MacArthur, Quezon, and Executive Order Number One: Another View Author(s): Paul P. Rogers Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 93-100 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639456 . Accessed: 18/02/2014 15:53

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MacArthur,Quezon, and ExecutiveOrder Number One-Another View

Paul P. Rogers

Theauthor is a professoroffinance at VirginiaPolytechnic In- stituteand State Universityand formerstenographer to DouglasMacArthur

THE ARTICLE OF Carol Petillowhich appeared in the February,1979, issue of thisjournal and thesubsequent flurry of publicityproduced a pre- dictableprotest from the wide circleof Douglas MacArthurdevotees and an equally predictabletwitter of delightfrom those who believeda flawhad been foundin theMacArthur image.' I was assignedas stenographerto MacArthurand hischief of staff, Richard KerensSutherland, on October20, 1941. I was takento Corregidorand was evacuatedto Australia.I servedas secretaryand officemanager until Septem- ber 1945. I witnessedthe eventsdiscussed by Petillo.I typedmany of the documentsinvolved. I had closeintimate contact with MacArthur and Suther- land. I have studiedthe documents and I have ponderedtheir significance. I havechallenged my memory and myjudgments. Sutherland'sdiary records that at threein the afternoonof February13, 1942, MacArthurwalked into Lateral Three of Malinta Tunneland spent halfan hourdiscussing with his chief of staff "highly secret matters of policy." One hourlater Sutherland began to workon the"composition, at thedirection ofGeneral MacArthur, of important Executive Order for President Quezon." Sutherlandworked at thetask until eight that evening. He preparedthe draft ofExecutive Order Number One and gaveit tome to be typed.I returnedthe typedcopy to him.He readit and handedit to MacArthur.MacArthur read thepaper and returnedit to Sutherlandcommenting that the amounts hardly compensatedfor income they had lostduring their service with the Military

'Carol M. Petillo,"Douglas MacArthurand Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond," PacificHistorical Review, XLVIII (1979), 107-117. 93

Pacific Historical Review ? 1983, by the Pacific Coast Branch, AmericanHistorical Association

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Mission. MacArthurwalked out of Lateral Three leavingthe paper with Sutherland,who continuedto workuntil eleven.2 AfterSutherland left his deskfor the night, I made thedaily entry in my Corregidordiary. With some hesitation I decidedto recordthe event, but to camouflagethe factsI changedthe word"order" to "act." I changedMac- Arthur's$500,000 to $50,000,then changed Sutherland's $75,000 to $45,000 to keepit in linewith amount recorded for MacArthur. The amountsgiven to RichardJ. Marshalland SidneyL. Huffwere recorded without change. It was notvery cleverly done but it satisfiedmy sense of propriety.The affair was buriedin thediary entry. As a matterof honor I did notdiscuss it during thewar or after.I had beenaccepted into a positionof trust and I wouldnot violatethe obligation my position imposed upon me.3 The ExecutiveOrder4 would not have been taken to Quezonbefore Febru- ary 14. At two thatafternoon MacArthur, President Manuel L. Quezon, High CommissionerFrancis B. Sayre,and Sutherlandmet to discussthe "dis- posal ofmoney and securities,and on mattersof high policy." A dispatchof February 15 directedthe transfer of funds by Chase National Bank.5In Washington,D.C., actionwas delayedwhile the request was dis- cussedby GeneralGeorge C. Marshall,Secretary of War HenryL. Stimson, and PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt.The matterwas referredto Secretaryof theInterior Harold L. Ickesfor final action. Five dayswere required to reach a decision.The officialmemorandum for record states that there is no recordof approvalby Ickes.Nevertheless, Chase NationalBank madethe transfer and so notifiedthe Adjutant General on February18.6 On Corregidorthere was somesense of urgency in viewof Quezon's immi- nentevacuation. To guaranteepayment, an equivalentamount of Philippine currencywas segregated,boxed, and deliveredto SidneyHuff who actedfor

2"BriefSummary of Actionin the Officeof Chiefof Staff,"box 2, RG 2, MacArthurMe- morialArchives. A descriptionof MacArthur'sWorld War II officefiles will be foundin my unpublishedmanuscript, "MacArthur and Sutherland,"which is filedwith my "Corregidor Diary" in the MacArthurMemorial Archives, although neither are yetavailable to thepub- lic. 3Paul P. Rogers,"Corregidor Diary." Only Sutherland,Marshall, and Huff had been membersof the Military Mission. Charles A. Willoughlyand otherofficers joined MacArthur afterthe Mission had been dissolvedand reconstitutedas UnitedStates Army Forces in the Far East. 4Box 4, Item 27, SutherlandPapers, RG 200, National Archives.All of the materialsin Item21 were keptwith other records in filingcabinets in myoffice. 5MacArthurto Agwar[Adjutant General, War Dept.], Number285, Feb. 15, 1942. I typed thisradiogram but I have not founda copyin MacArthur'sfiles. Franklin D. RooseveltLi- brary,PSF 64, containsRoosevelt's copy. MacArthur's signature is theritual signature which was requiredon all officialcorrespondence. The effectivesignatures are thoseof Jose Abad Santos,Secretary of Finance, and Manuel Quezon. Whenthis message was receivedin Wash- ington,two copies were sentto the Secretaryof the General Staff.He in turnsent a para- phrasecopy to Chase National Bank. 6Memofor Record, WPD 004.2 (2-20-42),will be foundin (Section1) (Case 1), RG 165, National Archives;J. R. Deane to C. F. Brown,Feb. 17, 1942, File 9-7-4 Banking,RG 126, National Archives.

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MacArthurwith the understandingthat it would be returnedto Manuel Roxas,who acted for Quezon, if the transfer were confirmed. The receiptwas signedon February19.7 Quezon had radioedChase Nationalon February18 askingconfirmation. Confirmation was receivedon February25 afterQuezon had leftCorregidor. The box of currencywas returnedto Roxas forQuezon who bythen was in Panay.Quezon was notifiedon February27 ofthe fact of theconfirmation.8 The transferof thecurrency made no moresense than my diary entry. If Roosevelthad notapproved the transfer of funds through the banks, the entire affairwould have been annulled.Physical possession of a box of currency wouldhave raised significant legal problems. Eventually, the large amount of currencywould have to be presentedfor redemption and difficultieswould have beenencountered. MacArthur and Sutherlandwould have knownthis. As in the case of my diaryentry, the uselessstratagem relieved everyone's senseof propriety. RichardSutherland was themost capable officer in MacArthur'scommand. In a veryreal wayhe "ran" MacArthur'swar. Laterin thewar he and Mac- Arthurwould have difficulties but at thistime they were close friends. During WorldWar II, wherethe conduct of the war was concerned,MacArthur and Sutherlandacted as one evenafter their friendship had dissolved.It hardly detractsfrom MacArthur's stature to assert that he madeeffective use ofa fine chiefof staff and recognizedthat he had one,a factwhich biographers should note. There is no evidencein thediary or elsewherewhich would justify accept- ingJanuary 3, 1942,as thedate of action.I am convincedthat the order was writtenon February13 and backdated.The choiceof February13 seemsto createa dilemmabecause backdating appears to be unnecessary.However, it may indicateonly that the matter had beendiscussed as earlyas January3 withaction delayed until such time as Quezon'sevacuation had beenagreed upon. Thereis no clearrecord as towho actually originated the action. One might assumethat Quezon raisedthe matter with MacArthur and askedthat Mac- Arthurput the document in finalform. Or, on thecontrary, one mightargue just as reasonablythat MacArthur raised the issue with Quezon and was told to preparea document.Or it may be thatMacArthur and Sutherlandpre- pareda documentand presentedit to Quezon forsignature accompanied by pleasfor justice and charityor bythreats of retribution. There is no evidence.I am inclinedto believethat the matter was firstdiscussed by MacArthurand Quezon,and thatQuezon more likely raised the possibility of some recognition of MacArthur'sservices. It is likelythat the affair might have been discussed

7Attachedto ExecutiveOrder Number One. 8USAFFE 40, USAFFE Section,MacArthur/Sutherland Secret File, box 15, folder1, RG 4, MacArthurMemorial Archives. The same materialswill be foundin Item 3, Sutherland Papers, RG 200, National Archives.The receiptsigned by Roxas is attachedto Executive OrderNumber One. USAFFE 58 is locatedwith USAFFE 40.

This content downloaded from 128.173.125.76 on Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:53:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 96 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW privatelyas earlyas January.Quezon and MacArthurtalked daily about manythings. The problemof motivation will be difficultto resolveunless one works from the positionthat the parties were reasonable and prudentmen who expected thatthe transaction would be judgedby the standards of their peers. The rec- ord disclosesno attemptto hide the matter.The variousdocuments which effectedthe transfer of funds were dispatched through War Departmentchan- nels. MacArthurand Quezon would have expectedthem to be deliveredto Marshall and by him to Stimsonand Roosevelt.Ickes controlledPhilippine financesand he inevitablywould be calledinto the discussion. MacArthur, as Chiefof Staff, had beena memberof the Roosevelt administration, knew Stim- son and Ickes,and was acquaintedwith the probable course of eventswhich mustfollow receipt of sucha dispatchfrom Corregidor at a timewhen both thesemen were still quivering from the shock of Quezon's proposal to neutral- ize thePhilippines. Roosevelt had an opportunityto blockthe transfer of funds and did notdo so and therebygave the matter whatever legality was required presumablybecause he believedit to be in thenational interest. Whether in the eyesof Divine Justice it was moralor immoral,one mustsuppose that Divine Justicewill finda solutionwhen human frailty is unableto do so. Thereis stronghistorical precedent for such a grant,and givena legitimate desireto rewarda faithfulgeneral, the method is notparticularly questionable. As forthe amount involved, it is impossibleto knowhow to placea fairvalue on such services.MacArthur was notone to underestimatethe value of his own performance.It is understoodin academeas well as in themilitary that onlya foolundervalues his worth and thatit is betterto ask fortoo much than to ask fortoo little.MacArthur records that during his touras Chiefof Staff an attemptwas made to reduceGeneral John J. Pershing'spension. Mac- Arthurappeared before the Senate Appropriation Committee to speakin Per- shing'sbehalf. He "spokeof the tributeaccorded General Douglas Haig in England.Haig was Pershing'scounterpart during World War I. Afterthe war, Haig was promotedto fieldmarshal and received,in additionto a life trustof nearly$9,000 a year,a trustfund of nearlyhalf a milliondollars, yieldingan incomeof about $30,000 a year."9 One portionof a sentencein Quezon's memoirsalso may be relevant:"... the Filipinoreturns lavishly, with a loyaltythat knows no bounds,the affec- tionand confidenceof those whom he has elevatedto high office."10 On theday ofQuezon's departure from Corregidor he wrotea longletter to MacArthur to expressin personalterms the feelingwhich had beenexpressed officially by ExecutiveOrder Number One. The letteris reproducedhere in full."

9Douglas MacArthur,Reminiscences (Greenwich, Conn., 1965), 101. 1'Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight(New York,1946), 221. "Personal File, box 2, RG 2, MacArthurMemorial Archives.

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MALACANAN PALACE MANILA

FortMills, P. I. February20, 1942 My dear General MacArthur:

AlthoughI have givenofficial recognition to theservices you haverendered to theGovern- mentof the Commonwealth and to theFilipino people in myExecutive Order No. 1, seriesof 1942, I feelthat I mustwrite you thisletter, which partakes of an officialas well as private character,in orderto tell you how gratefulI am, my own family,and the membersof my whole stafffor the kindness and generositywith which we have been treatedhere; and to ask you to conveyto all the officerswithin your command, particularly to General Moore, our deep gratitude. As I have already told you, I would have remainedhere to the verybitter end, if you deemedit necessaryfor me to stay.I am goingonly because you and I have agreedthat the cause forwhich we are fightingcan be bestpromoted by mybeing in theunoccupied territory whereI could renderyou help and assistanceby keepingup themorale and determinationof mypeople to standby America. But I am leavingyou with a weepingheart, for you and I have not only been friendsand comrades;we have been more than brothers.My thoughtswill always be withyou and yourdear wifeand mygodson. If betterdays should come to all ofus, as I hope theywill, I expectthat the memoryof thesehectic days will strengthenour friend- ship and cooperationeven more. I am leavingmy own boys,the Filipino soldiers, under your care. I knowthat you will look aftertheir welfare and safetyand that,above all, you will see to it thattheir names may go down in historyas loyal and bravesoldiers. Withmy love to you,Jean and theboy, in whichall myfamily joins, I say good-byetill we meetagain. May God everkeep you underHis protection.

Sincerelyyours,

/s/ Manuel Quezon Gen. Douglas MacArthur CommandingGeneral, USAFFE FortMills, P. I.

Too muchhas been madeof theapparent vacillations with respect to the evacuationof Quezon. There was neverany doubtthat Quezon mustleave Corregidor.The problemsarose with respect to timing,method, and ultimate destination.The timingwas dictatedby uncertaintyas to the impactof Quezon's departureon theFilipino troops in Bataan.January was too soon. Aprilwould have been too late. The methodof evacuation was complicatedby Quezon's health. His doctors did not feelhe could survivea tripby submarine.MacArthur's radiogram concerningthis fact was intendedto appriseRoosevelt of a possibledisaster and to transferto Rooseveltthe onus of responsibilityfor it. A surfacevessel involvedsubstantial risk of captureand death.The evacuationplan provided forboth contingencies. Quezon finallyagreed to thesubmarine for the initial stageof the evacuation. A submarinehad to be calledin frompatrol and there

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was no certaintythat one wouldarrive. The dateactually chosen for Quezon's evacuationwas determinedby the arrival of Swordfish at Corregidor. Quezon's innerconflicts concerning evacuation are reflectedin the docu- ments,his own record, and othersas well.They are notdifficult to understand. MacArthurwent through the same agonies when his turn came. On March11 whenI typedthe order for Master Sergeant Rogers to leaveCorregidor, I felt the same conflict:a greatshame intensified by the factthat I also feltgreat relief.None had a choice.Quezon, MacArthur, and I wereall underorders to leave.Quezon mightagonize and protestbut the thought of his daughtersin thehands of Japanese soldiers was reasonenough to do whatcommon sense and ordersfrom Washington already dictated. Conclusionsdrawn in the Petilloarticle as problemsfor further investiga- tionare interestingexcursions into mystery story writing and are discussed seriatum.12 1. The criticismsof MacArthur'sbehavior to whichPetillio refers are taken froma secondarysource. The secondarysource picked them out of primary sourceswithout any apparentevaluation. The questionis not whether MacArthurwas criticizedbut whetherany othercourse of actionwould have been possibleor productiveof betterresults. All militarydecisions representa compromisebetween civilian and militaryneeds. MacArthur's loyaltyto theFilipinos and Quezon has neverbeen doubted. Even ifthere had beenno loyalty,ninety-five percent or moreof the troops engaged were Filipinosand Quezon'srequests would have carried great weight. In addi- tionto all of this,the decisions referred to weremade in earlyDecember. ExecutiveOrder Number One was issuedin February.Were the decisions madein anticipationof the grant? 2. Does one reallybelieve that Roosevelt was afraidthat MacArthur, in an- ger,would cast aside reputationand honorafter long years of faithful ser- vice? 3. Petillois incorrectin statingthat Quezon's evacuationhad "clearly"not been decideduntil mid-February. The factof evacuationwas acceptedin January;the precisedetails as to whenand how were not decideduntil February.As of February10 MacArthurwas alreadyunder orders to ar- rangethe evacuationof Quezon. As it turnedout, Quezon had leftCor- regidorbefore the transfer of funds was completed.'3 4. MacArthur'sattitude with respectto liberationof the Philippineswas sharedunequivocably by Roosevelt. The promiseto liberatethe Philippines made by Roosevelton January30 and on February10 committedthe

'2No attemptwill be made to documentthe numerous sources which provided the basis for mycomments. A fullydocumented statement would run farbeyond the bounds of thislimited paper. Specificdocuments are cited. 13USAFFE 25, USAFFE Section,MacArthur/Sutherland Secret File, box 15, folder1. This materialis also in Item3, SutherlandPapers.

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UnitedStates to thisaction as a matterof nationalhonor.14 The desireto attackJapan by way of the Philippinesreflected not only MacArthur's senseof obligationto theFilipinos but his own senseof futurecommand possibilities.If the Philippineswere by-passed,the supremecommand would go to AdmiralChester Nimitz and MacArthurwould be leftin limbo.All of thismay seemto be important,but thedecision to moveto Japanthrough the Philippines was madeon strategicand tacticalgrounds, supportedby all Pacificcommanders, by Rooseveltand Marshallin Wash- ington,with only Admiral Ernest King demurring. 5. No documentationsupports the view that Manuel Roxasshould have been treatedas a criminalof war. He was thethird ranking power in thePhilip- pines.Had Roxas takenan oathof allegianceto Japan,everything else to the contrary,he wouldhave been hanged.It was acceptedas a factthat SergioOsmefia's term as presidentwould be a limitedone and thatat the firstelection he wouldbe replaced.In thetraditional hierarchy, Roxas was thenext man in lineand at thetime he seemedto be as essentialto political stabilityas theEmperor of Japan was heldto be a yearlater. As to theviolation of established procedures in makingthe disbursement, it mustbe rememberedthat after December 24, 1941, the Governmentof the Commonwealthof the Philippinesdid not exist exceptin the personsof Quezon and the halfdozen men withhim on Corregidorwho actedunder emergencypowers. They weremen without a countryto govern.There were no procedures,personnel, or recordsby which Quezon couldlegitimize expen- ditures.A documentin the MacArthur/SutherlandSecret File, Philippine GovernmentSection, Quezon 135, whichcarries Sutherland's notation, "Mr. Rogers-File,"describes this dilemma. The documentcontains an inventoryof currencyof theCommonwealth which records the disbursement of thefunds withoutany details of the transaction. The documentrecords that Quezon did nothave in his possession,even in Washingtonafter the evacuation, a copyof theEmergency Powers legislation which had beenenacted before the Japanese occupationof Manila. He certainlywould not be awarepersonally of the intri- cate detailsof administrative regulations spelled out either in theregular pro- ceduresor in theemergency powers. The discoveryof ExecutiveOrder Number One reflectscommendable de- termination.It was not easilylocated. I acknowledgewithout hesitation the scholarlyperseverance and desirefor truth which is reflectedby the discovery. Scholarlyintegrity demanded that the discovery be madepublic. The publicis entitledto knowof the affair and tojudge it. A man's characterand achievementare reflectedin an amalgamof inci- dents.Given the complexity of human existence it wouldbe foolishto expecta careerto be devoidof someincident which could be turnedto criticism.An untutoredor a frivolousmind may read into such an incidentwhat he chooses,

14USAFFE 11 and 25, USAFFE Section,MacArthur/Sutherland Secret File, box 15, folder1.

This content downloaded from 128.173.125.76 on Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:53:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 100 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW smirkingbecause he has neitherthe wisdom nor the understanding which is requiredto takethe full measure of theman's accomplishment.The scholar doesnot have such freedom. He carriesin hishands the reputation of the men he studies.Their achievements entitle these men to a fairhearing. I am willingto reaffirma judgment which is basedupon my own experi- ence,still firmly held afterforty years of seriousthought about the matter. I watchedMacArthur four years in defeatand in victory.His habitualbehavior revealedgenerosity, sensitivity, sympathy, understanding, and a genuinecon- cernfor subordinates. When praise and encouragementfailed to spurthem to action,he did nothesitate to use anyother stratagems necessary to enforcehis will. MacArthurwas trulya fineman drivenby a deep senseof dutyand destiny,tempered always by humanity and justice. His historicalgreatness has been confirmed.He has passedinto legend. During the years I servedMac- ArthurI did notsee anythingor hearanything which would impugn his char- acter.There is nothingin anyof the documents seen by me duringthe war or in thoseI haveseen since which cause me to questionthis judgment.

Rejoinderby Carol Petillo

As I readthe opening paragraphs of Paul Rogers'sstatement, my expecta- tionsmounted. Finally, it appeared,an actualobserver of the 1942 exchange wouldaddress the many questions which my research had raised,and whichI had onlypartially answered in myoriginal article (PHR, February1979), my responseto JustinWilliams (PHR, August1980), and in myrecently pub- lishedbook, Douglas MacArthur:The PhilippineYears (Indiana University Press,1981). I was soon disappointed.Despite his referencesto documents whichother scholars have not yet been permitted to see,and hiscertainty con- cerningan episodewhich he mustrecall from a distanceof morethan forty years,the major portion of Rogers'sargument relies on opinionand evalua- tionswhich have longbeen questioned by studentsof modernAmerican and Philippinehistory. Since space is limitedhere, I willrefer interested readers to coverageof thisdebate in theearlier mentioned publications, and respondto onlya fewof Rogers's allegations. Much of his argumentis easilyrefuted. Perhaps the most obvious fault of logic is his comparisonof MacArthur'sacceptance of Philippinemoney to GeneralJohn J. Pershing'spension fight or the rewardgiven to General Douglas Haig by GreatBritain after World War One. In bothof these cases, themen in questionwere being rewarded by thesame governments that they had servedexclusively throughout their long careers. In theMacArthur epi- sode,possible conflicts between the Philippineand UnitedStates interests in thisperiod raise very different issues and makethe comparison invalid. Even moredifficult to acceptis Rogers'scontention that the exchange was, on theone hand,honorable and basedon historicalprecedent and yet,on the otherhand, it requiredby his own judgment efforts "to camouflagethe facts."

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