J N e Great Historical Events That Were De p a~ Significantly Affected by the rsrSSSS Weather. Part 11: Meteorological Jerusalem lsrael Aspects of the Battle of Waterloo*

Abstract Napoleon's forces. The emperor was forced to sign his abdication (April 1814) and the victorious allies ban- The Waterloo Campaign extended from 15 to 18 June 1815, with ished him into exile on the island of Elba, off the west the decisive Battle of Waterloo taking place on the 18th. The coast of Italy. The French Senate reinstated the Bour- campaign involved the "Army of the North" of Napoleon on the one hand, and the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies on the other. The bon dynasty in the person of Louis XVI's brother, latter were commanded, respectively, by the Duke of Wellington and styled as Louis XVIII. However, before long, person- Prince Blucher. A shallow but active low and associated warm and ages loyal to Napoleon sent him messages informing cold fronts crossed the battle area on the 16th and 17th. him of dissatisfaction in the country and suggested his The weather had important effects on the battles. On the 16th, return. On 20 March 1815, the former emperor entered in a battle between part of the French army and part of the Prussian army, at the village of Ligny, about 40 km south-southeast of Paris, where he was received by enthusiastic crowds. Brussels, thunderstorms connected with the passage of the afore- With this began Napoleon's "one hundred days' rule." mentioned warm front made the use of muskets impracticable. Representatives of the powers opposed to Napo- However, the most important weather effects developed on the leon were holding the "Congress of Vienna" at the time, 17th and during the night from the 17th to the 18th. Violent thunder- and decided then and there to form a new coalition storms occurred early in the afternoon of the 17th close to Ligny, while Napoleon was in the process of attacking the Anglo-Dutch against him. Their armies were to invade France from force at Quatre Bras. The rains turned the ground into a quagmire, the north, east, and southeast. In conformity with his making it impossible for the French artillery and cavalry, and even usual strategy, the emperor wished to deal separately for the infantry, to move across the fields in extended order, as with each army of the coalition. He decided to attack required by the emperor. The French advance was so greatly first the enemy closest to Paris: namely, an Anglo- slowed down that Wellington was able to withdraw his lighter force to a better position near Waterloo. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch force was Dutch army, commanded by the Duke of Wellington, almost completely preserved for the decisive battle of the next day. and a Prussian army, commanded by Prince Blucher. The rainshowers of the 17th and the night from the 17th to the These two marched into Belgium in June 1815. Napo- 18th softened the ground to an extent that, on the morning of the leon crossed into Belgium on 15 June at the head of his 18th, Napoleon and his artillery experts judged that the battle—the army, the "Army of the North" (Armee du Nord), and on Battle of Waterloo—could not be started before a late hour of the forenoon [1130 local standard time (LST)]. Until the arrival of the the 16th struck at the Prussians at Ligny, about 40 km Prussian force, about 1600 LST and later, the battle tended to go in south-southeast of Brussels. Events of the remaining favor of the French, but the Prussians turned the tide of the fighting. days of the "Waterloo Campaign," which ended with The paper quotes judgments of military historians on the signifi- the Battle of Waterloo on the 18th, are described very cant effects of the weather. Some historians believe that, had briefly in the following sections, where emphasis is put Napoleon been able to begin the attack earlier on the 18th, the battle on the weather effects on the battles. would have ended in a French victory.

1. Antecedent events 2. Weather of the days leading to the Battle of Waterloo, 15-18 June 1815 Early in 1814, armies of some member states of the anti-Napoleon coalition invaded France and defeated According to information received from the Belgian Royal Institute of Meteorology in Brussels, there were *Part 10, "Crop Failure in Britain in 1799 and 1800 and the British no regular meteorological stations operating in Bel- Decision to Send a Naval Force to the Baltic Early in 1801," was gium in 1815. However, Vanderlinden (1924, 302- published in the February 1992 Bulletin (73,187-199). See Part 9 304) compiled a brief descriptive account of the weather (71, 33-41) for a complete list of the series up to and including Part 8. + in the country in 1815, and, in a one-sentence-long Visiting with the Department of Meteorology, University of Copen- hagen, since 1986. statement regarding June, he writes that the begin- ©1993 American Meteorological Society ning of the month was rather rainy and that thunder-

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC storms occurred on the 12th, 17th, and 20th. Memoirs day was rainy, with thunder at 1000 LST. The weather and letters of participants of the Waterloo Campaign of the 18th was very cloudy, but no rain is mentioned. (to be quoted below) record that there was a major The Haarlem data show a rise of 3°C in temperature thunderstorm in the general area of Waterloo on the from the 16th to the 17th; more significant is (see the 16th in the late afternoon/early evening, and that the next paragraph) the drop of about 4.5°C in the tem- thunderstorm that burst on the 17th early in the after- peratures for 1300 LST from the 17th to the 18th. noon was especially violent. The showers and rains of Figure 1 is a synoptic map for western and north- that storm continued, with some intermissions, until western Europe and the northeastern North Atlantic about 0800 local standard time (LST) on the 18th, the for the 17th, the day of the most significant weather in day of the Battle of Waterloo proper. The showers and the battle area. The map was prepared by John rains turned the ground into a quagmire, severely Kington, Climatic Research Unit, University of East impeding the trafficability of the fields not only for the Anglia, Norwich, England, based on the data bank artillery and cavalry, but the infantry as well. This will built up at the unit; construction of the map was aided be described in the following sections. by Kington's study of weather conditions in western In view of the absence of regular meteorological Europe in the late eighteenth century (see Kington stations in Belgium at the time, we have examined the 1988). The weather of that day had the most serious data of the meteorological stations at the Paris Astro- and fatal consequences on Napoleon's army. nomical Observatory (PAO), at Haarlem and Zwanburg If we assume that the depression and the cold and in the Netherlands, and at two stations in the London warm fronts of Fig. 1 moved essentially eastward (as area (Greenwich and Camden). Table 1 lists some of they usually do), then the data of Table 1 and the the data of the PAO and Haarlem. The printed record pressure and front configurations of Fig. 1 can be of observations of the PAO for the month lists the connected in a satisfactory manner. It seems prob- highest and lowest values of the pressure of each day, able, and perhaps even certain, that the thunderstorm as well as at midday; air temperatures are stated only and showers of the 16th late in the day in the battle for noon. The weather is recorded for three periods of area (of the Battle of Ligny, Ligny being a village about the day: "morning," "midday," and "evening." Haarlem, 25 km from Waterloo and nearly 40 km to the south- on the other hand, records, among others, the air southeast of Brussels, see Fig. 2; the battle was fought temperatures at 0800, 1300, and 2200 LST. between a French force and a Prussian force) were In Table 1 we reproduce the highest and lowest connected with the passage of the warm front of the pressure values at the PAO, as well as the remarks on depression. This suggestion is supported by reports of the weather; in the case of the Dutch station, we list its participants of the battle, which state that on the 17th, temperatures and the all too brief notes on the weather. by 1300 LST, the air was sultry: apparently, the battle The latter do not specify the hours at which the area fell into the warm sector of the low pressure weather stated prevailed. system. It is seen in Table 1 that Paris reports a drop in The great thunderstorm and showers/rains of the pressure from the 16th to the 17th; the maximum value 17th were in all likelihood associated with the passage of the day lowered by over 5 mb. The weather of the of the cold front of the low. This is corroborated by the

TABLE 1. Meteorological data for the days of the Waterloo Campaign, 15-18 June 1815.

Date in Paris Astronomical Observatory Haarlem June 1815 Pressure (mb) Weather Temperature (°C) at LST Weather

Max. Min. Morning Midday Evening 0800 1300 2200

15 1009.3 1001.5 cloudy very cloudy fine 15.6 19.4 15.6 showery, very windy

16 1009.8 1003.7 cloudy overcast rain 15.7 22.2 15.6 somewhat brighter

17 1004.2 1001.8 very cloudy rain, thunder intermittent 21.2 21.1 15.6 warm, showers, at 10 rain then cloudy

18 1005.9 1004.6 very cloudy very cloudy very cloudy 15.0 16.7 14.4 rain with hard wind

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC data of Haarlem, which show a consider- able drop in temperatures from the 17th to the 18th (see Table 1). It seems rea- sonable that the cold front crossed the Dutch city on the 18th, perhaps at night: Haarlem reports rain and "hard" winds for the day.

3.16 June

Although the meteorological event of the 16th did not have as great an effect on ground conditions—and, hence, the battle—as the meteorological events of the 17th and those of the night from the 17th to the 18th, we shall describe the event in brief, for it was relevant to what happened on the next two days, including the day of the Battle of Waterloo proper. In conformity with his usual strategy, the emperor endeavored to deal sepa- rately with the Anglo-Dutch and Prus- sian armies, and this meant that he had to prevent the two forces from joining. He found it preferable to deal with the Prussians first and, accordingly, assigned the 16th for this purpose. About half (two corps) of the Prussian army was located near the village of Ligny (Fig. 2), whereas an Anglo-Dutch FIG. 1. Synoptic chart for western Europe for 17 June 1815, the day before the Battle of Waterloo. The isobars are drawn at 4-mb intervals. As is seen in the map, force was situated around the village of a low pressure system covered the low countries, northwestern France, and southern Quatre Bras, about 32 km south-south- England. "Embedded" in the system are a warm and a cold front. Presumably, it was east of Brussels and 12 km to the north- the passage of the warm front across the campaign area that produced the west of Ligny. Napoleon ordered Mar- thunderstorm late in the day on the 16th, with some consequences on the fighting. The warm sector crossed the area between the night of the 16th and about 1300 or shal Ney, commander of the left wing of 1400 LST on the 17th. It is almost certain that the cold front passed through the battle his army, to attack Quatre Bras and seize area between about 1400 and 1500 LST on the 17th, producing a violent thunderstorm it from Wellington's force, while he him- and rains that continued throughout the day and night, with some intermissions. The self dealt with the Prussians. The battle showers and rains caused sodden fields, which interfered with action, preventing began rather late in the day, because the Napoleon from dealing a hoped-for decisive blow on Wellington's force. The most fatal consequence of the rains, however, was that the emperor could not begin the emperor was waiting for one of his corps combat on the 18th, the Battle of Waterloo proper, sufficiently early in the morning and (Lieutenant-General Gerard's) to arrive give himself enough time to defeat the Anglo-Dutch before the arrival of the and take up its position. Additionally, he Prussians. The joint Anglo-Dutch and Prussian force was notably larger than was waiting to hear the din of cannonade Napoleon's force and was able to inflict a crushing defeat on the French. from Quatre Bras that would have indi- The chart was prepared especially for this paper by J. Kington, Climatic Research cated that Ney went into action (Ney did Unit, University of East Anglia, Norwich, England, based on the meteorological data bank built up by the unit. not). The late start left a maximum of close to six hours of daylight (sunset was about 2020 LST1), which turned out not to be enough to beat the Prussians decisively. The 1 Although it is almost certain that, had the moon been full and the sky Prussians put up a determined fight. cloudless, the battle could not have been continued at moonlight, it About 1930 LST, Napoleon ordered the Imperial is worth pointing out that during 16-18 June the moon was between its first and second quarter—that is, it would not have provided much Guard, his most loyal and battle-seasoned troops, to light. For data on the phases of the moon in June 1815, see Morrison launch an attack, hoping that they would be able to (1966). secure a definite victory. But about the time he issued

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC the 17th and the night from the 17th to the 18th was more thundery and persistently rainy than on the 14th. This is true not only for Paris but also for the battle area in Belgium, as indi- cated by memoirs and letters of participants of the campaign. It seems reasonable to ascribe the intense thunderstorm ofthe17th and rains to the passage of the cold front shown in Fig. 1. Becke, author of a two-vol- ume documented study of the Waterloo Campaign, quotes (Vol. I, p. 335) a Lieutenant Hope (Letter of a British Officer, 239- 240; not seen by this author) as follows: on the 17th "the hazy morning cleared up about 1000 LST, by noon the sun was pow- erful, by 1300 LST the air was sultry and thunder was faintly FIG. 2. General map of the area of the Waterloo Campaign. Waterloo is situated about 13 heard before 1400 LST." km south-southeast from Brussels. The scale of the map can be estimated from the fact that Before we turn to descriptions the distance between Waterloo and Ligny (scene of the Battle of Ligny on the 16th) is about 25 km. of the thunderstorm, it is appro- priate to point out that Hope's ======:= brief "account" of the weather of the morning of the 17th sug- the order, a major thunderstorm burst and the heavy gests that the warm sector of the low of Fig. 1 passed rains made it impracticable to use the muskets. The the battle area in the morning and the earliest part of guard had to make a bayonet charge, which was less the afternoon. The statement that thunder was faintly effective than volleys of musket fire. The Prussians heard before 1400 LST corresponds in all probability were forced to retreat and, although the battle was a to what we call "distant thunder." Presumably, the French victory, both sides suffered heavy casualties: distant thunder originated from the thunderstorms of the Prussians lost 16 000 men, and the French 11 000; the approaching cold front. the Prussian losses were increased by the subse- Hope describes the thunderstorm as "awful," "ap- quent desertion of the colors by 8000 troops. It is palling," and "terrific." (The letter was written a week almost certain that the number of Prussian casualties after the event.) Another British officer, Captain C. would have been greater had the guard been able to Mercer, Royal Horse Artillery, writes as follows (1969, use its firearms. The possibly greater losses would 147, 148): have rendered the Prussian force less capable of recuperating, as it did, from the blow. In any case, as The sky had become overcast since the morning ... a consequence of the French victory, the Prussian large isolated masses of thundercloud, of the deep- army was put out of action for the 17th, when Napoleon est, almost inky black, their lower edges hard and strongly defined, lagging down, as if momentarily intended to smash Wellington's force. about to burst, hung suspended over us, involving our position and everything on it in deep and gloomy obscurity. . . . The first gun that was fired seemed to burst the clouds overhead, for its report was instantly 4.17 June followed by an awful clap of thunder, and lightning that almost blinded us, whilst the rain came down as if a a. Thunderstorm and rains water-spout had broken over us. Despite the fact that the pressure drop recorded at the PAO meteorological station from the 16th to the A meteorologically particularly significant observa- 17th was notably smaller than from the 13th to the 14th tion (less subjective than the previously quoted obser- (not shown in Table 1), the weather of the afternoon of vations), indicative of the intensity of the front and

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC thunderstorm circulation, is cited by Houssaye (1900a, In a collection of letters, the editor, Major-General p. 258), a prominent historian of France's imperial Siborne, reprints a letter of Capt. W. B. Ingilby, Royal period. He writes that shortly after 1400 LST, big black Horse Artillery (Siborne 1891, letter No. 81). In the part clouds were "pushed" (this is a literal translation of the of the letter relating to 17 June, the captain writes as French term he used) by "furious" winds. The showers follows: and rain were so heavy, according to Houssaye (p. 261), that one could not distinguish the color of uni- At the last moment the order was given [Wellington's forms at a distance of five to six steps. The military order to retreat from Quatre Bras] and the whole commenced a rapid retreat in three Columns and by consequences of the rainshowers are described in the different roads. At this instant the heavy black cloud following paragraphs. broke with a tremendous clap of thunder and torrent of As was pointed out above, the 17th was the day rain.... The road and the ground became so quickly deluged with the heavy rain that was falling, that it assigned by Napoleon for dealing with the Anglo- became impracticable for the French Cavalry to press Dutch force, which, as was mentioned earlier, was our Column in any force. In fact, out of the road in the located in the area of the village of Quatre Bras (see track of our own Cavalry, the ground was poached into Fig. 2) some 32 km a little south of southeast from a complete puddle. Seeing this, and having lost the Brussels. On the morning of the 17th, the emperor shoe from off a Gun horse, I halted and had it put on in spite of some skirmishers. . . . This will show how decided to postpone the beginning of the attack until impracticable it was for them to press on this cross noon, hoping that by then the ground that was soft from road. . . . The rain continued very heavily throughout the previous evening's showers would be dry enough the night. for the artillery and cavalry, as well as infantry, to advance and spread out over the fields.2 Brett-James (1964) published excerpts from nu- Also on the morning of the same day, Wellington merous memoirs and letters relating to the Waterloo received information on the Prussian defeat at Ligny Campaign. On pages 93-94 he cites from the mem- 4 the previous day. The French force was too large oirs of the French sergeant Hippolyte de Mauduit of compared to his at Quatre Bras and, deprived of the the Imperial Guard: hope of help from the Prussians, he decided to with- The tracks were so deep in mud after the rain that we draw his force to a better defensive position, behind a found it impossible to maintain any sort of order in our ridge near the village of Mt. St. Jean, about 4 km south- column In looking for easier paths a large number southeast of Waterloo. of men went astray, and not until daybreak did they all The retreat of the smaller and lighter Anglo-Dutch manage to rejoin the columns. . . .Our greatcoats and trousers were checked with several pounds of mud. A force began about 1300 LST. Because of the retreat, great many of the soldiers lost their shoes and reached the fight became for the French a battle of pursuit, the bivouac barefoot. involving the possibility of the enemy's escape. Shortly before 1500 LST, the thunderstorm burst. It quickly To sum up the military significance of the thunder- turned the fields into quagmire (see Chandler 1966, p. storm and rains of the 17th on the fighting of the same 1061), rendering the ground intrafficable not only to day and the next day, we shall quote the judgments of the artillery and cavalry but for the infantry as well. three military historians. Consequently, all the three French arms had to crowd Captain A. F. Becke (1914, vol. I, p. 337): to the only paved road, the narrow Brussels road. Inevitably, the pursuit slowed. By 1830 LST, it was Rarely has the storm [the thunderstorm of the 17th] clear that the Anglo-Dutch force succeeded in avoid- been given sufficient credit for the part it played in retarding the Emperor's fiery, if tardy, pursuit of his ing battle. Napoleon's hope to smash Wellington's foe. Given good weather, then June 17 might have force before it could join up with the Prussians became seen very different happenings—even in spite of frustrated by the weather.3 Ney's early and disastrous failure. For the sodden roads and fields delayed the French advance tremen- To show the severity of ground conditions, we shall dously; otherwise Wellington would probably have cite excerpts from recollections of two participants of been attacked towards the evening, so as to ensure the combat. that he was immobilised, and then by 0800 LST, on

2The above-quoted weather-caused decision of Napoleon to delay the start of the attack is quoted by several writers—e.g., by Captain Siborne (1895, p. 364). Some of the quotes are based on statements made by the emperor at his place of final banishment on the island of St. Helena. 3Chandler (1966, p. 1062) quotes Napoleon's remark, made at St. Helena, regarding the "unfinished" battle of the 17th against Wellington. He is reported to have said that "what would I not have given to have had Joshua's power to slow down the sun's movement by two hours." 4Becke (1914, vol. I, p. 261) gives the rank of de Mauduit as captain.

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC June 18, at latest, the great battle would have been arms, or over 25% of the Army of the North. Such a 5 begun. It might have been as bloody as Eylau but it large body of troops was not meant for an intelligence would have been far more decisive, and a French victory. mission, and this should have been clear to the marshal. In the afternoon, the various elements of Grouchy's Professor D. G. Chandler (1966, p. 1062): force began to march toward Gembloux. The march was badly hindered by the sodden ground, due to the It is possible, even probable, that Napoleon would persistent rains. For instance, one of Grouchy's corps have succeeded in catching up with Wellington and (Lieutenant Vandamme's) took an hour to move 2 km force him to fight there, but for the adverse turn in the weather. to a meeting point (Becke 1914, vol. I, p. 353). The force led by the marshal himself took about four hours Major-General J. F. C. Fuller (1985, p. 189): to cover 10 km, reaching Gembloux between 1800 and 1900 LST; one other corps (Lieutenant-General In part at least, this terrific storm of rain saved Gerald's) arrived at Gembloux at 2100 LST. When Wellington, for it so drenched the ground that the Grouchy reached Gembloux, he took no action, al- French were unable to advance across country and though some two hours of daylight remained. He were, in consequence, tied to the Brussels Road. Had they been able, as was Napoleon's wont, to advance should have realized that the French center's right in extended order, it is probable that, in spite of the late flank would possibly come under attack by Blucher start, the Emperor would have caught up with his and, moreover, that Blucher would possibly achieve enemy by five or six o'clock. Had he done so, and had junction with Wellington. In the latter case, the allies he attacked Wellington and fixed him to his position when not fully deployed, it is also possible that he would have presented a much larger force than might have beaten him during the next morning, or what Napoleon's. Grouchy's tardiness meant that the is more likely, have forced him to retire during the night. Prussians gained more time to move toward a junction with the Anglo-Dutch. b. Marshal Grouchy's mission One other important incident of the day that was influenced in no small part by the weather (for the 5. The night of 17-18 June remaining part, the responsibility lay with a high French commander) occurred on the right flank of the The rains continued during the night. Some of the French army (the center was commanded by Napo- memoirs and letters of participants of the campaign leon himself). Command of the right wing was en- describe the rains of the night as "torrential." trusted by the emperor to Marshal Grouchy, an out- In his collection of excerpts, Brett-James (1964, standing cavalry officer and an excellent tactician, but 98-99) quotes Napoleon's thoughts during his noctur- a general officer lacking strategic insight (according to nal tour (around one o'clock in the morning). He was the literature). angry that the Anglo-Dutch force escaped battle the As mentioned before, the precise location of the previous afternoon (the 17th) and apprehensive that Prussian forces (two corps beaten at Ligny, and two Wellington and Blucher would possibly link up near other corps not involved in the previous day's battle) Brussels. The emperor reminisced as follows (only the was not known to Napoleon on the morning of the 17th weather-related thoughts are quoted here): when he verbally instructed Grouchy to reconnoiter the whereabouts of the Prussians. In a later written The rain fell in torrents ... the French troops were order of the same day, the marshal was instructed to bivouacked in the mud. The officers thought it impos- sible for us to give battle during the day. The artillery proceed to Gembloux (see Fig. 2; Gembloux is about and cavalry could not manoeuvre on the ground so 40 km south-southeast from Brussels and about 10 km soaked was it; and they calculated that twelve hours northeast of Ligny), pursue the Prussians, and find out of fine weather would be needed to dry it out. if Blucher was moving to the support of Wellington. No doubt (Houssaye 1900a, p. 231) Napoleon's idea was On page 100, Brett-James cites William Gibney, for Grouchy to interpose his wing between the Prussians assistant surgeon to the 15th Hussars (British): and the Anglo-Dutch and thus protect the right flank of Torrents of rain fell all night,... a night spent in pouring the French center. rain, sitting up to the hips in muddy water. For the mission, Grouchy was allocated the rela- tively large force of 33 000 troops, including all three On pages 102-104, the same compiler quotes from the recollections of British Private Matthew Clay:

5The Battle of Eylau, Prussia, was fought 7-8 February 1807 By and by, the flint musket then in use was a sad bore between Napoleon's army and a Russian army. The fighting was on that occasion: from the effects of the wet, the extremely fierce. springs of the lock became wood bound and would not

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC act correctly, and when in action the clumsy flints or if we wish to quibble, the false estimation of the state became useless. of the ground, by Drouot and the artillery officers, compelled the Emperor to alter his orders. The attack was postponed from six or seven o'clock, to nine o'clock, then once more deferred because the troops 6.18 June—The day of the Battle of had not yet taken up their positions. This delay saved Waterloo the English Army.6

On the 18th, the rains stopped between 0700 and Houssaye's lines were written late in the nineteenth 0800 LST (Fuller 1985, p. 193). Soon thereafter, century (the 1900 edition was the 31 st edition). About Napoleon set out with General Drouot, commander of three-quarters of a century later, the British military the Imperial Guard, for the purpose of examining the historian Chandler (1966, p. 1067) sustains the French state of the ground: Would it be possible to move the scholar's conclusions. He writes: guns? Originally, Napoleon intended to begin the attack at 0900 LST at the latest. However, Drouot This decision [postponement of opening the battle until late in the forenoon because of the sodden advised the emperor to postpone the beginning of the ground] proved the most fatal one of the day for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch force for a few hours, to let French. For had even an inadequately supported the ground dry in the meantime; otherwise, the attack infantry attack been launched against Wellington in could not begin with an artillery bombardment. More- the morning, the French must surely have won; for Blucher would have been too late arriving on the field over, the round shot would have buried themselves in to affect the issue. the mud instead of ricocheting (Fuller 1985, p. 193, footnote 3; Becke 1914, vol. II, p. 4); that is, many of the rounds would have been wasted. 7. Conclusions Thus, on both the 17th and the 18th Napoleon began the attack late in the day and on both occasions The above study indicates that the Waterloo Cam- in consequence of soaked ground. On the 18th, how- paign, including the Battle of Waterloo, was notably ever, the late beginning was fatal. By midafternoon the affected by the rains connected with the passage of a battle was close to becoming a French victory. How- system of warm and cold fronts across the general ever, about 1600 LST, the first Prussian units joined area of the campaign. The case of the Battle of the combat and were followed by other Prussian units. Waterloo shows that the weather can have far-reach- The combined allied armies greatly exceeded the ing direct and indirect consequences. Not only did French army in strength, and this turned the Battle of Napoleon lose his throne forever—the political map of Waterloo into a decisive allied victory. Wellington Europe was changed by the victorious allies as well. In himself admitted that, before the Prussians' arrival, his France, the Bourbon dynasty was reinstated. In the force was close to defeat. In a letter to his brother inevitable "soul searching" in France for the causes of William, dated 19 June 1815, relating to the Battle of the debacle, Grouchy was blamed for the disaster. Waterloo, he wrote the following: "It was the most The marshal defended himself by referring to the desperate business I ever was in. ... I never was so abominable state of the ground, which slowed down near being beat." (See letter No. 31 in Webster 1948.) and exhausted his troops and rendered him unable to As an outcome of Waterloo, Napoleon lost his throne prevent the junction of the Prussians with the Anglo- irretrievably and was sent into banishment on the Dutch. distant island of St. Helena, and at the Congress of Vienna, the allies redrew the political map of Europe. Acknowledgments. The writer is pleased to thank John King- Houssaye, the prominent French scholar previ- ton, Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia, Norwich, ously cited, sums up the consequences of the wet England, for preparing the synoptic chart for 17 June 1815 (Fig. ground on the Battle of Waterloo in the following words 1 in this paper) especially for this study. Thanks are due to the following organizations or individuals for (Houssaye 1900a, 493-494; English translation, meteorological data for June 1815: Service Meteorologique 1900b, p. 288): Interregional, lle-de-France, Centre Interdepartemental de Paris- Montsouris, Meteorologie Nationale, Paris; Maurice Crewe, librar- At Waterloo Napoleon wished to begin the action in the early morning; his orders testify to this. Had the 6 battle begun towards six or seven o'clock, neither On the sheet of the meteorological observations in June 1815, the Grouchy's great strategic blunder [his failure to place observer of the station at Camden, London, added the following his force in the way of Blucher], nor the mistake of the remark concerning the 21st: "Diprest [sic] with the rumour that Emperor himself in neglecting to repeat his orders, Bonaparte had beaten Wellington & reached Brussels." Thus, after would have led to any serious consequences, for the three days of the allied victory, London did not know yet of the great English army would have been routed before the victory of the allies. The news of the victory reached London during arrival of the Prussians. . . . The state of the ground, the night of 21-22 June.

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Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/08/21 08:23 PM UTC ian, National Meteorological Library, Bracknell, Berkshire, Eng- Houssaye, H., 1900a: 7S75l/l/ater/oo,31sted.LibrairieAcademique land; and Dr. Arijan van Engelen, Royal Netherlands Meteoro- Didier, 512 pp. logical Institute, De Bilt, The Netherlands. Dr. H. Einicke, Astronomi- , 1900b: 1815 Waterloo. English translation of the foregoing by cal Observatory, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Den- A. M. Mann, A. Euan-Smith, Ed., A. and Ch. Black, 470 pp. mark, is thanked for data of the moon in June 1815. Kington, J., 1988: The Weather of the 1780s over Europe. Cam- Finally, thanks are due to Dr. A. A. Orgill, senior librarian, Royal bridge University Press, 160 pp. Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, England, for cop- Mercer, C., 1969 (reissue of 1927): Journal of the Waterloo Cam- ies of some pages from the literature. paign. Kept Throughout the Campaign of 1815 by the Late General Cavalie Mercer; with an Introduction by M. Glover. P. Davies, 388 pp. Morrison, B. L., 1966: Phases of the Moon 1800-1939. Circular No. References 112, U.S. Naval Observatory, 42 pp. Siborne, H. T., Ed., 1891: Waterloo Letters. A Selection from Becke, A. F., 1914: Napoleon and Waterloo. The Emperor's Cam- Original and Hitherto Unpublished Letters Bearing on the Opera- paign with the Armee du Nord, 1815. A Strategical and Tactical tions of the 16th, 17th, and 18th June, 1815, by Officers who Study. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Vol. I: 361 pp., Vol. Served in the Campaign. Cassell & Co., 409 pp. II, 322 pp. , 1895: The Waterloo Campaign 1815,4th ed. A. Constable and Brett-James, A., 1964: The Hundred Days. Napoleon's Last Cam- Co., 332 pp. paign from Eye-Witness Accounts. Macmillan & Co., 242 pp. Vanderlinden, E., 1924: ChroniquedesEvenementsMeteorologiques Chandler, D. G., 1966: The Campaigns of Napoleon. The Macmillan en Belgiquejusqu'en 1834. M. Hayez, Imprimeurde I'Academie Co., 1172 pp. Royale de Belgique, 329 pp. Fuller, J. F. C., 1985: The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Webster, C., Ed., 1948: Camden Miscellany XVIII. Some Letters of Their Influence upon History 1792-1944. J. Terraine, Ed., Pala- the Duke of Wellington to His Brother William Wellesley-Pole. din, Granada Publishing, 595 pp. Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 38 pp.

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