The End of Work
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• • • THE END OF WORK The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era JEREMY RIFKIN A Jeremy P. TarcherlPutnam Book published by G. P. Putnam's Sons New York Contents Acknowledgments ix Foreword by Robert L. Heilbroner xi Introduction xv PART I THE Two FACES OF TECHNOLOGY 1. The End of Work 3 2. Trickle-down Technology and Market Realities 15 3. Visions of Techno-Paradise 42 PART II THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 4. Crossing into the High-Tech Frontier 59 5. Technology and the African-American Experience 69 6. The Great Automation Debate 81 7. Post-Fordism 90 PART III THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE 8. No More Farmers 109 9. Hanging Up the Blue Collar 128 10. The Last Service Worker 141 PART IV THE PRICE OF PROGRESS 11. High-Tech Winners and Losers 165 12. Requiem for the Working Class 181 13. The Fate of Nations 198 4. A More Dangerous World 208 PART V THE DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA 15. Re-engineering the Work Week 221 16. A New Social Contract 236 17. Empowering the Third Sector 249 18. Globalizing the Social Economy 275 Notes 294 Bibliography 330 Index 337 Foreword Robert L. Heilbroner CONOMISTS HAVE ALWAYS been uneasy about what machinery Edoes for us and to us. On the one hand, machines are the very em bodiment of the investment that drives a capitalist economy. On the other hand, most of the time when a machine moves in, a worker moves out-sometimes many workers. Economists have always granted that a machine may displace a few workers here and there, but in the end, they have maintained, productivity will be vastly aug mented, and as a consequence, the national income. But who gets the income? In 1819 the famous economist David Ricardo wrote that the amount of employment in an economy was of no consequence, as long as rent and profits, out of which flowed its new investment, were undiminished. "Indeed?" replied Simonde de Sismondi, a well-known Swiss critic of the times. "Wealth is every thing, men are absolutely nothing? What? ... In truth then, there is nothing more to wish for than that the king, remaining alone on the island, by constantly turning a crank, might produce, through auto mata, all the output of England."l Jeremy Rifkin's mind-opening book is about a world in which corporations have taken the place of kings, turning cranks that set into motion the mechanical, electrical, and electronic automata that pro vide the goods and services of the nation. This is by no means a recent development If we could look down over the man-machine history of the United States-or for that matter, any modem nation-we would see that for two hundred years there has been a great migration of xi xii Foreword workers leaving jobs that technology had taken away, looking for others that it was creating. As the curtain rises on this drama, at the beginning of the 19th cen tury, machines were not highly visible. North, south, east and west, farming was the quintessential occupation; largely manual, helped along with hoes and spades, horse-drawn plows, carts, and the like. Then, around the middle of the century, things began to change. Cyrus McCormick invented the reaper; John Deere the steel plow; the tractor appeared. As a consequence, by the three-quarter mark of the century, the proportion of the national labor force in agriculture had decreased from around three quarters to half; by 1900 to a third, by 1940 to a fifth, today to about 3 percent. What happened to those whose jobs were taken over by machines? They moved to other fields, in which technology was creating new places for work. In 1810 a mere 75,000 persons worked in the infant "manfactories" that made pig iron and lumber and the like; fifty years later, over 1,500,000; by 1910, over 8 million; by 1960, twice that. In terms of percentages, the industrial labor force grew by leaps and bounds until it offered work to some 35 percent of the total labor force. The figures did not, however, climb indefinitely. Technology was not only opening up jobs in the new automobile plants, home appli ance factories, and power plants, but also trimming them down as the assembly line followed the lathe, as drills and presses increased their speeds, and as remarkable new "calculators" began to simplify the work of foremen. Between 1960 and 1990, output of manufactured goods of all kinds continued to rise, but the number of jobs needed to create that flow of production fell by half. We are almost finished with our drama. During all the time that labor was moving into, and then out of the factory, a third great sector was offering growing possibilities for employment. This was the ex panding range of "service" employments-teachers and lawyers, nurses and doctors, maids and baby-sitters, government officials and traffic cops, file clerks, typists, custodians, salespeople. It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the number of "service" employees in the early 19th century, but by 1870 there were perhaps 3 million in the diverse branches of this sector, and by the 1990S nearly 90 million. Service employment thus saved this-and other modem economies-from absolutely devastating unemployment. 2 As with manufacturing, technology in the service sector created with one hand and took away with the other. The sector grew on the Foreword xiii back of the typewriter and the telephone, shrank under the impact of the Xerox machine and the mail order catalogue. But it was the computer, of course, that brings the drama to a close, threatening to allow the corporation to sit on its island, turning its crank while the automata go to work. That is the historic transformation about which Jeremy Rifkin is writing. His book is rich in detail, absorbing in its real-life relevance, and large in scope, spelling out the global, as well as the national impli cations of the change in the reach and impact of technology in our time. If he is right-and his range and depth of research strongly suggests that he is right-we are pushing the relationship of machines and work beyond the uneasy accommodation of the last two hundred years into a new relationship about whose configuration we can say little except that it will have to be markedly different from that of the past Rifkin explores some of the obvious changes that will be forced upon us by this emerging relationship-changes that range from the dislocations and dysfunctions that will assuredly accompany a studied indifference to the problem, through reconfigurations in the pat terns of work life as dramatic as those that separate today's work-years and work-days from those in Dickenss time, to possibilities for the creation of a new employment-offering sector that I will allow him to describe. This is a book that ought to become the center of a long-lasting and deep-probing conversation for the nation. I would describe it as an indispensable introduction to a problem that we will be living with for the rest of our own and our children's lives. Robert L. Heilbroner is the author of many books and articles in economics, most recently Visions of the Future, to be published by Oxford University Press in early 1995. Introduction LOBAL UNEMPLOYMENT has now reached its highest level since G the great depression of the 1930s. More than 800 million human beings are now unemployed or underemployed in the world.l That figure is likely to rise sharply between now and the tum of the century as millions of new entrants into the workforce find themselves without jobs, many victims of a technology revolution that is fast replacing human beings with machines in virtually every sector and industry of the global economy. After years of wishful forecasts and false starts, the new computer and communications technologies are finally making their long-anticipated impact on the workplace and the economy, throwing the world community into the grip of a third great industrial revolution. Already, millions of workers have been permanently elimi nated from the economic process, and whole job categories have shrunk, been restructured, or disappeared. The Information Age has arrived. In the years ahead, new, more sophisticated software technologies are going to bring civilization ever closer to a near-workerless world. In the agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors, machines are quickly replacing human labor and promise an economy of near automated production by the mid decades of the twenty-first century. The wholesale substitution of machines for workers is going to force every nation to rethink the role of human beings in the social process. Redefining opportunities and responsibilities for millions of people in a society absent of mass formal employment is likely to be the single most pressing social issue of the coming century. While the public continues to hear talk of better economic times ahead, working people everywhere remain perplexed over what ap- xv xvi Introduction pears to be a "jobless recovery." Every day, transnational corporations announce that they are becoming more globally competitive. We are told that profits are steadily rising. Yet, at the same time, companies are announcing massive layoffs. In the single month of January 1994, AmericaS largest employers laid off more than 108,000 workers. Most of the cutbacks came in service industries, where corporate restruc turing and the introduction of new laborsaving technologies are result ing in greater productivity, larger profits, and fewer jobs.2 We are entering a new phase in world history-one in which fewer and fewer workers will be needed to produce the goods and services for the global population.