Paulson Policy Memorandum
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China
Calum G. Turvey
April 2016 Paulson Policy Memorandum
About the Author
Calum G. Turvey
Calum G. Turvey is the W. I. Myers Professor of Agricultural Finance at Cornell University, teaching in the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management. He also serves as the Editor of Agricultural Finance Review. Turvey received his PhD from Purdue University in 1988 and then joined the faculty of Agricultural Economics and Business at the University of Guelph, teaching there until 2002. In 2002 he joined the faculty of the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics as professor and director of the Food Policy Institute and Chair from 2003-2005. In 2005 he moved to the Department of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell, assuming the Myers chair. He conducts research in the areas of agricultural finance, risk management, and agricultural policy.
The author is grateful to Holly H. Fu, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, for walking him through the evolution of credit and Nong Ben Ju. Any errors, omissions, and all opinions expressed in this paper are entirely the responsibility of the author.
Cover Photo: Reuters/Sheng Li Paulson Policy Memorandum
Introduction
he rural credit financial delivery the designations by RCCs of credit system in China is a blend of worthy villages, the use of tax laws Tcapitalistic, market-oriented to encourage joint stock village and finance and social responsibility. Under commercial banks to establish branch current reforms, many Rural Credit offices in poverty zones, establishing a Cooperatives (RCCs) are converting to regulatory framework for mobile and joint stock Rural Commercial Banks Internet financial services, and, in what (RCBs) and, in the process of maximizing might be the most significant structural shareholder value, are in many instances change in China’s agricultural economy reducing lending to farm households. in recent years, the promulgation of laws to relax restrictions on transacting Recent reforms now permit village and land use rights and issuing mortgages township banks, branches of city banks, against land use rights.1 micro-credit companies and lending- only companies to make loans in rural Yet despite these financial innovations areas. But increasing the overall supply of and reforms, China still faces an ever- credit to rural areas does not necessarily widening gap in urban-rural incomes. imply an increase in Deepening the the supply of credit to There are many townships throughout financial markets has production agriculture China that still have no or limited not resulted in the or agriculturally related access to formal credit. requisite spillover businesses. Indeed, effects to reverse there are many townships throughout income inequality that economic China that still have no or limited access theory predicts. to formal credit. Moreover, the problems of income, To be sure, China is actively seeking capital, and productive inequality are changes to its institutional structures, directly related to China’s broader and at the highest levels has appointed goals of urbanization, increased offices for financial inclusion to commercialization of agriculture, and promote policies and programs aimed the development and streamlining of at improving the breadth and depth agricultural supply and value chains to of financial services to farmers, value meet domestic and global food demand. chains, and agriculturally related businesses. These include direct The credit challenges facing China are support to transform mutual self-help daunting, with credit demand required groups to RCC supported cooperatives, at the intensive margin to increase
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 1 Paulson Policy Memorandum
productivity per unit of land and at the of the formal financial sector as a extensive margin to meet the demands whole. In terms of social responsibility, of farm size expansion and agribusiness uncoordinated agricultural lending development. With about 250 million can lead to technical and allocation farm households representing about inefficiencies that can only exacerbate 750 million persons, the amount of the problems that policy is attempting capital required to achieve wins in all to resolve. of these policy goals is substantially greater than the amount that China’s Should China consider a nationally commercialized credit system is able, or coordinated approach to delivery of indeed willing, to provide. agricultural credit as is found with the American Farm Credit System or This memorandum explores whether Canadian Farm Credit Corporation the genesis of rural credit as described (FCC) and government supported credit above is healthy for agriculture and elsewhere? While acknowledging rural lending. On the merits of economic the very real political and economic efficiency, the answer is probably sensitivities and difficulties, this memo yes. But an uncoordinated system of argues for a new government-sponsored costly rural credit delivery will likely enterprise for sourcing, coordinating, and be unattractive to many financial distributing agricultural credit, drawing in institutions and thus may prove to part off the experience of the Nong Ben be a hindrance to the development Ju—a program from the mid-1930s.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 2 Paulson Policy Memorandum
What Was The Nong Ben Ju?
nitiated in 1936,Nong Ben Ju was a 1933 and one of the four largest banks program of agricultural development of the Republican period), and the Idesigned to coordinate agricultural issuance of bonds secured by the assets activities at the micro and macro levels, of system banks. Initial capital would including the provision of agricultural be provided to rural savings and loans, credit.2 Administered through the cooperatives, and pawnshops. Agricultural Credit Administration, it was to be the culmination of many years of To maintain liquidity and credit reserves, effort to bring agriculture, agricultural allowances were made for rediscounting development, and agricultural and remortgaging farm loans. In reconstruction into the financial system. addition, the Farm Credit Bank would promote a network of granaries and Nong Ben Ju included elements of other storage facilities that would be the German-based Raiffesen system able to make loans to farmers secured toward agricultural on future harvest. cooperation and the American Farm For various reasons, Credit System. But not least of which in many respects, the war with Japan Nong Ben Ju went that began in 1937, further in the sense Nong Ben Ju did not that it aimed not come to fruition. just to promote Debate ensued access to credit and as to whether to support financial such an entity institutions for Photo: Flickr/Hong Meen Chee should include agriculture, but also to promote and commercial bank interests in making direct Chinese agricultural policy with a loans to non-agricultural enterprises very visible hand. or whether it should follow the American Farm Credit Administration In terms of farm credit, Nong Ben Ju was and restrict credit activities to farms, designed around a tripartite funding agriculturally related businesses, and program, including direct transfers from rural development. the government, capital contributions from the four policy banks of the era Regardless of intent, by 1948 there backed by commercial paper (including was still no active legislation on an the Farmers Bank of China, founded in agricultural credit system in China,
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 3 Paulson Policy Memorandum
although it was quite clear that a to make agricultural loans. The effort system similar in design to the American also focused on specializing meso-level cooperative system was held in favor financial institutions and organizations, during the Republican period. For as well as unifying banks, credit example, the Committee for Planning on cooperatives, and savings and loans at Agricultural Credit of the Farmers Bank the micro level. of China sought to coordinate basic agricultural agencies and institutions. With this brief history, it is evident that the competing objectives of a robust This included unifying the agricultural and efficient financial sector on the one credit system by centralizing the hand, and ensuring farm households upper echelons of the system with welfare, commercializing agriculture, the authority to issue (and secure) and promoting rural development on bonds to supplement deposit capital the other, are not new to China.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 4 Paulson Policy Memorandum
A New System of Agricultural Finance in China
istorical experiences in Western The cooperatives structure, however, has agricultural finance suggest that been changing rapidly in recent years Hit is often necessary to establish as they convert to banks, though these a publicly supported and regulated conversions are primarily for purposes of financial system for agriculture that governance and access to capital. In most operate in parallel and in tandem cases, the RCBs are not withdrawing with a competitive banking system. entirely from rural lending but shoring up Examples are numerous, including the capital to increase lending. Landschaft in Germany, the Credite Agricole in France, the Farm Credit The rural credit cooperative system in Administration in the United States, any contemporary Chinese province and the FCC in Canada.3 is managed by the provincial Rural Credit Cooperative Unions (RCCU) Moreover, if Western experiences and regulated by the China Banking are to also hold true in China, then a Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in Beijing. system of agricultural lending will grow, There is no federal coordination between develop, evolve, and mature with the RCCs in different provinces and regions. agricultural economy.4 Since RCCs across China have similar goals, there may be an advantage to It isn’t just the West, however. China establishing a high-level federal entity itself had a similar idea of centralized based on regional characteristics. coordination in the aforementioned Nong Ben Ju, though one that never Such a federation would need to be actually materialized. The question, flexible enough so that any provincial then, is whether it is time for China to RCCU can carry on its business as again consider a new centralized and usual, but with a common goal of coordinated system for agricultural credit. social responsibility that can be used to coordinate both agricultural and credit But before answering that question, a policy to rural areas across China. brief explanation of how the current systems work in the West and China is Consider a comparative example: In the merited. United States, the farm credit system was based on 12 regions, with each Role of RCCs in Agricultural Lending region comprised of multiple states. Local demand for credit was passed through to The institutions with the farthest reach in the regional land bank, and cumulative rural China today are the RCCs and RCBs. demand was then coordinated by the
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 5 Paulson Policy Memorandum
centralized Farm Credit Administration. China (ADBC). Micro credit corporations, Each region had autonomy in setting village and township banks, and credit- interest rates according to risk, but only financial institutions also have all regions were linked by a board of some influence. Current Chinese policy governors and a common law. encourages the RCCs to convert to RCBs within the next few years, though clearly The FCC of Canada, however, operates not all are able to do so. in a slightly different way. FCC offices are located in the agricultural growing The ABC was, until its recent public regions that serve as local supply centers. listing, wholly state owned but has not Farmers’ loan requests are made and operated as a policy bank in recent years. approved through the provincial offices But the central government still retains and in turn the loan request is forwarded some degree of influence to encourage to the federal FCC office, which provides ABC to boost lending to agriculture. The the funds. only true policy bank is the ADBC, but its mandate is to finance rural infrastructure Such a system operates outside of and certain commodity sectors beyond the normal banking system but it also the farm gate—for example, for competes with that system. From a social processing. responsibility perspective, the system was designed so that farmers’ access to How Would Such a System Work in credit was not contingent on the number China? of rural banks, the deposits in those banks, or prevailing economic conditions. Drawing lessons from the West and This ensured that farmers always had a from its own history, China needs to set source for credit. up a unique and dedicated system of agricultural credit for good and bad years. As indicated, both the existing Canadian This would be a permanent but flexible and American farm credit systems system that is fluid from the bottom must compete with their respective up and the top down in a coordinated commercial lenders in terms of interest way. Such a system would preserve the rates and service delivery and are subject autonomy of the participating rural to the same lending standards as the financial institutes at the local/micro level, commercial banks. integrate the rural banks at the meso level, and create a new government entity In China today, three central players at the macro level. dominate rural and agricultural lending: the RCCs, the Agricultural Bank of China The general structure of this integrated (ABC)—one of the big four banks—and system, comprised of new entities, is the Agricultural Development Bank of detailed below (see Figure 1).
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 6 Paulson Policy Memorandum
• Farm Credit China: This would be a • Federation of Rural Credit national oversight institution, a parastatal Cooperatives (FRCC): This would be organization with the sole purpose of a publicly supported, central-level recommending policy, coordinating the organizational body composed of farm credit system, providing regulatory regional Rural Credit Cooperatives guidance, and supervising the system Federations (RCCF) that acting as the banks. Many of these activities are intermediary between the provincial already housed within the CBRC, so there RCCU and Farm Credit China. may be potential to leverage synergies by placing this entity within the CBRC. The regional RCCF would be a body comprised of the executive members • China Farm Credit Mortgage from two or more provincial RCCUs. The Corporation: This entity would establish purpose of the RCCF would be to gather a bond market to increase access to information, disseminate outreach, long-term credit for agricultural and and direct policy for a multi-provincial food businesses and ultimately to raise agricultural region. In some sense, this the capital for transactions in land structure is analogous to the US Federal and forestry user rights, should such Reserve system of regionally based transactions be permitted in the future. branches.
Figure 1. A Schematic for a Modified Credit System for Rural China
Source: Author.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 7 Paulson Policy Memorandum
The advantage to defining regional supply areas. The SPV is a unique entity RCCFs would be to reduce the that acts as an aggregator on behalf of number of independent policy RCCs or other financial institutions with recommendations feeding into the excess deposits in low demand areas, FRCC. In addition, by defining regional and RCCs or banks in high demand areas authority, public policy can avoid but with loan to deposit ratios at or near the “one-size-fits-all” approach, the regulatory maximum. thereby permitting, as in Canada, targeted credit policies to regions with Securitization in this context can reasonably homogenous agricultural refer to certificates of deposit and conditions and risks. repurchase agreements issued by borrowing institutions that are In addition to these three entities performance-secured by mortgages/ we recommend an expansion of the loans receivable. Reserve capital in mandate of the ADBC to securitize the SPV can be accumulated through surplus deposits through a special small fees or interest charges, and by purpose vehicle (SPV) in order to supply government-sponsored performance short term credit to high-demand/ low insurance (see more details below).
Figure 2. Proposed RCCF Groupings
Source: Author.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 8 Paulson Policy Memorandum
Geographic Representation of RCCFs The policy framework, including estimates for short- and long-term credit Based on the propsed structure, facilities, would be passed on to Farm nine separate RCCFs covering the Credit China which would negotiate lower, middle, and upper regions of recommendations with the central east, central, and western China (see government, including the Ministry Figure 2).5 Of course, these provincial of Agriculture, People’s Bank of China demarcations are discretionary and in (PBOC)—the central bank—and CBRC. fact should be designed around the Briefs would also be provided to ADBC principles of contiguous states and and the China Farm Credit Mortgage common crop portfolios, topography, Corporation. agronomic conditions—including weather patterns—and industrial Interlinked Financing of SMEs with patterns. Securitized Financial instruments
The RCCFs would meet quarterly each One of the advantages of having such a year to ensure that changing conditions farm credit system is that it would have are dealt with expeditiously. Such the flexibility to coordinate, syndicate, meetings should involve the gathering of and originate large money loans to small intelligence from each provincial RCCU and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). member on credit conditions, causes, Currently, the ability of SMEs to access and effects. In as much as confidentiality short-term working capital is inadequate and private business information can be (see Figure 3). maintained, aggregate data would be compiled and any recommendation for A typical SME in China may have centralized action recorded. Such action thousands of farm households providing could include policy recommendations goods and services under contract. As on credit, credit products, additional part of the contracting process, however, assistance, emergency and disaster aid, many firms, such as food firms, require a research, and survey work, among others. vertical linkage between the processing plant and the farm household to ensure On a rotating basis, the chairs of each that the quality of goods being produced RCCF would meet collectively with the is homogenous and satisfies specific central FRCC on a quarterly basis and growing, cultivation, best management within 30 days of the regional RCCF practices,and times for delivery and meeting. At this meeting, the credit and payment, among others. ground conditions of each region would be presented and compared. Common To do this, SMEs must provide many of elements could then be synthesized into the inputs to the farmers on account, a common policy framework for action. which means that vast amounts of short-
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 9 Paulson Policy Memorandum
Figure 3. How Agribusiness Firms Currently Contract with Farm Households
Source: Author.
term working capital are being tied up RCC. But because of the risk in dealing in direct and indirect credit facilities to with farmers, even when farmers have a farmers. bona fide contract, lending to farmers is believed to be prohibitive. To meet these needs, SMEs in China must deal with many farmers, each of In addition to farmer risks, some RCCs which requires some form of security or or RCCUs simply would not have enough guarantee. For the most part, financial deposits to lend out to all of the farmers institutions will not lend against accounts who have production contracts with receivables or other factors. This means an SME. To obtain the credit would, in that the pledge is often in terms of the some cases, require negotiating with physical plant. Using long-term physical multiple RCCs and banks in order to assets to secure short-term debt on borrow the necessary funds to lend out. a revolving basis does not satisfy the But these loans would not be viewed as liquidity matching principle and in fact riskless and would require some market reduces the ability of the SME to acquire adjustment for risk. long-term credit facilities. A new system can be put in place and In essence, SMEs must take on a role work more effectively in addressing these that should and could be fulfilled by the challenges (see Figure 4). For instance,
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 10 Paulson Policy Memorandum
one potential solution is to use an The contract would also stipulate the inputs already existing policy bank, such as the required—and the cost of those inputs if ADBC, for this purpose. As noted above, purchased from an SME or its suppliers. ADBC could create an SPV for financing the farm household-linked working The contract standard should be capital requirements of SMEs. This SPV preapproved by the ADBC and the could in turn be financed through short- managers of the SPV. It should also term interest bearing deposits from RCCs have regional portability so that the (or other banks), as well as funds from contract will be recognized as chattel the PBOC and specially allocated poverty by RCCs in regions different from where alleviation funds. the SME is located. The contract should also stipulate certain punishments and SMEs would be required to sign a penalties for farmers not fulfilling the production contract with the farmer, terms of the contracts. stipulating the product to be delivered, the quality standard of the product, With the contract in hand, the farmer including propagation and cultivation could then receive from the local RCC an requirements, the dates by which advance on delivery no greater than half the product is to be received and the the contract value. The loan awarded quantities expected, and a stated price. would be recorded and forwarded under
Figure 4. Proposed System of Agricultural Finance
Source: Author.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 11 Paulson Policy Memorandum
seal to the SME, which would then pay the the local RCC, which then advances funds RCC directly from the grower proceeds. equal to the maximum of the actual anticipated costs of production, or 50 Figure 5 shows the flow of funds to SMEs. percent (or some other predetermined While the securitization of SME working rate) of the contract value (contract capital will take place among RCCs price times contract quantity). When the because of their extensive network in farmer delivers on the contract, the SME rural areas, there is no reason to exclude returns full principal and interest to the other financial institutions including local RCC, and then the net proceeds to the ABC. Funds would be transferred the farmer. The local RCC delivers the from the surplus banks to the ADBC, payment, less fees and interest, to the which securitizes the funds through the SPV. The SPV then pays interest to the SPV into an interest-bearing note. To surplus banks holding the balance for encourage investment, this note should redemption of the securitized notes or be of Tier 1 quality. for further reinvestment.
The terms of the contract determine the Meeting Long-Term Credit Needs amount of production credit required. Once the contract is authorized, the If there is one thing to be learned from farmer takes the authorized contract to the European and US experiences, it is
Figure 5. Cash Flow Transactions of Proposed Financing of SMEs
Source: Author.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 12 Paulson Policy Memorandum
Figure 6. Solution to the Problem of Long Term Credit in Rural China
Source: Author.
that in developing a financial sector, the and export markets for agricultural growth of the agricultural economy was products. Similar constraints hold for constrained by the issuance of long-term other rural SMEs involved in a large mortgages and amortization. The same number of manufacturing processes. is true in China today. At the farm level in China, capital is restricted to short terms Concept and Structure of the China Farm of usually less than three years, which Credit Mortgage Corporation requires capital investment decisions be postponed until enough savings can be In the United States, bonds are issued on accumulated. This is costly not just to the behalf of rural stakeholders and secured farmer but also to the sustainable growth by the value of the underlying land and of the agricultural economy. assets. There is a simple structure where farmers and agricultural businesses Likewise, many agribusiness, food, and demand credit through the local farm forestry firms cannot get long-term debt credit banks, which, upon due diligence, for capital expansion and must delay make a request for funds to the farm growth until accumulated retentions are credit funding corporation. sufficient to underwrite the capital costs. This is costly not only to shareholders, The corporation issues bonds to the but also the development of domestic public through a network of investment
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 13 Paulson Policy Memorandum
banks and brokerages, and the proceeds and the risk quality of the securities are funneled through the farm credit provided, the CFCMC could also issue systems to the farm credit banks, which commercial paper with adjusted terms then issue the mortgages or notes. and market price of risk. The coupons would be tied closely to the posted rates Figure 6 depicts the creation of a new of the RCC, ABC, and other rural lenders. but similar structure for China, which But because of the inherent risks of would be called the China Farm Credit term credit and the time value of Mortgage Corporation (CFCMC). (In money, it is anticipated that coupons an alternative scenario, an existing would be 100 to 300 basis points (2-3 institution such as ADBC can be used.) percent) higher than the legal rates on operating credit in the same markets. CFCMC would be regulated by the CBRC and brought under the political The prospective CFCMC would act influence of the PBOC. The main as a clearinghouse in what might be function of the CFCMC would be to act best described as an over-the-counter as the integrator between long-term market (OTC) for agricultural and rural credit demand and supply. It would credit. But its interface with the general issue bonds secured by the agricultural investment community would ensure real estate assets on which the that the bonds would ultimately find a mortgages and credit instruments are correct market price. based, record all account information and track market conditions, redeem The investment community will bonds, pay coupon interest, audit credit ultimately arbitrage between the risks quality with respect to underlying and returns of CFCMC-issued financial security values, and transfer money instruments and alternative investment between investors and lenders. opportunities to determine the market price for the bonds. But it should also Investors can also buy long-term bonds be recognized that as an investment ranging from 5 to 30 years, which would vehicle, a CFCMC bond would not, in typically be issued to the public through general, be highly correlated with the investment banks at a daily auction market pool of investments because (bid-ask) and at an appropriate discount the general inelasticity for food demand to ensure that the investment banks ensures that, above all others, the receive a reasonable return. food economy will never suffer a full economic collapse. But the CFCMC could also issue bonds directly to the public and other legal While it is unclear as to how, ultimately, entities. Depending upon the terms an agricultural land market would work required by the demanding businesses through transactions on land-use rights,
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 14 Paulson Policy Memorandum
the general trend is that productive and so it is important that Chinese agricultural land rises in the long run. regulators identify any emergent price However, agricultural land price bubbles bubbles and price the security value of have periodically occurred in the West, the bonds prudentially and accordingly.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 15 Paulson Policy Memorandum
Conclusion and Recommendations
roposing a new government- those in the most economically troubled sponsored enterprise for sourcing, areas of China. Of course, there is Pcoordinating, and distributing question of whether perpetually loss- agricultural credit is to some extent making RCCs should continue to exist at daring. It is an idea undoubtedly fraught all, but in closing inefficient RCCs, the with political and economic sensitivities number of underserved areas would and difficulties in modern China. But increase. Put differently, until a sound like Nong Ben Ju of the Republican system of credit emerges in China, era, which was seen as an imperative the social benefits of keeping remote in years past, the rural-urban divide in and unprofitable RCCs operating, even terms of access to credit must be dealt at a cost to the public, may well be with not in a piecemeal manner, but in a warranted in the interim. systematic way and on a national level. In the longer term, however, which What this memorandum ultimately may in fact be measured within years, recommends is that the current network the FRCC can establish policies and of RCCs and other pilot new programs agricultural financial The rural-urban divide in terms of to serve these areas. institutions across access to credit must be dealt with One possibility is China be nested under not in a piecemeal manner, but in a that the system a single umbrella. This systematic way and on a national level. facilitates mergers is not to suggest in any and acquisitions way that the nature of these institutions (M&As) so that well-run RCCs acquire should change in terms of structure and the assets of poorly run RCCs. Capital governance nor that the cooperative for M&A could be obtained from within standard or the bank standard be the system. Other RCCs may recognize altered from its present course. But synergies between themselves, so they the system must not be so rigid that it would merge to create larger, more cost prevents innovations that are effective efficient delivery systems. If it is more in one region from reaching other areas. efficient to convert RCCs into joint stock Moreover, the rules that bind financial Rural Credit Banks, as is the current trend institutions at the provincial level need in China, then this should not materially to be relaxed so that the same set of affect the basic coordinating mechanism. regulations holds for all. Another advantage of a new, systemic A new system could also assist in the approach would be to encourage and transformation of the RCCs, especially facilitate information sharing. The
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 16 Paulson Policy Memorandum
CBRC has already initiated a program in and neither are the proposed regional Guangxi province through which a risk clusters. The functionality of long rating questionnaire is completed by and short-term securitization can be all potential borrowers, entered into a modified as well. Moreover, while this computer system, and shared between memo has focused only on RCCs and ABC and RCC. Leveraging information RCBs, there is no reason why this system technology and information exchange cannot also include the ABC. can dramatically improve transparency and accuracy on the credit worthiness Ultimately, however, it is quite evident and risk rating of clients. As indicated, that credit delivery to Chinese farmers measures are already in place to and rural businesses needs to be construct such a system. examined through a different lens. The system-wide approach proposed here What is proposed here is a template and can, at a minimum, serve as a useful should be viewed as such. The proposed blueprint from which a new rural credit new entities, of course, are not fixed, system could emerge.
Redesigning Agricultural Credit Delivery in China 17 Paulson Policy Memorandum
Endnotes
1 Guo Pei and Xiangping Jia, “The Structure and Reform of Rural Finance in China,” China Agricultural Economic Review, 1(2):212 – 226, 2009; Shen, M., Huang, Jikun, Zhang, Linxiu, Rozelle, Scott, “Financial Reform and Transition in China: A Study of the Evolution of Banks in Rural China”,Agricultural Finance Review, 70(3):305 – 332, 2010; Turvey, Calum G., Guangwen He, Rong Kong, Ma Jiujie, and Patrick P. Meagher, “The 7 Cs of Rural Credit in China,” Journal of Agribusiness in Developing and Emerging Economies, Vol. 1 No. 2, 2011, pp.1(2): 100-133, 2011.
2 Fu Hong, Evolution of Modern Rural Financial Institutions in Repbulican China, China Material Press, Beijing, 2009.
3 Jensen, Farrell E., “The Farm Credit System as a Government-Sponsored Enterprise,” Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 2000), pp. 326-335.
4 Turvey, C. G., ”Historical Developments in Agricultural Finance,” Working Paper, Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca NY, 2015.
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