight Aermacchi M.B. 326Fs were sold will probably be great pressure exerted on the to Ghana by Italy; only 3 are presently opera­ aircraft-producing countries to provide combat tional. — The neighboring Ivory Coast has a aircraft or at least trainers that can be fitted small number of Broussards and Pilatus Port­ out with guns, rockets, or other ordnance. The ers. — Libya began its air force in 1959 with 2 U.S. may well be called upon to provide either Egyptian Gomhouria fighters and later ac­ aircraft, pilots, or supporting sendees as in the quired 2 U.S. T-33s. — Nigeria, as previously Congo recently. It will be difficult to refuse mentioned, has some Domier Do-27s and a a beleaguered nation, even though our better Heron transport, 6 Delfin L-29s, 2 Mig-15s, judgment tells us that expensive aircraft are and 8 Mig-17s. The secessionist state of Bia- inappropriate for a struggling and financially fra has 2 B-26s, although at least one of these burdened state. If the U.S. finds itself in this was said to have been destroyed in recent position, it would be better to provide the fighting. — Kenya is receiving 6 Chipmunks, African air forces with multipurpose craft that 11 Beavers, and 4 Caribous from Great Britain. could be used in a practical civilian role after — Senegal has 2 C-47s, light aircraft, and sev­ their military utility had ended. eral Mig-15 trainers. — The Sudan has 20 light It is well to mention briefly the role of transports and British Provost training craft.5 civil aviation in Africa. Many of the qualified If Africa’s new states are not troubled by African pilots obtained their training as second international wars or internal disorders, the officers on the national flag carriers. The na­ trend in acquisition and utilization of aircraft tional airlines established shortly after inde­ will continue along the lines already followed. pendence, in most instances, were originally There will be small, versatile air forces that more useful as sovereignty symbols than as concentrate on logistical support, patrol, and profitable enterprises. Many of these flag car­ disaster duty. There is a strong case to be riers are still heavily subsidized by the govern­ made for air force civic action to parallel the ments, but others have moved in the direction civic-action programs pursued by some African of paying their own way. Improved manage­ armies. The Imperial Ethiopian Air Force has ment practices and abandonment of unprofit­ already become involved in this sort of pro­ able routes have helped the financial position gram. The small air forces can be used in crop of Ghana Airways. Air Afrique, a cooperative spraying and insect eradication. The Ghana venture of several French-speaking West Afri­ Air Force has used helicopter sprayers to com­ can countries, has the reputation of being an bat mosquitoes in the Accra area. The Imperial exceedingly well-run enterprise. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 67

Future political events in Africa will prob­ cohesion may well call for military operations ably determine, more than anything else, the in which the role of air power—even a modest future of military aviation. The necessity of level of air power—will be a decisive factor. maintaining territorial integrity and national The Brookings Institution

Notes 1. See, e.g., African Forum (Summer 1966); VV. F. Gut- have to be completely retrained by the British. Both of the teridge. Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New antagonists in the Nigerian civil war have had to rely mainly York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Morris Janowitz, The Mili- on mercenary pilots. tary in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: 5. These data were derived from Neville Brown and University of Chicago Press, 1964). W. F. Gutteridge, The African Military Balance, Adelphi Papers 2. See ‘Trance’s Military Role in Africa,” West Africa No. 12 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, August 1964), (n.d.), reprinted in Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1964). passim; and George Weeks (comp.), "The Armies of Africa,” 3. U.S. military aid to Ethiopia is discussed briefly in Africa Report, Vol. 9, No. i (January 1964), pp. 5—21; and “Who's Armed Whom?" The Economist, 25 March 1967. The John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, Arms to Developing IEAF inventory includes one squadron of F-86s and 7 F-5s. Countries: 1964-1965, Adelphi Papers No. 28 (London: Insti­ 4. The Russians had promised the former president of tute for Strategic Studies, October 1966). It was reported on Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, that they could train Chanaian pilots 9 August 1967 in the New York Times that the Sudan was in in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in six months. When a group the process of acquiring Mig-17s from the U.S.S.R., although of these trainees returned from the U.S.S.R., it was discovered 12 Sudanese cadets were being trained in the U.S., two as jet that the Soviets had not succeeded and that the Ghanaians would pilots. V THE GREAT JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE v

Master Sergea nt Cornelius W. Conley

N 4 November 1944 a United States Navy patrol craft spotted something O that looked like a large fragment of tattered cloth floating on the sea, 66 miles southwest of San Pedro, California. A sailor tried to drag the fabric on board the craft but discovered that a heavy undercarriage was attached to it. When the fabric was hauled on board, it was found to be a rubberized-silk balloon. The apparatus connected to the under­ carriage of the balloon consisted of a small radio transmitter with an on-off vibrator cir­ cuit to interrupt the transmitted signal period­ ically, giving a characteristic signal that could serve for identification purposes. The trans­ mitter had a small variable condenser (actu­ ated by an aneroid bellows), which caused the transmitted frequency to vary between 6.2 and 6.6 megacycles, depending upon the altitude of the balloon. Under reasonably favorable conditions, the transmitter would have a range of approximately 1000 miles. JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 69

There was also an aneroid bellows con­ Though its appearance was quaint, the trolling the operation of a ratchet contact balloon was a practical and effective one. The switch, which was designed to make contact fbi soon discovered that the Japanese had successively with its seven switch points as the obligingly printed a good deal of information atmospheric pressure varied. The switch es­ on the bag. It had been completed only a few tablished contact when the external pressure w'eeks before, on 31 October 1944 to be exact, went up and broke contact when the pressure at a Japanese factory. Japanese characters went down. Contact w'as then made on the also revealed the number of hours spent in its next successive point when the pressure went manufacture and data regarding work shifts. up again. The purpose of such a device was to change the transmitted signal for each cycle The Rising Sun’s V Weapon of the balloon’s ascent and descent. In addi­ tion, the ratchet device wras used to drop sand The use of balloons as a weapon of war ballast automatically from the hopper type of w'as conceived by the Japanese Military Scien­ undercarriage when the balloon fell to a pre­ tific Laboratory in 1933, w'hen study and re­ determined level. search projects were started on the use of All the equipment bore Japanese mark­ a 4-meter (13.12-foot) balloon with a flying ings and indicated that something new' and range of 100 kilometers (62.14 miles). The mysterious had been introduced into the strug­ study continued until 1935, when the research gle that w’as World War II. group of the lab started studying the theory After the finding of the first balloon, it of long-range balloon warfare, utilizing winds was two more weeks before other fragments at altitudes of 3 to 6 km. They investigated were salvaged from the ocean. At 1000 hours methods of keeping balloons airborne for long on 14 November 1944, the Coast Guard at periods of time and tried to determine if the Kailus, Hawaii, saw an airborne object de­ w'est wind continued to blow' the entire 10,000- scend into the sea, five miles out. The object km distance across the Pacific Ocean. For was reported to be a paper balloon 30 feet some unknowm reason the project w'as dis­ in diameter. A fragment of the envelope and continued. Either the experiment w'as com­ some of the attached gear were recovered pleted or, with no apparent need for this type from 20 feet of w'ater. of weapon at that time, the whole idea w'as Around 15 November, a balloon floated shelved until some future date. silently across Cape Flattery on Washington’s That date turned out to be 7 December rainswept northern coast. Finally, unseen, un­ 1941 w'hen Japan entered World War II. At heard, it buckled gently into a heap near this time Major General Sueyoski Kusaba re­ Kalispell, Montana, 475 air miles east of the quested that the research group be given per­ Pacific Coast. After its discovery by two mission to conduct full-scale development of puzzled loggers on 11 December 1944, men a long-range balloon. In addition, he requested of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that a 1000-km area be reserved for manu­ the Army Air Forces investigated to determine facture and test. But his pleas fell on deaf its origin and purpose. The amount of snow' ears, and he found little if any support for his on the balloon when discovered indicated that idea. The project remained a closed subject it had landed between 11 and 25 November. until a single event took place on 18 April The balloon had presumably been launched 1942 and shook the Japanese military empire, from an offshore submarine, as had been the dispelling once and for all the Japanese mili­ small seaplane, piloted by Nobuo Funita, tarists’ boast that their zone of inner defense which on 9 September 1942 had dropped was impregnable against air power. about 165 pounds of fire bombs near Mt. The event was the Doolittle raid on Emily, Oregon, causing small forest fires. But Tokyo, by sixteen carrier-based B-25 medium why these unarmed balloons? bombers. Technical Major General Sueyoski Kusaha, director of Japans long-range balloon program, wears a medal on his right breast pocket for his leadership of the project. . . . The fully inflated rubberized-silk balloon is like one found off San Pedro, California, and used by the U.S. in testing.

Hydrogen-filled balloons were launched from site near Otsu, located in northern Shiga prefecture, Japan. When it was discovered by the U.S. Army in 1947, the area was overgrown with weeds, and the equipment was rusty. . . . A Japanese balloon in eastward flight over the Pacific Ocean. JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 71

Apparently the attention given to the them into a solution of glycerine. Japanese home defense had been secondary After the panels were dried, the edges to that given to efficient operations in the war were trimmed and the panels were pasted theaters. In spite of at least one radio message together on a spindle form, the top part first, Tokyo received, the Japanese were unprepared then the lower part. After the relief valve was for the attack. installed, the suspending band was attached In seeking reprisals for the Doolittle raid, to the two hemispheres, and they were pasted the Japanese conceived the first transoceanic together. automatic-balloon campaign in history. It was Then the balloon was filled with gas for to be their V-l weapon. The Ninth Military test purposes and coated with a protective Laboratory was immediately ordered to study varnish. The earlier paper balloons were made various balloons capable of carrying bombs to in factories, but when the demand reached its the American continent. peak, the factories merely processed the paper It was first intended that the balloons and made the majority of the panels. The pan­ would be released from submarines off the els were then sent to subcontractors, who West Coast of the United States, and in March assembled the panels into the finished product. 1943 a 6-meter (19.6-foot) balloon with a de­ Some of the industrial firms connected with sired range of 300 km (186.4 mi) was devel­ the operation were the Mitsubishi Saishi oped which flew 1000 km (621.4 mi) between (Paper Factory), the Nippon Kakokin Com­ the west and east coasts of “Japan proper.” pany, and the Kokuka Rubber Company. It Later it was found that this model could stay is interesting to note that the major share of in the air for more than 30 hours at an altitude assembly work was performed by Japanese of 8 km (4.97 mi). school girls working in large theaters and By this time, however, the Japanese Navy sumo wrestling arenas in the Tokyo, Osaka, was so depleted that ships and submarines and Kyoto areas. necessary to carry on such an attack were no The type “B ” balloon, which was a Japa­ longer available, and therefore further investi­ nese Navy project, was made of habutai silk gations were necessary to invent a balloon with gum coating. The Fujikur Industrial capable of traversing the expanse of ocean be­ Company impregnated the silk with the rub­ tween Japan and North America. ber type of gum. The balloon had a standard So the Ninth Lab was ordered to develop weight of approximately 170 kg. a balloon with a range of 10,000 km, to be These balloons consisted of four sheets of released from the Japanese home islands. The gum-coated habutai silk pasted together to research was started in August, with the form panels for the bottom half and five layers emphasis on two objectives: maintaining the for the top half. After the two halves had been balloon aloft for a long period of time and formed, they were put together in spherical determining whether the west wind was con­ shape. The connecting parts were sewed to­ tinuous for 6200 miles across the Pacific. They gether with a wide, overlapping seam, and began by studying what were termed the “A” cotton tape sealed the seams. Then the balloon and “B" types of balloons. was inflated and tested, and any leakage was The materials of the “A” type balloon con­ stopped by a gum concentrate with benzol as sisted of handmade and handpatched integu­ the solvent. mentary paper. The raw, handmade mulberry General Kusaba had many other obstacles paper had a standard weight of 15 g/sq m. to overcome before the harmless-looking bal­ With four pieces of paper pasted together loon could be turned into an effective weapon. lengthwise and breadthwise alternately, the The variability of atmospheric phenomena balloon section began to take shape. The next was at first regarded as the chief problem. step was to soften the paper panels by first After several meteorological observations, dipping them into a solution of soda ash, then however, it was concluded that as long as the washing them with water, and finally dipping weather was not too bad the atmospheric pres- sure should remain fairly constant across the ocean at a given altitude. It was recognized that there were some ascending and descend­ ing air currents, though, even at 10 km (32,000 ft), as a result of weather conditions on the earth. Probably the greatest problem was in de­ veloping a radiosonde that could operate at length under the varying stratospheric con­ ditions. The responsibility for development of such a system went to the Japanese Fifth Army Technical Laboratory. The primary pur­ pose of the radio equipment would be to test the balloon’s flying course and its altitude, to indicate the balloon’s inside pressure. In addi­ tion, it would provide data on the balloon’s ascending and descending flight and indicate when the ballast was being dropped. The first tests were conducted from the Chiba prefec­ ture area. At the time, there was no known radio­ sonde that could operate for the desired length of time under stratospheric conditions. The most trouble was encountered in the develop­ ment of a power source of adequate durability and the selection of frequencies. In order to check the function of the radio equipment during these experimental flights, various mod­ els of the radiosonde apparatus were devel­ oped and suspended from the balloon instead of bombs. After considerable effort, the lab finally succeeded in building a set. It was attached to a balloon, and the balloon was released on a free flight. For 80 continuous hours the set continued to operate, relaying valuable flight information. The radio fell silent when the balloon reached a point 130 degrees west longitude. Based on theoretical calculations, a balloon could cross the Pacific in three days during the winter period of November to March.

The San Pedro balloon carried this “hopper” type of automatic ballast-dropping mechanism, with the radio transmitter mounted on top of it. Radio shown below. JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 73

The radiosonde system developed for posing that the decreasing ratio of the tem­ monitoring the balloon's flying course was one perature effected by the altitude was fixed, that produced a continuous wave, moderated then by calculating the air pressure of this bv a multivibrator. This piece of equipment particular altitude, they were able to draw an had a power output of 2 watts with an A & B aerological isobar. By calculating the inclining frequency which worked on an alternating degree between the isobar and the speed of cycle. “A” would operate 10 minutes and rest the wind from the latitude charted, they could 10 minutes; while “A” was resting, “B was draw a line to a point on a chart. operating, and vice versa. On the basis of this conception, they anal­ In October 1944, 50 hours of flying rec­ ogized the flying course of the balloon, its ords were obtained on a type “A” balloon and speed, and its diffusion; and thereby they de­ 80 hours on a type “B balloon. Charts that cided where to launch the balloons. It was were plotted on both balloons showed that the noted that the upper airstream which reaches type “B” maintained a more constant and the American continent is a winding one; that stable altitude. the airstream in the American continent area From the results of the 200 experimental tends to flow southward. The time required balloon flights conducted from February to for a balloon to fly the complete course was March 1944, it was concluded that if more estimated from 30 to 100 hours; the average improvements were made in the future, the time was 60 hours. objective would be reached. The Japanese also had a minor problem To investigate the weather conditions, in determining a launch site. If Hokkaido had lab scientists tried to collect all available been the starting point, the balloons would material and information from the Central have entered the Soviet Union; so Choshi in Meteorological Observatory and from the southeast Honshu was chosen as the best Military Observation Bureau, but at the time launch site. Another reason for selecting this there was little information or reference ma­ area was its proximity to the hydrogen supply. terial concerning altitudes above 500 meters. In determining when to launch a balloon, They obtained some data about the upper the Japanese used a simple process. If a high regions over Japan and the American main­ atmospheric pressure front had just passed the land, but nothing about the Pacific Ocean area, then it was most suitable for balloon area. Since they were unable to obtain infor­ launching; but if a high pressure front was mation about the west wind in the strato­ approaching or if a low pressure front had sphere, they had to analyze the data available just passed, then it was unsuitable for a bal­ from the Tateno Aerological Observatory. loon launching. Average winds aloft were plotted for each Another equally difficult problem resulted month beginning in January 1943. These were from the changes in temperature which the used to forecast wind velocities and directions. balloon encountered during its flight. A sud­ By September of that year maps had been den change of temperature from 20 degrees in completed, but they indicated a sharp curve the day to —50 degrees after sunset would of the airstream on the west coast of the cause the balloon to drop. The Japanese American continent. This new discovery be­ Eighth Technical Laboratory was assigned to came the subject of many interesting discus­ help solve the temperature and contraction sions. By November 1943 the theoretical cal­ problems. culation had been verified to a small degree Since the “B" type balloon had a greater by the radio observations of the experimental inside pressure (35 mm Hg), there was little balloon flights. These flights showed that the difficulty with the temperature contraction calculated routes were accurate as high as problem. This was determined by analyzing 300 km. the radiosonde equipment which recorded the It is interesting to note how the predicted amount of ballast dropped. The “B" balloon route charts were drawn up. First by sup­ proved to be a better balloon, but due to a 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW shortage of materials only 300 were made. at Nakoso, Fukushima prefecture, with two In regard to the “A” type balloon, the companies of launching crews and six launch­ problem was to determine how much sand ing stations. In addition there were the same should be carried, how much to drop at one number at Ichinomiva, Aichi prefecture, but time, and how many feet and how often the at Otsu, Shiga prefecture, there were three balloon would fall at night. Inasmuch as the companies and nine stations. duration of a flight was limited by the quan­ In order to track the flights of the radio­ tity of sandbags aboard the balloon, it was carrying balloons, they had direction-finding estimated that 35 sandbags, each weighing stations at Shikoku, Furukawa Iwanai, and approximately 3 kilograms, would be needed. one near Ichinomiya. This quantity could keep the balloon flying for four days if it dropped approximately 25 kg of ballast per day. For What Purpose? It took a year’s research and experiment­ After the first preliminary studies had ing before both forms of the balloon were been made, it was believed in the United ready for practical use. It was decided that States that the paper balloons were weather the first armed balloons would be launched balloons or antiaircraft barrage balloons used on 3 November 1944. The balloons were re­ by Japan to combat B-29s that were attacking leased by a crew usually during the calm pe­ the Japanese home islands. It was surmised riods of evening or early morning. When the that if this were the case the balloons must wind velocities were greater than five meters have strayed to the United States by accident. per second, the balloons were launched by The Japanese were apparently unaware their one of two methods. balloons had reached this country. When the wind velocity was two miles Then on 23 December 1944, a paper bal­ per hour or less, the inflated and loaded bal­ loon was recovered 15 miles north of Marshall, loon was secured with doubled ropes passed Alaska. This balloon, like the Kalispell one, through the loops in the catenary rope at the did not have any undercarriage, but two sand­ equator of the envelope. One end of each bags were recovered, and the relief valve had holding rope was released simultaneously, a large “26" inscribed on it with chalk. permitting the balloon to rise free. When the Another paper balloon was discovered at wind velocity was greater, up to ten miles per Estacada, Oregon, on 31 December 1944. It hour, a different method was used. First, the was similar to both the Kalispell and Marshall ballast-dropping apparatus and load were balloons in its basic construction features. placed on a stand several feet above the These incidents were brought immediately ground. The envelope was then filled upwind to the attention of the Commanding General, from the stand and loaded equatorially with Western Defense Command, who initiated sand ballast in special containers designed to staff studies to determine the origin of the open when pulled from below. The balloon balloons, the purpose for which they were was then “walked" into position and attached being directed toward the United States, and to the ballast-dropping mechanism. The bal­ their capabilities. last release ropes then were pulled, allowing The War Department was also kept fully the balloon to rise. It is presumed that this informed of each reported balloon incident, method was used to minimize the shock and and on 4 January 1945 the Chief of Staff des­ oscillation that would have occurred if the ignated the Commanding General. Western balloon had been released abruptly. Launch­ Defense Command, coordinator for all balloon ing normally required a crew of 30 men and intelligence activities in the Seventh, Eighth, could be done in 30 minutes. On days with and Ninth Service Commands. Concurrently, favorable weather conditions, as many as 150 the Commander, Western Sea Frontier, was balloons were released. designated coordinator for balloon intelligence The Japanese maintained launching points activities over ocean water areas. JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 75

One of the first objectives which the air quencies usually ranged from about 5000 kilo defense organization had to consider before cycles to over 12,000 kilocycles, with individ­ it could establish an effective defense was the ual transmissions varying in some cases by purpose behind the Japanese balloons. Japan’s more than 250 kilocycles. In many cases the subjection to bombing attacks and her inabil­ frequency fell and rose several times during ity to retaliate against them was undoubtedly the period of monitoring, as if the balloon of deep concern to the Japanese government. were losing altitude, dropping ballast, and After extensive studies were made, it was rising again. In a number of cases the fre­ concluded that "ranging shots” were one of the quency dropped quite rapidly, and then the most probable uses for the balloons. The pre­ signal stopped suddenly as if the balloon fell vailing winds over the North Pacific were of into the ocean. such velocity and direction that it would be As additional information became avail­ possible to send balloons from Japan to the able, the Western Defense Command esti­ United States at the most favorable altitudes, mated that the balloons were being released which were between 20,000 and 25,000 feet. from an airfield near Sendai, 180 miles north Reliable meteorological texts reported that at of Tokyo, on the island of Honshu. From this an altitude of 25,000 feet there is an air cur­ information, it had to be assumed that the bal­ rent that crosses Japan from the west, veers loon episodes to date were Japanese "ranging southward toward Hawaii, then swings to the shots” in preparation for mass launchings of north crossing California and part of Montana such balloons. where it again veers southward. Our B-29 On the assumption that these “ranging bombers had verified the existence of these shots” would provide the Japanese with the strong westerly winds at high altitudes over flight course of the balloon and the point at Japan. A balloon at 25,000 feet could be carried which it landed, we had to do everything pos­ eastward from Japan at a speed of from 30 to sible to prevent the Japanese from obtaining 60 mph, perhaps even faster. January and Feb­ this valuable information. It was almost cer­ ruary would be the most favorable months of tain that any news, if published, would be the year for the launching of the balloons. In picked up by the Japanese. Furthermore, it addition, the latitude of Tokyo would provide was not considered advisable to alarm the the most favorable release point. From here U.S. civilian population until such time as the an average wind flow at 20,000 feet could balloons might become a menace. cam ' the balloons across the United States On 4 January 1945 two men working in between Vancouver and southern Oregon. At a field near Medford, Oregon, heard a loud 30,000 feet, velocity would be higher by 15 to explosion and saw a spurt of flames 20 to 30 20 percent, and a balloon launched from the feet high, followed by a cloud of yellow smoke same latitude could land in Canada. in a nearby field. When they arrived on the Very few accurate tracks (or series of scene, they found a hole in the ground about plots) of the point of origin of the signals had 6 inches in diameter and 12 inches deep. The been obtained because of technical difficulties, sides of the hole appeared to have been baked. but the tracks that had been obtained showed Further investigation revealed a burned metal movements of the transmitters along the gen­ casing, cylindrical in shape, and pieces of eral course of the upper winds and at speeds molten metal, which indicated that the object that might be expected from free balloons. A was very likely an incendiary bomb. A hook, direction-finder net for the purpose of obtain­ identical to those used on the shroud lines of ing accurate fixes was organized. the balloons, was also found. No planes were The signals were generally of the same overhead at the time of the incident, nor were type, pulsed continuous-wave transmissions of any other objects seen in the air. It was pre­ varying frequency and with marked transient sumed likely that the bomb dropped from a characteristics. The pulse rates usually ranged balloon. On the same day, the U.S. Office of between 20 and 150 pulses per minute. The fre­ Censorship requested that all news agencies 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW refrain from publishing news of the Japanese animal plagues, or even human disease germs, balloon operations. After the request had been the government enlisted the services of the issued, the commanding generals of the vari­ state health officers, veterinarians, county agri­ ous commands personally presented the intel­ cultural agents, 4-H Clubs, and agricultural ligence aspects of the problem to the various college authorities in the defense program. news agencies in the United States, Canada, Decontamination squads were trained; and Mexico. stocks of decontamination chemicals, suits, and Thus the defense of silence was under­ masks were made ready at strategic points. taken to prevent the enemy from gaining the Farmers and ranchers were urged to report information he desired. From now on the the first signs of any strange disease in their Japanese balloons would be referred to only cattle, sheep, or hogs. by the code name “paper.” In order to obtain material for study, the The second most logical purpose of the closest possible liaison had to be maintained balloons would be to carry and introduce va­ with all agencies that might spot the balloons. rious types of bacteriological warfare ( bw ) The War Department specifically prohibited agents. The intense cold ( — 20 to — 50°C) at mentioning the possible use of the balloons for the altitude of the balloon flights would facili­ bacteriological warfare, not only to the public tate the transmission of bacteria, and disease in general but to anyone other than those in­ germs affecting humans, animals, crops, and dividuals whose duties actually required that forests could be transported. It should be they have knowledge of this type of warfare.® emphasized that before bw agents could be Other possible uses of the balloons could effectively dispersed, technical difficulties had be for the transportation of enemy agents and to be overcome. The following speculation for Japanese propaganda purposes. It was con­ was based on the assumption that the enemy sidered unlikely that the balloons could be had overcome all or part of these difficulties. used to transport personnel from Japan, since Despite the lack of specific evidence to the long trip through the stratosphere would prove that the two balloons earned bw loads, require extensive equipment. The fact that the it nevertheless was well within theoretical balloons had an automatic ballast-dropping limits for such vehicles to carry and disperse device suggested that they were not intended bacterial agents. The type of agent chosen to carry personnel. However, a partially in­ would depend upon the degree of accuracy flated balloon launched from a submarine with which the balloons could be sent. In the could conceivably make a relatively short trip event that the landing was within city limits, inland with a person aboard. effective agents would be either those epi­ The first reference to the balloons in Japa­ demic in character (e.g., pneumonic plague) nese propaganda was heard on 17 February or nonepidemic agents easily transmissible via 1945 in a Domei News Agency broadcast the respiratory tract (e.g., psittacosis). If in­ beamed to the United States in English. The accurate dispersal were attempted, insect- Japanese claimed that 500 casualties had been borne agents or those affecting livestock inflicted in the United States and that numer­ would be an obvious choice. In the insect- ous fires had been started. The broadcast also borne group the mission might be accom­ announced that government authorities in the plished by distribution of properly prepared United States had found it necessary to issue bait or by infection of animals upon which the general warnings against attacks by the Japa­ mosquito feeds. It would be theoretically pos­ nese balloons and thus had agitated the peo­ sible to infect the vast U.S. culicine (mosquito) ple. It was emphasized that these occurrences population and establish a permanent endemic focus of an agent. In the meantime, to combat the possibil­ “Author’s note: When I was in Japan, I talked to Mr. ity that the balloons would be used to shower Kusaba about this subject, and he confirmed the fact that there was no intention to use the balloons for the carrying or spreading pestilence in the form of plant-disease spores, of BW agents. JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 77

had shattered the American feeling of security This was preceded by a confidential note to all from attack by the Japanese. This broadcast editors and broadcasters that a prepared pub­ was the first of a series designed as a war of lic release for publication was forthcoming nerves against the United States. Subsequent and would outline the policy desired. The Japanese broadcasts beamed to Europe, South­ editors were requested not to report specific- east Asia, and China repeated this same theme balloon incidents of any type and to report and in one instance added that several million balloon activities in very general terms, in airborne troops would be landed in the United order to deny the Japanese useful information States in the near future. concerning the landing dates and places. In the meantime, information concerning The first Japanese reaction to the Ameri­ the hazards of the Japanese balloons was pre­ can newspaper and radio publicity was a pared for public dissemination, but by word Domei radio broadcast, in Romanized Japa­ of mouth only. It was distributed only within nese, datelined Lisbon, Portugal, 22 May 1945. the areas affected by the balloons and was not This broadcast was directed to Greater East published or broadcast over radio. Release of Asia. The broadcast was practically a repeti­ additional information did begin on 14 May tion of the U.S. press and radio release. Later 1945 through state educational systems and a brief Japanese report, dated 23 May 1945, civic organizations such as Rotary, Kiwanis, was also heard. It, too, was just a repetition. Lions, and Chamber of Commerce. Then a broadcast in English from Singa­ Then a press and radio release concerning pore (radio station Nampo Domei) was re­ the balloons was authorized for 22 May 1945. corded on 4 June 1945. The broadcast was

Balloon and valve attachment (shown in- verted from rod) were recovered eight miles west of Holy Cross, Alaska, January 1945. . . . Sandbags fo r ballast w ere suspended from the paper balloon found near Marshall, Alaska, D ecem ber 1944. A paper balloon found near Hayfork, California, had four unexploded 10-lb incendiary bombs attached. . . . The standard Japanese 33-lb antipersonnel bomb could cause casualties within a radius of 300 ft.

The Holy Cross balloon had this altitude device suspended from it. The section linking two knotted portions of rope shrouds is com- posed of numerous light rubber bands, to act as shock absorber. \ JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 79

based on statements made at a press confer­ ganda broadcasts. Yet the statements did not ence by Lieutenant Colonel Nakajima Shozo, suggest that the balloon activity was a prelude a spokesman for the Imperial Forces in the to one-way attacks by long-range bombers; in Southern Area, who had been associated with fact, such attacks could be carried out when­ press and propaganda activities since August ever sufficient information was obtained on 1943. He claimed that the balloons were caus­ wind currents. The Japanese were known to ing havoc in the U.S., even though thus far have planes which, loaded only with the nec­ they had only been released on an experimen­ essary gasoline and bombs and flying with tal scale. He also predicted that when the favorable winds, could make such a flight over experimental period was over, “large-scale the shortest route—from Paramushiro to attacks with death-defying Japanese airmen Seattle, or even to San Francisco. manning the balloons would be launched." No evidence indicated that enemy agents Japanese propaganda then started assert­ were being transported by balloons, and long- ing that such attacks by “death-defying Japa­ range bombers seemed impractical. Both were nese airmen” would be launched soon. It was only remote possibilities. believed that the 32-foot balloon would be The last possible use of the balloons incapable of carrying a man from Japan to which had to be considered was their ability this continent with the necessary survival to transport incendiary and antipersonnel equipment at 30,000 feet. However, a balloon bombs. These bombs could be dropped during 62 feet in diameter, believed to be the largest flight by means of the ballast-release device practicable size, could carry a useful load of designed to operate whenever the balloon about 2600 pounds at 30,000 feet. According descended below certain altitudes. Wide­ to the Army Air Force Materiel Division, such spread dispersal of incendiary bombs in a balloon would require 1350 pounds of ballast heavily forested areas, where most of the for a 100-hour trip. The minimum weight of balloons were discovered, would have serious a man with survival equipment (pressurized effects during the dry season. Incendiary gondola, oxygen equipment, food, water, and bombs dropped during the wet season might clothing) was estimated to be 640 pounds. On have a delayed-action device that would the basis of this weight, it was believed pos­ ignite only after the surrounding ground had sible to transport an agent from Japan to this dried. continent by a 62-foot balloon. Gas bombs could also be dropped from Japanese propagandists continued their the balloons, but this method would be an ex­ efforts to inspire terror and divert forces in the tremely ineffective one for gas warfare, since United States. They also tried to convince their it lends itself neither to accuracy nor to build­ Japanese audience and others that the United ing up the requisite lethal concentrations. It States mainland had been successfully at­ was unbelievable that the enemy would resort tacked with a new and ingenious weapon. to such a random and futile method. As a follow-up to the propaganda, Shimu- Incendiaries, on the other hand, presented zu Rikuro, a former press attache of the Japa­ a different picture. They required neither nese Embassy in Argentina and manager of accuracy nor a large concentration to be effec­ the Domei News Agency in that country, tive. A single incendiary bomb might do as stated that the bombing attack by balloons on much damage as a dozen if it struck an area the United States had produced more damage of combustible dry materials. Thus fires in than the Americans had admitted. He said that forests and grain fields could readily be started the balloons were a “prelude to something over widely scattered areas during periods of big." dry weather by means of the balloons. This use Was this “something big” to be one-way of incendiaries appeared most logical, since suicidal attacks by long-range Japanese bomb­ the payload of the balloons was limited. In­ ers:' There were certain remote references to cendiaries would probably do more damage this possibility in some of the Japanese propa­ per unit of bomb-weight than any other type 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

of light bomb, particularly against an indis­ radar stations had been placed on a caretaker criminate target area. Antipersonnel bombs basis; the Ground Observer Corps had been would probably be employed as a harassing inactivated, and the Information and Filter device and would also have some incendiary Centers had been closed. With no aircraft effect. warning service in operation, the Fourth Air Intelligence considered it highly improb­ Force was unable to guard the West Coast able that the Japanese would attempt to em­ against a surprise air attack of any kind. No ploy incendiary bombs to start forest fires combat planes were kept on ground alert, and during the winter months, when the forests a defense force could be organized only after were covered with snow. It was necessary, several hours’ warning. Antiaircraft defense however, to revise this opinion when informa­ was likewise on a very limited basis. tion was received that a bomb had landed During the course of the conference, the from a balloon near Minton, Saskatchewan, 12 Fourth Air Force was assigned the following January 1945. It was reported that the balloon missions to counteract the balloon menace: had descended 6 miles north of the U.S.- (1) To direct all its installations to observe Canada border and released a 20-pound bomb and report all unidentified free balloons, or and two flares or incendiaries. One flare or similar airborne objects, as well as any suspi­ incendiary exploded; the other and the bomb cious objects on the ground. did not. The balloon then rose and disap­ (2) To establish such measures as may be peared. necessary to intercept unidentified balloons or So far no evidence had been obtained to similar airborne objects, so as to make ground disprove the theory that the balloons were recovery' possible. being used to carry bombs and incendiaries, (3) To prepare plans and initiate action for although the unusual radio signals heard from the visual or electronic detection of unidenti­ the Pacific area indicated that ranging might fied objects in the Western Air Defense Zone. still be the primary purpose. (4) To coordinate with the Western Sea Frontier to secure and study meteorological data affecting free balloon flights in the north U.S. Defensive Measures Pacific area. (5) To request the Pacific and Alaskan The unsolved mystery of the purposes of wings of the Air Transport Command and the the balloons only hastened the preparation of Western Flying Training Command to instruct defense plans. The uncertainty of the enemy’s their personnel to report balloon sightings. intentions and the possibility that the balloons (6) To request the Civil Aeronautics Au­ might eventually become a real menace prob­ thority to instruct personnel of commercial air­ ably stimulated the development of counter­ lines and pilots of private planes to report bal­ measures. On 17 January 1945, a conference loon sightings. was called to evaluate the situation, present Of these responsibilities, the two most impor­ to the various representatives the evidence tant were the second and third: interception that had been collected, and discuss the nature and detection of balloons. of the balloon threat and possible defensive The Fourth Air Force established a warn­ measures. ing system based on the use of meteorological A description of the balloon incidents that data to provide as much as three days ad­ had occurred during the preceding three vance information of weather conditions fa­ months and the status of the defense forces on vorable for a balloon attack. the West Coast were outlined during the meet­ As balloon incidents persisted and more ing. It was explained that since early 1944 the information became available, two major con­ primary mission of the Fourth Air Force had ferences were called by the Ninth Service been training, with little attention given to air Command at the request of the Commanding defense readiness. Nearly all the early-warning General, Western Defense Command. The first JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 81

conference was held 9 March 1945 at the the Fourth Air Force. The operations of the Presidio of San Francisco for the purpose of project were to include search for balloons fully acquainting representatives of the West­ by radar and interception by fighter planes ern Defense Command, Ninth Service Com­ guided by vhf ground equipment. Radar plots mand, Western Sea Frontier, Central Pacific were to be reported to the Silver Lake Region Command, Alaskan Department, and the Do­ Control Center, where it was expected that minion of Canada with the possibilities of balloon targets could be recognized by their bacteriological warfare. The second confer­ speed, altitude, and relation to known wind ence was held 23 March 1945 at Fort Douglas, currents. P-38 and P-61 aircraft were to be Utah, to inform interested state and federal kept on an alert status at Paine Field, Quilla- agencies of the balloon incidents. At the meet­ yute Naval Air Station, and Shelton Naval Air ing Western Defense Command representa­ Station. Detailed weather information indi­ tives took an active part in the proceedings. cating the probable courses of the balloons One of the major topics discussed was the was to be furnished the control group by the relationship of Japanese balloons to forest weather officer of the Fourth Air Force. fires. As a result of this meeting, the War De­ In the opinion of several radar experts, partment authorized the Army to assist the the balloon envelope would not be radar- Forestry Service in fire control. A plan, the visible. The steel relief valve would be visible, “Firefly Project,” was immediately and jointly but its small size would probably allow it to initiated by the Western Defense Command, pass unnoticed through a radar search zone. Fourth Air Force, and Ninth Sendee Com­ The chances of detection at 10,000 feet would mand. be small and at higher altitudes nil. These con­ A complete, detailed plan known as the clusions were checked out by sending aloft a “Joint Western Sea Frontier-Western Defense facsimile of the valve. Radar-visibility tests of Command Plan covering defense against Japa­ the metallic structure of the balloon were nese Free Balloons, Short Title ‘BD-1’ ” was made to determine at what ranges it would be completed on 15 August 1945 but not pub­ possible to detect the balloons in flight. lished. All previous plans, with a few minor It had now become apparent that the Jap­ changes, were incorporated in BD-1 as a final anese balloons were being directed toward the consolidated plan covering all phases of bal­ continent of North America, rather than arriv­ loon defense. ing by accident. The increase in the number In April 1945 an experimental program of recoveries and sightings indicated that the known as “Sunset Project” had been con­ experimental phase was over and that the bal­ ducted by the Fourth Air Force under super­ loons were being launched for effect. Although vision of the Western Defense Command. The only a relatively small number had been recov­ purpose was to determine the effectiveness of ered, it was likely that for each one recovered radar in detecting balloon arrivals and to study or sighted a large number had landed unseen the possibilities of bringing the balloons down in remote, uninhabited areas. Furthermore, at sea or in open land areas with machine-gun those that had been recovered were ones which fire from fighter planes using a new experi­ had failed to function properly. mental ammunition known as the headlight The only known fatalities on the United tracer. If the balloons were effectively downed, States mainland from enemy attack during their potential danger could be minimized. Six World War II came on 5 May 1945 ten miles sites along the coast of Washington and in the northeast of Bly, Oregon, when five children vicinity of Seattle were selected for the instal­ and one woman were killed from the blast of lation of ten radar units. Their coverage ex­ a bomb that had been carried by a balloon. tended along the coast from Cape Flattery in The cause of the tragedy was verified by forest the north to the mouth of the Columbia River. men who said it appeared that the victims had All equipment required for the project, clustered around the balloon and someone however, was not immediately accessible for curiously tugged it enough to detonate one of 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the bombs carried underneath. The only pub­ tion but crudely constructed. None of those licity permitted on the incident at the time examined contained explosive charges. was that an unidentified object had exploded, The third type was the 4.46-kg incendiary killing six people. bomb. Recovered bombs of this type varied Investigations of free balloon incidents in weight from 10.5 to 11.1 pounds. disclosed three types of explosive ordnance. The first type is the standard Japanese Army At the end of April 1945, the balloon barrage 15-kilogram. Type 92, antipersonnel bomb. ceased. Had the Japanese called it off as a fail­ The danger radius for this bomb (weighing 33 ure? Or was this a deceptive lull before a pounds) on open terrain is 150 feet; casualties greater barrage? Weeks and months passed may result within a radius of 300 feet. with no resumption. The second type was a new 12-kg ther­ The reason why was not solved until after mite incendiary, fuzed for instantaneous func- the war. In 1947 Brigadier General W. H. Wilbur (now retired) visited Japan and con­ ferred with General Kusaba. According to this foremost authority, the Japanese had figured that at least ten percent of the balloons should have reached the United States and Canada. Word of the initial landing in Montana was the only information that the Japanese re­ ceived until they picked up the report of the six deaths near Bly, Oregon. With only one ' • « __J " __ J v * » reported landing on the American continent, the Japanese General Staff began to doubt A VL! ’ ^ *“ * -s «* *» • General Kusaba and his project. More than xl.k Y 5 £.-*>* once he was reminded that he was wasting the fast-dwindling resources of the country. Fi­

* r t • • • ' \ 1. nally, toward the end of April, General Kusaba was told to cease all operations. The paper i-a*...O .j ... balloons cost originally about 10,000 yen each, -A.v 9VI iX w i.V A.wi O roughly $2300 at the prewar rate of exchange, X'ci -< but the cost was reduced somewhat by mass Z1 A.v : VV production. More than 9000 balloons were built, and over 6000 were launched. Ir.L 2 ln_\ The project in a sense failed because a 2X 7X2. wall of silence was formed by the American j.7 rxv.x rxv people. The success of the security measures >f/' • • »» ** » •• 'fcA-f** ' Ji A . m ! _____ I, is indicated by an Associated Press release of »'• * » »'v ’ ** *\ * • A** _ jUJM. — S — SL . A*. . .vJ 2 October 1945 which contained the following ^^ -'V A ^ ----- *• - 'Vf/STf.AX •• .1 comments: “The Japanese listened eagerly to radio reports, hoping to hear of the bombs’ effectiveness. But American editors voluntarily kept the information to themselves and so dis­ couraged the Japanese that they abandoned I -J V 1 the project.’’ •*> <. The campaign of silence was abandoned by the War and Navy Departments following Xv-A the tragic incident on 5 May 1945. On 22 May Monument to the only American casualties from the Japa- the War and Navy Departments issued a joint nese balloon bombs, ten miles northeast of Bltj, Oregon statement describing the nature of the balloon JAPANESE BALLOON OFFENSIVE 83

bombs and warning all persons not to tamper area stretching from the island of Attu to the with any such objects they might find. The bal­ state of Michigan and from northern Alaska loon weapon was said to constitute no serious to northern Mexico, in all some 285 of them. military threat to the United States because This fact points to the greatest weakness in the the attacks were “so scattered and aimless.” free balloon as a military weapon: it could not The statement continued: ” . . . the possible be controlled. saving of even one American life through pre­ The balloon attacks ceased before the cautionary measures would more than offset radar stations of Sunset Project had an oppor­ any military gain accruing to the enemy from tunity to detect any balloons. Numerous re­ the mere knowledge that some of his balloons ports of balloon sightings reached the Seattle actually have arrived on this side of the control group, and 68 interceptions were ac­ Pacific.” tually attempted. However, none of the sight­ The balloon project was a complete fail­ ings were verified, and practically all were ure as far as damage to military installations identified as weather balloons, blimps, or the was concerned. Nearly all the balloons that planet Venus, which was often mistaken for landed on the North American Continent did a balloon. It became increasingly evident that so in open country or in wooded, mountainous Japan had ceased balloon launchings, and the areas, far from centers of population and mili­ lack of activity stateside led Continental Air tary establishments. It is possible that some Forces to terminate Sunset Project on 1 August bombs caused forest and brush fires, but no 1945. evidence was ever discovered to indicate that Thus in the same month that saw' the end any of the balloons were armed for bacteriolog­ of World War II came the finale of Japan’s ical warfare. Balloons were reported over an balloon offensive. 1989th Communications Squadron Books and Ideas

FROM CHAOS TO CONFUSION: THE CHINESE RED ARMY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS

D r . K enneth R. W hiting

n 1 August 1967 the Chinese People’s These are valuable accounts, but each covers Liberation Army ( pl a ) celebrated the only a few years of the total span, and further­ fortiethO anniversary of the Nanch’ang Upris­ more some of these witnesses were, to put it ing, which it regards as its birthday. In that mildly, predisposed to find an inordinate forty years it had grown from a number of amount of wisdom, virtue, and courage in the small rebel bands wandering about southern Red Army of the Yenan and the Japanese War China into a multimillion-man military force periods. Chalmers Johnson, General Chassin, with the beginnings of a thermonuclear capa­ the State Department’s “White Paper,’’ and bility. The saga of its growth and development Rigg, to mention only four works, cover the has long been in need of a comprehensive period of the Civil War (1946-49) in some treatment in English. This does not mean that detail. As for the Chinese activities in the there have been no works in English dealing Korean War, there are numerous general and with the Chinese Red Army. Ralph Powell specialized studies ranging from the official filled in the gap for the 1895-1912 period, i.e., histories, such as those of Appleman and the necessary background, and F. F. Liu has Futrell, to the vividly written books of “Slam” provided an excellent work on the Nationalist Marshall. For the late 1950s and early 1960s, military forces. ( See Bibliography.) There are there is a plethora of books and articles by also a number of eye-witness accounts of the Alice Hsieh, Morton Halperin, Powell, Git- Red Army in the late 1930s and early 1940s tings, Joffe, Garthoff, and many others. What by Edgar Snow, Nym Wales, Agnes Smedley, was lacking up to 1967 was a good solid book Harrison Forman, Evans Carlson, and others. covering the entire forty-year history of the BOOKS AND IDEAS 85

aimed forces of the Chinese Communists. Now cal controls, professionalism versus revolu­ at long last Samuel Griffith has given us that tionary fervor, the militia, and two excellent book.f chapters on the military leadership. He also General Griffith devotes the first hundred has seven tables, in an appendix, which deal pages of his book to the development of the with military strengths, controls, and organi­ Chinese Red Army up to the end of the Civil zation. War and the establishment of the Communist It would be hard to overpraise Gittings’ regime in Peking in late 1949. He then de­ book. It is well written, more than adequately scribes the Chinese intervention in the Korean documented, and, if anything, cautious to the conflict in some detail, about a quarter of the point of being overcautious in evalutions; in book, which is sound planning, since that is short, he refuses to speculate beyond his evi­ the only open military confrontation between dence. Like General Griffith’s book, this one the United States and the pl a up to now. The should be read by anyone interested in the rest of the book is a description of the pl a : its Chinese armed forces, or even in the history organization, armament, problems, and even of China in the last two decades. a chapter on its impact on the nations sur­ A third book on the pl a was also pub­ rounding China. lished in 1967, that of Alexander George of the General Griffith’s style is lively, and he rand Corporation.ftf In spite of its somewhat shows an admirable familiarity with a wide misleading title, the book is almost entirely a range of source materials, thus insuring the study of the Chinese “G.I.” in the Korean scholarly credentials of the work. But the conflict, filling some 200 of the 225 pages general reader is not slapped in the face with which make up the book. Its “aftermath” con­ a continual flaunting of the scholarly appara­ sists of the 25 pages tacked onto the end, a tus, as it is either in the fifty pages of notes brief survey of events since 1953. George ana­ or in the three excellent charts on the organi­ lyzes the results of interviews with Chinese zation of the government, the Party, and the prisoners and comes up with a Chinese Com­ pl a (in a pocket at the end of the book). munist military model, within which he dis­ After the long drought, moreover, it now cusses leadership, morale, political controls, seems to be raining a downpour of books about and other topics. It is a far more specialized the pl a . John Gittings, of the Royal Institute work than those of Griffith and Gittings, but of International Affairs in London, also pub­ far less interesting to the general reader—and, lished an excellent book in 1967.ft Gittings’ one suspects, even to the specialist. book deals in depth with the pl a between 1946 Unfortunately for the three authors of the and the mid-1960s, with emphasis on the politi­ books under review, their opera were pub­ cal side of things—the Party control of the lished right in the midst of the utmost confu­ armed forces and the role of the latter in the sion in Communist China. All three authors government of Communist China. Unlike seem to be in some awe of the tight political Griffith’s book, this one is arranged by topic, controls that characterize the pl a ’s organiza­ with sections on strategy, mobilization, politi­ tional structure, or seemed to until 1966. Mao

fBrigadier General Samuel B. Griffith II, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret), The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1967, $10.95), 398 pp. \sr’ > f t John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, $8.50), 331 pp. f ff Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, $6.95), 255 pp. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Tse-tung’s oft-repeated injunction—that al­ China, a pro-Mao “order” to be sure. But at though political power comes out of the barrel this point the situation became very sticky when of a gun, nevertheless, politics must always be the reliability of the pl a turned out to be in command of the gun—seems less impressive somewhat questionable. How could this be? in the autumn of 1967 than it did a few years As our three authors point out in great detail, ago. The question now seems to be: Whose the Party controls in the pl a have always been politics? all-embracing. Furthermore, Mao’s closest Both Gittings and George ignore the comrade-in-arms (to use the jargon) and heir “great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” which apparent, Lin Piao, has been working assidu­ was really just getting under way when their ously at improving them over the last seven books went to press, while Griffith did manage or eight years. But a good deal of evidence has to get in an “Epilogue: January 1967,” in been accumulated in the past few months which his bewilderment over what is going on that a number of military regions have been in China is manifest. The reviewer is not being either indifferent or actively opposed to Mao’s critical of the three authors but is merely ex­ Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. pressing his own distress: Now that we finally It seems to this reviewer that there are have three solid works on the pl a , why did several reasons for the “unreliability” being Mao, Lin Piao, and that “witch” of the Great demonstrated by segments of the pl a . First, Cultural Revolution, Chiang Ching, have to the political control system in the armed forces tear up both the Party and the pl a ? was fundamentally a Party control system, and Information on recent happenings in it is the Party apparat itself that Mao is China is scarce and not very reliable, but that attacking, especially its top leadership as ex­ the pl a is playing a central role in the swirl emplified in the head of state, Liu Shao-eh'i, of events is beyond question. When Mao fired and the Secretary-General of the Party, Teng his Minister of Defense, P’eng Teh-huai, in Hsiao-p’ing. The military leader in any area the fall of 1959 and gave the job to Lin Piao, therefore has to determine whether he is to he was apparently in the process of trying to be faithful to the Party per se or to Mao’s insure the pl a as a reliable bulwark in the clique within the Party. Loyalty now involves intra-Party struggle upon which he was about a choice: Loyal to whom? to embark. Lin Piao spent the next seven years Second, the thirteen military regions of drumming the thought of Mao into the mili­ China are enormous areas, some far from tary at all levels. When the Great Proletarian Peking, in a land not celebrated for effective Cultural Revolution got under way in early transportation and communications systems. 1966, the pl a was in the forefront of the attack Many of the commanders of these military upon all elements in the Party and the govern­ regions have been there for a decade or more ment opposed to the line favored by Chairman and have built up a close relationship with Mao. By August 1966 a new instrument for the government and Party bureaucracies of carrying out the Maoist revolution had been their regions. It hardly seems strange that created, the Red Guards, composed of millions these military commanders resent both the of teen-agers, who were encouraged to assault Red Guard attacks on top civilian personnel of anybody they felt to be anti-Maoist in thought their regions and the chaos engendered by the and deed, or even not pro-Maoist enough. As irresponsible gangs of young thugs. General Griffith points out (p. 299), mass Finally, in the period following the movements just do not start spontaneously in Korean War the officer coq^s as a w-hole be­ Red China, and he is certain that the pl a was came quite professional. It had to if it were in charge of the initial recruitment and train­ to cope with the new weapon systems being ing of these juvenile delinquents. introduced into the pl a . But in the last few By early 1967, however, things had gotten years the officers have been humiliated, first so out of hand that Mao and his small clique by the “to the ranks” movement, whereby all called on the pl a to preserve order throughout officers, even generals, had to spend a month BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

or more in the ranks doing close-order drill an end to the military regionalism that had and even cleaning latrines, and then in 1965 plagued China for almost a century. The events bv the complete abolishment of all rank and of the last year, however, w'ould seem to indi­ insignia of rank within the pl a . In addition, cate much less than monolithic civilian control personnel of the pl a spend as much as a third of the armed forces and instead ever growing of their time in nonmilitary economic activities difficulties in Peking’s authority over the mili­ such as farming and construction work. If one tary satraps in many regions. Although one combines all these legitimate gripes with the hesitates to prophesy a revival of warlordism inordinate amount of time the troops are in Communist China, a nation that is now forced to spend listening to the political clap­ entering the thermonuclear era, nevertheless, trap pun eyed by the political cadres, it is easy the present situation—or our ignorance about to see why there should be antagonism among it—leaves the field of speculation wide open some of the military commanders. for even far-out scenarios. Regional autonomy, usually under a mili­ The purpose of this brief exegesis on the tary leader, was the curse of China as early current chaos in China is merely to warn the as the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion in reader that the three books here reviewed are the second half of the nineteenth century and descriptions of a People’s Liberation Army reached ridiculous proportions during the era that seemed the embodiment of political re­ of warlords between 1916 and 1928. Even liability as late as 1965. Then came Mao’s Chiang Kai-shek was never able to completely nihilistic “cultural revolution,” and even the eradicate the evil and had to compromise with stolid, politically faithful pl a was caught up various regional warlords between 1928 and in the confusion engulfing China. Never were 1949. Thus the tight Party controls within the three books published at a more inopportune pl a from 1949 until recently seemed to herald time—and they are such good books, too! Aerospace Studies Institute

Bibliography Johnson, Chalmers A. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalti. Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. Department of the Army, 1961. Liu, F. F. A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949. Carlson, Evans F. The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956. Military Efficiency. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the Gauntlet. New York: Wil­ 19-10. liam Morrow, 1953. ------) Twin Stars Over China. New York: Dodd, Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895- Mead. 1940. 1912. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955. Chassin, Lionel M. The Communist Conquest of China: A His- Rigg, Robert B. Red China's Fighting Hordes. Harrisburg, tory of the Civil War, 1945-1949. Trans. T. Osato and L. Penna.: Military Services Publishing Company, 1951. Gelas. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Smedley, Agnes. Battle Hymn of China. New York: Knopf, 1943. Forman, Harnson. Report from Red Chiiui. New York: Holt, ------China’s Red Army Marches. New York: 1945. Vanguard Press, 1934. Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950- Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China, New York: Random House, 1953. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961. 1938. Garthoff, Raymond L., ed. Sino-Soviet Military Relations. New United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to York: Praeger, 1966. the Period 1944-1949. Washington, D.C.: Department of Halperin, Morton H. China and the Bomb. New York: Praeger, State Publication 3573, 1949. (The famous "White Paper.’’) 1965. Wales, Nym. Inside Red China. New York: Doubleday, Doran, Hsieb, Alice L. Communist China’s Strategy in the Nuclear Era. 1939. Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. ______Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Joffe, Ellis. Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Con- Communists. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952. trol in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964. Cambridge, Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Mass.: Harvard East Asia Research Center, 1965. Enter the Korean War. New York: Macmillan, 1960. MYTH OF THE MONOLITH

Major Nic h o l a s P. Vaslef

he nearly 300-year-old history of Sino- Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66,” and T Russian relations has seldom been marked “Politico-Military Issues in the Sino-Soviet by cordiality. At best, these relations were Debate, 1963-65.” The other essays consider characterized by the desire of both countries such topics as “Armed Conflict in the Chinese to establish a modus viveiuli with respect to Borderlands, 1917-50,” by O. Edmund Clubb; numerous territorial questions; at worst, they “Soviet Military Aid to Nationalist China, were beset by problems of ideology and na­ 1923-41,” by James C. Bowden, Jr.; “The tionalism that threatened to disrupt the mili­ Eruption of Sino-Soviet Politico-Militarv Prob­ tary and political status quo. With the estab­ lems, 1957-60,” by Harold P. Ford'; “The lishment of the People’s Republic of China in Limits of Alliance: The Quemoy Crisis of 1949, the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet 1958,” by John R. Thomas; “The Sino-Soviet Union, was successful in building up an image Nuclear Dialogue: 1963,” by Alice Langley of the Communist World as an invincible Hsieh; “The Soviet Generals’ View of China monolith stretching from Eastern Europe in the 1960’s,” by J. Malcolm Mackintosh; and across the vast expanse of Asia to the People’s “Sino-Soviet War in 19xx?” by O. Ferdinand Republic of China. Miksche. The exposure of the Sino-Soviet rift to Many of these articles overlap in subject Western eyes has turned that monolithic image matter, but they provide, in their totality, a into a myth. It is this myth of the monolith chronological and detailed examination and that serves as the underlying theme for the analysis of their respective subjects. Although scholarly and readable anthology, Sino-Soviet they emphasize military relations, they do not Military Relations,t edited by Raymond L. ignore the overriding political considerations Garthoff. Dr. Garthoff is Special Assistant for and decisions leading to the military aspects Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs in the U.S. of Sino-Soviet relations. A recurring theme is Department of State. He also teaches at the that Sino-Soviet military relations were never School for Advanced International Studies of free of mutual mistrust, that the U.S.S.R. gave Johns Hopkins University and is the author of grudging aid to its huge but impotent Com­ several military studies, including Soviet Mili- munist neighbor, and that China resented tary Doctrine, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear more and more its dependence on the aid be­ Age, and Soviet Military Policy. ing doled out by the U.S.S.R. The impression The volume consists of ten essays by eight is that the Sino-Soviet treaties of friendship authors. Dr. Garthoff contributes a concise and alliance of 1945 and 1950 were military Introduction and three articles: “The Soviet and political expedients not unlike those Intervention in Manchuria, 1945-46,” “Sino- signed during World War II between various

______¥------fRaymond L. Garthoff (ed.), Sino-Soviet Military Relation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, $7.50), xii and 285 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

Western countries and the U.S.S.R.. notwith­ with Soviet and Chinese nationalist armies standing the possibility that at war’s end the facing each other on the Amur and Sungari Soviet Union could well turn upon its erstwhile rivers. The results were to affect the United allies with impunity. States in the Far East more than a decade The Introduction of this volume briefly later, for the Japanese had witnessed the traces the high points of Sino-Soviet relations quick defeat of the Chinese troops and saw since the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and in­ that the U.S.S.R., not China, was their prime vestigates the “decade of American misunder­ adversary in the Far East. standing of the nature of Russo-Chinese In July 1937 the Sino-Japanese War be­ relations.” (p. 5) Now that the Sino-Soviet rift gan, opening the way for a new era of friend­ is out in the open for all to see, the time has ship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. come when “it is both possible and necessary and the Chinese Nationalists. Combining his to recognize, to analyze, to understand, and personal knowledge with information not to act on the basis of national distinctions and easily accessible to the general reader, Mr. differences among the Communist states— Clubb describes the confrontations of the above all, on the differences between the Soviet three major powers in Asia, assesses the mili­ Union and Communist China.” (p. 6) This, tary strengths of the Chinese, Japanese, and then, is the purpose of the studies in this Soviet forces, recounts the Japanese forays anthology: an analysis of the role of military into Soviet territory, and analyzes the political and politico-military considerations in Sino- implications affecting the major world powers. Soviet relations. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the rapid turn of events leading to the start of World War II crushed Japanese designs on Soviet O. E dmund C lubb, retired Foreign territory. The subsequent signing of the Soviet- Service Officer, who was the Consul General Japanese nonaggression pact of April 1941 “per­ in Peking when the Chinese Communists took mitted each to pursue its own national ends the Forbidden City and is author of the well- unhindered by the other.” (p. 40) known Twentieth Century China, analyzes In the first years after the war the Chinese conditions in northern China and Manchuria Communists began to win control of mainland after the Russian Revolution, as well as the China, and Moscow was anxious to establish conflicting White Russian, Chinese, and Japa­ relations with the new Central People’s Gov­ nese interests in these areas, and discusses anti- ernment. By 1950 the situation had stabilized, Bolshevik factions in Siberia, the Allied inter­ but only temporarily, for now it was the vention, and the creation of the Soviet Far Chinese who looked “across their frontiers Eastern Republic. He contends that the with the idea of reincorporating the Mongolian present status of Outer Mongolia as an People’s Republic into the Chinese empire, independent country was due to China’s weak­ and of making good various claims on the ness and failure to protect it, and he concludes Russian borderlands. . . . The Chinese border­ that China lost it by default, (p. 16) Mao lands have clearly taken on a new aspect, and Tse-tung and others have, of course, stated on will never be the same again.” (p. 43) several occasions that Outer Mongolia would Lieutenant Colonel James C. Bowden, Jr., eventually become an integral part of China, U.S. Army, covers the crucial period between and while the status quo has been preserved the wars. He has included numerous facts, until now, there is no doubt that the Chinese some major and some relatively minor, but consider Outer Mongolia to be territoria did not expand sufficiently on two points that irredenta. are of great significance: the Borodin mission After the abortive efforts of the Soviet to China and the establishment of the Union to establish footholds in China by sign­ Whampoa Military Academy under Chiang ing treaties with various factions, relations Kai-shek. These two events were very impor­ deteriorated and by 1929 were at low ebb, tant for the Chinese Nationalists, since they 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

heralded the real beginning of the unified and the U.S.S.R. itself was not in a very strong united Kuomintang Army and defined its military position, having undergone purges of relationship with the Soviet ( Borodin) mis­ its top military leadership and frantically sued sion. Too, the disputes of the Soviet Union for time on its western frontiers. Its immediate and the Comintern on matters of military aid purpose, then, was to create a strong National­ to China should have received at least a cur­ ist China that could hold off Japan. Its long- sory mention. range goal, in this case diametrically opposed When in 1927 Chiang Kai-shek purged to the immediate one, was to look after its the Kuomintang of all Communists, Soviet traditional national interests and to promote advisers left China, all Soviet consulates were Communist ideology insofar as the two did closed, and relations between the Soviet Union not contradict one another. and the Kuomintang Nationalist government Dr. Garthoff’s two chapters on the post­ were severed. At this point, an interesting war years are excellent for authoritative infor­ comment is made, which very possibly identi­ mation on the Soviet Far Eastern campaign fies the first seeds of dissension between the and its aftermath, liberally footnoted from Russian and Chinese Communists: official U.S., Soviet, and Japanese sources. The immediate postwar stage of the The Soviet Union made no effort to come Soviet occupation of Manchuria involved the to the aid of the Chinese Communists, and systematic looting and dismantling of Man­ George Kennan maintains that the ruthless churian plants, factories, and other hardware destruction of the Communists by Chiang Kai- shek marked a crucial turning point in Sino- left there by the Japanese. Coupled with this Soviet relations. From that time on, Mao Tse- project was one that was not as clear-cut or tung was “an ally, but not a satellite.” (p. 53) as well understood, involving Soviet aid to both the Chinese Nationalist army and Mao By 1937 the situation had reversed itself, Tse-tung’s rapidly growing Communist forces. and a nonaggression pact and a barter agree­ The author believes that the Russians “had ment for weapons were signed. American initially overestimated the strength of the efforts to aid the Chinese unofficially in their National Government, and underestimated war against Japan with the famous Flying that of the Communists.” (p. 77) If there was Tigers were indeed meager, if Soviet reports any initial vacillation on the part of the are to be believed. A Soviet military historian U.S.S.R. after World War II, by the middle of is quoted as stating that by 1940 “986 Japanese 1947 the Soviets clearly saw that the National­ planes were destroyed. More than 100 Soviet ists were being defeated. Continuing their hero-pilots . . . were killed in these battles.” play of one faction against the other, the So­ (pp. 54-55) The U.S.S.R. supplied over one viets in January 1948 offered to act as mediators thousand aircraft to China by 1940, and two in the civil war. Dr. Garthoff questions the thousand Soviet pilots had rotated through the Soviet Union’s intent in this offer, wondering air units. if its real purpose was to have an impotent The author believes that at the same time neighbor on its eastern frontier. This is, per­ Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists was haps, wishful thinking on his part, as there is greatly limited, in keeping with the Russian nothing to indicate that this was the Soviet policy of playing the two Chinese factions rationale. Indeed, there was no reason for the against one another in the hope of maintaining U.S.S.R. not to act as mediator: the United a weak and disunited China. In fact, however, States, which was seeking peace in China the substantial aid to the Chinese Nationalists, through a number of missions, would have with virtually none going to the Communists, been satisfied; the U.S.S.R. expected to obtain makes it rather evident that the U.S.S.R. was major concessions from the Nationalists for the favoring the Nationalists only because it had Chinese Communists, including prime govern­ no hopes for the success of Mao Tse-tung’s ment and military positions; the Kremlin did forces. It should also be noted that in 1940 not anticipate any difficulties with the Chinese BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

Communists in obeying orders from Moscow; which Khrushchev denounced Stalin, and Rus­ and Stalin counted on the Chinese Com­ sian refusal to cooperate in the development munists to carry out a coup d’etat after a short of a Chinese atom bomb—all apparently made period of coalition government with the Na­ the Chinese doubt the basic solidity of Sino- tionalists. In short, there was every reason to Soviet relations. Consequently, ties between believe that China would become a satellite the two countries began to dissolve slowly, for on the eastern frontier of the U.S.S.R. just as the most part unnoticed by Western eyes, a number of countries had become Soviet while the presses of both Communist nations puppets on its western borders. still paid lip service to the Communist mono­ On Valentine’s Day, 1950, the U.S.S.R. lith. and the People’s Republic of China signed a In April 1960, Sino-Soviet disagreements Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual were finally brought out into the open by the Assistance. The honeymoon of the two Com­ Chinese. Thereafter the situation deteriorated munist giants did not last long, and initial rapidly with the withdrawal of virtually all vows of eternal friendship were soon replaced 1300 Soviet economic and military' advisers by mutual disillusion and mistrust. History and technicians. Dr. GarthofF concludes his has yet to give a final evaluation of the events chapter with an analysis oF Chinese-Soviet in China from 1945 to the present, but without relations in 1965 and 1966, stating that since key Soviet and Chinese Communist docu­ 1960 “there has been almost no Sino-Soviet ments, a complete analysis of Soviet intents military relationship.” (p. 94) At the time the and actions is obviously impossible. Reading article was written (late 1966) this may have through these chapters, however, one gains been true, but a new phase of Sino-Soviet a clearer concept of the Sino-Soviet rift and cooperation relative to Vietnam apparently detects Soviet duplicity in dealings with the began in the spring of 1967. two Chinas. For example, the case of the A detailed account of the beginning of the U.S.S.R. “handing over” Manchuria to Mao open rift is given by Harold P. Ford. Quoted Tse-tung is countered by Dr. GarthofF, who are numerous Chinese sources on the impor­ points out that “if that were the case, why tance of modem military training, including destroy the major part of the great Mukden the use of nuclear weapons, and on the pro­ arsenals which could have given the Chinese posed new training program that collapsed Communists the wherewithal to fight?” (p. 83) because of Soviet reluctance to cooperate. In­ On the other hand, there is no denying that the creasingly vitriolic Chinese attacks on Soviet Chinese Communists reaped the majority of foreign policy, especially in regard to the the benefits derived from Soviet occupation, U.S.S.R.’s halfhearted backing of Chinese including not only captured Japanese arms and claims to the offshore islands and Taiwan, artillery but also the first tanks and aircraft show the new Chinese attitude toward the to come into the possession of Mao’s forces. Soviet Union. Too, it has been generally assumed that both The rift is further examined by John R. China and the Soviet Union fully supported Thomas in his chapter on Quemoy. The day- North Korea during the Korean War without by-day summary of this crisis reveals the al­ bickering over costs or policy. Dr. GarthofF, most casual attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward a however, reveals that the Chinese Communists problem that the Chinese Communists con­ had to pay for all the Soviet aid, which sidered most vital to their national interests. amounted to some two billion dollars in the The now famous official Chinese Government years between 1950 and 1957. and it was not Statement of 1 September 1963, in which the until 1965 that the Chinese finally paid off the Chinese scorned Soviet claims of support dur­ debt. ing the Quemoy crisis, is quoted in full in the The Soviet looting of Manchuria, the appendix. Korean War, the Twentieth Congress of the Alice Langley Hsieh, Far Eastern expert Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956) at with the Foreign Service and the rand Cor­ 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW poration, provides a narration on the increas­ Internal pressures and shortcomings are ing hostility between the U.S.S.R. and China said to contribute to Chinese “petty bourgeois” and an analysis of Mao Tse-tung’s futile at­ and “anarchist” views on revolution every­ tempts to acquire the atom bomb from the where. The Chinese callous indifference to U.S.S.R. She discusses Khrushchev’s reminder what would be the enormous sacrifices of nu­ clear war is also said to contribute. ... On the to the Chinese in 1962 “that the United States basis of this Chinese readiness for nuclear war was a paper tiger with atomic teeth’’ (p. 151) which the Russians dialectically interpret as and the gradually worsening Sino-Soviet rela­ desire for nuclear war, the Military Thought tions which grew even more frigid with the article goes so far as specifically to accuse the Chinese denunciation of the partial nuclear Chinese Communist leaders of supporting gen­ test ban agreement. ocide. (p. 175) The author analyzes the problem of Chi­ nese possession of nuclear weapons in three With respect to Chinese military science, the vital points: (1) the proliferation of nuclear Soviet article concludes that weapons; (2 ) China’s need to possess an in­ —the Chinese view on military science is dependent defense potential; and (3) the “pure adventurism”; alternative of reliance on the Soviet Union’s —the view of the West as a “paper tiger” is nuclear deterrent, (p. 160) illogical and erroneous; The Russians had previously tried to as­ —the result of a protracted military conflict sure the Chinese that, with Soviet help, China would be defeat, not victory; need not develop its own nuclear weapons but —the adventurist “total” strategy of the should instead concentrate on strengthening Peking style is pregnant with indescribable her domestic economy. Having experienced calamities for all peoples, including the Soviet reluctance in other instances, Foreign Chinese people, (p. 175) Minister Chen Yi categorically stated that The Soviet article further points out that Soviet assurances were worthless (p. 163), and the Chinese “consider that world thermonu­ the Chinese went ahead with their nuclear clear war is inevitable and [are attempting] to program. Since this chapter was written (D e­ hurry it along . . . they evidently suppose that cember 1963), the Chinese have produced the Chinese people will have the best chance both an A-bomb and an H-bomb (detonated since they are the most populous people on in June 1967). Their next steps are to accumu­ the earth.” (p. 176) The Soviet position is, late a stockpile and develop an effective predictably, peaceful coexistence on all planes delivery system. Meanwhile, the possibility of with the eventual collapse of the capitalist even a partial nuclear ban treaty with China system of its own weight. seems remote. Now that the rift has pushed ideology Raymond Garthoff’s next contribution is aside and nationalism and Realpolitik are in based on an October 1963 article in the Soviet the ascendancy, it may well be that this Soviet journal Voennaya my.si’ (Military Thought) appraisal of Chinese politico-military policies entitled. “The Peking Version of ‘Total Strat­ is rather honest. At the same time, being cog­ egy,’ ” by a Soviet politico-military affairs ex­ nizant of rapid Soviet policy shifts, we should pert. This journal was marked “For Generals, accept it not as a new, definitive, and “per­ Admirals, and Officers of the Soviet Army and manent” Soviet line but rather as the present Navy Only,” and the articles published there­ Soviet view which is meant, at least in part, in are allegedly much more frank than those to answer the numerous Chinese charges of found in open sources. Basically, the Soviet collusion with the U.S., fear of the West, and article is an attack against the Chinese claim revisionism of the basic concepts of Marxism. that their military science is based on Marxist J. Malcolm Mackintosh, British expert on principles, and it introduces historical “evi­ Soviet military affairs and author of many ar­ dence” to support its argument. Concerning ticles as well as the book Strategy and Tactics that article, Garthoff writes: of Soviet Foreign Policy, discusses the Sino- BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

Soviet frontier and the problems of defense two Sino-Soviet treaties (1945 and 1950) and faced by the Soviet Union. He makes some related documents, the complete Soviet arti­ calculated guesses on what the Soviet General cle on “The Peking Version of Total Strategy,’” Staff is likely to recommend in terms of man­ and the “Chinese Government Statement on power and firepower, in the army, navy, and Sino-Soviet Politico-Military Relations.” air forces, and considers the problems of Since publication of Sino-Soviet Military logistical supply, in view of the great distances Relations in December 1966, China’s relations involved, and the limited capability’ of the with the U.S.S.R. have further deteriorated, Trans-Siberian Railroad. Sinkiang Province and the internal Chinese struggles—the out­ and Mongolia are mentioned as potential comes of w'hich will undoubtedly affect rela­ trouble spots, as are numerous undemarcated tions with the U.S.S.R.—are not yet resolved. areas stretching from the Soviet Maritime The most recent events, how'ever, do not out- Province to Soviet Central Asia. His conclu­ date the book. One possibly new aspect in­ sion that the U.S.S.R. and the West may “find volves Soviet aid to North Vietnam. The Peking some unexpected common ground” based on Review of 10 March 1967 (p. 25) carries a mutual distrust of Red China (p. 192) is simi­ violent attack against the U.S.S.R. in an article lar to a view which is currently being ex­ entitled “New Disciples of Goebbels” by pounded by the Red Chinese and which is “Renmin Ribao,” commentator. References are putatively finding sympathy among leaders in made to a Soviet bulletin wffiich allegedly dis­ Western countries and in the Soviet Union. seminated The last contribution to this volume, “Sino- a whole lot of fantastic fabrications such as that Soviet War in 19xx?” by Lieutenant Colonel Soviet supplies for Vietnam have “often just O. Ferdinand Miksche (Retired), is a rather disappeared” in transit through China, that speculative piece of writing, even though it is Red Guards “disassembled” some of the Soviet based on “some of the fundamental underlying equipment and “ ‘forgot’ to return some of the geopolitical and strategic factors” (p. 193) that important parts,” that “Chinese characters took would allegedly contribute to any such war the place of Soviet trade marks” on Soviet between China and Russia. The argument for equipment, that “the latest types” of Soviet a possible Sino-Soviet war centers around the equipment “were replaced . . .” Chinese need for Lebensraum and the impos­ This same article (p. 33) defends the Chinese sibility of feeding the rapidly increasing Chi­ by stating that they have always transported nese population. The author discusses the all material through China and warns that potential aggression of China in all directions, “such rumours and calumny will only make citing the advantages and disadvantages of people see more clearly to w’hat low depths each area as to natural and agricultural re­ this group of Soviet revisionist renegades have sources, and the expected opposition to such sunk. No good awaits them.” expansion by the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and the It is difficult to assess the degree of Chi­ countries directly involved. Aside from geo­ nese harassment, but there was apparently political and economic considerations, the en­ some truth in the Soviet charge. Last spring, tire chapter is too “iffy.” It is a well-known though, according to several sources, including weakness of Kremlinologists and China-watch­ the U.S. News and World Report (“New Turn ers to engage in speculation, and certainly in Vietnam—A ‘Deal’ Between Russia and there is room for speculation in a field in China,” 24 April 1967, pp. 42-43), the Rus­ which relatively little is known from open sians and the Chinese have concluded a “deal” sources. Yet this chapter is misplaced in a whereby “free and complete passage of Soviet work that is otherwise scholarly and well military equipment across China to North documented. Vietnam” is assured. In the article one U.S. official was quoted as saying: T he vol ume contains extensive notes, an in­ Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi finally put a gun to dex, and appendices giving the full texts of Peking’s head, threatening to open negotia­ 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tions with the US unless China accepted an in the next decade. Soviet relations with Red agreement guaranteeing no interference with China will most certainly have a strong bear­ the movement of Soviet war supplies overland ing on U.S. policies in the Far East and, of and by air across China. course, with the U.S.S.R. itself. If this report is true, a new phase in Sino- The Sino-Soviet rift has exposed the many Soviet military relations has begun, which has fissures of the mythical monolith, and Dr. yet to be confirmed, defined, and evaluated. Garthoff has compiled an excellent anthology Whether or not the United States of isolating the important military aspects of America accords some degree of diplomatic Sino-Soviet relations. It is a work that should recognition to Red China is in itself irrelevant. not pass unnoticed by military observers inter­ What must be recognized is the fact of China’s ested in keeping current on the decisive events existence as a potential major nuclear power in that troubled part of the world. United States Air Force Academy

The Contributors

groups, in 1943 he was named Com­ mander, 381st Bombardment Group, and led it to England, where it joined the Eighth Air Force. He was Deputy Director of Operations, USAFE, Janu­ ary-August 1944, when he was as­ signed as Deputy Commander, 316th Bombardment Wing, Colorado Springs, Colorado. He commanded that wing in Okinawa from December 1945 to May 1946, when he became Chief, Operations Division, Hq SAC, Bolling Field, D.C. Other assignments have been as student, then instructor. Air Command and Staff School, to 1948; in War Plans Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF, to 1952; as Com­ mander, 68th Bombardment Wing, Lake Charles AFB. Louisiana, then Commander, 38th Air Division, Hunter AFB, Georgia, to June 1955; Commander, 5th Air Division, SAC, R obert M. Kipp (M.A., Ohio Univer­ Morocco, to July 1957; Director of sity) is Chief of the History Branch, Personnel Planning, Hq USAF, to History and Research Division, Head­ July 1959; Deputy Commander, Fif­ quarters Strategic Air Command. He G en er a l Joseph J. N azzaro (USMA) teenth Air Force, March AFB, Cali­ served in the U.S. Army overseas, is Commander in Chief, Strategic Air fornia, to October 1962; Commander, 1946—49. He has been in the USAF Command. Following graduation at Eighth Air Force, Westover AFB, historical program for twelve years, West Point, he completed flying train­ Massachusetts, to December 1964; first with the Air Rescue Service of ing in 1937 and was assigned to duty and Vice Commander in Chief, Stra­ Air Force Logistics Command and for in the Philippines. After several tegic Air Command, until his present the last ten years at Hq SAC. During assignments with bombardment appointment on 1 February 1967. 1963 he worked on Project Forecast. sioned through the BOTC program, he entered the Air Force in 1954 and attended Supply Officer School at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Subsequently he served in the supply field with Tactical Air Command at Cannon AFB, New Mexico; then in Alaska, working first on materiel sup­ port for the Dew Line and then with the 5010th Air Base Wing at Eielson AFB, Alaska. In 1961 he was assigned to SAC's 801st Combat Support Group at Lockbourne AFB. Ohio. After at­ tending Squadron Officer School, he was sent to Offutt AFB, Nebraska. On completion of various programming and system schools, he was assigned to his present position with the Direc­ torate of Command Control, DCS/O, C o mma n der Roger J. M il l e r , USN Hq SAC. He has completed the Air ( M.A., George Washington University; Command and Staff Course by corre­ M.S., University of Mississippi) is spondence. Navigator of the antisubmarine air­ craft carrier USS Kearsarge (CVS-33). Following designation as a naval avi­ M ajor Frank H. Mc Ardle (M.S., ator in 1949, he flew carrier-based George Washington University) is a attack aircraft in both Atlantic and KC-135 instructor and crew com­ Pacific fleets, including two Korean mander, 916th Air Refueling Squad­ War combat tours. After serving as ron, Travis AFB, California. He re­ an advanced flight instructor, he at­ ceived a reserve commission in 1951 tended the Navy’s General Line and after navigator training was as­ School at Monterey, California. He signed to Biggs AFB, Texas, as a then flew carrier-based heavy attack crewman on SAC’s first tanker, the aircraft in East Coast squadrons. Sub­ KB-29. He completed pilot training in sequent assignments included a tour 1954 and served as Squadron Mainte­ as instructor of international relations nance Officer and Wing Standardiza­ at the Naval War College and intelli­ tion Pilot in KC-97s at Schilling AFB, gence analyst (Communist China), Kansas, until 1960. Other assignments Joint Staff, CINCPAC. Commander have been as Chief, Command Flight Miller is a graduate of the Naval War Crews, and special mission pilot, 1st College Command and Staff Course Strategic Aerospace Division, Van- and of the Army War College. His denberg AFB, California, to 1962; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding articles have been published in several C olonel Geo ffr ey Cheadle professional journals, including Air General. Vandenberg AFB. to 1963; fUSMA; M.S.E.E., Purdue University; University Review. and Division Administrative Officer, E.E.. Massachusetts Institute of Tech­ Whiteman AFB, Missouri, to 1965. nology) is Director of Information, He recently completed 35 combat re­ Hq Air Force Systems Command. Af­ fueling sorties in Southeast Asia. ter graduating from West Point in Major McArdle is a graduate of the 1944, he flew B-17s and B-29s in the USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor ZI until joining a photomapping School, Squadron Officer School, and squadron on Guam in 1946, then Air Command and Staff College. serving in the Admiralty Islands and at Clark Field. Philippine Islands, as communications officer. After gradu­ ate work at Purdue, he taught elec­ trical engineering at West Point until 1952. Other assignments have been as AACS detachment commander and squadron operations officer, Korea; as wing communications officer, 1808th AACS Wing Headquarters, Tokyo; as rated observer, after schooling at Waco, Texas, and B-47 combat crew commander and squadron operations officer, 100th Bomb Wing. He was C olonel W il l ia m F. S cott (USMA; reassigned to ARDC and the Air M.A., Georgetown University) is as­ Force SAGE project office. New York. signed to Headquarters USAF. After After receiving, the Electrical Engineer graduation at West Point in 1943, he degree from MIT, 1963, he was as­ served with the 398th Bomb Group, signed to the T-actical Division, Direc­ Eighth Air Force. From 1947 to 1950 torate of Development, DCS/R&D, he was assigned to the Strategic Intel­ Hq USAF. In 1965 he became Chief ligence School, War Department Gen­ of the Requirements Plans Croup, eral Staff, first ns a student, then on Directorate of Operational Require­ the faculty. He next served as an ex­ M ajor John A. W ohlman (B.S., ments and Development Plans, DCS/ change officer at the RAF College, University of Connecticut) is a sys­ RicD. Upon graduation from National Cranwell, England, instructing in tems analyst for the SAC Automated War College in 1967, he came to his bomber operations. He attended Air Command Control System. Commis­ present assignment. Command and Staff College in 1952 and afterwards taught air operations Problems of Nationality and Indus- at Air University. Subsequent assign­ trial Management, Iron Ore Resources ments have been as Chief. Electronics of the U.S.S.R., and Materials on the Division, ACS/Intelligence; U.S. Air Soviet Petroleum Industry. He also Attache, Moscow, 1962-64; Research contributed two chapters to Asher Associate, Foreign Policy Research Lee’s book, The Soviet Air Force, and Institute, University of Pennsylvania, an article to Eugene Emme’s book, and exchange duty with the Depart­ The Impact of Air Power. ment of State. Colonel Scott’s master’s thesis, “An Analysis of Time Factors in the Development and Production of Air Weapon Systems," was used dur­ ing the 1957 Senate subcommittee hearings in its inquiry into satellite and missile problems. He has been a previous contributor to Air University Review and Orbis.

M aster Ser gea n t Cornelius W. C onley (B.A., University of the Phil­ ippines) is assigned to the 1989th Communications Squadron, Torrejon AB, Spain. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1948 and was in the aircraft maintenance career field until 1961, when he retrained into his present career field. He has completed the following Air Force courses: Basic Aircraft and Engine (1948—49), En­ gine Specialist (1950), Aircraft Main­ tenance Technician (1954), Academic Dr . Ross K. B aker (Ph.D., University Instructor (1958), Management In­ M ajor Nic h o l a s P. V aslef (Ph.D., of Pennsylvania) is a member of the structors Institute (1963), Develop­ Harvard University) is Associate Pro­ Brookings Institution Foreign Policy ment and Management of Training fessor of Russian, U.S. Air Force Studies staff. He was formerly with Materials (1964), Instructional Pro­ Academy, but is currently on a one- the Foreign Policy Research Institute, grammer (1965), and Senior NCO year postdoctoral visiting professor­ University of Pennsylvania, and the Academv, Military Airlift Command ship grant from the Institute for the Center for Research in Social Systems, (1965). Study of the USSR in Munich, Ger­ American University. In addition to many. After graduating from the Uni­ his doctoral thesis. Military Status and versity of Washington, he served with Status-Deprivation in Postwar Latin the 7050th Air Intelligence Service America, which was published as a Wing in Germany, 1952-56, and with monograph by the Center for Re­ the 4602d (1006th) Air Intelligence search in Social Systems, Dr. Baker’s D r . K en n et h R. W hiting (Ph.D., Service Squadron, Colorado Springs, publications include articles in Orbis, Harvard University) is a member of 1956-58. He obtained the M.A. in Army, and International Development Aerospace Studies Institute and of International Relations from Stanford Review. He is presently coauthoring the faculty. Air University. He for­ University and has been teaching at a book with Dr. Ernest W. Lefever on merly taught Russian history at Tufts the Academy since 1960, except for political and military development in College. Dr. Whiting is the author of his assignment at Harvard for doctoral the Congo, Ethiopia, and Ghana, en­ The Soviet Union Today: A Concise studies in Slavic languages and litera­ titled Spear and Sceptre, to be pub­ Handbook (1962) and of numerous ture. Major Vaslef is the primary au­ lished by Brookings in 1968. Dr. studies and monographs on Russian thor of Basic Russian Course Hand- Baker is also a professorial lecturer subjects, including Readings in Soviet book, used at the Academy and Air at Catholic University of America. Military Theory, Essays on Soviet Force-wide.

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Tactical Air Employment—Current Status and Future Objectives” by Lieu­ tenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, USAF, as the outstanding article in the November-December 1967 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF L ieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Dow ns. USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. YVest c ot t , J r ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. Mido si May Patterson. Assistant Editor, Portuguese Language Edition Wil l ia m J. De Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator F ir st Lieu t en a n t Jerry R. Stringer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS Colonel Mer r it t G. Garner. Hq Military Airlift C om m and Colonel Alfred J. Lynn, H i / Strategic Air Command Colonel Marvin M. S tanley, H

ATTENTION Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW