A Business Lawyer's Bibliography: Books Every Dealmaker Should Read
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Perelman, M. (2007). Some Economics of Class. in M. Yates (Ed.), More
Perelman, M. (2007). Some economics of class. In M. Yates (ed.), More unequal: Aspects of class in the United States. New York: Monthly Review Press. How much more will be required before the U.S. public awakes from its political slumber? Tepid action in the workplace, the voting booth, and the streets have allowed the right wing to steamroll revolutionary changes that have remade the entire sociopolitical structure of the United States. Since the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, every Democratic administration with the exception of Lyndon Johnson's has been more conservative—often far more conservative—than the previous Democratic administration. Similarly, every elected Republican administration, with the single exception of George Herbert Walker Bush's, has been more conservative than the previous Republican administration. The deterioration in the distribution of income is a symptom of a far larger problem. Perhaps formulating the situation in the United States might help people understand their class interests as well as reveal who has benefited from the right-wing revolution. Critics of Marx have long taken pleasure in claiming that the rise of the middle class in the United States and other advanced capitalist economies disproves Marx's "predictions" of the course of capitalism. In recent decades, however, the distribution of income in the United States is coming to resemble that of many poor Latin American economies, with a shrinking middle class and an obscene share of wealth going to the richest members of society. Although proponents of the U.S. model pretend that recent economic trends represent a success, in truth they are signs of capitalism's failure. -
Fall 2005 $2.50
American Jewish Historical Society Fall 2005 $2.50 PRESIDENTIAL DINNER 'CRADLED IN JUDEA' EXHIBITION CHANUKAH AMERICAN STYLE BOSTON OPENS 350TH ANNIVERSARY EXHIBIT FROM THE ARCHIVES: NEW YORK SECTION, NCJW NEW JEWISH BASEBALL DISCOVERIES TO OUR DONORS The American Jewish Historical Society gratefully STEVEN PLOTNICK HENRY FRIESS JACK OLSHANSKY ARNOLD J. RABINOR KARL FRISCH KATHE OPPENHEIMER acknowledges the generosity of our members and TOBY & JEROME RAPPOPORT ROBERTA FRISSELL JOAN & STEVE ORNSTEIN donors. Our mission to collect, preserve and disseminate JEFF ROBINS PHILLIP FYMAN REYNOLD PARIS ROBERT N. ROSEN DR. MICHAEL GILLMAN MITCHELL PEARL the record of the American Jewish experience would LIEF ROSENBLATT RABBI STEVEN GLAZER MICHAEL PERETZ be impossible without your commitment and support. DORIS ROSENTHAL MILTON GLICKSMAN HAROLD PERLMUTTER WALTER ROTH GARY GLUCKOW PHILLIP ZINMAN FOUNDATION ELLEN R. SARNOFF MARC GOLD EVY PICKER $100,000+ FARLA & HARVEY CHET JOAN & STUART SCHAPIRO SHEILA GOLDBERG BETSY & KEN PLEVAN RUTH & SIDNEY LAPIDUS KRENTZMAN THE SCHWARTZ FAMILY JEROME D. GOLDFISHER JACK PREISS SANDRA C. & KENNETH D. LAPIDUS FAMILY FUND FOUNDATION ANDREA GOLDKLANG ELLIOTT PRESS MALAMED NORMAN LISS EVAN SEGAL JOHN GOLDKRAND JAMES N. PRITZKER JOSEPH S. & DIANE H. ARTHUR OBERMAYER SUSAN & BENJAMIN SHAPELL HOWARD K. GOLDSTEIN EDWARD H RABIN STEINBERG ZITA ROSENTHAL DOUGLAS SHIFFMAN JILL GOODMAN ARTHUR RADACK CHARITABLE TRUST H. A. SCHUPF LEONARD SIMON DAVID GORDIS NANCY GALE RAPHAEL $50,000+ ARTHUR SEGEL HENRY SMITH LINDA GORENS-LEVEY LAUREN RAPPORT JOAN & TED CUTLER ROSALIE & JIM SHANE TAWANI FOUNDATION GOTTESTEIN FAMILY FOUNDATION JULIE RATNER THE TRUSTEES VALYA & ROBERT SHAPIRO MEL TEITELBAUM LEONARD GREENBERG ALAN REDNER UNDER THE WILL OF STANLEY & MARY ANN SNIDER MARC A. -
Understanding Enron: "It's About Gatekeepers, Stupid"
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2002 Understanding Enron: "It's about Gatekeepers, Stupid" John C. Coffee Jr. Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation John C. Coffee Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's about Gatekeepers, Stupid", 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2117 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid" By John C. Coffee, Jr* What do we know after Enron's implosion that we did not know before it? The conventional wisdom is that the Enron debacle reveals basic weaknesses in our contemporary system of corporate governance.' Perhaps, this is so, but where is the weakness located? Under what circumstances will critical systems fail? Major debacles of historical dimensions-and Enron is surely that-tend to produce an excess of explanations. In Enron's case, the firm's strange failure is becoming a virtual Rorschach test in which each commentator can see evidence confirming 2 what he or she already believed. Nonetheless, the problem with viewing Enron as an indication of any systematic governance failure is that its core facts are maddeningly unique. -
David W. Sussman, Are Our Pastimes Past Their Time?
SUSSMAN MACRO DRAFT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2017 2:24 PM ARE OUR PASTIMES PAST THEIR TIME? HOW WILL THE MEDIA INDUSTRY DISRUPTION AND CHANGES TO THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AFFECT THE SPORTS INDUSTRY? David W. Sussman† CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 450 I. THE INCREASED REVENUES AND ASSET VALUES OF SPORTS TEAMS HAVE BEEN DRIVEN LARGELY BY INCREASES IN THE RIGHTS FEES PAID BY MEDIA COMPANIES ......................... 453 II. DISRUPTIONS TO THE ECOSYSTEM OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ........................................................................... 463 A. Technological Disruptions to the Entertainment Industry Ecosystem ................................................................... 468 1. Audience Fragmentation....................................... 468 2. Disintermediation ................................................. 470 3. Shifting Viewership Choices ................................. 471 4. Ad-Skipping ........................................................... 473 5. Time-Shifting ......................................................... 475 6. Copying of Content ............................................... 478 7. Non-Linear Viewing (VOD) .................................. 479 B. Digital Distribution of Content: The Competitive Alternative to Traditional Platforms .......................... 480 1. OTT Distribution Services .................................... 482 2. Other Emerging Technologies .............................. 483 3. Cord Cutting/Cord Shaving -
Apple and Amazon's Antitrust Antics
APPLE AND AMAZON’S ANTITRUST ANTICS: TWO WRONGS DON’T MAKE A RIGHT, BUT MAYBE THEY SHOULD Kerry Gutknecht‡ I. INTRODUCTION The exploding market for books of all kinds in the form of digital files (“e- books”), which can be read on mobile devices and personal computers, has attracted aggressive competition between the two leading online e-book retail- ers, Amazon, Inc. (“Amazon”) and Apple Inc. (“Apple”).1 While both Amazon and Apple have been accused by critics of engaging in anticompetitive practic- es with regard to e-book sales,2 the U.S. Department of Justice has focused on Apple. In 2012, federal prosecutors brought an antitrust suit against Apple and five of the nation’s largest book publishers—HarperCollins Publishers LLC (“HarperCollins”), Hachette Book Group, Inc. and Hachette Digital (“Hachette”); Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan (“Macmillan”); Penguin Group (USA), Inc. (“Penguin”); and Simon & Schuster, Inc. and (“Simon & Schuster”) (collectively, the “Publisher Defendants”)3—for collud- ing in violation of the Sherman Act to raise the retail prices of e-books.4 Each ‡ J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author would like to thank Calla Brown for her daily support and the CommLaw Conspectus staff for their diligent effort during the writing and editing process. Finally, a special thanks to Antonio F. Perez for providing expert advice during the writing of this paper. 1 Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter Complaint]. -
Capitalism and Risk: Concepts, Consequences, and Ideologies Edward A
digitalcommons.nyls.edu Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters 2016 Capitalism and Risk: Concepts, Consequences, and Ideologies Edward A. Purcell New York Law School Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation 64 Buff. L. Rev. 23 (2016) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS. Capitalism and Risk: Concepts, Consequences, and Ideologies EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.t INTRODUCTION Politically charged claims about both "capitalism" and "risk" became increasingly insistent in the late twentieth century. The end of the post-World War II boom in the 1970s and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union inspired fervent new commitments to capitalist ideas and institutions. At the same time structural changes in the American economy and expanded industrial development across the globe generated sharpening anxieties about the risks that those changes entailed. One result was an outpouring of roseate claims about capitalism and its ability to control those risks, including the use of new techniques of "risk management" to tame financial uncertainties and guarantee stability and prosperity. Despite assurances, however, recent decades have shown many of those claims to be overblown, if not misleading or entirely ill-founded. Thus, the time seems ripe to review some of our most basic economic ideas and, in doing so, reflect on what we might learn from past centuries about the nature of both "capitalism" and "risk," the relationship between the two, and their interactions and consequences in contemporary America. -
The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation
Florida State University Law Review Volume 34 Issue 2 Article 2 2007 The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation Steven M. Davidoff [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal, Takeover Regulation, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2007) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol34/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW THE SEC AND THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION Steven M. Davidoff VOLUME 34 WINTER 2007 NUMBER 2 Recommended citation: Steven M. Davidoff, The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 211 (2007). THE SEC AND THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF* I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 211 II. THE GOLDEN AGE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION.................................. 215 A. The Williams Act (the 1960s) ..................................................................... 215 B. Going-Privates (the 1970s)......................................................................... 219 C. Hostile Takeovers (the 1980s)..................................................................... 224 1. SEC Legislative -
Ethnic Hegemonies in American History
ETHNIC HEGEMONIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY GEORGE HOCKING ______________________ POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN GENETIC DIVERSITY Western Political philosophy tends toward moral and political uni- versalism: the idea that norms are valid for all human beings. This presupposes either that human beings are biologically pretty much the same, or that human biodiversity is irrelevant to moral and politi- cal issues. Nevertheless, Western political philosophers initially lim- ited their conclusions to ethnically homogeneous regions they knew and understood. Plato’s Republic, for example, portrays an ideal soci- ety for Greeks, not barbarians, and even well past the Enlightenment John Stuart Mill explicitly excluded many non-Europeans from his conclusions in On Liberty.1 Plato and Mill were prescient to do so. Few pre-modern people could travel widely. Consequently most people they knew were much like themselves. But during the Age of Discovery, which started at the end of the fifteenth century, European voyages throughout the world encountered the full richness of Earth’s botanical, zoological, and an- thropological diversity, and efforts to understand it contributed to the seventeenth century’s Scientific Revolution. By 1735, in the Enlightenment’s full flower, Sweden’s Carl Linnaeus developed the system still used to classify Earth’s biodiversity. He ob- served significant morphological differences between the human popu- lations of the different continents, which led him classify these groups as distinct species.2 Such human populations are now called races. The great controversy of our time rages between those who ac- knowledge or deny the existence of distinct races. The race deniers are motivated by the conflict between human biodiversity and philoso- phical or religious forms of universalism. -
Rapport Annuel 2006
RAPPORT ANNUEL 2006 Viva La Difference ! 02 Message d’Elisabeth Badinter 04 Gouvernement d’entreprise 06 Message de Maurice Lévy 08 Le P12 10 Plus près du futur 16 Nos différences font La Difference 54 Les femmes et les hommes du Groupe SOMMAIRE 60 Contribuer à un monde meilleur 70 Faits & chiffres 2006 72 Présence mondiale 74 Chiffres clés 76 Gestion optimisée 78 Publicis Groupe en Bourse 80 Publicisdrugstore 81 Document de référence Viva La Difference ! 01 RAPPORT ANNUEL 2006 Elisabeth Badinter, Présidente du Conseil de Surveillance Une nouvelle ère de la communication Vitalité. Si l’on me demandait de définir Publicis en un seul mot, c’est celui que je retiendrais. En effet, existe-t-il un autre groupe dans le monde qui puisse se targuer de : fêter ses 80 ans en relevant un nouveau défi ; agir en pionnier malgré des succès qui auraient conduit plus d’un à se reposer sur ses lauriers ; rester animé par une envie dont la motivation n’est pas seulement d’engranger des bénéfices mais aussi et surtout d’agir, de s’ouvrir, de partager, de contribuer pleinement et de façon innovante aux flux qui forgent la société de demain ? Message d’Elisabeth Badinter Nous récoltons cette année encore les fruits de Parmi ces valeurs, retenons la plus fondamentale : cette dynamique. La qualité des résultats réalisés est l’indépendance. C‘est l’une des grandes forces de exceptionnelle. Que soient félicités les équipes et Publicis que Maurice Lévy, soutenu par le Conseil de les managers pour leur engagement et leur motivation. Surveillance, a su préserver. -
The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform Randall D
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Brigham Young University Law School BYU Law Review Volume 2010 | Issue 2 Article 9 5-1-2010 The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform Randall D. Guynn Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 421 (2010). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss2/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:05 PM The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform Randall D. Guynn The U.S. real estate bubble that popped in 2007 launched a sort of impersonal chevauchée1 that randomly destroyed trillions of dollars of value for nearly a year. It culminated in a worldwide financial panic during September and October of 2008.2 The most serious recession since the Great Depression followed.3 Central banks and governments throughout the world responded by flooding the markets with money and other liquidity, reducing interest rates, nationalizing or providing extraordinary assistance to major financial institutions, increasing government spending, and taking other creative steps to provide financial assistance to the markets.4 Only recently have markets begun to stabilize, but they remain fragile, like a man balancing on one leg.5 The United States and other governments have responded to the financial crisis by proposing the broadest set of regulatory reforms Partner and Head of the Financial Institutions Group, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, New York, New York. -
Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws
Florida International University College of Law eCollections Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2003 Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws Jerry W. Markham Florida International University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons Recommended Citation Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 725, 812 (2003). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,121/,1( Citation: Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 725 (2003) Provided by: FIU College of Law Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Tue May 1 11:26:02 2018 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal -
Securities Market Structure and Regulation
INTRODUCTION In beginning this symposium on the structure and regulation of the securities markets, I’m sure we will all keep in mind George Santayana’s caution that: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1 Although enormous changes have taken place over the past few decades, we keep hearing echoes of the past. When the London Stock Exchange (LSE) switched from floor-based to electronic trading exactly twenty years ago, it decided that the transformation might be too traumatic for its members, so it adopted a hybrid market—an electronic market combined with traditional floor trading. The hybrid market lasted just over four months, at which time the LSE closed its floor for trading in equities. Will the New York Stock Exchange’s experience with its new hybrid market be the same or different? The Consolidated Limited Order Book (CLOB), which I expect will be discussed today, was first proposed to the SEC thirty years ago by Professor Peake, one of today’s speakers, in 1976, a year after Congress told the SEC to create a national market system. The CLOB, which would execute investors’ orders electronically under a rule of time and price priority, seemed to him the best way to assure best execution of investors’ orders throughout the national market system. In 1978, the SEC told the exchanges to create a CLOB. A year later the Commission had second thoughts: it feared that a CLOB would lead to the elimination of exchange trading floors by inexorably forcing all trading into a fully automated trading system.