James Barr, a Line in the Sand: the Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, – (New York and London

Book Reviews / Bustan: The Middle East Book Review  () – 

James Barr, A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, – (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, ),  pp. ISBN ----

ALineintheSand, which looks at the overt and covert Anglo-French struggle in the Middle East from the Sykes-Picot Agreement in  to the  war in Palestine, is worth reading because of its subject and the archival sources it utilizes. In the prologue to his book, James Barr, a journalist by profession, dramatically describes how in the summer of , his eyes “bulged” when he came across a report from early , written by an MI security officer. The officer, recently returned from the Middle East, alleged that the French authorities in the Levant were arming and financing “Jewish terrorists” fighting against British forces in Palestine. That information had been given to him by an MI officer who in turn claimed that it came from a “Top Secret” source. Barr concludes that “while the British were fighting and dying alongside the Americans to liberate France, their supposed allies the French were secretly backing Jewish efforts to kill British soldiers and officials in Palestine.” The history of the rivalry between France and Britain for dominance in the region is well known. Barr offers a long catalogue of imperial feuding, machinations, intrigues and back-stabbing by two ostensibly allied powers. He lays the blame evenly on France and Britain, but it would have been more accurate to study those relations as three decades of Britain’s persistent efforts to renege on the commitments it made to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The terms “Fashoda” or “Perfidious Albion,” often used by French officials, might have been more appropriate to describe Britain’s subversive activities against France in the Middle East.1 In the summer of , Britain finally succeeded in evicting a defeated France from Syria and Lebanon, and for a short spell achieved its “moment” in the Middle East (to borrow Elizabeth Monroe’s term). Despite its declared policy of decolonization, Britain emerged from World War II as a hegemonic power in control of a “Covert Empire” designed to safeguard its vital strategic and economic interests in the region. But within a decade, this house of cards, diligently built by British diplomats, military officers and intelligence agents, came tumbling down: Britain, like France before her, was forced out, leaving the inhabitants of the region to clear up the mess its representatives had made for more than half a century.

1) In this regard, see: John Marlow, Perﬁdious Albion: The Origins of Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant (London: Elek Books, ).

The first half of the book is comprised of two parts. The first examines France and Britain’s division of the territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire in World War I, while the second covers the interwar years. Both periods have been well-documented, but Barr presents a comprehensive account of the com- plex rivalry between the two powers in the grand old tradition of th century European colonialism set against the background of the rise of the nationalist movements of Arab Nationalism and Zionism. He depicts the struggle between these powers through a series of episodes and lively descriptions of the indi- viduals involved. His extensive research in British and French archives and numerous private papers reveals hitherto unknown details of the clandestine Anglo-French war in the Middle East. For example, he gives details of the secret activities of Gilbert MacKereth, the British consul in Damascus before World War II, who succeeded in bribing and recruiting French officials and top Syr- ian leaders, including Prime Minister Jamil Mardam, as part of Britain’s efforts to end the flow of volunteers and arms to the Arab uprising in Palestine. The second half of the book is also made up of two parts: the first examines the secret Anglo-French war in Syria and Lebanon during World War II, while the second looks at the clandestine Franco-Zionist/Israeli collaboration against Britain, culminating in the  war. Barr adds insightful details to the many accounts of the Anglo-French struggle in the Levant during World War II and the clash there between Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle. The recent discovery in French archives of secret British and Syrian documents obtained by the French Intelligence in Beirut sheds new light on the extent of Britain’s covert operations to oust France from the Levant and tacitly incorporate Syria and Lebanon into its sphere of influence. There is now evidence that the Lebanese constitutional crisis of November , which marked Lebanon’s independence from France, was staged by General Edward Spears, the British Minister to Syria and Lebanon, and Riad al-Sulh, the Lebanese Prime Minister, while the Syrian crisis of May , which effectively ended France’s control of Syria, was engineered by British agents in tacit collaboration with Jamil Mardam, the acting Prime Minister. Using recently declassified MI files, Barr presents new evidence of the extensive efforts by British intelligence agencies to uncover the Franco-Zion- ist/Israeli collaboration during –. Again, while major aspects of this collaboration are well known—particularly France’s assistance to the Zionist movement in furthering the illegal immigration of Jewish refugees from Europe after the war and supplying arms to the Hagana and Etzel, Jewish paramilitary organizations—Barr adds details about the British intelligence agencies’ deep concern regarding this collaboration.