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Epidemia-Ultra-2019-1Ra-Ed.Pdf Epidemia ultra La ola reaccionaria que contagia a Europa Franco Delle Donne | Andreu Jerez Editores Primera edición: Abril 2019 Arte de portada: Alejandra Arregger Maquetación: Franco Delle Donne Edición: Andreu Jerez Copyright © 2019 Franco Delle Donne y Andreu Jerez Todos los derechos reservados. ISBN: 9781093734850 Publicación independiente Berlin/Veitshöchheim Alemania Things always become obvious after the fact. N.N. Taleb ÍNDICE Prólogo. Raúl Gil Benito 9 Alemania: La ruptura del consenso de postguerra 15 Andreu Jerez Austria: La ultraderecha europea de primera hora 33 Juan Carlos Barrena Bélgica: El laboratorio europeo 47 Marco Appel Croacia: Extremismo de raíces bélicas 69 Patricio Schwanek España: VOX, ¿arcaísmo o modernidad? 79 Guillermo Fernández Sánchez Francia: De la refundación del lepenismo a la caza del 93 poder Enric Bonet Torra Grecia: Amanecer Dorado, neonazismo en la calle y en el 115 parlamento Hibai Arbide Aza (Muzungu Producciones) Hungría: Anticomunismo, nacionalismo y orbanismo 141 Alfonso Lombana Sánchez Italia: Del separatismo regionalista al nacionalismo 156 aglutinador Alejandra Guerra Países Bajos: Entre la islamofobia y la rebelión de las 168 élites Sebastiaan Faber Polonia: Radicalización a la sombra del gobierno de Ley 191 y Justicia Beata Wojna Reino Unido: Brexit o el precio del nacional populismo 207 Ana María Roura Suecia: ¿Amenaza sistémica o descontento coyuntural? 222 Edmé Domínguez R. ¿Por qué votamos a la ultraderecha? 235 Franco Delle Donne Sobre los autores 251 PRÓLOGO Raúl Gil Benito Ya han ganado. Soy español y escribo este prólogo desde Berlín. En unas horas, mi país decidirá el tamaño que tendrá la ultraderecha en el parlamento. Sabremos también si el próximo gobierno tendrá ministros de VOX, gran protagonista de la política española en los últimos meses, tras su irrupción en las elecciones andaluzas. Ya han ganado. Escribo este prólogo bajo esa incertidumbre. Tengo miedo a que la epidemia ultra contagie a mis compatriotas. Miedo a no reconocerme más en mi país. Tengo 43 años y es la primera vez que me ocurre. Ya han ganado. Y quiero señalar a los culpables: los partidos políticos y los medios de comunicación. Ambos se han movido entre la manifiesta incapacidad para detener el crecimiento de la ultraderecha y el indisimulado interés electoral y comercial por alimentarlo. 9 EPIDEMIA ULTRA Sé que no soy original. Que esta historia se ha escrito antes en una quincena de países europeos. Como buen ciudadano, he sentido preocupación cada vez que la ultraderecha obtenía un buen resultado electoral en algún rincón de Europa, pero esta vez es mi país y me toca más de cerca. Así funciona el cerebro. Ya han ganado. Por eso está usted leyendo Epidemia Ultra. No hice Erasmus, porque me afilié muy joven a un partido, y entre la militancia y mi desarrollo personal, elegí militancia. Error. No hice Erasmus, pero sé que este programa ha contribuido más a la identidad europea que todas las resoluciones del Parlamento Europeo juntas. Una identidad, asentada sobre el ideal de vivir en un territorio de paz y bienestar social, sostenida sobre la movilidad laboral, la moneda común y una toma de decisiones colectiva. Una identidad europea que fue herida de muerte en los años de la crisis económica y las políticas de austeridad. Herida infectada por el nacionalismo, que está empezando a afectar a los órganos vitales. Los gobiernos nacionales le hicieron el trabajo sucio a la ultraderecha. Ante la crisis del proyecto europeo, fueron los primeros en poner por delante los intereses de cada país, trasladando a los ciudadanos la idea de que, frente la incertidumbre, el camino es el refugio en lo nacional. Las primeras enmiendas a la idea de Europa que nos legaron Monnet, Schuman, Spinelli o Veil llegaron desde las dos familias políticas tradicionales del continente: conservadores y socialdemócratas. Ellos abrieron la puerta y la ultraderecha está entrando hasta la cocina. El 26 de mayo, según todas las proyecciones, se convertirán en la segunda fuerza del Parlamento Europeo. Lo que aún no sabemos es si su estrategia será dinamitar el proyecto europeo desde dentro o tratar de gobernar las instituciones para ponerlas a su servicio. De la lectura de este libro, se concluye que hay muchas ultraderechas en Europa, con sus peculiaridades en cada país, y que están lejos de coordinar sus esfuerzos, pero a diferencia de las familias políticas tradicionales (conservadores, 10 PRÓLOGO | RAÚL GIL BENITO socialdemócratas, liberales y verdes) tienen bien claro y definido su objetivo común: acabar con la Unión Europea tal y como la conocemos. Quizá esté ahí el problema, que es una de las razones de su éxito. Que muchos ciudadanos europeos no sufran ante esa posibilidad, porque el modelo social europeo les suene a fracaso y no se sientan identificados con la democracia liberal. No es culpa suya, sino de quienes dimos por hecho que el gran pacto de la postguerra iba a estar vigente siempre. Todo empezó con la crisis de representación y la ruptura del contrato social. Con la debilidad de instituciones que hasta ayer creíamos robustas. Con el fin de las certezas. En este sentido, se acude mucho al lugar común del alejamiento entre élite y pueblo. Como si alguna vez hubieran estado cerca y no fuéramos conscientes de que la democracia liberal es también votar a una élite para que se ocupe de los asuntos públicos. Por eso yo defiendo que tiene más que ver con que el pueblo ha empezado a considerar inútiles a unas élites que ya no resuelven sus problemas. Y ese desencanto, en muchos casos indignación, ha sido aprovechado por movimientos de ultraderecha para desarrollar estrategias de carácter populista, ofreciendo a esas personas una nueva narrativa con la que identificarse. Como leerán en estas páginas, la ultraderecha ha trazado la línea, poniendo en un lado al pueblo y en el otro, a los viejos partidos, las instituciones europeas y los inmigrantes (especialmente los que profesan el islam). Sobre ese criterio amigo-enemigo construyen sus estrategias, marcos y narrativas. Con la decadencia de los viejos partidos, la debilidad del proyecto europeo, y el eterno y equívoco debate sobre la inmigración, ¿cómo vamos a ser capaces de proponer un proyecto alternativo al de la ultraderecha que emocione a los ciudadanos europeos? En Epidemia Ultra, la mejor contribución realizada hasta la fecha para comprender el fenómeno de la ultraderecha europea, se detallan las diferentes razones que explican el crecimiento de estas fuerzas, su capacidad para construir 11 EPIDEMIA ULTRA hegemonía, dominar el debate público, e instalar los marcos que les benefician. Leyendo el libro, pareciera como si, de repente, las mejores mentes de Europa se hubieran puesto al servicio de los ultras, y al otro lado nos encontrásemos personas sin capacidad de análisis ni respuesta ante su performance política. Ojalá fuera tan sencillo como eso. Porque para ganar la batalla, bastaría con incorporar a nuestro equipo a esas mentes prodigiosas. Pero desgraciadamente la respuesta está en el cerebro humano, como explica Franco Delle Donne en el capítulo titulado ‘¿Por qué votamos a la ultraderecha?’. Hay herramientas para combatir a la ultraderecha, sabemos perfectamente qué la alimenta y qué no (aunque luego no obremos en consecuencia), y existe cierto consenso en que los valores que defendemos proyectan un mundo más justo y habitable, pero el contagio continúa. Para entender por qué, son más útiles los neurólogos que los periodistas. Ya han ganado. El crecimiento y la consolidación de la ultraderecha en Europa pone en riesgo la escala de valores sobre la que hemos construido nuestras sociedades, introduce el miedo en la toma de decisiones personales y colectivas, y desplaza la ventana de Overton en el debate sobre derechos civiles y libertades públicas a posiciones que creíamos enterradas para siempre. Los ciudadanos preocupados por este fenómeno tenemos dos opciones: despachar con displicencia a quienes no piensan como nosotros, menospreciando y ridiculizando sus emociones y posiciones en la búsqueda de su identidad, o tratar de poner freno al relato del miedo, la desesperanza y el odio que sólo busca generar división y enfrentamiento. Estamos ante una batalla cultural, en la que la definición de lo que entendemos por identidad es clave. Una democracia más participativa y que controle a los poderes económicos, el combate contra la pobreza y la precariedad, el movimiento feminista, la lucha contra el cambio climático o la apuesta por sociedades abiertas e inclusivas también pueden generar identidad y un relato alternativo a las narrativas que está 12 PRÓLOGO | RAÚL GIL BENITO imponiendo la ultraderecha. La pregunta es si estamos a tiempo: si ya han ganado o aún podemos contraatacar. 13 EPIDEMIA ULTRA 14 ALEMANIA: LA RUPTURA DEL CONSENSO DE POSTGUERRA Andreu Jerez “AfD es un todo fenómeno federal, una ola, pero, demasiado a menudo, en los parlamentos regionales o en asambleas municipales el partido cuenta con gente que no tiene ni idea”. Estas palabras de Jahn Zoschke resumen a la perfección el momento que vive Alternativa para Alemania (AfD): tras convertirse en la tercera fuerza del Bundestag en las últimas elecciones federales de septiembre de 2017 con el 12,6% de los votos, el partido ultraderechista más exitoso de la historia de la República Federal parecía tenerlo todo a su favor para seguir creciendo y convertirse en la segunda fuerza del país por delante de los socialdemócratas del SPD, hundidos en una inédita y profunda crisis de identidad, y a pocos puntos de los democristianos de la CDU, con la canciller Angela Merkel en las horas más bajas de una carrera política ya en su ocaso. Sin embargo, AfD lleva meses anclado en torno al 13% en la encuestas de intención de voto, un porcentaje nada despreciable para un partido tan joven (fundado en 2013), pero 15 EPIDEMIA ULTRA muy lejos de su anunciado asalto a los cielos con el que los ultras amenazaban la estabilidad del país más poderoso de la Unión Europea hace tan sólo unos meses.
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