Boer War Iain Sharpe describes the crisis in the Liberal Party that was provoked by the Anglo-Boer War. TheThe LiberalLiberal PartyParty andand thethe SouthSouth AfricanAfrican WarWar 1899–19021899–1902
he South African War of –, com- (leader in the House of Commons from to Tmonly known as the Boer War, brought to a ) and John Morley, Gladstone’s biographer, were head long-standing divisions in the Liberal Party inclined to sympathise with these views. However, over its attitude to empire and foreign policy and some Liberals (dubbed ‘Liberal Imperialists’) be- very nearly led to a permanent split along the lines lieved that a policy of opposition to imperial expan- of the Liberal Unionist secession. The sion was an electoral albatross for the Liberal Party. general election saw the party reach the nadir of the Lord Rosebery, Gladstone’s successor as Prime Min- its pre- electoral fortunes, when it suffered an ister, and rising stars such as Sir Edward Grey, unprecedented second successive landslide defeat. R. B. Haldane and H. H. Asquith felt that the party Internal feuding between supporters and opponents was in danger of being portrayed as unpatriotic – of the war threatened to lead a permanent division willing to countenance the dismantling of empire in the Liberal ranks, along the lines of the Liberal and thus the decline of British power. Rosebery Unionist secession of . Ye t, within four years of wanted the party to shake off the Gladstonian the war’s end the Liberals were back in power, hav- legacy and positively embrace empire. Although he ing themselves won a landslide majority. Paradoxi- resigned from the Liberal leadership in , a year cally, although the war led to the Liberal defeat in after his government was defeated in a general , its legacy contributed to the victory. election, he remained a ‘king over the water’ for many Liberals who sympathised with his views. The third strand of opinion was represented by Empire and the Liberal Party Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader The divisions in the Liberal Party that the war ac- from . Campbell-Bannerman belonged to the centuated had their origins in differing views on centre of the party, describing himself as ‘a Liberal how the party should cope with the growing enthu- and an imperialist enough for any decent man’. He siasm for empire among the electorate during the and many mainstream Liberals broadly supported s and s. On these issues the party divided the Cobden/Gladstone tradition, but saw the need into three camps. Many Liberals believed the party for the party to be pragmatic. They recognised that should follow in the footsteps of Cobden, Bright hostility to empire was not electorally popular, but and Gladstone in supporting ‘peace, retrenchment equally they rejected the views of the Liberal Impe- and reform’. They opposed overseas expansion and rialists who seemed prepared to abandon Liberal entanglements as wrong in themselves and as drains principles altogether in the cause of electoral expe- on the exchequer. Many backbench Liberal MPs felt diency. Campbell-Bannerman’s views were shared that it was a fundamental purpose of the party to by a substantial section of the party but, as is often maintain what they saw as the ‘Liberal tradition’ of a the case when parties suffer debilitating splits, those pacific foreign and imperial policy. Some leading at either extreme were unwilling to unite around a figures in the party such as Sir William Harcourt compromise policy for the sake of party unity. Given
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01 3 the nature of these divisions, an impe- Diamond Jubilee year, Harcourt’s room opposed the war saw it as the party’s rial war was guaranteed to highlight for manoeuvre was constrained by the duty to follow in the tradition of and widen the faultlines within the need to avoid appearing unpatriotic. Gladstone’s – Midlothian cam- Liberal Party. The Jameson Raid episode highlighted paign and defend the rights of small na- the dilemma the Liberals faced in op- tions. However, Liberal MPs who were posing the government on matters that involved in anti-war agitation were Britain and South Africa appeared to involve Britain’s vital na- mostly obscure and eccentric back- 1877–1899 tional interests – a dilemma which was benchers, while their sympathisers at to recur during the war. the higher levels of the party remained The war in South Africa was the culmi- nation of a quarter of a century’s efforts To recover Britain’s position after circumspect. Thus anti-war Liberals by British governments to establish su- the raid, the government appointed Sir were unable to impose their policy on premacy in the region, which was seen Alfred Milner as High Commissioner the party leadership. Many Liberal op- as a vital British strategic interest as a to the Cape Colony in . Milner, a ponents of the war became involved in committed imperialist who described non-party organisations such as the key point on the route to India. South Africa consisted of the two British himself as a ‘British race patriot’, was South Africa Conciliation Committee colonies of the Cape and Natal and two a highly-regarded administrator and and the more extreme Stop-the-War independent Dutch republics, Transvaal had close links with the Liberal Im- Committee. In February some of and Orange Free State. In perialists, sharing a Balliol back- them set up the League of Liberals Disraeli’s government annexed the ground with Asquith and Grey. He Against Militarism and Aggression as a Transvaal, but after an uprising by was determined to bring matters to a pressure group for anti-war Liberals. Transvaalers and the defeat of a British head and assert British supremacy in Opponents of the war were dubbed army at the battle of Majuba Hill in South Africa. After abortive negotia- ‘pro-Boers’ by their opponents, and tions during the summer of , often adopted the label themselves as a , the new Liberal government ef- fectively restored its independence un- Britain despatched troops to South badge of defiance. In response to the der British suzerainty. The discovery of Africa in September and in response creation of the League of Liberals gold in the Transvaal in made the Transvaal and the Orange Free Against Militarism and Aggression, matters more pressing as it meant that State launched a pre-emptive inva- Liberal Imperialists founded the Im- the Transvaal could be in an economi- sion of Natal. perial Liberal Council in the spring of cally dominant position within South , although the most famous Lib- Africa. Over the following decade eral Imperialists such as Rosebery, Britain tried to force the Transvaal into The outbreak of war Asquith, Haldane and Grey held aloof accepting a British-dominated South From the start Campbell-Bannerman from the Council as it was inconsistent African federation. as Liberal leader tried to resolve the with their previously expressed criti- At the end of the Cape Prime problem of how to lead an opposition cisms of the factionalism of the pro- Minister, Cecil Rhodes, engineered the party during wartime, without appear- Boers. For Liberal Imperialists the war ‘Jameson Raid’, an invasion of the ing unpatriotic. His position was made offered an opportunity to restore the Transvaal in support of a planned ris- more difficult by the fact that British party’s patriotic credentials by putting ing by the Uitlanders – British citizens territory had been invaded and, in the party differences aside and supporting living in the Transvaal who dominated early part of the war, was under enemy the government. In June the occupation, so opposition to the war Imperial Liberal Council scored a the gold mining industry there. The rising did not take place and the raid was not a realistic political option. propaganda victory when it managed ended in fiasco with the invading force Campbell-Bannerman pursued a mid- to get thirty-eight Liberal MPs to vote being captured by Transvaal comman- dle course, agreeing to vote supplies with the government on a pro-Boer dos. The embarrassment of the raid’s for the war, but criticising the govern- motion on the defence estimates, ment’s aggressive diplomacy in dealing while only thirty Liberal MPs voted failure was compounded by a wide- spread suspicion that the Unionist Co- with the Transvaal. But while many for the motion itself. lonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, Liberal MPs could support this posi- The initial months of the war saw a was complicit in its planning. How- tion, there were many on either wing series of humiliating setbacks for the ever, when a House of Commons com- of the party who would not rally British forces, but from early for- mittee of inquiry into the raid made no round it. tunes changed. The news of the relief of criticism of the government the Liberal Splits in the party became apparent the siege of Mafeking arrived on leader, Sir William Harcourt, who almost immediately after the outbreak May, and led to spontaneous patriotic served on the committee, was widely of war. An amendment to the Queen’s demonstrations in major towns and felt to have let Chamberlain off the Speech in October criticising the gov- cities and attacks on the homes of hook. Yet, since the inquiry took place ernment’s diplomacy, moved by Liberal prominent pro-Boers. In Battersea, the at a time when delicate negotiations MP Philip Stanhope, won the support future cabinet minister John Burns had of fifty-five Liberal MPs even though his windows smashed by a jingoistic were taking place with the Transvaal and in the middle of Queen Victoria’s the leadership abstained. Liberals who mob. In June Campbell-Bannerman
4 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01 gave his support to the principle of an- fighting a general election and shortly with the pro-Boer brush, Joseph nexing the two republics, while calling before the dissolution he wrote to his Chamberlain notoriously claiming that for a swift granting of self-govern- party leader ‘I have had some disgusting ‘a vote for the Liberal is a vote for the ment. With the war apparently won, it rebuffs in my appeals for money… a Boer’. The result was a landslide de- was widely expected that the govern- disgusting number of candidates have feat for the Liberals – the first time ment would call a general election to skied off’. The Liberals allowed the since before the Reform Act that capitalise on the wave of patriotic feel- Unionists unopposed returns – an they had lost two general elections in a ing that followed British military suc- all-time high since the Reform row. John Auld, in his study of the Lib- cess. On September Parliament was Act. In its manifesto, the party tried to eral pro-Boers, has calculated that on dissolved and a general election called. salvage its patriotic reputation by prais- average pro-Boer candidates performed ing the ‘genius’ of Lord Roberts, the around three per cent worse than the Commander in Chief in South Africa, average Liberal, although mainstream The ‘khaki election’ as well as criticising both the diplomacy and imperialist Liberals were not im- Unionist victory was a foregone con- that had led to the war and the govern- mune from the tide flowing in favour clusion. By the summer of the ment’s opportunism in trying to cash in of the Unionists. Liberal Chief Whip Herbert Gladstone electorally on military success. The This election has been dubbed the admitted that the party was not up to Unionists attempted to tar all Liberals first ‘khaki election’, anticipating that of . However, the view that the elec- Anti-war meetings frequently ended in violence as a result of the attentions of jingo tion result demonstrated the elector- crowds. (Punch, 4 April 1900) ate’s support for war and empire has been challenged, particularly by Rich- ard Price and Henry Pelling. Price has argued that to the working classes the war was less important than questions of social reform and that local issues had a significant impact on individual results. But while such factors may have made a difference in some constituen- cies, it remains the case that the war was the dominant issue. The cases cited by Pelling and Price only show that there were a few minor deviations in some constituencies from the broader elec- toral trend against the Liberals. Until the summer of the Liberals had been making steady gains at by-elec- tions, to the extent that they might have hoped to win the next general election with a small majority. Their electoral fortunes changed with the outbreak of war. Every by-election fought between the outbreak of war in October and the summer of showed a swing to the Unionists as voters rallied to the government’s patriotic call. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the war was the decisive factor in the Liberal defeat. Electoral adversity was not enough to bring the party together. The Imperial Liberal Council continued to scheme against the Campbell-Bannerman lead- ership. The election result seemed to justify its analysis of the Liberal Party’s weaknesses and in October it issued a manifesto that repudiated Campbell- Bannerman and demanded that the party:
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01 5 … distinguish Liberals in whose policy Methods of barbarism Although Campbell-Bannerman’s de- with regard to Imperial questions patri- nunciation of ‘methods of barbarism’ otic voters may justly repose confi- In the summer of there was an- has been a source of pride to Liberals dence from those whose opinions natu- rally disqualify them from controlling other outbreak of warfare within the of later eras, at the time it was consid- the action of the Imperial Parliament. party. This was precipitated by the Lib- ered a blunder, even by many of his Sir Edward Grey threatened to dis- eral Imperialists’ lionising of Milner own supporters, because it was seen as own Campbell-Bannerman’s leader- when he returned home on leave in an attack on British troops. Campbell- ship and even the Chief Whip May. For many Liberals, Milner’s in- Bannerman felt the need to clarify his Herbert Gladstone wobbled, calling transigence was the reason for war remarks, saying ‘I never said a word, on Campbell-Bannerman to support breaking out and for the Boers’ refusal which would imply cruelty… on the Rosebery and Milner. to surrender even when their territory part of officers or men in the British However, neither the pro-Boers nor had formally been annexed. But the Army’. The Liberal Imperialists im- the Liberal Imperialists were able to party leadership had to be sensitive mediately denounced Campbell- influence the party decisively in their about attacking him because Asquith, Bannerman as he seemed to them to direction. Neither group wanted to Grey and Haldane supported him. have joined the Pro-Boer camp. split from the party, but each wished The methods used by the British H. C. G. Matthew has pointed out that that their opponents would either Army to defeat the Boers were strongly the crisis over the ‘methods of barbarism’ leave or keep quiet. The Liberal Impe- opposed by both pro-Boers and main- speech was in part based on a misunder- rialists wanted to see a re-launched stream Liberals. In response to the standing. Campbell-Bannerman in- Liberal Party, shed of its unpopular guerrilla tactics used by the Boer com- tended to make a specific denunciation of ideological baggage – a project that mandos, the British army tried to cut the concentration camps. However, the bears similarities to the re-branding of off Boer supplies by rounding up civil- Liberal Imperialists took it as a move to the Labour Party as ‘New Labour’ ians and putting them into concentra- drive them out of the party. As Haldane nearly a century later. However, the tion camps, and by burning Boer farms. put it ‘The party must be rescued from Liberal Imperialists lacked a Tony Blair The aim was to starve the Boers into getting wholly and uselessly out of rela- – a leader with the determination to submission. The death rate in the camps tion to the national sense’. Even fight and win the internal battles that was very high: by the end of the war Asquith, who had until this point re- would have to take place before the around , Boers had died in the mained aloof from the internal dispute, party could be reformed. Instead they camps – more was highly and looked to Rosebery, who continued to than the number publicly critical of remain aloof from politics while tanta- of troops on both Although Campbell- Campbell- lising his supporters with speeches that sides killed in the Bannerman’s Bannerman. war. Asquith’s Liberal hinted at a return. Lacking clear and denunciation of ‘methods decisive leadership, the various Liberal Emily Hob- Imperialist sup- Imperialist attempts to win control of house (sister of of barbarism’ has been a porters organised a the party were indecisive and the writer L. T. source of pride to dinner for him (a unfocused. Hobhouse) vis- standard method The pro-Boers had their problems ited the camps on Liberals of later eras, at of the time of too, having had their numbers depleted behalf of the the time it was showing support at the general election and experiencing South African considered a blunder, for a politician), throughout the war the break-up of Women and which was widely their meetings by jingoistic crowds. Children Distress because it was seen as an seen as a direct Famously, in , Lloyd George spoke Fund. On her re- attack on British troops. challenge to at an anti-war meeting at Birmingham turn to England Campbell- Town Hall, the heart of Joseph Cham- in , she at- Bannerman’s lead- berlain’s fiefdom, which ended with a tempted to publicise her findings, ership. The conflict in the Liberal Party riot by a jingoistic crowd. With no fac- which were very critical of the condi- was parodied by the Parliamentary tion able to deliver a knockout blow to tions she had witnessed. She met sketchwriter Henry Lucy as ‘war to the its opponents, Campbell-Bannerman Campbell-Bannerman who agreed to knife – and fork’. continued to lead as best he could. speak out against the concentration In the event, the Asquith dinner was Attacks on him by Liberal Imperial- camp policies, which he did at a dinner a damp squib. A party meeting at the ists consolidated his support on the on June, saying: Reform Club ten days earlier resulted centre and left of the party, But he was A phrase often used is that ‘war is war’, in a vote of confidence for Campbell- careful to keep lines of communication but when one comes to ask about it Bannerman to which the Liberal Impe- one is told that no war is going on, that open with the Liberal Imperialists, espe- rialists assented. In addition, Rosebery, it is not war. When is a war not a war? having declined to preside at the cially Asquith. When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa. Asquith dinner, upstaged his potential
6 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01 ally by speaking at the City Liberal ciliatory to both wings of the party. He Club on the same day as Asquith’s din- defended Milner and criticised the ex- ner in a speech in which he famously pression ‘methods of barbarism’ but ac- announced his intention to ‘plough my cepted the National Liberal Federation furrow alone’ – an apparent snub to resolution which criticised the camps Asquith. Rosebery wanted to see a and urged the government to make decisive split in the Liberal Party, but peace rather than insist on uncondi- Grey, Asquith and Haldane were un- tional surrender. willing to break away without a com- The speech repudiated many of the mitment from Rosebery to make a po- arguments of the Liberal Imperialists, litical comeback. Given the show of but they preferred to ignore this as they unity at the Reform Club, Asquith hoped that Rosebery was now going to could hardly raise the standard of rebel- return to politics and resume his right- lion now and so played down the divi- ful position at the head of the Liberal sions over South Africa, saying ‘I have Party. Sir Edward Grey wrote bluntly to never called myself a Liberal Imperialist. his party leader that ‘… if you & The name of Liberal is good enough Rosebery work together, I have no for me’. more to say & no new departure to In September the breach widened make; if on the other hand you & he further when Campbell-Bannerman decide that you cannot co-operate I repudiated the Liberal Imperialist can- must say this: that I go with him’. To didate selected by the local Liberal asso- many Liberals it seemed that the Ches- The pro-war press portrayed anti-war Liberals as eccentric and unfashionable. ciation in the North-East Lanark by- terfield speech was a peace overture. Liberals were criticised for having con- election. He unofficially supported the Herbert Gladstone wrote to Campbell- ceded self-government to the Transvaal Independent Labour Party candidate Bannerman ‘we ought to sink differ- after the Battle of Majuba in 1881. (Punch, and the Unionists gained the seat with ences… since there is so much that is 19 September 1900) a split Liberal vote. This increased the broad, generous and wise in what he Liberal Imperialists’ sense that they says…’. licly to the Chesterfield speech at a were being driven out of the party. Campbell-Bannerman, however, had meeting of the London Liberal Federa- They were losing the battle to control a clearer understanding of Rosebery’s tion in January and once again declared the structures of the Liberal Party – in intentions. He had noticed that while himself willing to see Rosebery return. December the National Liberal Fed- Rosebery’s pronouncements on the In February Rosebery spoke at Liver- eration passed a resolution broadly in war had struck a chord across a wide pool, reiterating the importance of a line with Campbell-Bannerman’s posi- section of the party, other parts of the ‘clean slate’ in domestic policy and of tion on the concentration camps. It speech made demands that would be abandoning Home Rule. Campbell- was becoming clear that the party less palatable to mainstream Liberals. Bannerman brought matters to a head leader, rather than the Liberal Imperial- These included abandoning Irish by pronouncing against Rosebery, say- ists, could command the support of Home Rule and a adopting a ‘clean ing he was asking Liberals to ‘sponge party organisations at regional and con- slate’ in domestic policy – that is repu- out every article of our creed’. stituency level. diating the party’s policy programme, Rosebery promptly announced his which Rosebery saw as ‘faddist’ and complete separation from Campbell- likely to alienate floating voters. Bannerman and the Liberal Party. The Rosebery’s speech at Campbell-Bannerman met Rosebery Liberal Imperialists set up a new or- Chesterfield and confirmed that the latter was not ganisation, the Liberal League, with In order to revive their flagging for- envisaging a return to Liberal politics. Rosebery as president and Asquith and tunes, the Liberal Imperialists needed Campbell-Bannerman wrote to Grey among the vice-presidents. It ap- Rosebery who, as an ex-prime minis- C. P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester peared to herald the launch of a ter, had a wider public appeal than Guardian, which had joined in the calls breakaway political movement. But Asquith, Haldane or Grey. Rosebery for reconciliation between Campbell- events took a different course: the announced his intention to address a Bannerman and Rosebery: peace of Vereeniging on May meeting at Chesterfield on Decem- there has been no offer of help to the brought the Boer War to an end and ber, and the Liberal Imperialists hoped Party – it was to the Country. He will removed the main source of division not join in: even on the war. There this would mark his political comeback. within the Liberal Party. never has been… any unwillingness on The aftermath of the war saw a swift Rosebery again demonstrated his flair our part for his return: this is absolute. for brilliant but enigmatic platform The impediment is that he won’t. turn of the political tide. Uncomfort- able questions were now asked about oratory. On the war he appeared con- Campbell-Bannerman responded pub- the government’s conduct of a war in
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01 7 which the world’s largest empire had within the party and factionalising re- The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid (Ox- taken two-and-a-half years to defeat inforced them. In fact the Liberal Im- ford, 1968), especially p.187 ff. 7 Gollin, A M Proconsul in politics: a study of Lord two tiny republics. In addition, the war perialists had more in common with Milner in opposition and power (London, 1964) had highlighted Unionist failings in so- their fellow Liberals than they did with p.129 cial policy, with recruitment statistics an imperialist visionary like Milner or, 8Porter op. cit. p.77. 9Koss op. cit. p.38. showing a very high number of volun- for that matter, with the semi-detached 10 John Auld ‘The Liberal Pro-Boers’, Journal of teers unfit for service. This was embar- Rosebery. It might be thought there- British Studies 14(2) (1975) p.82. rassing to a party that had championed fore, that the Liberal Imperialists were 11 Koss op. cit. p.xiv. 12 Matthew op. cit. p.42. the cause of empire and an imperial wrong in their analysis of the Liberal 13 Ibid. p.52. race. As a recent historian of the Con- Party’s electoral problems. Yet this 14 John Burns diary 19 May 1900, British Library servative Party has written: would be an oversimplification. Despite B.L. Add. MS 46318. their failure either to win control of the 15 Wilson, John C-B: a life of Sir Henry Campbell- The Conservative Party’s problems as Bannerman (London, 1973) p.327. the party of empire reached a crisis party or to launch a successful breaka- 16 Hamer, D. A. Liberal Politics in the Age of point with the Boer War. The military way group, the Liberal Imperialists had Gladsone and Rosebery (Oxford, 1972) p.298. weaknesses, administrative incompe- a profound impact on the future of Lib- 17 Matthew op. cit. p.54. tence and indeed social problems 18 Blanche, M. D. ‘British Society and the War’ in which the war has revealed laid the eralism. The party fought the elec- Peter Warwick (ed.) The South African War: Conservatives open to the charge that, tion on a platform of not implementing The Anglo–Boer War 1899–1902 (Harlow, as the party of Empire, they had not Irish Home Rule during that Parlia- 1980) p.223. done a particularly good job. 19 British general election manifestos, 1900-1974 ment, thus avoiding accusations of Compiled and edited by F. W. S. Craig (London: The Unionist response to these prob- wanting to break up the empire and, Macmillan, 1975) pp.4–6. lems made matters worse for them and with Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secre- 20 Marsh, Peter T. Joseph Chamberlain: entre- tary, it proclaimed support for continu- preneur in politics (New Haven and London, helped to revive the Liberal Party. In 1994) p.499. , Joseph Chamberlain, attempting ity with the Unionists in foreign policy. 21 Auld op. cit. p.79. to build on the imperial unity shown During the – Liberal Govern- 22 Richard Price An Imperial War and the British by the support of Britain’s dominions ment the pacifist wing of the party Working Class (London and Toronto, 1972); Henry Pelling Popular Politics and Society in for the war effort, launched his cam- (who had mostly been Pro-Boers) were Late Victorian Britain (London and Basingstoke, paign for tariff reform with the aim of able to exert little influence on overseas 1968) see particularly pp.94–96. binding the empire together economi- policy. By , therefore, the party had 23 Figures taken from Craig, F. W. S. British parlia- mentary election results 1885–1918 (London, cally. The Liberal Party united behind a taken great strides towards ridding itself 1974). defence of free trade, one of its great of the image of being unpatriotic and it 24 Quoted Porter op. cit. p.80. causes. Asquith, working once again in was a very different Liberal Party that 25 Wilson op. cit. p.338. won the general election from the 26 Matthew op. cit. p.79ff. tandem with Campbell-Bannerman, 27 Koss The Pro-Boers pp.105–126. led the campaign in the country against one that lost that of . The war had 28 Grigg, John The Young Lloyd George (London, tariffs. The Unionists split three ways: taught the party a lesson. 1973) pp.286–287. both free traders and tariff reformers 29 Wilson op. cit. p.346–47 30 Ibid. p.336. resigned from the government while Iain Sharpe is a member of the Liberal 31 Spies, S. B. ‘Women and the War’ in Warwick those in the middle tried in vain to find Democrat History Group and a Liberal op. cit. p.170. a workable compromise. In addition, Democrat Councillor in Watford. 32 Wilson op. cit. p.349. 33 Ibid. p.351. the government’s education bill, intro- 34 Matthew op. cit. pp.64–65 duced in , angered the Noncon- 1For an analysis of Liberal opponents of empire 35 Koss, Stephen Asquith (London, 1976) pp.54–55. formist Churches because it proposed see Porter, Bernard Critics of empire: British 36 Rhodes, James, Robert Rosebery (London, Radical attitudes to colonialism in Africa 1895– 1963) p.426. state funding of church schools. Liberal 1914 (London, 1968), especially Chapter 3; 37 Koss Asquith p.56. Nonconformists, divided over the Boer Price, Richard An Imperial War and the British 38 Matthew op. cit. pp.74–75. War, now united to fight the education Working Class (London and Toronto, 1972), 39 Ibid. p.77. Chapter 1 and Koss, Stephen The Pro-Boers: bill. Within a year of the end of the war 40 Wilson op. cit. p.367. the anatomy of an antiwar movement (Chicago 41 Matthew op. cit. p.80–81. the Liberal Party had recorded a steady and London, 1973), ‘Introduction’. 42 Robbins, Keith Sir Edward Grey: a biography of stream of by-election gains. In , the 2 Matthew, H C G The Liberal Imperialists: the Lord Grey of Fallodon (London, 1971) p.98. ideas of politics of a post-Gladstonian elite (Ox- government’s importation of Chinese 43 Wilson op. cit. p.371. ford, 1973) 44 Ibid. p.374. indentured labourers to work the mines 3Porter op. cit. p.75. 45 Ibid. p.385. in the Transvaal enabled the Liberals to 4 Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher with Alice 46 Searle, G. R. The quest for national efficiency: a make political capital both on humani- Denny Africa and the Victorians: the official study in British politics and political thought mind of imperialism (London: 1961) p.410 ff. 1899–1914 (Oxford, 1973) pp.60–61. tarian grounds and over the apparent 5The government was a coalition of Conserva- 47 Green, E. H. H. The crisis of Conservatism: the snub to British labour. tives and Liberal Unionists. In accordance with politics, economics and ideology of the British The restoration of unity within the contemporary usage I have used the word ‘Un- Conservative Party, 1880–1914 (London, 1995) ionist’ to describe the government throughout Liberal Party was a remarkably easy p.77 this article. 48 Bernstein, George L. Liberalism and Liberal Poli- process. As George L. Bernstein has ar- 6For a detailed study of Harcourt’s handling of tics in Edwardian England (Winchester, Mass, gued, the war exaggerated the divisions the aftermath of the Jameson Raid see Butler, J 1986) pp.31–35.
8 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 29 Winter 2000–01