MacArthur, Quezon, and Executive Order Number One: Another View Author(s): Paul P. Rogers Source: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 93-100 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3639456 . Accessed: 18/02/2014 15:53 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Pacific Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 128.173.125.76 on Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:53:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions An Exchangeof Opinion MacArthur,Quezon, and ExecutiveOrder Number One-Another View Paul P. Rogers Theauthor is a professoroffinance at VirginiaPolytechnic In- stituteand State Universityand formerstenographer to DouglasMacArthur THE ARTICLE OF Carol Petillowhich appeared in the February,1979, issue of thisjournal and thesubsequent flurry of publicityproduced a pre- dictableprotest from the wide circleof Douglas MacArthurdevotees and an equally predictabletwitter of delightfrom those who believeda flawhad been foundin theMacArthur image.' I was assignedas stenographerto MacArthurand hischief of staff, Richard KerensSutherland, on October20, 1941. I was takento Corregidorand was evacuatedto Australia.I servedas secretaryand officemanager until Septem- ber 1945. I witnessedthe eventsdiscussed by Petillo.I typedmany of the documentsinvolved. I had closeintimate contact with MacArthur and Suther- land. I have studiedthe documents and I have ponderedtheir significance. I havechallenged my memory and myjudgments. Sutherland'sdiary records that at threein the afternoonof February13, 1942, MacArthurwalked into Lateral Three of Malinta Tunneland spent halfan hourdiscussing with his chief of staff "highly secret matters of policy." One hourlater Sutherland began to workon the"composition, at thedirection ofGeneral MacArthur, of important Executive Order for President Quezon." Sutherlandworked at thetask until eight that evening. He preparedthe draft ofExecutive Order Number One and gaveit tome to be typed.I returnedthe typedcopy to him.He readit and handedit to MacArthur.MacArthur read thepaper and returnedit to Sutherlandcommenting that the amounts hardly compensatedfor income they had lostduring their service with the Military 'Carol M. Petillo,"Douglas MacArthurand Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond," PacificHistorical Review, XLVIII (1979), 107-117. 93 Pacific Historical Review ? 1983, by the Pacific Coast Branch, AmericanHistorical Association This content downloaded from 128.173.125.76 on Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:53:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 94 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW Mission. MacArthurwalked out of Lateral Three leavingthe paper with Sutherland,who continuedto workuntil eleven.2 AfterSutherland left his deskfor the night, I made thedaily entry in my Corregidordiary. With some hesitation I decidedto recordthe event, but to camouflagethe factsI changedthe word"order" to "act." I changedMac- Arthur's$500,000 to $50,000,then changed Sutherland's $75,000 to $45,000 to keepit in linewith amount recorded for MacArthur. The amountsgiven to RichardJ. Marshalland SidneyL. Huffwere recorded without change. It was notvery cleverly done but it satisfiedmy sense of propriety.The affair was buriedin thediary entry. As a matterof honor I did notdiscuss it during thewar or after.I had beenaccepted into a positionof trust and I wouldnot violatethe obligation my position imposed upon me.3 The ExecutiveOrder4 would not have been taken to Quezonbefore Febru- ary 14. At two thatafternoon MacArthur, President Manuel L. Quezon, High CommissionerFrancis B. Sayre,and Sutherlandmet to discussthe "dis- posal ofmoney and securities,and on mattersof high policy." A dispatchof February 15 directedthe transfer of funds by Chase National Bank.5In Washington,D.C., actionwas delayedwhile the request was dis- cussedby GeneralGeorge C. Marshall,Secretary of War HenryL. Stimson, and PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt.The matterwas referredto Secretaryof theInterior Harold L. Ickesfor final action. Five dayswere required to reach a decision.The officialmemorandum for record states that there is no recordof approvalby Ickes.Nevertheless, Chase NationalBank madethe transfer and so notifiedthe Adjutant General on February18.6 On Corregidorthere was somesense of urgency in viewof Quezon's immi- nentevacuation. To guaranteepayment, an equivalentamount of Philippine currencywas segregated,boxed, and deliveredto SidneyHuff who actedfor 2"BriefSummary of Actionin the Officeof Chiefof Staff,"box 2, RG 2, MacArthurMe- morialArchives. A descriptionof MacArthur'sWorld War II officefiles will be foundin my unpublishedmanuscript, "MacArthur and Sutherland,"which is filedwith my "Corregidor Diary" in the MacArthurMemorial Archives, although neither are yetavailable to thepub- lic. 3Paul P. Rogers,"Corregidor Diary." Only Sutherland,Marshall, and Huff had been membersof the Military Mission. Charles A. Willoughlyand otherofficers joined MacArthur afterthe Mission had been dissolvedand reconstitutedas UnitedStates Army Forces in the Far East. 4Box 4, Item 27, SutherlandPapers, RG 200, National Archives.All of the materialsin Item21 were keptwith other records in filingcabinets in myoffice. 5MacArthurto Agwar[Adjutant General, War Dept.], Number285, Feb. 15, 1942. I typed thisradiogram but I have not founda copyin MacArthur'sfiles. Franklin D. RooseveltLi- brary,PSF 64, containsRoosevelt's copy. MacArthur's signature is theritual signature which was requiredon all officialcorrespondence. The effectivesignatures are thoseof Jose Abad Santos,Secretary of Finance, and Manuel Quezon. Whenthis message was receivedin Wash- ington,two copies were sentto the Secretaryof the General Staff.He in turnsent a para- phrasecopy to Chase National Bank. 6Memofor Record, WPD 004.2 (2-20-42),will be foundin (Section1) (Case 1), RG 165, National Archives;J. R. Deane to C. F. Brown,Feb. 17, 1942, File 9-7-4 Banking,RG 126, National Archives. This content downloaded from 128.173.125.76 on Tue, 18 Feb 2014 15:53:08 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions An Exchangeof Opinion 95 MacArthurwith the understandingthat it would be returnedto Manuel Roxas,who acted for Quezon, if the transfer were confirmed. The receiptwas signedon February19.7 Quezon had radioedChase Nationalon February18 askingconfirmation. Confirmation was receivedon February25 afterQuezon had leftCorregidor. The box of currencywas returnedto Roxas forQuezon who bythen was in Panay.Quezon was notifiedon February27 ofthe fact of theconfirmation.8 The transferof thecurrency made no moresense than my diary entry. If Roosevelthad notapproved the transfer of funds through the banks, the entire affairwould have been annulled.Physical possession of a box of currency wouldhave raised significant legal problems. Eventually, the large amount of currencywould have to be presentedfor redemption and difficultieswould have beenencountered. MacArthur and Sutherlandwould have knownthis. As in the case of my diaryentry, the uselessstratagem relieved everyone's senseof propriety. RichardSutherland was themost capable officer in MacArthur'scommand. In a veryreal wayhe "ran" MacArthur'swar. Laterin thewar he and Mac- Arthurwould have difficulties but at thistime they were close friends. During WorldWar II, wherethe conduct of the war was concerned,MacArthur and Sutherlandacted as one evenafter their friendship had dissolved.It hardly detractsfrom MacArthur's stature to assert that he madeeffective use ofa fine chiefof staff and recognizedthat he had one,a factwhich biographers should note. There is no evidencein thediary or elsewherewhich would justify accept- ingJanuary 3, 1942,as thedate of action.I am convincedthat the order was writtenon February13 and backdated.The choiceof February13 seemsto createa dilemmabecause backdating appears to be unnecessary.However, it may indicateonly that the matter had beendiscussed as earlyas January3 withaction delayed until such time as Quezon'sevacuation had beenagreed upon. Thereis no clearrecord as towho actually originated the action. One might assumethat Quezon raisedthe matter with MacArthur and askedthat Mac- Arthurput the document in finalform. Or, on thecontrary, one mightargue just as reasonablythat MacArthur raised the issue with Quezon and was told to preparea document.Or it may be thatMacArthur and Sutherlandpre- pareda documentand presentedit to Quezon forsignature accompanied by pleasfor justice and charityor bythreats of retribution. There is no evidence.I am inclinedto believethat the matter was firstdiscussed by MacArthurand Quezon,and thatQuezon more likely raised the possibility of some recognition of MacArthur'sservices. It is likelythat the affair might have been discussed 7Attachedto ExecutiveOrder Number One. 8USAFFE 40, USAFFE Section,MacArthur/Sutherland Secret File, box 15, folder1, RG 4, MacArthurMemorial Archives. The same materialswill be foundin Item 3, Sutherland Papers, RG 200, National Archives.The receiptsigned