The Case of Wagner. Nietzsche Contra Wagner. the Twilight of the Idols
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THE-CASE-OF-WAGNER N1ETZSCHE-CONTRAWAGNER THE-TWILIGHTOF-THE-IDOLS THE-ANTICHRIST FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE FROM-THE- LIBRARY-OF TWNITYCOLLEGE TORONTO PRESENTED gy tos* David Ouchterlony (0 THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE Gbc Worhs of ffriefcricb VOL. I. A GENEALOGY OF MORALS POEMS Translated by WILLIAM A. HAUSSMANN and JOHN GRAY [Ready March 20, 1899. VOL. II. THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA A BOOK FOR ALL AND NONE Translated by ALEXANDER TlLLE. [Ready April 24, 1899. VOL. ill. THE CASE OF WAGNER NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS THE ANTICHRIST Translated by THOMAS COMMON. [Ready May 22, 1899. Other Volumes to follow. LONDON T . FISHER U N W I N This sole authorised edition of the Collected Works of Friedrich Nietzsche is issued under the editorship of ALEXANDER TILLE, Ph.D., Lecturer at the University of Glasgow. It is based on the final German edition (Leipzig: C. G. Naumann) prepared by Dr. Fritz Kocgcl, and is published under the supervision of the NictzscJie-Archiv at Nauinburg. Copyright in the United States by Macmillan and Co. All rights reserved. THE CASE OF WAGNER NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS THE ANTICHRIST BY FRIEDR1CH TRANSLATED BY NIETZSCHE THOMAS COMMON LONDON T. FISHER UNWIN PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1899 1313 CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITOR vii THE CASE OF WAGNER xxiii Preface I A Letter from Turin of May, 1888 5 Postscript 43 Second Postscript 51 Epilogue 56 NIETZSCHE CONTRA WAGNER 61 Preface 63 Where I admire 65 Where I make Objections 67 Wagner as a Danger 69 A Music without a Future 71 We Antipodes 73 Where Wagner belongs to 76 Wagner as the Apostle of Chastity 79 How I got free from Wagner 82 The Psychologist speaks 84 Epilogue 89 VI CONTENTS Page THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 95 Preface 97 Apophthegms and Darts 99 The PiQblenL of-Socrates 107 "Reason" in Philosophy 116 How the "True World" finally became a Fable 124 Morality as Anti-naturalness 126 The four great Errors 134 The Improvers of Mankind 147 What the Germans lack 154 Roving Expeditions of an Inopportune Philosopher 164 My Indebtedness to the Ancients 222 The Hammer speaketh 233 THE ANTICHRIST 237 Preface 239 The Antichrist 241 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION If it be the task of philosophy to unite the results of the various departments of learning into an uncontradictory whole, the philosophy of the present age in Germany and Great Britain can claim a somewhat higher position than that of half a century ago. Although intellectual cobweb- spinning in the mode of Spinoza or Hegel has by no means died out, the continuation of speculative tradition is no longer regarded as the test for a philosopher s significance. Above all, natural science, with its results as well as with its unavoidable presuppositions, has within the last half cen tury won a place in general esteem making it impossible for philosophy any longer to neglect it. More especially has the doctrine of evolution in the shape it received in s of 1859 from Darwin "Origin of Species changed most the genera] concepts about man, his position on the earth, his descent and his relation to the lower animals, and philo sophy has been compelled to define its position towards these new discoveries. Whilst ever since the appearance of Hux ley s "Evidence as to Man s Place in Nature" in 1863 bio logical science, and particularly phylogeny and ontogeny, all over the world have been busy to establish even the minor facts which bear on the ascent of beings by con tinual evolution, and to collect ever new evidence upon the I X INTRODUCTION method of that development, English philosophy, so far as it has taken any notice of evolutionarism, has endeavoured to show that sexual and natural selection and elimination cannot possibly account for what, since the middle of last " " century, has been called human progress. It has denoun ced every attempt to apply that principle to human society " " and the progress of civilisation. Darwin himself inaugu " rated that movement in his " Descent of Man. " When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great number of courageous, sympa thetic, and faithful members who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other. " That sounds like an application of natural selection to sociology, but is the very opposite. What we should have expected to " " hear from the great teacher of the struggle for existence is an entirely different proposition. In a tribe the members of which (including the weak and sick) assist each other in every kind of danger natural selection must soon come to an end, a kind of panmixy must arise and lead to a rapid decline of individual strength and thereby of the tribe it self. The last chapter of Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace s "Darwinism" (1889) is a sample of the same way of reas oning. This unwillingness to acknowledge the selection of the fit and the elimination of the unfit as pre-requisites of " " human progress has, quite recently, reacted upon general biological theories by producing the Neo-Lamarckism of Sir Francis Galton and Mr. William Bateson. If scientists themselves, whenever they touch upon the more complex problems of human existence, dare not apply to them the principles they would not question for a moment INTRODUCTION XI in the realm of the organic world outside of man, how can one wonder if philosophers have still less courage? Mr. Herbert Spencer s own philosophical development has been one long campaign against natural selection and elimination, and in favour of heredity of acquired characters. His fight with Professor Weismann is only an incidental skirmish. The whole drift of Mr. Spencer s thought almost appears to be in spired by the question : how to evade and veil the logical consequences of Darwin s evolutionarism for human existence? If that were the task he set for himself, his reasoning could scarcely have been better than it is. That he uses the word evolution so frequently does not matter in the least. What he terms evolution is utterly at variance with Darwin s con cept of development as the natural result of a struggle for existence. Only by a misunderstanding can he be called the philosopher of Darwinism, for he has never got beyond Lamarck s ideas of natural development by accumulation of acquired qualities. Nor have any of his disciples looked at the problem from any other side. In the works of his closest follower, Mr. John Fiske, the gulf between Darwinism and philosophical evolutionarism becomes even more apparent, for Mr. Fiske, despite his much greater rhetorical gift, does not rival his great master in the art of complicating expres sion or in the patient elaboration of long lines of argument the point of which is concealed until the last moment. "When humanity began to be evolved, an entirely new chapter in the history of the universe was opened. Hence forth the life of the nascent soul came to be first in im portance, and the bodily life became subordinated to it. Henceforth it appeared that the process of zoological change had come to an end, and the process of psychological change " was to take its place. These sentences from Mr. Fiske s I* Xii INTRODUCTION book on "The Destiny of Man" (1884) may be taken as fairly representative of the position taken up by English philosophy towards Darwin s doctrine of evolution. Thus, until the words and "lower" quite recently, whenever "higher" were used about the animal world they were unconsciously applied in two absolutely different meanings, according as man was meant to be included or not. In regard to the " " animal world without man higher meant : with greater physical strength, more richly differentiated, able to defend its life against more dangerous enemies, gifted with more effective means of motion and of getting food, having pro geny which at birth, though smaller, is almost as perfect otherwise as the parents. Bodily differentiation and the qualification of the individual for self-defence and food- acquisition always stand in the foreground. When the word " " higher was used of man, however, it meant something quite different. The savage tribes with their natural forces unimpaired were regarded as the lower types, and civilised man, although in ill-health, lame and unable to earn a " " " " penny all his life, as the higher. Higher in this sense may be taken as almost identical with : more socially dependent, with milder customs, able to enjoy mental pleasures, unable to live under any conditions but those of modern civilisation. At any rate the word was used regardless of any faculty of self-defence or self-maintenance, regardless of any physio logical superiority in the power of locomotion, in strength and other bodily capacity. The fragile person with special intellectual but with gifts, a progeny as fragile and strength- less as was without hesitation as himself, assumed "greater" than the man with the strong body and average mental ability who presents his nation with half a dozen able sons and daughters. INTRODUCTION xiii Thus the whole of the animal world was measured by two standards, was estimated according to two utterly diffe rent principles. These standards were nowhere denned, these principles were never examined.