Testimony before theHouse ofRepresentativesCommittee on Foreign Affairs, PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence, and Committee on Oversight

Amb . Kurt Volker Former U . S. SpecialRepresentative for UkraineNegotiations

October 3, 2019

Thank you very much for theopportunityto provide this testimony today.

Allow meto begin by stressing that you and the American people can bereassured andproud thatthe DepartmentofState andthe DepartmentofDefense, andthe professionalsworking there civil and foreign serviceandmilitary have conducted themselveswith thehighest degree ofprofessionalism , integrity, anddedicationto thenationalinterest. That is a testamentto the strength ofour people, our institutions, andour country.

As a formermemberof theSeniorForeign Service, andin conductingmyrole as U .S . Special Representativefor UkraineNegotiations, I have similarly acted solely to advance U . S . national interests, which included supportingdemocracy and reform in ; helpingUkrainebetter defend itself and deter Russian aggression; and leading U . S . negotiatingefforts to endthewar andrestoreUkraine' s territorialintegrity.

Throughoutmy career, whether as a career diplomat, U . S. Ambassador to NATO , or in my other capacities, have tried to be courageous, energetic, clear-eyed and plain -spoken - always acting with integrity, to advance core American values and interests. Myefforts as U . S. Special Representativefor UkraineNegotiationswere no different.

In carrying outthis role, at somestage foundmyself faced with a choice: to be aware of a problem and to ignore it, or rather to accept that itwasmyresponsibility to try to fix it.

I wouldnothavebeen true to myself,my duties, ormy commitmentto the people of the UnitedStatesor Ukraine, if I did notdive in and try to fix problemsas best could.

There are five keypoints I would like to stress in this testimony , and I would like to submit a longer version and timeline of events for the record . Letmebe clear that I wish to be complete and open in mytestimony in order to help get the facts out and the record straight.

First,my efforts were entirely focused on advancing U . S . foreign policy goals with respect to Ukraine. In this, wewere quite successful. U . S. policy toward Ukrainefor the past two years has been strong, consistent, and has enjoyed support across the Administration, bipartisan support in Congress, and support among our Allies and Ukraine. While I will notbe there to lead these efforts any longer, sincerely hope thatwe are able to keep this policy strong going forward You may recall that in the Spring of 2017, when then - Secretary of State Tillerson asked if would take on these responsibilities, there were major, complicated questions swirling in public debate about the direction of U . S . policy toward Ukraine .

Would the Administration lift sanctions against Russia ? Would it make somekind of grand bargain ” with Russia, in which itwould traderecognition of Russia's seizure of Ukrainian territory for someother dealin Syria or elsewhere? Would the Administration recognize Russia's claimed annexation of Crimea ? Willthis just becomeanother frozen conflict? There were also a vast number of vacancies in key diplomatic positions, so no one was really representingtheUnited States in thenegotiating process about ending the war in eastern Ukraine.

Caring deeply aboutsupportingUkraine; recognizingthat itstandsfor all of us in building a democracyand pushingback Russian aggression on their soil; and seekingto makesure American policy is in the rightplace, I agreed to take on these responsibilities. Then-Secretary ofState Tillerson and I agreedthatour fundamentalpolicy goalswould be to restore the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of Ukraine, and to assure the safety and security of all Ukrainiancitizens,regardlessofethnicity, nationalityor religion.

I did this on a voluntary basis, with no salary paid by the U . S . taxpayer , simply because believed itwas importantto serve our country in this way. I believedI could steer U . S . policy in the right direction.

In two years, the track record speaksfor itself.

I was the Administration ' smost outspoken figure highlighting Russia' s ongoing aggression against Ukraine , and Russia ' s responsibility to end the war . We coordinated closely with our European Allies and Canada, to maintain a united front against Russian aggression , and for Ukraine' s democracy , reform , sovereignty , and territorial integrity . Ukraine policy is perhaps the one area where the U . S . and its European Allies are in lock-step . This coordination helped to strengthen U . S . sanctions against Russia , and to maintain EU sanctions aswell. Along with others in the Administration , I strongly advocated for lifting the ban on the sale oflethal defensive arms to Ukraine , advocated for increasing U . S . security assistance to Ukraine, and urged other countries to follow the U . S . lead . engaged with our Allies, with Ukraine , and with Russia in negotiations to implement the Minsk Agreements , holding a firm line on insisting on the withdrawal ofRussian forces, dismantling of the so -called “ People ' s Republics, restoring Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity . In order to shine a spotlighton Russian aggression and to highlightthehumanitarian plightsuffered by the people in the Donbas as a result, I visited the war zone in Ukraine three times, with media in tow . Together with others in the Administration, wekeptU . S . policy steady through PresidentialandParliamentary elections in Ukraine, and worked hard to strengthen the U . S. Ukraine bilateralrelationshipunderthenew Presidentand government, helping shepherd a peacefultransition ofpowerin Ukraine.

In short,whereas two years ago ,most observerswould havesaid that timeis on Russia's side, wehave turned the tables, and timeis now on Ukraine' s side.

Second, in May ofthis year, I becameconcerned that a negativenarrativeaboutUkraine, fueled by assertionsmade by Ukraine' s departingProsecutorGeneral, was reachingthe Presidentof the , andimpedingourability to support the new Ukrainian governmentas robustly as believedwe should. After sharing myconcernswith the Ukrainian leadership, an advisorto PresidentZelenskyy askedmeto connecthim to thePresident's personallawyer, MayorRudyGiuliani. I did so. I did so solely because I understood thatthenew Ukrainian leadershipwanted to convince those, likeMayorGiuliani, who believed such a negativenarrativeaboutUkraine, thattimes have changed and that, under PresidentZelenskyy, Ukraine is worthyof U . S . support. I also made clear to the Ukrainians, on a number of occasions, thatMayorGiulianiis a private citizen and the President' s personallawyer, and that hedoesnotrepresentthe UnitedStatesgovernment.

Third , at no timewas aware of or took part in an effortto urge Ukraineto investigate former Vice President Biden . Asyou will see from the extensive textmessages am providing, which convey a sense ofreal-time dialogue with severaldifferentactors, Vice President Biden was never a topic of discussion .

Moreover, as Iwas awareofpublic accusationsaboutthe Vice President, severaltimes cautionedthe Ukrainiansto distinguish betweenhighlightingtheir own efforts to fight corruption domestically, includinginvestigatingUkrainian individuals( somethingwe supportas a matterof U .S . policy), and doing anything that could be seen as impacting U . S. elections (which is in neither the United States' norUkraine' s owninterests). To thebest ofmy knowledge,no such actionsbyUkrainewere ever taken, at leastin part, I believe, becauseof the advice gavethem .

Notably, I did notlisten in on the July 25 2019 phone callbetween President Trump and PresidentZelenskyy , andreceived only superficial readouts about that conversation afterwards. In addition, I wasnotaware that Vice President Biden' s namewasmentioned, or a request was made to investigate him , untilthe transcript of this call wasreleased on September 25, 2019.

Fourth, while executingmyduties, keptmy colleaguesat the State DepartmentandNational Security Councilinformed, and also briefed Congress, aboutmyactions. This included in personmeetings with senior U . S. officials at State, Defense, and the NSC, aswell as staff briefingson CapitolHill, and public testimonyin the Senate on June 18, 2019. I have an extensiverecordofpubliccommentaryaboutour Ukrainepolicy. have no doubtthat there is a substantialpaper trailof State Departmentcorrespondenceconcerningmymeetingswith Ukrainians, Allies and so forth . As a matterof practice, I did notedit or clear on these messages,buttold the reporting officersjust to reportas they normallywould.

Fifth and finally, I strongly supported the provisionof U . S . security assistance, includinglethal defensiveweapons, to Ukrainethroughoutmy tenure. becameaware of a hold on CongressionalNotificationsaboutproceedingwith that assistanceon July 18, 2019, and immediatelytried to weigh in to reversethatposition. I was confidentthatthis positionwould indeedbereversed in the end, becausethe provision of such assistancewas uniformly supported at State, Defense, NSC, theHouseof Representatives, theSenate, and the expert communityin Washington. AsI was confidentthe position wouldnotstand, I did notdiscuss thehold withmyUkrainian counterpartsuntilthematterbecamepublic in late August. The position was indeedreversed, and assistance allowed to continue, within a few weeks after that.

I would now liketo turn themattersofspecific interestto this Committee.

ContactswithMayorGiuliani

In the earlymonthsof2019, I was aware of an emerging,negativenarrativeaboutUkraine in the United States, fueledby accusationsmadeby thethen-ProsecutorGeneralofUkraine, , that someUkrainian citizensmay have soughtto influencethe U . S. 2016 Presidential election, includingby passinginformationthey hoped would reach the Hillary Clinton campaign thatwasdetrimentalto the campaign.

There was a second narrative, also fueled by the then- ProsecutorGeneral, thatthe company, , had soughtto garner influence with then - Vice President Biden, by paying high fees to his son .

Mr. Lutsenkomade these allegations in conversations with U . S . media, which gave them wide circulation, particularly among conservativemedia viewers.

waswell aware ofthe situation in Ukraine, andhadmetMr. Lutsenkoonce, during oneofmy visitsto Ukrainein 2018 . Ukrainehas a well-deservedreputationforrampantcorruption. Nonetheless, Ibelieved that these accusationsbyMr. Lutsenkowerethemselvesself-serving, intended to makehimselfappear valuable to the United States, so that theUnitedStatesmight weigh in againsthis being removedfrom officeby thenew government.

In addition , have known former Vice President Biden for 24 years, andthe suggestion that he would be influenced in his duties as Vice Presidentbymoney forhis son simply hasno credibility tome. I know him as a man of integrity and dedication to our country . In May, 2019, learned thatformer New York MayorRudyGiulianiplanned to travel to Ukraine to look into these accusations. I reached outto briefhim beforehis visit - specifically, to tell him thatLutsenko is not credible and will be replaced once a new governmenttakesoffice , and that I hadmetwith President-elect Zelenskyy when he was a candidate, had subsequently been in touch with his advisors, and was convinced thathewas sincerely committed to reform and to fighting corruption in Ukraine.

We had a briefphone call , which ended as Mayor Giulianineeded to attend to anothermeeting or call. I texted afterward to offer to finish the conversation, butwe did not speak again at that time.

later read that hecanceled his trip , and that heasserted that President-electZelenskyy was surrounded by “ enemies of theUnited States” – something with which I fundamentally disagreed.

On May 21, visited Ukraine as partof the U . S . PresidentialDelegation to theInauguration of thenew President. Secretary ofEnergy led thedelegation , andwewere also joined by U . S. Ambassador to the European Union, , and U . S. Senator Ron Johnson .

I do notrecall any of the Lutsenko accusations coming up in the course of ourmeetingswith Ukrainian officials. Instead, wehad a very productivemeetingwith PresidentZelenskyy about his commitment to reform . Heannouncedearly Parliamentary electionsthat same day. We came away convinced thathewassincereaboutmassivereform in Ukraine, would face significantinternalopposition, and thathe deserved strong U . S . support. Wedecidedto seek a meetingwith PresidentTrump upon our return to theUnited Statesto brief him on our impressions and recommendationsfollowing the visit .

Wemetas a group with PresidentTrumpon May 23. We stressed ourfindingthat President Zelenskyy representedthebestchance for getting Ukraineoutof themire of corruption ithad been in for over 20 years. argued that how thenext 3 -6 monthsplayed out would determine the future of Ukrainefor thenext 5 years. Weurged him to invite PresidentZelenskyy to the White House.

The Presidentwasvery skeptical. Given Ukraine's historyof corruption, that is understandable. Hesaid that Ukraine was a corrupt country, full of terrible people.” Hesaid they tried to take medown." In the course of that conversation, hereferenced conversationswithMayor Giuliani. Itwas clear tomethat despite the positive newsand recommendationsbeing conveyedby this officialdelegation aboutthenew President, President Trump had a deeply rootednegative view on Ukraine rooted in the past. Hewas clearly receiving other information from other sources, includingMayorGiuliani, that wasmore negative, causing him to retain this negative view .

Within a few days, PresidentTrumpindeed signed the congratulatoryletterto President Zelenskyy, whichincludedan invitationto thePresidentto visit him at theWhite House. In the weeks that followed , I and several others sought to nail down a specific date for that visit, without result. No reason was given , but I believed that the President' s long-held negative view toward Ukrainewas causing hesitation in actually scheduling themeeting.

Nonetheless, I continued to believethat once thetwo Presidents actually sat downtogether, PresidentTrumpwould quickly concludethat PresidentZelenskyy is sincere in his commitment to reformingUkraine, is a charismatic politician who enjoysthesupportofhis people, and is worthyof U . S. support.

On July 2, metwith PresidentZelenskyy andhis delegation in Toronto, Canada, as I was the senior U . S . Representativeattending a conference aboutreform in Ukraine. Atthe end ofthat meeting, I had a private conversation with PresidentZelenskyy, in which I explainedthat believed thatMayorGiulianicontinues to have a negative view ofUkrainebased on assertions of actionsthathappenedin 2016, and that this viewpointis likelymakingitsway to the President. Imade clear thatMayorGiulianidoes not speak forthe U . S . government, butis a private citizen and the President' s personalattorney.

stressed thatthose ofuson the PresidentialDelegationathisInaugurationunderstoodthat PresidentZelenskyy andhisteam hadnothing to do with anythingthathappenedin 2016, and thatthebestthing would be to havea bilateralmeetingwith PresidentTrump. I said thatas soon as thatmeetingwould takeplace, IwasconfidentthatPresidentTrump would be as impressedwith PresidentZelenskyy as andtheothers on ourdelegationhadbeen, and that our bilateralrelationshipwould flourish.

Itwas clear to that wehad a growingproblem in the negative narrative aboutUkraine, built on these earlier accusationsbyMr. Lutsenko, thatwas impedingthe development ofour bilateralrelationship and the strengthening ofoursupport for Ukraine. I therefore faced a choice: do nothing, and allow this situation to fester ; or try to fix it. I tried to fix it.

On July 10 2019, met a close aideto PresidentZelenskyy, Andrey , for coffee in Washington DC. We followed up the conversation aboutMayorGiuliani, and he askedmeto connect to him with MayorGiuliani. agreed to reach out to MayorGiuliani and ask ifhe would agree to be connected.

I did so July 10 writing toMayorGiulianito seek to gettogether , and finally on July 19 meeting for breakfast for a longerdiscussion .

At thatbreakfast,Mr. Giulianiwas accompanied by Ukrainian-Amercian businessman . Wehad a long conversation about Ukraine. To my surprise, Mr. Giulianihad already cometo theconclusion on his own that Mr. Lutsenkowasnot credible and acting in a self serving capacity. Hementioned both the accusations about Vice PresidentBiden and about interference in the 2016 election, and stressed that allhewanted to see was for Ukraineto investigatewhathappened in the past and apply its own laws. stressed myview that the current President of Ukraineis sincerely committed to rooting out corruption and reforming Ukraine. It is the best chance Ukrainehas hadto move forward in a generation , and he deserves U . S . support.

Concerningthe allegations, I stressed thatno onein the new team governing Ukrainehad anything to do with anythingthatmayhave happened in 2016 orbefore theywere making TV shows at the time. Mr. Lutsenko, however, would remain in placeuntil a new governmentwas seated in a month ormore. Itwasimportantto reach out andprovide strong U . S. support for President-elect Zelenskyy .

also said at that July 19 meetingthat it is not credibleto methatformer Vice President Biden would havebeen influenced in anywayby financialor personalmotives in carryingouthis dutiesas Vice President. A differentissue is whether someindividualUkrainiansmayhave attempted to influencethe 2016 election or thoughtthey could buy influence: that is at least plausible, given Ukraine' s reputation for corruption. Buttheaccusation that Vice President Biden acted inappropriately did not seem at all credible to me.

I followed up on the request from Andrey Yermak to be connected to Mayor Giuliani directly , and the Mayor said hewould indeed like to connect. stressed that I thought itwas important that he get the facts straight from the new team , not from the outgoing Prosecutor General or others who have a different self-interest.

That day, July 19, I connected the two of them by textmessage, and facilitated a phone conversation which took place on July 22. During that conversation , they agreed to meet in Madrid in early August, 2019 .

In a few follow up messages ,Mr. Yermak was concerned that hehad notheard back from Mayor Giuliani about scheduling the meeting in Madrid , so I stepped in again to put them back in touch so themeeting would be scheduled . It took place on August 2, 2019 .

After theymet, both MayorGiulianiandMr. Yermak calledmeto givemetheir impressions. Both were positive. Neither said anything about Vice PresidentBiden. MayorGiulianisaid that hehad stressed the importanceofUkraineconducting investigationsintowhathappened in the past, andMr. Yermak stressed thathetold MayorGiulianiit is the government' s program to root out corruption and implementreforms, and they would be conductinginvestigationsas part ofthisprocessanyway.

Later, possibly on August 7 , MayorGiulianicalled bothmeand Amb. Gordon Sondland to provide a more detailedreadout. We expressed ourhope thatMayorGiulianiwould convey to the Presidenthispositive impression of thenew leadership in Ukraine, and reassure the Presidentthat theadvicehewas getting from us to schedule the White House visit of PresidentZelenskyy was the rightthing to do. MayorGiuliani then said hebelieved the Ukrainian President needed to make a statement about fighting corruption, and that he had discussed this with Mr. Yermak . I said that I did not think this would be a problem , since that is the government' s position anyway.

I followed up with Mr. Yermak, hesaid that they would indeed be prepared to make a statement. He said it would reference Burismaand 2016, in a wider contextofrooting out corruption anyway. There wasnomention of Vice PresidentBiden. Rather, in referencing Burisma, it was clear hewas only talking aboutwhether anyUkrainianshad acted inappropriately.

On August 16, Mr. Yermak shared a draft with me, which I thoughtlookedperfectly reasonable. It did notmention Burismaor 2016 elections, butwas generic. I conveyedthis draft to Amb. Sondland, who agreed it was an excellentstatement. Wehad a further conversation with MayorGiuliani, who said that in his view , the statement should includespecific reference to “ Burisma and “ 2016. , there was nomention of Vice PresidentBiden in these conversations.

Amb. SondlandandI discussed these points, and edited the draft statementby Mr. Yermak to include these points to see how it looked. I then discussed furtherwithMr. Yermak. He said that for a number ofreasons including the fact thatMr. Lutsenko was still officially the ProsecutorGeneral-- they do notwant to mention Burismaand 2016. agreed - and further said that believeit is essentialthat Ukrainedo nothingthat could beseen as interferingin 2020 elections. It is bad enough that accusationshave been made about2016 - is essential thatUkrainenotbe involvedin anythingrelatingto 2020. Heagreed and the idea of putting out a statementwas shelved. ThepointaboutUkraineavoidinganything that could playinto U .S . elections in 2020 is a messagethatI know our Chargéin Ukraine, Amb. BillTaylor, reinforcedin othermeetings.

During this time, I informed Secretary ofState Pompeo, Counselor Brechbuhl, NationalSecurity Advisor Bolton, NSC staff, and Chargé Amb. BillTaylor on various occasions that I was engaged in these conversations, andwas seeking to steer them in a way to reinforce an accurate picture ofthe Ukrainian leadership's commitment to reform and fighting corruption..

According to myrecords, the last contact hadwith Mr. Giulianiaboutany of these things at that timewas August 13. Thenext contact between uswas his attemptto callme, afterthe currentnewscycle broke, on September 21. I did notreturn the call right away. I consulted with the Counselorof the State Department, , on September 22 . Mr. Giuliani sent a numberof textmessagesto meon September 23.

spoke with Secretary of State Pompeo on September 23. Secretary Pompeo said that hehad been called byMayor Giuliani, who asked that the State Department confirm that it had arranged the meeting between himself and Mr. Yermak . I told the Secretary that the State Department Spokesperson had already confirmed this, in a statement given to the press on August 22. Secretary Pompeo askedme to callMr. Giulianiback , tell him this, and share a copy of that statement. did so .

U .S. Security Assistance

As is well documented , Ihad long supported lifting the ban on lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine, advocated for the supply of javelin anti-tank systems, advocated for an increase in U . S . assistance, and urged other nations to provide more assistance as well.

The issue of a hold placed on security assistance to Ukraine also cameup during this same time I was connecting Mr. Yermak andMayorGiuliani. I did not perceive these issues to be linked in anyway.

On July 18 , I was informed that at an interagency (sub -PCC ) meeting , OMB had said that there was a hold being placed on Congressional Notifications about security assistance to Ukraine. No reason was given .

A higher levelinteragencymeeting (PCC) wasthen scheduled to take placeto discuss the issue on July 23. I met in advance with the individualwhowould representthe State Departmentat thatmeeting, AssistantSecretary ofState for Pol-Mil Affairs, R . Clarke Cooper. stressedhow importantitwas to keep thesecurity assistance moving Ukraine' s self-defense, deterrence of further Russian aggression, as a symbolof our bilateralsupport forUkraine, and as partof having a strong position going into anynegotiationswith Russia. Hefully agreed andintended to representthat position at the PCCmeeting. also had separate conversationswith the Pentagon and NSC staff to reiterate the sameposition.

I was told later that there wasno outcomefrom the PCC meeting. That said, I wasnotoverly concerned about the developmentbecause believed thedecisionwould ultimately be reversed. Everythingfrom the force oflaw to theunanimousposition ofthe House, Senate, Pentagon, State Department, and NSC staff argued for going forward, and I knew itwould just be a matter of time.

July 25 Phone Call

I departed for a long-planned trip to Ukraineon July 23. Thad avoided going to Ukraineduring the course ofthe Parliamentary election campaign, just as I had during the Presidentialrun- off, to avoid any possible perception of U . S . intervention in the Ukrainian elections. The Parliamentary election took placeon July 21, so I felt I could visitafterwards, congratulate the President, and visit the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine, something did each year. particularlywanted to support PresidentZelenskyy' s decision to pullback Ukrainian forces at Stanitsia Luhanska and to urge Russian forces to do the same. 10

During this time, Ihad also been urging that the Presidentmake a congratulatory phone call after the Parliamentary election - especially since we still did nothave a date for a White House visit. A congratulatory call would keep the relationship warm .

On July 24, I hadmeetingsin Vienna at the OSCE, and then continued on to Kyiv , arriving just aftermidnight. Even though I hadbeen pressingfor a Presidentialcongratulatory phone call, still did notknow whether orwhen such a callwas to be scheduled until I was already en route to Kyiv.

Wehadmeetingsall day in Kyiv on July 25, including lunch with Mr. Yermak, and then metwith PresidentZelenskyy on July 26 . U.S . Chargé Amb. Taylor and I then visited the conflict zone laterthatsame day. Wespoke to the press in Stanitsia Luhanska on July 26 , and I gave a press conference in Kyiv on July 27.

The Presidential phonecalltook place on July 25, the day beforeI met with President Zelenskyy, alongwith Amb. Sondland and Amb. Taylor.

I was not on the July 25 phonecall. received a general readoutvia our Chargéandmyown State Dept. staffer, aswell as from Mr. Yermak. Allsaid itwas a good, congratulatory call, that they discussed the importance of fighting corruption and promotingreform in Ukraine, and that PresidentTrump reiteratedhis invitation to PresidentZelenskyy to visit the White House. I was notmadeaware ofany reference to Vice President Biden or his son , which I only learned about when the transcriptofthe callwas released on September 25 2019 .

Nomention of security assistance was made in the readouts either, and I said so in mypress remarks on July 27 , 2019 , in Kyiv .

Ambassador Yovanovitch

I have known Ambassador Yovanovitch since we served together in London in 1988. Throughout our careers, we have worked together at various times. When I was serving as the PrincipalDeputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs , I recommendedher strongly to serve as U . S. Ambassador to Armenia , which she did quite capably.

I havealwaysknownher to beprofessional, capable, dedicatedto the nationalinterest, and of the highestintegrity.

AvoidingConflictsof Interest

Before accepting the position as U . S. SpecialRepresentative for Ukraine Negotiations, I worked carefully with Departmentof State lawyers to identify and prevent any possible conflicts of interest 11

Given my commitment to building the McCain Institute at Arizona State University , as well as a number of other personal considerations, I did notwant to accept a full-time,paid position in the Department of State. Rather, preferred to work on a part-time, voluntary , and non compensated basis, which allowedmeto continue with myother duties .

I therefore set out a detailed set of ethics undertakingswith the Department, andrecused myselffrom anyUkraine-related activities elsewhere - particularly at BGR Group, where serve as a senior internationaladvisor to the firm . Per prioragreementwhen I joined Arizona State University, I do notdo any client-specific work forthe firm , nor do engage in any representationalactivities. Upon becoming U . S . SpecialRepresentativeforUkraine Negotiations, I immediatelynotifiedthe firm that I was recusingmyselffrom allUkraine-related activity. Allofthese documents are available to the Committee.