Free Speech and Modern Republican Government. Murray Dry

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Free Speech and Modern Republican Government. Murray Dry University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Constitutional Commentary 1989 Free Speech and Modern Republican Government. Murray Dry Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Dry, Murray, "Free Speech and Modern Republican Government." (1989). Constitutional Commentary. 796. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/796 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FREE SPEECH AND MODERN REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT* Murray Dry** The title of this essay reflects the importance we attach to free­ dom of speech, both for its own sake and for the sake of free govern­ ment. As we understand free government today, its foundation lies in individual rights rather than a selfless dedication to the commu­ nity, and that is why I chose the term modern republican govern­ ment. My discussion draws largely on Supreme Court decisions concerning freedom of speech. It will, however, turn from constitu­ tional law to political philosophy because of the inherent relation­ ship between thought and political life. 1 That relationship became evident during the very year of the Court's first free speech decision, when in a dissent Holmes wrote: [W]hen men have realized that time has upset fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 2 This argument sounds more like John Stuart Mill's On Liberty than the Declaration of Independence, or the founders' Constitution. When Jefferson wrote that "the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction," he was referring to opinions regarding religion.3 Mill is the one who wrote that "truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites," and further, that since "the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that I would like to thank my colleague, Eve Adler. for her comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and Daniel Northrop, my research assistant during the summer of 1989, for assisting me in the final revisions. ** Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. I. See Cropsey, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE ISSUES OF POLITICS {1977). 2. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 3. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill For F.stablishing Religious Freedom (1779), THE PoRTA­ BLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 251-52 (M. Peterson ed. 1975). This particular clause, which Jef­ ferson wrote in 1779, was deleted by the Virginia legislature when it was adopted in 1786. 351 352 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:351 the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied."4 An inquiry into the philosophic sources of our free speech doc­ trines will clarify our understanding of the relationship between the founders' understanding of freedom and our own.s In addition, it may provide us with a basis for improving our approach to first amendment questions. I will begin with an overview of our consti­ tutional doctrines concerning free speech, focusing on the justifica­ tions for free speech protection and the resulting judicial tests or devices for protecting it. In Part II, I will turn to the American founders' views on freedom of speech. Because direct evidence re­ garding the meaning and importance of freedom of speech for the founders is scanty, and because the judicial arguments draw on more than is made explicit, I will turn in Part III to the philosophic foundations of our Constitution, focusing on Locke and Spinoza. I will conclude by suggesting some changes in the Supreme Court's treatment of free speech. I Professor Gerald Gunther introduces the voluminous material on free speech, which comprises thirty percent of his casebook,6 with two questions: ( 1) "What justifies special solicitude for free speech values?"; and (2) "[W]hat judicial techniques serve best to manifest that judicial solicitude?" Let us consider how he illus­ trates the answers that different Justices have given to these questions. Gunther identifies three different justifications for free speech protection: I. to promote individual self-expression and self-realization; 2. to serve a system of representative democracy and self-government; 3. to serve to promote the search for knowledge and "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas." Consider first Justice Brandeis's famous concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, a criminal syndicalism case. 7 Brandeis's cele- 4. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 46, 50 (Norton ed. 1975). 5. Mill's importance for our understanding of freedom of speech suggests that consti­ tutional interpretation cannot simply be described in terms of historical legal research or logical analysis. The debate has been cast in recent times in terms of interpretivism, or a jurisprudence of original intention, versus non-interpretivism, or a jurisprudence of contem­ porary ratification. If the choice is between historical study to determine what the founders said in order to decide, with nothing else. a contemporary issue, versus a constitutional law that pays no attention to the founding principles, we are in trouble. 6. G. Gt;NTHER, CONSTJTCTIOI'AL LAW (lith ed. 1985). 7. Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a 1989] FREE SPEECH 353 bration of liberty supports both the self-realization goal and the self­ government goal, and, to some extent, the marketplace of ideas ap­ proach to truth. He agrees that the development of human faculties was the object of the government established by our founders, and that our republican form required an alert citizenry rather than an inert people. Fear of punishment breeds repression and hate, which menaces stable government, and speech liberates men from irra­ tional fears. After referring to, without explaining, "the wide differ­ ence between advocacy and incitement," Brandeis continues: "In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated." Both Holmes in Abrams and Brandeis in Whitney seem to have thought that the individuals and organizations involved in the crim­ inal cases are misguided but harmless, and that it was an abuse of government authority to imprison them. (Whitney was a member of the Left Wing Socialists, but she did not herself vote for the use of violence as part of the party program.) But suppose the organi­ zation was stronger? Is there never anything to worry about? Brandeis expresses confidence that if the speech falls short of incitement to violence, speech can counteract speech and "political truth," which must mean political freedom and sound policy, will win out. Holmes expressed a similar view in Abrams, but now con­ sider his dissent in Gitlow, a criminal syndicalism case similar to Whitney, decided two years earlier in 1925. means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth: that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile: that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of nox­ ious doctrine: that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people: that public discussion is a political duty: and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction: that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination: that fear breeds repression: that repression breeds hate: that hate menaces stable government: that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies: and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities. they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of free speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927). 354 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 6:351 It is said that this [Left Wing Socialist] manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth.
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