Ethical Consensus and the Truth of Laughter
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Ethical Consensus and the Truth of Laughter Page | 1 SERIES: MORALITY AND THE MEANING OF LIFE Edited by: Professor Albert W. Musschenga (Amsterdam) Professor Paul J.M. van Tongeren (Nijmegen) Page | 2 Ethical Consensus and the Truth of Laughter The Structure of Moral Transformations Hub Zwart KOK PHAROS PUBLISHING HOUSE KAMPEN - THE NETHERLANDS 1996 Page | 3 This is the second edition of the book (revised version: July 2017) The editing of the first version of this book (1996) was subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) © 1996, Kok Pharos Publishing House P.O. Box 5016, 8260 GA Kampen, the Netherlands ISBN 90 390 0412 9 / CIP ISSN 0928-2742 NUGI 631/619 Page | 4 Table of Contents Introduction: The Beginning of Moral Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem...................................................6 Chapter 1: Established Morality and Discontent .............................................................................................. 13 1. The current status of moral philosophy ................................................................................................... 13 2. The ethics of compartmentalisation and the waning of moral truth .......................................................... 16 3. The method of avoidance or the loss of problems .................................................................................... 31 4. The case of Socrates: a buffoon who had himself taken seriously ............................................................ 37 Chapter 2: Laughter as a State of Mind ........................................................................................................... 45 1. Despotic liberalism, rereading and gay laughter ...................................................................................... 45 2. Towards a philosophy of laugher: Bakhtin .............................................................................................. 46 3. Marx, or: judging grobianism ................................................................................................................. 59 4. Incipit parodia: Nietzsche ...................................................................................................................... 64 5. Judging Zarathustra ................................................................................................................................ 72 6. Sola experientia: Bataille ....................................................................................................................... 77 7. Uneasy laugher: Foucault ....................................................................................................................... 81 Chapter 3: Judging Socrates ............................................................................................................................ 87 1. Mocking Asclepius ................................................................................................................................ 87 2. The truth of laughter .............................................................................................................................. 92 3. The absurd couple and the ill-mannered questioner ............................................................................... 105 4. The problem of Socrates ....................................................................................................................... 110 5. Philosophies for sale ............................................................................................................................ 113 Chapter 4: Judging Luther ............................................................................................................................ 117 1. Preliminary remarks: the early sixteenth century as ἀγών ...................................................................... 117 2. Nietzsche’s judgement of Luther .......................................................................................................... 119 3. Luther “Lie-gends” .............................................................................................................................. 125 4. Luther as a contemporary of Rabelais ................................................................................................... 130 5. Rabelais and his world ......................................................................................................................... 131 6. The tower experience: the issue of locality............................................................................................ 133 7. The excremental grid............................................................................................................................ 142 8. Luther’s biography as a sequence of chronotopes .................................................................................. 149 9. Ambivalence ........................................................................................................................................ 152 10. Luther’s body of writing ..................................................................................................................... 153 11. Whether for the sake of their conscience or for the sake of their paunches ........................................... 156 12. The court jester’s privilege ................................................................................................................. 160 13. Interminable analysis or final judgement? ........................................................................................... 164 14. Elimination or resurgence: towards a gelastic philosophy of laughter? ................................................. 169 Chapter 5: The Transfiguration of the Moral Subject: a Rereading of When We Dead Awaken ....................... 176 1. Did Ibsen laugh? .................................................................................................................................. 176 2. Artistic calling ..................................................................................................................................... 180 3. Transfiguration .................................................................................................................................... 187 4. Beyond cynicism.................................................................................................................................. 192 5. Laughter as remedy .............................................................................................................................. 199 Literature ..................................................................................................................................................... 206 Page | 5 Introduction: The Beginning of Moral Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem One of moral philosophy’s most tenacious questions concerns its beginning. For instance, should it be located in the discovery, or in the justification of moral truths? As discovery precedes justification (chronologically speaking), it seems justifiable to argue that moral philosophy should begin with the discovery of moral truth, when an important moral insight reveals itself to us or forces itself upon us for the first time. Yet, one might object that the recognition of moral truth already presupposes a moral subject, someone who is susceptible to it, who already has some justified knowledge concerning duties, norms or values. In other words, moral experience is always responsive. In the absence of moral subjectivity, nothing would be of any value, and the world would be devoid of moral significance. Moreover, another question concerning the beginning of moral philosophy may also vex us. Should we start from established morality, that is, from the moral consensus which manages to maintain itself and is guiding contemporary moral life, or from experiences of uneasiness or discontent? Should established morality be contested and criticized, or rather consolidated, reinforced and legitimized by moral philosophy? I will point out that in contemporary moral discourse something like a consensus sapientium has emerged among moral philosophers, which basically consists of the idea that it is the goal of moral philosophy to strengthen and justify established morality, and to secure and immunize it against experiences of chronic discontent. The basic objective of this book, however, will consist in the effort to contest some of these established truths which are mistakenly considered beyond contestation. Instead of reconstructing and consolidating established morality – the “Aristotelian” option so to speak (in terms of ancient Greek morality) – I will opt for a “Socratic” approach, challenging what is mistakenly taken to be self-evident, exposing the established consensus to instances of obfuscated moral truth, which it seems unable to incorporate. The basic contention put forward in this book is that both the logical and the chronological beginning, of moral philosophy as well as of morality as such, is to be found in the subversive experience of laughter. It is in the experience of laughter that the vulnerability of established morality finds itself exposed, that moral truth reveals itself to us, and that moral subjectivity is in fact produced. I presume that this remarkable claim demands some preliminary elucidation before being elaborated more fully in the subsequent sections and chapters of this book. Moral