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All in the Mind Psychology for the Curious

All in the Mind for the Curious

Third Edition

Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos

www.ebook3000.com This third edition first published 2017 © 2017 John & Sons, Ltd Edition history: Whurr Publishers Ltd (1e, 1996); Whurr Publishers Ltd (2e, 2001) Registered Office John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148‐5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley‐blackwell. The right of Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and authors have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data Names: Furnham, Adrian, author. | Tsivrikos, Dimitrios, author. Title: All in the mind : psychology for the curious / Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. Description: Third edition. | Chichester, West Sussex, UK : John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016009020| ISBN 9781119161653 (cloth) | ISBN 9781119161615 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781119161660 (Adobe PDF) | ISBN 9781119161677 (ePub) Subjects: LCSH: Psychology. Classification: LCC BF131 .F87 2017 | DDC 150–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016009020 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Cover image: Gettyimages/ALFRED PASIEKA/SCIENCE PHOTO LIBRARY Set in 10/12.5pt Galliard by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India

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www.ebook3000.com Contents

Chapter Descriptions vi Preface to the Third Edition viii Acknowledgments ix Some Quirky Quotes About Psychology x

1. Introduction: Public Beliefs About Psychology 1 2. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 15 3. The Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology’s History and Development 46 4. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 66 5. The Man Called Freud 96 6. A Guide Into 120 7. Psychology and Work 140 8. Do Looks Matter? 165 9. Judging and Nudging 190 10. A in the Marketplace 211

References 235 Further Reading 243 Index 259

www.ebook3000.com Chapter Descriptions

1. Chapter 1 Introduction: Public Beliefs About Psychology. A short and informative chapter that provides a jargon‐free and aims to demystify some of the main misconceptions related to ­psychology and psychological theorizing. 2. Chapter 2 “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities. This chapter explores a plethora of topics related to everyday psychological topics and how psychology has been portrayed or perceived by the general public. Topics range from how our brains work to a number of therapies used today and their actual impact. A candid and to‐the‐point ­chapter that equally educates and entertains. 3. Chapter 3 The Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology’s History and Development. For about 150 years from many back- grounds, trained in many different areas, have investigated a wide range of psychological topics from to mating and to prej- udice. This chapter summarizes some of the key works of prominent psychologists and showcases the impact of their work in our society. The information is provided in a playful and accessible manner. 4. Chapter 4 Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories. This is a very applied chapter that looks into the very essence of how science is perceived, and how it operates within the remit of psychology. This link between science and science fiction creates an excellent platform to explore how psychology can help us investigate a number of ­conspiracy theories that populate our society and media alike. 5. Chapter 5 The Man Called Freud. Without doubt the most famous psychiatrist ever to have lived was . He remains, to this day, the most quoted of all psychologists or psychiatrists who did so much to shape how people in the 20th and 21st centuries see themselves. This chapter provides an insight into some of the key ideas that shaped psychology.

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6. Chapter 6 A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology. This chapter is aimed at assisting the reader to understand the causes, development, and treatment of mental illnesses. This is an area that remains both important and controversial, with a number of public viewpoints and misconceptions. Covering topics such as schizophrenia and psychop- athy, the chapter includes a number of key studies that allow novice readers to explore how psychologists use various diagnostic tools to detect and deal with conditions. 7. Chapter 7 Psychology and Work. Working spend about one‐ third of their day at work (8 hours out of 24). Work is central to our lives and therefore of considerable interest to psychologists. This chapter explores how psychology is used to assist us in developing and managing employees at work. We explore issues of stress, burn- out, and other key topics and conditions that people may be facing at work. 8. Chapter 8 Do Looks Matter? This is an important question, not least because it colors the way we examine the social impact of attractive- ness, as well as questions concerning body image and body esteem. This chapter aims to explore which traits and characteristics best explain interpersonal attraction: that is, why people may be attracted to each other. 9. Chapter 9 Judging and Nudging. Psychologists have always been interested in how people make decisions. They are fascinated by peo- ple’s arationality and irrationality, unlike economists, who base many of their theories on people being logical and rational. Psychological research has shown a very long list of cognitive biases to which eve- ryone is prone. These are “errors” people make in their everyday thinking. This chapter explores such errors and provides tips as to how to improve one’s decision‐making processes. 10. Chapter 10 A Psychologist in the Marketplace. Consumer psychology aims to examine how consumers in an individual and social context make purchase, consumption, and disposal decisions to satisfy both wants and needs. The growth of consumer psychology has mirrored that of advertising and the commercial sector in the Western hemi- sphere during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Given such interest, we explore how individuals make decisions related to what they consume as well as the real impact that marketing and advertis- ing may have upon our marketplace choices.

www.ebook3000.com Preface to the Third Edition

The interest in psychology can be seen by the number of stories in every newspaper and blog. It is rare for a day to go by without a major news report sharing some new, interesting, and often counterintuitive finding from one or another branch of psychology, particularly neuroscience. Psychology books sell well. This is not a textbook, nor is it a thematic book. It is a book for the curious. We have chosen topics that interest us … and we hope the reader. In that sense it is quirky. We believe there are few competitors for a book like this … and we are happy with that. We have tried to be academically sound but also produce a readable text.

Adrian and Dimitrios

www.ebook3000.com Acknowledgments

We have a number of research assistants to thank. Every year, for a quarter of a decade, we have had a placement student from Bath as a research assistant. With very few exceptions they have been a wonderful asset for us: clever, curious, and very computer literate; happy, honest, and hard‐ working; and good fun. We frequently ask them to search out material, critique something that we have written, tabulate findings, and so on. They do so with (apparent) enthusiasm and speed, and we are enormously grateful. Many of their efforts have gone into this book. Naming them in reverse order (that is, according to who worked with us most recently) they are Luke Treglown, Olivia Nettleton, Will Ritchie, Rebecca Milner, and Kate Telford. Special thanks must go to Steen Tjarks for the brilliant summaries of two books that appear in Chapter 3, and to Viren Swami, who contributed so much to the chapter on attractiveness.

Adrian and Dimitrios

www.ebook3000.com Some Quirky Quotes About Psychology

There is something wrong with a society in which parents are afraid to speak to their children without first consulting a psychologist. (Balaam) Anyone who goes to a psychiatrist ought to have his head examined. (Sam Goldwyn) Many who go into the profession [] do so in order to overcome their own neurosis. (Professor Ernest Jones) Because Professor Feynman answered an Army psychiatrist’s questions truthfully he was thought to be insane. (Stuart Sutherland) The business of psychology is to tell us what actually goes on in the mind. It cannot possibly tell us whether the beliefs are true or false. (Hastings Rashdall) Plagued by anxiety, troubled by worry, the psychological individual of our decade seeks only “peace of mind.” It appears to represent the best way of coping with life’s tensions. There is a pathological need to fill the hollow of our inner being. As we do not have a sufficient sense of selfhood, there must be a constant reaffirmation of our existence by seeing ourselves in others. (Sambar Cohen) A large part of the popularity and persuasiveness of psychology comes from its being a sublimated spiritualism: a secular, ostensibly scientific way of affirming the primacy of “spirit” over matter. (Susan Sontag) There is no psychology; there is only biography and autobiography. (Thomas Szasz) Psychiatrists are the new monks, their offices the secular monasteries against whose walls come to wail, while seeking to be shriven, the guilt‐ ridden, the sinner, the troubled‐in‐mind. (Alexander Theroux) I do not have a psychiatrist and I do not want one, for the simple reason that if he listened to me long enough, he might become disturbed. (James Thurber)

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Psychotherapy, unlike castor oil, which will work no matter how you get it down, is useless when forced on an uncooperative patient. (Abigail van Buren) In psychology, as in the management of pigs, it is one thing to know the body of principles, the science; it is quite another to possess the art of putting these principles into practice. (William Glover) It is still open to question whether psychology is a natural science, or whether it can be regarded as a science at all. () Magicians pull rabbits out of hats. Psychologists pull habits out of rats! (Anon) The world of psychology contains looks and tones and feelings; it is the world of dark and light, of noise and silence, of rough and smooth; its space is sometimes large and sometimes small, as everyone knows who in life has gone back to his childhood’s home; its time is sometimes short and sometimes long, it has no invariables. It contains all the thoughts, , , imaginations, volitions that you naturally ascribe to mind. (E. B. Titchener) Psychology is a science, but science is only exactified common sense. (E. S. Waterhouse) is a mass of cant, of slush and of superstition worthy of the most flourishing days of the medicine man. () Psychology is not a young science; it is merely a difficult one. (J. C. Marshall) Psychiatrist (n.) a person who owns a couch and charges you for lying on it. (Edwin Brock) Psychiatry (n.) spending $50 an hour to squeal on your mother. (Mike Connolly) Psychoanalysis (n.) the disease it purports to cure. (Karl Kraus) Psychologist (n.) a man who, when a good‐looking girl enters the room, looks at everyone else. (Anon) Psychopath (n.) someone who lives in an ivory tower and dribbles over the battlements. (Fritz Leiber)

www.ebook3000.com 1 Introduction Public Beliefs About Psychology

1.1 Introduction

Psychology is a new science – barely 140 years old. It has an official “birth date” of the 1880s in Germany. With new methods and discoveries we understand more and more about such things as how the brain operates, why people behave the way they do, and the causes of human unhappiness. In fact psychology looks as if it is on the edge of some great discoveries thanks to developments in neuroscience, statistics, and data gathering. What people who study psychology often say is that it gives you an “aha” experience. “Aha” is the expression of surprised happiness that comes with insight. “Aha” experiences often occur when psychology can offer explanations for seemingly bizarre or irrational behavior: why people spend money when depressed; why anorexics starve themselves; why clever people make such bad decisions. Psychology provides a rich vocabulary through which it can describe and explain behavior. Psychological terms like passive‐aggressive, obsessive‐ compulsive, and self‐actualization are part of many individuals’ vocabulary. There is a joke about “,” which is the misuse or overuse of psychological language and , but this usually occurs only in the popular press and by non‐psychologists. Some psychological theories are counterintuitive – that is, a number of the theories are not what common sense suggests. Some theories are quite commonsensical but there are also several that are not. Nevertheless, many skeptics and some cynics have continued to maintain that all the findings in psychology are really only a form of common sense.

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

One way to discover the reality of human nature is, according to most psychologists, through scientific experimentation and observation, but lay people do not use scientific evidence when forming their ideas about their fellows. Many believe in superstitions and old wives’ tales that have been perpetuated, but never tested, over the generations.

1.2 Public Ignorance About Psychology

It is paradoxical that, with so much media on psychological issues, the general public remains so ignorant about a topic. Certainly they seem unable to independently evaluate claims about many pseudo‐scientific pursuits like , psychic surgery, subliminal advertising, and the like. So many myths of popular psychology are held by people despite considerable evidence to the contrary. These include: “It is better to express anger than hold it in”; “Low self‐esteem is the cause of nearly all psychological problems”; “People of opposite personality type are attracted to one another.” Fortunately there is evidence that if people take courses in psychology they become less likely to hold myths and misconceptions and more critical and skeptical in their thinking (Kowalski & Taylor, 2009; Standing & Huber, 2003). Many studies have looked at very specific areas to try to understand why people have so many misconceptions. Thus Aamodt (2008) looked at criminal psychology and came to the conclusion that myths were held for various specific reasons. There are three reasons for public ignorance:

1. Media The media often favors sensationalistic rather than factual reporting of science. Further, the media has a “let all flowers bloom” and “anything goes” philosophy aimed at entertainment, not education. 2. Pseudo‐science A lot of pseudo and bogus science is behind multi‐ million dollar industries that depend on keeping the public poorly informed about their claims and the fact that they may have been shown to be fraudulent. 3. Psychologists When appearing in the media, they are persuaded to favor “sexy soundbites” rather than useful explanations. If they insist on the latter they tend to be edited out of the transmission.

Thus the lay person is presented with confused, contradictory, exaggerated, incomplete, and naïve findings and theories. It is no wonder that some believe that psychology is either just common sense or a matter of opinion. Introduction 3

Stop a hundred people in the street and ask them to name all the psy- chologists they have ever heard of. The likelihood is that 90% will nominate Freud and about a third Jung. Asked if they can name a living psychologist, only about 5% probably can. This galls modern psychologists because although many are impressed by Freud’s insights, intuition, and learning, they see little development in psychoanalysis and are skeptical about total reliance on clinical interviews. More importantly, many have no truck with the pretentiousness of a field that shuns empirical disconfirmation. Many people cannot distinguish between a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a psychoanalyst or a psychiatric social worker. Some use the work “shrink” or “head doctor” or even “psycho‐the‐rapist” (Gadon & Johnson, 2009). Developmental psychologists may join educational departments; social and organizational psychologists may be happier in business schools; physi- ological psychologists could happily work in a biology department; and even clinical psychologists could be embraced by psychiatrists. This makes things difficult for the lay person, who often thinks psychology is little more than or a discipline whose primary aim is to help people.

Psychology is an amazingly diverse discipline. So diverse that any two psychologists have almost nothing in common. Psychology is an archipelago, not an island. And some think it is drifting apart near to collapse.

Many disciplines study human behavior – sociology, economics, anthropology, history, and so forth – but what makes psychology unique is its scope and methodology. Psychology studies the full range of human (and non‐human) behavior from the micro to the macro level. Second, psychologists use scientific methodology to test their theories. It is the data‐based scientific study of behavior (see Figure 1.1). It is a young science and the record of progress is mixed. As Stanovich (1998, p. 21) notes, psychology is an immensely diverse discipline covering a range of subjects that are not tied together by common content. Instead, what uni- fies the discipline is that it uses scientific methods to understand behavior. The scientific method is not a strict set of rules; instead it is defined by some very general principles. Three of the most important are shown in Figure 1.2. Psychology still has an image problem for various reasons (Stanovich, 1998). These include:

●● Guilt by association. Because psychologists have been interested in testing claims in various pseudo‐sciences (clairvoyance, psychic surgery), 4 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

The source of the Secondary information (often the sources lost or Things are internet) got it wrong distorted crucial always more in the first place information complicated than they seem

People often People make too make very bad many inappropriate judgments comparisons

Figure 1.1 Possible reasons for holding myths.

(1) Science employs methods of systematic empiricism.

(2) Science aims for knowledge that is publicly verifiable.

(3) Science seeks problems that are empirically solvable and that yield testable theories. . . . Science renders knowledge public by procedures such as peer review and mechanisms such as replication.

Figure 1.2 General principles of science.

psychology has been associated with them! Psychologists are in a trap: If they refuse to investigate certain problems for fear of being con- fused with them, they are not true scientists. But if they research issues dispassionately and show pseudo‐scientists to be writing nonsense, this association may be seen as confirmation that psychology itself is a pseudo‐science. ●● Self‐help books that commercialize create an inaccurate impression of the aims, methods, and knowledge in psychology. These books are characterized by unrepresentative but vivid case studies, endorsements, and miraculous personal testimonies. Further, they propagate “recipe” knowledge – they show how to follow various steps without explaining why they should work. Introduction 5

●● Media psychologists are self‐selected, have a poor reputation with academic peers, and respond to the media’s of news, drama, and certainty as opposed to fact. Further, whereas television, radio, and quality newspapers have trained writers in the fields of physics, eco- nomics, and medicine, they do not employ trained psychologists. Again, psychologists are often trapped: When they refuse or fail to give glib, simplistic answers to problems, they are criti- cized and devalued, but if they do give such answers they are often misleading. ●● The terms “psychologist” and “psychology” are often very loosely used. Often the work of physiological psychologists is mistaken for biology; for computer science or ergonomics; and for medicine. Thus, in the eyes of the public, psychology is reduced to counseling and clinical psychology. ●● Unscientific attitudes within psychology itself. Psychologists can also rightly be accused of unprofessional behavior and unclear thinking. Further, professional organizations are much more concerned with chartering and licensing than with scientific behaviors. They look more like trade unions than scientific societies. Thus rigorous scien- tific psychologists and pseudo‐scientific speculative commentators sit side by side. ●● Everybody is a psychologist. Some believe they have a special, more profound, and perceptive insight into human nature. ●● Finally, some people imply that psychology diminishes or dehumanizes psychology. This is a moral or metaphysical objection based on the idea that trying to uncover fundamental mechanisms and processes reduces our wonder and curiosity about human behavior.

1.3 Tackling Student Skepticism About Psychology

Lilienfeld (2012) offered some useful advice for people when they became really skeptical about psychology. “Are you analyzing me right now?” Psychologists are asked this question by students, lay people, or both at some point. Many students and lay persons believe psychology is all Freud analysis all the time. Surveys suggest the general public does not regard our field as scientific. Most students have armed themselves on the first day of lectures with multiple myths and beliefs about what psychology is all about. Lilienfeld (2012) proposes ways to handle some of these spurious claims. 6 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Myth 1: Psychology is merely common sense

●● Students, on their first days, can generate a number of beliefs they find intuitive and obvious: opposites attract; we use only 10% of our brain; gut instincts are usually correct. Yet all of these assertions are false – or at best very poorly supported.

Combating the common sense myth ●● So, how to debunk these spurious claims? Provide students with research that contradicts these beliefs. Introduce them to , which is the tendency to perceive outcomes as foreseeable once we know them. Once we learn of a psychological finding, it suddenly appears self‐evident.

Myth 2: Psychology is not a real science

●● Students perceive the psychological discipline as incomparable with that of “hard sciences.” Therefore, it must be far less scientific! Why do students assume this? Hard sciences use objective measures such as volts or chemical levels that make self‐reports seem flawed by subjective artifacts such as memory bias. Real sciences are perceived to be defined by exacting research designs. Students assume replicability in psychology cannot match that of a hard science.

Debunking the soft science myth ●● Point out to students that subjectivity does not mean unscientific. Ample data and studies demonstrate the validity of self‐reports. ●● Discuss how psychology safeguards against human error. Point out how fields in psychology routinely use randomized control groups and blind studies. Psychology also has a reliance on sophisticated ­statistical methods, from multiple regressions to structural equation modeling. ●● Psychology’s lack of replicability may be overstated. Hedges (1987) found particle physics results were no more replicable than those in psychology. Psychology also has more active scholars addressing poten- tial problems with the replicability of their findings.

Myth 3: Psychology is not useful to society

●● Despite teachers’ efforts, some students still miss how psychology applies to everyday life. The role of biology in health seems clear. Introduction 7

The role of engineering in building bridges seems obvious. As the wide breadth of psychology is not apparent to most students, they assume it has no clear role.

Earning a place in society ●● From the multitudinous range of real‐world applications you know, select a few that will resonate with your students. Psychology is used to standardize tests for university and graduate admission, as well as per- sonal selection tests for employees. researchers apply their field to improving the safety of vehicles and other apparatus. Cognitive psychologists use heuristics to influence the world of marketing, nego- tiation, and sales. ●● Even in the field of science, psychology has yet to receive recognition. Social science has always been seen as a “soft” science. Even though psychologists often emphasize the importance of being empirical and testable in their theories, psychology is still not recognized by the Nobel Prize. In 2002, the psychologist received a Nobel Prize for his studies in decision making. Although these studies were heavily psychological, his award was made in the field of ­economics.

Myth 4: Psychologists and psychotherapists are the same

●● Most students and their parents perceive psychologists and psycho- therapists to be extremely similar. In one study, students estimated that 56% of psychologists were in private practice, whereas the actual figure is 39%. ●● Part of the issue is that psychologists are confused with other “helping” professionals.

Knowing a coach from a couch ●● Draw attention to the misleading coverage of psychologists by the entertainment media. Many films use the terms psychologist and psy- chiatrist interchangeably. ●● Share information with your students about the different roles of dif- ferent psychological disciplines.

Myth 5: Psychology is pretty useless – it cannot make good predictions

●● Students recoil when their frantically shouted out questions are answered with the phrase “it depends.” This can frustrate students 8 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

into thinking psychological research cannot predict anything with ­certainty. They may also be dismayed by studies predicting a small percent of variance or when correlations do not exceed r = .30. Clearly, the consensus is that psychology is not powerful enough to predict behavior well.

Showing off its strength ●● Remind students of psychology’s high “causal density,” which is far higher than other hard sciences! ●● Statistical associations tend to be context dependent. For example, the relationship between divorce and negative outcomes in children is con- tingent on a myriad of variables. As a result, it is potentially impossible to apply a firm numeric value to this prediction. ●● This incompleteness stems in part from the sheer number of moderating variables, as well as our lack of knowledge of their impact.

Myth 6: Psychology is pretty useless – everyone is unique, so how can it predict behavior?

●● We are constantly told, from primary school into our working lives, that we are individual, unique, one of a kind. So students now assume psychology cannot generate meaningful generalizations as a result. For example, if every person with is slightly different, how can we outline underlying and universal treatments that are effective?

The fallacy of uniqueness ●● Psychologists understand and value the uniqueness in living things. The aim of psychology is to decode human thoughts and behavior in the hope of generating theories and models that can be applied to the majority of people. Various research methods have been developed to look at individual differences. For instance, research in differences in gender, age, race, and culture has certainly demonstrated psycholo- gists’ effort in valuing human uniqueness. ●● The reality is that unique variables may be irrelevant to the underlying mechanisms of the treatment. Use vivid examples to debunk this rumor: All cases of melanoma are unique, yet 90% can be cured with early surgery. The same is true for psychiatric diagnoses. We do not state that all individuals in a category are alike, just that they are alike in one crucial way: the core signs and symptoms that comprise that category. Introduction 9

General teaching tip

●● Acknowledge and address the underlying sources of skepticism. The history of our discipline is characterized by attempting to change misperceptions. But a great more deal needs to be done!

Part of the issue is what students are exposed to:

●● Poorly supported or totally inaccurate pop psychology, featured in general‐population magazines written by non‐professionals. ●● Spurious portrayals in media and culture, with the “face” of psychology being such as Dr. Phil McGraw (“Dr. Phil”). ●● The sheer multitude of self‐help books published without rigorous scientific testing, making claims far beyond the data.

The role of teachers:

●● Teachers play a valuable role in educating students about psychology’s scientific side. Many misunderstandings are what we may term “under- standable misunderstandings.” Instructors must be prepared to acknowledge the understandable basis of student skepticism and tackle this head on.

As psychology is a part of our everyday lives and is subjectively “immediate,” it is liable to seem intuitively obvious. But familiarity must not be confused with genuine understanding!

1.4 Psychology and Control

Psychologists work in the media and the military. They are employed by advertising agencies, political parties, and others whom some would con- sider to peddle propaganda. Is psychology about (politically) controlling others? Wars have been good for psychologists. With massive call‐ups, psychologists have been heavily involved in selection, training, ergonomic design, welfare, and treatment of both military and civilians. Since World War II (1939–1945), psychologists have made a particular study of such things as interrogation techniques, and the effects of captivity and “brain- washing” or re‐educating both captured soldiers and defeated civilians. 10 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

This research has provided many benefits, such as an understanding of the significant individual differences in reactions to sensory deprivation and also more recent understandings of post‐traumatic stress disorder. Both sides in war provide propaganda for the people at home as well as the enemy. The aim of propaganda is to change emotions and beliefs about very general issues. It is clearly deceptive, slanted, and enriched with powerful emotional overtones. Further, propagandists attempt to keep failures, “cock‐ups,” and reverses “in perspective” and to preserve the credibility of the army and politicians. At times the aim is to keep the public calm but at other times the central aim is to arouse them. Psychologists have been interested in dispassionate research of these issues whereas others have actually been involved in devising propaganda messages. Advertising may be considered a type of propaganda. It is certainly more persuasive in times of peace: It employs many psychologists and spends vast amounts of money! Psychologists have distinguished between the sources of the message (are they credible, trustworthy, sexy, experts); the message itself (is it clear, vivid, one‐sided); the medium (print, radio, television); the audience (are they knowledgeable, sympathetic, attentive) and the situation where they receive it (the home, the movies, a supermarket). There is a vast and fascinating research literature on consumer behavior: good words to use (new, improved, quick), good pictures (animals, babies), and where best to place products (eye level, end of aisles, check- out) and how to package them (bundles, piled high). Some psychological research in this area has attracted a great deal of attention but little sup- port. A good example is subliminal attention – messages that occur too quickly or faintly to reach conscious awareness but somehow are regis- tered and effective. This was all popularized by Vance Packard’s book The Hidden Persuaders (1957). But careful research showed the whole subliminal issue to be, as one reviewer put it, “preposterous, absurd, ­ludicrous, and laughable.” However, it has been established that moods do purchasing. Hence stores may pump in certain smells (baking bread, pine forests) or play particular music to change or enhance moods and so increase the likelihood of customers purchasing products. Psychologists have also been active in devising consumer typologies. This is sometimes called psychographics and its aim is to segment actual or potential markets into types based on the values and lifestyles of consum- ers. Thus one could take any product (cars or cameras) or any setting (supermarkets or the web) and categorize the different types of consumers based not on their demography (age, sex, class) but their psychology

www.ebook3000.com Introduction 11

(interest, opinions, values) (Gunter & Furnham, 1992). Marketing ­psychologists get involved in naming products, which has been shown to be very important. They also carry out research on designing the packag- ing, suggesting catchy slogans, placing the advertisement – indeed, the whole campaign. So, to return to our question: Is psychological inquiry dangerous because it teaches us, or worse, it teaches clever psychologists, how to control behavior? It has always been the ambition of psychology to describe, understand, and then predict behavior. If one can understand the antecedents of behavior it is not difficult to see how one may control them. Psychologists are frequently called in to try to control the spread of alcoholism or delin- quency or theft. They are requested to help with social engineering by helping through legal, social or physical means to create environments that prescribe some behaviors and proscribe others. Most people are happy with this but seem far less happy when psychologists work for manufactur- ers and governments or organizations (the police, the secret service, pris- oners’ associations) whose aims are somehow more political. Accusations of control are always political in the sense that they have strong value judgments attached to them. Just as the study of physics was responsible for both nuclear power and the nuclear bomb, so the study of psychology may be used for very different purposes. If understanding and prediction are part of control, then psychologists wish to control a great deal. And individual psychologists, like individual scientists, have very varied political and moral beliefs.

There are psychologists who are both strongly pro‐corporal punish- ment (spanking) and anti‐corporal punishment. There are left‐wing and right‐wing psychologists. There are inevitably what most people would regard as morally good and morally bad psychologists. The aim of psychology, however, is always the understanding and prediction of behavior.

How psychological findings are used is of interest to psychologists but is not their primary aim. Disciplines such as social policy and administra- tion are much more interested in these questions. Certainly psychologists believe in “giving psychology away” – not in developing products and processes for certain powerful or wealthy clients 12 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious but in helping people in general understand the cause of things. Psychology benefits human welfare by attempting to understand and predict human behavior and publicizing the process through scientific papers and books. It is, in that sense, no different from economics or chemistry. The idea that we should not research a topic like advertising, or welfare, or consumer behavior because the knowledge might be abused by some- one is unacceptable. No topic within the field of human behavior is beyond the legitimate research of psychology.

1.5 How People Get Tricked

Perhaps we can understand why people hold false beliefs and misconcep- tions by how fraudsters successfully trick them. Polidoro (1999) has examined in detail the deception mechanisms used in psychic fraud. He claims there are 26 different strategies that are cate- gorized under five headings:

How to be believable 1. Psychics create believable claims – at least to those who believe in these sorts of things. 2. Supernatural psychic powers come from outside forces (e.g., God), so that detractors have to take on the Almighty. 3. Psychics like to appear modest and humble, which makes an audience more sympathetic and likely to overlook various issues. 4. Psychics pretend to be amazed by their own powers because (coming from outside) they do not know if they always work. 5. The more psychic phenomena are consistent (appearing many times in the same guise), the stronger the evidence of genuineness. 6. Psychics produce claims that individuals want to believe because they satisfy emotional needs for healing or contact with dead relatives. 7. Psychics credit their audience/participants with paranormal powers to motivate them.

How to limit and thwart the controls 1. The results of the (magic) psychic demonstrations are not stated in advance so participants do not know what to look for. 2. During the demonstration the original goal is switched slightly to one that escapes the controls. Introduction 13

3. Psychics create chaos to divert attention – or the opposite by being very slow and monotonous to reduce observers’ vigilance. 4. Psychics exploit control by preparing for tricks well in advance and getting access to secret information. 5. Psychics exploit inoffensive or reviewable controls that allow a sleight of hand. 6. The subject is allowed to suggest tests and conditions for tests, which gives people confidence but does not increase their powers of detection.

How to perform seeming miracles 1. The psychic appears incapable of fraud by being young, innocent, and incapable. 2. The psychic fails to pass the test designed to determine if the necessary skill is present: this makes him/her innocent of fraud (e.g., he/she physically cannot bend spoons). 3. The psychic appears to have no to deceive: he/she does not look for fame or money and is content with the recognition of the genuineness of his/her powers. 4. The psychic uses familiar objects particularly if borrowed from the audi- ence, so “proving” that no manufacturer’s “gimmicks” are involved. 5. The psychic uses simple methods again so as not to encourage distrust in the audience. 6. The psychic never uses the same method to fabricate the same kind of information. He or she never repeats a trick because it so often relies on the person not knowing what to expect and therefore what to look for. 7. The great fake psychics are improvisers as they need to be able to do things on the spur of the moment.

What to do in case something goes wrong 1. Failure is a proof of genuine paranormal powers: it cannot be a trick. 2. Skeptics produce “negative vibrations” that prevent the phenomenon occurring. 3. Any trickery detected may be attributed to the subject’s desire to please the audience – they could not help themselves because they needed to please the observers. 4. Any trickery detected may be considered proof of genuine powers because the ruse is simply too crude to be mistaken – the psychic did it involuntarily. 14 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

How to distort memories 1. The psychic is elusive, making it difficult to remember exactly what went on. 2. The psychic recapitulates often what happened to alter memories.

Certainly, by studying tricks one has a very good idea of why otherwise normal, bright individuals are taken in by them.

1.6 Conclusion

People remain very interested in all things psychological. The average newspaper usually contains, on a daily basis, at least one article reporting some recent finding. However, when exaggerated and misleading head- lines are used, lay people will be left with inaccurate and unempirical psychological knowledge.

Lay people often misunderstand psychologists’ work. Poorly sup- ported pseudo‐science claims are constantly reinforced by the media, leading to ignorance of the field among the general public. Most people often do not realize how practical and influential psychologi- cal knowledge can be. It is untrue that psychologists have mystical power or can read minds, but they study behavior, which allows them to predict behav- ioral patterns. Does that mean psychologists can control behavior and intercept thoughts subliminally? Knowledge itself is neutral but is susceptible to being misused. Much depends on how psychologists maintain their competence and professionalism, and where they draw the line in the constant battle against psychology being viewed as a pseudo‐science. 2 “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities

2.1 Popular Myths

Psychologists spend a great deal of time and effort attempting to re‐educate people who hold erroneous ideas about a subject. From one source or another many people come to believe in certain psychological theories that are patently untrue. And because of self‐fulfilling prophecies it becomes extremely difficult to dislodge those ideas. Let us now consider myths in a number of different areas.

2.2 Mind and Brain Myths

The brain

We use only 10% of our brain.

Beyerstein (1999a) has pointed out the many illogicalities of this myth. First, if 90% of the brain is usually unused, there should be many parts of it that could sustain damage without disturbing any of those abilities. Second, given the process of natural selection, it seems improbable that scarce resources would be wasted to produce and maintain an underuti­ lized organ. Third, brain‐imaging technology shows that, even during sleep, there are no completely silent areas in the brain. Finally, in the extensive examination of brain functioning and specialty localization, no one has detected the silent 90% that is not used.

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 16 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Metabolic studies, microstructural analysis, and work on neural disease provide no support for the 10% myth, which seems to have originated in the self‐improvement industry and among mad numerologists. Beyerstein (1999a, p. 23) notes:

It seems likely that some early investigators’ (probably optimistic) estimate that researchers only know what 10% of the brain does may have been mis­ interpreted as an assertion that we normally only need to use 10% of it. The of a trusty, “cerebral spare tyre” continues to nourish the cli­ entele of “pop‐psychologists” and their many recycling self‐improvement schemes…As a refuge for occultists and flim‐flam seeking the neural basis of the ­miraculous, the probability of its being true is considerably less than 10%.

Left brain is verbal, rational, linear, and scientific; right brain is spatial, intuitive, emotional, creative, and artistic.

Corballis (1999) has traced the origins of this myth in the last century. Clearly there is something about the symbolism of left and right that inspires such potent ideas. From a specialization in laterality he notes that there is more that is symmetrical than asymmetrical about our brains. He observes:

My Chambers Concise Dictionary (1989 paperback edition) defines myth as “an ancient traditional story of gods or heroes, esp. one offering an explana­ tion of some fact or phenomenon.” Except for the word “ancient,” this is not a bad definition of science, where our modern gods are genes and muons and black holes. We do, of course, go beyond the evidence in con­ structing theories, and the view of cerebral asymmetry I have presented in this chapter no doubt contains its share of myth. The problems arise when we allow the myth to escape from scientific scrutiny and become dogma, and when that dogma creates financial opportunities for charlatans and false prophets. That is what I think has happened with the left brain and right brain. (Corballis, 1999, p. 41)

Body energy Saravi (1999) has considered myths about body energy that one finds in the ancient Chinese and Indian medical traditions as well as in homeopa­ thy. He argues that these energies have no known physical correlates and cannot be quantified. He notes that these “energies” are depicted as ­having positive and negative signs. “New Agers” and psychobabblers’ “energy” has only a remote relationship with its physical, scientific coun­ terpart. For these groups, it is just a word conveniently invoked to explain “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 17 phenomena whose very existence is far from certain (Saravi, 1999, p. 47). Finally, he spells out various misconceptions about energy and its trans­ formations, such as matter and energy being freely exchangeable under physical conditions. He concludes:

Brain energy utilization has been the focus of a great deal of research in the last few decades, and has enhanced our knowledge of normal and deranged CNS function. However, neither clinical nor experimental data, from the living subject to the molecular level, lend any support either for mystical conceptions of mysterious “energies” related to brain function or paranor­ mal phenomena. Of course, true believers will not be discouraged by these facts, but they can indeed make a difference for those who think that keep­ ing an open mind does not mean to be blind and deaf to scientific evidence. (Saravi, 1999, p. 58)

Brain boosters Beyerstein (1999b) has spent many years studying pseudo‐scientists and writes with great panache about them. He notes:

Pseudoscientists have learned that an effective way to amass cash and con­ verts is to begin with an uncontroversial claim from a respected branch of science and to proceed by imperceptible steps to stretch it to absurd but lucrative proportions. Looking for something to add sizzle to their sales pitches, New Age huck­ sters are repackaging shopworn with cheap mysticism and giving it a gloss of scientific respectability claiming unearned affiliation with neuroscience. I describe the emergence of this trend which began with the self‐improvement messiahs of the 19th century who saw the profit potential in tying threadbare positive thinking platitudes to the rapidly developing science of brain research. Their descendants, and those of their ever‐hopeful clientele, continue to populate the fringes of that segment of the New Age marketing empire known as “the human potential movement.” (Beyerstein, 1999b, p. 61)

Beyerstein (1999b) examined the recent fascination with brain boosters. He notes that products break roughly into three categories: (1) devices that passively record brain waves in the hope that informing people about their status will teach trainees to produce the allegedly beneficial ones at will; (2) devices that attempt to alter brain activity directly by delivering trains of pulsating stimuli; and (3) so‐called smart cocktails, nutritional supplements that are supposed to improve brain functioning by increasing the availability of the raw materials used by the brain’s chemical pathways. 18 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

It seems abundantly clear from Beyerstein’s analysis that claims made for brain boosters are completely unfounded. He concludes:

The desire for self‐improvement and deeper understanding are two of our most noble human aspirations. Unfortunately, these commendable attrib­ utes go hand in hand with some other prevalent human traits – among them, our penchant for wishful thinking, self‐delusion, and grasping for quick fixes. Jumping to congenial, comforting conclusions is something we all do to those who manage to claw their way to these plateaux – guarantee that anyone promising a shortcut will soon attract a large following, whether deserved or not…There is, as we have seen, nothing new in the New Age. Its core beliefs are…traceable at least as far back as the mystery cults of the pre‐Socratic Greeks. New Agers’ criteria for truth are emotional rather than empirical – if it feels good, it must be true….The New Age movement dif­ fers from its predecessors only in the modern‐sounding jargon it chooses for restarting many of these ancient dogmas. The movement is primarily a mar­ keting umbrella that combines numerous threads of ancient magical belief with the modern fascination with the latest in technology. (Beyerstein, 1999b, p. 68)

There are many other demonstrably false assertions about mind and brain. The idea of dualism in ancient philosophy studies the mind–body problem and argues that the spiritual mind and the physical body (includ­ ing the brain) are separate but interrelated entities. Supportive examples such as near‐death and out‐of‐body experiences are used to reinforce the dualistic notion of humans, but critics have nonetheless questioned the reliability of these self‐reported and subjective experiences. Some of the currently fashionable myths include recovered memories and sleep learning. An area that has attracted much mythology as well as research into its causes is . Gilhooly (1999) reviewed various “fast‐track” methods to engender creativity: brainstorming, morphological synthesis, and so forth. He concluded that we know creativity is explicable in terms of everyday (not special) cognitive processes marshaled in a goal‐directed way (as opposed to blue‐sky research) over long periods of time (not sud­ denly). Creativity does not require special innate talents so much as knowledge acquisition. Further, “fast‐track” methods are of limited use in large‐scale, real‐life creative problem solving compared with extensive trial‐and‐error search (Gilhooly, 1999, p. 155). There has also been nonsense written about aging (and how to reduce its effects), and and what it (miraculously) can achieve. However, scientists have been active in researching and revealing multifarious aspects of deception, showing many miraculous findings to be explicable in terms of placebos and magicians’ secrets. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 19

2.3 Myths about Happiness

For decades, mythical beliefs have continuously bothered psychologists in their line of work. Common misunderstandings include psychologists’ area of research interests. Nowadays it is believed that one best under­ stands how a normal process works when it goes wrong. That is, one understands how the kitchen clock works only when one has to fix it.

Psychologists do not study health; they study illness. They do not study happiness; they study depression. They do not study marriage; they study divorce. But recently psychologists have given up this rather bleak approach and have dared to research such things as health and happiness. In doing so they have exposed various myths. (Eysenck, 1990)

●● “Happiness depends on the quality and quantity of pleasurable events that happen to one.” Alas, the effect of such events is often transient; worse, they make subsequent events that are only moderately pleasurable appear uninteresting in comparison. A person enjoys pleasures because he or she is happy, not vice versa. Happiness is not the result of ever more vivid jabs of excitement. It can be the result of extremely hum­ drum activities such as stamp collecting or bird watching. ●● “Modern stressful living has made people less happy than in previous times.” This is not 20:20 hindsight but rather a view of the past through rose‐tinted spectacles. It involves selectively poverty, disease, and primitive technology. People in advanced (and supposedly stressed) Western societies are generally happier than those in underdeveloped countries. It is the way you live, not your standard of living, that counts most, however. ●● “Those with serious physical disabilities are less happy than other people.” Whilst sudden or creeping (acute vs. chronic) disability does induce depression, studies on quadriplegics have shown that the level of hap­ piness soon recovers and that disability is no handicapper of happiness. Great beauty, physical strength or robust health are not themselves causes of happiness. ●● “Young people in their prime of life with few responsibilities are happier than older people.” In fact, contentment and satisfaction tend to increase with age. The young have stronger levels of positive and negative affect (), but the balance is the same. Young people ride on a more 20 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

daring rollercoaster of emotion and many thrive on this. They tend to call the flat sections “boring.” ●● “People who experience great happiness also experience great unhappi- ness.” This is a popular oversimplification. Being neurotic tends to lead to great highs and lows, but for the most part people do not swing widely between the two extremes. And you certainly do not have to “pay” for happiness with periods of unhappiness. ●● “Intelligent people are happier than unintelligent people.” As academics, we can confidently confirm that this is completely untrue; indeed, the opposite may even be the case. More intelligent people tend to have higher (and more difficult to achieve) aspirations and to worry about things (the arms race, the of life) over which they have no control. Ordinary, “boring” people do not agonize over the meaning of life and may be all the better for it. ●● “Children usually add significantly to the happiness of a married couple.” Again, the opposite is true, particularly for married women. We can be pretty certain that the presence of children reduces happiness because most married couples become happier again as soon as all of their chil­ dren have left the nest. But there is a strong biological need to procre­ ate which can withstand the years of parenting. ●● “Winning a fortune ensures happiness.” Studies of pools winners show that, for many, the disruption causes the opposite. Loss of friends through jealousy, persistent begging letters, and so on can often lead to despair. People soon adapt to their wealth and move in new circles where, by comparison, they are not rich at all. Curiously, most working people who adjust best to their fortune are not those who “spend, spend, spend” but those who invest it and continue much as before. As with illness and disability, levels of happiness after winning a large sum of money soon return to earlier levels. There are happy and unhappy millionaires. ●● “Men are happier than women because it is a man’s world.” In fact, there is precious little difference between men and women, although young women tend to be slightly unhappier than young men, and the oppo­ site is true from middle age onwards. Again, the so‐called benefits of being a man do not and cannot ensure happiness. ●● “Pursuing happiness directly is the surest way to lose it – it occurs in a natural way and cannot be produced to order by thinking about it.” Indeed, the opposite again is true – anything can be done more effec­ tively and achieved more rapidly when we possess the relevant knowl­ edge. At least knowing what does not cause happiness prevents us pursuing it pointlessly. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 21

●● “Happiness is a superficial goal to pursue.” For some who belong to the muscular Christianity school of chin up and buckle down, happiness per se is a fruitless goal. They argue it is better to strive for solid work achievements. Happiness is also linked with physical health and predic­ tive of longevity. As unhappiness can kill you, it can hardly be seen as a trivial aim. ●● “Happiness is a fleeting experience, an ephemeral state.” But we know from longitudinal research that the degree of happiness is stable over time. It is linked to personality and, despite some misconceptions, this changes relatively little over time. Happiness can be attained by adopt­ ing an outlook and lifestyle and can be permanent. ●● “Marriage tends to reduce happiness.” Again, the opposite is true, particularly for men. Despite the high divorce rate the figures are very clear. Overall, married people are much happier than unmarried people.

To many people, the stars of the media, the sports field, and the confer­ ence table appear not only extremely well adapted, but also very happy. Their press agents and hagiographic autobiographies often strive to create the same impression. And this leads ordinary people to believe that money, good looks, power, and physical prowess are the key ingredients of happi­ ness. They are wrong. Popular idols and figures also have their problems. They are neither ecstatically happy nor depressed. Indeed, the trappings of wealth, power, and fame are just that: “traps and prisons,” not nirvanas. The fact is that ordinary folk are just as happy.

2.4 Modern Myths of Popular Psychology

Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, and Beyerstein (2011) highlight the 50 great myths of popular psychology. We are surrounded by popular psychology, which is referred to in the news, on television, and in films. The Internet and bookshops give us access to psychological insights into understanding our lives, offering things such as self‐help options, and advice on relation­ ships and addiction. Sadly, though, much of the available literature is rife with misconceptions and myths, and people become misinformed about psychology. Those proclaiming themselves as gurus and mental health experts, offering psychological advice online or on television, often dis­ perse information that is full of flaws. This information is often taken on board by the general public as it fits into the broad view of human nature and is plausible. 22 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Lilienfeld et al. (2011) suggest how the following ways influence us to believe popular psychology myths.

1. Word‐of‐mouth: Incorrect beliefs about psychology are spread by ver­ bal communication. The fact that we’ve heard a piece of information over and over again does not mean that it is correct. However, we often confuse a statement’s familiarity with its accuracy. 2. Selective perception and memory: Our perception of reality is altered by our biases and expectations, with our interpretations being impacted upon by our beliefs. The majority of us are unaware of distorted per­ ceptions; this is termed naïve realism. Our past experiences impact upon our judgments of frequency, and we overestimate the occur­ rence of things that have occurred previously. 3. Exposure to a biased sample: We are presented with a biased view of populations. One study found that 75% of mentally ill individuals depicted on television had violent tendencies, whereas in fact the actual rate of violence among such individuals is much lower. Such skewed coverage may lead ordinary people to believe that individuals with mental illnesses are aggressive and dangerous. Psychotherapists are also presented with a biased sample of the general population. They have skewed views, for example that it is extremely difficult for an individual to quit smoking without formal psychological help, due to the chronic sample with which they interact. 4. Misleading media portrayals: The media often describes mental ill­ nesses and treatments as being more sensational than they are. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), for example, has been depicted as dangerous and ruthless. Yet today, ECT is an increasingly safe treat­ ment method.

50 great myths and why they are false This section is based on the work of Lilienfeld et al. (2011).

Myths about the brain and perception 1. Most people use only 10% of their brain power. As discussed above, research shows that there is not a single area that can be destroyed in the brain without leaving stroke or head trauma patients with serious functioning deficits. One paper noted a Florida woman who had lost 50% of her cerebrum through oxygen deprivation and lay in a vegeta­ tive state for 15 years. Such instances highlight that our whole brain is necessary for normal functioning. It is suggested that this myth is so “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 23

popular because it is comforting, as individuals may attribute their lack of success to not having full use of their brilliant brain. 2. Some people are left‐brained, others are right‐brained. Each half of the brain differs in which mental activities it can perform relatively better than the other. The two halves of the brain differ in how they process information rather than in what they process. The left hemisphere is relatively better at processing grammar, while the right hemisphere is better at considering the emphases of speech. In a normal functioning brain, the two hemispheres communicate extensively during the majority of tasks in an integrated fashion. 3. Extrasensory perception (ESP) is a well‐established scientific phenome- non. Belief in psychic abilities and ESP is widespread throughout modern society, with 41% of adults studied believing in ESP. The US government attempted to employ such abilities in their Stargate pro­ gram of 1972, intending to acquire militarily useful information from people in distant, inaccessible places. However, this was discontinued in 1995 due to lack of success. Further, studies have been conducted for over 150 years that have attempted, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate the existence of ESP. Beliefs in such paranormal phenomena exist as a result of the need to believe in something greater than ourselves lying beyond our conscious senses. 4. Visual are accompanied by tiny emissions from the eyes. One study found that 30% of participants said that the eyes emit rays or particles enabling them to see. Winer and Cottrell (1996) highlight that we often describe people as giving us a “piercing stare” or a “cut­ ting look.” It may be that people overgeneralize such metaphors and take them literally, believing that the eye outputs energy. 5. Subliminal messages can persuade people to purchase products. Information outside of our conscious awareness can influence our judgments; however, this is different to the subliminal processing envisioned by pop psychology. Much research has investigated efforts to prime consumers into purchasing and the failure of unconscious attempts to do this, with no evidence suggesting that subliminal mes­ sages can influence consumer behavior.

Other brain and perception myths to explore:

●● We need a full brain to function effectively. ●● Modern humans have larger brains than Neanderthals. ●● Areas of activation on brain scans mean that brain regions are becom­ ing more active. 24 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● “Alpha consciousness” is associated with states of relaxation. ●● Adult humans don’t grow new neurons. ●● As adults, we lose about 100,000 neurons each day. ●● Blind people have especially well‐developed senses of hearing and touch. ●● Blind people can detect obstacles at a distance by sensing heat and pressure on their foreheads. ●● A coma is a state of deep sleep. ●● We can “awaken” people from comas by playing their favorite songs. ●● Biofeedback is a uniquely effective means of reducing tension. ●● Humans have an invisible “body energy” that can cause psychological problems when blocked. ●● Alcohol kills brain cells. ●● Alcohol’s primary effect is stimulating the brain. ●● Alcohol enhances sexual arousal. ●● One can always detect alcohol on the breath. ●● Alcohol promotes sleep. ●● Alcohol warms up the body. ●● It’s easier to get drunk at high altitudes, such as while flying in an ­airplane. ●● Impaired judgment after drinking occurs only after obvious signs of intoxication. ●● Drinking coffee is a good way to sober up after heavy drinking. ●● A cold shower or exercise is a good way to sober up after heavy drinking. ●● Switching among different types of alcohol is more likely to lead to drunkenness than sticking to one type of alcohol. ●● One can’t become an alcoholic by drinking beer only. ●● There’s good evidence that people who smoke marijuana for many years end up apathetic. ●● Most people with brain injury look and act disabled. ●● Following a head injury, the best prescription is rest. ●● A head injury can’t produce brain damage unless the person is knocked unconscious. ●● Prefrontal lobotomies (more popularly called “lobotomies”) turn peo­ ple into human “vegetables.” ●● Humans have five senses. ●● Most color‐blind people see the world in black and white. ●● Dogs see the world in black and white. ●● Reading in dim light can ruin our eyesight. ●● The human tongue’s tastes can be described as a “map” of four tastes. ●● Consuming ice cream or other cold substances too quickly causes pain in our brains. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 25

●● Magnets, like those embedded in shoe insoles, can reduce pain. ●● Eating lots of turkey can make us tired.

Myths about development and aging 6. Playing Mozart to infants boosts their . Students who listen to 10 minutes of a Mozart piano sonata were found to significantly improve on a spatial reasoning task compared to a group who lis­ tened to a relaxation tape or silence. However, the experiment docu­ mented only short‐term impacts and related to college students, not infants. The media has reported extensively on this effect, and has applied it to groups that have not been empirically investigated, for example elementary school and high school students, despite repli­ cations of the original study reporting either no effect or a minimal one. It has instead been suggested that short‐term arousal resulting from listening to Mozart is in fact the causal factor, with stimuli that heighten arousal increasing performance on demanding tasks. 7. Adolescence is inevitably a time of psychological turmoil. Books and films focus more on troubled stories of unhappy adolescents and their , presenting the public with a biased representation of teenagers. Adolescents are at somewhat elevated risk for difficulties with parents, mood instability, and engaging in risky behavior. It is not typical for adolescents to go through such experiences. 8. Most people experience a midlife crisis in their 40s or early 50s. Erikson (1968) observed that in middle adulthood, many people struggle to find purpose and meaning in their lives, and go about “correcting” their flaws. However, Shek (1996) conducted a cross‐cultural study that did not find dissatisfaction in the majority of middle‐aged men and women. Further, a study of 7,195 participants concluded that those between the ages of 40 and 60 felt more in control of their lives and higher well‐being than in the 10 years previous. 9. Old age is typically associated with increased dissatisfaction and senility. There is generally a negative stereotype about the elderly, with 65% of participants agreed that “most older people are lonely and isolated.” An investigation into Disney children’s films led to the finding that 42% of elderly characters are portrayed negatively, displaying traits such as anger and forgetfulness. However, this is not the case. One study found that participants over the age of 60 were actually happier than were those between 21 and 40 years old. Furthermore, the group of people documented as being happiest were men aged 65 and older. 10. When dying, people pass through a universal series of psychological stages. The six stages of grief, denial, anger, bargaining, depression, 26 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

and acceptance were popularized by Kübler‐Ross (1969) and were intended to describe the stages that people pass through when dying. Unfortunately, Kübler‐Ross’s theory is based on subjective observa­ tions and measurements of emotions that were not standardized. Dying people may pass through stages in different orders. Many ter­ minally ill individuals may skip stages, or even pass them in reverse order. Dal Bello‐Haas, Del Bene, and Mitsumoto (2002) highlight that some patients initially accept their impending death, and later enter denial. Dealing with death is not as simple as initially proposed.

Other development and aging myths to explore:

●● A mother’s bad mood can lead to miscarriage. ●● The first few minutes following birth are crucial for effective parent– infant bonding. ●● The first three years are especially critical to infant development. ●● Children given a great deal of physical encouragement and support walk earlier than other children. ●● Newborn babies are virtually blind and deaf. ●● Infants establish attachment bonds only to their mothers. ●● Mothers who talk to their children in baby talk (“motherese”) slow down their language development. ●● Children exposed prenatally to crack cocaine (“crack babies”) develop severe personality and neurological problems in later life. ●● Young children almost never lie. ●● Overweight children are just carrying “baby fat” that will melt away as they grow older. ●● Adoption takes a negative psychological toll on most children. ●● Children raised by gay parents have higher rates of homosexuality than other children. ●● Marital satisfaction increases after couples have children. ●● People need less sleep as they get older. ●● A large percentage of the elderly live in nursing homes. ●● Older people are more afraid of death than younger people. ●● Almost all senile people suffer from Alzheimer’s disease. ●● Excessive aluminum causes Alzheimer’s disease. ●● Many people die of “old age.” ●● Terminally ill people who have given up all hope tend to die shortly thereafter. ●● Terminally ill people can often “postpone” their deaths until after hol­ idays, birthdays, or other personally significant days. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 27

Myths about memory 11. Human memory works like a tape recorder or video camera, and accurately records the events we’ve experienced. Our memories are, in fact, not true replicas of past events. We do experience flashbulb memories of extremely emotional or salient events that stand out to us and seem to be precise. Yet even flashbulb memories of events such as 9/11 are prone to distortions, as with all memories. It is proposed that our memories are blurred by our personal beliefs, needs, and emotions. 12. Hypnosis is useful for retrieving memories of forgotten events. It is widely believed that hypnosis has memory‐enhancing powers. Yapko (1994) documented that 75% of people agree that hypnosis enables people to “accurately remember things they otherwise would not.” However, forensic psychologists now take the view that hypnosis either has no effect on memory (Erdelyi, 1994), or can in fact distort . Worryingly, hypnosis has also been found to increase unwar­ ranted confidence in those memories recalled (Green, Lynn, & Malinoski, in press), and thus can be very misleading and have nega­ tive impacts if used in court cases, such as incorrect conviction. 13. Individuals commonly repress the memories of traumatic experiences. Psychologists and psychiatrists use the term dissociative to describe the inability to remember stressful or traumatic events that can’t be explained as normal forgetting (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). McNally (2003) suggests that, instead of repress­ ing and actively forgetting disturbing instances, those that occurred in childhood could be recalled through the realization in adult life that it was in fact an instance of abuse. Piper (1997) highlights the fact that failure to report an event does not mean that an individual has repressed it. It may be that individuals need several prompts to recall embarrassing information, after failing to report it in the first place. 14. Most people with amnesia forget all details of their earlier lives. Films depicting those with amnesia often tell the story of people who have lost all memories from their past, yet have no difficulty learning new things. Yet those suffering from true amnesia are faced more with the problem of , or loss of memory for new infor­ mation, and thus have problems forming new memories. Patients may also suffer – loss of memory of the past – but this is not the main problem. A patient known as H.M. who under­ went brain surgery in an attempt to halt his severe epilepsy became virtually incapable of remembering recent events, being unable to recall people he had met 5 minutes earlier, for example. 28 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Other memory myths to explore:

●● The memory of everything we’ve experienced is stored permanently in our brains, even if we can’t access all of it. ●● Some people have true “photographic memories.” ●● With effort, we can remember events back to birth. ●● Memory is chemically transferable. ●● The of memory is only a problem for preschoolers. ●● People who can’t recall what they had for lunch yesterday have a poor “short‐term memory.” ●● Rote memorization is the best way to retain information. ●● Almost all forgetting is due to decay of information in our brains. ●● Ginkgo and other herbal remedies improve memory in normal indi­ viduals.

Myths about intelligence and learning 15. Intelligence (IQ) tests are biased against certain groups of people. It has been suggested that IQ tests favor white males. This does not reflect a bias in IQ tests, rather that groups do in fact differ in a particular trait. Reassuringly, the issue has been empirically tested. Authors confirm that there is no evidence that IQ tests underpredict the performance of women or minorities, and modern authors support this finding. 16. If you’re unsure of your answer when taking a test, it’s best to stick with your initial hunch. Between 68% and 100% of college students believe that their total score will not be improved by changing their initial answers. Yet research demonstrates that changing your origi­ nal answer on a multiple choice paper is more likely to increase your final score, with those who change more answers tending to score higher than other students. 17. The defining feature of dyslexia is reversing letters. Many people’s per­ ceptions of dyslexia are that those with the condition literally see letters backward. Interestingly, backward writing and letter reversals are evi­ dent in young children learning to write and spell, not just in those with dyslexia. Further, reversing letters is only one issue that dyslexic children suffer with, and are not the defining feature of the condition. 18. Students learn best when teaching styles are matched to their learning styles. Much research has been carried out into matching teaching and learning styles, with many studies failing to support this approach. It is suggested that this is due to the finding that some teaching styles reap more successful results than others, regardless of students’ learning style. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 29

Other intelligence and learning myths to explore:

●● Extremely intelligent people are more physically frail than other people. ●● IQ scores almost never change over time. ●● IQ scores are unrelated to school performance. ●● and other standardized tests are highly coachable. ●● There’s a close link between genius and insanity. ●● Mental retardation is one condition. ●● Most mentally retarded individuals are severely retarded. ●● There is no association between brain size and IQ. ●● Women are worse drivers than men. ●● Creative breakthroughs occur in sudden bursts of insight. ●● Very high levels of motivation usually help when solving difficult problems. ●● Negative is a type of punishment. ●● Punishment is a highly effective means of changing long‐term behavior. ●● The best means of maintaining a behavior is to reward every response. ●● B. F. Skinner raised his daughter in a “Skinner box,” contributing to her psychosis in later life. ●● Small class sizes consistently promote better student achievement. ●● Grouping students in classes by their ability levels promotes learning. ●● Holding immature or underperforming students back a grade can be helpful. ●● Standardized test scores don’t predict later grades. ●● Direct and immediate feedback is the best means of ensuring long‐ term learning. ●● “Discovery learning” (in which students must discover scientific prin­ ciples on their own) is superior to direct instruction. ●● The standardized test scores of US students have been declining in recent decades. ●● Students typically recall only 10% of what they read. ●● Speed reading courses are effective. ●● Subvocalizing increases reading ability. ●● Deaf people can understand most of what other people say by reading lips. ●● Some people “speak in tongues.” ●● Many identical twins have their own private language. ●● had dyslexia.

Myths about consciousness 19. Hypnosis is a unique “trance” state that differs in kind from wakeful- ness. Many explanations regarding hypnosis have been put forward, including the idea that when hypnotized, people are in a sleep‐like 30 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

state in which they lose their willpower and are unable to remember what has happened. Research shows that the majority of the public accept as fact media portrayals and myths that the hypnotized state is quite different from waking consciousness. However, studies have found that hypnotized people are somewhat in control, and can resist and even deny suggestions under hypnosis. Hypnotized people have also been shown not to act out of character when under hypnosis or following hypnosis, despite media suggestions. 20. Researchers have demonstrated that dreams possess symbolic meaning. Forty‐three percent of Americans believe that dreams reflect their unconscious desire. These beliefs have stemmed from Freud’s idea that dreams contain symbols relating to the dreamer’s unconscious desires. Yet scientists reject the suggestion that dream images carry universal symbolic meaning. Hobson, Pace‐Schott, and Stickgold (2000) propose that REM (rapid eye movement) dreams are our brain’s attempt to formulate a story from the random firing of brain areas during sleep, and thus do not contain meaning. 21. People can learn new information, like new languages, while asleep. Sleep‐assisted learning is discussed widely in the media and in books. A review of studies showing encouraging results relating to learning while sleeping has highlighted that such studies did not control for a key factor: whether the participant was awake. It may be that partici­ pants were actually awake when listening to the tapes. Studies that have controlled for sleeping by monitoring brain waves found little evidence for sleep‐assisted learning. 22. During “out‐of‐body” experiences, people’s consciousness leaves their bodies. Out‐of‐body experiences (OBEs) have been reported widely across cultures. Yet scientific research suggests that it is not possible for our consciousness to leave our bodies. A hypothesis explaining the experience proposes that an OBE is the disconnection between a person’s sense of self and his or her sensations. Blanke and Thut (2007) instead argue that OBEs are the result of different brain areas failing to integrate information from a number of senses. Scientists have managed to successfully induce OBEs by stimulating the tem­ poral lobe. This suggests that our consciousness does not actually leave our physical body, despite the subjective feeling that it does.

Other myths about consciousness to explore:

●● Relaxation is necessary for hypnosis to occur. ●● People are unaware of their surroundings during hypnosis. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 31

●● People have no memory of what took place while hypnotized. ●● Most modern hypnotists use a swinging watch to induce a hypnotic state. ●● Some hypnotic inductions are more effective than others. ●● People who respond to many hypnotic suggestions are gullible. ●● Hypnosis can lead people to perform immoral acts they wouldn’t o­therwise perform. ●● Hypnosis allows people to perform acts of great physical strength or skill. ●● People can’t lie under hypnosis. ●● The primary determinant of hypnosis is the skill of the hypnotist. ●● People can remain permanently “stuck” in hypnosis. ●● Extremely high levels of motivation can allow people to fire‐walk over burning hot coals. ●● Dreams occur in only a few seconds, although they take much longer to recount later. ●● Our brains “rest” during sleep. ●● Sleeping pills are a good long‐term treatment for insomnia. ●● “Counting sheep” helps people to fall asleep. ●● Falling asleep the moment one’s head hits the pillow is a sign of a healthy sleeper. ●● Many people never dream. ●● Most dreams are about sex. ●● Most dreams are bizarre in content. ●● People dream only in black and white. ●● Blind people don’t dream. ●● If we dream that we die, we actually die. ●● Dreams only occur during REM sleep. ●● People can use lucid dreaming to improve their mental adjustment. ●● Most sleepwalkers are acting out their dreams; most sleeptalkers are verbalizing them. ●● Sleepwalking is harmless. ●● Sleepwalking is associated with deep‐seated psychological problems. ●● Waking a sleepwalker is dangerous. ●● Transcendental meditation is a uniquely effective means of achieving relaxation.

Myths about emotion and motivation 23. The polygraph (“lie detector”) test is an accurate means of detecting dishonesty. Polygraph machines record a measure of physiological activity, including skin conductance and respiration. However, interpreting such charts as indicators of lying is notoriously difficult. 32 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

We all differ in our physiological activity. A person who sweats more than another person could be identified as lying, while someone who sweats less could be judged truthful. Furthermore, Lykken (1998) highlights that there is no evidence for a physiological reaction indica­ tive of lying. The “lie detector” is in fact simply an arousal detector. 24. Happiness is determined mostly by our external circumstances. Eysenck (1990) suggested that happiness is directly related to the number of positive life events and individual experiences. However, Diener and Seligman (2002) compared participants who were found to be the happiest 10% and the least happy 10%, and concluded that those happy individuals had not experienced more positive events such as doing well in exams. Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2004) found instead that women’s sleep quality and prone­ ness toward depression were more highly correlated with daily hap­ piness than were life circumstances including income and job satisfaction. Genes are thought to influence happiness more than experience. Lykken and Tellegen (1996) found ratings of happiness to be much more similar between identical twins than non‐identical twins, who only share half of their genes. 25. Ulcers are caused primarily or entirely by stress. Warren and Marshall (1983) looked into this area, discovering a bacterium (H. pylori) that was found in people with ulcers but not in those without. The use of antibiotics in people with ulcers decreases the recurrence of ulcers by 90–95%, providing strong evidence for causation. 26. A positive attitude can stave off . Many have taken the view that positive attitudes can slow down the progression of cancer, and thus stressed people may be inflicting cancer on themselves. However, most empirical studies find no link between stress and cancer. It has even been found that people who have more stressful lives are less likely to develop cancer. Support groups enhancing positive attitudes have been found to improve cancer sufferers’ quality of life, but not to extend their lives.

Other myths about emotion and motivation to explore:

●● Voice stress analyzers can help to detect lying. ●● “Positive thinking” is better than negative thinking for all people. ●● If we’re upset about something, we should just try to put it out of our minds. ●● Women have better social intuition than men. ●● People are especially sad on Mondays. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 33

●● People who are prone to good moods tend to have fewer bad moods than other people. ●● Most women’s moods worsen during their premenstrual periods. ●● Living in modern Western society is much more stressful than living in undeveloped countries. ●● Being placed in control of a stressful situation causes ulcers. ●● Familiarity breeds contempt: We dislike things we’ve been exposed to frequently. ●● Extreme fear can turn our hair white. ●● Sex makes advertisements more effective. ●● Women have a “G‐spot,” a vaginal area that intensifies sexual arousal. ●● Men think about sex on average every 7 seconds. ●● Beauty is entirely in the eye of the beholder. ●● People who are most distinctive in certain physical features are typically viewed as most attractive by others. ●● Athletes shouldn’t have sex prior to a big game. ●● Exposure to pornography increases aggression. ●● Most children who frequently “play doctor” or masturbate were s­exually abused.

Myths about interpersonal behavior 27. Opposites attract: We are most romantically attracted to people who differ from us. Films, books, and television programs often tell the story of opposites falling in love. However, many studies find that people who are more similar in personality traits are more likely to be attracted to each other than those with differing personality traits. Similarity of per­ sonality traits is also a good predictor of marital stability and happiness. 28. There’s safety in numbers: The more people present at an emergency, the greater the chance that someone will intervene. There are a number of stories where an individual has been in need of help and a large num­ ber of people have failed to intervene. Kitty Genovese, for example, was stabbed to death in 1964 in New York, in full view of 38 eyewit­ nesses, none of whom chose to act. Latané and Darley (1968) pro­ pose two reasons for such happenings. (1) If no one else is reacting to a situation, we mistakenly assume that it is not an emergency. (2) Even if it is established that an emergency is occurring, if others are present, this decreases our personal responsibility for the negative consequences of not assisting. Interestingly, Gergen (1973) found that learning about the bystander effect actually decreases the chance of people failing to help in such situations. 34 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

29. Men and women communicate in completely different ways. Much of the media currently highlights the differences between men and women. There are books offering guidance for communicating, and films suggest this is commonplace. Yet empirical research shows that differences between the sexes are minimal. In a meta‐analysis, Hyde (2005) found a minimal overall difference between men and women with regards to talkativeness and the disclosure of personal informa­ tion. This suggests men and women only communicate slightly dif­ ferently. Hall (1984) concludes that women were just slightly better at detecting and differentiating emotions than were men. 30. It’s better to express anger to others than hold it in. There is a general consensus that releasing anger is healthier than letting it build up. This stems from Freud’s proposal that repressed anger can accumu­ late until it eventually impacts upon your mental health. Freud sug­ gested that such negative feelings should be vented through catharsis, releasing the anger, in order to live happily. However, studies have shown that expressing anger actually makes a person more aggressive. Violent video games, which are suggested to have a cathartic effect, are also associated with increased aggression both inside the lab and in daily life.

Other myths about interpersonal behavior to explore:

●● Large groups make less extreme decisions than individuals. ●● Crowding consistently leads to more aggression. ●● People’s attitudes are highly predictive of their behaviors. ●● “Brainstorming” new ideas in groups works better than asking people to generate ideas of their own. ●● High levels of anger in marriage are highly predictive of divorce. ●● Poverty and poor education are major causes of terrorism, especially suicide bombings. ●● Most members of cults are mentally disturbed. ●● The best way to change someone’s attitude is to give him or her a large reward to do so. ●● Rewarding people for creative work always strengthens their motiva­ tion to produce more creative work. ●● Basketball players shoot in “streaks.” ●● Playing hard to get is a good way of getting someone interested in you romantically. ●● When Kitty Genovese was murdered in New York City in 1964, no one came to her aid. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 35

Myths about personality 31. Raising children similarly leads to similarities in their adult personali- ties. Harris (1998) put forward the “nurture assumption,” propos­ ing that children brought up in the same way grow up to be similar to one another and to their parents. Children are found to be similar to their parents on the majority of personality traits, but this does not confirm Harris’s proposal; it may be that genes are playing a role. Tellegen et al. (1988) confirms this, finding that identical twins reared apart are as similar in personality characteristics as identical twins raised together. Segal (1999) supports the impact of genes further, finding that unrelated children raised in the same adoptive are surprisingly different in terms of personality. 32. The fact that a trait is heritable means we can’t change it. Many authors have implied that heritable traits are difficult or impossi­ ble to alter. Heritability is defined in percentages. If a characteris­ tic is 0% heritable all differences in the trait are entirely determined by the environment, and if it is 100% heritable then all differences are defined by genetics. The majority of personality traits are 60% heritable. Nevertheless, however heritable a trait is does not mean we cannot modify it. Instead, a high heritability means that cur­ rent environmental factors impact minimally on individual differ­ ences in a trait. The figure does not relate to the potential effects of new environments. We can also treat heritable conditions. Phenylketonuria (PKU) is 100% heritable and means carriers can­ not break down the amino acid phenylalanine. Those with PKU can avoid the negative symptoms (mental retardation) by exclud­ ing phenylalanine from their diets, thus modifying the effects of the heritable trait. 33. Low self‐esteem is a major cause of psychological problems. Many hold the view that low self‐esteem is linked to several psychological issues, including violence, depression, anxiety, and alcoholism. Yet a large meta‐review of 15,000 studies relating to this claim found that self‐ esteem is only minimally related to interpersonal success, and that self‐esteem is not related to smoking or drug abuse. Interestingly, aggressive children overestimate their popularity among their peers, implying that they had high self‐esteem. It may be that high self‐ esteem is not so beneficial either. 34. Most people who were sexually abused in childhood develop severe person- ality disturbances in adulthood. There is no doubt that a history of will impact upon the victim. However, Rind, Tromovitch, and Bauserman (1998) published findings stating that 36 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

the association between a history of child sexual abuse and adult psychopathology, including depression, anxiety, and eating disor­ ders, was weak. Further, the authors found that the relation between abuse and psychopathology was not heightened when the abuse was more frequent or more severe. Of those who were sexually abused in childhood who did suffer from later personality disturbances, no specific symptoms were found across victims. 35. People’s responses to inkblots tell us a great deal about their personali- ties. The Rorschach Inkblot Test, whereby people are presented with symmetrical shapes and asked to describe what they make out from them, has been used widely by clinicians, who believe it allows them to access unconscious thoughts and feelings. Yet scientific research offers virtually no support for the usefulness of such techniques. Wood, Lilienfeld, Garb, and Nezworski (2000) concluded that the majority of Rorschach scores are unrelated to personality traits, and also are only trivially related to a number of clinical disorders, includ­ ing depression and anxiety disorders. 36. Our handwriting reveals our personality traits. Graphology is a pseudo‐scientific practice referred to as “character reading.” Graphologists have views regarding people’s writing and propose that certain writing traits are related to personality factors; for exam­ ple, crossing t’s with “whip‐like lines” suggests a sadistic personality. Graphologists’ claims have been widely investigated. Klimoski (1992) found that those trained in graphology could not predict job performance better than chance. Dean (1992) performed a meta‐ analysis of many studies into the area, concluding that graphologists failed to predict either personality traits or work performance.

Other myths about personality to explore:

●● Astrology predicts people’s personality traits at better than chance levels. ●● People’s drawings can tell us a great deal about their personalities. ●● Positive self‐affirmations (“I like myself”) are a good way of boosting self‐esteem. ●● Most people who were physically abused in childhood go on to become abusers themselves (the “cycle of violence”). ●● There’s strong evidence for the concept of “national character.” ●● Obese people are more cheerful (“jollier”) than non‐obese people. ●● Open‐ended interviews are the best means of assessing personality. ●● A clinician’s number of years of experience using a pre­ dicts his or her accuracy in clinical judgments from this test. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 37

●● More information is always preferable to less information when making diagnostic judgments. ●● Anatomically correct dolls are a good way of determining whether a child has been sexually abused.

Myths about mental illness 37. Psychiatric labels cause harm by stigmatizing people. Rosenhan (1973) proposed that psychiatric diagnoses cause us to treat people with such labels negatively. Ruscio (2004) instead found that a number of studies support the suggestion that any negative behavior directed to those with mental disorders is a result of their abnormal behavior as opposed to the label given to them. Interestingly, adults have been found to rate children with mental disorders more favorably when they are aware that they have been diagnosed and labeled with a particular disorder. It may be that a label helps others to understand the reasoning behind an individual’s behavior and thus accept it. 38. Only deeply depressed people commit suicide. Between 13 and 41% of those who commit suicide do not meet the criteria to be diagnosed with major depression. Around 10% of those committing suicide instead have either schizophrenia or substance abuse (Rihmer, 2007). For reasons often unexplained, around 5–10% of people who commit suicide do so without having a at all. A number of these may be “rational suicides,” with the choice being made following careful thought in the lead‐up to a serious life event, e.g., terminal illness. 39. People with schizophrenia have multiple personalities. There is a mis­ conception that schizophrenia is characterized by having a “split per­ sonality.” Arieti (1968) investigated this view, concluding that those with schizophrenia do not have coexisting personalities. This is important as the mental disorder has numerous risks associated with it, such as heightened risk for suicide and clinical depression. Trivializing such a condition in the media and using lay terms can result in underestimations of the severity of schizophrenia, and reduce affected individuals’ urgency to seek treatment. 40. Adult children of alcoholics display a distinctive profile of symptoms. There is a profile of symptoms thought to be specific to those expe­ rienced by adult children of alcoholics (ACOAs). Yet Sher (1997) reviewed the symptoms thought to be associated with ACOAs and found little support for the syndrome. Further, specific symptoms associated with the profile, such as co‐dependency, have been inves­ tigated and little evidence was found to support that this trait exists 38 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

in ACOAs. Despite this, ACOAs are more likely to label themselves as being co‐dependent, possibly because they have been made aware of popular psychology relating this trait to ACOAs. 41. There’s recently been a massive epidemic of infantile autism. Autism, previously considered to be a rare condition, is now believed to affect around 1 in 150 people (Carey, 2007). Many have blamed vaccines containing the preservative thimerosal, as these are administered prior to children developing the disorder. However, a more plausible explanation of the increasing predominance of the disorder is the slackening of diagnostic practices. In 1980 the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) required patients to meet 6 of 6 criteria to be diagnosed, whereas the 1994 revision required meeting 8 of 16 criteria. The principles upon which autism is diagnosed have therefore become looser, resulting in increasing diagnoses of the condition. 42. Psychiatric hospital admissions and crimes increase during full moons. The “lunar effect” relates to the belief that the full moon is linked to a number of strange occurrences. Rotton and Kelly (1985) reviewed all literature in a meta‐analysis, allowing them to conclude that a full moon was not linked to murders, crimes, suicides or psychiatric hos­ pital admissions. More recent analyses of full moon effects have sup­ ported Rotton and Kelly’s findings, and have failed to associate the lunar effect with dog bites, emergency room visits, and heart attacks.

Other myths about mental illness to explore:

●● Psychiatric diagnoses are unreliable. ●● Most psychotic people in Western society would be viewed as “sha­ mans” in non‐Western cultures. ●● Hallucinations are almost always a sign of serious mental illness. ●● Most people with agoraphobia can’t leave their houses. ●● Most people who experience severe trauma, like military combat, develop post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). ●● The symptoms of PTSD were first observed following the Vietnam War. ●● Most phobias are traceable directly to negative experiences with the object of the fear. ●● People with fetishes are fascinated with certain objects. ●● Psychosomatic disorders are entirely in people’s heads. ●● People with hypochondriasis are typically convinced they’re suffering from many different illnesses. ●● Most people with anorexia have lost their appetite. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 39

●● All people with anorexia are female. ●● Eating disorders, especially anorexia and bulimia, are associated with a history of child sexual abuse. ●● Almost all people with Tourette’s syndrome curse. ●● The brains of children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are over‐aroused. ●● Autistic individuals have a particular talent for generating prime numbers. ●● All clinically depressed people suffer from extreme sadness. ●● Depressed people are less realistic than non‐depressed people. ●● Depression has been demonstrated to be due to a chemical imbalance in the brain. ●● Children cannot become seriously depressed. ●● The rates of depression in women increase dramatically during the postpartum period. ●● People with bipolar disorder, formerly called manic depression, all experience both depressed and manic episodes. ●● Suicide typically happens without warning. ●● Most people who commit suicide leave a suicide note. ●● People who talk a lot about suicide are extremely unlikely to commit it. ●● Asking people about suicide increases their risk for suicide. ●● Suicides are especially likely during the Christmas holidays. ●● Suicide is especially common during the dark days of winter. ●● The age group at highest risk for suicide is adolescents. ●● More women than men commit suicide. ●● Families play a major role in causing or triggering schizophrenia. ●● All people with catatonic schizophrenia are inactive, lying in a fetal position. ●● People with schizophrenia virtually never recover. ●● Virtually all people who use heroin become addicted to it.

Myths about psychology and the law 43. Most mentally ill people are violent. 75% of mentally ill people depicted in films are shown to be physically violent and aggressive, and cases relating to mentally ill individuals in the news focus on violent crimes. Research contradicts this portrayal, with mentally ill individuals without substance abuse disorders being no more likely to act v­iolently than other individuals. Ninety percent of those who are diagnosed with mental illnesses never commit a violent crime. 44. Criminal profiling is helpful in solving cases. Criminal profiling offers the police a description of an individual who has committed a crime in the hope that this assists in the capture of the criminal. However, 40 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

professional profilers have been found to be no better than an untrained individual at identifying the personality characteristics of a criminal from details regarding the crime. One study even found that experienced criminal profilers were actually less accurate at c­onstructing profiles than were chemistry graduates. 45. A large proportion of criminals successfully use the insanity defense. Pleading insanity means that a person cannot be held legally respon­ sible for a crime. The M’Naughten rule (used in the ) suggests this to be appropriate when an individual does not know what he or she is doing at the time of the crime, or does not know that this act is wrong. Most people believe that this defense is used regularly (in 37% of felony cases), but in fact it is used in less than 1% of US trials. The public believe that the defense is used around 40 times more than it is actually employed. 46. All people who confess to a crime are actually guilty of it. Many people have been known to falsely admit to high‐profile crimes (the kidnap­ ping of the son of world‐famous aviator Charles Lindbergh led to 200 people confessing). Reasonings behind such actions are the need for “self‐punishment” for real or imagined past mistakes, aiming to protect the true criminal, or because the person cannot differentiate between reality and fantasy. Those who make false ­confessions have been associated with a number of characteristics, such as being relatively young and suggestible, having a previous criminal history, and using illicit drugs.

Other myths about psychology and the law to explore:

●● Rehabilitation programs have no effect on the recidivism rates of criminals. ●● Most pedophiles (child abusers) have extremely high levels of recidivism. ●● All pedophiles are untreatable. ●● The best approach to treating delinquents is “getting tough” with them. ●● The overwhelming majority of acts of domestic violence are committed by men. ●● The rates of domestic abuse against women increase markedly on Super Bowl Sunday. ●● Being a postal worker is among the most dangerous of all occupations. ●● Most psychopaths are violent. ●● Most psychopaths are out of touch with reality. ●● Psychopaths are untreatable. ●● Serial killings are especially common among Whites.

www.ebook3000.com “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 41

●● Police officers have especially high rates of suicide. ●● There is an addictive personality. ●● Alcoholism is uniquely associated with denial. ●● Most rapes are committed by strangers. ●● Police psychics have proven useful in solving crimes. ●● Homicide is more common than suicide. ●● “Insanity” is a formal psychological and psychiatric term. ●● The legal determination of insanity is based on a person’s current m­ental state. ●● Most people who plead insanity are faking mental illness. ●● The insanity plea is a rich person’s defense.

Myths about psychological treatment 47. Expert judgment and intuition are the best means of making clinical decisions. Meehl (1954) identified two methods of decision making: the clinical method, relying on judgment and intuition, and the mechanical method, using a formal algorithm (sets of decision rules) to come to conclusions. One important study compared diagnosis of mental disorders between clinical and mechanical methods. The authors found that mechanical predictions are equally or more accu­ rate than clinical predictions. This included predictions regarding psychiatric diagnoses, predicting suicide attempts, and aspects such as predicting college performance. This has been attributed to decisions in the clinical method being made based on knowledge from cases learned or that have been dealt with, whereas the mechanical method uses a more representative sample or literature. Mental health profes­ sionals are found to place more emphasis on their personal experi­ ence than on incorporating wider findings into their diagnoses, and so mechanical predictions assign more valid weightings. 48. Abstinence is the only realistic treatment goal for alcoholics. Many believe that alcoholism is a progressive and incurable disease, and thus that abstinence is a necessary treatment goal for alcoholics. However, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA, 2006) found that 36% of 43,093 adults who had been alco­ holics at least a year prior to the survey were fully recovered; 17.7% of these could now drink alcohol in moderation, without abusing it. 49. All effective force people to confront the “root” causes of their problems in childhood. One of Freud’s most enduring sugges­ tions is that difficulties in life are the result of childhood experiences. However, memories from early years often give distorted insight into true events. Therefore, increasing numbers of psychotherapists are 42 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

placing less emphasis on uncovering childhood traumas. Many now take different routes; for example, behavioral therapists focus on current behaviors that are the cause of problems, and cognitive‐ behavioral therapists aim to alter irrational beliefs in their patients. 50. Electroconvulsive (“shock”) therapy (ECT) is a physically dangerous and brutal treatment. Many people assume that ECT is physically dangerous and psychologically harmful, and authors have found per­ ceptions that it is painful, causes nausea and vomiting, and destroys brain cells. Early forms of ECT were very different to modern‐day administrations, resulting in violent convulsions, broken bones, and shattered teeth. Patients receiving the treatment now are given a muscle relaxant and general anesthetic to prevent such injuries. The majority of research supports the therapy, and conclusions suggest that it is a helpful treatment for severe depression.

Other myths about psychological treatment to explore:

●● A psychologically caused disorder requires psychotherapy; a biologi­ cally caused disorder requires medication. ●● More experienced therapists tend to have much higher success rates than less experienced therapists. ●● Psychiatrists and psychologists are essentially identical. ●● The school of therapy is the best predictor of treatment effectiveness. ●● All people who call themselves psychotherapists have advanced degrees in mental health. ●● Most psychotherapy involves using a couch and exploring one’s early past. ●● Most modern therapies are based on the teachings of Sigmund Freud. ●● Psychotherapy did not exist prior to Freud. ●● Psychotherapies can only help, not hurt. ●● Most psychotherapies use empirically supported therapies. ●● Drug Resistance and Education (DARE) programs are effective. ●● People who have experienced a trauma must fully “process” the trauma to improve. ●● Psychotherapies that don’t address the deeper causes of problems result in symptom substitution. ●● Few people can quit smoking on their own. ●● Nicotine is far less addictive than other drugs. ●● Attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorder is caused by excess sugar in the diet. ●● Antidepressants greatly increase suicide risk. ●● Antidepressants often turn people into zombies. “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 43

●● Antidepressants are much more effective than psychotherapy for treating depression. ●● Most new antidepressants, like Prozac and Zoloft, are more effective than older antidepressants. ●● Placebos influence only our imagination, not our brains. ●● Herbal remedies are superior to antidepressants for improving mood. ●● The fact that a substance is “natural” means that it is safe. ●● Acupuncture works only if one inserts the needles in specific points in the body. ●● Electroconvulsive therapy is rarely administered today.

Having discussed myths that are widely believed yet false, it is interesting to acknowledge a number of findings that are true yet violate our intuitions (see Table 2.1). The following are widely supported by scientific research, unlike the 50 myths that have just been discussed (see Figure 2.1).

1. Our brains contain approximately 3 million miles of neural connec­ tions among our brain cells. (This length would cover the distance between the Earth and moon 12 times.) 2. Those who have suffered from severe language loss as a result of strokes to the left frontal lobes detect lies more accurately than those without brain damage. Lacking speech may result in the development of alternative skills to detect deception. 3. US census information shows that vast numbers of people live in places with names similar to their first names. There are significantly

Table 2.1 Percentage of myths thought true, false or unknown

No. of items % True % False % Don’t know

1 Brain and perception 37 44.0 40.0 16.0 2 Development and aging 23 42.8 42.4 14.8 3 Memory 9 39.1 39.9 21.0 4 Intelligence and learning 28 50.3 30.3 19.4 5 Consciousness 30 37.4 42.5 19.9 6 Emotion and motivation 19 51.3 35.3 13.4 7 Interpersonal behavior 12 50.7 30.5 18.8 8 Personality 10 50.8 29.4 19.8 9 Mental illness 35 40.0 38.3 25.7 10 Psychology and the law 21 36.8 38.0 25.2 11 Psychological treatment 25 34.7 41.7 25.6 Total 249 43.4 37.1 19.5

Source: Furnham & Hughes (2014). 44 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Much information is spread by word-of-mouth, and urban legends become widespread beliefs. So we should be skeptical about believing information that “everybody knows…”

Media coverage is often misleading. The preference to report interesting stories can lead us to misjudge the frequency of sensational cases.

Heuristics can lead us to come to incorrect conclusions. Aspects such as availability and representativeness heuristics (judging probability based on the information available) are useful shortcuts for quick decisions but cannot be relied upon.

Finding that two aspects are correlated does not mean that one causes the other.

Figure 2.1 Reasons why myths occur.

more Georges who live in Georgia than would be expected by chance, for example, as well as Louises living in Louisiana, and Virginias living in Virginia. This is suggested to be due to people gravitating to places that have a similar name to themselves, reflecting implicit egotism, whereby people unconsciously prefer things resembling them. 4. People’s handshakes have been found to reflect their personalities. Those with firm handshakes are more likely to be extraverts and emo­ tionally expressive, and less likely than average to be shy. 5. People who hold a pencil with their teeth, thus forming a smiling expression, have been found to consider cartoons funnier than people holding one with their lips, similar to a frowning expression. The facial feedback hypothesis explains this, suggesting that our facial muscles deliver feedback to our brains that influences our emotions.

The 50 false myths discussed above highlight that we must consider a number of factors when assessing the truthfulness of a “fact.” In essence, the 249 “other myths to explore” in Lilienfeld et al. (2011) are all suggested to be false, implying that participants were unable to spot false myths over 60% of the time. Furnham and Hughes (2014) also con­ cluded that psychology students were able to recognize more myths than the general public, but the effect sizes were small, suggesting that formal psychological education has limited success in alleviating psychological misunderstandings and misconceptions (see Figure 2.2). “Untangling” Myths and Psychological Realities 45

% True % False % Don’t know

Figure 2.2 Percentage of myths thought true, false or unknown (Furnham & Hughes, 2014).

2.5 Conclusion

There are many reasons why there are so many myths about psycho­ logy. There are journalists who prefer to simplify and sensationalize studies, so misrepresenting psychological findings. There are practitioners who, in an attempt to sell a wide variety of products, make dramatic and unsub­ stantiated claims about psychological processes. The study of beliefs in myths goes back over a century as academic psy­ chologists have been interested in establishing where people tend to hold erroneous views so that they can in time correct them.

Why does the number of mythical claims grow despite the advance of psychological knowledge? Many popular psychological myths are deeply rooted among the general public. This is largely because journalists and the media tend to cherry‐pick and oversimplify findings. The claim that we only use 10% of our brain is logically invalid but, despite psychologists’ con­ stant clarifications, people are still very much attached to such catchy claims. This leaves psychologists with a never‐ending responsibility to re‐educate the general public about the fallacy of these myths. 3 The Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology’s History and Development

3.1 Introduction

It is said that all psychology, as well as , has a long ­history, but a short past. This implies that, whereas people have discussed, debated, and described human behavior at least since the ancient Greeks, it was not until three‐quarters of the way through the 19th century that the discipline was dignified with academic departments, professors, text- books, and all the other paraphernalia of a recognized discipline. Some people, who were probably badly taught the subject at school, often complain that history is just about learning names and dates. Yet many also recognize that those who have no knowledge of their past are condemned never to learn from their mistakes. There are many ways to look at the history of psychology. It can be done by examining developments in certain areas like clinical or work psy- chology or specific countries or regions. However, by far the most popular method has been to look at the contribution of individual psychologists. In this chapter we summarize two very popular books that aimed to list all the major names in psychology and their central ideas. These are arranged in chronological order. There are of course a number of deci- sions to be made about who to include and exclude. People have their own preferences and prejudices, which means that they might favor a fel- low countryman or someone who shares a similar outlook and philosophy rather than an outsider who sees the world differently. For instance, many people would argue that or should be given credit for being the first (experimental) psychologist.

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 47

A few observations:

1. Nearly all the thinkers come from Europe (particularly Germany and Great Britain) and America. This may indicate more of a Western and ethnocentric view than the fact that people from the East or the Southern hemisphere have not made a contribution to psychology. 2. This is very much a look back and does not reflect the many dramatic and important changes that are taking place today.

Nevertheless, the list gives a sense of the sweep of psychology, of all the topics that have been considered over time.

3.2 The Psychology Thinkers and Their Ideas

The Psychology Book was published in 2012 (Benson et al., 2012). Subtitled Big Ideas Simply Explained, it has six contributors and eight sections that attempt to explain and describe all of psychology in terms of its major thinkers. The book provides a simple but comprehensive description of the whole topic. A second book that approaches this topic but in a rather different way is Key Thinkers in Psychology by the philosopher Rom Harré (2006). He chose to categorize various important thinkers into eight groups, depend- ing on their philosophy and particular interest. In this chapter we summarize these lists of thinkers and ideas, giving you a quick overview of most of the significant psychological theorists of all time.

Behaviorists Ivan Pavlov, 1849–1936 (Russia) Famous for the approach. In classical conditioning terminology, an unconditioned stimu- lus (US) is an event that causes a response to occur, which is referred to as the unconditioned response (UR). In Pavlov’s study with dogs, the food in the dog’s mouth is the US, and the salivation that results is the UR. Pavlov went further and added an element known as the non‐excitatory conditioned (CS), which is paired with the US.

Burrhus Frederic Skinner, 1904–1990 (USA) Skinner invented the oper- ant conditioning chamber, also known as the Skinner Box. He was a firm believer in the idea that human free will was actually an illusion and that our 48 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious behavior is a result of the consequences experienced when carrying out similar behaviors in the past; thus we learn from our experiences. If the consequences were bad, there was a high chance that the action would not be repeated; however, if the consequences were good, the actions that led to it would be reinforced. Skinner called this the principle of reinforcement. He innovated his own philosophy of science called radical , and founded his own school of experimental research psychology – the experimental analysis of behavior. Skinner’s analysis of human behavior culminated in his work Verbal Behavior, as well as a philosophical mani- festo, Walden Two, both of which have experienced an enormous increase in interest experimentally in applied settings.

Edward Thorndike, 1874–1949 (Austria) Learning environments and profits and losses associated with them. The law of effect, which is the idea that getting a positive response first time will make the behavior more likely to be repeated. Work on was also explored, i.e., simple stimulus and response at different ages.

John Watson, 1878–1958 (USA) Little Albert was his most cited experi- ment, looking at the effects of fear responses to a rat. Watson then moved on to look at unemotional parenting, and the ideas of attachment began.

Edward Tolman, 1886–1959 (USA) Rats in a maze and the ideas of ­latent learning. Starts exploration into the ideas of cognitive maps and reward attainment.

Edwin Guthrie, 1886–1959 (USA) Repeated exposure creates learning and thus predictable behaviors.

Karl Lashley, 1890–1958 (USA) Looked at the neurological side to the behaviorist approach. In particular the memory trace was his main focus.

Zing‐Yang Kuo, 1898–1970 (China) Looks at the idea of behavioral epi- genetics. He denied the notion of behavior as an instinct, arguing that it is part of our genetics. Most known experiments involve the use of kittens who were raised with a rat, which became their friend.

Joseph Wolpe, 1915–1997 (South Africa) Started looking at the learned response of fear and whether it could be unlearned. He developed a way to unlearn fear by looking at the way it was first learned. This was done via a method called reciprocal inhibition. Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 49

Albert Bandura, 1925– (Canada) Developed social learning theory. We are surrounded by people talking and acting in different ways. We remem- ber these observed actions and then mentally rehearse them. If motivated we reproduce the actions ourselves. This social learning is through mod- eling. There is also the Bobo doll experiment of aggression, violence in the media, and gender development.

Developmentalists Lev Vygotsky, 1896–1934 (Belarus) Vygotsky’s main work was in devel- opmental psychology. He proposed a theory of the development of higher cognitive functions in children that saw reasoning emerging through practical activity in a social environment. Early in his career he argued that the development of reasoning was mediated by signs and therefore con- tingent on cultural practices and language as well as on universal cognitive processes. Vygotsky also posited the concept of the zone of proximal development, often understood to refer to the way in which the acquisition of new knowledge is dependent on previous learning, as well as the availability of instruction.

Jean Piaget, 1896–1980 (Switzerland) Piaget is known for his epistemo- logical studies with children. His theory of and epistemological view are together called . Piaget placed great importance on the education of children. He inves- tigated the hidden side of children’s minds. Piaget proposed that children moved from a position of egocentrism to sociocentrism. For this explana- tion he combined the use of psychological and clinical methods to create what he called a semi‐clinical interview. Piaget believed that the process of thinking and intellectual development could be regarded as an extension of the biological process of the evolutionary adaptation of the species, which also has two ongoing processes: assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation is when a child responds to a new event in a way that is con- sistent with an existing schema. Accommodation is when a child either modifies an existing schema or forms an entirely new schema to deal with a new object or event. Piaget argued that intelligence develops in a series of stages that are related to age and are progressive because one stage must be accomplished before the next can occur.

Erik Erikson, 1902–1994 (Germany) Developed the eight stages of per- sonality development. Anything that grows has a ground plan and out of 50 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious this the parts arise. Personality develops via eight stages. By negotiating each stage successfully, we develop as mentally healthy. Failure at a stage leads to mental deficiency.

Bruno Bettelheim, 1903–1990 (Austria) Is the close mother relationship actually good? Bettelheim concluded that this is not necessarily the case.

Harry Harlow, 1905–1981 (UK) Did similar work to but on animals, focusing on monkeys and the critical learning period.

John Bowlby, 1907–1990 (UK) Looked at the various ways children attach to their parents. There is a critical period, according to Bowlby, of the first 24 months. If attachment is broken within this period, it causes serious and permanent damage. Touched on both parents’ role, not just the mother’s.

Mary Ainsworth, 1913–1999 (UK) Did the same work as Bowlby but focused rather on the mother and her infant. She developed the “” to measure and study attachment types.

Kenneth Clark, 1914–2005 (USA) Looked at prejudice and children. By the age of 3 children are racially aware and forming prejudices. In the 1930s both White and Black children had prejudices against the Black race and a preference for White skin color. This leads to segregation and social influences from parents and teachers.

Lawrence Kohlberg, 1921–1987 (USA) Based work around building moral reasoning. Morality develops in six stages throughout life. In two pre‐conventional stages, moral behavior is determined by punishment and so on. In the two conventional stages behavior is consistent to what others believe to be right. Finally, in the two post‐conventional stages, the indi- vidual is the ultimate moral judge.

Steven Pinker 1954– (Canada) How much behavior is innate? Looks at the concept of ex nihilo and how we learn from birth.

Simon Baron‐Cohen, 1958– (UK) Looked at brain types and the empa- thizing–systematizing theory of adult brains. Female brains are hard- wired for empathy, male brains for building systems. Autistic people, for instance, do not show empathy. Thus autism is an extreme form of the male brain. Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 51

Cognitivists Sir Frederic Bartlett, 1886–1969 (UK) He was the first professor of ­ at the University of Cambridge and one of the forerunners of cognitive psychology. However, while Bartlett considered his own work on cognitive psychology to be a study in , more recent developments have individualized his concepts. One of his most famous studies was on the cognitive and social pro- cesses of remembering. He retrieved a series of short fables (the best known was the Native American fable called “The War of the Ghosts”), each of which comprised a sequence of events that were ostensibly logical but subtly illogical, and there were several discreet non‐sequiturs. Bartlett would recite this story to subjects, then later (sometimes much later) ask them to recall as much of it as possible. He discovered that most people found it extremely difficult to recall the story exactly, even after repeated readings, and hypothesized that, where the elements of the story failed to fit into the schemata of the listener, these elements were omitted from the recollection or transformed into more familiar forms.

George Kelly, 1905–1967 (USA) Personal construct theory. Kelly’s fun- damental view of personality was that people are like naïve scientists who see the world through a particular lens, based on their uniquely organized systems of construction, which they use to anticipate events. But because people are naïve scientists, they sometimes employ systems for construing the world that are distorted by idiosyncratic experiences not applicable to their current social situation. A system of construction that chronically fails to characterize and/or predict events, and is not appropriately revised to comprehend and predict one’s changing social world, is considered to underlie psychopathology (or mental illness).

Jerome Bruner, 1915– (USA) Bruner is one of the pioneers of the cogni- tive psychology movement in the United States. This originated through his own research when he began to study sensation and perception as be- ing active rather than passive processes. In 1947 Bruner published his classic study, “Value and Need as Organizing Factors in Perception,” in which poor and rich children were asked to estimate the size of coins and wooden disks the size of American pennies, nickels, dimes, quarters, and half‐dollars. The results showed that the value and need the poor and rich children associated with coins caused them to significantly overestimate their size, especially when compared to their more accurate estimations of the same‐size disks. Similarly, another classic study conducted by Bruner and Leo Postman showed slower reaction times and less accurate answers 52 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious when a deck of playing cards reversed the color of the suit symbol for some cards (e.g., red spades and black hearts). These series of experiments issued in what some called the “New Look” psychology, which challenged psychologists to study not just an organ- ism’s response to a stimulus, but also its internal interpretation. After these experiments on perception, Bruner turned his attention to the actual cog- nitions that he had indirectly studied in his perception studies.

Noam Chomsky, 1928– (USA) Sometimes described as the “father of modern linguistics,” Chomsky is also a major figure in analytic philosophy. The basis to Chomsky’s linguistic theory is that the principles underlying the structure of language are biologically determined in the human mind and hence genetically transmitted. He therefore argues that all humans share the same underlying linguistic structure, irrespective of sociocultural difference. In this he opposes the radical behaviorist psychology of B. F. Skinner, arguing instead that human language is unlike modes of commu- nication used by any other animal species.

Bluma Zeigarnik, 1901–1988 (Russia) The Zeigarnik effect: waiters could remember items on an order if they were not yet paid for. She used ­interruptive tasks to test memory and concluded that it was due to lacking closure.

Leon Festinger, 1919–1989 (USA) When we have two conflicting or ­inconsistent beliefs we become uncomfortable, a state called cognitive ­dissonance. If accepted it causes further inconsistency, so we find ways to make it consistent. It’s called unshakeable conviction.

George Armitage Miller, 1920–2012 (USA) Information goes into work- ing memory (Wm) first. Wm has a limited capacity – roughly 7 items (7 categories). If information is organized into chunks it is easier to store. It can hold 7 +/− 2 items.

Aaron Beck, 1921– (USA) Started the . Psychoana- lytic therapy looks at patient unconscious. Cognitive therapy looks at peo- ple’s perceptions. Cognitive therapy has strong empirical evidence; it helps us to better look at how a disorder manifests itself.

Robert Zajonc, 1923– (USA) Repeated exposure to a stimulus breeds familiarity with it. It brings about attitude change and takes the form of preference or affection. This preference is emotional and forms on a ­subconscious level before a person is aware of it. Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 53

Roger Brown, 1925–1997 (USA) Flashbulb memories, based on high shock value.

Donald Broadbent, 1926–1993 (UK) Information from the senses is briefly held in the short‐term memory (STM) store, passed through a fil- ter, then only one piece of information is selected for attention. Our STMs are like a Y‐shaped tube. All information is fed in and this can create a bottleneck, which allows only one stream of information.

Endel Tulving, 1927– (Estonia) is events and experi- ence. Distinct from semantic. Time and place = associations from the epi- sodic memory. Sensory cues are also combined to form a more overall memory. Only humans can “travel back in time” to reminisce on old events. Separated memory types using .

Roger Shepard, 1929– (UK) How the mind make sense of information. Looked at “sense data,” which the brain processes and makes inferences from. Used images of two tables and looked at mental rotation to get an idea of illusions. Did illusion experiments and said perception is “exter- nally guided hallucination.”

Daniel Kahneman, 1934– (USA) Looked at risk and decision making. Came up with the idea of heuristics and of prospect theory. His work, which won the Nobel Prize for economics, shows that we are not as cool- ly rational as we believe we are. We are, in a sense, lazy, fast thinkers who make many errors.

Elizabeth Loftus, 1944– (USA) Looked at the fallibility of memory. Sug- gestibility of memory, the famous leading questions studies, and misinfor- mation effect. There are legal implications too. syndrome and questionable therapy are also key areas.

Paul Salkovskis, 1950– (UK) One of the first to use cognitive behavior therapy widely and promote it. Used it for obsessive‐compulsive disorder (OCD). We all have unwelcome thoughts; some people cannot shake them and they become over‐important and obsessional. This leads to OCD.

Daniel Schacter, 1952– (USA) are important. Sometimes we forget important things via transience, absent‐mindedness, and blocking. Memories become confused by misattribution, suggestibil- ity, and bias. We can also want to forget by persistence. 54 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Emotion psychology Nico Frijda, 1927–2015 (Netherlands) Emotion is an essentially uncon- scious process. Emotions are motivating forces and are spontaneous bio- logical processes. They can be understood by others via actions, e.g., blushing. Feelings are how we interpret our emotions and we are con- sciously aware of our feelings. Others cannot guess as feelings can be easily disguised.

Paul Ekman, 1934– (USA) Emotions are a runaway train. Emotions can start before we are consciously aware of them. Thus it is hard to control our emotions. Emotions can override some fundamental drives, e.g., ­disgust overrides hunger. Basic six emotions.

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, 1934– (Italy) When we engage in activity we enjoy, we become absorbed and reach a state of flow. We are focused, ­serene; there is a sense of timelessness and clarity; we are not conscious of ourselves. Flow is similar to ecstasy.

Martin Seligman, 1942– (USA) Looked at the concept of “happy lives.” There are three kinds: the good life – pursuing growth and achieving flow; the meaningful life – acting in the service of something greater than your- self; the pleasant life – socializing and seeking pleasure. These bring lasting happiness, but this happiness cannot be achieved without social relation- ships. Social relationships do not equal happiness, but happiness does not occur without them.

Social psychologists William McDougall, 1871–1938 (UK) He wrote a number of highly ­influential textbooks and was particularly important in the development of the theory of instinct and of social psychology in the English‐speaking world. He was an opponent of behaviorism and stands somewhat outside the mainstream of the development of Anglo‐American psychological thought in the first half of the 20th century.

Fritz Heider, 1896–1988 (Austria) His work was related to the Gestalt school. Heider founded the attribution and cognitive balance approaches in social psychology. In The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, Heider included his earlier works on naïve or commonsense psychology, which provided the building material for the comprehension of interpersonal Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 55

­relations in the book. The book contains several influential ideas. Heider argued that social perception follows many of the same rules of physical object perception, and that the organization found in object perception is also found in social perception. Because biases in object perception some- times lead to errors (e.g., optical illusions), one might expect to find that biases in social perception likewise lead to errors (e.g., underestimating the role of social factors and overestimating the effect of personality and attitudes on behavior).

Muzafer Sherif, 1906–1988 (Turkey) One of the founders of modern so- cial psychology, Sherif developed several unique and powerful techniques for understanding social processes, particularly social norms and social conflict. Many of his original contributions to social psychology have been absorbed into the field so thoroughly that his role in their development and discovery has disappeared. Other reformulations of social psychology have taken his contributions for granted, and re‐presented his ideas as new.

Solomon Asch, 1907–1996 () An American Gestalt psychologist and pioneer in social psychology, Asch created seminal pieces of work in impression formation, prestige suggestion, conformity, and many other topics. His work follows a common theme of that the whole is not only greater than the sum of its parts, but the nature of the whole fundamentally alters the parts. Asch was interested in how humans form impressions of other human beings. He was intrigued by how we are able to easily form impressions of humans even though we have such com- plex structures. He was specifically interested in how impressions of other people were established and if there were any principles that regulated these impressions. Asch concluded that “to know a person is to have a grasp of a particular structure.” He demonstrated through his experiments that forming an impression: (1) is an organized process; (2) that the char- acteristics are perceived differently in relation to other characteristics; (3) that central qualities are discovered, causing a distinction between them and peripheral qualities; and (4) that relations of harmony and c­ontradiction are observed.

Michael Argyle, 1925–2002 (UK) Some of Argyle’s best known contri- butions were in this field. He was especially interested in gaze. One of his best known books, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, became a best‐seller. Argyle made contributions to many fields in psychology, in- cluding , social skills, non‐verbal communication, the psychology of happiness, and the psychology of social class. 56 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Serge Moscovici, 1925–2014 (Romania) Moscovici claimed that majority influence in many ways was misleading – if the majority was indeed all powerful, we would all end up thinking the same. Drawing attention to the works of Gabriel Tarde, he pointed to the fact that most major social movements have been started by individuals and small groups (e.g., Chris- tianity, Buddhism, the Suffragette movement, Nazism) and that without an outspoken minority, we would have no innovation or social change. The study he is most famous for, “Influences of a Consistent Minority on the Responses of a Majority in a Color Perception Task,” is now seen as one of the defining investigations into the effects of minority influence.

Melvin Lerner, 1929– (USA) We believe people get what they deserve. People want to believe that they live in a safe, stable, and orderly world, i.e., where bad things only happen to bad people. People blame the vic- tims of misfortune in order to protect themselves from feeling vulnerable.

Elliot Aronson, 1932– (USA) Came up with the concept of cognitive dis- sonance. In some situations sane people do crazy things. If unaware of the social circumstances that prompt actions we may infer that a deficiency in their character. We do not understand the context.

Stanley Milgram 1933–1984 (USA) Milgram conducted various studies and published articles during his lifetime. The most notable was his con- troversial study on obedience to authority, conducted in the 1960s during his professorship at Yale. Power of the group and the feeling to obey. Also important was the attribution of guilt. Other experiments that changed social psychology were the small world and lost letter experiments.

Philip Zimbardo, 1933– (USA) Did the world famous prison experi- ment. Looked at role acceptance and personality change. Conformity to social pressures and an authority.

Ignacio Martín‐Baró, 1942–1989 (Spain) Did work on traumatized so- ciety. Because it aims to be impartial and universal, mainstream psychology does not address the way specific contexts and environments shape mental health. The sociopolitical environment of people needs to be understood to understand trauma.

William Glasser, 1925–2013 (USA) Looked at choice theory. We are by nature social beings; important to us are love and belonging. When our close interpersonal relationships are troubled we become unhappy. A lot of Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 57 unhappiness is associated with mental illness. By repairing interpersonal relationships we can treat mental illnesses.

The computationalists on intelligence Alan Turing, 1912–1954 (UK) Turing is often considered to be the ­father of modern computer science. With the Turing test, Turing made a significant and characteristically provocative contribution to the debate regarding : whether it will ever be possible to say that a machine is conscious and can think. He provided an influential formali- zation of the concept of algorithm and computation with the Turing m­achine, formulating the now widely accepted “Turing” version of the Church–Turing thesis, namely that any practical computing model has either the equivalent or a subset of the capabilities of a Turing machine.

Herbert Simon, 1916–2002 (USA) Simon was among the founding ­fathers of several of today’s important scientific domains, including artificial intelligence, information processing, decision making, problem solving, attention economics, organization theory, complex systems, and computer simulation of scientific discovery. He coined the terms bounded rationality and satisficing, and was the first to analyze the architecture of complexity and to propose a preferential attachment mechanism to explain power law distributions. With , Simon developed a theory for the simulation of human problem‐solving behavior using production rules. The study of human problem solving required new kinds of human measurements and, with Anders Ericsson, Simon developed the experimental technique of verbal protocol analysis.

Marvin Minsky, 1927–2016 (USA) At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Artificial Intelligence Lab, Minsky and Seymour Papert started developing what came to be called the society of mind theory. The theory attempts to explain how what we call intelligence could be a product of the interaction of non‐intelligent parts. Minsky says that the biggest source of ideas about the theory came from his work in trying to create a machine that uses a robotic arm, a video camera, and a computer to build with children’s blocks.

John Searle, 1932– (USA) John Searle is very well known for his develop- ment of a thought experiment called the “Chinese room” argument. He set out to prove that human thought was not simply computation. His 58 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious main premise is that a computational process in itself cannot have an ­“understanding” of events and processes. Simply put, Searle tried to show how computers do not have to understand things like a language to pro- cess information. There has been a great deal of controversy over the ­examples he uses to demonstrate this. In his theory, Searle describes a scenario in which a person is isolated in a room. The individual receives pieces of paper marked with Chinese characters from under the door. Even though the person does not understand Chinese, if there is a formal sort- ing process for the characters they can be filed into a meaningful order. The room is supposed to be an analogy for the computer. Those who ­argue the point say that the analogy should hold for the entire brain. They maintain that a person’s understanding of Chinese is an emergent prop- erty of the brain and not a property possessed by any one part.

Joy Guilford, 1897–1987 (USA) Started the measurement craze used in many of today’s businesses. Problem solving can be done via convergent thinking and can be tested via IQ. Creative solutions use divergent think- ing; thus to test it, one needs a problem‐solving and imagination test. This is how was born.

The biopsychologists Wilder Penfield, 1891–1976 (Canada) With his colleague Herbert Jas- per, he treated patients with severe epilepsy by destroying nerve cells in the brain where the seizures originated. Before operating, Penfield stimulated the brain with electrical probes while the patients were conscious on the operating table (under local anesthesia only), and observed their responses. In this way he could more accurately target the areas of the brain ­responsible, reducing the side effects of the surgery. His technique also allowed him to create maps of the sensory and motor cortices of the brain showing their connections to the various limbs and organs of the body. These maps are still used today, practically unaltered.

Alexander Luria, 1902–1977 (Russia) The Luria–Nebraska Neuropsy- chological Test is a standardized test based on the theories of Luria regard- ing neuropsychological functioning. There are 11 scales: motor functions, rhythm, tactile functions, visual functions, receptive speech, expressive speech, writing, reading, arithmetic, memory, and intellectual processes.

Konrad Lorenz, 1903–1989 (Austria) Lorenz is often regarded as one of the founders of modern ethology, developing an approach that began with Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 59 an earlier generation, including his teacher Oskar Heinroth. Lorenz stud- ied instinctive behavior in animals, especially in greylag geese and jackdaws. Working with geese, Lorenz rediscovered the principle of imprinting.

Karl H. Pribram, 1919–2015 (Austria) He did pioneering work on the cerebral cortex. To the general public, he is better known for his develop- ment of the holonomic brain model of cognitive function and his contri- bution to the ongoing neurological research into the engram. He was also interested in the neurophysiological basis of “spiritual” experiences.

The perception psychologists Fritz Pearls, 1893–1970 (Germany) Founder of the Gestalt, with roots in Kant’s work. Involves the questioning of our own objective truths: We need to look at our own human lenses that shape our experience of the world. Gestalt psychology is a theory of mind and brain that proposes that the operational principle of the brain is holistic, parallel, and ana- logical, with self‐organizing tendencies. The classic Gestalt example is a soap bubble, whose spherical shape (its Gestalt) is not defined by a rigid template or a mathematical formula, but rather emerges spontaneously by the parallel action of surface tension acting at all points in the surface ­simultaneously.

Wolfgang Köhler, 1887–1967 (Estonia) Further developed the Gestalt. Used chimpanzees to illustrate his ideas. A chimpanzee uses trial and error but fails and then pauses to consider the problem. It then reaches an in- sight and applies this insight to similar problems in the future. Thus it is active. Instinct is a dynamic pattern. This is all about insightful learning.

James Gibson, 1904–1979 (USA) Considered one of the most important 20th‐century psychologists in the field of visual perception. In his work he rejected the fashionable behaviorism for a view based on his own experi- mental work, which pioneered the idea that animals “sampled” information from the “ambient” outside world. He also coined the term affordance, which refers to the opportunities for action provided by a particular object or environment. This concept has been extremely influential in the field of design and ergonomics; see, for example, the work of Donald Norman, who worked with Gibson and adapted many of his ideas for his own theories. Gibson argued strongly in favor of direct perception or ­direct realism as opposed to cognitive indirect realism. He termed his new a­pproach ecological psychology. 60 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

David Marr, 1945–1980 (UK) Marr treated vision as an information‐ processing system. With Tomaso Poggio he proposed the idea that one must understand information‐processing systems at three distinct, com- plementary levels of analysis. This idea is known in as Marr’s tri‐level hypothesis:

●● Computational level: What does the system do (e.g., what problems does it solve or overcome) and similarly, why does it do these things? ●● Algorithmic/representational level: How does the system do what it does? Specifically, what representations does it use and what processes does it employ to build and manipulate the representations? ●● Physical level: How is the system physically realized? In the case of bio- logical vision, what neural structures and neuronal activities implement the visual system?

David Hubel, 1926–2013 (Canada) The Hubel and Wiesel experiments greatly expanded the scientific knowledge of sensory processing. The part- nership lasted over 20 years and became known as one of the most prom- inent research pairings in science. They found that some neurons fired rapidly when presented with lines at one angle, while others responded best to another angle. Some of these neurons responded to light patterns and dark patterns differently. Hubel and Wiesel called these neurons sim- ple cells. Still other neurons, which they termed complex cells, detected edges regardless of where they were placed in the receptive field of the neuron and could preferentially detect motion in certain directions. These studies showed how the visual system constructs complex representations of visual information from simple stimulus features.

Richard Gregory, 1923–2010 (UK) Gregory’s main contribution to the discipline was in the development of cognitive psychology, in particular that of perception as hypotheses, an approach that had its origin in the work of Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) and his student Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Between them, the two Germans laid the basis of investigating how the senses work, especially sight and hearing. According to Gregory, Helmholtz should take the credit for realizing that perception is not just a passive acceptance of stimuli, but an active process involving memory and other internal processes. Gregory progressed this idea with a key analogy. The process whereby the brain puts together a coherent view of the outside world is analogous to the way in which the sciences build up their picture of the world, by a kind of hypothetico‐deductive process. Although this takes place on a Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 61 quite different time scale, and inside one head instead of a community, nevertheless, according to Gregory, perception shares many traits with scientific method. A series of works by Gregory developed this idea in some detail. Gregory’s ideas ran counter to those of the American direct realist psychologist J. J. Gibson.

The personologists , 1897–1967 (USA) Allport was one of the first psycholo- gists to focus on the study of the personality and is often referred to as one of the founding figures of . He contributed to the formation of values scales and rejected both a psychoanalytic approach to personality, which he thought often went too deep, and a behavioral approach, which he thought often did not go deep enough. He emphasized the uniqueness of each individual, and the importance of the present con- text, as opposed to past history, for understanding the personality.

Raymond Cattell, 1905–1998 (UK) Known for his exploration of many areas in psychology, including the basic dimensions of personality and , a range of cognitive abilities, the dynamic dimensions of motivation and emotion, the clinical dimensions of personality, patterns of group and social behavior, applications of personality research to psycho- therapy and learning theory, predictors of creativity and achievement, and many scientific research methods for exploring and measuring these areas. As a psychologist, Cattell was rigorously devoted to the scientific method. He was an early proponent of using factor analytical methods instead of what he called “verbal theorizing” to explore the basic dimensions of per- sonality, motivation, and cognitive abilities. One of the most important results of Cattell’s application of was his discovery of 16 factors underlying human personality. He called these factors “source traits” because he believed they provide the underlying source for the sur- face behaviors we think of as personality. This theory of personality factors and the instrument used to measure them are known respectively as the 16 personality factor model and the 16PF Questionnaire.

Hans Eysenck, 1916–1997 (Germany) He is best remembered for his work on intelligence and personality, though he worked in a wide range of areas. At the time of his death, Eysenck was the living psychologist most frequent- ly cited in science journals. The two personality dimensions, extraversion and neuroticism, were described in his 1947 book Dimensions of Personality. It is common practice in personality psychology to refer to these dimensions 62 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious by their initial letters, E and N. E and N provided a two‐dimensional space to describe individual differences in behavior. An analogy can be made to how latitude and longitude describe a point on the face of the Earth. Also, Eysenck noted how these two dimensions were similar to the four personal- ity types first proposed by the Greek physician Hippocrates.

Erving Goffman, 1922–1982 (Canada) Goffman made substantial a­dvances in the study of face‐to‐face interaction, elaborated the “dramaturgi- cal approach” to human interaction, and developed numerous concepts that have had a massive influence, particularly in the field of the microsociology of everyday life. Many of his works have concerned the organization of eve- ryday behavior, a concept he termed “interaction order.” He contributed to the sociological concept of framing to game theory, and to the study of interactions and linguistics. With regard to the latter, he argued that the activity of speaking must be seen as a social rather than a linguistic construct.

David McClelland, 1917–1998 (USA) Developed the three key needs of leaders. Also involved in the model: Motivation is the key component to job performance, but what people say about their motivation cannot be taken at face value. This is because are largely unconscious. His test revealed the three motivations: achievement, power, and affiliation.

Walter Mischel, 1930– (Austria) Looked at how behavior can be pre- dicted and concluded personality alone is useless, we also need to look at external factors. The relationship between the person and the situation is key in predicting behavior.

The psychoanalysts and therapists Sigmund Freud, 1856–1939 (Austria) The ideas of hypnosis and hysteria were explored. Looked at the everyday mind and what forms it, i.e., early childhood experiences and fixations from it. This involved dynamic thought, motivating drives, and the unconscious. Psychoanalytical treatments were born from this approach, e.g., interpreting dreams and hypnotherapy.

Alfred Adler, 1870–1937 (Austria) Moved beyond Freud’s work by looking at the self and its concepts. In particular he looked at the inferior- ity complex and how it forms.

Carl Jung, 1875–1961 (Switzerland) Combined aspects from his mentor Freud with philosophical approaches. Of interest were the ideas of archetypes Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 63 and the collective unconscious as well as the concept of ex nihilo. These archetypes were translated into dreams, thus dream analysis became a pro- found method of inspection.

Melanie Klein, 1882–1960 (Austria) Came up with the concept of mobi- lizing the libido against aggression and looked at the concepts of creation and growth, founding much of the work on child psychology. Developed the concepts of pleasure and pain and the constant conflicts that arise.

Karen Horney, 1885–1952 (Germany) Looked at social environments and their health applications to us. We need to beware of toxic environ- ments and we should strive to become our ideal selves.

Anna Freud, 1895–1982 (Austria) Expanded on the concept of the ­superego and the ego. More importantly she listed and discussed ego ­defense mechanisms.

Donald Winnicott, 1896–1971 (UK) Challenged the idea that child up- bringing determines everything, and that a combination of being loved and hated forms a real understanding of what it is to be loved. The idea of countertransference surrounds concepts such as this. He also looked at the “antisocial tendency,” which tests caregivers, dealing with hatred and the invoking emotional response. These ideas particularly surround children that have gone through adoptions or fostering programs. The concept of healthy hatred was also explored, i.e., the idea of hating appropriately, and subsequently the use of the therapeutic relationship and its importance in helping solve the issues.

Erich Fromm, 1900–1980 (Germany) Discussed the notions and implica- tions of not being identified with a social group. Life is fraught with anxi- ety and powerlessness due to the separation from nature and from one another. These feelings can be overcome through discovering our own ideas and abilities, accepting our uniqueness, and developing our capacity to love.

Jacques Lacan, 1901–1981 () Looked at relationships between the self and what he calls “the other.” The other is everything else that lies beyond the boundaries of ourselves. He states that we define and redefine ourselves through the existence of the other and that we under- stand the world through language. The unconscious is the discourse of the other. 64 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Carl Rogers, 1902–1987 (USA) Rogers’s ideas revolved around reaching a state of well‐being, both mental and physical. In order to enjoy a good life according to Rogers, we need to be open to experience, live in the present, trust ourselves, take responsibility for our own choices, and treat others with positive regard. This sort of work formed the person‐centered approach.

Viktor Frankl, 1905–1997 (Austria) Looked into more clinical areas such as depression and suicide prevention.

Abraham Maslow, 1908–1970 (USA) Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs refers to the needs that must be achieved to reach success and self‐ transcendence. This helps one reach the optimal state of eudemonia. This hierarchy is often applied to a variety of psychological areas, from clinical to organizational.

Françoise Dolto, 1908–1988 (France) Condemned traditional systems of morality and education that try to get everyone to conform.

Rollo May, 1909–1994 (USA) The father of existential psychotherapy, looking at the broader human experience. For example, suffering is a nor- mal part of the human experience. He proposed an approach similar to Buddhism, involving acceptance of and learning from negative experiences.

Albert Ellis, 1913–2007 (USA) Experiences do not cause any specific emotional reaction. He suggested that when negative things happen we can either react irrationally or consider a response. If we act irrationally it reinforces ways of thinking that may be unhelpful and unbeneficial; this leads to even poorer opinions of ourselves. In contrast, considering our response leads to beneficial strategies and infinite possibilities. Specifically addressed are conditioned responses, challenging beliefs, constructivist theory, and active therapy.

Virginia Satir, 1916–1988 (USA) Her theory was that one’s role in the family is key in the way one develops into an adult. From our role we learn how to react in certain ways to family members. These reactions shape a role that we adopt when under stress. This role can overwhelm our sense of self. In this approach the family is the “factory” where people are made. Role playing is an important aspect of this theory.

Paul Watzlawick, 1921–2007 (USA) Builds on the idea that in order for therapy to work we need to understand ourselves and the roots of our Names and Dates That Shaped Psychology 65 emotions. Also looks at the “linear” view that one needs to understand our past, current states, and possibly future ones to make progress. The therapeutic relationship is also important.

Dorothy Rowe, 1930– (Australia) By stopping blaming oneself one can beat depression. We blame ourselves due to the “just world” approach. Once we reconsider our beliefs, we can think more rationally.

The psychopathologists Corbett Thigpen, 1919–1999 (USA) Developed the idea of multiple per- sonality disorder and that this was possible via the way personality traits interact.

David Rosenhan, 1932– (USA) Takes the anti‐psychiatry approach. ­Psychiatrists say mental disorders can be accurately diagnosed through symptoms so they should be able to tell the difference between sane and insane people. Rosenhan’s experiments showed this cannot be done via their view; it exists only in the mind of the observers.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the huge range of subjects that psychologists have examined. For about 150 years psychologists from many backgrounds trained in many different areas have investigated a variety of psychological topics, from memory to mating and personality to prejudice.

A great way of understanding a discipline is often to look at its history. Psychology did not begin to flourish in Europe and America until the 19th century. Many significant psychologists have published their theories and ideas, building a strong foundation for the discipline. From behaviorism to psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and psychopathology, it is clear that our psychological understanding has continued to develop and improve over time. 4 Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories

4.1 Introduction

Is psychology a science? Or merely common sense? Consider the battery of quotes for and against science and common sense. Pro‐science ●● A scientist is a man who would rather count than guess. M. Gluckman ●● Science is organized common sense where many a beautiful theory is felled by an ugly fact. T. H. Huxley ●● Science may be described as the art of systematic oversimplification. K. Popper ●● The man of science does not discover in order to know: He wants to know in order to discover. A. N. Whitehead ●● Science increases our power in proportion as it lowers our pride. C. Bernard ●● Science is what you know, philosophy is what you don’t know. B. Russell ●● You know very well that unless you are a scientist, it’s much more important for a theory to be shapely than for it to be true. C. Hampton Anti‐science ●● Science is always wrong: It never solves a problem without creating ten more. G. B. Shaw ●● I am tired of all this sort of thing called science … We have spent mil­ lions on that sort of thing for the last few years, and it is time it should be stopped. S. Cameron

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 67

●● One of the most pernicious falsehoods ever to be universally accepted is that scientific method is the only reliable way to the truth. R. Bube ●● Traditional scientific method has always been, at the very least, 20–20 hindsight. It’s good for seeing where you’ve been. R. Pirsig ●● Though many have tried, no one has ever yet explained away the deci­ sive fact that science, which can do so much, cannot decide what it ought to do. J. W. Krutch ●● Look at those cows and remember that the greatest scientists in the world have not discovered how to make grass into milk. M. Pulin Pro‐common sense ●● It is a thousand times better to have common sense without education than to have education without common sense. R. Ingersoll ●● Common sense in an uncommon degree is what the world calls wis­ dom. S. T. Coleridge ●● The philosophy of one century is the common sense of the next. H. W. Beecher ●● The best prophet is common sense. Euripides ●● If man has common sense he has all the sense there is. S. Rayburn ●● Common sense is instinct and enough of it is genius. H. W. Shaw ●● Common sense is the wick of the candle. R. W. Emerson ●● Fine sense and exalted sense are not half so useful as common sense. B. Gracian ●● The crown of all faculties is common sense. It is not enough to do the right thing: It must be done at the right time and place. W. Matthews Anti‐common sense ●● Common sense is the collection of prejudices people have accrued by the age of 18. A. Einstein ●● Logic is one thing and common sense is another. E. Hubbard ●● Common sense is in spite of, not the result of, education. V. Hugo ●● Common sense is, of all kinds, the most uncommon. T. Edwards ●● Common sense, however logical and sound, is after all only one human attitude among many others, and like everything human, it may have its limitations – or negative side. W. Barrett ●● Common sense is one of the most fairly distributed things in the world, for each thinks he is so well endowed with it that even those who are hardest to satisfy in all other matters are not in the habit of desiring more of it than they already have. R. Descartes ●● If common sense were as unerring as calculus, as some suggest, I don’t understand why so many mistakes are made so often by so many people.­ C. Winkel 68 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

4.2 Maxims for Distinguishing Science From Non‐Science

At various points in time, people have “demonstrated” various ­psychic powers from spoon bending to remote viewing. Where these phenomena have been investigated, nearly all have proved to be incapable of replication or are explicable in terms of trickery or con­ ventional scientific explanations.

Marks and Kammann (1980) have skeptically analyzed and appraised claims about extrasensory perception (ESP), precognition, clairvoyance, telepathy, psychokinesis, and other related phenomena. They conclude their book with an appendix titled “Modes for rationales or the art of doubt,” which lists 10 maxims that attempt to prevent lay people from being fooled by bogus psychic phenomena. The rules are:

●● If‐what‐then‐what: Make the theorist be specific by asking what the theory predicts. ●● Disprovability: Ask the theorist what piece of evidence would be required to disprove his/her theory. ●● Burden of proof: It is for the theorist to prove or substantiate his/her belief in the theory rather than your disbelief. ●● Alternative thinking: It is possible that other phenomena (mediating variables) explain the theorist’s evidence just as well as the phenomena he or she cites. ●● Missing negative cases: Very often negative cases (those that “disprove” a theory) are omitted, so making the data look stronger. These need to be sought out. ●● Personal observation: Subjective validations are not sufficient unless accompanied by detailed recorded observations. ●● Testimonials: Personal experience is poor evidence because often peo­ ple are not fully aware of forces acting upon them or their real needs and motives. ●● Sources: It is worth examining the credibility of the source of a ­theory – where it is published, debated, and so forth – as these sources are frequently dubious. ●● Emotional commitment: The more a person is ego‐involved in a theory, the less rationally and skeptically it may be assessed. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 69

●● Ad hominem technique: “First a believer may hold certain authorities to be infallible, and quote their opinions as evidence. Second, he may try to place contrary believers into a category of bad people and thus reject their arguments out of hand. Third, he may turn against you, accusing you of bad motives or stupidity. All of these arguments are fallacious, and it is not only important to recognize them, but also not to use them. The object is to learn, not to win” (Marks & Kammann, 1980, p. 226).

Becoming a psychic or a fortune teller: 13 secrets In a wonderful paper, Hyman (1977, pp. 26–29) lets readers into the secrets of how to become a palmist, graphologist, fortune‐cookie reader, and so forth. All his rules are reproduced here lest the trickster hoodwink the inquiring lay person.

1. Remember that the key ingredient of a successful character reader is con- fidence. If you look and act as if you believe in what you are doing, you will be able to sell even a bad reading to most of your subjects. The laboratory studies support this rule. Many readings are accepted as accurate because the statements do fit most people. But even read­ ings that would ordinarily be rejected as inaccurate will be accepted if the reader is viewed as a person with prestige or as someone who knows what he is doing. One danger of playing the role of reader is that you will persuade yourself that you really are divining true character. This happened to me. I started reading palms when I was in my teens as a way to sup­ plement my income from doing magic and mental shows. When I started I did not believe in palmistry. But I knew that to “sell” it I had to act as if I did. After a few years I became a firm believer in palmistry. One day the late Dr Stanley Jaks, who was a professional mentalist and a man I respected, tactfully suggested that it would make an interest­ ing experiment if I deliberately gave readings opposite to what the lines indicated. I tried this out with a few clients. To my surprise and horror my readings were just as successful as ever. Ever since then I have been interested in the powerful forces that convince us, reader and client alike, that something is so when it really isn’t. 2. Make creative use of the latest statistical abstracts, polls, and surveys. This can provide you with a wealth of material about what various subclasses of our society believe, do, want, worry about, and so on. For example if you can ascertain about a client such things as the part 70 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

of the country he comes from, the size of the city he was brought up in, his parents’ religion and vocations, his educational level and age, you already are in possession of information that should enable you to predict with high probability his voting preferences, his beliefs on many issues, and other traits. 3. Set the stage for your reading. Profess modesty about your talents. Make no excessive claims. This catches your subject off guard. You are not challenging him to a battle of wits. You can read his character; whether he cares to believe you or not is his concern. 4. Gain his cooperation in advance. Emphasize that the success of the reading depends as much upon his sincere cooperation as upon your efforts. (After all, you imply, you already have a successful career at reading characters. You are not on trial – he is.) State that due to dif­ ficulties of language and communication, you may not always convey the exact meaning that you intend. In these cases he is to strive to reinterpret the message in terms of his own vocabulary and life. You accomplish two invaluable ends with this dodge. You have an alibi in case the reading doesn’t click; it’s his fault, not yours! And your subject will strive to fit your generalities to his specific life occur­ rences. Later, when he recalls the reading he will recall it in terms of specifics; thus you gain credit for much more than you actually said. Of all the pieces of advice this is the most crucial. To the extent that the client is made an active participant in the reading the reading will succeed. The good reader, deliberately or unwittingly, is the one who forces the client to actively search his memory to make sense of the reader’s statements. 5. Use a gimmick such as a crystal ball, tarot cards, or palm reading. The use of palmistry, say, serves two useful purposes. It lends an air of novelty to the reading; but, more importantly, it serves as a cover for you to stall and to formulate your next statement. While you are ­trying to think of something to say next, you are apparently carefully studying a new wrinkle or line in the hand. Holding hands, in ­addition to any emotional thrills you may give or receive thereby, is another good way of detecting the reactions of the subject to what you are saying (the principle is the same as “muscle reading”). It helps, in the case of palmistry or other gimmicks, to study some manuals so that you know roughly what the various diagnostic signs are supposed to mean. A clever way of using such gimmicks to pin down a client’s problem is to use a variant of “Twenty Questions,” somewhat like this: Tell the client you have only a limited amount of time for the reading. You could focus on the heart line, which deals

www.ebook3000.com Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 71

with emotional entanglements; or the fate line, which deals with ­vocational pursuits and money matters; the head line, which deals with personal problems; the health line, and so on. Ask him or her which one to focus on first. This quickly pins down the major cate­ gory of problem on the client’s mind. 6. Have a list of stock phrases at the tip of your tongue. Even if you are doing a cold reading, the liberal sprinkling of stock phrases amidst your regular reading will add body to the reading and will fill in time as you try to formulate more precise characterizations. You can use the statements in the preceding stock spiels as a start. Memorize a few of them before undertaking your initial ventures into character read­ ing. Palmistry, tarot, and other fortune‐telling manuals also are rich sources of good phrases. 7. Keep your eyes open. Also use your other senses. We have seen how to size up a client on the basis of clothing, jewellery, mannerisms, and speech. Even a crude classification on such a basis can provide suffi­ cient information for a good reading. Watch the impact of your state­ ments upon the subject. Very quickly you will learn when you are “hitting home” and when you are “missing the boat.” 8. Use the technique of “fishing.” This is simply a device for getting the subject to tell you about himself. Then you rephrase what he has told you into a coherent sketch and feed it back to him. One version of fishing is to phrase each statement in the form of a question. Then wait for the subject to reply (or react). If the reaction is positive, then the reader turns the statement into a positive assertion. Often the subject will respond by answering the implied question…Later he will tend to forget that he was the source of your information. By making your statements into questions you also force the subject to search through his memory to retrieve specific instances to fit your general statement. 9. Learn to be a good listener. During the course of a reading your client will be bursting to talk about incidents that are brought up. The good reader allows the client to talk at will. On one occasion I observed a tealeaf reader. The client actually spent 75 percent of the total time talking. Afterwards when I questioned the client about the reading she vehemently insisted that she had not uttered a single word during the course of the reading. The client praised the reader for having so astutely told her what in fact she herself had spoken. Another value of listening is that most clients who seek the services of a reader actually want someone to listen to their problems. In addition many clients have already made up their minds about 72 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

what choices they are going to make. They merely want support to carry out their decisions. 10. Dramatize your reading. Give back what little information you do have or pick up a little bit at a time. Make it seem more than it is. Build word pictures around each divulgence. Don’t be afraid of hamming it up. 11. Always give the impression that you know more than you are saying. The successful reader, like the family doctor, always acts as if he knows much more. Once you persuade the client that you know one item of information about him that you could not possibly have obtained through normal channels, the client will automatically assume you know all. At this point he will typically open up and ­confide in you. 12. Don’t be afraid to flatter your subject every chance you get. An occa­ sional subject will protest such flattery, but will still cherish it. In such cases you can further flatter him by saying, “You are always suspi­ cious of people who flatter you. You just can’t believe that someone will say well of you unless he is trying to achieve some ulterior goal.” 13. Finally, remember the golden rule: Tell the client what he wants to hear.

4.3 Superstition vs. Science

“To say that a reinforcement is contingent upon a response may mean nothing more than that it follows the response. It may follow because of some mechanical connection or because of the mediation of another organism; but conditioning takes place presumably because of the temporal relation only, expressed in terms of the order and proximity of response and reinforcement”. (Skinner, 1948)

It is not difficult to understand why sometimes we are not as rational or empirical as we think. Humans, even animals, like to draw patterns and create meanings. Evolution did not eliminate our superstitious beliefs because they do not reduce our chances of survival, and yet controver­ sially, they have been shown to boost our confidence and our feeling of being in control of our lives. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 73

There is a famous story that illustrates what psychologists call super­ stitious behavior. An animal psychologist had a lab full of pigeons he was using to explore the implications of behavior theory. Pigeons ­demonstrated they had shape and color discrimination and quite a bit more. They had become quite used to the old food‐for‐a‐correct‐ answer routine. One weekend the researcher went home but forgot to turn off the time feeders for a row of birds. After half an hour the machine dispensed a tasty helping of feed. Naturally the birds observed this acutely and assumed they had been rewarded for what they were doing. So they repeated the behavior every 30 minutes and out came the reward. Thus the pigeon‐fancying researcher was amazed to find that every so often the birds got ready to do their thing. Some pecked at their cage, others lifted both wings, some pirouetted at the bottom of the cage, ­others cooed appreciatively. The food came unconditionally, but the pigeons had “seen connections” and causal links and believed they had brought about their just reward. Daft birds? Well, what about football players and their “lucky” socks or boots? Students and their equally lucky charms, pens, and mascots? Can socks influence the outcome of a game? Of course not. Perhaps the less control we have over life and the more unpredictable it seems, the more we believe not in luck, chance, and good fortune but in the operation of fantastical powers. Drawing connections and causal relationships between events gives us a sense of security. Believing that events have a cause and occur in an orderly fashion rather than randomly assures us that we are still in control of our lives. This is also known as the locus of control. There has been considerable interest in the knowledge, beliefs, and superstitions that students bring to psychology courses. In 1925 Nixon sought to demonstrate that his students arrived at the beginning of his psychology classes with a variety of erroneous beliefs about human behavior but that these changed as a result of his teaching. Many oth­ ers have attempted to do likewise; most have failed. Nixon gave more than 350 students a 30‐item true–false test containing items such as “Many eminent men have been feeble‐minded as children,” “A square jaw is a sign of willpower,” and “The marriage of cousins is practically certain to result in children of inferior intelligence.” Over half of this sample believed “Intelligence can be increased with training,” “The study of mathematics is valuable because it gives one a logical mind,” “Man is superior because his conduct is very largely guided by reason,” “Adults sometimes become feeble‐minded from over‐study,” and “You 74 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious can estimate an individual’s intelligence pretty closely by just looking at his face.” Twenty‐five years later Levitt (1952) replicated this study on super­ stition. A questionnaire was administered to 100 men and the results were compared with those of Nixon. There was overall a significant decline in superstitious beliefs. Some superstitions, like those concern­ ing phrenology and physiognomy (determining a person’s character by examining bumps on their skull or from the appearance of their face), Levitt believed had become extinct, although he noted that others that had declined, such as those concerning magic, would probably find modern replacements. He concluded that superstitions (or cognitive distortions) must be important to the individual (otherwise they would not be held), ambiguous (because the true facts are lacking or con­ cealed), and related to certain personality factors (insecure, anxious, neurotically prone). Over 30 years later Tupper and Williams (1986) replicated the study in Australia and found the level of superstition back up to 21% compared with Nixon (1925) at 30.4% and Levitt (1952) at 6.5%. Thus instead of seeing a steady decline in superstitious beliefs over time, the results are moderately consistent between 1925 and 1983. These results do show a modest decline, but not as much as predicted by Nixon, and indeed an increase on Levitt.

4.4 Common Sense

To many people, the theories they come across in a number of the social sciences – psychology, management, sociology, criminology – are “com­ mon sense.” That is, the theories or findings are already commonplace, and hence the research is thought to be a trivial, expensive, and point­ less exercise describing or providing what we already know. Being ­sensitive to this criticism, which is naturally seen as misplaced, social scientists have often confronted this point at the beginning of their textbooks, warning readers of the dangers of common sense, lulling people into the false belief that they understand other people. Some have even provocatively used the term “uncommon sense” in their papers and titles. Why not test yourself? Below are 39 statements derived from various sources that you must decide are either true or false. See how much com­ mon sense helps you to give the correct answer. These examples are from Furnham and Oakley (1995). Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 75

Test: Common sense

Are these statements true or false?

1. In general, women conform more than men. 2. In bargaining with others, it is best to start with a moderate offer – one close to the final agreement desired. 3. In making decisions, committees tend to be more conservative than individuals. 4. Dangerous riots are most likely to occur when temperatures reach extremely high levels (e.g., around 95–100°F). 5. The more persons present at the scene of an emergency, the more likely are the victims to receive help. 6. If you pay someone for doing something they enjoy, they will come to like this task even more. 7. In choosing their romantic partners, most people show a strong preference for extremely attractive persons. 8. If you want to get someone to change his or her views, it is best to offer this person a very large reward for doing so. 9. When a stranger stands very close to us, we usually interpret this as a sign of friendliness and react in a positive manner. 10. Most people feel sympathy for the victims of serious accidents or natural disasters and do not hold such persons responsible for the harm they have suffered. 11. Unpleasant environmental conditions (e.g., crowding, loud noise, high temperatures) produce immediate reductions in performance on many tasks. 12. Directive, authoritative leaders are generally best at obtaining high levels of productivity from their subordinates. 13. In most cases, individuals act in ways that are consistent with their attitudes about various issues. 14. Top executives are usually extremely competitive, hard‐driving types. 15. Most persons are much more concerned with the size of their own salary than with the salary of others. 16. Direct, face‐to‐face communication usually enhances coopera­ tion between individuals. 17. Most persons prefer challenging jobs with a great deal of free­ dom and autonomy. 76 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

18. The behavior of most lower animals – insects, reptiles and amphibians, most rodents, and birds – is instinctive, i.e., unaf­ fected by learning. 19. For the first week of life, a baby sees nothing but a gray‐blue regardless of what he or she “looks at.” 20. A child learns to talk more quickly if the adults around him/ her habitually repeat the word he/she is trying to say, using proper pronunciation. 21. The best way to get a chronically noisy schoolchild to settle down and pay attention is to punish him/her. 22. Slow learners remember more of what they learn than fast learners. 23. Highly intelligent people – “geniuses” – tend to be physically frail and socially isolated. 24. On average, you cannot predict from a person’s grades at school and college whether he or she will do well in a career. 25. Most national and ethnic stereotypes are completely false. 26. In small amounts alcohol is a stimulant. 27. LSD causes chromosome damage. 28. The largest drug problem in developed Western countries, in terms of the number of people affected, is marijuana. 29. Psychiatry is a subdivision of psychology. 30. Most mentally retarded people are also mentally ill. 31. Electroshock therapy is an outmoded technique rarely used in today’s mental hospitals. 32. The more severe the disorder, the more intensive the therapy required to cure it; for example, schizophrenics usually respond best to psychoanalysis. 33. Quite a few psychological characteristics of men and women appear to be inborn in all cultures; for example, women are more emotional and sexually less aggressive than men. 34. No reputable psychologist believes in such irrational phenom­ ena as ESP, hypnosis, or the bizarre mental and physical achievements of Eastern yogis. 35. To change people’s behavior toward members of ethnic minor­ ity groups, we must first change their attitudes. 36. The basis of the baby’s love for its mother is the fact that the mother fills his/her physiological needs for food and so on. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 77

37. The more highly motivated you are, the better you will be at solving complex problems. 38. The best way to ensure that a desired behavior will persist after training is completed is to reward the behavior every single time it occurs throughout training (rather than intermittently). 39. A schizophrenic is someone with a split personality.

Total up the Fs, because they are all false for different reasons that have been discovered by psychological experiments or observations. If you scored 30 or more “falses,” well done! If you scored below 10, you will definitely benefit from reading on. Developmental psychologists are equally eager to dispel myths and ­present facts. Consider the following (see Hetherington & Parke, 1993). The facts and findings about children’s development are sometimes ­fascinating, but at other times puzzling or even surprising. Below is a sam­ ple of recent facts and findings about developing children that we shall explore in depth in later chapters in this volume.

Fact 1: Adolescents reach puberty Fact 6: Even one experience with two years earlier than their grand­ cocaine can adversely affect the parents did. developing fetus. Fact 2: Newborns can tell their own Fact 7: Babies can learn in the mothers by smell. womb. Fact 3: Children can learn a new lan­ Fact 8: Even 2‐year‐olds experience guage more easily than their parents. jealousy. Fact 4: Waterbeds can aid the deve­ Fact 9: Aggression at age 8 can lopment of babies who are born p­redict criminality at age 30. prematurely. Fact 10: Newborn infants possess Fact 5: Divorce adversely affects the the ability to walk. development of boys more than girls.

People believe that psychology, along with other social sciences, is sim­ ply common sense for various reasons (see Figure 4.1). Nearly all psychological research that has demonstrated that people are cruel, uninsightful, self‐centered, compliant, or antisocial has been criti­ cized more than findings that have painted the opposite picture. So, unless the results depict humans as rather different from how we like to view them, most people say the research results are simply common sense. 78 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

(1) Many findings are well known, intuitive, unsurprising, and uninformative.

Reasons why (2) Psychological explanations, psychology is which are the “stuff of personal perceived as the experience”, are amenable to same as common common sense and should have sense: explanations in that use common sense, not jargon or trivia.

(3) Many experimental findings or social science writings appear not to contradict widely held views of human nature.

Figure 4.1 Three reasons why people think all psychology is common sense.

Some people believe that all of science is common sense. Paradoxically, it is the “hard” scientists who are most convinced that all science is just common sense. Huxley (1902, p. 42), a famous British scientist, noted in an essay:

Science is nothing but trained and organised Common Sense, differing from the latter only as a veteran may differ from a raw recruit: and its methods differ from those of Common Sense only as far as the guardsman’s cut and thrust differ from the manner in which a savage wields his club.

Whitehead, another well‐known scientist, is reputed to have argued that science is rooted in the whole apparatus of commonsense thought. Other scientists have rejected common sense as a source of ideas, let alone test­ able theories; some psychologists have been particularly dismissive of the importance of common sense. Skinner (1972) wrote: “What, after all, have we to show for non‐scientific or pre‐scientific good judgement, or common sense, or the insights gained through personal experience? It is science or nothing” (p. 160). Eysenck (1957, p. 13), in his celebrated book Sense and Non‐Sense in Psychology, states:

This is only one example of what appears to be an almost universal belief to the effect that anyone is competent to discuss psychological problems, whether he has taken the trouble to study the subject or not and that while everybody’s opinion is of equal value, that of the professional psychologist must be excluded at all costs because he might spoil the fun by producing some facts which would completely upset the speculation and the wonderful dream castles so laboriously constructed by the layman. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 79

Thus, for these eminent psychologists, common sense is a dangerous area from which to draw ideas as these are often misguided or unfalsifiable. Even worse, various commonsense ideas may be based not on simple ­surmise but on prejudice and political ideology. Moreover, one can cite extensive literature that illustrates lay persons’ faulty reasoning; for ­example, the readily observed failure of lay people to make appropriate use of disconfirmatory information in problem solving and the overwhelming preference for confirmatory strategies in logical reasoning tasks. For ­example, if you want to find out whether somebody is an extravert you can ask whether he or she has many friends, likes going out, and really enjoys parties (confirmatory) or, alternatively, whether he or she is rather shy in company (disconfirmatory). Lay people prefer to use the first of these two approaches and to ignore any disconfirmatory information that might be available. There are many other well‐established findings showing human irration­ ality in everyday settings. For example, people overestimate the frequency of well‐publicized events (deaths due to being murdered or having cancer) while underestimating less publicized events such as dying from asthma or diabetes. Similarly, when considering, say, the relative job performance of two people, the absolute number of successes is given greater weight than the relative number of successes to failures – people ignore the denomina­ tor. There are many, many examples of this type of faulty reasoning. So the argument ebbs and flows. Is psychology a science? Is science a good thing? Is science common sense?

4.5 Beware the Fortune Cookie

Is psychology as (non‐)scientific as astrology or graphology? As many peo­ ple in fact seem to believe in astrology as in psychology: They are victims of some of the oldest tricks in the trade. Why do so many people from all backgrounds believe in, consult, and act upon astrological and graphological predictions? The same is true of tarot cards, crystal ball readings, and other hocus pocus. Some businesses in Britain use the services of graphologists, whereas the French frequently consult astrologers. Patient research by impartial researchers has by and large failed to find any significant replicable, theoretically based or explica­ ble findings. This is perhaps far truer of graphology than of astrology. Both are falsifiable and both have been falsified, yet people still believe. In short, graphology and astrology are bunkum. Yet many people are hood­ winked. Why? 80 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

There are two sorts of answers to this question. One concerns the reli­ ability and validity of alternative, more scientifically acceptable ways of assessing, describing or measuring people, like ability tests. High unem­ ployment has meant unprecedented numbers of people applying for jobs, and bewildered selectors are turning to any means of assessment they trust in, understand or can afford. Some believe in school grades or the predic­ tiveness of leisure pursuits (always the greatest source of lies in an applica­ tion form), despite the evidence that they are weak predictors of occupational success. However, distrust of psychology, the emergence of numerous, fairly bogus consultancies, and excessive use of poorly psycho­ metrized tests mean that because of the costs and poor performance of some of these tests, distraught and overburdened selectors are turning elsewhere for easy answers. Some have turned to graphology. Yet literally dozens of scientific studies challenge the validity of graphology again and again in accurately describ­ ing personality or predicting behavior (Beyerstein & Beyerstein, 1992). Furnham (1988) reviewed these studies examining the validity of graph­ ological analysis, noting the following typical conclusions:

●● “It was concluded that the analyst could not accurately predict person­ ality from handwriting.” This was based on a study by Vestewig, Santee, and Moss (1976) from Wright State University, who asked six hand­ writing experts to rate 48 specimens of handwriting on 15 personality variables. ●● “No evidence was found for the validity of the graphological signs.” This is from Lester, McLaughlin, and Nosal (1977), who used 16 graphologi­ cal signs of extraversion to try to predict from handwriting samples the extraversion of 109 subjects whose personality test scores were known. ●● “Thus the results did not support the claim that the three handwriting measures were valid indices of extraversion.” This is based on the study by Rosenthal and Lines (1978), who attempted to correlate three graphological indices with the extraversion scores of 58 students. ●● “There is thus little support here for the validity of graphological anal­ ysis.” This was based on a study by Eysenck and Gudjonsson (1986), who employed a professional graphologist to analyze handwriting from 99 subjects and then fill out personality questionnaires as she thought would have been done by the respondents. ●● “The graphologists did not perform significantly better than a chance mode.” This was the conclusion of Ben‐Shaktar and colleagues (1986) at the Hebrew University, who asked graphologists to judge the profes­ sion, out of 8 possibilities, of 40 successful professionals. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 81

●● “Although the literature on the topic suffers from significant methodo­ logical negligence, the general trend of findings is to suggest that graphology is not a viable assessment method.” This conclusion comes from Klimoski and Rafael (1983), based at Ohio State University, after a careful review of the literature.

After excellent empirical studies in the area Ben‐Shaktar, Bar‐Hellel, Belen, Ben‐Abba, and Fling (1986, p. 652) thoughtfully concluded:

●● Although it would not be surprising if it were found that sloppy hand­ writing characterized sloppy writers, stylized calligraphy indicated some artistic flair, and bold, energetic people had bold, energetic hand­ writing, there is no reason to believe that traits such as honesty, insight, leadership, responsibility, warmth, and promiscuity find any kind of expression in graphological features. Some may have no somatic expres­ sion at all. Indeed, if a correspondence were to be empirically found between graphological features and such traits, it would be a major theoretical challenge to account for it. ●● There are not enough constraints in graphological analysis and the very richness of handwriting can be its downfall. Unless the graphologist makes firm commitments to the nature of the correspondence between handwriting and personality, one can find ad hoc corroboration for any claim. ●● The a priori intuitions supporting graphology listed above operate on a much wider range of texts than those graphologists find accept­ able. As graphologists practice their craft, it appears that, from a graphological viewpoint, handwriting, rather than being a robust and stable form of expressive behavior, is actually extremely sensitive to extraneous influences that have nothing to do with personality (for example, whether the script is copied or not, or the paper lined or not). ●● It is noteworthy that most graphologists decline to predict the sex of the writer from handwriting, although even lay people can diagnose a writer’s sex from handwriting correctly about 70% of the time. They explain this by insisting that handwriting only reveals psychological, rather than biological, gender. Although common sense would agree that some women are masculine and some men effeminate, it would be somewhat perverse to argue against the presumption that most women must be feminine and most men masculine. Could the graphologists simply be reluctant to predict so readily verifiable – or falsifiable – a variable? 82 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

However, the more plausible reason why people believe in graphology and astrology is paradoxical. Graphological and astrological interpreta­ tions or readings are indeed true, but (and it is an important but) they are true because they consist of vague positive generalizations with high base‐ rate validity (they are true of most people), yet they are supposedly derived specifically for a named person. For nearly 40 years psychologists have been investigating the Barnum effect. It was the famous circus‐act producer Phineas T. Barnum who said “there’s a sucker born every minute” and had as his formula for success “a little something for everybody.” The Barnum effect refers to the phenom­ enon whereby people accept personality feedback about themselves, whether it is universally valid or trivial, because it is supposedly derived from personality assessment procedures. In other words, people believe in astrology and graphology because they fall victim to the fallacy of personal validation, which means that people accept the generalizations, the trite bogus descriptions that are true of nearly everybody, to be specifically true of themselves. Consider a psychological study to illustrate this point. An American psychologist called Stagner (1958) gave a group of personnel managers a well‐established personality test. But instead of scoring it and giving them the actual results, he gave each of them bogus feedback in the form of 13 statements derived from horoscopes, graphological analyses, and so on. Each manager was then asked to read over the feedback (supposedly derived for him/herself from the “scientific” test) and decide how accurate the assessment was by marking each sentence on a scale (a) amazingly accurate; (b) rather good; (c) about half and half; (d) more wrong than right; (e) almost entirely wrong. Over half felt their profile was an amazingly accurate description of themselves, whereas 40% thought it was rather good. Almost none believed it to be very wrong. These are the classic Barnum statements:

1. You have a great need for other people to like and admire you. 2. You have a tendency to be critical of yourself. 3. You have a great deal of unused capacity which you have not turned to your advantage. While you have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for them. 4. Disciplined and self‐controlled outside, you tend to be worrisome and insecure inside. 5. At times you have serious doubts as to whether you have made the right decision or done the right thing. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 83

6. You prefer a certain amount of change and variety and become dis­ satisfied when hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. 7. You pride yourself as an independent thinker and do not accept ­others’ statements without satisfactory proof. 8. You have found it unwise to be too frank in revealing yourself to others. 9. At times you are extraverted, affable, sociable, while at other times you are introverted, wary, reserved. 10. Some of your aspirations tend to be pretty unrealistic. 11. Security is one of your major goals in life.

People definitely and not unnaturally have a penchant for the positive. Many researchers have replicated this result. A French psychologist adver­ tised himself as an astrologer in various newspapers and received hundreds of requests for his services. He replied to each letter by sending out identical mimeographed copies of a single ambiguous horoscope. More than 200 clearly gullible clients actually wrote back praising his accuracy and percep­ tiveness. An Australian professor regularly asks his first‐year students to write down their dreams in frank detail, or to describe what they see in an ink­ blot – the more mystical the task the better. A week later he gives them the statements shown above for rating as before. Only after they have publicly declared their belief in the test are the students encouraged to swap feedback. The humiliation of being so easily fooled is a powerful learning experience. Furnham (1994) tricked his students with a “medical Barnum.” They were told the following:

Trichosis Diagnosis. There are many ways of determining a person’s state of health. For instance, examining heartbeats, urine specimens, blood pressure etc., modern medicine attempts to measure body functioning. But there are other methods that have been used for thousands of years. For instance, by examining the state of a person’s pupils it has been possible to diagnose certain illnesses. There has also been a long‐standing interest in the extent to which a c­areful physical and chemical analysis of hair can give very interesting clues to body health. For instance, the evidence that Napoleon was poisoned was provided by a close analysis of his hair. More recently DNA analysis can be done by the examination of a person’s hair. This study is an attempt to examine if hair analysis or trichosis diagnosis can be used to diagnose the health of otherwise normal healthy individuals. We want you to provide 2–5 hairs (preferably from the back of the head) and put them in an envelope with your name on it. It takes some time to do this analysis so it will not be until next week that we give you the feedback, which will be put in the same envelope. 84 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

All students agreed to do this but the request did cause anxiety. Three wanted to know if the test could detect drug taking and one whether it would detect cancer. Students were reassured that it could not but that this form of analysis was a good indicator of general health. The following week, 52 of the 60 arrived at the timetabled lab and were shown advertising from an organization that purported to do such an analysis. They were given the envelope that contained their hair samples. It now included, along with their own samples, two pages typed in differ­ ent script. The one page consisted of a paragraph of the medical Barnum items that they were asked to rate. A second page set out the items one by one (24 in all) and participants were asked to rate them on a 7‐point scale for accuracy (7 being extremely accurate; 1 being not accurate at all). In order to encourage belief in this feedback, results were printed in various typefaces and in different order. Thus if one participant happened to glance at his/her neighbor’s printout, it would not appear the same. Participants were told not to confer, warned about social desirability, and encouraged to give their honest answers. A third of the feedback items received a score of 60% or above. Some of the highest ratings were about normality (18, 20), which is to be expected given this sample. Other items rated as accurate referred to variability in behavior (6 sleeplessness; 10 tiredness; 15 appetite; 17 anxiety; 22 food craving). The item that yielded the lowest score (rated by the majority as inaccurate) referred to quite specific physical behaviors (13 nose bleeding; 21 urine color). Interestingly, nearly two‐thirds believed the health indus­ try themes about their diet benefiting from more fresh fruit and vegetables.­ Research on the Barnum effect has, however, shown that belief in bogus feedback is influenced by a number of important factors, some to do with the client and the consultant (their personality, naïveté, etc.) and some to do with the nature of the test and the feedback situation itself. Women are not more susceptible than men, although of course generally naïve or gul­ lible people are (tautologically!) more susceptible to this effect. However, the status or prestige of the consultant is only marginally important, which is of course good news for the more bogus people in this field. Nevertheless, some variables are crucial. One of the most important is perceived specificity of the information required. The more detailed the questions the better – so you have to specify exact time, date, and place of birth to astrologers. In one study an American researcher gave all his sub­ jects the same horoscope and found that those who were told that the inter­ pretation was based on the year, month, and day of birth judged it to be more accurate than those who were led to believe that it was based only on the year and month. Again and again studies show that after people receive Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 85 general statements they think pertain just to them, their faith in the proce­ dure and in the diagnostician increases. Clients’ satisfaction is no measure of how well the diagnostician has differentiated them from others, but it is utterly dependent on the extent to which they believe it is specific to them. The second factor confirms the truth that we are all hungry for compli­ ments but skeptical of criticism. That is, the feedback must be favorable. It need not be entirely, utterly positive, but if it is by and large positive with the occasional mildly negative comment (which itself may be a compli­ ment), people will believe it. People do not readily accept the negative version even if it is seemingly specifically tailored to them. This confirms another principle in personality measurement, the Pollyanna principle, which suggests that there is a uni­ versal human tendency to use or accept positive words or feedback more frequently, diversely, and facilely than negative words and feedback. It has been shown that, according to the evaluation of two judges, there were five times as many favorable as unfavorable statements in highly acceptable interpretations and twice as many unfavorable statements in rarely accepted interpretations. Hence the popularity of astrology and graphology. Feedback is based on specific information (time and place of birth for astrology; slant and size of writing, correctness of letters, dotting of i’s and crossing of t’s, use of loops and so forth in graphology). It is nearly always favorable. It is often the anxious (worried, depressed, insecure) who visit astrologers, grapholo­ gists, and fortune tellers. They are particularly sensitive to objective ­positive information about themselves and the future. Therefore, the very type of feedback and the predisposition of clients make acceptance highly proba­ ble. Thus if the general description seems true (and it probably is), people frequently conclude that it must be even more true when even more addi­ tional information is given. Furthermore, this process is enhanced over time for two reasons. Since Freud it has been known that people selectively remember more positive events about themselves than negative ones, and are thus likely to remember more feedback that coincides with their own views of themselves than information that is less relevant or contradictory. Second, of course, people have to pay for the consultation. Perhaps one needs a wealth warning in every astrological statement! There are other attractions of astrological and graphological readings. They not only give useful, fascinating information about oneself, but they are also claimed to predict the future, thus reducing anxieties and uncertain­ ties about what will happen. Moreover, unlike other forms of therapy, which require psychological work and/or behavior change to obtain any benefit, in graphology one merely has to supply a writing specimen, or in astrology 86 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious the exact time and place of birth. There is much to gain and ­little to lose at the astrologist’s or graphologist’s. Not surprisingly, then, a ­comfortable col­ laborative illusion of scientific validity emerges, formed between the buyer and seller of the astrological reading or handwriting analysis. There is one other reason why people validate graphology and astrol­ ogy: the self‐fulfilling prophecy. It is quite possible that if one is told “as a Virgo, you are particularly honest,” this may lead one to notice and subse­ quently selectively recall all or any instances, albeit trivial ones, of behavio­ ral confirmation (pointing out that a person had dropped a bus ticket; giving back excess change). The self‐fulfilling prophecy may work on both a conceptual and a behavioral basis. Thus Virgos come to include the trait of honesty in their self‐concept but they may also actually become more honest. In this way graphology and astrology predictions may come true because accepting the predictions partly dictates that our behavior will change appropriately! Beware the fortune cookie, the graphologist, the astrologer! The moral of the story, of course, is that you can impress anyone with the perspicacity of your psychological insights as long as they are vague, relevant for most peo­ ple, generally favorable, but personalized just for you. Fortune tellers have exploited this fact for hundreds of years. Crystal balls have been replaced by tarot cards or simple pen and ink, but the principle remains the same. The fault of false belief, dear Reader, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.

4.6 Conspiracies and Cover‐Ups

A relatively new area of research that has attracted a good deal of attention is that of conspiracy theories. One definition of a conspiracy theory is a false belief that major events are caused by multiple actors working together in secret as part of an evil, cruel, omnipresent group. The movies have a lot to answer for in peddling conspiracy theories about topics such as the Cold War and McCarthyism. This process of movies provoking conspiracy theories is part of what makes America the home of the conspiracy theor y.

Conspiracy theories are beliefs that attribute the ultimate cause of an event, or the concealment of an event from public knowledge, to a secret, unlawful, and malevolent plot by multiple actors working together. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 87

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are widespread across the globe, although they appear to be particularly prominent in the West. In the United States, for instance, national opinion polls regularly show that up to 90% of Americans believe Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone in killing John F. Kennedy. Perhaps more surprising is the prevalent belief, particularly among African American and gay communities, that the HIV/AIDS epi­ demic is a form of genocide perpetuated by government officials. Here are some conspiracy statements. Judge whether you think they are true or not.

1. A powerful and secretive group, known as the New World Order, are planning to eventually rule the world through an autonomous world government, which would replace sover­ eign government. 2. SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) was produced under laboratory conditions as a biological weapon. 3. The US government had foreknowledge about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but allowed the attack to take place so as to be able to enter World War II. 4. US agencies intentionally created the AIDS epidemic and administered it to Black and gay men in the 1970s. 5. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., was the result of an organized conspiracy by US government agencies such as the CIA and FBI. 6. The Apollo moon landings never happened and were staged in a Hollywood film studio. 7. Area 51 in Nevada is a secretive military base that contains hid­ den alien spacecraft and/or alien bodies. 8. The assassination of John F. Kennedy was not committed by a lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, but was rather a detailed, organized conspiracy to kill the president. 9. In July 1947, the US military recovered the wreckage of an alien craft in Roswell, New Mexico, and covered up the fact. 10. Princess Diana’s death was not an accident, but rather an organized assassination by members of the British royal family who disliked her. 11. The Oklahoma City bombers, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, did not act alone, but rather received assistance from neo‐Nazi groups. 88 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

12. The Coca‐Cola Company intentionally changed to an inferior formula with the intent of driving up demand for its classic product, later reintroducing it for financial gain. 13. Special interest groups are suppressing, or have suppressed in the past, technologies that could provide energy at reduced cost or reduced pollution output. 14. Government agencies in the UK are involved in the distribu­ tion of illegal drugs to ethnic minorities.

There are also theories about how advertising works (e.g., that there is a lot of very successful subliminal advertising) and how governments and big pharmaceutical companies work together (Furnham, 2013). Here are some examples.

Statement

1. Advertisers place the word “sex” very subtly in advertisements to attract your attention. 2. Advertisers flash subliminal (below consciousness) images in television advertisements. 3. Supermarkets use undetectable gases (smells) in shops to change a person’s mood to encourage sales. 4. Advertisers target specific audiences through their choice of timing of advertisements in programs. 5. Shops trick you with pricing, i.e., putting up prices for a few minutes, then lowering them and claiming big discounts. 6. Junk mailers use “sneaky tactics” to get people to open the envelope. 7. Advertisers disguise their ads in envelopes appearing to be offi­ cial government documents. 8. Alcohol and tobacco companies sponsor various events to appeal to particular groups. 9. Drug companies falsify their data on the effectiveness of their drugs. 10. Drug companies bribe doctors with presents and conferences to prescribe their drugs. 11. Tobacco companies actually approve of cigarette smuggling. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 89

12. Tobacco companies try to get around the advertising laws in every country. 13. Various companies (mining, tobacco, drug) bribe politicians in any country they can to get laws passed to protect them. 14. Drug companies torture millions of animals in trials. 15. Companies sell medically prescribed drugs which they know are addictive. 16. Oil companies deliberately suppress better car technology that uses less fuel. 17. Oil companies encourage politicians to invade countries to take their oil. 18. Manufacturers use copy‐cat product packing to trick shoppers into buying more. 19. Light bulb companies prevent technological advances into producing longer‐lasting light bulbs. 20. Governments ban certain third world products not because they are unsafe but because they compete too well. 21. Government guidelines set poor diet guidelines so that the medical industry generates drug and treatment revenue in unhealthy patients. 22. Oil companies intentionally ignore oil reserves to create the illusion of scarcity that keeps prices high. 23. Manufacturers use illegal additives in foods (e.g., some brands of crisps) to make them addictive. 24. Effective alternative medicines are rejected by medical councils to maximize revenue. 25. Drug companies get normal behavior to be termed a disorder so they can invent drugs to cure it. 26. Food companies are dishonest about genetically modified food. 27. Banks manipulate inflation and other figures to make more profit. 28. Lawyers knowingly lie on behalf of their clients. 29. Shops fake sell‐by dates to make more profit.

The questions psychologists are interested in are who believes in ­conspiracy theories, both well known and obscure, when they believe them, and why. There are conspiracies about the murder of President Kennedy and Princess Diana, whether we landed on the moon, and who was ­responsible for 9/11. Big events, it seems, must have big causes, and 90 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious there are many who challenge official accounts. Conspiracy theorists of many backgrounds argue that:

●● It is naïve to believe the official version of events. ●● Governments are Machiavellian manipulators of the media. ●● The government narrative aims to keep people ignorant and in fear. ●● Those who are anti‐conspiracy theories demonize them and won’t take the time to look at the evidence (closed mindedness). ●● Conspiracy theory popularizers aim to hold those in power to account and reclaim history. ●● It is the mockers and scoffers who are the stupid ones.

Conspiracy theorists argue that there are many groups who, in effect, censor the information that we receive (see Figure 4.2). The script goes like this:

“There is a geopolitical agency that is behind the schedule – we are in a time of crisis – so which authorities do you trust anyway?”

Corporations The (banks, oil government companies, (the FBI, pharmaceutical CIA, etc.) companies)

The military (Nato, etc.)

Figure 4.2 Targets of conspiracy theories. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 91

Psychological researchers have tried to ask the question: “Are people who believe in conspiracy theories irrational, naïve, insane, paranoid or wise skeptics?” Most psychologists are skeptical about such theories, though they do recognize that there are real cover‐ups by governments and other bodies. In Great Britain there is a 50‐year rule, which means that some (but not all) government papers are published only 50 years after the events have occurred. Many showed that, indeed, lots of informa­ tion was covered up or distorted. Conspiracy theories can be psychologically functional. For many, they make sense of a confusing and uncertain world. They make clear who the forces of darkness are as well as the forces of light, and endow people with the feeling that they are privy to secret knowledge. They also may help people define which group they belong to. Are we in danger of pathologizing real cover‐ups? After all, these do occur, and all families have conspiracies of silence. Are conspiracy theorists better informed and wiser than those who swallow the government/cor­ poration line? Conspiracy theories often intersect with politics. Within two months of the terrorist attacks George W. Bush was railing against 9/11 conspiracy theories and urging Americans not to be sidetracked from the truth of what happened. Ironically, this last part is exactly what the conspiracy the­ orists themselves were saying. Bale (2007, pp. 51–53) has suggested a set of four key characteristics that distinguish conspiracy theorists from real conspiratorial politics.

1. Conspiracy theorists “consider the alleged conspirators to be Evil Incarnate.” That is, the conspirators are not simply actors with differ­ ing political points of view, but are rather “inhuman, superhuman, and/or anti‐human beings who regularly commit abominable acts and are implacably attempting to subvert and destroy everything that is decent and worth preserving in the existing world.” 2. Conspiracy theorists “perceive the conspiratorial group as both monolithic and unerring in the pursuit of its goals.” In other words, conspiracy theorists believe that there is a single conspira­ torial hub, which plans and coordinates its activities and which possesses a high degree of internal solidarity, cohesiveness, and single‐mindedness. 3. Conspiracy theorists “believe that the conspiratorial group is omni­ present.” That is, most conspiracy theories postulate the existence of a group of conspirators that is “international in its spatial dimensions and continuous in its temporal dimensions.” In this view, the conspira­ torial group is believed to be capable of operating anywhere, which in 92 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

turn allows for any negative outcome even remotely associated with the aims of the conspiratorial group to be attributed to them. 4. Conspiracy theorists believe that the conspiratorial group is “virtually omnipotent.” In short, the conspiratorial group is considered to have been the force behind events of historical importance and continues to use nefarious and subversive means to maintain its domination over society. The one means of subverting its influence is to heed the warning of ­conspiracy theorists, although that is by no means a guarantee of success.

There has been a phenomenal growth and dissemination of conspiracy theories surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (see Goldberg, 2004). Although 9/11 conspiracy theories are varied and multitudinal, they share a disbelief of mainstream accounts of those events. Typical commentaries are centered around the related ideas that the US (and other) governments either had foreknowl­ edge of, or planned and perpetrated, the 9/11 attacks, for the furtherance of their own aims, both domestic (clamping down on civil liberties) and foreign (wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). Although repeatedly disputed in the mainstream press and by empirical research, 9/11 conspiracist beliefs continue to find relatively widespread appeal, both in the United States and elsewhere. The dissemination of such beliefs has been aided, in part, by the following that has been attracted by groups such as the 9/11 Truth Movement, whose members convene through online media and at national and international conferences. From an empirical point of view, however, it is notable that no prior research has examined predictors in 9/11 conspiracist beliefs, mirroring the general dearth of research in conspiracy theories. The study described below sought to overcome this lack of prior research by investigating personality and individual difference predictors of beliefs in 9/11 conspiracy theories. The items below were used in a study by Swami, Chamorro‐Premuzic, and Furnham (2010), who found that politically cynical people and those with negative attitudes to authority tended to believe more in these ­theories.

1. The World Trade Center was destroyed, not by planes that crashed into it, nor by the fires that followed, but by explosives or other devices planted in the building. 2. If aircraft struck the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, they were probably controlled by the US military. 3. Because successful air–ground connections are near impossible, mobile phone calls from passengers on allegedly hijacked planes were likely fabrications or never made at all. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 93

4. Intact windows at the Pentagon and a lack of debris prove that the Pentagon was not hit by an aircraft. 5. The Pentagon was not hit by a passenger aircraft but by something smaller, possibly a missile. 6. Government and military exercises (or “war games”) were intention­ ally held on September 11, 2001 to deliberately confuse military personnel and therefore to allow the attacks to take place. 7. United Airlines Flight 93, which is said to have crashed in Pennsylvania, was actually downed by the US military. 8. The US military were ordered to “stand down” (that is, not to respond) prior to the 9/11 attacks so as to allow the attacks to occur. 9. Reports that some of the 9/11 plane hijackers are still alive prove that others were responsible for the attacks. 10. The fact that the US government is withholding information about the 9/11 attacks is evidence of a cover‐up. 11. Officials investigating the 9/11 attacks have sought to suppress the emergence of evidence that might contradict the “official account.” 12. Because they had foreknowledge of the attacks, a number of indi­ viduals and/or companies were able to make a profit by selling shares in trades likely to be affected the attacks (e.g., airline companies). 13. Individuals within the US government knew of the impending attacks and purposely failed to act on that knowledge. 14. The US government agencies, including the military and intelli­ gence, dealt incompetently with the 9/11 attacks and sought to cover up their failures. 15. The US government allowed the 9/11 attacks to take place so that it would have an excuse to achieve foreign (e.g., wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) and domestic (e.g., attacks on civil liberties) goals that had been determined prior to the attacks. 16. The fact that neither George W. Bush nor his security personnel responded to the 9/11 attacks in a manner that indicated the presi­ dent might be in danger is proof that they had privileged access to the planning and execution of the attacks.

There is little relevant psychological work in this area. Some researchers traced beliefs in conspiracy theories to feelings of powerlessness, particu­ larly among people who believe they have become voiceless. Conspiracy theories help individuals to make sense of a world beyond their control, offering seemingly coherent explanations for complex social events. Believing, for instance, that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by the US government simplifies the complexity of understanding contemporary politics, particularly in the face of great tragedy. Moreover, by locating 94 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious beliefs in conspiracies within feelings of powerlessness, some researchers have further suggested that such beliefs lead eventually to a distrust of oth­ ers, especially those in authority. Other early work suggested that beliefs in conspiracy theories serve self‐ esteem maintenance purposes while affording believers an outlet for reas­ serting their individualism or for the expression of negative feelings. For instance, people who believe the world is filled with malevolence may subscribe to conspiracist beliefs that allow them to direct their anger at specific individuals who they feel are responsible for their condition (governments, immigrants, secret groups). Certainly, this was the conclusion of a study on cult movements, which found cult members to score highly on a measure of hostility (Ungerleider & Wellisch, 1979). Others suggest the popularity of conspiracy theories in contemporary Western culture as a function of diminishing faith in governments, a pro­ cess that may be exacerbated by some modes of media such as the Internet (see also Moy & Scheufele, 2000). Another example of a study is that done by Swami and Furnham (2012) on the disappearance of Amelia Earhart. Born in 1897, Amelia Earhart was a noted American aviation pioneer and was the first woman to receive the Distinguished Flying Cross, awarded for becoming the first aviatrix to fly solo across the Atlantic Ocean. She set many other aviation records, wrote best‐selling books about her flying experiences, and encouraged greater acceptance of aviation, especially the role of women. In 1937, Earhart and navigator Fred Noonan attempted a circumnavigational flight of the globe, departing Miami on June 1 and making stops in South America, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia before arriving in Lae, New Guinea, on June 29. On July 2, Earhart and Noonan took off from Lae with the intention of heading to Howland Island in the central Pacific Ocean. During this flight, radio transmission was lost. Despite an unprecedented search, no physical evidence of Earhart, Noonan, or their aircraft was found. Amelia Earhart was declared legally dead on January 5, 1939, but fascination with her disappearance continues to this day. In Swami and Furnham’s (2012) study, participants were asked to choose which of the following items were the most likely explanations for Earhart and Noonan’s disappearance.

●● Their aircraft ran out of fuel and crashed at sea, not far from Howland Island. ●● They arrived at the then uninhabited Gardner Island, landed on an extensive reef flat, but ultimately perished. ●● Running out of fuel, they turned their aircraft around and ultimately crashed near Rabaul in New Guinea. Science, Pseudo‐Science, and Conspiracy Theories 95

●● The Japanese military downed their aircraft as they were spying on the Japanese in the Pacific at the request of the Franklin Roosevelt ­administration. ●● They were captured and executed when their aircraft crashed on Saipan Island, then under Japanese occupation. ●● They intentionally downed their aircraft near Japanese occupied terri­ tory so that the US Navy could spy on the Japanese during the subse­ quent rescue mission, and were safely picked up by the Navy. ●● They survived the flight, returned to the United States, and assumed new identities. ●● During the flight, they unwittingly made contact with an extraterres­ trial spacecraft and were abducted.

The order reflects the most plausible/least conspiratorial item to the most. In their TV study they found that belief in the least plausible explanations was associated with people of lower self‐assessed intelligence, greater skep­ ticism in politics, and lower self‐esteem.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter illustrates how people’s superstitious beliefs and inclinations to favor conspiracy theories are led by their reliance on common sense. Surprisingly, some have suggested that such beliefs can be beneficial in moderation.

The excessive amount of pseudo‐science, inaccurate use of psycho­ logical knowledge, and confusion with common sense has put psy­ chology in a very disadvantaged position in today’s society. Individuals such as psychics or telepathists who claim to possess supernatural powers have led lay people to associate them with psychology. In essence, humans are superstitious and like to draw connections between unrelated events. Such an innate tendency has made people think they are mind readers and know all about psychology. In addition, studies on conspiracy theories, for instance the cause of the 9/11 attacks, suggest people prefer to believe claims and the­ ories that are not presented via public or government media but through sources that may lack evidence and support. The question is, as well as having lower self‐rated intelligence, what other factors can be related to people’s acceptance of conspir­ acy theories? 5 The Man Called Freud

5.1 Knowledge of Psychoanalysis

Without doubt the most famous psychiatrist ever to have lived was Sigmund Freud. Along with Marx and Darwin, it was the ideas of this German‐speaking psychiatrist that did most to shape how people in the 20th and probably the 21st centuries see themselves. He remains, to this day, the most quoted of all psychologists or psychiatrists. Freud changed the way we think and talk about ourselves. Many of his basic ideas have been popularized, and terms from his theories, like anal, obsessional, phallic symbol or penis envy, have bubbled down into every­ day language. Freud was a highly original thinker, without doubt one of the greatest of the 19th century. He developed a highly controversial theory, indeed theories, about personality development, mental health, and illness. Many books have been written about Freud and some have sought to apply his own ideas to understanding the man. Thus Osborne (1993) notes that there are four complicated and significant things about Freud’s childhood:

1. His mother adored him and always knew he would be great. 2. His father was not a success, producing hardship and trauma. 3. His family was Jewish in an anti‐Semitic culture. 4. All his extended family wanted him to do well, encouraging him to be ambitious.

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. The Man Called Freud 97

Studies in hysteria from private practice • 1886–1895 until the break with Breuer

Self-analysis and formulation of major • 1895–1899 principles

Id psychology, first system of • 1900–1914 psychoanalytic psychology

Ego psychology, extension • 1914–1939 and reworking of earlier ideas

Figure 5.1 Freud’s different interests over time.

These factors were to shape Freud’s outlook in significant ways. Indeed, many people argue that Freud’s work and his own psychological make‐up are inseparable. Osborne (1993) goes on to suggest there were four main phases of Freud’s work (see Figure 5.1). Underlying a lot of Freud’s ideas as well as those of the neo‐Freudians is a common set of assumptions.

●● Behavior is a result of fights and compromises among powerful, often unconscious motives, drives, and needs. ●● Behavior can reflect a motive in a subtle or disguised way. ●● The same behavior can reflect different motives at different times or in different people. ●● People may be more or less aware of the forces guiding their behavior and the conflicts driving them. ●● Behavior is governed by an energy system, with a relatively fixed amount of energy available at any one time. ●● The goal of behavior is pleasure (reduction of tension, release of energy, the pleasure principle). ●● People are driven primarily by sexual and aggressive instincts. 98 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● The expression of these drives can conflict with the demands of society – so the energy that would be released in the fulfillment of these drives must find other channels of release. ●● There is a life (Eros) and death (Thanatos) instinct.

Ask the lay person to name just one psychologist he or she has ever heard of and the response is Freud. Many still consider his work some of the best ever done and his books are still extensively read. However, despite his fame, Freud remains widely misunderstood and misquoted – so much so that a book entitled What Freud Really Said was written (Stafford‐Clark, 1970). Today there are basically three attitudes toward Freud and psychoanalysis, the theory he formulated, summarized below.

Pro: Freud was one of the geniuses of history. With minor excep­ tions, his basic theory is correct, universal, and brilliant. His descrip­ tion of the causes of human behavior was a major and unique breakthrough. This view agrees with Freud’s own appraisal of the importance of psychoanalysis: that it was as profound a revolution in human thought as those created by Galileo, Darwin, and Einstein in their respective fields.

Equivocal: Freud was a great thinker of his time. Although many of his ideas have lasting value, some are dated, limited to Freud’s time and place, and others are simply wrong. This is probably the most common current view among psychiatrists and many clinical psychol­ ogists, who still use many of Freud’s terms, ideas, and therapeutic methods. Like the proverbial curate’s egg, the theory is good in parts.

Anti: Freud was a fraud, psychoanalysis a dinosaur in the history of ideas, doomed to extinction, and the most stupendous intellectual con­ fidence trick of the 20th century. Anti‐Freudians criticize Freud and his modern followers for their lack of scientific rigor, for regarding psycho­ analysts as the chosen group that accepts no dissenters or disbelievers, and for promoting a costly method of therapy that is not demonstrably better than any other – and, indeed, may imprison rather than liberate. For some alchemy is to chemistry as psychoanalysis is to psychiatry. The Man Called Freud 99

5.2 Quizzes

Many of Freud’s concepts and methods have influenced ordinary people who have never read his work or have even a slight understanding of what he was trying to say or achieve. Before we continue, test your own knowl­ edge of Freud. Kalat (1993) designed the following short quiz.

Match the Freudian defense mechanisms or ways of protecting oneself in the top list with the situations in the list that follows:

1. Repression 2. Denial 3. Rationalization 4. Displacement 5. Regression 6. Projection 7. Reaction formation 8. Sublimation

a. A man who is angry with his neighbor goes hunting and kills a deer. b. Someone with a smoking habit insists that there is no convincing evidence that smoking impairs health. c. A woman with doubts about her religious faith tries to convert others to her religion. d. A man who beats his wife writes a book arguing that people have an instinctive need for aggressive behavior. e. A woman forgets a doctor’s appointment for a test for cancer. f. Someone who has difficulty dealing with certain people resorts to pouting, crying, and throwing tantrums. g. A boss takes credit for a good idea suggested by an employee because: “It’s better for me to take the credit so that our depart­ ment will look good and all the employees will benefit.” h. Someone with an unacceptable to shout obscenities becomes a writer of novels. Answers a. 4, displacement b. 2, denial c. 7, reaction formation d. 6, projection e. 1, repression 100 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

f. 5, regression g. 3, rationalization h. 8, sublimation

If you got less than four out of eight try this shorter quiz devised by Wade and Travis (1990). This time you are required to supply the Freudian concept.

Which Freudian concepts do these examples suggest?

1. A 4‐year‐old girl wants to snuggle on Daddy’s lap but refuses to kiss her mother. 2. A celibate priest writes poetry about sexual passion and love. 3. A man who is angry with his boss shouts at his kids for making noise. 4. A woman who was molested by her brother for many years assures her friends that she adores him and thinks he is simply perfect. 5. A racist justifies segregation by saying that Black men are only inter­ ested in sex with White women. 6. A 9‐year‐old boy who moves to a new city starts having tantrums.

Answers

1. Oedipus/Electra complex 2. Sublimation 3. Displacement 4. Reaction formation 5. Projection 6. Regression

5.3 The Basics

So what did Freud believe? Medawar (1969), a Nobel Prize‐winning geneti­ cist, noted that claims that any objections to the truth of psychoanalysis are not to be treated seriously because they are defenses against truths which, for the unanalyzed, are too painful even to contemplate. Such objections to Freud’s ideas are called resistance to the theory. Medawar argues that this point robs psychoanalysis of all claims to be scientific because, by this device, it shuts itself off from scrutiny. As we have seen, scientific theo­ ries must by definition be refutable or, in other words, testable. Medawar thus dismisses the theory, and others have strongly agreed with him. Psychology as a science began as an effort to study human conscious­ ness, but Freud compared conscious awareness to the tip of a mental The Man Called Freud 101

­iceberg. Beneath the visible tip, he argued, lay the unconscious part of the mind, containing unrevealed wishes, guilty secrets, unspeakable yearnings, and conflicts between desire and duty. These forces, he argued, have far more power over human behavior than consciousness does, so the true study of human psychology must probe beneath the surface. To probe the unconscious, Freud developed the psychoanalytic method. The unconscious reveals itself, said Freud, in dreams, “free association” – talking about anything that pops into your head, without worrying about what anyone will think of you – and slips of the tongue. Because so many thoughts and memories are hidden in the unconscious and because patients resist uncovering them, Freud maintained, psychoanalytic therapy can be long and difficult. Some patients may be in therapy for 20 years or more – so much so that it may well look like a form of addiction.

5.4 The Dynamics of Personality

Freud’s theory, and the approach of many of his followers, is called psycho- dynamic because it is based on the movement of psychological energy within the person, in the form of attachments, conflicts, and motivations. Freud used ideas from physics of the conservation of energy: Within any system, he thought, energy can be shifted or transformed, but the total amount of energy remains the same. Psychological energy – the energy it takes to carry out psychological processes, such as thinking or dream­ ing – was, to Freud, another form of physical energy. The imagery relates to 19th‐century inventions such as the steam engine, which, by converting water into steam through heat, was able to power great machines. Freud believed that energy, if blocked from direct expression, must be displaced onto a substitute. When displacement serves a higher cultural, socially useful purpose, as in the creation of art or inventions, it is called sublimation. Freud himself thought that, for the sake of civilization and survival, sexual and aggressive energies could and should be displaced or sublimated into socially appropriate and constructive forms. Thus reli­ gious orders teach children because they cannot have children; or barren couples may keep pets as substitutes for their parenting energy. The displacement of energy from one object to another is a key feature of Freud’s of personality. Personality differences in ­habits, attitudes, and behavior patterns stem from the way people displace energy from their early instinctual preferences. Freud called children ­polymorphously perverse because their perversions and obsessions could take any form. 102 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

5.5 The Structure of Personality

To Freud, the human personality is made up of three major systems: the id, the ego, and the superego.

●● First, the id is the reservoir of all psychological energies and inherited instincts. For Freud, the id was the “true psychic reality” because it represents the inner world of subjective experience. It is unconcerned with objective reality and is unaffected by the environment. The id operates according to the pleasure principle, seeking to reduce tension, avoid pain, and obtain pleasure. The id is the most primitive part of one’s personality. The id contains two basic competing instincts: the life or sexual instincts (fueled by psychic energy called the libido) and the death or aggressive instincts. As instinctive energy builds up in the id, the result is an uncomfortable state of tension. The id may discharge this tension in the form of reflex actions, displacement, physical symp­ toms or “wishful thinking” – uncensored mental images and forbidden thoughts. The energy escapes but manifests itself in odd ways. It is the job of the psychoanalyst to recognize and discover the outward mani­ festation of the id. ●● Second, the ego is a referee between the needs of the instinct and the demands of society. It obeys the reality principle, putting a rein on the id’s desire for pleasure until a suitable outlet can be found. The ego thus represents “reason and good sense.” Freud described the relation­ ship between ego and id this way: “In relation to the id, [the ego] is like a man on horseback who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse…Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego constantly carries into action the wishes of the id as if they were its own.” If a person feels anxious or threatened when those “wishes of the id” conflict with social reality, the ego has certain weapons at its command to relieve the tension. These weapons, called defense mecha- nisms, have two characteristics: they deny or distort reality, and they usually operate unconsciously. According to Freud, they are often unhealthy patterns that cause emotional problems and self‐defeating behavior.

Although there is no single agreed list of all the processes that Freud considered to be defenses, we shall use the main ones described by Freud’s daughter, Anna Freud, who became an eminent psychoanalyst herself, and by modern personality researchers. The Man Called Freud 103

●● In repression, a threatening idea, memory or emotion is blocked from becoming conscious. It refers to the mind’s effort to keep a lid on unacceptable feelings and thoughts in the unconscious, so that you are not even aware of them. Of course, repression is only partly successful and can cause havoc with memory. ●● In projection, one’s own unacceptable feelings are attributed to some­ one else. A person who has uncomfortable sexual feelings about mem­ bers of a different ethnic group may project this discomfort onto them, saying, “those people are dirty minded and oversexed.” Some cultures institutionalize the whole process of projection. ●● With regard to regression Freud believed that personality develops in a series of stages, from birth to maturity; each new step, however, pro­ duces a certain amount of frustration and anxiety. If these become too great, normal development may be briefly or permanently halted and the child may remain fixated at the current stage; for instance, he or she may not outgrow clinging dependence. People may “regress” to an earlier stage if they suffer a traumatic experience in a later one. Adults occasionally reveal “partial fixations” that they never outgrew, such as biting nails or sucking the thumb, and often regress to immature behavior when they are stressed. The temper tantrums of some adults may be very similar to how they behaved as children. ●● In denial, people simply refuse to admit that something unpleasant is happening or that they are experiencing a taboo emotion. It can often be seen initially in people who are told that they are dying. ●● Intellectualization and rationalization are higher‐level defenses that depend on complex cognitive processes. Intellectualization is the unconscious control of emotions and impulses by excessive depend­ ence on “rational” interpretations of situations. In rationalization, the person finds excuses to justify actions that were caused by repressed and unacceptable feelings. Some people find that a university education trains them to be highly sophisticated at rationalization. ●● In displacement, people release their “pent‐up” emotions (usually anger) on things, animals or other people that are not the real object of their feelings. People use displacement when they perceive the real ­target as being too threatening to confront directly.

These defense mechanisms, Freud maintained, protect the ego and allow the person to cope with reality. Different personalities emerge because people differ in the defenses they use, in how rigid their defenses are, and in whether their defenses lead to healthy or disturbed functioning. 104 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● The superego, the last system of personality to develop, represents the voice of morality, the rules of parents and society, the power of author­ ity. It operates on the morality principle. The superego consists of the ego ideal, those moral and social standards you come to believe are right, and the conscience, the inner voice that says you did something wrong. The superego sits in judgment on the activities of the id, hand­ ing out miserable feelings (guilt, shame) when you break the rules. Naturally, some people have better developed superegos than others.

According to Freud, the healthy personality must keep all three systems in balance. A person who is too controlled by the id is governed by impulse and selfish desire, whereas someone who is too controlled by the superego is rigid, moralistic, and authoritarian. A person who has a weak ego is unable to balance personal needs and wishes with social duties and realistic limitations. A wit once described psychoanalysis as the story of a sex‐crazed monkey (the id) attacking a naïve spinster (the ego) while being supervised by a nervous bank manager (the superego).

5.6 The Development of Personality

Two things need to be said before the psychosexual theory is described. First, people have three levels of awareness: conscious (what we are aware of), preconscious (what we can be aware of if we attend to it carefully), and unconscious (that about which we cannot be aware except under exceptional circumstances). Therapy is often aimed precisely at bringing the unconscious into the conscious. Second, personality has a structure. It is the result of three factors: the unconscious ever‐present id that is the biological basis of personality; the partly conscious ego that develops in the first year and is the psychological executive of personality; and the superego that develops from the age of 3 to 5 years and is the social and moral component of personality. Freud thought that personality develops over five stages. Freud called these stages psychosexual because he believed that psychological development depends on the changing expression of sexual energy in different parts of the body as the child matures. Only through successful resolution of these stages can children develop a desirable personality. Fixation in the psychosexual stages can result in “abnormal” and undesirable personality and behavior.

●● The oral stage marks the first year of life as babies take in everything through their mouths. The mouth is the focus of sensation and stimu­ lation at this stage. People who remain fixated at the oral stage, Freud The Man Called Freud 105

maintained, may as adults seek constant “oral gratification” in such activities as smoking, drinking, overeating, debating, nail biting, etc. They may choose dentistry, the law, opera singing, wine tasting or ­lecturing, all of which are oral occupations. ●● The anal stage, at about age 2 to 3, marks the start of ego development as the child becomes aware of the self and of the demands of reality. The major issue at this stage is control of bodily wastes, a lesson in self‐control that the child learns during toilet training. People who remain fixed at this stage, Freud thought, may become “anal reten­ tive,” holding everything in, obsessive about neatness and cleanliness. Or they can become just the opposite, “anal expulsive” – messy and disorganized. It is said that those jobs concerned with monitoring, checking, controlling or quality assuring are anal. Because attitudes to money are supposedly acquired in this phase, money‐related jobs such as accountancy are anal. ●● The phallic (or Oedipal) stage lasts roughly from 3 to 5 years of age. Here sexual sensations are located in the penis for boys and in the clitoris for girls. The child wishes to possess the parent of the opposite sex and get rid of the parent of the same sex. Children of this age sup­ posedly announce proudly that “I’m going to marry Daddy [or Mummy] when I grow up” and reject the same‐sex “rival.” Freud labeled this phenomenon the Oedipus complex after the Greek legend of King Oedipus, who unwittingly killed his father and married his mother. Later, some psychoanalysts used the term Electra complex (from another Greek legend) to describe the female version of this conflict, but Freud himself, and almost all contemporary psychoana­ lysts, speak of the Oedipus complex for both sexes. Boys and girls, Freud believed, go through the Oedipal stage differ­ ently. Boys at this stage are discovering the pleasure and pride of having a penis. When they see a female for the first time, they are horrified. Their unconscious exclaims (in one way or another), “Her penis has dropped off! How could this happen? The girl must have been cas­ trated. Who could have done such a thing to her? My powerful father.” This realization, said Freud, causes little boys to accept the authority of the father, who must have the power to castrate them too. They repress their desire for the mother and decide to be as much like the father as possible. Identification is the process by which they take in, much as being their own, the father’s standards of conscience and morality. The superego has thus emerged. Freud admitted that he didn’t know what to make of females, who, lacking the penis, couldn’t go through the same steps. He speculated 106 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

that a girl, upon discovering male anatomy, would panic that she had only a puny clitoris instead of a stately penis. She would conclude, said Freud, that she had already been castrated. As a result, girls don’t have the powerful motivating fear that boys do to give up their Oedipal feel­ ings. They have only a lingering sense of “penis envy.” The healthy female supposedly resolves penis envy by having children. The neurotic female resolves penis envy by behaving like men, perhaps by having a career or becoming too “masculine.” Women do not develop the strong moral superegos that men do. They feel inferior to men, dislike other women, and develop the unfortunate personality traits of passiv­ ity, vanity, jealousy, and “masochism” (taking pleasure in being treated badly). Needless to say, feminists take issue with Freud. By about age 5, when the Oedipus complex is resolved, the child’s basic personality patterns are formed. Unconscious conflicts with parents, unresolved fixations and guilt, and attitudes toward the same and the opposite sex will continue to replay themselves throughout life. ●● The latency stage lasts from the end of the to puberty. The child settles down, goes to school, makes friends, develops self‐confidence, and learns the social rules for appropriate male or female behavior. Sexual feeling subsides and skills are developed. This is a period of learning social mores and is not typified by psychological trauma of any sort. ●● The genital stage begins at puberty and marks the beginning of what Freud considered mature adult sexuality. Sexual energy is now located in the genitals and eventually directed toward sexual intercourse. Not everyone, however, reaches this mature stage. The defense mechanisms of the ego and the displacement of instinctual energy may prevent peo­ ple from reaching mature genital sexuality and keep them fixated on “immature” forms of sexual behavior.

The Oedipus quiz (Osborne 1993) 1. Is the Oedipus complex universal? 2. Why is it necessary to use a myth to describe what is supposed to be an obvious human psychic reality? 3. Why should a child fear castration? 4. Why does sexual curiosity get repressed after the Oedipus complex? 5. Why did Freud never clearly define exactly what he meant by the complex? 6. Why is the positive form of the complex, the desire for the death of the rival, seemingly stronger than the negative form, love for the ­parent of the same sex? The Man Called Freud 107

7. How does the Oedipus complex work in societies where children are brought up, not by mother and father, but by the extended family, or uncles, or communally? 8. Why did Freud initially think there was a total symmetry between the development of boys and girls, and then decide the development of girls was more complex? 9. Why did Freud originally think the fear of castration came from real threats from parents and nurses? 10. Why did Freud later argue that the fear of castration came from hints, fantasies, and, most importantly, from the little boy seeing the “actually” castrated little girl? 11. What has rivalry got to do with Oedipality? 12. Why are boys and girls supposedly the same but different in the Oedipus complex?

The theory postulates that problems moving from one stage to the next lie at the heart of adult personality. If one moves through the state without any crises, fixations or regressions, it does not mark or influence adult personality. However, problems arising from these stages mark one for life. Hence there are adult personality traits that arise from childhood experi­ ences. Further, opposite patterns can be seen as reactions to the same problem (see Table 5.1). The first phase lasts up until about 18 months. The issues concern feed­ ing and the erogenous zones of the mouth, lips, and tongue, and weaning from liquids onto solids as well as biting when the teeth arrive. Children who have problems at this stage therefore become orally fix­ ated because they were weaned too early or too late or experienced oral deprivation or overindulgence. Many adult activities are very oral: eating, drinking, kissing, talking, smoking, and chewing. The deprived oral pes­ simist may, according to the theory, use the mouth as a punishment. He or she may be very sarcastic and choose oral occupations like lawyer or dentist. Some will become food faddists or drink prohibitionists. Others may be speech purists, nail biters or pen chewers. They may enjoy particu­ lar Dracula movies or espouse the virtues of vegetarianism. On the other hand, the indulgent oral optimist may become a sugar, wine or food expert and humorist. Such people are more likely to smoke, to play wind rather than string or percussion instruments, and to like warm, milky, and mild foods. Thus both oral optimists and pessimists live with their problems over early feeding, but in very different ways. The second phase is the anal phase and here the source of conflict is toilet training. It is about control where the child discovers he can control, please 108 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Table 5.1 Extremes of Freudian personality types

ABNORMAL NORMAL ABNORMAL

Oral Traits Optimism Pessimism Gullibility Suspiciousness Manipulativeness Passivity Admiration Envy Cockiness Self‐belittlement

Anal Traits Stinginess Over‐generosity Constrictedness Expansiveness Stubbornness Acquiescence Orderliness Messiness Rigid punctuality Tardiness Meticulousness Dirtiness Precision Vagueness

Phallic Traits Vanity Self‐hate Pride Humility Blind courage Timidity Brashness Bashfulness Gregariousness Isolation Stylishness Plainness Chastity Avoidance of promiscuity Happiness Sadness or frustrate parents by expelling or withholding feces. Freudians believe this phase is associated with later hostile, sadistic, and obsessive behavior. Traits are orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy. It has been suggested that attitudes to time, cleanliness, and money are linked to and associated with this phase. So the anal expulsives are generous, untidy, and chaotic while the anal retentives are mean, meticulous, and mindful. This is the world of petty officialdom, quality controllers, and bankers. Then we have the ideas of anal fixation and anal eroticism, which have come down into popular language. The third phase is the phallic phase, characterized by the famous Oedipal (and Electra) complex, which lasts from age 2 to 5 years. The erogenous zone is the genitals. Freud regarded this as the kernel of neuroses. The 5‐year‐old boy supposedly (and unconsciously) feels both profound love The Man Called Freud 109

for his mother and hatred of his father. But no society can tolerate and this leads to the castration complex, which is belief that the father revenges the child’s jealous rage by castration, which nullifies the complex. The phase is characterized by either vanity or recklessness in adulthood or its opposite. So a poor resolution to this conflict may lead to either excessive promiscuity or chastity. It may lead to parent fixation or a con­ tinuous looking backward to the past. Pride and doubt, boldness and timidity are personality characteristics associated with the phallic stage. The phallic stage is followed by latency and then the genital stage, which occurs from adulthood onwards. The sources of conflict are manifold and concern many of the difficulties experienced by all people, establishing healthy relationships, getting a job, and enjoying life. It’s about finding what the Freudians called adapted and healthy defense mechanisms. Freudian ideas still attract disbelief, indignation, and dismissal. Some have been put to the test and found wanting. Others have demonstrated that aspects of the theory are certainly true.

5.7 Dreaming

“Dreams are the royal road to the unconscious” (Freud, 1899).

Most people know that Freud and his followers were interested in dreams. Klein (1984, pp. 30–31) has defined precisely what Freudians believe about dreams:

●● All dreams represent a wish. This wish is usually concerned, as often in Freudian theory, with repressed conflicts that cannot find expression in waking life. The wish is therefore an unfulfilled wish. According to this view, dreaming is important for mental health. ●● Dreams are the guardian of sleep. Dreams are the product of id activity. Without them these wishes from the id would become conscious and flood the ego with anxiety and we would wake. This, indeed, is the basis of nightmares. Awakening from a nightmare occurs when the wish is about to break into consciousness. The nightmare is the result of the attempt to convert the anxiety‐laden wish into acceptable dream material. ●● Dreams are shaped by the censor. This id activity is monitored and charged by the censor (equivalent to the superego, a concept that was 110 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

a relatively late development in psychoanalytic theory), which ensures, by disguising the wish, that it can evade the ego. Where this fails, as has been seen, the subject awakes. ●● These changes and disguises are known as dreamwork. They are pri­ mary processes, id activity. Hence a study of dreamwork is a study of unconscious, primary mental processes. This indeed accounts for the importance attached to dreams.

Normally primary processes, being unconscious, are not accessible. Dreamwork is an exception. Analysis of dreams, therefore, was described as the royal road to the unconscious. Issues are inferred from the dreams themselves. This was achieved by obtaining free associations to dreams. Dreams change and distort reality. The changes and disguises take various forms. Two common ones are symbolism and condensation. Trivialization and changing into the oppo­ site are also typical dreamwork mechanisms. These changes mean essentially that what is dreamed, the manifest con­ tent, is relatively harmless. The unfulfilled wish is held in the latent con­ tent. Dream analysis by free association aims to penetrate the dreamwork and reveal the latent wish. Freud was interested in the dynamics, structure, and development of personality. The Interpretation of Dreams sets out to do two things: to demonstrate how Freud’s theories of the unconscious mind are confirmed through dream analysis, and to demonstrate how dream analysis works. Freud says that all dreams are meaningful: that each dream has a cause; that we only remember the manifest content of the dream (what happens in the dream); that the latent (or repressed and unconscious part) is the cause of the dream, and that there is a complex relationship between the two which can only be exposed through free association of thought. The obvious question is, where do dreams come from and what causes a particular dream? Freud says some of the main information in dreams derives from the following.

1. Recent events and obvious emotional facts like being made angry. Revenge is obtained in the dream – simple wish‐fulfillment. 2. Many ideas are blended together by the dream – otherwise known as condensation. 3. Displacement: an important event may be represented by a recent but unimportant memory. Free association uncovers the link. 4. Long buried memories are represented by recent trivial ideas. Deep displacement which only psychoanalysis can uncover. The Man Called Freud 111

The mechanisms of dreamwork are summarized by Osborne (1993, pp. 49–50).

1. Condensation. That one image can stand for many associations. The complexity of the latent content of a dream can therefore be derived from analyzing how repressed ideas, old ideas, unrecognized ideas, and unthought‐out associations connect up with the condensed image that is at the forefront of the dream. The way that a single idea or event can simultaneously represent different impulses Freud calls “over‐determination.” 2. Displacement. This is where the feelings related to one thing are c­onnected to a different one; thus, for example, murderous feelings toward a sister‐in‐law are displaced onto a little white dog. 3. Dramatization. Interestingly, dreams are of course almost wholly visual, rather like a film. Like some bad films, there often seems to be little connection between the events and the images in a dream. However, as they say, every picture tells a story. In dreams, the story is hidden and the visuals are the clue. 4. Symbolization. Images stand in for and symbolize other things. Phallic symbols are now widely recognized (interestingly), such as guns, tall round buildings, and so on. Dreams make great use of sym­ bols. Freud said, “in dreams symbols are used almost exclusively for the expression of sexual objects and relations.” 5. Secondary elaboration. When someone wakes up they recall their dream and start to think about what it means. This starts with an inter­ pretation that can take them further away from the latent content.

Modern research on dreams is interesting. Why do we enter a fantasy world several times a night when we sleep? Why do we perceive imaginary events and perform imaginary behaviors, and what do they mean? Are they a gateway into our unconscious? A person awakened during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and asked whether anything happened will almost always report a dream. These reports indicate people are conscious during sleep, even though they may not always remember the experiences. The manifest content seen by the dreamer masks the hidden meaning or significance behind the latent content, which is what can cause anxiety and psychological discomfort. The dreams themselves are not direct represen­ tations of our unconscious but need to be analyzed as they are symbolic or metaphors for our true underlying feelings. Some symbols are widely shared because of physical or functional similarities, for example, but there is no simple cipher that can be generally applied. 112 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

It is clear that Freud would argue strongly that dreams provide an insight into our unconscious. However, his work was done over one hun­ dred years ago and many present‐day psychologists have a lot more to add to the topic. One explanation for dreaming does not involve unconscious conflict or desires. In the REM phase of sleep a circuit of acetylcholine‐secreting ­neurons in the pons becomes active, stimulating rapid eye movements, activation of the cerebral cortex, and muscular paralysis, all of which causes us to see images. Moreover, multiple experiments have found that the eye movements a person makes during a dream correspond reasonably well with the content of the dream; the eye movements are what one would expect if the events in the dream were really occurring. The images evoked often incorporate memories of episodes that have recently occurred or what the person has been thinking about lately. Presumably the circuits responsible are more excited by their recent use. Patients awaiting major surgery reveal their fears in what they dream about during the two or three nights before the operation. Their fears are rarely expressed directly, being about scalpels or operating rooms. Their reference is indirect, in condensed symbolized form. Dreams often express what is currently most important in a person’s life, not a deep underlying wish‐fulfillment concept. Hobson (1988) argues that our brains produce fragmented images, which we tie subconsciously together by making a story. Such findings do not dispute Freud’s belief that dreams involve ­complex cognitive processes, many of which are hidden from view. But they argue against the central tenet of his theory: that they are dis­ guised representations of forbidden urges that are held deep in the unconscious. We do not know whether the particular topics we dream about are related to the functions that dreams serve or if the purpose of REM sleep is fulfilled by the physiological changes in the brain, regardless of the plot. Given that we still do not know why we dream, this uncertainty is not surprising. But the rapid progress we are making in most areas of brain research gives us hope that we will have some answers in the not‐too‐ distant­ future.

5.8 Critiques

Over the years psychologists have attempted to evaluate Freudian ideas and practices. The following are amongst the most common attacks. The Man Called Freud 113

●● Untestable hypotheses. It is impossible to test many of the ideas in psy­ choanalysis, old or new, original or revised. They are descriptive obser­ vations, more poetic than scientific. Because so much of psychoanalytic theory depends on the subjective interpretation of the analyst, there is no way to decide which analyst is right. Freud saw penis envy; Horney saw womb envy. Freud saw castration fears; other analysts did not. ●● Incorrect or time‐limited ideas. Many of Freud’s ideas that were put to the test have proved faulty. His notion that our instincts fill an internal “reservoir,” for instance, has been disproved by modern research in physiology. The body does not “store” anger or other emotions. People can certainly collect grievances and keep a mental list of grudges, but this is not the same as saying they have a fixed amount of aggressive energy. Other Freudian ideas have been shown to be specific to his society rather than universal, timeless principles. Freud’s belief that sexual conflicts are behind most personality problems, for example, was probably truer in Victorian times than today. Anthropologists have accused him of being a product of his time, and his theories are only relevant to middle‐aged, neurotic Viennese women of his day. ●● The “patients represent everyone” fallacy. Freud and his followers gener­ alized inappropriately from patients in therapy to all human beings. To be accurate, the observer would have to study a random sample of women, children or homosexuals who are not in therapy. In fact, the theory was based on a very small number of far from typical patients. ●● The “looking backward” or “faulty memory” fallacy. Looking backward over lives means arranging events sequentially. We assume that if A came before B, then A caused B. Psychoanalysts often make this error. Looking backward also depends on a person’s memories, which are highly subject to distortion. ●● An overemphasis on unconscious processes rather than real experiences. Freud’s emphasis on the unconscious had a powerful effect, then and now, not just for theoretical reasons but also for practical ones. It was a great step forward to discover that people are not always aware of their actual desires or of the motives behind their behavior. However, some psychologists today believe that the emphasis on the unconscious went too far, overshadowing the importance of real events and con­ scious thoughts. Since Freud the problems of conscious thought and behavior have proved equally intriguing.

Klein (1984) spelled out nine objections which, he argued, have been effective in persuading most academic psychologists that Freudian theory is unscientific and not worthy of serious study. 114 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● The sample that formed the basis of Freud’s data was composed in the main of neurotic and hysterical Viennese Jewish women, a fin de siècle phenomenon of a dying European tradition. From so limited a sample it is impossible to extrapolate theories about all human beings. ●● In the psychoanalytic writings of Freud and most of his followers, almost no data are reported. What is presented is an interpretation of unknown data, sometimes mixed with accounts of what a patient said. There is, there­ fore, no way of checking the interpretations for consistency, for instance. ●● Freud saw four to five patients a day, each for an hour. It was his ­custom, after dinner, to write up these cases. He did not take notes during the session for fear of spoiling the rapport with his patients. It is, therefore, pertinent to question the accuracy of Freud’s recollection of his data. Freud’s own conception of repression would suggest that Freud would not remember data that failed to fit his hypotheses. ●● Freud eschewed quantification. Lack of quantification enforces vague­ ness to the theorizing, which is, per se, not good. ●● This lack of quantification means that there is no (and cannot be any) statistical analysis. This, in turn, means that it is impossible to estimate to what extent any observations are likely to have arisen by chance. Without such statistical analyses, it is impossible to interpret even clearly reported data. ●● Furthermore, the theory is not refutable. This is a serious objection, since refutability lies at the heart of scientific theorizing (Popper, 1959). For example, what contrary evidence could be adduced to the late Freudian claim that two drives energize human behavior, Eros (the life instinct) and Thanatos (the death instinct)? ●● Freudian theory fails to predict. It is able to explain, post hoc, but this is a function of its vagueness rather than its explanatory power. ●● Finally, psychoanalytic therapy (the raison d’être, after all, for the ­theory) did not work. Indeed, exposure to psychoanalysis probably prevented recovery, which in 70% of cases occurred spontaneously. ●● The conclusion drawn from this battery of objections is that psychoa­ nalysis is an unscientific nonsense, best relegated to the history of ideas, along with phlogiston, the flat earth, and the Ptolemaic theory of a geocentric universe (Klein, 1984, p. 47).

In a spirit of fair‐mindedness Klein does attempt to answer some of these points:

●● The objection of sampling, though true, is almost equally applicable to all branches of psychology, except perhaps psychometry. The Man Called Freud 115

●● The claim that failure of the analytic therapy implies failure of the theory contains a logical fallacy. As it cannot be demonstrated that a particular theory is applied either well or badly, then neither success of therapy nor its failure can be attributed to the underlying theory. ●● It is possible to conceptualize Freudian theory not only as one huge theory but also as a collection of hypotheses. Not all these hypotheses will turn out to be correct. However, the failure of one hypothesis does not imply the failure of all. In other words, it is in order to argue that ­psychoanalytic theory consists of a collection of hypotheses, some false, others true. It therefore makes no sense to reject psychoanalysis as a whole, as do psychologists in general, or to accept it, as do psychoana­ lysts. What is really required is to sift through these hypotheses, one by one, in the light of empirical evidence, which is the essence of the sci­ entific method. Thus, at a stroke, psychoanalysis in this conception is transformed from unscientific to scientific. ●● As regards the efficiency of psychoanalytic therapy, it is wrong to say that psychoanalysis is an effective therapy. It is equally wrong to say that it is ineffective. There is no definitive evidence either way.

Frosh (1997), in his review, concluded that he was both for and against psychoanalysis. He was against it because of:

●● authoritarian training and institutional structures; ●● confusion over evidence; ●● poor documentation of clinical material; ●● weak research base; ●● limited outcome and process literature; ●● ethnocentricity; ●● a tendency toward normative moralizing.

Osborne (1993) argues:

●● Freud was always a determinist, which means whenever he is talking about psychic phenomena he considers these to be caused by some process in the dynamic system of personality. ●● The id, the unconscious, is not that mysterious or impenetrable; it is part of normal life and psychoanalysis can demonstrate its effect. ●● When Freud talks about trieb he does not mean instincts, as many of his translators suggest, but drives, which are very different things. If it was all instinctual then Freud would be a biological determinist, but he is not. 116 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● Freud argues that too much repression of any kind leads to neurosis and unhappiness. This central fact determines much of modern civilization.

On the positive side of the balance sheet Frosh (1997) notes its:

●● engagement with subjectivity and emotion; ●● concern with agency and internality; ●● widening the scope of rationality; ●● critical awareness of the limits of consciousness; ●● fluid and complex interpersonal focus; ●● appreciation of fantasy and therapeutic integrity.

Frosh (1997, pp. 232–233) notes the centrality of the concept of unconscious fantasy in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts believe that the individual is inbred with fantasies – wishes, dreams, anxieties, and con­ flicts – that have casual significance:

When we love or hate someone, when we draw together in communities or hide in isolation from others, when we seek or refuse help, we are exacting fantasies, unconscious structures of meaning…steeped in this messy, uncon­ trollable, uncontainable material, it is perhaps not surprising that psychoa­ nalysis should turn out also to be messy, uncontrolled and uncontained. In many situations, it operates as if its wild and radical vision of the constitu­ tion of human subjectivity is just too hot to handle. Then, psychoanalysis takes on a constricting role as if its moral task is that of defending against its own fire or at least of challenging it safely away from the surrounding gunpowder.

Frosh believes the reaction of many psychoanalysts to public scrutiny and criticism indicates both anxiety and insecurity. He rather mischie­ vously applies a psychoanalytic interpretation of this behavior – is it because they do not believe in what they do, or are they scared to know what they do? Psychoanalysis does not believe in the possibility of immaculate, objec­ tive, uncontaminated evidence. It accepts the inevitability of reflexivity. According to Frosh (1997), “Because one can never separate the claim from the claimant, one can never attest to the objective validity of the theory in question. In simple terms, psychoanalysts can wriggle out of anything by appealing to the trickery of the unconscious” (p. 234). Yet Frosh (1997) believes that psychoanalysts have something to offer with their understanding of intersubjectivity and their careful observa­ tional tradition. He is balanced about therapy. He notes that therapeutic The Man Called Freud 117 procedures have been described as “domineering, constricting, expensive. Elitist, speculative, intrusive, patriarchal and socially oppressive…the length, expense and downright weirdness of the psychoanalytic endeavour is inexcusable, at least in the public health arena” (p. 236). Frosh also talks about the vivacity of the therapeutic procedures, the subtle vocabulary to express variations in consulting room‐based attitudes, beliefs, and emotions, care and patience, and the ability to wait and observe. But overall Frosh does seem more against than for psychoanalysis. Consider the following quotation:

What we are left with is an elaborate set of esoteric practices, lacking any con­ vincing evidence to demonstrate their utility, but institutionalized in a variety of closely related forms and rationed through “closed shop” arrangements so that their purveyors can charge fees high enough to sustain a middle‐class professional lifestyle. Talking to themselves in a sophisticated jargon, these analysts convince one another that they are working on something substantial and meaningful. In addition, they make themselves available to pronounce on some of the centrally troubling issues of contemporary life – violence, child abuse, sexual distress – acting as if they know what they are talking about. But, the argument might run, they do not know anything except their own opinions. It is all a self‐deceiving fraud. (Frosh, 1997, p. 237)

5.9 Freud and Falsifiability

Popper argued that all Freudian explanations were post hoc; they attempted to explain human behavior after the fact, rather than predict anything. This does not worry literary criticism and other arts disciplines deeply influenced by psychoanalysis, but it does concern scientists who believe the demise of Freudian psychology within most psychology departments was primarily due to its failure to satisfy the falsifiability criterion. Stanovich (1998) is particularly critical of psychoanalytic , which he describes as the “spinning of endless webs of rational sounding conjectures.” He argues that many psychoanalysts’ explanations of particular­ behaviors were useless, wrong, and dangerous:

These explanations were enticing because they did explain things. In fact they explained everything – after the fact. However, the explanations they provided created only the illusion of understanding. By attempting to explain everything after the fact, they barred the door to any advance. Progress occurs only when a theory does not predict everything but instead makes specific predictions that tell us – in advance – something specific about the world. The predictions derived from such a theory may be wrong, of course, but this is a strength, not a weakness! (Stanovich, 1998, p. 27) 118 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Eysenck (1985), a lifelong and savage critic of psychoanalysis, did not believe, however, that falsifiability issues were the nail in the coffin of psy­ choanalysis. He argued that many Freudian ideas are testable but mostly fail the test. His criticism of the psychoanalytic edifice is that too often the theories are not only logically inadequate, but also they fail under disinter­ ested testing conditions to generate factual support. Psychoanalysis is both a method of theory and treatment but also of inquiry and research. Eysenck (1985) offers the following warnings to the reviewer of the many writings by and about Freud and other psychoanalysts:

●● “Do not believe anything you see written about Freud or psychoanaly­ sis, particularly when it is written by Freud or other psychoanalysts, without looking at the relevant evidence” (p. 26). ●● “Do not believe anything said by Freud and his followers about the success of psychoanalytic treatment” (p. 31). ●● “Do not accept claims of originality, but look at the work of Freud’s predecessors” (p. 33). ●● “Be careful about accepting alleged evidence about the correctness of Freudian theories; the evidence often proves exactly the opposite” (p. 35). ●● “In looking at a life history, don’t forget the obvious” (p. 37).

He ends this attack in the following words.

“Psychoanalysis is at best a premature crystallization of spurious orthodoxies; at worst, a pseudo‐scientific doctrine that has been equally harmful to the hopes and aspirations of countless patients who trusted its siren call. The time has come to treat it as a historical curiosity, and to turn to the great task of building up a truly scientific psychology”. (Eysenck, 1985, p. 208)

5.10 Freud Today

The debate rages on into the 21st century. Students love Freud. It literally is sexy. It is often counterintuitive and the theories sound powerful. Few people can help admiring Freud’s scholarship, imagination, and creativity. Some insights that occurred in a Viennese surgery over 100 years ago are receiving clear proof today, but others are not. Inevitably, then, the debate will continue as to the major contribution of the man who is still the most famous psychologist in history. The Man Called Freud 119

Sigmund Freud is probably the best known and most quoted psy­ chiatrist in history. His work on the unconscious and defense mecha­ nisms led him to develop psychoanalysis. Using techniques such as dream analysis and free association, Freud attempted to understand and explain hidden unconscious conflicts. The psychodynamic approach also provides explanations of the development of personal­ ity, including Freud’s famous Oedipus complex. Only through reso­ lution of the conflicts at each stage will the child develop “normal” personality traits. Nonetheless, Freud’s theories have received a considerable amount of criticism, from unfalsifiability to an over­ emphasis on the unconscious, from being subjective to being overly simplified. Nevertheless, Freud and his approach developed a way of studying psychology and human beings that behaviorism did not, that is, to view a person through a more holistic lens. 6 A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology

6.1 Introduction

Most psychology students go through a clinical phase where they ­contemplate becoming a certified, licensed clinician. It is difficult to get onto courses as there is great competition. There is also a surprising number of clinicians who leave the profession for a variety of reasons. Yet for most people psychology is really all about mental illness (and health). Traditionally this area is called abnormal psychology, though many now call it clinical psychology. Abnormal psychology is the study of abnormal beliefs and behaviors. It looks at the origins, manifestations, and treatments of disordered habits, thoughts or drives that are classified or categorized under various headings. Indeed, there is a great deal of debate within both psychiatry and psychology as to how to categorize, define, and name abnormal/clinical conditions. These may be caused by environmental, cognitive, genetic or neuro- logical factors. The question of cause is all important for treatment. Whilst it is relatively easy to spot people who are distressed or acting bizarrely, it is much more difficult to define abnormality. Abnormal usually means departure from the accepted, cultural norm. For psychologists, the real issue is whether the behavior is maladaptive, causing a person distress and social impairment. If a person’s behavior seems irrational or poten- tially harmful to themselves and others, we tend to think of that as abnor- mal. For the psychologist it is called psychopathology, for others madness or insanity. For many madness is deeply frightening as mad people are seen to be dangerous, unpredictable, and a menace to themselves and others.

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 121

Socioeconomic status, gender, and race are all related to abnormality. So are cultural factors, as what is abnormal in one culture and at one time is not abnormal in another. Women are more likely to have anorexia, bulimia or anxiety disorders than men, who, in turn are more likely to be substance abusers and psychopaths. Poor people are more likely to be diagnosed schizophrenic than rich people. American children suffer a high incidence of disorders of under‐control compared to over‐control, but the opposite is true in the West Indies. Furnham (2008a) suggested that there are at least five ways to look at abnormality.

Normality vs. abnormality

Subjective: This is perhaps the most primitive idea that uses our- selves, our behavior, and our values as the criteria of normality. This is the stuff of idiom and adage (once a thief, always a thief; there’s nowt so queer as folk). So people like us are normal, those who are different are not. This approach also tends to think in simple catego- ries or non‐overlapping types: normal – abnormal – very abnormal. Normative: This is the idea that there is an ideal, desirable state of how one should think and behave. This view of the perfect world is often developed by religious and political thinkers. Normality is per- fection: The further from normality one is, the more abnormal. It’s a more “what ought to be” than “what is reasonably possible” state of affairs. Nothing is normal because nobody is perfect. Cultural: Culture dictates trends in everything from dress to demeanor, language to love. Culture prescribes and proscribes behaviors. Certain things are taboo, others are illegal. Again, the further away or different from cultural norms a person appears to be, the more he or she is judged as abnormal. However, as cultural beliefs and practices change, so do definitions of normality. The case of homosexual behavior nicely illustrates this issue. Statistical: All statisticians know the concept of or the normal distribution. It has particular properties and is best known in the world of intelligence. Thus a score of 100 is average, 66% of the population score between 85 and 115, and around 97% between 70 and 130. Thus if you score below 70 and over 130 you are unusual, extreme, though the word abnormal would not be applied. This model has drawbacks in the fact that because a ­behavior occurs frequently, it does not necessarily make it healthy or desirable. 122 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Also, whilst it may work for abilities that are reasonably straightfor- ward to measure, it is less easily adapted to more subtle and multidi- mensional issues like personality or mental illness. Clinical: Social science and medical clinicians attempt to assess the effectiveness, organization, and adaptiveness of a person’s function- ing. Much depends on which dimensions are being assessed. Clinicians also accept that the normal–abnormal distinctions are gray and somewhat subjective, though they strive for reliable diagnosis. Abnormality is usually associated with poor adaptations, pain or bizarre behaviors.

However, abnormality revolves around half a dozen or so generally agreed upon criteria relating to what have been called the 4Ds: distress, deviance, dysfunction, and danger. Abnormality generally involves pain and suffering as well as poor adaptation – not being able to do the everyday things of life, such as maintain happy interpersonal relationships and look after oneself. Another is irrationality – bizarre, illogical beliefs about the physical or social world as well as, very often, the spiritual world. Individuals’ behav- ior is often incomprehensible to others. They might hear voices or believe inanimate objects are alive. Abnormal people are often unpredictable; they can be very volatile, changing from one extreme to another and often quite unable to control their behavior. Their behavior is often very inappropriate. Abnormality is characterized by unconventional, usually rare, undesira- ble behaviors that are sometimes called vivid and eccentric. People might move, speak or dress in a very odd way. Some societies tolerate their behavior more than others. Abnormality has a moral dimension because it is associated with break- ing rules, violating moral standards, and disregarding social norms. Illegal, immoral, undesirable behavior is abnormal. Hence the concept of sad, bad, and mad all being linked in people’s thinking. Friends, family or just onlookers often feel uncomfortable around clear evidence of abnormality. People avoid, move away from, and shun abnor- mality. It can bring shame to families, and become a deeply taboo topic. But there are problems with any definition of abnormality, as Furnham (2008a) has noted. First, a healthy person in an unhealthy society is often labeled as abnormal. There have been many historical incidents where sick societies have been deeply intolerant of those who do not obey or concur with their narrow A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 123

(unhealthy, maladaptive) standards of belief and behavior. It was not that long ago that homosexuality was thought of as a mental illness in the West. Second, expert observers can’t agree on the categorization of normal vs. abnormal. There remains fundamental disagreement about whether a per- son is considered in some sense abnormal. Psychiatrists seem to “discover” different disorders every so often, and drop others. For instance, passive aggressive personality disorder has been dropped and hoarding disorder has been discovered. Third, there is the question of who is to make the judgment. Very few people think of themselves as abnormal: Most of us are reasonably positive about ourselves and indeed have a great deal of information others do not have. Yet there are well‐known traps and hazards in making a self‐diagnosis. It is easier to be an observer and label others abnormal, in particular those different from or threatening to us. Fourth, there is a sociopolitical dimension to many judgments because of the implications for treatment. It is no surprise that psychologists and psychiatrists are suspect for many people, and how many have gone into politics for ideological reasons. If you argue the cause of a problem is envi- ronmental, then supposedly changing that environment may both cure and prevent the illness.

6.2 Being Sane in an Insane Place

One of the most famous anti‐psychiatry studies was done in the early 1970s (Rosenhan, 1973). Eight “normal,” mentally healthy researchers tried to gain admission, through diagnosis, to a number of American mental hospitals. The only symptom they reported was hearing voices (saying things like “empty” and “hollow”). Seven were diagnosed as schizophrenic and admitted. Once in the hospital they behaved normally and were ignored when they politely asked for information. They later reported that their diagnostic label of schizophre- nia meant they had low status and power in the mental hospital. Then the researchers decided to come clean and admit they had no symp- toms and felt fine. But it took nearly three weeks before they were discharged, often with the diagnosis “schizophrenia in remission.” So normal, healthy people could easily be diagnosed as abnormal. But could the reverse happen? The same researchers told psychiatric hospital staff that fake or pseudo‐ patients pretending to be schizophrenics might try to gain access to their hospital. The researchers then found that 19 genuine patients were suspected as frauds by two or more members of staff, including one psychiatrist. The conclusion was that it is not possible to distinguish the sane from the insane in mental hospitals. Though this famous study has received 124 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious considerable criticism on ethical and experimental grounds, it added great impetus to the anti‐psychiatry movement. People with schizophrenia are seen to be driven to their form of madness by social, economic, and ­familiar pressures. There were three main origins of the anti‐psychiatry movement (see Figure 6.1). The first started in the early 1950s and was a result of the war between Freudian‐inspired psychoanalytic psychiatrists and the new biological‐physical psychiatrists. The former, who favored protracted, dynamic ­talking cures and who were losing power, were challenged by the latter, who saw their approach as not only costly and ineffective but pro- foundly unscientific. The biological psychologist treatments were surgical and pharmacological and had some important early successes. The old guard challenged the new guard. The second attack began in the 1960s with famous figures like David Cooper, R. D. Laing, and Thomas Szasz in different countries becoming highly vocal about the use of psychiatry to control those who deviated from societal norms. Thus people who were seen to be sexually, politically or morally deviant or different were subject to psychiatric processing and control. Szasz’s famous book, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), explains this position well. The third force was made up of North American and European ­sociologists, notably Erving Goffman and Michel Foucault, who saw the devious power of psychiatry and its effects on labeling, stigmatizing, and hospitalizing people.

Those who support the anti-psychiatry movement...

Opposed the medical Concerned that certain Believed that families, model of illness and religious and ethnic institutions, and the treatment. They groups were oppressed state are as much a believed those who because they were in cause of illness as a were living by different some sense abnormal. person’s biological codes of conduct were They were pathologized functioning or erroneously and and therefore made to genetic make-up. dangerously labeled believe they needed delusional. treatment.

Figure 6.1 Beliefs of the anti‐psychiatry movement. A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 125

The high point of this movement occurred at the time of the 1960s countercultural, challenging zeitgeist. Popular films (e.g., One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest) and radical magazines appeared that contested biologi- cal psychiatrists and state services and practices. The anti‐psychiatry movement was always a loose coalition of social action groups and tended to focus on very specific problems like schizophrenia or sexual disorders. It talked of authenticity and liberation, of empowerment and personal management rather than pharmaceutical intervention. Many began to attack the pharmaceutical industry and particularly established ­psychiatric institutions like the great Victorian mental hospitals. The movement was and still is very concerned about the power of ­diagnostic labels. It sees those labels as giving a bogus impression of accu- racy and immutability. It has succeeded to a large extent such that schizo- phrenics are now regularly described as people with schizophrenia, and AIDS victims as people with AIDS. Diagnostic labels and manuals are rejected because people meet no or multiple criteria, and there is little agreement between experts.

6.3 Mental Illnesses

Most people recognize and understand the causes, manifestations, and even the treatments for depression, which is widespread. But there are some mental illnesses that elicit fear and confusion. We shall consider two, schizophrenia and psychopathy.

Schizophrenia Schizophrenia is a psychotic illness characterized by a disorder of thoughts and perceptions, behaviors and moods. It is common to differentiate between neuroses and psychoses. Neurotics tend to be anxious, depressed, guilt‐ridden or inhibited. They are often fearful, showing worry, tension, distractibility, depression or fatigue or self‐defeating coping like obsessive thoughts, compulsive rituals or excessive forgetting. Psychoses show much more serious and disturbing symptoms. These include hallucinations, delusions, powerful disturbances of mood, obvious disturbances of thought, as well as acute and chronic relationship prob- lems leading to isolation and social withdrawal. Whereas most neurotics have insight into their condition, psychotics do not. The diagnostic term schizophrenia is a major cause of dispute and debate among psychiatrists, patient groups, and the general public. The 126 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Most people are terrified by the prospect of meeting someone with schizophrenia. They are thought of as deranged, dangerous, and demented as well as unhinged, unpredictable, and uncontrollable. most common objection is that it is an unhelpful “umbrella” term that covers a range of different disorders with different symptoms and differ- ent causes. Diagnosis is therefore unreliable. Some advocate the idea of schizotypy, which refers to a continuum of personality characteristics and experiences related to psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. This is ­different from the categorical view that you either have or do not have the problem. It is assumed that schizophrenia affects 1 in 100 people and is the most serious of mental disorders. It has been suggested that prognosis for the problem is this: a third of people require long‐term institution- alization; a third show remission and could be considered cured; while a third have periods of symptoms followed by “normality.” They are dif- ferent because of the symptoms they do have (positive) and don’t have (negative) compared to normal people. They tend to have various ­manifestations of thought disorders (disorganized, irrational thinking), delusions, and hallucinations. However, they tend to lack energy, initia- tive, and social contacts. They are emotionally very flat, have few pleas- ures, and are withdrawn. There are many common misconceptions about people with schizophrenia:

●● They are dangerous, uncontrollable, and unpredictable; in fact, most are rather shy, withdrawn, and concerned with their problems. ●● They have a split Jekyll and Hyde personality; in fact, what is split is the emotional (affective) and cognitive (thought) aspect of people with schizophrenia. ●● They do not, and cannot, recover: once a schizophrenic, always a schiz- ophrenic.

The classification of schizophrenia remains complex because of the range and diversity of symptoms. These include delusions (odd, false beliefs); hallucinations (false sensory perceptions of sound, sight, smell); disorganized speech (incoherence, loose associations, use of neologisms); disorganized behavior (dress, body posture, personal hygiene); negative, flat emotions (lack of energy, libido); poor insight into their problems; and depression. A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 127

Because of complications with the diagnosis, various subtypes have been named. Thus there is catatonic, paranoid, and disorganized schizophrenia. Catatonics (from the Greek “to stretch or draw tight”) often adopt odd, stationary poses for long periods of time. Paranoid schizophrenics have delusions of control, grandeur, and persecution and are consistently suspi- cious of all around them. Disorganized schizophrenics manifest bizarre thoughts and language, with sudden inappropriate emotional outbursts. Some mention simple or undifferentiated schizophrenia. Others have dis- tinguished between acute (sudden onset and severe) vs. chronic (pro- longed, gradual). Another distinction is between Type I (mostly positive symptoms) and Type II (mostly negative symptoms). There is still no complete agreement about the subtypes or the ­precise deficits in functioning, though these usually come under four headings: cognitive or thinking; perceptual or seeing; motor or mov- ing; ­emotional or feeling. Researchers are also still continuing to seek out the source or cause of areas of vulnerability that mean some people develop schizophrenia. So there are increasingly sophisticated genetic studies as well as those looking particularly at complications of preg- nancy and traumatic childhood experiences, brain functioning, and family and cultural influences. It has been recognized that researchers and medical and lay people tend to believe in or follow different approaches that describe the cause and treatment of schizophrenia. Essentially these split into biological models stressing genetic, biochemical or brain structure causes, and sociopsychological models that focus on problems of communication and punishment in early life. Certainly development in behavior genetics and brain science has led to greater interest in the biological approach to cause and cure. The popularity of different approaches waxes and wanes, but they are still identifiable in how various groups of people approach schizophrenia.

The medical model Schizophrenic people are in most cases called patients, reside in hospitals, are diagnosed, given a prognosis, and then treated. The medical model regards mental malfunction such as that found in the schiz- ophrenic patient primarily as a consequence of physical and chemical changes, primarily in the brain. The origin of schizophrenia is still unknown at present, but there has been much research during the past half‐century, with modern workers using a variety of brain‐imaging techniques. Twin and adoption studies have convinced most researchers that a genetic factor is involved. Other researchers concentrate on brain biochemistry. Some hypothesize the 128 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious existence of brain abnormalities in schizophrenics, possibly caused by a virus. This approach suggests the behavior of schizophrenics is a symptom of their illness, and it has no real interpretive value except as a rough index of the severity of the disorder. Treatment consists primarily of medical and sometimes surgical proce- dures, but mainly the use of neuroleptic drugs. The function of the mental hospital is believed to provide an environment that facilitates the care and cure of those suffering from the disease. The medical model suggests ­society has the right to restrain those suffering from schizophrenia who may be temporarily dangerous, but it is the duty of society to be sympa- thetic to the schizophrenic.

The moral–behavioral model Schizophrenics are seen as suffering for their “sinful” or problematic behavior in the past. The etiology of schizophre- nia is to be found in the process of learning from others with similar ­behavior, or other inappropriate learning experiences. All schizophrenic behavior in this perspective is to be taken at face value. Much schizophrenic behavior contravenes moral or legal principles, and this is the key to both understanding and curing the disorder. Treatment is by far the most important aspect of the moral–behavioral model, which is rarely held in developed countries these days. Whether behavior is seen as sinful, irresponsible, simply maladjusted or socially deviant, the crucial thing is to change it so as to make it socially acceptable. The methods used range from simple moral exhortations to complex behavioral techniques, such as token economies, verbal control of behav- ior, and social skills training. Hospitals, it is believed, act as correctional institutions, differing from a prison only in that the patient has broken social rules rather than laws. Inside, the atmosphere may be one of a total institution that facilitates the changing of behavior (as an example, think of the film One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest). Society, according to this model, has the right to impose such sanctions as incarcerations and the duty to provide places for the treatment of deviance.

The psychoanalytic model The psychoanalytic model of schizophrenia ­differs from the others in that it is interpretive, treating the patient as an agent capable of meaningful action. Rather than seeing persons with ­schizophrenia as acted on by various forces (both biological and envi- ronmental) which cause them to behave in certain ways, the psychoana- lytic ­conception of schizophrenia is concerned with patients’ intentions, ­motives, and reasons. A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 129

This model suggests the primary causes of schizophrenia are unusual or traumatic early experiences or the failure to negotiate some critical stages of emotional development. The behavior of the person with schizophrenia is to be interpreted symbolically; it is the therapist’s task to decode it. This interpretive approach attaches meaning to the patient’s behavior. Long‐ term, one‐to‐one therapy with a trained psychoanalyst is the primary treat- ment offered by this model. If a person with schizophrenia is in a hospital, it is used to facilitate recovery through maximal contact with the psychotherapist, and also to remove the schizophrenic from the home environment, where the prob- lems originated. Schizophrenics, it is argued, have the right to be spared moral judgment for their actions and to be treated sympathetically, but have the duty to cooperate with the analyst. Further, according to this model, society has the duty to provide services to deal with schizophrenics and to show sym- pathy for sufferers.

The social model All social models in psychiatry have the fundamental premise that the wider influence of social forces is more important than other influences as a cause or precipitant of mental disorder. Mental illness is seen partly as a symptom of a “sick” society, other symptoms being a high divorce rate, work pressures, juvenile delinquency, increased drug addiction, and so on. The pressures of the modern world fall more heavily on the poor and disadvantaged, and thus they seem to suffer more of what is described as “illness.” The behavior of the schizophrenic is a symptom of the wider problems of society. There is no individual treatment in the social model. Instead what is required is large‐scale social change to reduce the stresses on indi- viduals and thus reduce the incidence of mental illness. The social model sees the hospital as a dumping ground for the poor and others unable to live in the world outside. This is reflected in the practices of some hospitals that seem to be oriented less to providing a cure than to providing shelter. Society must change so as to reduce stresses on people and thereby pro- vide a cure for mental illness.

The conspiratorial model The conspiratorial theory is perhaps the most radical conceptual model of schizophrenia in that it denies the existence of mental illness (as a physical disorder) and stands in direct opposition to the medical model. Since there is no physical disease, there is no physical cause. Mental illness is not something someone has, but something someone does or is. Psychiatric 130 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious diagnoses are, according to this model, simply stigmatizing labels applied to persons whose behavior offends or annoys others, and are used to control eccentric, radical or politically harmful activity. The behavior of the person with schizophrenia is a direct consequence of the way the person has been treated by others. The conspiratorial model denies any treatment or cure in the usual sense. To deal properly with schizophrenics, one must respect their right to behave as they wish (within legal limits). If the individual seeks help, then it should be provided, but there should be no coercion.

Psychopathy Do you think you might have bumped into a psychopath today? Ever met one? How would you know? Does the image of the killer and the shower scene in the Hitchcock movie Psycho come to mind? There is an extensive, compulsive, and fascinating literature on psycho- paths amongst us. Films have made people think psychopaths are all deranged ax murderers or serial killers. But they are also convicts and mer- cenaries. As with all psychiatric illnesses there have been discussions and debates about definitions and terms. Babiak and Hare (2006) clarified the distinc- tion between two overlapping terms.

Psychopathy is a personality disorder described by the personality traits and behaviours. Psychopaths are without conscience and incapable of empathy, guilt, or loyalty to anyone but themselves. Sociopathy is not a formal psychi- atric condition. It refers to patterns of attitudes and behaviours that are con- sidered antisocial and criminal by society at large, but are seen as normal or necessary by the subculture or social environment in which they developed. Sociopaths may have a well‐developed conscience and a normal capacity for empathy, guilt and loyalty, but their sense of right and wrong is based on the norms and expectations of their subculture or group. Many criminals might be described as sociopaths.

There are two dimensions of psychopathy. The first is socioemotional, where psychopaths are superficial and lacking in empathy, guilt or remorse. They are also deceitful and manipulative while being prone to egocentric- ity and grandiosity. The second is their social deviance associated with boredom susceptibil- ity, impulsivity, and lack of self‐control. In children they show evidence of behavior problems and in adulthood antisocial behavior. This has led to the development of a checklist. A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 131

Babiak and Hare (2006) summarize the issue neatly.

Are psychopathic features the product of nature or nurture? As with most other things human, the answer is that both are involved. A better question is “To what extent do nature and nurture influence the development of the traits and behaviours that define psychopathy?” The answer to this question is becoming much clearer with the application of to the study of personality traits and behavioural dispositions.

Hare (1999), in a chapter on white‐collar psychopaths, noted how many were “trust‐mongers” who, through charm and gall, obtained then very callously betrayed the trust of others. He notes how they make excel- lent impostors and how they frequently target the vulnerable. He calls them subcriminal psychopaths, and they can thrive as academics, cult ­leaders, doctors, police officers or writers. They violate rules, conventions, and ethical standards, always just crossing legal boundaries. Hare also gives a rich description of what he calls a corporate psychopath. He notes that there is certainly no shortage of opportunities for ­psychopaths who think big. It’s lucrative. “They are fast talking, charming, self‐assured, at ease in social situations, cool under pressure, unfazed by the possibility of being found out, and totally ruthless” (p. 121). Babiak and Hare (2006) believe most of us will interact with a psycho- path every day. But their skills and abilities make them difficult to spot. Often they tend to be charming, emotionally literate, and socially skilled. They are often highly articulate, and brilliantly chameleon‐like in their impression motivation. Non‐institutionalized psychopaths are described as carefree, aggressive, charming, and impulsively irresponsible. They have the essential personal- ity characteristics of the psychopath but seem to refrain from serious ­antisocial behavior. Researchers have identified many politicians and ­business leaders as non‐criminal psychopaths. They are duplicitous but not illegally so. They show many patterns of misconduct but seem not to get caught. They seem brilliant at tactical impression management and are drawn to unstable, chaotic, rapidly changing situations where they can more easily operate. Successful, non‐incarcerated psychopaths seem to have compensatory factors that buffer them against criminal behavior like higher social class and intelligence. In this sense the successful psychopath has a wider set of coping mechanisms than less privileged and less able psychopaths who soon get caught. The term psychopath or sociopath was used to describe antisocial per- sonality types whose behavior is amoral or asocial, impulsive, and lacking 132 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious in remorse and shame. Once called “moral insanity,” psychopathy is found more commonly among lower socioeconomic groups, no doubt because of the “downward drift” of these types. Personality‐type tests of the psychopathic personality give a clear indica- tion of the sort of behaviors that are relevant:

●● Impulsive non‐conformity (reckless, rebellious, unconventional). ●● Blame externalization (blames others, rationalizes own transgressions). ●● Machiavellian egocentricity (interpersonally aggressive and self‐centered). ●● Carefree non‐planfulness (excessive present orientation with lack of forethought or planning). ●● Stress immunity (experiencing minimal anxiety). ●● Fearlessness (willing to take risks, having little concern with potentially harmful consequences). ●● General cold‐heartedness (unsentimental, unreactive to others’ distress, lacking in imagination).

These seem to factor into two dimensions, one related to high negative emotionality and the other low behavioral constraint. Further research by Benning, Patrick, Blonigen, Hicks, and Iacono (2005) led these authors to think about two distinct facets of the psychopath: fearless dominance (glib, grandiose, deceitful, low stress) and impulsive antisociality (aggres- sive, antisocial, low control). This suggests that within the psychopath population one may be able to distinguish between these two groups. Antisocial (psychopathic) managers show a blatant and consistent disre- gard for, and violation of, the rights of others. They often have a history of being difficult, delinquent or dangerous. They show a failure to ­conform to most social norms and frequently, if not bright or privileged, get into trouble with the law for lying, stealing, and cheating. They are always deceitful, as indicated by repeated use of aliases and duping others for personal profit or pleasure. They can be, in short, nasty, aggressive con artists – the sort who often get profiled on business crime programs. They are also massively impulsive and fail to plan ahead. They live only in, and for, the present. They show irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults. They manifest a surprisingly reckless disregard for the physical and psychological safety of self and others – or the business in general. In an environment that values risk taking they are clearly in their element. They are famous for being consistently irresponsi- ble. Repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or to honour financial obligations is their hallmark. Most frustrating of all, they show lack of remorse. They are indifferent to or cleverly rationalize having hurt, A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 133 mistreated or stolen from another. They never learn from their mistakes. It can seem as if labeling them as antisocial is a serious understatement. Oldham and Morris (1991) call these types “Adventurous.” They describe the psychopath in popular terminology, which makes it easier for non‐specialists to spot.

The following eleven traits and behaviours are clues to the presence of the Adventurous style. A person who reveals a strong Adventurous tendency will demonstrate more of these behaviours more intensely than someone with less of this style in his or her personality profile:

1. Non‐conformity: men and women who have the Adventurous per- sonality style live by their own internal code of values. They are not strongly influenced by other people or by the norms of society. 2. Challenge: to live is to dare. Adventurous types love the thrill of risk and routinely engage in high‐risk activities. 3. Mutual independence: they do not worry too much about others, for they expect each human being to be responsible for him‐ or herself. 4. Persuasiveness: they are silver‐tongued, gifted in the gentle art of win- ning friends and influencing people. 5. Adventurers relish sex: they have a strong sex drive and enjoy numer- ous, varied experiences with different partners. 6. Wanderlust: they love to keep moving. They settle down only to have the urge to pick up and go, explore, move out, move on. 7. Freelance: Adventurous types avoid the nine‐to‐five world. They prefer to earn an independent, freelance living, do not worry about finding work, and live well by their talents, skills, ingenuity and wits. 8. Open purse: they are easy and generous with money, believing that money should be spent and that more will turn up somewhere. 9. Wild oats: in their childhood and adolescence, people with the Adventurous personality style were usually high‐spirited hell‐raisers and mischief makers. 10. True grit: they are courageous, physically bold, and tough. They will stand up to anyone who dares to take advantage of them. 11. No regrets: Adventurers live in the present. They do not feel guilty about the past or anxious about the future. Life is meant to be experi- enced now. (p. 218)

Hogan and Hogan (2001) call the antisocial person “Mischievous.” They note that this type expects others to like them and find them charm- ing, and they expect to be able to extract favors, promises, money, and other resources from people with relative ease. However, they see others as merely to be exploited, and therefore have problems maintaining ­commitments and are unconcerned about social, moral, and economic 134 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious expectations. They are self‐confident to the point of feeling invulnerable, and have an air of daring and sang‐froid that others can find attractive and even irresistible. In industries where bold risk taking is expected, they can seem a very desirable person for senior management positions. Babiak and Hare (2006) believe that psychopaths are indeed attracted to today’s business climate. They devised a questionnaire to help people spot them at work. There are, according to the authors, 10 markers of the problem. The successful industrial psychopath is characterized by the following features.

1. Comes across as smooth, polished, and charming. 2. Turns most conversations around to a discussion of him‐ or herself. 3. Discredits and puts down others in order to build up own image and reputation. 4. Lies to co‐workers, customers or business associates with a straight face. 5. Considers people he or she has outsmarted or manipulated as dumb or stupid. 6. Opportunistic; hates to lose, plays ruthlessly to win. 7. Comes across as cold and calculating. 8. Acts in an unethical or dishonest manner. 9. Has created a power network in the organization and uses it for ­personal gain. 10. Shows no regret for making decisions that negatively affect the com- pany, shareholders or employees.

Psychopaths can easily look like ideal leaders: smooth, polished, charm- ing. They can quite easily disguise their dark side – bullying, amoral, manipulative. In the past it may have been politics, policing, law, the media or religion that attracted psychopaths, but now it is increasingly the fast‐ paced, exciting, glamorous world of business. It is difficult to estimate the number of successful industrial psycho- paths. It is also sometimes difficult to explain why they get away with it for so long. However, when inquiring among those who work or have worked with a successful psychopath, it is no mystery how much misery or dys- functionality they can bring to the workplace.

6.4 How Good Are You?

Could you spot someone with a mental illness? Would you know what to recommend to them to get help? The term mental health literacy (MHL) was introduced by Jorm (2000) and defined as knowledge and beliefs A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 135 about mental disorders that aid their recognition, management or ­prevention. It involves being able to recognize a mental illness, the ­symptoms of ­psychological distress, and have knowledge and beliefs about help‐seeking behavior. Here are six people. What problems do you think they have?

Case 1: Nancy is 24 years old. Recently, she has been having trouble getting out of bed. She burst into tears at the dinner table a couple of days ago and had to be excused. That didn’t really matter to her because she wasn’t hungry anyway. She sees her future as very bleak and believes she will never be accepted by any clinical psychology graduate school or that she will ever again find someone she as much.

Case 2: John is 30 years old. He has been feeling unusually sad and miserable for the last few weeks. Even though he is tired all the time, he has trouble sleeping nearly every night. John doesn’t feel like eating and has lost weight. He can’t keep his mind on his work and puts off making decisions. Even day‐to‐day tasks seem too much for him. This has come to the attention of his boss, who is concerned about John’s lowered productivity.

Case 3: Jane is a White middle‐class bank executive aged 34 years. Over the last couple of weeks she has been staying up later at night. She typically wakes up her husband to talk about the “revolutionary” new ideas she has had to create an international bank cartel. She is full of energy and talks rapidly about the many ideas she has.

Case 4: Greg is aged 24 and lives at home with his parents. He has had a few temporary jobs since finishing school but is now unemployed. Over the last six months he has stopped seeing his friends and has begun locking himself in his bedroom, refusing to 136 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

eat with the family or have a bath. His parents hear him walking about his bedroom at night while they are in bed. Even though they know he is alone, they have heard him shouting and arguing as if someone else is there. When they try to encourage him to do more things, he whispers that he won’t leave home because he is being spied upon by the neighbor. They realize he is not taking drugs because he never sees anyone or goes anywhere.

Case 5: Elaine is 26 years old. For the past two weeks she has been feeling really down. She wakes up in the morning with a flat, heavy feeling that sticks with her all day. She isn’t enjoying things the way she usually would. In fact, nothing gives her pleasure. Even when good things happen, they don’t seem to make Elaine happy. She pushes on through her days, but it is really hard. The smallest tasks are difficult to accomplish. She finds it impossible to concentrate on anything. She feels lacking in energy and out of steam. Even though Elaine feels tired, when night comes she can’t get to sleep. She feels pretty worthless and very discouraged. Elaine’s family has noticed that she hasn’t been herself for about the last month and that she has pulled away from them. She just doesn’t feel like talking.

Case 6: Peter, who is 20 years old, spends lots of time alone. He does not react correctly when his family try to talk to him, for example laughing at bad news. He sometimes gets his words mixed up, and his family have heard him talking even when he’s alone in his room. Sometimes he will go for hours without moving, even though he’s not asleep. He also sometimes experiences auditory hallucinations and delusions.

Did you spot that Cases 1, 2, and 5 are depressed? The other three are showing symptoms of schizophrenia. Now try the following.

Lewis is 45 years old, married, and a lawyer by profession. He was the youngest full partner in the firm’s history and is known as the firm’s hardest‐driving member. He is too proud to turn down a new A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 137

case and too much of a perfectionist to be satisfied with the work done by his assistants. Displeased by their writing style and sentence structure, he finds himself constantly correcting their briefs and therefore is unable to keep up with his schedule. When assignments get backed up, he cannot decide which to address first, starts mak- ing schedules for himself and his staff, but then is unable to meet them and starts working 15 hours a day. Lewis never seems able to relax. Even on vacations he develops elaborate activity schedules for every family member and gets angry and impatient if they refuse to follow his plans. His wife is fed up with their marriage and can no longer tolerate Lewis’s emotional coldness, rigid demands, and long working hours.

What, if anything, would you say is Lewis’s main problem?

• How distressing do you think it would be to Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 have Lewis’s condition? Extremely • How sympathetic would you be toward someone Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 with Lewis’s problem? Extremely • In general, how happy do you think Lewis is? Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely • In general, how successful at his work do you Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 think Lewis is? Extremely • In general, how satisfying do you think Lewis’s Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 personal relationships are? Extremely

Did you get that Lewis has obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)? Here’s another case.

Derek is 27 years old. As he was driving with his wife to a computer store he felt dizzy. As soon as he noticed this sensation, he experi- enced a rapid and intense surge of sweating, accelerated heart rate, hot flashes, trembling, and a feeling of detachment from his body. Fearing he was going to crash his car, he pulled off the road. After 10 minutes Derek began to feel better, but now he worries that it will happen again and is reluctant to drive long distances. 138 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Do you think that Derek in any sense has a psychological problem? If so, what is it?

• Do you think that Derek should seek professional Yes… No… Undecided… help for this problem? • How happy overall do you think Derek is? (Very) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Not at all) • How successful at work do you think Derek is? (Very) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Not at all) • How good are his personal relationships? (Very) 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 (Not at all)

Derek has . An easy one?

Celia, aged 19, came home suddenly from work at McDonald’s and screamed that she was going to die. While standing at her counter, she had experienced the worst sensations of her life. Her heart began to pound like a jackhammer, she was gripped by panic and dread, she felt the ground underneath her about to give way, and she was convinced she was having a stroke or a heart attack. She spent the next two weeks in bed and, thereafter, refused to walk beyond the front gate.

Do you think that Celia in any sense has a psychological problem? If so, what is it? Celia has agoraphobia.

Perhaps these cases have made the diagnosis of mental disorders sound simple. Despite the controversies surrounding diagnostic tools, psychia- trists are required to adhere in their observations and interpretations to manuals such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). There are a number of requirements that suspected cases have to satisfy before psy- chiatrists can determine whether or not they have a problem, and what the problem is. Rosenhan’s (1973) study demonstrated that the validity of diagnostic tools and interreliability between clinicians will need to be improved sig- nificantly before people develop more faith in psychiatry. Nonetheless, A Guide Into Abnormal Psychology 139 many hold the view that it would be the lesser of two evils to commit a type one error, which is to admit a sane individual into a psychiatric hospital, than a type two error, which is the failure to diagnose an insane individual.

6.5 Conclusion

Understanding the causes, development, and treatment of mental illnesses is what many people believe is at the heart of psychology. It is an area that remains both important and controversial.

Psychopathology is about understanding abnormality. Abnormality can be defined in different ways, such as statistically, culturally, and clinically. Defining abnormality, however, implicates the need to dis- tinguish the abnormal from the normal, providing psychiatrists with the challenge to accurately diagnose those who are mentally ill from the healthy. The anti‐psychiatry movement that began in the 1960s questioned the need to pathologize individuals and the reliability of diagnostic tools, since past studies have shown that psychiatrists and clinicians cannot reliably distinguish a sane person in an insane environment. 7 Psychology and Work

7.1 Introduction

Just as there is pure and applied mathematics, so there is pure and applied psychology. Cynics have pointed out that the opposite of pure is “impure,” whereas the opposite of applied is “inapplicable.” Essentially the differ­ ence between the two is not particularly clear and some psychologists move happily between the two. “Pure” psychologists may investigate problems for their own sake rather than to improve the lives of others. They may indulge in “blue sky” research or be interested in issues that, at first glance, may seem to have no applied value. However, as has been found in many of the hard and bio­ logical sciences, often pure research reveals important facts that have immediate value. Some psychologists have argued, however, that some of the best pure research arises from pure problems. Thus trying to under­ stand the causes of airplane accidents or patient non‐compliance (now called adherence) may inspire great insights into the processes involved. In this sense pure psychology knowledge is gained from understanding applied problems (see Figure 7.1). Hartley and Branthwaite (2000) suggested that applied psychologists tend to adopt rather different roles:

●● Counselor: Skills include the ability to “help people talk openly, to express their feelings and ideas, to draw out responses and reactions to help them explore their problems more deeply and thoroughly and to see their concerns from different perspectives” (p. 2).

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Psychology and Work 141

Applied psychologists, Pure psychologists are by assisting with interested in pure education or design or research; in understanding vs. policy, help put the the processes and understanding derived mechanisms that underlie from pure research into particular behaviour. practice.

Figure 7.1 Pure vs. applied psychology.

●● Colleague: As a member of a multidisciplinary team who provides ­“particular perspective and approach over and above their knowledge, expertise and specialized technique” (p. 3). ●● Expert: A consultant with specialized concepts and theories and practi­ cal experience with highly specific problems. Experts “bring different insights into some of the problems and difficulties that may be experi­ enced in social systems such as factories, schools, libraries, hospitals, prisons and transport” (p. 3). ●● Toolmaker: A developer of techniques, processes, and programs includ­ ing questionnaires, training courses, learning aids, computer programs, and so forth. ●● A detached investigator: A scientist who attempts to develop and test theories by controlled observation and experiment. ●● Theoretician: Devises theories for mechanisms and processes that underlie observed behavior. “Theories provide the link between laboratory studies and the ‘real’ world. Theories are the means by which results from studies under artificial circumstances can be applied to practical problems” (p. 6). ●● Change agent: Designer of social engineering processes aimed at chang­ ing and hopefully improving individuals, institutions, and society at large.

Hartley and Branthwaite (2000) note that the main areas of professional training are clinical psychology, educational (school) psychology, occupa­ tional (work) psychology, government and civil service, as well as specialist jobs in community, consumer, counseling, environmental, forensic, health, sport, and research psychology.

7.2 Management and Common Sense

Working adults spend about one‐third of their day at work (8 hours out of 24). Work is central to our lives and therefore of considerable interest to psychologists. 142 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Organizational and occupational psychologists are crucially interested in work‐related behavior. They have themselves been working most of the 20th century to establish, among other things, what factors predict job productivity, worker satisfaction, and the relationship between the two. They ask many and varied questions. Baron (1986, p. 7) gives a typical list:

●● Are there actually conditions under which leaders are unnecessary? ●● Do female managers differ from male managers in important ways? Or is the existence of such differences basically a myth? ●● How do individuals learn about the “right” way to behave in an organ­ ization? (That is, how do they become socialized into it?) ●● What sources of bias operate in the appraisal of employees’ perfor­ mance? ●● Is information carried by the grapevine and other informal channels of communication accurate? ●● What are the best techniques for training employees in their jobs? ●● What tactics can be used to convert destructive organizational conflict into more constructive encounters? ●● How do individuals (or groups) acquire power and influence within an organization? ●● What conditions cause people to suffer from burnout? What can be done to prevent such reactions? ●● How can resistance to change within an organization be overcome? ●● How do new technologies affect the structure and effectiveness of organizations? ●● What steps can be taken by American businesses to compete more effectively against their Japanese counterparts? ●● What factors lead persons to feel satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs? ●● Are individuals or committees better at making complex decisions?

The so‐called discipline of management science often has low status in business schools, partly because the hard men of figures (accountants, actuar­ ies, economists) despise the soft waffle of organizational behavior. Management science is thought to be a trivial, expensive, and pointless exer­ cise in describing or proving what we already know. All of its findings are intuitive, unsurprising, and uninformative; worse, it is packed with esoteric, mid‐Atlantic jargon that clouds common sense in the pretense of clarifying it. But there are serious problems with the commonsense argument. First, common sense is frequently contradictory. Second, if all management is common sense, nothing can be counterintuitive or the result of faulty reasoning. Research in the sciences is full of such examples and it would Psychology and Work 143 not be surprising if some aspects of management science were the same; that is, the opposite of common sense. It could be argued that current management knowledge is in fact absorbed from management science as it is frequently popularized in newspapers and magazines. Thus, ironically, common sense could be the result of the ideas of management science being commented upon in the popular press. A frequently discussed finding from research cannot remain non‐obvious to managers, any more than a joke can remain funny to ­people who hear it over and over again. If all management is common sense and most people supposedly have this curious trait, why is there so much disagreement on management issues, processes, and procedures? When managers try to specify the competencies essential for high‐flyers in a company, many are tempted to include common sense, despite the fact that it is almost impossible to define, measure, and therefore select. It may indeed be like the search for the Holy Grail – longstanding, compli­ cated, and unsuccessful. But why not test yourself? Are the following statements true or false? Mark them accordingly and see how you rate on the commonsense factor in management.

How good are you? 1. In most cases, leaders should stick to their decisions once they have made them, even if it appears they are wrong. 2. When people work together in groups and know their individual con­ tributions cannot be observed, each tends to put in less effort than when they work on the same task alone. 3. Even skilled interviewers are sometimes unable to avoid being influenced in their judgment by factors other than an applicant’s qualifications. 4. Most managers are highly democratic in the way that they supervise their people. 5. Most people who work for the government are low risk takers. 6. The best way to stop a malicious rumor at work is to present covering evidence against it. 7. As morale or satisfaction among employees increases in any organiza­ tion, overall performance almost always rises. 8. Providing employees with specific goals often interferes with their performance: They resist being told what to do. 9. In most organizations the struggle for limited resources is a far more important cause of conflict than other factors such as interpersonal relations. 144 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

10. In bargaining, the best strategy for maximizing long‐term gains is seeking to defeat one’s opponent. 11. In general, groups make more accurate and less extreme decisions than individuals. 12. Most individuals do their best work under conditions of high stress. 13. Smokers take more days in sick leave than do non‐smokers. 14. If you have to reprimand a worker for a misdeed, it is better to do so immediately after the mistake occurs. 15. Highly cohesive groups are also highly productive.

Answers: 1–5 true; 6–12 false; 13–14 true; 15 false.

If you scored 5 or less, why not try early retirement? Scorers of 6 to 10 should perhaps consider an MBA. A score of 11 or above – yes indeed, you do have that most elusive of all qualities: common sense. Einstein defined common sense as the collection of prejudices that ­people have accrued by the age of 18, whereas Victor Hugo maintained that com­ mon sense was acquired in spite of, rather than because of, education.­ It might be a desirable thing to possess in the world of management, but don’t kid yourself that it is very common. Perhaps a close reading of the rest of this book might help low scorers acquire more “uncommon sense.” Another go! Why not a little quiz to determine potential management ability? Try the simple true–false quiz to determine your aptitude. Many people believe simple management aphorisms. A considerable number of British managers believe that, for nearly all workers, money is the most important motivating factor at work. They also believe, contrary to the evidence, that happy workers are productive workers and that great leaders are born with the “right type” of personality. Education may not be the panacea for all management evils. It may not be at all helpful to people who lack some basic level of ability. It should, however, discourage people from holding simple, naïve, misconceived, and even wrong views about how to get the best out of employees.

Do you have the ability to manage? 1. Relatively few top executives are highly competitive, aggressive, and show time urgency. 2. In general, women managers show higher self‐confidence than men and expect greater success in their careers. 3. Slow readers remember more of what they learn than fast readers. Psychology and Work 145

4. To change people’s behavior toward new technology we must first change their attitudes. 5. The more highly motivated you are, the better you will be at solving a complex problem. 6. The best way to ensure that high‐quality work will persist after train­ ing is to reward behavior every time, rather than intermittently, when it occurs during training. 7. An English‐speaking person with German ancestors/relations finds it easier to learn German than an English‐speaking person with French ancestors. 8. People who graduate in the upper third of the A‐levels table tend to make more money in their careers than average students. 9. After you learn something, you forget more of it in the next few hours than in the next several days. 10. People who do poorly in academic work are usually superior in mechanical ability. 11. Most high‐achieving managers tend to be high risk takers. 12. When people are frustrated at work they frequently become aggressive. 13. Successful top managers have a greater need for money than for power. 14. Women are more intuitive than men. 15. Effective leaders are more concerned about people than the task. 16. Bureaucracies are inefficient and represent a bad way of running organizations. 17. Unpleasant working conditions (crowding, loud noise, high or very low temperatures) produce a dramatic reduction in performance on many tasks. 18. Talking to workers usually enhances cooperation between them. 19. Women are more conforming and open to influence than men. 20. Because workers resent being told what to do, giving employees ­specific goals interferes with their performance.

Answers: 1 true; 2–7 false; 8–9 true; 10–11 false; 12 true; 13–20 false.

How did you do? Score 0–5: Oh dear! Pretty naïve about behavioral science. Score 6–10: Too long at the school of hard knocks, we fear. Score 11–15: Yes, experience has helped. Score 16–20: Clearly a veteran of the management school of life. 146 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

7.3 Psychologists as Business Consultants

What do organizational psychologists consult on? Human resource con­ sultants (HRCs) – organizational psychologists working for human resource departments – tend to look at five areas (Furnham & Gunter, 1994). These are discussed below.

Diagnostic HRCs can offer a second opinion. They can bring the objectivity and disinterestedness of the outsider but also the potential experience of hav­ ing seen the problem before. A major advantage of using experienced and insightful HRCs is that they can show the organization to be funda­ mentally flawed in either its own diagnosis of maladies or the proposed solutions. Organizations like to believe that easy solutions are possible; they are also frequently unable to distinguish between explicit and implicit messages from clients, customers or their own staff whom they meet every day. For instance, managers’ complaints about the number of staff they have in their department to complete workloads could have as much to do with problems in organizational structure, or a particular manager’s ambitions, as it does with staffing. Equally, staff complaints about the physical working environment may be more a function of the psycho­ logical climate of the office which they feel uncomfortable or incapable of articulating. Human resource consultants will tell you that diagnosis is more difficult and important than cure and that therefore getting it right easily merits the modest fee. In this they may be right.

Measurement Many personnel managers are not highly trained in measuring human ­performance, abilities, needs or personal preferences (for example, intelli­ gence, personality, team role preferences). After gullible but enthusiastic and peer‐pressured purchases of flashy but not necessarily valid tests, per­ sonnel managers often set about measuring the line manager’s personality or the team role preference. Organizations measure what they value more frequently than what they actually need to. This is where the well‐trained HRC can bring to bear a formidable array of well‐tested measures. Over 100,000 tests are in print and a good HRC will know where to look for the most appropriate measure. Psychology and Work 147

There is a tendency to use tests just because the organization has bought them. Rather than spend all one’s effort measuring the personalities of direc­ tors, the HRC may wisely make recommendations about the organizational culture (the values and norms of the organization), climate (the perception of employees), communication networks, clients, customers or competitors’ perceptions. Organizational problems require organometric audits just like those carried out by the finance department. Measuring instruments (ques­ tionnaires, tests) need to be robust, reliable, valid, multidimensional, sensi­ tive to faking, and normed for the appropriate population. Human resource consultants must, of course, not only choose and administer good tests, but must know how to analyze them appropriately and interpret the data. As HRCs know, many personnel officers often shy away from objective hard data, preferring softer interviews, reports or selected quotes from key players. This may be one reason why they are often despised by their hard‐ headed colleagues in accounts, strategic planning, and even marketing. Nevertheless, many HRCs are experienced and trained psycho‐ and organo­ metricians and are well able to measure important organizational variables.

Instruction There is, and there will probably always be, a place for “chalk‐and‐talk” training. Now more likely to be run with personal computers, impressive videos, self‐instruction, completion booklets, and elaborate feedback reports, the business of education remains a central task for some HRCs. Training adults is a challenging task for the HRC. There are people in organizations who are themselves very bright and highly educated, and may be extremely critical of any outside consultant. The good HRC soon realizes that training adults is rather different from educating students. Training managers must be practical and con­ crete, with lots of memorable examples and helpful models. Whereas aca­ demics are trained to be critical and skeptical, HRC instructors soon realize they are more appreciated if they are enthusiastic and zealous about the cause. Human resource consultants are frequently extraverts with a self‐confidence that extends somewhat beyond the bounds of their ability. As a result they rarely fear the role of teaching, training or instructing, although they may not be that good at it. Good teaching is a rare combi­ nation of intellectual ability and knowing how to put information across. Certainly instructing or teaching is a crucial function for many HRCs. For many, alas, the term training has a poor reputation and trainers are considered rather lowly (paid) sorts of consultant, especially when teachers are trained to deliver packaged courses. 148 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Process Some HRCs specialize in process or interpretation as opposed to product. When, for instance, a management team is underperforming or suffering low morale, the process‐oriented HRC might be called in not only for diagnosis, but also to provide a cure. Process skills are closely akin to group psychotherapy, and indeed that may be how the consultant was originally trained. Just as most accidents are the result of human error, so, quite com­ monly, poor business operations are the result of human frailty. Whether one prefers to use meaningless euphemisms like personality clash or not, many people recognize that the quality of human relationships in offices, teams, and departments contributes to business success or failure. It is the intangible psychological factors of morale, conflict, and lack of commit­ ment that the process consultant hopes to make manifest and explicit. Good HRCs, and those with psychoanalytic training, are frequently able to reveal unexpected or even paradoxical findings, such as depression amongst employees being a consequence of their anger. To some, process consultants represent the wackiest ‐type psychological airheads who ask both intrusive and daft questions primarily to embarrass. Furthermore, they may not even come to a conclusion, write a report or deliver any tangible outcome. Insight alone is often the orally explicit goal of the process consultant. It is nearly always the case that process work has to be done by the outside consultant. Politically, the personnel department may wisely judge it necessary to lure in consultants, albeit at some cost.

Systems Some HRCs are specialists in devising, operating or tweaking systems like a performance management system, selection system or staff development system. More often than not this involves the development of fairly sophis­ ticated computer‐based statistical software. As a result, these HRCs are not the warm and cuddly process type but hardened fellows. Because writing software and developing systems is very time consum­ ing, these HRCs tend to offer a fairly fixed package. It is true that it can be personalized or adapted to suit each organization, but these modifica­ tions are usually fairly minimal. In this sense the systems HRC sells pack­ ages used by the personnel department. Some computer‐illiterate and number‐phobic directors are highly gul­ lible to the hard sell of systems HRCs, for two reasons. First, they may not Psychology and Work 149 be able to make an intelligent judgment on the usefulness, limitations or appropriateness of the system. Second, perhaps more importantly, person­ nel managers are eager to show that they are up‐to‐date, “scientific,” and sophisticated, and hence are impressed by the large irrelevant packaging rather than the content. But all organizations need efficient, computer‐ assisted systems. Some HRC systems experts can devise very useful ­systems that may last organizations for years.

7.4 The Hawthorne Effect

Occasionally the results of one study may be seminal in the sense that they have a crucial effect on thought in psychology at work. The Hawthorne studies are most frequently mentioned in this respect. This nine‐year study was begun in 1924 at the Western Electric Company’s Hawthorne Works at Cicero, Illinois, in association with the American National Academy of Sciences. The research was intended to identify lighting levels that would produce optimal productivity. In the first illumination experiment, however, the productivity of the workers increased when illumination was increased but also when it was decreased. Overall, productivity bounced up and down without an apparent direct relationship to illumination level. The results were perplexing. A second illumination study had an experimental group that experi­ enced illumination changes and a control group for which illumination was held constant. In this experiment, production increased in both groups to an almost equal extent. In yet a third illumination experiment, lighting levels were decreased over time. As a result, productivity levels increased for both experimental and control groups (at least until an extremely low level of illumination was reached). Naturally these results puzzled the experimenters of the time. To correct some of the control problems in the lighting study, the Relay Assembly Test Room studies were conducted during 13 periods between 1927 and 1932. The experiments progressed from simply recording out­ put under normal conditions to introducing a group incentive program, rest periods of varying duration, reducing work weeks, and providing free lunches. Throughout this time output, morale, and attendance rates were shown to increase. It was first thought that relief from monotony, altera­ tions in supervisory styles, and the group incentive program accounted for the increases in measured productivity of staff. Previously, all subjects had worked under conditions such that the overall performance of the group had little effect on individuals. During the experiments, this was changed 150 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious and individual earnings became closely related to group performance through the group incentive plan. More studies were undertaken to deter­ mine exactly how this plan influenced individual performance. What so many results showed was that whatever the researchers did – turn lights up, then down; introduce breaks then take them away – the productivity of those working increased. Increasingly, the researchers were becoming aware of human attitudes and related behavioral factors. To find out more about these phenomena, between 1928 and 1930, an extensive interviewing program was conducted­ among more than 21,000 employees. The interviews made it possible to investigate attitudes about the job, supervisors, and working conditions. Finally, in 1931–1932, the researchers conducted the Bank Wiring Observation Room studies. In this stage, the importance of the group and informal relations was recognized as a determinant of individual attitudes toward change. While the experiments had initially started by looking for physical determinants of productivity, they ended up believing that ­psychological factors were more important. Although the marginal implications of the studies are far reaching, the value of the Hawthorne studies for researchers and managers lies in the discoveries concerning individuals in groups and organizational design. Four conclusions were obvious:

●● Individual differences. The Hawthorne studies emphasized that indi­ viduals are different and that these differences can have significant effects on managerial behavior. The interview program demonstrated the complexity of attitudes and how overt behavior may differ from attitudes. Thus a new wage incentive or vacation policy may be ­perfectly acceptable to one person and totally rejected by another. Individual differences are systematic, open to investigation, and taxonomizable into discrete types or continuous traits. ●● Groups. After the findings of the Hawthorne researchers were publi­ cized, the importance of group processes was realized. During various stages of the experiments it became evident that informal groups not prescribed by organizations can and do exert great influence on indi­ viduals. Group pressures can cause individuals to work more or less, to accept or resist change, and to behave in a variety of ways that may differ from their own personal preferences. Further, groups outside the organization can directly reflect behavior within the organization. ●● Individuals in groups. Formal groups are those required and estab­ lished by the organization such as production and sales units. Employees also belong to informal or social groups that are not prescribed by the Psychology and Work 151

structure. An established group who have worked together for a long time may form a social group who eat or go bowling together. The same is true of newcomers or recent employees. Such groups may be quite important in the formation of individual attitudes and in influ­ encing work behavior. ●● Organizational design. The implication of the studies for the formal design of organizations has to do with perceiving the organization as a social system. Although the structure of an organization appears very fixed and formal, in reality there is an “organization” that does not show up on the chart. This social organization includes all the social groupings and power alliances that exist in all structures, which include all the friendship groups and political alliances that criss‐cross the organization.

The idea of formal and informal groups, as well as organizations, is an interesting and important one, and may be seen as a result of the human relations school. Today people talk about the Hawthorne effect, which is like an organizational placebo pill. It refers to the fact that certain changes that occur may be the result not of physical changes (the introduction of IT; office redecoration; new staffing arrangements) but rather the way in which people are treated. The Hawthorne researchers have been criticized on a number of grounds with regard to the conduct of their studies and their analysis of the results. Their basic assumptions about the cooperative or social nature of humans and their ability to be satisfied by changes in their environment have been challenged. They assumed that contented workers were pro­ ductive workers in much the same way we assume contented cows give more milk. Perhaps the most serious criticisms made of the Hawthorne studies related to the research methodology employed. Most human relations theory and practice is based on relatively few observations of some small samples of human beings at work. Hawthorne researchers may have mini­ mized the effects of economic incentives for no apparent justifiable reason and elevated supervision and interpersonal relations to a point of primary importance. Some have argued, in effect, that the Hawthorne studies were scientifically worthless. Others have attempted to counter this criticism by claiming that the Hawthorne studies did make a significant contribution by placing monetary incentives in their proper place within the social con­ text. The defenders of the studies maintain that the researchers did not deny the importance of economic incentives but simply rejected them as an independent factor influencing worker performance. 152 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

The most frequently rehearsed criticisms of the Hawthorne studies are that:

●● They lack scientific validity and tend toward mysticism. Human relations writers generally spent little time gathering the data necessary to sup­ port their claims. When they did, they were rarely obtained in a system­ atic manner. For this reason they project an aura of mysticism or “armchair philosophizing,” which is unacceptable to the modern behavioral scientist. ●● They overemphasize the group and focus on group decision making. In human relations writings the object of concern almost always appears to be the relationship of the individual in a group, with less concern for the behavior processes of the individual. ●● They view conflict as fundamentally destructive. Little concern was given to the positive effects of conflict, such as the stimulation of innovation. Coordination was always the goal. ●● They are evangelistic. Advocates were insistent upon the value of human relations concepts in solving organizational problems. It has been shown that human relations, like structural thought, is a creed of the establish­ ment and supports the preeminence of management in an organization. ●● There is no effect. Some have agreed that a detailed study of the results in fact provided little evidence of any demonstrable effect at all!

Much of the objection to the human relations perspective has been initi­ ated by modern behavioral scientists who are interested in many of the same phenomena. Behavioral scientists are concerned with the systematic analysis of human behavior and take pride in the objectivity with which they approach their subject and their adherence to the conventional meth­ ods of experimental science. They also view their research as interdiscipli­ nary in character and realize that it is often difficult, if not impossible, to understand the sociology of a group separate from the psychology of the individuals comprising it and the anthropology of the culture within which it exists. However, there have been few subsequent studies, of whatever scientific quality, that have had such an influence on work psychology as the results of the Hawthorne studies.

7.5 Money, Motivation, and Happiness

Other than the possible influence of psychological changes on levels of productivity, economic incentives also remain a highly controversial cate­ gory when it comes to their influence on work performance. Psychology and Work 153

Does money bring happiness? Is money the best (the only really successful) motivator in the workplace? If money does not bring happiness, what does?

Nearly everyone is paid – in money – for work. But organizations differ widely in how money is related to performance. The question of central interest to organizational psychologists is the power of money as a motiva­ tor, which works in several ways:

●● Piecework. Here workers are paid according to how much they pro­ duce. It can be judged only when workers are doing fairly repetitive work where the units of work can be counted. ●● Group piecework. Here the work of a whole group is used as the basis for pay, which is divided between the group. ●● Mixed productivity bonus. Here there is a guaranteed weekly wage, plus a bonus based on the output of the whole department. ●● Measured daywork. This is similar except that the bonus depends on meeting some agreed rate or standard of work. ●● Merit ratings. For managers, clerical workers, and others it is not pos­ sible to measure the units of work done. Instead their bonus or incre­ ments are based on merit ratings made by other managers. ●● Monthly productivity bonus. Managers receive a bonus based on the productivity of their departments. ●● Profit sharing and co‐partnership. There is a guaranteed weekly wage and an annual or twice‐yearly bonus for all, based on the firm’s profits. ●● Other kinds of bonus. There can be a bonus for suggestions that are made and used, and there can be competitions for making the most sales, finding the most new customers, not being absent, and so forth. ●● Use of other benefits. Employees can be offered other rewards such as medical insurance or care of dependents.

Traditionally it has been assumed that money is a hygiene not a motiva­ tor factor. That means, in short, that issues around money such as believ­ ing that one is not paid at market rates or not paid equitably are a major source of dissatisfaction. However, it is not a motivator. Being paid appro­ priately does not increase satisfaction or productivity – but not being paid enough certainly causes dissatisfaction. 154 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Researchers have argued that there is plenty of evidence that there is effectively no statistical relationship between money paid, subjective motivation, and measurable performance in a job over time. It is suggested that there are four reasons for this:

●● Adaptation – although everybody feels happier after a pay rise, windfall or lottery win, one soon adapts to this and the effect rapidly disappears. ●● Comparison – people define themselves as rich/wealthy comparing themselves to others. However, with increased wealth, people usually move in more upmarket circles where there is always someone wealth­ ier than themselves. ●● Alternatives – as economists say, the declining marginal utility of money means that as one has more of the stuff, other things like freedom and true friendship seem much more valuable. ●● Worry – an increased income is associated with a shifting of concern from money issues to the more uncontrollable elements of life (for example, self‐development), perhaps because money is associated with a sense of control over one’s fate.

Even the evidence for performance‐related pay (PRP) is far from con­ vincing. The aims of such systems are straightforward: Good performers should be satisfied by working hard and motivated to continue to work hard because they see the connection between job performance and (merit‐pay) reward. Equally, poor performers should be motivated to try harder to achieve some reward, or leave. There are different types of PRP systems, depending on who is included (to what levels), how performance will be measured (objective counts, subjective ratings or a combination), and which incentives will be used (money, shares, and so forth). There are various reasons for the failure of PRP systems. First, there is frequently a poorly perceived connection between pay and performance. Many employees have inflated ideas about their performance levels that translate into unrealistic expectations about rewards. Often the percentage of performance‐based pay is too low relative to base pay. That is, if the organization starts off with too little money in the pot, it may be impossible to discriminate between good and poor performance, so threat­ ening the credibility of the whole system. The most common problem lies in the fact that, for many jobs, the lack of objective, measurable work output requires heavy, often exclusive use of performance ratings. These are very susceptible to systematic bias, which renders them neither reliable nor valid. Psychology and Work 155

(1) The employee must value the extra money that he or she will make under the plan.

(2) The employee must not lose important values (health, job security, and the like) as a result of high performance.

(3) Employees must be able to control their own performance in that they have a chance to strive further.

(4) The employee must clearly understand how the plan works.

(5) It must be possible to measure performance accurately (using indexes of performance, cost effectiveness, public relations ratings).

Figure 7.2 Conditions for an incentive plan to work.

Many PRP plans have failed because the performance measure(s) that were rewarded were not related to the aggregated performance objectives of the organization as a whole, that is, to those aspects of the performance that were the most important to the organization. Also the organization must ensure that workers are capable of improving their performance. If higher pay is to drive higher performance, workers must believe in (and be capable of) performance improvements. In short, Miner (1993) has argued that five conditions need to be met to ensure that any sort of incentive plan works (see Figure 7.2). Money is important but so is job security, a considerate boss, reasonable holidays, and manageable stress levels. At certain times in their lives people are prepared and able to trade off quality of working and home life for money. Its power as a demotivator may be reasonably strong, but its power as a motivator remains low. Money also remains a topic that few happily discuss. There are all sorts of reasons why money remains a taboo subject. Various theories have been put forward to explain this:

●● Rich people, who dictate etiquette, eschew discussing their money lest the poor figure out how to get it for themselves. Or because friends and relatives might want it or become envious of it. 156 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

●● It is superstitious to talk of money: It means it could be taken away. ●● Boasting about money could encourage envious others to inform tax authorities. ●● If money is associated with food, avoiding discussing it reduces hunger, need, greed, and vulnerability. ●● If money is associated with filth in the eyes of people, shunning discus­ sion of it can be a way of fending off feelings of shame. ●● On some levels we know our attitudes to money reveal a lot about us that we would rather keep private.

Myers (2000, p. 59) has posed the old question:

“Are rich people happier?”

He reviewed the salient literature and concluded:

“Happiness tends to be lower among the very poor. Once com­ fortable, however, more money provides diminishing returns on happiness.”

Further the evidence suggests that economic growth in affluent coun­ tries provides no boost to morale and happiness. Faith, friendships, and belonging as well as personality factors are clearly more important.

7.6 Stress at Work

The word stress is derived from the Latin word stringere, which means “to draw tight.” It is such an overused and elusive term that many have agreed it should be completely abandoned. Many definitions exist. Some believe stress can and should be subjectively defined (i.e., what I say about how I feel), while others feel an objective definition is needed (perhaps physical measures of blood pressure). Some researchers believe a global definition is appropriate (one general thing called stress); others emphasize that stress is multidimensional. Should you define it by the outside stimulus Psychology and Work 157 factors that cause it or, rather, by how people respond to it? Until the 18th century, it colloquially implied hardship, adversity or affliction (specific types of stress). It was later used by physicists to describe a force exerted upon an object, so that resultant changes in volume, shape, and size were called strains. Hence, stresses and strains. In the 19th century, the pursuit and maintenance of a constant internal state was seen as the essence of a free and independent life. Research sought to identify those adaptive changes responsible for steady‐state mainte­ nance. This motivation toward equilibrium was called homeostasis, from the Greek words homoios meaning “similar” and stasis meaning “state.” Stress was considered to be a threat to homeostasis (a rocking of the boat), but this usage of the term was subject to change and imprecision. By the mid‐1950s researchers seemed to have settled on the response‐ based definition of stress as the sum of all non‐specific changes caused by function or damage. This was later reworded to the non‐specific response of the body to any demand made upon it, rendering it even more inclusive. Yet lots of questions remain and are often discussed in the popular press. Many scare statistics are quoted about how much stress causes mental and physical illness, then absenteeism and thence cost to the economy. There are debates about which jobs are most (or least stressful) and what one could do about them. Is work stress primarily a function of the person or the job? That is, does it arise because some are (neurotically) vulnerable to stress whereas others are hardy and resistant? These days most people speak as if stress is imposed on them by work conditions, yet in earlier times people spoke about “having nerves,” implying nervous dispositions. Other questions include: Is there the possibility that moderate amounts of stress may be good for one? Should people be taught coping skills to over­ come inevitable work stress? And because there is a stress industry com­ mitted to finding work stress, is it frequently misdiagnosed?

Theories and models There are various models or theories that try to describe and understand stress. The simplest perhaps is demand–control theory, which looks at the various psychological and physical demands put on a person to behave in a particular way and the control or decision latitude they have in delivery. High demand, low control situations are worst. Another way of describing this is challenge and support. In most management jobs, leaders are both supported and challenged. They are supported by peers, subordinates, and superiors, who also 158 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

­challenge them to work harder and smarter. Thus it is possible to think of the average manager in terms of support and challenge:

●● Much support, little challenge: Managers in this role are in the fortunate position of good technical and social support, but the fact they are underchallenged probably means that they underperform. They may be stressed by boredom and monotony. ●● Much support, much challenge: This combination tends to get the most out of managers as they are challenged by superiors, subordinates, shareholders, and customers to work smarter but are given the appro­ priate support to succeed. ●● Little support, much challenge: This unfortunate but very common situation is a major cause of stress for any manager because he or she is challenged to work consistently hard but only offered minimal emotional, informational (feedback), and physical (equipment) support. ●● Little support, little challenge: Managers in some bureaucracies lead a quiet and unstressed life because they are neither challenged nor sup­ ported, which usually means neither they nor their organization bene­ fits. They belong to the category of employee who has psychologically quit but physically stayed.

Three components Most of the models and theories about stress consider how three factors lead to stress. They are essentially things about the make‐up of the indi­ vidual, particularly their personality, ability, and biography. Second, there are features about the environment, usually but not exclusively considered in terms of the work environment. Third, there is how the individual and the environment perceive, define, but more importantly try to cope with stress, strains, and pressures. The argument is that there are individual, environment, and coping factors that, considered together, determine whether, when, and why individuals and groups experience stress.

1. The individual Two people with similar experience and qualifica­ tions and in the same job can experience very different levels of stress. One gets ill and goes absent, while the other soldiers on. Why?

Neuroticism and stability: The anxious worriers. People with negative affect, namely those with a mix of anxiety, irritability, neuroticism, and Psychology and Work 159

self‐deprecation, tend to be less productive, less job satisfied, and more prone to absenteeism. Neurotics tend to dwell on their mistakes, disappointments, and shortcomings and to focus more on the negative aspects of the world in general. They seem more prone to experiencing stress and less able to cope with it.

Locus of control: The instrumentalist and the fatalist. Individuals develop a general expectancy regarding their ability to control their lives. People who believe that the events that occur in their lives are the result of their own behavior and/or ability, personality, and effort are said to have the expectancy of internal control, whereas those who believe events in their lives to be a function of luck, chance, fate, God(s), powerful others or powers beyond their control, comprehension or manipulation are said to have an expectancy of external control. Managers with internal locus of control tend to see threatening events at work as less stressful and they cope with it better than managers with external locus of control.

Type A behavior: The competitive, frantic manager. The Type A pattern is characterized by excessive and competitive drive and an enhanced sense of time urgency. This behavior pattern is multidimensional, having many components such as an intense sustained desire to achieve, an eagerness to complete, persistent drive for recognition, a continuous involvement in deadline activities, a habitual propensity to accelerate mental and physical functions, and consistent alertness. Considerable research has identified other traits associated with this syndrome.

2. The job or organization Some jobs are more stressful than others. But why? What makes one induce high levels of stress in all employees while another does not?

●● Occupational demands intrinsic to the job. Some jobs are simply more stressful than others. Various studies have shown that certain features associated with particular jobs are stressful. For example, the greater the extent to which the job requires (a) making decisions, (b) constant monitoring of machines or materials, (c) repeated exchange of infor­ mation with others, (d) unpleasant physical conditions, and (e) per­ forming unstructured rather than structured tasks, the more stressful the job tends to be. ●● Role conflict: Stress results from conflicting demands. For many people at work, it is important that they engage in role juggling – rapidly switch­ ing from one role and one type of activity to another (from boss to 160 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

friend, teacher to partner, law enforcer to father confessor). This is common among working mothers but also human resource directors. The adverse effects of role conflict are less pronounced in work settings characterized by friendliness and social support than in work settings where such conditions are lacking. ●● Role ambiguity: Stress resulting from uncertainty. This can occur when managers are uncertain about several matters relating to their jobs, such as the scope of their responsibilities, what is expected of them, and how to divide their time between various duties. Sometimes, ambiguity results from not having clear job descriptions, goals or specified responsibilities, but often it is attributable to changes occur­ ring in the organization or the marketplace at large. It is thus fairly common. ●● Over‐ and underload stress from having too little or too much to do. Work overload can be both quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative over­ load stress occurs when managers are asked to do more work, in a limited period, than they are able to do. Qualitative overload stress occurs when managers believe they lack the required skills, ability or resources to perform a given job. Quantitative underload leads to boredom that occurs when employees have too little work to do, and qualitative underload occurs when boring, routine, repetitive jobs are associated with chronic lack of mental stimulation. ●● Responsibility for others: Stress resulting from a heavy burden. Most man­ agers are (or should be) responsible for their subordinates: They have to motivate them, reward and punish them, communicate and listen to them, and so on. Considerable stress is often experienced by managers when confronting the human costs of organizational policies and deci­ sions: listening to endless complaints, mediating disputes, promoting cooperation, and exercising leadership. ●● Lack of social support: Stress from being socially isolated or ignored. Having friends and supporters in times of difficulty helps managers see stressful events as less threatening and more controllable than if they had little or no support. They can provide emotional, financial, and information support at different times. Friends and supporters can also often suggest useful strategies for dealing with the sources of stress. ●● Lack of participation in decisions: Stress from helplessness and alienation. Many middle managers are or feel they are the victims of decisions made at a higher level, over which they have no control. The major cause is that managers are allowed neither to witness nor to contribute to important business decisions that affect their jobs. Psychology and Work 161

3. Coping How does a person with stress attempt to cope? Go for a jog? Pray? Pour a stiff drink? Try to see the funny side of it? One distinction that has been made is between problem‐focused coping (aimed at problem solving or doing something to alter the source of stress) and emotion‐focused coping (aimed at reducing or managing the emo­ tional distress that is associated with, or cued by, a particular set of circum­ stances). Emotion‐focused responses involve denial, others involve positive reinterpretation of events, and still others involve the seeking out of social support. Similarly, problem‐focused coping can potentially involve several distinct activities, such as planning, taking direct action, seeking assistance, and screening out particular activities. It is argued that, for various rea­ sons, individuals tend to adopt and habitually use a few of the coping pat­ terns, which may or may not be successful. However, it does appear that people can be taught or trained to relinquish less successful coping strate­ gies and adopt others.

Optimism: A buffer against stress. One personal factor that seems to play an important role in determining resistance to stress is the familiar dimension of optimism/pessimism. Optimists are hopeful in their outlook on life, interpret a wide range of situations in a positive light, and tend to expect favorable outcomes and results. Pessimists, by contrast, interpret many situations negatively, and expect unfavorable outcomes and results. Optimists are much more stress‐resistant than pessimists. Optimists and pessimists adopt sharply contrasting tactics for coping with stress. Optimists concentrate on problem‐focused coping – making and enacting specific plans for dealing with sources of stress. In addition, they seek social support – the advice and help of friends and others – and refrain from engaging in other activities until current problems are solved and stress is reduced. Pessimists tend to adopt rather different strategies, such as giving up in their efforts to reach goals with which stress is interfering, and denying that the stressful events have even occurred. Furthermore, they have different attributional styles: The optimist attributes success internally and failure externally, and vice versa. Indeed, that is how optimism and pessimism are both measured and maintained.

Hardiness: Viewing stress as a challenge. Another individual difference factor that seems to distinguish stress‐resistant people from those who are more susceptible to its harmful effects is hardiness or resilience. This term refers to a cluster of characteristics rather than just one. Hardy people appear to differ from others in three respects. They show higher levels of: commitment – deeper 162 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious involvement in their jobs and other life activities; control – the belief that they can, in fact, influence important events in their lives and the outcomes they experience; and challenge – they perceive change as a challenge and an opportunity to grow rather than as a threat to their security. Together, these characteristics tend to arm hardy persons with high resistance to stress. People classified as high in hardiness report better health than those with low hardiness, even when they encounter major stressful life changes. One can recognize stress by its consequences. The list is long but can usually be categorized under three headings.

Physiological symptoms ●● A noticeable decline in physical appearance. ●● Chronic fatigue and tiredness. ●● Frequent infections, especially respiratory infections. ●● Health complaints, such as headaches, backaches, stomach and skin problems. ●● Signs of depression, change in weight or eating habits.

Emotional symptoms ●● Boredom or apathy: lack of affect and hopelessness. ●● Cynicism and resentfulness. ●● Depressed appearance, sad expressions, slumped posture. ●● Expressions of anxiety, frustration, tearfulness.

Behavioral symptoms ●● Absenteeism, accidents. ●● Increase in alcohol or caffeine consumption; increase in smoking. ●● Obsessive exercising. ●● Irrational, quick to fly off the handle. ●● Reduced productivity: inability to concentrate or complete a task.

Individuals often try to cope with their stress by lifestyle changes, by attempting relaxation or meditation techniques or by signing up for ther­ apy. There are also organizational symptoms of stress like high absentee­ ism and labor turnover, a deterioration in labor relations and a reduction of quality control, even theft and arson. Some attempt to reduce workers’ stress by job redesign, organizational restructuring, and introducing stress management programs. Psychology and Work 163

Burnout

Burnout is the outcome of physical, psychological, and emotional exhaustion.

Failure to cope with stress may result in burnout. Boredom, the opposite of a heavy workload, may cause it. Poor communication between supervisors, peers, subordinates, and clients is a common cause. Poor or inequitable rewards may be another reason. Too much responsibility with too little sup­ port is also found to contribute to it. Having to acquire new and specialized skills too frequently to do quite different, important, but meaningless tasks is yet another cause. Classic causes and consequences of burnout are the following well‐ established facets of alienation. First, meaninglessness – the idea that there is no purpose, inherent worth or meaning in day‐to‐day work. Second, estrangement from the goals of the organization – assigning personally low value to those things the organization values highly. Third, powerless­ ness – the expectancy that, whatever one does, it will not relate to success or happiness. Victims of burnout first complain about physical exhaustion. They have low energy and feel tired much of the time. They report many symptoms of physical strain, such as frequent headaches, nausea, poor sleep, and changes in eating habits. Second, they experience emotional exhaustion. Depression, feelings of helplessness, and feelings of being trapped in one’s job are all part of the syndrome. Third, people suffering from burnout often demonstrate a pattern of mental or attitudinal exhaustion, often known as depersonalization. They become cynical about others, tend to treat them as objects rather than as people, and hold extremely negative attitudes toward their organization. In addi­ tion, they tend to devalue themselves, their jobs, their managers, and even life in general. Finally, they often report feelings of low personal accomplishment. People suffering from burnout conclude that they have not been able to accomplish much in the past and assume that they probably will not succeed in the future. Burnout is this syndrome of emotional, physical, and mental exhaustion, coupled with feelings of low self‐esteem or low self‐efficacy, resulting from prolonged exposure to intense stress. Not much fun really. 164 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Table 7.1 Symptoms of burnout

Physical Behavioral changes Work performance condition

Headache Increased irritability Reduced efficiency (more time Sleeplessness Changing moods spent working, but with less Weight loss Reduced tolerance for productivity) Gastrointestinal frustration Dampened initiative disturbances Increased Diminished interest in working Exhaustion and suspiciousness of Reduced capacity to perform fatigue others effectively under stress Fidgetiness Greater willingness to Increased rigidity of thought Frequent take extreme risks (closed thinking, inflexible) colds/flu Overuse of alcohol and tranquilizers

Symptoms of burnout The major signs that burnout is occurring fall into three categories: physical condition, behavioral changes, and work performance (see Table 7.1).

7.7 Conclusion

Psychology has always played a significant role within the business world. Psychological knowledge has been applied practically, from devising selec­ tion processes to developing techniques to motivate workers and relieve stress. Such knowledge has been shown to be favored by many employers and workers. The realization that monetary incentives cannot increase workers’ performance and happiness endlessly, the importance of psycho­ logical reinforcement, and the understanding of work stress have immensely influenced the way people view organizational psychology.

Organizational psychologists apply their knowledge and under­ standing of human behavior to improve work performance and the quality of the workplace. Instead of merely taking into account the importance of physical incentives, psychologists emphasize also the significant role psychology plays in the workplace. 8 Do Looks Matter?

8.1 Introduction

Which traits and characteristics best explain interpersonal attraction, that is, why people may be attracted to another? One factor always comes out as number one: physical attractiveness. This finding has since come to epitomize and exemplify one of the most ubiquitous findings in the psychological literature: that beauty matters. Indeed, research over the past four decades has demonstrated profound and broad‐reaching implications of physical attractiveness for people’s lives. But what aspects are more important than others? And why so? Are they all culturally invariant? Attractive people are treated differently from others more generally. Research has shown that attractive people are afforded more personal space, are more likely to win arguments, and are more trusted with personal secrets. Other research is consistent with these findings, show- ing that attractive people are considered more intelligent, happier, and more successful, perceived as having a better personality, and more likely to get married. These studies demonstrate what has come to be known as the beautiful is good bias. Research repeatedly demonstrates a positive correlation between physical attractiveness and treatment from others, leading physi- cally attractive individuals to have better jobs, higher incomes, and more friends than others. Such studies leave us in no doubt that physical beauty can have a profound impact on an individual’s daily life. What such studies

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 166 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious do not answer, however, is how we should define attractiveness. This is an important question, not least because it colors the way we examine the social impact of attractiveness, as well as questions concerning body image and body esteem.

8.2 Defining Attractiveness

So how to define attractiveness? It used to be said of attractiveness, as a judge once said of pornography, that it is difficult to explain but easy to recognize. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to learn that human beings have been trying to do just that – explain beauty – for centuries. The ancient Greeks, for example, believed that beauty was a matter of having the right mathematical proportions. Indeed, mathematical functions of beauty, such as Plato’s golden section, also featured prom- inently in the notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci and other artists of the Renaissance.

The idea that beauty is in the eye of the beholder – that different people have different ideas about beauty and therefore do not agree about who is, and who is not, beautiful – was for a long while the dominant view in much of philosophy and art.

In contrast to the subjective view of beauty, however, psychologists have argued that there may be objectively defined criteria of attractiveness. Socialization theorists, for example, emphasize the effects on judgments of beauty of social and cultural norms, and stress the idea that social stereo- types such as the “attractiveness is good” bias create their own reality. A different idea that is currently very popular in both lay and scientific circles is that beauty is a reliable index of health and fertility. This is the evolutionary psychological view of human attractiveness.

8.3 Are Attractive People More Intelligent?

Dare one even go here? Is it true that very successful people tend to be more attractive than less successful people? Why are there so few very good‐looking people in prisons and mental hospitals? Do Looks Matter? 167

There are three theoretical/ideological positions in this area.

Unfair, stereotypic, and warranting intervention Many argue that the beautiful is good stereotype is unfair. They suggest that any research demonstrating a relationship between attractiveness and work/school performance is the result of social processes (such as self‐ fulfillment) as opposed to biological realities. Thus, employing individuals on the basis of attractiveness is an unfair and unjust discrimination against those who are less attractive.

An evolutionary fact and reality Some accept the notion of beautiful is good as fact, taking the evidence to support the theory that those who are physically attractive will perform more effectively at work. It is therefore considered to be beneficial to take an individual’s attractiveness into consideration when interviewing, in order to employ the most successful candidate. Mate selection theory proposes that unrelated traits co‐evolve through assortative mating – whereby attractive women have children with intelli- gent men as they have access to plentiful resources. Good gene theory suggests that attractiveness indicates health, fitness, and quality; and differ- ential parental solicitude theory takes the stance that more attractive children are invested in more by their parents.

An association that develops This viewpoint believes that those who are physically attractive are exposed to developmental advantages which impact upon personality and social behavior. The beautiful is good stereotype results in attractive people being treated beneficially throughout their lives; by parents, peers, teachers, and eventually employers. This results in attractive individuals being more likely to be self‐confident, assertive, and socially skilled, giving them advantages in the workplace, particularly due to the development of interpersonal skills. So, although attractiveness does not biologically relate to work success/intelligence, it is a social indica- tor. Attractive people are also liked, trusted, and helped more by peers, subordinates, and clients due to the beautiful is good stereotype, making it advantageous from a business perspective to choose attractive employees. 168 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

8.4 Why do we Find Particular Physical Characteristics Attractive?

In the evolutionary psychological view of human history, the central mating problem for men was inseminating fertile females, while the cen- tral problem for women was obtaining good genes from high‐quality males and perhaps some parental provisioning and protection. For evo- lutionary psychologists, these remain the central problems for men and women today. Under the rubric of sexual strategies, they have postulated integrated sets of behaviors that organize and guide an individual’s reproductive effort (see Table 8.1). Women, it is said, choose males based on their high status and ability to provide resources for their offspring. As a result, men strive to acquire more resources than other men in order to attract women, and women develop preferences for various cues in men that signal either possession of, or the likelihood of acquiring, resources. On the other hand, among the features that men look to are youth and physical appearance. According to this idea, human ancestors needed to assess women for their youth and health, but they could only base this on such cues as clear skin, baby‐like facial features, a particular body shape or other characteristics that indicated good health. This evolutionary psychological model helps to make sense of many of the empirical findings from experimental social psychology. For example, men from a range of cultures have been shown to favor youthful‐ looking women. If such preferences are the result of inherited mecha- nisms, then men would seem to be wired up to choose reproductive partners whose youthful fertility offers the best chance of genetic profiles being reproduced. So we have established the features that men are attracted to, and women now want to look like the traditional Barbie doll, with long blonde hair, small waists, large breasts, and blue eyes. In the present day women have the technology and ability to be able to make themselves look as they wish, and men fall for these tricks. Male brains cannot fully comprehend silicone breasts, blonde hair dye, or colored contact lenses, as these things did not exist in the ancestral environment. They can cognitively under- stand that women with these features are not actually as young as the features would indicate, but they still are attracted to them because their ancestral psychological functioning is fooled by modern techniques that did not previously exist. Do Looks Matter? 169

Table 8.1 Attractive features in women and evolutionary reasons behind these

Why are men Answer attracted to…

Youth Young women are preferred by men as they have greater reproductive value than older women. This relates to the expected number of children that a woman is yet to have in her reproductive career. Evolutionary psychologists propose that this is the reason for males being attracted to young women, despite concern in civilized society with the age of consent. Yet our ancestors did not come up against such laws, and thus the human brain finds it difficult to comprehend these rules that did not previously exist – and males are therefore attracted to young females. Long hair Men seek to find healthy women to nurse their offspring and make good mothers. A good indicator of health is a woman’s hair. Healthy individuals have shiny hair, while the hair of unhealthy individuals loses its luster. During illness the body takes nutrients from non‐vital parts of the body (the hair) and redirects them to areas necessary for survival. So, hair is a good indicator of good health. The rate of hair growth is very slow (approximately 6 inches per year), and therefore one can judge an individual’s past health from the quality of hair of differing lengths. If someone experiences illness, the section of hair growing in this time will be of lesser appearance than when they are well. In past years there was nothing a woman could do to disguise poor hair quality when she was unwell. Presently, older women tend to keep their hair shorter as they become less healthy, and do not want to keep tell‐tale signs of illness on show. Small waist 36–24–36 are considered the ideal measurements of a woman. Men universally prefer a waist‐to‐hip ratio (the ratio between the circumference of the waist and the circumference of the hips) of 0.7. Why? It has been suggested that this is because healthy women have lower waist‐to‐hip ratios than unhealthy women. Health problems such as diabetes, hypertension, and strokes change body‐fat distribution, increasing waist‐to‐hip ratios. Women with lower waist‐to‐hip ratios also are more fertile, as they have larger amounts of reproductive hormones. Interestingly, the ratio fluctuates during the menstrual cycle, being at its lowest during ovulation, when a woman is most fertile. Men are unconsciously looking out for healthier and more fertile women.

(Continued ) Table 8.1 (continued)

Why are men Answer attracted to… Large breasts Larger and thus heavier breasts sag more evidently with age than do smaller ones, making it easier for a man to judge a woman’s age. In the ancestral environment there was no calendar and concept of birthdays and so women did not keep track of their age. Larger breasts were therefore a better basis upon which to judge age, and therefore reproductive value. However, there is a competing hypothesis. A recent study of Polish women found that those with large breasts and a small waist were the most fertile, based on the level of their reproductive hormones. It may be that men therefore prefer women with large breasts for the same reason they have a preference for women with small waists. Blonde hair Blonde hair is another indicator of a woman’s age and thus reproductive value. Blonde hair changes dramatically with age, becoming darker after the birth of a woman’s first child, as her estrogen levels reduce, and darkening even more with the birth of her subsequent children. Young girls with blonde hair often grow up to become women with brown hair. So, if males are attracted to blonde hair, they are unconsciously trying to reproduce with younger women, with higher reproductive value and greater health. Blonde hair evolved in Scandinavia and Northern Europe, where the climate was cooler and our ancestors were clothed. Males therefore needed an indicator of age other than the distribution of a woman’s body fat. Men then evolved the predisposition to prefer blonde women. This can explain the “blondes are dumb” stereotype, as the average age of light blondes in the ancestral environment would have been a teenager, where for brunettes in the same environment it would have been much older, perhaps 35. A blonde female in such times would therefore have been much less experienced and wise. It is the case that younger people are less knowledgeable, as opposed to those with blonde hair being less knowledgeable. Blue eyes The only available explanation for the universal liking for blue eyes was offered in 2002. The human pupil dilates when it is exposed to a stimulus that it likes – e.g., the pupils of women dilate when they see babies. This can be used as an honest indication of an individual’s liking for something. So we cannot hide our attraction to someone, as we cannot control this automatic dilation. Blue is the lightest color of human iris, and therefore the dark brown pupil is easiest to observe in blue eyes. Therefore, it is easiest to judge whether another is attracted to you if they have blue eyes. This helps explain the liking for blue eyes in both sexes, as it is equally important for a woman to judge whether a male is attracted to her. This theory can also justify why people with brown eyes can be considered “mysterious.” The pupil is difficult to judge against the dark color of brown irises, and so we cannot judge whether a person is attracted to us. Do Looks Matter? 171

8.5 What Are the Key Factors?

Attractiveness has played an important role in human evolutionary history, leading people to talk about survival of the prettiest. The rationale behind this idea is that reproduction is the only way for an inherited characteristic to be passed from one generation to the next. Thus, evolution favors those organisms that get to reproduce and whose offspring themselves get to reproduce. In other words, having sex that results in the birth of offspring is the sole way of achieving evolutionary success. The best cues of all are those that are:

●● Uniquely elaborated in our species. ●● Show considerable difference between men and women (that is, they are sexually dimorphic). ●● Are grown only after puberty (sexual maturity). ●● Are manifestly valued as sexual signals. ●● Are selectively elaborated through ornament and make‐up.

Such cues probably evolved as indicators of fertility, viability, age, health or lack of infestation by pathogens and parasites.

1. The waist‐to‐hip ratio The ultimate success or failure of must of course be judged on its products. Does it provide us with plausible and illuminating insights into human nature or human behavior? One example of evolu- tionary psychological research that highlights both its predictive power and its limitations is studies that highlight the waist‐to‐hip ratio (WHR) as an indicator of a woman’s attractiveness. One of the key determinants of attractiveness that prefigured in early attractiveness research was an individual’s overall body weight, measured as the body mass index (BMI). Various studies found that women were considered more attractive, better mate choices, and more positive in general if they were thin. However, Singh (1993) presented evidence that it was body fat distribution, rather than overall weight, that was related to judgments both of a woman’s attractiveness and potential reproductive success. Singh’s reasons for investigating these particular morphological features are primarily due to their uniqueness. The features concerned with the measurement of the WHR, the waist and the buttocks, are unique to humans and it is therefore possible that this serves some unique functional significance. 172 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Before and after puberty, body shape differences between men and women are negligible and only during early reproductive life is there maximal differentiation. This is brought about by the active sex hor- mones during and after puberty, which influence the anatomical distri- bution of adipose tissue. In women, estrogen stimulates fat cells to accumulate in the buttocks and thighs, and inhibits accumulation in the abdominal region. By contrast, testosterone in men maximally stimulates accumulation of fat cells in the abdominal region and inhibits fat deposits in the thighs and buttocks. These differences produce gynoid and android fat distri- bution respectively, which in turn can be measured by the WHR (the ratio between the circumference of the waist and the circumference of the hips). An important part of Singh’s evolutionary predictions is the finding that the WHR is related to a variety of life outcomes. Susceptibility to various major physical diseases and psychological disorders is conveyed by the size of the WHR. In addition, Singh points out that the WHR signals all conditions that affect women’s reproductive status. For example, in his summary of this research, Singh (1993) argues that the probability of successful pregnancy induction is affected by the WHR and that married women with higher WHRs have more difficulty becoming pregnant. For Singh, the main problem facing our hunter‐gatherer ancestors in evolutionary history was the identification of mate value. Over evolution- ary time, therefore, perceptual mechanisms were selected in men to detect and use information conveyed by the WHR in determining a woman’s potential as a mate. To investigate, Singh developed a set of two‐dimensional line drawings of the female figure, which were systematically varied with respect to overall body weight and the WHR. In a series of experiments, Singh reported that low WHRs (indicative of curvaceousness) were judged as the most attractive. For Singh, the WHR acts as a wide first‐pass filter, which serves to exclude women who are unhealthy or who have low reproductive capac- ity. It is only after this culturally invariant filter is passed that other fea- tures, such as the face, skin or weight, become utilized in mate selection. The filter is culturally invariant or universal to all men because it was an adaptive assessment of female mate value for all males in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Singh’s studies have been replicated in a whole host of (industrialized) countries, with the similarity of results being taken as evidence for the universal nature of WHR as a signal for mate selection. Do Looks Matter? 173

2. Body weight At first glance, this appears to be an excellent example of evolutionary psychology in action: Singh goes beyond lay beliefs by predicting that the WHR will be the primary attribute of physical attraction regardless of the cultural setting. Yet in recent years, it has become increasingly clear that this is not the whole story. Some researchers have argued, for example, that Singh’s findings are the result of an artifact in the experimental design. Tovée, Hancock, Mahmoodi, Singleton, and Cornelissen (2002) pointed out that Singh’s line drawings varied WHR within each weight category by altering the width of the torso. This changes not only the WHR of the stimuli but also the apparent body weight (measured as BMI, or weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared). The stimuli thus confound WHR differences with changes in BMI and so the apparent preference for a WHR of 0.70 could simply be a preference for slim body shape. Indeed, a growing body of literature has explored the relative contribu- tions of WHR and BMI to judgments of female physical attractiveness, and these generally find that WHR is a weaker predictor of ratings. Most of these studies have used technologically advanced sets of stimuli (e.g., photographic and three‐dimensional images), and typically find that the effect sizes of BMI and WHR in attractiveness ratings are vastly different: Variation in BMI almost always accounts for more than 70% of the variance, whereas WHR accounts for less than BMI. Yet others have questioned the universal nature of preferences for low WHRs. Several studies among hunter‐gatherer tribes have found that they generally prefer high over low WHRs, and in any case body weight is a better predictor of attractiveness ratings (Wetsman & Marlowe, 1999). Among the Matsigenka of Peru, for example, Yu and Shepard (1999) found that an isolated group ranked line drawings first by weight (high preferred to low) and only then high WHR over low WHR, diametrically opposed to findings in industrial societies. What, then, should we make of the WHR and attractiveness? One pos- sibility is that the WHR affects attractiveness ratings only indirectly. Recent research has highlighted the possibility that the WHR is used to make social judgments about gender. In other words, the WHR seems to be involved in differentiating men from women, or pregnant from non‐ pregnant women. Moreover, the WHR is strongly linked with perceived femininity, and to the extent that femininity is associated with female attractiveness, women with sex‐typical WHRs should be considered highly attractive. 174 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Within this paradigm, there is room for both evolutionary and socialization explanations. Underlying biology may direct a preference for WHRs that are sex‐typical, but culture and learning may influence proximate prefer- ences more strongly. Indeed, there is now a greater recognition that evo- lutionary psychological models of attraction are altogether too one‐sided. Accepted uncritically, most evolutionary psychological theories degener- ate into absurd, misogynist claims that serve to perpetuate prejudices and discrimination (e.g., the idea that men occupy positions of power in soci- ety because it is “natural” or the idea that men have mental modules that direct them to rape under appropriate circumstances). At a more basic level, most contemporary researchers are keen to emphasize learned and experiential components of attraction alongside possible evolutionary preferences. That is, culture and biology should be seen as working together and not in isolation.

3. Temporal and situational factors Recent studies have further highlighted temporal and situational factors that may affect interpersonal attraction. Some studies have shown that feelings of resource scarcity can affect preferences, with hungry partici- pants judging slightly heavier potential partners as more attractive than satiated participants. Importantly, this finding mirrors patterns of cultural differences in preferences for body weight. Just as hungry participants within a particular culture prefer a slightly heavier potential partner, so relatively poorer cultures idealize heavier body weights than relatively socioeconomically developed societies. It is likely that the subjective experience of resource deprivation (such as hunger) provides implicit cues about collective resources in a society, and that people use these cues to construct their preferences. Through participation in socioculturally specific processes and practices, individuals come to have an understanding and a feeling of what is ideal, for example with regards to idealized body weights. Individuals who share similar beliefs interact in social episodes in local worlds, and these interac- tions (along with cultural institutions) shape the individual’s psychological experience. Thus, what is desirable in a particular socioeconomic context appears desirable in the eyes of individuals, and what is culturally meaning- ful becomes meaningful to these individuals. As a consequence, the cultural values are internalized and represented in individual psychological tenden- cies, and they are used by individuals to guide their actions and preferences. It is possible to reconcile such findings with some evolutionary theories. For instance, the finding that hunger affects judgments of attractiveness in Do Looks Matter? 175 predictable ways suggests strongly that there exist proximate mechanisms influencing attraction at the individual level. At the same time, such mech- anisms may be shaped by evolutionary factors. One possibility is that in times of hardship or prolonged resource scarcity, we should be attracted to features that index environmental security. Because only people with resources will be able to put on body fat during times of scarcity, it makes sense to prefer slightly heavier potential partners. This is why almost all cultures have or had ideals of attraction that emphasized heavier or plump bodies. Such a model relies on the interplay between evolutionary, sociocultural, and individual mechanisms, and has the advantage of not privileging one aspect of human nature (the biological) over another (the sociocultural). A comprehensive understanding of any particular psychological tendency, such as judgments of body weight, requires some analysis of the collective reality of which that tendency is a constituent part. The collective reality that grounds and affords this psychological tendency includes human evolutionary history as well as socioculturally and historically rooted ideas and values, institutions, and social practices, which reflect and promote these ideas and values. Moreover, it will include a web of everyday social interactions, which represent and promote these ideas.

4. Individual differences Just as investigations of preferences for body weight have highlighted vari- ability across cultures, it is also likely that there exist individual differences in ratings of attractiveness within cultures. This suggests that it is impor- tant to understand the social nature of attraction. Although we may decide that human evolutionary history has had profound effects in shaping human nature, behaviors such as partner selection and mating strategies must ultimately be explained proximately. One important social factor that may moderate physical attraction is reciprocity, that is, we like those who like us, and dislike those who dislike us. In a classic study conducted in the mid‐1950s, Dittes and Kelley (1956) had participants join a small discussion group. During the discus- sion, they led participants to believe that other group members either liked or disliked them. They found that participants who believed they were liked were more attracted to the group than those who believed they were disliked. However, various factors may mediate the relationship between ­reciprocity and liking, including individual attachment styles or the self‐ esteem of the observers. For example, Dittes (1959) carried out another group experiment in which participants were classified as having high 176 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious or low self‐esteem. Participants were then placed either in a satisfying ­condition (the group’s behavior toward them was positive) or a frustrating condition (negative group behavior). For participants who were low in self‐esteem, attraction to the group depended on how the group behaved. By contrast, for those high in self‐esteem, the difference in attraction was not significant, suggesting that for people with high self‐esteem, liking is not affected by acceptance or rejection. The effects of reciprocity can also interact with the nature of the situ- ation. In some situations, we may highly value praise from another per- son; in other situations, we realize that he or she has an ulterior motive in praising us, and so praise does not elicit liking. We also attach greater value to praise from strangers than from our friends and family, from whom we expect praise. The pattern in which the praise is received is also influential. An interesting example is the gain–loss hypothesis: We tend to like most those who initially dislike us but then warm to us, and we dislike most those people who like us initially but then turn cold. An explanation for this effect is that it involves anxiety reduction. When we experience rejection, our anxiety rises, but when rejection changes to acceptance, the anxiety is reduced so that we experience the pleasure of being liked.

5. Proximity and similarity Most theories of attraction focus on physical characteristics of the observed, such as their body weight. But non‐physical attributes can also play an important mediating role in determining who is, and who is not, consid- ered physically attractive. One possibility is that the personality of the observed individual determines our attraction: We perceive as more physi- cally attractive people who we know have a cheerful or warm personality. This highlights yet another aspect of interpersonal attraction, namely the social interactions that take place between individuals which lead to relationships. Two key factors that are known to affect attractiveness ratings of people we know are proximity (or propinquity) and similarity. Though it may seem obvious, the physical proximity of one person to another is a potent facilitator of attractiveness. In a famous study of a housing complex, Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) found participants had more friends who were living on the same floor as them, rather than on other floors or in other buildings. Even within the same floor, participants were more likely to be friends with their next‐door neighbor than they were with someone at the end of the corridor. Do Looks Matter? 177

Moreover, proximity allows other factors to come into play in determining interpersonal attraction, such as familiarity. Proximity generally leads to repeated exposure and greater familiarity, and therefore more liking. Familiarity enhances liking as a part of a more general effect in which repetitive presentation of stimuli increases liking for them. The familiarity effect also extends to the faces of strangers, which are judged as more liked and more attractive when they are seen more often. In contrast, when something familiar seems different, people feel uncomfortable. For example, people do not usually like mirror reversals of photos of their own or others’ faces. Another social factor that moderates attractiveness is similarity of atti- tudes or values. It is often said that opposites attract, but within the psychological literature there is very little evidence for this complemen- tarity view. Rather, the evidence suggests that people who are evenly matched in their physical appearance, social background, and personality are more likely to be attracted to one another. Studies of long‐term rela- tionships have confirmed that at the time of initial testing, partners are similar in a number of aspects such as age and education. Over time, partners become even more similar on measures of mental abilities and attitudes. But similarity in attitudes can also work in different ways. In another classic study, Newcomb (1961) gave students rent‐free accommoda- tion in return for filling in questionnaires about their attitudes and values. The first questionnaires were filled in before students arrived at the university. Over the course of the semester, attraction between students and attitude changes were measured, and the results showed that in the first few weeks, attraction was related to proximity. However, as the semester progressed, attraction related most closely to similarity of pre‐ acquaintance attitudes. Such studies led to the formulation of a law of attraction, which argued that attraction toward a person bears a linear relationship to the propor- tion of attitudes associated with that person. But the law is intended to be more generally applicable than just to attitudes in common between two people. Anything that other people do that agrees with your perception of things is reinforcing. The more other people agree, the more reinforcing they are and the more you are attracted to them. Conversely, differences in attitudes and interests can lead to dislike and avoidance. One possible explanation for this is that the recognition that we like something that someone else does not is a cognitively imbalanced state that makes us feel uncomfortable. One way to resolve this is by deciding that we do not like that person, thus re‐establishing cognitive consistency. 178 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

8.6 Physical Characteristics and Personality

We have discussed the reasoning behind what makes an individual physi- cally attractive, as well as other contributing factors to attraction. Research has also related particular physical characteristics to personality traits. In typical experiments participants would be presented with photo- graphs that showed a person’s face with particular or exaggerated charac- teristics. These were then rated by participants who were given a checklist of many traits (up to 40) and asked what they could associate with the photos. Argyle (1994) summarized a number of findings (see Table 8.2). These studies have all shown that facial features especially can lead to clear, agreed impressions of personality. This occurs because people make assumptions that if a person looks similar to others they know, they share traits. Further, people make inferences from body parts: High foreheads mean large brains, which indicates intelligence; thick lips mean good at kissing, which indicates lax morality. These associations may be culture specific and change over time. Research on personality judgments based on physical characteristics has continued. Fink, Neave, Manning, and Grammer (2006) showed face symmetry significantly affected the health and personality ratings of judges. The more asymmetric the face, the less the person was judged as sociable, lively, self‐confident, and balanced, and the more as anxious.

8.7 Attractive Personalities

Over the years there have been a number of studies that have examined the influence of giving personality information as well as photographs when examining ratings of attractiveness. Many have looked at the relative power of attractiveness over personality, and vice versa. Nettle (2006) attempted a full and parsimonious description of the benefits and costs of each of the Big Five personality dimensions. See also Table 8.3.

Extraversion Extraverts are more sociable, sensation‐seeking, and have more social sup- port. They are usually more socially skilled and interpersonally confident. Their attitude to, interest in, and experience of sex means they tend to have a greater number of sexual partners, mating successes, and offspring. However, it also means they are more prone to infidelity (Nettle, 2005), Do Looks Matter? 179

Table 8.2 What people think physical features indicate

Features Judged as

Shallow set eyes Carefree, easy‐going, cheerful, with a sense of humor, Light eyebrows honest, warm‐hearted Bright eyes Younger face Energetic, conscientious, patient, honest, warm‐ Few horizontal wrinkles hearted, friendly, intelligent, responsible, kind, trustful, easy‐going Older face Meek, studious Averagely thick lips Older face Distinguished, intelligent, refined Thin lips Dark complexion Hostile, boorish, sly, quick‐tempered, conceited Oily, coarse skin Younger face Carefree, excitable, sly, conceited Low eyebrows Narrowed eyes Bright eyes Moral character (sincere, conscientious) Widened eyes Eyelids not visible Social acceptability (likeable, good mixer) Smooth skin Well‐groomed Smiling High eyebrows Gold‐digger syndrome (likes men’s attention, Tilted head conceited, demanding) Narrowed eyes Narrowed eyes Sexuality Relaxed mouth Beautiful Thick lips Smooth skin Well‐groomed Much lipstick which suggests that their children are more likely to be exposed later to step‐parents, which is an established risk factor in their development. Introverts are less sociable but safer; they run the risk of a lower likeli- hood of finding mates and social support networkers, but lead a more secure lifestyle, which is better for childrearing. Certainly it seems extraverts are 180 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious rated as more interpersonally attractive. Social confidence, fun‐loving activity preferences, and optimism make them more attractive to many people in the short term, and for short‐term social relationships.

Neuroticism Neurotics are more likely to be anxious, depressed, guilt‐ridden, phobic, and hypochondriacal. They are less likely to have good long‐standing and satisfying personal relationships and jobs. They are, however, socially vigi- lant, wary, and risk averse. Neurotics are very aware of subtle (and possibly threatening) social changes, which can be a strong survival mechanism in certain environments. Neurotics are very interested in their own and others’ emotions, which can make them highly sensitive readers of social situations. Those very low in neuroticism, labeled stable or highly adjusted, may have some disadvantages. They may be too trusting and eager to avoid social and physical hazards; they may underperform and strive less hard because they are afraid of failure. They may also be socially insensitive to the anxieties and worries of those around them and, therefore, have a small social support network. Overall, it does seem as if strongly neurotic people would be considered unattractive, too demanding, and high maintenance.

Openness Openness to experience is marked by creativity, , imagina- tion, and curiosity. Open individuals are attracted to the unusual and the unconventional. Openness is a good predictor of artistic and scientific achieve- ment and innovation (Furnham, 2008b). Open individuals are often thought of as creative. The flipside of novel thinking is delusions and occasionally super- natural and paranormal ideas. Creative individuals, when emotionally stable and associated with particular skills, particularly in the arts, are highly attractive to others and, therefore, have many different mates and a wide relationship network. However, those with unusual beliefs can easily be described as “mad” and rejected by society. Moderate to high levels of creativity are associated with attractiveness partly because creativity is highly valued in many settings. It also means that these individuals are thought of as very interesting.

Agreeableness Agreeable people are empathic, trusting, kind, well liked, respected, and valued as friends. They always seek and attempt to create harmony and concord. The trait is highly valued, and being sensitive (emotionally intel- ligent) to others’ moods is clearly advantageous. However, being too Do Looks Matter? 181 trusting, particularly of antisocial individuals, could be counterproductive. Being excessively attentive to the needs of others rather than one’s own may also be less adaptive. Agreeable people may be easy to exploit and unable or unwilling to assert their rights. Paradoxically, it appears that people who are called tough‐minded, critical, and skeptical often do better in the professions and business than those with high scores. Almost always agreeableness is rated as attractive in others. Disagreeable people are rated as egocentric, selfish, and unkind.

Conscientiousness Conscientious individuals are hardworking, dutiful, and orderly. They show self‐control and tend to be moral. They may be achievement ori- ented and highly diligent. It is no surprise, then, that this trait is one of the clearest markers of success in educational and occupational life. Conscientious people plan for the future and are happy to work constantly for desirable long‐term payoffs. People like to work and study with consci- entious people. They pitch up and pitch in. The major downside of high is associated with perfectionism, rigidity, and social dog- matism. Conscientiousness may also be thought of as a reaction to low ability in competitive settings. Some students learn to be competitive to compensate or make up for ability. Thus, conscientiousness is associated not with what in business circles is described as “doing the right thing” but with “doing the right thing right.” Managers, teachers, and parents value conscientiousness and attempt to instill it in those they know.

8.8 Attractiveness at Work

Do attractive people do better at work? Many studies suggest that physical attractiveness results in advantages in many aspects of work life, and many interaction effects have been found to play a role. For example, Judge, Hurst, and Simon (2009) studied 191 American adults and their financial outcomes, measuring their salaries as well as financial strain. They pro- posed three hypotheses. Due to past findings discussed, they suggested that physical attractiveness is positively correlated with financial income. The authors also hypothesized that physical attractiveness is positively related to educational attainment, due to the receipt of additional encour- agement and attention from early years, with support increasing academic achievement and motivation, resulting in educational attainment. Finally, they suggested that physically attractive people have more positive self‐ associations, relating to self‐esteem and life beliefs. Table 8.3 Examples of adjectives, Q‐sort items, and costs and benefits defining the Big Five factors of personality

Factor Factor definers Positive benefits Negative costs

Adjectives Q‐sort items

Extraversion Active Talkative Big social networks Accidents and risk Assertive Skilled in play, humor Relationship and mating taking Energetic Rapid personal tempo success Impulsivity and poor Enthusiastic Facially, gesturally Explorer of opportunities decision making Outgoing expressive Happiness Relationship instability Talkative Behave assertively Gregarious Neuroticism Anxious Thin‐skinned Hypervigilance Poor mental health Self‐pitying Brittle ego defenses Achievement‐striving Stress sensitivity Tense Self‐defeating Emotional sensitivity Poor physical health Touchy Basically anxious Competitiveness Unstable Concerned with Worrying adequacy Fluctuating moods Openness Artistic Wide range of interests Social attractiveness Mental illness Curious Introspective Creativity Social exclusion Imaginative Unusual thought Flexibility Bizarre belief system Insightful processes Change oriented and lifestyle Original Values intellectual matters Wide interests Judges in unconventional terms Aesthetically reactive

Agreeableness Appreciative Not critical, skeptical Psychological mindedness Vulnerable to Forgiving Behaves in a giving way Social networks exploitation Generous Sympathetic, considerate Strong relationships Failure to maximize Kind Arouses liking Valued group member personal advantages Sympathetic Warm, compassionate Too conflict‐avoidant Trusting Basically trustful Low assertiveness Conscientiousness Efficient Dependable, responsible Long‐term planning Obsessionality and Organized Productive Longer life expectancy perfectionism Planning ability Able to delay Good citizenship Rigidity with poor Reliable gratification Dependable and dutiful flexibility Responsible Not self‐indulgent team member Slow to respond Thorough Behaves ethically Has high aspirational level Table 8.3 Examples of adjectives, Q‐sort items, and costs and benefits defining the Big Five factors of personality

Factor Factor definers Positive benefits Negative costs

Adjectives Q‐sort items

Extraversion Active Talkative Big social networks Accidents and risk Assertive Skilled in play, humor Relationship and mating taking Energetic Rapid personal tempo success Impulsivity and poor Enthusiastic Facially, gesturally Explorer of opportunities decision making Outgoing expressive Happiness Relationship instability Talkative Behave assertively Gregarious Neuroticism Anxious Thin‐skinned Hypervigilance Poor mental health Self‐pitying Brittle ego defenses Achievement‐striving Stress sensitivity Tense Self‐defeating Emotional sensitivity Poor physical health Touchy Basically anxious Competitiveness Unstable Concerned with Worrying adequacy Fluctuating moods Openness Artistic Wide range of interests Social attractiveness Mental illness Curious Introspective Creativity Social exclusion Imaginative Unusual thought Flexibility Bizarre belief system Insightful processes Change oriented and lifestyle Original Values intellectual matters Wide interests Judges in unconventional terms Aesthetically reactive

Agreeableness Appreciative Not critical, skeptical Psychological mindedness Vulnerable to Forgiving Behaves in a giving way Social networks exploitation Generous Sympathetic, considerate Strong relationships Failure to maximize Kind Arouses liking Valued group member personal advantages Sympathetic Warm, compassionate Too conflict‐avoidant Trusting Basically trustful Low assertiveness Conscientiousness Efficient Dependable, responsible Long‐term planning Obsessionality and Organized Productive Longer life expectancy perfectionism Planning ability Able to delay Good citizenship Rigidity with poor Reliable gratification Dependable and dutiful flexibility Responsible Not self‐indulgent team member Slow to respond Thorough Behaves ethically Has high aspirational level 184 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

All three hypotheses were confirmed, with correlations ranging from r = .20 to r = .24, thus demonstrating the benefits of being physically attractive. However, intelligence was also found to predict educational attainment and income. The authors were able to demonstrate that physi- cal attractiveness exhibits both direct and indirect effects on income, and two mediators are educational attainment and self‐beliefs. Consider the evidence for the relationship between physical attractive- ness and success at work (Swami & Furnham, 2008).

Beauty: general attractiveness 1. Self‐rated attractiveness of high school graduates correlates with increased wage returns. 2. Pro‐attractiveness bias: held only for selection of opposite‐sex scholar- ship applicants (none for same sex) and for prospective job candidates but not for equally attractive interviewers, only moderately attractive as there is more social threat. 3. Attractiveness of electoral candidates in Finland was measured by photo ratings by non‐Finnish people. It was found that an increase in the meas- ure of beauty of one standard deviation is associated with a 20% increase in the number of votes for the average non‐incumbent candidate. 4. Cooperation: People are more likely to cooperate with others they find attractive; men who see themselves as more attractive cooperate more and women less in Prisoner’s Dilemma‐type game. 5. Career progression: Females who are married with children and have a poor physical appearance are generally perceived as less likely to succeed. 6. Physical attractiveness: Attractive job applicants are preferred and received higher salaries than unattractive applicants; attractiveness had a stronger effect for external applicants than for internal ones judged by recruiting agents’ estimates of reliability, classification, and estimations of salary.

Facial attractiveness and confidence 1. Babyfacedness: Being described as childlike or youthful looking was highly related to inferred competence in politics. However, it is unre- lated or positively related, depending on the candidate sample, to electoral success. 2. Facial attractiveness: Student‐ and adult‐rated attractiveness sug- gests increased attractiveness improves income prospects and core self‐evaluations, suggesting that looks, brains, and personality are important to income and financial strain. Do Looks Matter? 185

3. Cross‐cultural role: High facial attractiveness correlates with life out- comes more in the United States than in Ghana. 4. Income: Higher facial attractiveness in men predicts higher starting salaries and higher earnings later on. In women there is no effect on starting salary but they earned more later on. By 1983 men earned $2,600 more on average for each unit of attractiveness (5‐point scale) and women $2,150. 5. Favorableness in hirability, utility, and desirability: Attractive appli- cants received higher hirability ratings than unattractive ones, and more competent applicants were judged more favorably than less competent (moderate competency). The applicant’s gender had no effect. Being unattractive was more disadvantageous for a female than for a male sex‐typed job and being moderately competent was more disadvantageous for a female sex‐typed job than for a male sex‐typed job. Being attractive was more disadvantageous for women when they were moderately competent. This suggests that for women, attractiveness only increases hirability if they are highly competent. So less attractive, highly competent females would lose out to highly attractive females, but this effect was not found for males.

Hair color 1. Blondes receive large wage premiums and so do their spouses. 2. Blondes also elicit more households to contribute and collect higher donations (23% more) per contact compared to brunettes. However, this is mediated by race, so the finding applies only to Caucasians and not to minorities.

Weight 1. Waist circumference has a negative association with wages for women but not for men. All measures of obesity (BMI, fat mass, and waist circumference) are negatively associated with women’s employment probability and fat mass is negatively associated with men’s employ- ment probability. This means there is a risk that labor market penalties associated with obesity are measured with bias. 2. Views: Women are 16 times more likely to perceive employment‐ related discrimination and identify weight as the basis for discrimination than men. Overweight are 12 times more likely, obese 37 times more likely, and severely obese 100 times more likely than normal weight respondents to report discrimination. 186 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Height 1. Men have a higher IQ because they are taller; once height is con- trolled for, women’s IQ is higher than men’s. Height is also strongly associated with intelligence in both sexes. 2. Height is related to social esteem, leader emergence, performance, and income. Tall people are advantaged in several important aspects of careers and organizational lives.

Intelligence 1. Impression management (IM): Specifically looking while speaking is significantly correlated with IQ, was successfully manipulated by IM targets, and contributed to higher perceived intelligence ratings (Murphy, 2007). This suggests IM can improve one’s appearance of IQ and improve job prospects as IQ is an important factor. 2. Intelligence as measured by WAIS‐III and creativity independently predicted mate appeal across contexts (videotapes of participants: news reading, answer to creative question, and giving reasons one would be a good date).

Masculinity 1. Higher attributions of leadership competence were found for persons with masculine appearances than feminine appearances regardless of sex.

Weight‐based discrimination Prejudice and discrimination on the basis of sex and race are responsible for some of the most appalling acts of inhumanity seen throughout his- tory. Of course, sexism and racism today are much more likely to exist in subtle or new forms. By contrast, other forms of discrimination remain pervasive and widespread. For example, prejudice or discrimination on the basis of appearance, sometimes referred to as lookism or appearance dis- crimination, has received increasing attention in recent years. These differ- ent terms all refer to the same issue, namely that attractive people are given preferential treatment and unattractive people are denied opportunities. While there are many examples of lookism in Western societies, perhaps the most pervasive and insidious is weight‐based prejudice and discrimina- tion. In a sense, it is not surprising that individuals are discriminated on the basis of their body weight. A person’s body weight is an obvious characteristic and is difficult to conceal. Moreover, body weight is an Do Looks Matter? 187 important component of physical attractiveness for both men and women, which makes it likely that individuals with an unattractive body weight will be discriminated against. Indeed, some researchers have said that obese and overweight persons are the last acceptable targets of explicit prejudice and discrimination. Both anecdotes and experimental studies have shown that bias, prejudice, and discrimination are part of everyday life for over- weight and obese individuals.

In a classic survey in Psychology Today, it was reported that a quarter of women and a fifth of men would give up three or more years of their lives to be the weight they want (Garner, 1997).

A person’s body weight is an important part of self‐image. Some women even reported that they were choosing not to become pregnant because of fears of fatness. These examples highlight ideals of thinness in most socio- economically developed societies, where the message that it is good to be thin is so widespread that expressing negative attitudes toward obese peo- ple has become an accepted form of prejudice. Puhl and Brownell (2001) have reviewed the literature on bias and prej- udice against overweight people, and report that such prejudice exists in a wide range of applied settings. In employment, for example, overweight people may face a substantial disadvantage before, during, and after the interview process. One example is a study using videotapes of job appli- cants in a simulated hiring setting (Larkin & Pines, 1979). The scenario involved an applicant completing written screening tests for work requir- ing logical analysis and eye–hand coordination. Overweight applicants were significantly less likely to be recommended for hiring than average‐ weight applicants, and were also judged more negatively on a range of descriptors including neatness and productivity. Even if overweight indi- viduals are hired, they still face discrimination in terms of wages, promo- tions, and employment termination. Attractive individuals seem to reap many rewards in the workplace. Advantages have been recorded in the selection, evaluation, and reward processes.

Monetary advantages Frieze, Olson, and Russell (1991) investigated the salaries of 737 MBA students, finding that attractive males had the benefit of higher starting salaries and continued to earn more over time. More recently, Fletcher 188 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

(2009) confirmed previous findings, concluding that above‐averagely attractive people earn 5–10% more than averagely attractive individuals (whilst controlling for ability).

Recruitment advantages Dipboye, Arvey, and Terpstra (1977) looked into selection process advan- tages for those blessed with being physically attractive. When considering the interaction effects of interviewer sex and physical attractiveness and applicant sex, attractiveness, and qualifications, three main effects were found. Regardless of the interviewer, male candidates were rated above females, high over low qualifications, and the attractive over the unattractive. The authors concluded that stereotypes relating to physical attractiveness and sex‐roles accounted for discriminatory decisions in the workplace. Contrastingly, an experiment involving a fictitious resume (high/low qualifications) and a photograph attached (attractive/unattractive) (Pansu & Dubois, 2002) reached different conclusions. The authors investigated advantages reaped by physically attractive individuals, concluding that more qualified individuals were preferred regardless of attractiveness, while less attractive and qualified applicants were only chosen over attractive, less‐qualified individuals in jobs requiring relational skills.

Promotional advantages Anderson, Johnson, and Reckers (1994) considered the effect of five factors: gender, family structure, attractiveness/appearance, staff relations, and technical ability on promotions. They concluded that unattractive females who were married with children were less likely to be promoted than their counterparts.

Sales advantages The benefits of being physically attractive appear to be more clearcut in some jobs than others. When investigating the role of regional accents and attractiveness and sales people, authors found attractiveness played a very significant role in predicting purchase intention decisions (DeShields, Kara, & Kaynak, 1996). McElroy and DeCarlo (1999) considered physical attractiveness in the evaluation of sales performance of female staff members. They found that the role physical attractiveness played in casually predicting success and expectations of performance was “limited.” Do Looks Matter? 189

However, physical attractiveness can be seen as a drawback when con- sidering the perception of attractive individuals by members of the same sex. It may be that same‐sex individuals are jealous of people of their own gender. Intra‐sex competition to be the most attractive member of the workforce may come into play, with negative impacts.

8.9 Conclusion

It is patently obvious that there are huge social advantages to being physi- cally attractive. We have now come to understand that while beauty is to some extent (partly) in the eye of the beholder, we can define and explain why certain features make people attractive. We know that all features associated with youth and health (body shape and size, skin texture, body symmetry) are thought of as attractive in many cultures, and biases are often seen when comparing treatments received by attractive and less attractive individuals.

So how important is physical attractiveness? Physical attractiveness gives individuals a cutting edge in many areas. Attractive or beautiful individuals are perceived to be more successful, intelligent, reliable, outgoing, more confident, and resourceful. Mate selection theory proposes how intelligent men seek attractive women. People are biased and favor more attractive individuals than those who are less attractive. Studies have also shown how attractive individuals are found to receive a high income. But do not despair. The idea that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” still holds true and is still a dominant view today. 9 Judging and Nudging

9.1 Introduction

Psychologists have always been interested in how people make decisions. They are fascinated by the arationality and irrationality of people. Economists base many of their theories on people being logical and rational. Psychological research, however, has shown a very long list of cognitive biases to which all people are prone. These are “errors” people make in their everyday thinking. They are also called heuristics.

Heuristics are biases, mental shortcuts, the products of fast thinking.

There are a number of heuristics that are widely discussed in current behavioral economics research. Advertisers and businesses have long known about these and have understood that the way they frame their message, price option, promotions or proposition has a great impact on whether they will be chosen. Work in this area began well over 50 years ago with the famous studies on cognitive dissonance.

Cognitive dissonance Cognitive dissonance theory asserts that when people behave inconsist- ently with their beliefs and attitudes, they experience a negative state called cognitive dissonance. We try to resolve this “discomfort” by changing our

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Judging and Nudging 191

1 If a person is forced to behave in ways contrary to his/her belief, he/she will experience dissonance.

2 The greater the force compelling the behavior, the less the dissonance, and vice versa.

3 Dissonance can be reduced by changing attitudes.

4 So attitude change is greatest when forces to act are paradoxically minimal.

Figure 9.1 The theory of cognitive dissonance.

Group 1 is forced to do Group 3 is paid Group 2 is paid the task a paltry sum handsomely (with severe ($1) for their ($100) punishment if efforts they do not)

Figure 9.2 Three experimental groups.

attitudes or behavior, or both, to reduce the inconsistency (see Figure 9.1). We are powerfully motivated to achieve this comforting consonance. Paradoxically, then, behavior can lead to attitude change more easily than the other way around. Individuals change attitudes by changing behavior. For example, imagine you have three groups of people (as described in Figure 9.2) who write long, critical, well‐referenced essays about some important issue that they personally do not believe in (e.g., capital punish- ment, apartheid, research on animals). The theory states, and the data show, that it is the third group whose attitudes should change most toward that of the topic of the essay. This is because they can’t easily justify doing the task because of being forced to do it or the reward of much money. Dissonance is aroused and has to be reduced under very specific situa- tions, according to the theory. Just noticing that our behavior is inconsist- ent with our attitudes is insufficient. First, people must feel that their attitude‐discrepant behavior is freely chosen, completely volitional, and that they are personally responsible for it. If they act under coercion from some external force or threat (or lack of choice), dissonance is not necessarily aroused. 192 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

One study tested this by either asking or ordering students to write an essay on a controversial topic they did not personally support. The most dramatic shift in beliefs occurred among those who chose to write the essays. Second, people must feel that this attitude‐discrepant behavior is firmly committed and irrevocable. If the behavior is easily modifiable, this reduces dissonance. Third, they must believe that their behavior has important consequences for themselves and others. If the consequences are minor or trivial, they are unlikely to experience any dissonance. Finally, people experience most dramatic dissonance pressure when the particular attitudes or behavior concerned are central to their self‐concept, self‐worth, and values. This was illustrated in a very famous study. Three groups of students were required to perform a long, dull, repetitive, and monotonous task. Some were paid $1, some $20, and the control group nothing. Afterwards they were asked about the task. Those paid only $1 had persuaded them- selves the task was more enjoyable and interesting than those paid $20. The person paid $1 has a dilemma: Could/should they admit that they had been “bought” for a paltry sum, a cheap bribe? Not easily. So they reinterpreted the event. The person paid $20 had less of a problem: People do lots of things if the money is right. Dissonance also predicts that we have a tendency to derogate our victims. When we behave badly to another individual or group without any obvious justification, we shift our beliefs to justify this behavior by thinking of the victim more negatively. We like to think of ourselves as decent, kind, moral individuals who are just and unlikely to cause innocent people harm or distress. So if we do something hurtful like shout, ignore or even hit another person, our dissonance is aroused. If we can’t “take back” this behavior by apology or compensation, the easiest way to resolve our dilemma is to devalue the victim further by pointing out how bad they were and fully deserving of our ill treatment of them.

9.2 Cognitive Biases

Cognitive bias describes the psychological phenomenon where people tend to erroneously rely on heuristics, which results in decision‐making errors whereby they systematically deviate from choosing an optimal choice in favor of inferior alternatives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Over the years the number of established cognitive biases has grown considerably. It seems almost as if we are unable to make good rational choices in our daily lives. Judging and Nudging 193

In his popular book called The Art of Thinking, Rolf Dobelli (2015) outlines nearly 100 cognitive errors. A summary of his ideas is set out below. Cognitive biases can be categorized into different types. They can be induced by an external source, such as the society or groups. At times we are simply poor decision makers and are unable to spot misleading infor- mation provided, such as framing effects, the illusion of control, and the influence of our emotions.

1. Social influence and groups In essence, humans are very egocentric and believe that everyone else would and should think like us, for example concerning things we like and don’t like. This is known as the false‐consensus effect, where we tend to extrapolate our preferences to others, and think that the non‐conforming is abnormal. The people and society that surround us have a great impact on our behavior and perceptions. We like to compare with others. Social compari- son bias explains why we have a tendency to withhold assisting others because they may potentially outdo us. However, not hiring people who are better than you can lead to the “bozo explosion,” where you end up with less able people in order to feel superior. We also have a strong inclination to seek approval from other people. When we are in a group with people who share similar characteristics to ourselves, we tend to favor them more than people in the out‐group. This in‐group/out‐group bias is often where prejudice and discrimination stem from. People identify with their in‐group and display hostility to people who think or behave differently to them, for no real or logical reason. This act of seeking social proof makes us believe that we are doing it right when we are acting like the rest of our social group. However, the higher the number of believers or followers a belief or conception has does not make it true. The Earth isn’t flat no matter how many people used to believe it was so. If 50 million people say something foolish, it is still foolish. Social proof may be important for us, but it doesn’t do much more than make us feel safe. The seeking of approval diminishes individuality and logical thinking. Groupthink results when everyone is happy to be in the group and no one wants to appear to disagree with the consensus. Even when an erro- neous decision is made, people often withhold their opinion and pre- serve the group bonding to avoid disharmony. People also become lazier and less motivated when working in a group. Social loafing describes how individuals put in less effort when in a group as they feel that their 194 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious performance will not be visible. In business, the larger the team, the smaller the contribution a member will make. Perhaps having an authoritative leader may reduce the risk of group- think and social loafing, but an authority figure can also exert great influence over the individual, taking away their autonomy and free will. Milgram’s (1963) study is one of the most influential in social psychology, demon- strating the extent to which ordinary people were prepared to hurt an unknown person when faced with the commands of an authority figure and resulting in authority bias. Some marketers cleverly utilize the effect of social influence. For instance, the liking bias describes the situation when we are more inclined to buy something from people we like or who have something in common with us. Sales adopt this bias effectively to increase their product sales. Jo Girard, the most successful car salesman of all time, said that “There is nothing more effective in selling anything than getting the customer to believe, I mean really believe, that you like and care for them” (Girard & Brown, 2006).

2. Framing In 1981, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated how different wordings for the same choice could affect people’s judgment and decision. Prior can also influence our perception of subsequent options. Anchoring describes our tendency to rely too much on the first piece of information we are given (even if it is irrelevant) when making a decision. Students were asked to write down the last two digits of their social secu- rity numbers, then guess the price of a bottle of wine. Those with larger numbers estimated the bottle’s worth at near twice as high as those with low numbers. The framing effect is very influential on the way we make decisions. We perceive information differently depending on how it is worded. So it is not what you say, but how you say it. When people were asked to choose between “98% fat free” or “1% fat” beef, most still said the former was healthier despite its higher fat content. We favor things to be framed in a positive and gain format than in a negative and loss format. Humans are loss averse. We see gains and losses differently. Losing $100 is far greater a loss than winning $100 is a gain. We are therefore more likely to behave in a way to avoid losses. Emotions and feelings often impact on our judg- ment. We humans rely heavily on heuristics based in emotion to make decisions. Our emotional reasons to do something determine how we assess the risks and benefits. If we like something, the risks are small, but if we hate it, then the risks are large. Judging and Nudging 195

Absence is much harder to detect than presence. In academia, the proof of a hypothesis is acclaimed and will lead to publications, whilst the falsifi- cation of a theory is not interesting and may end up in a file drawer. We must be careful to check not only what is there, but also what isn’t.

3. Number and probability So do you think that by deciding in a logical and numerical way one can avoid some of the biases mentioned above? Perhaps simple math told you the hypothetical scenarios that Tversky and Kahneman (1981) used were identical, but simply considering numbers and figures does not necessarily give you the best option. Because, after all, how good do you think you are with math and numbers? The paradox of choice is a phenomenon that describes how a broader selection of options can actually lead to inner paralysis, poorer decision making, and discontent. With a larger range of choices, we will actually feel overwhelmed and less satisfied than if we are given only a few options. This is also known as decision fatigue, which suggests that mak- ing decisions is exhausting and can drain our willpower. Courageous judicial decisions drop from 65% to 0% as the day goes on, and return to 65% after a break, suggesting that we are likely to opt for the status quo when we are tired. We often regard ourselves as smart consumers or investors who know all about numbers and prices. However, a range of cognitive biases has pointed out exactly the opposite, the fact that we are actually more irra- tional and illogical than we think. When considering an event, we are likely to neglect any base‐rate information. Sometimes base‐rate information can be very useful, but often we will opt for more specific yet less relevant information. A similar bias is the gambler’s fallacy, where people link unre- lated events together as if they are a series of interrelated events. Flipping a coin nine times and landing on a head each time will not increase or decrease the 50:50 chance of landing a head or a tail on the tenth time, but many fail to recognize the independency of each toss. Also, we can easily understand a linear relationship but find it hard to grasp the concept of exponential growth. When numbers and relation- ships are presented in such a way, never trust your instinct because it is likely to be wrong. Consider this scenario. You are given two options: (A) For 30 days, you receive $1,000 a day. (B) On the first day, you receive 1¢, on the second, 2¢, on the third, 4¢, and so on for 30 days. Which option do you choose? The difference is colossal: (A) will earn you $30,000, but (B) will earn you $10 million. 196 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

In addition, we respond more to the expected magnitude of an event and often neglect the probability of its happening. After news coverage of a plane crash, people cancel flights in their masses. However, people fail to consider the number of flights there are in a day that land safely. We often overestimate the probability of an event (often statistically unlikely) happening. Numbers can be deceiving. When presented with data, we should always watch out for any potential deceptions. We need to pay particular atten- tion to the use of averages, as they often fail to signify any outliers in the population. Especially if the population is relatively small (and thus unrep- resentative), statistics can look very appealing, but they do not actually provide useful insight. Some companies or marketers employ a clever tac- tic, also known as the Will Rogers phenomenon, to present a rise in average in order to produce more attractive data to deceive consumers. Now, do you still think you’re good with numbers? We often rely on our instinct or even simple logics when solving a problem. Try the following:

1. A bat and ball costs $1.10. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? 10¢? 2. You are traveling from A to B to A again. From A to B, you travel at 100 mph. From B to A, you travel at 50 mph. What is your average speed? 75 mph?

The actual answers are 5¢ and 66.67 mph, but the answers above are the ones that easily pop into your mind. This shows how simple logic cannot be trusted. A tip for you: always reject the easy answers that first come into your head. Nevertheless, making decisions is never easy. With risk and uncertainty involved in every situation, we must learn to consider each one rationally. Do not feel averse toward uncertainty but accept it for what it is if you are to make clear decisions. Another type of bias that people often commit is one that is called the survivorship bias. People often overestimate their chances of success or survival. However, behind every successful story there are always 100 untold failures. If you are told how successful Bill Gates and Steve Jobs became without even having a college degree, think about how generaliz- able this claim is to the population. The outcome bias describes the same thing. People tend to attribute judgment to the outcome of decisions rather than considering the whole process. But a bad result does not necessarily mean a bad decision, and the same is true for good results. Judging and Nudging 197

4. Change Changes can be good or bad. Some people feel that they can and should have an influence on events. They then commit the action bias, when they think it is far better to do something than do nothing, even if it doesn’t achieve anything. Often in a novel situation, taking action may not be the best course and it may be better to hold off and wait. At other times, such as in catch‐22 situations, where either option brings misfortune, we often choose to remain inactive in an attempt to distance ourselves from the situation. This is also known as the omission bias. Here, doing nothing seems to be better than doing something. Sometimes we refrain from choosing or deciding because we feel that our options will remain open if we don’t act. This inability to close doors will often lead us to miss out on important opportunities. The continuous wish to seek additional information that makes no difference to the overall decision can also be detrimental, since having more information and more choices can make deciding more difficult, resulting in the information bias. Using a strategy of elimination can perhaps ease the decision‐making process next time when you are having trouble choosing. But if you have an enemy, give him information. Many people don’t like changes. Status quo bias describes our prefer- ence for sticking with the current default option, as it provides us with a feeling of safety and comfort. Policymakers, companies, and marketers know that we are bad at changing or resubscribing. Changing organ dona- tions from opt‐in to opt‐out increases the number of donors massively, since we are often too lazy to change. We don’t like changes because we often fear regretting our choice. The feeling that we have made a wrong decision often restrains us from actually making any decision. When people were asked which they found more distressing, losing money through making a choice or losing an opportu- nity to profit because of not making a choice, 92% chose the former. Sometimes the fear of regretting stems from the belief that resources are limited and not available for everyone. Our valuation of an item is affected by the amount that exists and how many people want it. The scarcity error explains why limited editions are more attractive to us. We hold certain expectations in life, and if things do not go as expected, we start to worry excessively. Even a small disparity can elicit an overreac- tive response. Some opt for the it‐will‐get‐worse‐before‐it‐gets‐better fal- lacy, which doctors often predict. When prescribing a medication, they often suggest that the condition will get worse before it gets better, and thus even worsening symptoms seem a relief as they confirm the doctor’s 198 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious predictions. However, it is also possible that the doctor is just wrong and the condition is simply getting worse. But we don’t have the ability to tell. Sometimes the unexpected can also be positive. A black swan describes an improbable event that can dramatically shake up your life, career, organization, or even country. It is something that we do not know we don’t know, but we will eventually understand how influential and big it can be. We will ultimately know how big the universe is, but no one could have foreseen the rise of Facebook a decade ago. Thus, overthinking does us no good and can sometimes make things worse. A rule of thumb is that if facing a decision about something you have practiced or a question you have answered many times, go with your instincts and emotions. If it is a new experience, make sure you think things through carefully.

5. Why do we keep making excuses? When something goes wrong, or when a situation doesn’t turn out the way we expect it to, why do we make endless excuses to justify it? We hate to accept that we have made wrong decisions. Often we pro- vide excuses for our actions, choices, and purchases. However, sometimes we know that we have got it all wrong, but it is too late to back out. So what do we do? Sometimes we should consider that events are independent of each other. We need to accept that they may not mean as much to others as to ourselves, or that they just don’t mean that much at all. Sunk cost fallacy describes how people continue to invest a lot of time, effort, and resources into something that is not going well. The investment itself becomes the reason to persevere because we don’t want to admit that we have made a wrong decision. That’s why we need to forget the past, because giving more will not guarantee your expected return. We have to accept that the cost has sunk, meaning that the spending is in the past, and we should not associate it with the present. Similar to the sunk cost fallacy, the endowment effect describes how we consider things to be more valuable once we own them. We give meanings and values to the item. We become emotionally attached and overestimate its value, but we rarely understand that others do not feel the same. A lecturer raffled off baseball tickets to his students. They were then asked how much the tickets were worth. Empty‐handed students estimated around $170 on average, whilst those with tickets valued them around $2,400. Effort justification is when we see a task or thing as more valuable when we have put a lot of effort into it. This is a form of cognitive dissonance Judging and Nudging 199 and one example is the IKEA effect: The furniture we build ourselves suddenly seems immensely more valuable than an expensive designer piece. This is because we think that anything we create is unbeatable, and we resist things that are “not invented here,” meaning that we demonstrate a resistance to change and to foreign ideas, preferring things created by ourselves. Cognitive dissonance arises when we sense an inconsistency in our cog- nition. Sometimes we understand that it was unnecessary to pay the amount of money we did for an item or that it is not worth as much as we think, but rationalizing it makes us feel better emotionally and the pur- chase seems to be more justifiable. Like Aesop’s tale of the fox and the grapes, when we can’t win an auction, we see the object as “sour grapes” to make us feel better. How can we attempt to avoid these potential biases? Perhaps if we first recognize the existence and automaticity of our rationalization mechanism. The winner’s curse suggests that the winner of an auction actually turns out to be the loser. This is because they have engaged in a battle to win the auction, expending far more money than intended because they think that being so close to winning justifies putting more and more in to achieve this end. People fall for the endowment effect, as they are again overesti- mating the value of the item and paying much more than it is worth. Hyperbolic discounting describes a similar phenomenon, where people are willing to give up more in order to increase the immediacy of a reward. The more we ignore hyperbolic discounting and delay our gratification, the more control we have over our impulses.

6. Don’t be a superstitious pigeon As discussed in Chapter 4, regardless of how silly it sounds, humans are just as superstitious as Skinner’s pigeons. We are constantly inferring rela- tionships and causalities between situations and events. The truth is, often we are simply clustering illusion and drawing false causalities. In 1994, Diane Duyser discovered that her piece of toast (after she had taken a bite) had the face of the Virgin Mary on it, thus suggesting a link with miracu- lous religious belief. The story attracted a lot of attention from the media and the toast ended up receiving over 1.7 million hits on eBay, eventually being sold for $28,000. This is also known as the association bias (when emotions are involved, it is known as the contagion bias). Silly, you might think, but people do associate random patterns with mystical powers, meaning that we cannot distinguish between causal direc- tion and causality. We also have an inclination to use inductive reasoning 200 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious and draw universal rules and theorems from a single account or instance. But any incorrect observation that doesn’t fit the rule is sufficient to erad- icate the whole theory. We need to accept that sometimes things can happen by coincidence. To interpret events in a way that fits our understanding and beliefs can lead to drawing false causality and committing the confirmation bias. We believe our introspective internal conviction far more than the external convictions of others. Thus we treat others’ convictions as unreliable, particularly if they don’t agree with our “obviously correct” beliefs, and assume that they are ignorant, idiotic, and malicious. Have you ever heard of the concept of beginner’s luck? Do you believe in it or do you think it is just a coincidence? Our initial success can tempt us to continue to invest more resources in a venture. But this can be dis- astrous. We should always be wary of things that get off to a great start. It is best to watch and wait before drawing conclusions. The error of drawing causality is evident, yet it seems logical to many in their daily lives. The question “Does Harvard make you smarter?” can be used to demonstrate this illusion. This cognitive error is known as the swimmer’s body bias. People often confuse the selection criteria with results, yet it is not necessary that if something endorses a specific quality it pred- icates and yields the quality. Harvard and many other elite universities are perceived as the best, perhaps not because of their teaching prestige but because they only accept the most intelligent students. Similarly, the halo effect occurs when a singular aspect dazzles us and blinds us to seeing the whole picture. Harvard’s producing some of the most intelligent students has prevented us from considering the quality of teaching. We tend to focus more on some aspects of information and fail to consider others.

7. Illusion or delusion? People often assume that they have far more control over their actions than actually exists and that they know more than they actually do. This, however, makes us more vulnerable to making incorrect decisions. One story goes like this. Every morning at 9 a.m., a man stands in the middle of a square waving a red hat. One day a policeman stops and asks him why he is waving his hat. “To keep the elephants away.” “But there are no elephants.” “I must be doing a good job then.” The illusion of being in control will lead us to behaving differently. The truth is, we have less control than we think, especially as regards the future. Prophets and experts predict and forecast the future on a daily Judging and Nudging 201 basis. Tetlock (2005) spent 10 years to find that past predictions given by self‐appointed experts were only marginally more accurate than random forecast generators. Nonetheless, the forecast illusion has led many people to make decisions that turn out to have no higher accuracy than chance. Even when we are capable of making reasonable decisions, we often neglect the power of luck and chance. The belief that skills and talents alone are sufficient in enabling success is illusory. Sometimes we just need a bit of luck to get what we really want.

8. Procrastination It is natural to be procrastinators, we all are. We tend to delay unpleasant, difficult, but important acts. We pick and choose what we want to do and often leave the important tasks to last. This is not a good habit, we know, but we never learn and continue to do it. We tend to overestimate our ability and are absurdly ambitious with our plans. For every to‐do list we write, how many of us can actually tick off the whole list? To avoid this overconfidence bias (or strategic misrepresen- tation), we have to learn to be more realistic about our capacities and time limits, and perhaps use outside examples as realistic benchmarks for how much and how well we can complete something. Then, when we succeed, we selfishly attribute the outcome to our- selves, but when we fail, we blame other people. This self‐serving bias leads us to overestimate our contributions, such as thinking that we take the bins out nearly 90% of the time. We often cherry‐pick events that favor aspects of ourselves and hide those that don’t. However, we don’t notice the times others help out cleaning the kitchen and so on. The fun- damental attribution error can lead us to underestimate the impact of external forces and situations. For instance, the reason why someone behaves in a particular way is due not to his or her internal attributes, e.g., personality, but to other external determinants, e.g., peer pressure. In addition, we need to take particular care when events are presented as being preceded by a single cause. We should be wary of the validity and reliability of this being so, as it is an ancient and dangerous fallacy, often resulting in scapegoats and blame.

9. Knowledge Are psychics truly knowledgeable or are they frauds? In Chapter 4, we discussed how to be a persuasive psychic or fortune teller using Hyman’s (1977) 13 rules. 202 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

There are two types of knowledge, real knowledge that has been accumulated over time, and chauffeur knowledge, which is putting on a show of knowledge and acting out anecdotes. Don’t fall into the error of thinking that the presenter or spokesperson has real knowledge when it is just a show. Sometimes, even real knowledge is non‐transferable and is domain dependent. Even a similar concept will have a different meaning in two different domains. Investors may have a great understanding of base‐rate neglect in finance but are baffled and bewildered by the same concept in biology. Transferring knowledge across fields is also not encouraged. The déformation professionnelle bias describes a situation when specialists attempt to apply their skills where they are not warranted. They will only focus on details that might relate to their profession, just as those wielding hammers see only nails.

10. Emotion and affection The salient effect suggests how emotional details attract more attention. Sometimes the stand‐out features can grab our attention and catch our eyes. They generate much more attention than they deserve, eventually blinding us to the true relevance of the information. Consider the fol- lowing two sentences and decide which you remember better: (A) “The king died, then the queen died.” (B) “The king died, then the queen died of grief.” Most would opt for the latter. The first describes two deaths that happen successively but in the second the deaths are linked emotionally and have meaning. Whilst the former is shorter and should be easier to remember, our brains don’t work that way. Stories attract us and give us a false sense of meaning and understanding; this is known as the story bias. Within the marketing and advertising sector, some marketers deliber- ately associate their products with sex to improve sales. They attempt to catch our attention and plant their product in our memory. Does this work? Some say it does, but only to an extent. This debate will be consid- ered further in the next chapter. Simply adding an emotional element can make the same story more memorable. Giving a story a face or personify- ing a story produces the same effect. Numbers and figures leave us cold, but seeing a person’s face at the other end of the numbers elicits a strong emotional response. Be careful when you encounter human stories. Ask for facts and statistics; do not get carried away by the emotive content and make irrational decisions. Judging and Nudging 203

9.3 Behavioral Economics

Behavioral economics is a broad term that can be defined as the applica- tion of economic theories in psychology. It is best understood as an inter- disciplinary approach that draws on both psychological and economic theories. Two classical views have been adopted, one from each field (see Figure 9.3). Psychologists and economists have disagreed on the relevance between the two fields on the grounds that economic theories predict average behaviors instead of individual behaviors, and that any consistent behavior can be described as rational. Building on these basic concepts of behavioral models and economic theories, theories of change have been developed. These theories seek to explain how behavior evolves and changes. Basic models of behavioral economics have been built around the cen- tral idea of applying economic theories to psychology. For example, when deciding on a holiday destination, you might consider the following fac- tors: sights you might wish to see, cost, time, weather, level of enjoyment, and so on. In doing so, you assign priorities to each of these factors and make a decision based on which outcome allows you to achieve your pri- orities in the best possible way. This has come to be known as the expected utility theory. Based on this alone, one of the basic drivers of human behavior is that of motivation; it both activates and gives direction to human behavior. As demonstrated in this model, most economic theories adopt the view that humans are motivated to maximize their utility, while functioning within a budget constraint. This, however, does not take into account the many factors that impact and shape the decision‐making process, and ultimately the final decision made.

Economists Social Psychologists Traditionally thought that Disagree with this claim that people are mainly interested people make decisions in achieving maximum gain. vs. rationally. They point to People then construct models extensive literature which of how they expect certain provides evidence that behaviours and decisions people often behave contrary to play out, based on certain to rationality principles underlying assumptions

Figure 9.3 Economists vs. social psychologists (Gilovich, 1991). 204 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Behavioral economics has been able to describe and explain the pro- cesses by which we take shortcuts and make logical errors. In essence it is suggested that people try to simplify and speed up their everyday decision making by adopting rules of thumb.

Behavioral economics has its intellectual foundations in both p­sychology and economics. It seeks to understand how people select, process, and decide upon financial (and other) information.

It offers profound and parsimonious information as to why so many seemingly educated and informed people make strangely illogical or irra- tional decisions with respect to all aspects of their money: borrowing, invest- ing, saving, and spending. It is axiomatic in economics that people make rational decisions about their money. Economists assume we (always) know what we want, which is for our own good, and we know how to get it. People make cost–benefit analyses in the pursuit of personal satisfaction and getting the most out of life with their individual resources. Economists have been challenged by certain economic behaviors that they have not found easy to explain: Why do people tip? Why do they spend differently with cash than with a credit card? Why do people have savings accounts that don’t offer interest that even keeps pace with inflation? Behavioral economics was born in the late 1960s from experiments that showed that people do not understand basic statistical phenomena (regression to the mean; the importance of sample size). Pioneers in this area – and Daniel Kahneman – explored the judgmental heuristics or mental shortcuts that people use to think about their money and other related issues. Prospect theory is a theory that describes decisions between alternatives that involve risk, i.e., alternatives with uncertain outcomes, where the probabilities are known. The model is descriptive: It tries to model real‐life choices rather than optimal decisions. People decide which outcomes they see as basically identical, then they set a reference point and consider lower outcomes as losses and larger as gains. The asymmetry of the S‐curve is indicative of Warren Buffett’s finding that “losses gain twice the emotional response of gains,” showing that people are risk averse (play it safe) in rela- tion to gains, yet loss averse (gamble to avoid losses) in relation to losses. For individual investors the purchase price of shares is the reference point against which they make all decisions. Thus they tend to sell too Judging and Nudging 205 soon after making a small gain or hold on for too long when the loss is perceived as temporary. As we have seen many times, the market overreacts to bad news and encourages selling. The fear of loss is overexaggerated. An important implication of prospect theory is the framing of risky situations. The following example highlights just what an effect framing has on people.

Participants were asked to imagine being a scientist working on an outbreak of an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been pro- posed. The first group of participants was presented with a choice between two programs.

Program A: “200 people will be saved”

Program B: “There is a one‐third probability that 600 people will be saved, and a two‐thirds probability that no people will be saved”

72% of participants preferred program A (the remainder, 28%, opted for program B). The second group of participants was presented with the choice between:

Program C: “400 people will die”

Program D: “There is a one‐third probability that nobody will die, and a two‐thirds probability that 600 people will die”

In this decision frame, 78% preferred program D, with the remaining 22% opting for program C. However, programs A and C, and pro- grams B and D, are effectively identical. A change in the decision frame between the two groups of participants produced a preference reversal, with the first group preferring program A/C and the sec- ond group preferring D/B.

Ariely (2008) said that humans are “predictably irrational,” and we commit the same fallacy repeatedly over time. Shaughnessy (2013) summarized 13 of Ariely’s findings: 206 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

1. We always compare and draw relationships between options that might be seemingly irrelevant. We like to think in relative terms. One example is that, by adding in a third “deluxe” option to two previous options that gave us a difficult decision‐making time, with one having slightly more expensive but slightly more attractive features, and one rather basic but cheaper, we will suddenly and automatically opt for the second option. Thinking in relative and comparative terms shows how irrational we can be, as the previous two options seem equally attractive to us. 2. The effect of anchoring describes consumers’ perception of an expected price for a product, which will not be easily influenced. Companies often advertise their products to be of a higher value in order to anchor their higher price in the consumers’ perception. When the cost coheres with their beliefs, they are more likely to purchase the item than if it is proportionally more expensive or cheaper than their anchoring price. For instance, luxury products being sold in super- markets or even convenience stores would actually decrease consum- ers’ willingness to purchase them, even if they cost less. 3. The idea of getting something for “free” or with “zero” conditions is overwhelmingly attractive for many people. Ariely argued that we are innately afraid of being offered something for free and will therefore be frightened by the idea. When Amazon started its free standard shopping service, it immediately recorded a sales increase, suggesting that people are willing to wait for a period of time just to get something for free. 4. Ariely said that we are essentially in two different worlds, one which is dominated by social norms and the other by market norms. He argued that sometimes we are happy to do things for no money but for a cause. In other words, social norms rather than market norms are the bigger force that motivates us to act in certain ways. But market norms should never be used to constrain or trump social norms, because people will stop seeing the need to follow social norms. 5. Emotional arousal can influence our decision making. A heightened state can lead us into making many reckless decisions. Just because we think we would not do certain things in our normal emotional state does not mean this will not change when we are aroused, especially in the context of sex. 6. We all have problems with procrastination and self‐control. Ariely found that students tend to do better when they recognize the time they have left for their assignments to ensure no last‐minute work is produced. We also have an insufficient level of self‐control. Some have proposed technologies to help us control our impulses, which can be a step forward. Judging and Nudging 207

7. The endowment effect describes our increased valuation of an item that comes into our ownership. Thus, owning something leads us to give higher value to an item than other people would. The IKEA effect, referred to above, describes how people are more likely to feel satisfied and pay a higher amount for furniture that requires them to put it together themselves. People feel stronger ownership of a prod- uct when they are required to complete it, which in reality can appear contradictory. 8. Ariely argued that choosing by elimination can often maximize our gains toward the end. However, in reality, people like to keep their options open, and thus are often distracted from the real objective. In his study, students would continue to spend money in order to keep their doors open in a virtual game, suggesting that they do not want to be told that their choices are shrinking. 9. Expectations can influence our views and experience of items and events. It was found that when people were informed that some- thing was distasteful, people did end up agreeing most of the time. 10. The placebo effect is when a person believes that he or she is given an effective treatment (usually drugs) that should produce changes in their physical or psychological state, when actually the treatment was fake (e.g., just glucose pills). Ariely argues that price also has an effect similar to the placebo effect. When people are told that they have spent more money or have bought a premier drug, they are more likely to feel better subsequently. The effect, however, diminishes when people are told to think about the relationship between price and quality. 11. Ariely found that many honest people will cheat if given the oppor- tunity. In his experiment he used several methods attempting to remind people of their morals, such as urging students to sign an honor code. 12. It was found that students had no hesitation in helping themselves to a can of Coke from a communal fridge, but would not take any money that was lying around. Ariely argued that this was because cheating and stealing are much easier when it is one step away from money. 13. People are willing to sacrifice their options to project a certain image to others, particularly those with a need for uniqueness, who may sacrifice personal utility in order to gain reputational utility.

Daniel Kahneman (2011) has provided a masterful summary of the cognitive and social psychology underlying behavioral economics. He distin- guishes between two types of thinking: fast and slow, or system 1 and 2 thinking (see Figure 9.4). 208 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

System 1 System 2 - Fast, intuitive, relies on - Slow, effortful, deliberate, heuristics more logical/rational - Automatic, requires little - Requires more attention effort, lazy and cognitive involvement

These two systems interact to minimize effort and optimize performance.

Figure 9.4 System 1 and system 2 thinking.

System 1 is lazy while system 2 means being more alert, intellectually active, skeptical, and rational. System 2 involves different forms of energy, but as people become more skilled at any task, their demand for energy diminishes. System 2 thinking keeps you busy and can deplete your willpower. People find cognitive effort mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible. Inevitably, intelligent people may be better at slow thinking and demanding computa- tion, but that does not mean they are immune to biases and lazy thinking. In a popular book entitled Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes, Belsky and Gilovich (1999) discuss seven typical issues.

1. Not all money is seen as equality. This is also known as mental accounting or fungibility. It means people define and therefore use money differently. People may spend $1,000 obtained from a roulette win, a salary, a tax refund or a lucky fund differently. When people get a bonus or a gift or a prize of $200 they are paradoxically more likely to spend it on something frivolous. Equally, buying something using a credit card or with cash (particularly low denomination notes) feels different. Often people are more likely to spend tax refunds or gift money recklessly and to use cash quite differently from a credit card. This makes people reckless with wind- fall money or forgotten cash, rediscovered savings, and so on. Equally, it is unwise to have savings acquiring a low interest while “borrowing” money on a credit card by not paying off debts at the end of the month. 2. We treat losses and gains quite differently. People’s decisions are powerfully influenced by how they frame or describe situations. People are much more willing to take risks to avoid losses and much more conservative when it comes to opportunities for gain. The same amount of pain and the same amount of pleasure have very different impacts. This is the psychology of loss aversion. This oversensitivity to loss means that people may respond quickly – even too quickly – to drops in the market. On the other hand, the selling of a stock or bond Judging and Nudging 209

(the pain of making a loss fund) makes some people more willing to take the risk of keeping the investment despite its continual decline. Oversensitivity to loss also means people go for certain gains. Behavioral economists have shown how loss aversion and our inabil- ity to ignore sunk costs mean people often act unwisely. But they have also explained why people don’t act when they should. We sometimes get overwhelmed by choice; paralyzed by having to make a decision, we defer the actual decision. 3. We are also prone to inaction. We also opt for the status quo – doing nothing, being resistant to change, unwilling to rock the boat. The endowment effect is particularly interesting. It means people overvalue what they own. That is why organizations allow for trial periods and money‐back guarantees. The advice from behavioral economists is sim- ple. Deciding not to decide is itself a decision. All decisions come with opportunity costs. Try to reframe a problem: Be a devil’s advocate. 4. The money illusion and the bigness bias. This problem classically arises when we confuse nominal changes in money (it goes up or down) with real changes, for instance as a function of inflation or deflation. The question is the current buying power of money as opposed to its actual amount. Related to this is the idea of base rate: the fact that people buy lottery tickets which, because of the real odds of winning, have been described as “a tax on the stupid.” People simply don’t understand the relationship between inflation and buying power. Many ignore or downplay various fees/commissions that people charge, and they don’t really understand compound interest. Behavioral economists warn against being impressed by short‐term success and ignoring the fine print when making money decisions. 5. Anchoring and confirmation bias. This is quite simply the common and strong tendency to latch onto some idea/fact or number and use it, whether relevant or not, as a reference point for future decisions. We are, of course, particularly susceptible to anchoring when we do not have much information about something (the cost of hotels in foreign countries, typical discounts, etc.). There is worse: confirmation bias, which also leads people to make important money decisions based on unimportant or irrelevant infor- mation. This is the searching out for, treating less critically, and being overly and unjustly impressed by information that confirms your pref- erences and prejudices. Warning signs include being somewhat over- confident in your ability to bargain and negotiate; making important money decisions without much research; and finding it ever harder to sell investments for less than you paid for them. Belsky and Gilovich (1999) suggest people broaden their advisors and try a little humility. 210 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

6. Overconfidence is a common “ego trap” that people fall into. Too many people don’t know how little they really know about financial issues. They feel that they can do things like sell their own house and pick great investments without specialist advice. Some people persist in the belief that they are beating the market, but don’t really know or understand their actual return on investments. They seem to believe that investing in what they know is a guarantee of success. It is really a case of “Investor: know thyself.” 7. Getting information through the grapevine and relying too much on the financial moves of others is the final “big money mistake” documented. This is all about investing with the herd and (mindlessly) conforming to the behavior of others. This is seen when people invest in “hot stocks and shares”; you buy when stocks are rising and sell when shares are falling. This is about being too reliant on the ideas of col- leagues, friends, journalists, and financial advisors. The advice is “hurry up and wait”; avoid fashions, “tune out the noise,” and actu- ally seek out opportunities to be contrarian.

Belsky and Gilovich helpfully end their book with “principles to ponder.”

9.4 Conclusion

Humans are irrational decision makers. Economists think that we behave in a way to maximize our gains, but psychologists tell us a different story. The variety of cognitive biases that we commit, as discussed in this chap- ter, shows that we are more vulnerable to different internal and external influences than we think.

Humans are not very good decision makers. We commit a huge number of cognitive biases and fallacies when we make decisions. We rely on our heuristics and intuition. We are influenced by other peo- ple and our own emotions and pre‐existing beliefs. Our fear of regret- ting makes us indeterminate. And we are not good with numbers and are not as logical and rational as economists predict us to be. Psychologists have worked hard to identify the fallacies that we commit. However, understanding them does not necessarily reduce their occurrence, implying that they might be hardwired in our human nature. 10 A Psychologist in the Marketplace

10.1 Introduction

Consumer psychology is a relatively new field of psychology. The American Psychological Association (APA) Consumer Psychology Division was only incorporated in 1960. Consumer psychology draws upon knowledge from a great variety of fields, such as cognitive psychology, social psychology, memory, and decision making, and aims to examine how consumers in an individual and social context make purchase, consumption, and disposal decisions to satisfy both wants and needs. The growth of consumer psychology has mirrored that of advertising and the commercial sector in the United States and Europe during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The approach of consumer psychology has been influenced by a number of psychological schools of thought over the years. The mentalist approach, for instance, emphasized the introspective observa­ tion of subjects to account for behavior. Hugo Munsterberg (1909), one of the pioneers of consumer psychology, adhered to this approach and argued for the study of psychological conditions in business and industry. Later on, behaviorism contributed to the study of consumer psychology as well. Other psychologists focused on purchase behavior rather than consumer intro­ spection, studying the impact of advertisement elements such as size and word color on behavior. Subsequently, Freud’s psychodynamic approach came into the picture, studying the role of basic unconscious motivational drives on influencing goal‐directed consumer behavior. As advertising, products, and the system of consumption have evolved over previous centuries, the research techniques of consumer psychology

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 212 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious have changed to accommodate new research questions that have emerged out of changing market trends. Technological advances have also spurred new research, such as the influence of virtual communities and social net­ works on consumer behavior. At the same time, fundamental research questions from the early days of consumer psychology, such as in the field of advertising efficacy, still remain relevant.

10.2 The Consumer as an Individual

The consumer is the heart of the consumption market, and products, services, advertising, and branding are geared toward influencing consumers. Most research focuses on exploring how individuals make consumption decisions. So how do people develop into consumers in the first place? Developmental psychologist (1983) articulated the theory of cognitive development to explain the social development of children. This has been particularly useful in understanding consumer socialization. In this model, children go through three stages of consumer socializa­ tion before resembling adults. These three stages are the perceptual stage (3–7 years), the analytical stage (7–11 years), and the reflective stage (11 years–adult). Through these stages, children simultaneously develop knowledge of product and marketplace structures as well as decision‐ making strategies.

1. Perceptual stage. At this stage, the view of the world through the eyes of children is directed toward the concrete and observable features around them. They begin to recognize the ideas of retail and stores and the concept of advertisements, but these knowledge structures remain superficial in nature. They are unable to grasp the deeper meaning of advertisements, which is to persuade and encourage them to buy a product. Children at this stage will start to exhibit brand preference, though this is based more on salient visual attributes such as product color and pack­ aging rather than underlying attributes such as product durability. Some would also start to value physical goods as a means to achieve individual­ ity and be “cool” among peers, albeit valuing goods along simple, salient attributes such as size or quantity. 2. Analytical stage. Children aged 7 to 11 years old develop a better understanding of advertising and begin to identify its purpose in per­ suading viewers. Children also shift from a simple perceptual method of categorizing products to one that incorporates underlying factors. The symbolic importance of brands such as in representing product A Psychologist in the Marketplace 213

quality and the social connotations of brand ownership and consump­ tion start to replace the purely perceptual discrimination of brands previously held by them. Children start to develop skills to gather product and service information to aid and inform their decision mak­ ing. The developing appreciation of the social and symbolic meanings attached to product ownership by children at this stage leads to the rise of socially motivated consumption patterns. 3. Reflective stage. In the reflective stage, adolescents become fully social­ ized as consumers. Knowledge of advertising intent continues to develop such that at this stage, they are able to recognize specific biases and tactics used by advertisers. Adolescents continue to develop a comprehensive appreciation of the social connotations of brand meaning. They become aware of, join, and form affiliations, relation­ ships, and communities built around their similar brand consumption patterns. They continue to seek information from diverse sources to inform consumption decision making, focusing on peers and friends as sources at this stage. Adolescent decision‐making strategies adopted at this stage allow them to accommodate more complex choices between alternative situations through coping mechanisms such as selective information processing.

These three stages of consumer socialization give a good overview of how an ideal consumer can develop. However, relevant faculties of the individual that facilitate consumption decision making and behavior are not considered, leading many to question the credibility of the model. While Piaget’s model shows how we begin to understand consumption from a young age, various groups present an increased level of concern as they see how vulnerable youngsters are and how deceptive some marketers can be.

10.3 Children and Advertising

There have been court cases prosecuting sales people who have effectively intimidated semi‐bewildered older people in their home. Now there are concerns about loan sharks whose interest rates are astonishingly high but not easily understood by those who are desperate for cash. Some customers are more vulnerable than others, especially younger consumers. But what can we do to prevent marketers from luring young­ sters to spend all their money on unnecessary products? How can we make sure that children can really develop in the way described in the consumer socialization model? Whose responsibility is it to educate them? 214 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Being vulnerable means that some people are more susceptible than the average person to the influence of high‐pressure sales people or advertise­ ments. However, there are problems arriving at a straightforward working definition: Vulnerability is a dimensional and relative measurement rather than a dichotomy indicator. A great deal has been written about advertising to children. Researchers and social policy specialists as well as pamphleteers and consumer activist groups have considered, often with more heat than reason, the effects of advertising, particularly television advertising, on children. The result is two conflicting forces, educators and legislators, who are bitterly opposed in terms of the data they quote, arguments they rehearse, and, more importantly, legislation they want and do not want passed. Advertising and marketing to young people is a social policy issue informed as much by heat as light. Academic researchers and political researchers find it just as difficult and pressurized as group activists to dis­ sociate empirical findings from a preferred solution to the problem of how to persuade young people to behave in particular ways. Over time this has led to the development of two opposing groups, with very differ­ ent ideologies (see Table 10.1). The two groups take a very different approach not only to advertising but also to social issues in general. They are ideologically different and inevitably somewhat selective in the evidence they admit to support their position. Yet the problem for both groups is they have a strong inclination to oversimplify a complex issue. The most important question considered here is which factors are the most powerful influences in determining purchasing preferences, requests, and behaviors. The issue concerns who is in the best position to decide what adver­ tisements young people can or cannot see: young people themselves, their

Table 10.1 The approaches of Educators and Legislators

Educators Legislators Politically Right‐wing Left‐wing Pro‐business Anti‐business Philosophically Descriptive Prescriptive/proscriptive Individualistic Collectivistic Empiricists Post‐empiricists Cautious Certain Research Crucial Optional Experimental Survey Academic publications Press releases, policy documents Aimed at understanding Aimed at acting A Psychologist in the Marketplace 215 parents or the state. There are obvious objections to young people them­ selves deciding, given their understanding and experience. Equally, one could argue that the state has no right to expose children to promotional messages and subvert the family. This leaves parents as the most obvious, important, and powerful people to help children understand the moral, social, and economic world and regulate consumer socialization. The two opposing groups also hold different stances on the restriction of children’s exposure to advertisements. Protectionists see the need to control advertising through legislation, arguing that it is society’s respon­ sibility to “protect” the young from advertisers. The opposing educators disagree with banning and rigorous restriction of advertising, for two reasons. First, children need education and banning advertisements would sim­ ply deprive them of opportunities to acquire consumer understanding and knowledge. It would render them more naïve and unable to understand or effectively deal with the new consumer society. Second, educators argue from experimental data both that advertisements are clearly not exclusive in determining preferences and sales, and that children are sophisticated consumers of the media even by the age of 8.

10.4 Vulnerability

In this section, three types of vulnerability are discussed.

Comprehension vulnerability This is essentially about understanding what one is being sold, at what price, and under what conditions. It is related to many factors like educa­ tion, intelligence, mother tongue, culture, and age. Older people have problems with hearing and memory. Many may have had little contact with financial language. This problem is compounded if their first language is not (in this case) English, or they come from a culture where the rules of selling are very different. This is always compounded by home selling, as there are many complex rules about treating strangers in the home. Young people have little experience of the market and consumption. Some companies often employ jargon terms that not everybody under­ stands to deliberately confuse customers. They are often very careful and comply with legal constraints, thus little can be done by consumers to identify any deception. Earlier in this book, we suggested a number of erroneous myths asso­ ciated with inaccurate “psychological” knowledge, including the idea of 216 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious subliminal advertising, which has not been supported by any empirical evidence. The idea is that by flashing up images and words very quickly, subliminal perception is believed to influence a person’s attitudes, beliefs, choices, and motives and to induce them to make a purchase decision, as this information is secretly registered in our unconscious without our con­ scious awareness. But psychologists will tell you that subliminal advertis­ ing does not work. At least not well enough to make you shop for that particular brand while you are sleepwalking. But lack of evidence has never got in the way of a good theory. Down the years journalists and popular authors have argued that some, even most, advertisements contain hidden sexual images or particular brand names or messages that affect our susceptibility to those advertise­ ments. So the attention‐grabbing, paranoid, but evidence‐free myth goes: Clever (evil) advertisers can make you do things against your better judgment, conscious decision making or will through subliminal messages in ads. From the late 1950s to the mid‐1970s, books with titles like Subliminal Seduction and Media Sexploitation kept the notion alive for a public appar­ ently happy to see wicked manipulative scientists working with greedy, cynical advertisers. Shopaholism, suicides, and sexual disorders were all seen to be partly consequences of this conspiracy. But clever sales people did see the positive side of the public’s gullibility. They knew from their research that subliminal advertising did not work, and was any way both illegal and illogical. But why not turn the whole thing around and openly sell the technique? Hey presto! We have subliminal auditory self‐help tapes. Soon, tapes were on sale that showed dramatic changes in mental and psychological health. You simply set the tape recorder to go off while you are asleep and you could experience weight loss, improved sexual function, and ease in stopping smoking, nail‐biting or fear of flying. Tapes came in various forms. Some were designed to be played while awake. But they all had those subliminally embedded messages that you could not pick up but which could change your life. Tapes provide a pipeline to the id – that Freudian concept of the primi­ tive persona which is a cauldron of seething excitement. They can, it is claimed, get to the deepest parts of our being. But scientists have tested these claims carefully and here is the paradox. Scientific evidence is often full of caveats and not written in everyday, easily accessible language. Scientists write for each other. Scientists might be unanimous in their evidence‐based opinion that subliminal tapes make fraudulent claims, but they don’t seem too hot at getting their message across. A Psychologist in the Marketplace 217

On the other hand, commercially savvy tape‐producers have commis­ sioned advertising agencies to design new campaigns. Using scientific jar­ gon and imagery and the power of repetition, aggressive campaigns have succeeded in keeping the myth alive. It is ironic that traditional advertising succeeds in selling subliminal tapes that don’t persuade. It’s so hard to beat pseudo‐science and superstition with skepticism and science. However, it is doubtless this level of vulnerability that is the most ­fundamental. It is also where good companies and the law can intervene. There are things organizations can and should do when selling to poten­ tially vulnerable customers, including taking account of the selling ­situation: where it takes place, what the social norms and conventions are, and how much pressure comes to bear on the individual. But there are sensible and sensitive checks and balances that can be put in place relatively easily when booking or confirming a sales appointment. This provides an excellent opportunity to ask a few unobtrusive questions, which may help identify the comprehension vulnerable. What organizations could do when going through a relatively well‐ thought‐through and tested script is to ensure that they categorize ­potential customers in terms of their risk for being comprehension vulner­ able. This could be, for example, a three‐ or five‐point scale ranging from not at all through potentially to very. Any sales person or organization needs to size up their appetite for risk at this point, for example the risks of court cases, loss of reputation, default in repayments, and so on. It is far better to have a carefully considered plan and strategy for avoiding vulnerable consumers and for managing the potentially vulnerable. This may mean asking for a friend or relative to be present at the sales meeting. It may mean putting the person through a short, non‐embarrassing test.

Financial vulnerability Many people are effectively financially illiterate, irresponsible or troubled. They very easily get into debt buying on the “never‐never.” They readily pur­ chase things they really cannot afford and undertake to make regular repay­ ments they can in no way serve. Many do not understand the arithmetic of interest rates. The data on financial literacy are indeed shocking. This implies that it is very easy to bamboozle a large number of people with numbers. However, many argue that assuming parenting is made more difficult solely because of the media is a simple‐minded belief. Somehow television commercials (and maybe even programs), it is argued, turn children into irrational, demanding, uncontrollable beasts. The standard argument is 218 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Tv commercial Wants DemandsChild-parent Purchase by conflict parents

Figure 10.1 The standard argument. shown in Figure 10.1. Television advertising, according to this model, creates (false, dangerous, and expensive) wants, not needs, in the child. This makes the (poorly socialized) child pester parents remorselessly with constant superficial demands. Parents try to resist, but this causes conflict, so they give in and buy something they cannot afford, which the child does not need and which may even be harmful. Television advertising is thus accorded a primary motivational role, and hence the problem can be solved simply by banning it, as suggested by the legislators. To believe that advertising alone can create wants is very naïve – advertising helps companies satisfy demand at best. It’s true. Advertising cannot persuade even the most gullible viewer to buy brands he or she really does not want. There are many interesting paradoxes in this approach. Protectionists who adhere to this model argue that children do not understand commercials but that equally they want everything in commercials. Children are too young to understand television advertising yet they are powerfully influenced by it, presumably because they do not understand the role of advertising. The belief that children are irrational and demanding individuals may arise partly because of the perception that people are suggestible and easily persuaded. A more realistic model demonstrated by Gunter and Furnham (1999) has considered several other powerful variables, including the influence of parents, peer groups, children’s own understanding of pur­ chasing behavior, the media, and their purchasing power (see Figure 10.2).

Assertiveness vulnerability Lastly, assertiveness vulnerability concerns the possession of the social skills associated with all negotiations. It means feeling comfortable and confident in simply saying “no” without shame, embarrassment, or incoherence. There are countless cases of people buying things they really did not want because they did not know how to turn away an experienced and subtle sales person who fully understood how to manipulate emotions and persuade vulnerable buyers. Perhaps you can recall a time when you made a purchase simply to avoid feeling uncomfortable or embarrassed, or to avoid disappointing the sales person because you were moved by their sincerity and perseverance? A Psychologist in the Marketplace 219

A realistic model

PARENT Intelligence Personality MEDIA Exposure Values Attention Parenting style Availability PURCHASE

Request purchase

PEER GROUP Lifestyle MONEY Availability Stability Understanding Values Habits Criminality

ADOLESCENT Intelligence Personality Values

Figure 10.2 A realistic model.

10.5 Consumer Decision Making

Although people can be vulnerable and persuaded by marketers’ tactics and strategies employed in advertising, we are not entirely (well, maybe a little) irrational when it comes to making purchase decisions. Decision is often made to accomplish a goal or a set of goals by an indi­ vidual. One predominant goal that underlies consumer decision making is to select the most optimal product or service that would satisfy a consumer’s relevant needs (and wants). Ideally, this goal alone would be able to account for consumption decision making in its entirety. However, we as humans are limited by our bounded rationality, which describes how the pursuit of opti­ mal decision making is confounded with the limitations we face in the pro­ cess, including our limited cognitive capacity and time. These constraints mean that the goal of accurate decision making thus needs to be balanced with several other goals, outlined in a choice goals framework (see Figure 10.3). In every decision, a balance across these goals needs to be struck. The importance we place on each goal depends on the context as well as the individual consumer. One key trade‐off that is apparent is the need to balance the goals of accuracy and effort. When faced with complex deci­ sions, consumers often employ automatic, non‐conscious heuristics to aid decision making. One such heuristic is the use of non‐compensatory strategies by consumers who are faced with complex choice alternatives. 220 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

1 • Maximize choice accuracy

2 • Minimize cognitive effort

• Minimize negative affect 3 experienced during decision making

• Maximize the ease with which 4 a choice can be justified

Figure 10.3 Better decision making.

A non‐compensatory strategy entails only considering a single factor (price, for instance) in order to make a choice decision, rather than the alternative of weighing the pros and cons of each choice across multiple factors. This has the benefit of simplifying the choice and helping the consumer eliminate choice alternatives with ease. In the context of affect‐laden decisions, the goal of minimizing negative emotions is also one which is relevant. In the face of choices that entail negative affect, consumers engage in two forms of decision making: either problem‐focused or emotion‐focused coping. The former entails the extensive processing of the decision with the aim of maximizing accuracy and minimizing the risk of negative outcomes. The latter entails avoidant behavior such as not making the choice so as to directly minimize negative affect, also known as the omission bias. The ultimate goal is to maximize the ease of justification of one’s choice. This is sometimes relevant in a social context when it becomes necessary to justify one’s choices to others. Heuristics such as asymmetric dominance, which states that if a choice dominates the alternatives on all relevant factors, it is more likely to be selected, were employed more by consumers for whom the goal of justification was relevant. The process of decision making is often framed as a deliberate task under­ taken consciously by the consumer. However, decision making can also occur along a more intuitive, unconscious route. This is best reflected in experiments using the priming paradigm, which show that the prior biasing of a consumer by product presentation has influenced the consumer on subsequent consumption decisions. This automatic route is postulated to be evolved to optimize behavior for our environment and includes reflexes and learned responses. The deliberate path allows for the effective pursuit of rational and declared goals, through which decision‐making strategies A Psychologist in the Marketplace 221 and logic can be applied. The separation of decision making into two paths is in line with findings highlighting the automaticity of behavior, and should thus be incorporated in decision‐making models. Yet there are always more profound implications. Intuitive and auto­ matic heuristics are generally useful in decision making, as they require minimal cognitive effort in the process. However, in certain situations they can lead to cognitive biases. Consider the following principles of persuasion that can be employed to influence others.

Reciprocity When we are given something by another person, or treated well, we feel obliged to reciprocate the kind behavior shown to us. It has been sug­ gested that all humans subscribe to this rule. We do not feel happy being indebted to someone and so offer something in return for what others have provided us with. Much experimental research confirms the existence of such a social norm, with the receipt of a favor being returned. Therefore, in order to persuade another person to do something for you, you can do something for them. This idea has been employed by waiters through presenting customers with candy with their check, in the hope that this gift is reciprocated with a tip. Staying longer at work to help out your boss with a high workload, for example, can make that person feel indebted to you, and lead to positive behaviors being reciprocated. Many companies, supermarkets or even restaurants offer loyalty schemes, in the hope that offering their customers discounts, deals or bonus points will reciprocate their loyalty and their return. Although this is not so much of a favor‐asking or guilt‐inducing strategy, some consumers will indeed consider revisiting the same stores because of their good service or loyalty schemes.

Commitment and consistency We have a drive to be consistent. When we make a commitment to do something, we experience personal and interpersonal pressure to behave as we have suggested that we will. Inconsistency is frowned upon and considered to be an undesirable personality trait by society, and so is avoided. Making a small commitment can therefore result in significant behavioral changes. In order to persuade people to accept large requests, it is suggested that they are first presented with small requests in the same area. People are likely to agree with later larger requests in order to appear consistent in 222 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious their values and behavior. You can increase compliance to give a charitable donation when individuals had previously made a small commitment online. Individuals have also been found to be increasingly willing to pur­ chase a product related to a cause that they previously committed to (e.g., when buying a product a donation is made to a rainforest protection charity). Situations like this are not uncommon in our everyday lives. Can you recount the times when, instead of storming off when a product in a shop or a dish in a restaurant that you wanted is sold out, you chose to go for an alternative brand or dish instead? Although emotional responses, such as guilt and embarrassment, have not been taken into account, it is not rare that by limiting a consumer’s choice, companies or sales can easily divert consumers’ attention to sometimes more expensive alternatives, just because we want to avoid any embarrassment and keep consistency.

10.6 The Social Consumer

As social creatures, the decisions we make do not occur in isolation but in the context of our relationships, community, and society. It is therefore impossible to consider the consumption decisions of an individual without also examining the impact of his or her social context. Social influence is manifested in consumer decision making through various forms, both implicitly and explicitly, as well as through informative and normative ways. The development of the effects of group influence on decision making is directly a result of consumer socialization and the growing appreciation of products and services as social symbols and status indicators, as was elaborated on above. This increasing importance of social influence on consumption decisions is reflected in the growing consumer priority on social goals. Authority figures play an influential and persuasive social force for ­people. Milgram’s famous 1974 experiment demonstrates the power that authoritative figures have in persuading others to act out of character. One hundred percent of participants delivered a confederate what they believed to be 300 volts of electric shock, labeled “intense,” with 65% of partici­ pants administering the maximum voltage of 450, which could be detri­ mental to health. Milgram concluded: “It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of authority that constitutes the chief finding of the study.” We are trained from birth to trust and abide by instructions from our parents, teachers, and society. Information provided by those in authorita­ tive positions is automatically trusted and used as a shortcut for making A Psychologist in the Marketplace 223 decisions. Once an individual in a position of authority has given an order, we are said to stop thinking about the situation and to start responding as suggested. Such a heuristic can be employed beneficially by companies with a large budget, through paying well‐respected celebrities to represent their brand in advertisements, and persuading others to purchase products. Charities also often employ celebrities in an attempt to encourage people to make donations to a cause that they believe must be worthy if an authority figure is supporting it. People like us can also employ the technique, through hinting to others how much we like a gadget or car belonging to a celebrity, for example; if they have it, it must be good. Automaticity and impulsivity in purchasing behavior can also be driven by the desire of social approval. Cialdini (2001) quotes sales expert Cavett Robert, suggesting that: “Since 95 percent of the people are imitators and only 5 percent initiators, people are persuaded more by the actions of oth­ ers than by any proof we can offer.” This is proposed to be especially true when we are unsure of ourselves. If we find a decision ambiguous, we are likely to accept others’ actions as the correct route. It also states that we are more likely to imitate behaviors of those whom we consider similar to ourselves in terms of age or background, for example. Campaigns such as anti‐smoking programs in schools have been found to only be effective when those communicating the information are same‐age peers. This effect has been found to be so strong as to persuade people against their own instincts. In Asch’s (1951) famous experiments, 75% of partici­ pants conformed with confederates who presented the same incorrect answer when asked to identify the longest line in a group. Follow‐up after the exper­ iment revealed that some participants were persuaded to believe that the group was in fact correct (although some simply stated they did not want to risk being ridiculed). This communicates the strength of social proof. Social influence has an implicit impact on consumer decision making, leading to changes in behavior patterns that the consumer him/herself may not be aware of and which may even be in direct contrast with his or her explicit attitudes. Research found that when implicit consumer atti­ tudes toward branded products were measured using the Implicit Association Test, they were markedly different as compared to the explic­ itly stated attitudes of the participants. Consumers are not just socially influenced individuals but are also mem­ bers of social groups. Individual attitudes within a social group tend to become more homogeneous as people shift their attitudes toward the group norms. This attitude alignment leads to the alignment of behavioral intentions as well, moderated by how much an individual identifies with 224 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious his/her social group. This desire for social affiliation manifests itself even in a minimal group paradigm, in which individuals spontaneously divide themselves into social groups along minimal, often arbitrary differentiat­ ing factors. Asch’s (1953) and others’ work on conformity highlighted the overriding impact social influence can have on even what we perceive as objective, unchangeable truths, thereby underlying the normative social influence mechanism described earlier. It is therefore unsurprising that studies have found that public evaluation of and group opinion toward products and services can influence a consumer’s perception of it. This is best represented by the formation and influence of communities built around brands, products, and services. These predominantly consumer‐ created communities are pervasive in the modern world, and are closely intertwined with the advent of the Internet and virtual communities. Such communities are demonstrated through the development of blogging and forums. Virtual communities have exploded onto the scene with the embrace of technology and news media by consumers and producers alike. To the producer, virtual communities provide an avenue through which brand identity and information can be quickly disseminated in an efficient and powerful manner. Such platforms also allow consumers to communicate and form their own powerful group identity built around product owner­ ship or brand usage. The social influence of virtual community on the consumer thus cannot be understated. The social impact of virtual com­ munity on the individual consumer is an area that is receiving more atten­ tion. In one of the models, both individual and group motives moderate an individual’s participation in a virtual community. Individual motives include group membership for purposive value, which is deriving utility from a predetermined goal to participating such as the goal of information gathering; self‐discovery value, which is discovering more about one’s taste preferences and values; maintaining social connectivity; and lastly, the enhancement of one’s social status and recognition. Social motives sug­ gested were based on those identified by Kelman (1961), namely compli­ ance (normative influence of others), internalization (similarity of self and group goals), and identification (tying of self‐concept with group identity). What is unique to virtual community is how various factors integrate as well as how people relate and react within such communities, which are largely moderated by the nature of the virtual platform itself. For example, a platform determines the synchronicity and methods through which members may interact with one another, such as through real‐time chat and the posting of videos respectively. These factors influence the inter­ activity of a platform and can lead to widely different group behaviors and A Psychologist in the Marketplace 225 social impacts specific to each virtual community. Two forms of virtual community, mainly small‐group and network community, may also form, with the former having smaller groups with better inter‐user identification and unity and the latter connecting many users across the platform, albeit through looser relations. These two forms of virtual community in turn can significantly influence the way in which the community influences the individual consumer. The role of context and social influence on the consumer is thus crucial for a more comprehensive understanding of consumer behavior and decision‐making. Contemporary research has highlighted the impact of implicit social influence as well as the more traditionally recognized explicit social influence. Lastly, the proliferation of virtual, web‐based communities in recent years shows no sign of abating, and could possibly lead to huge changes in how consumer community is organized and functions. Therefore, it would be wise for the development and impact of virtual community to be closely studied and monitored so as to help us develop a better understanding of its influence.

10.7 Services and Products

With the advent of the Internet and supermarkets, consumers today are faced with an unprecedented level of choice in the number and variety of products and services available. The proliferation of strong brand identities has also heavily influenced the current consumption market. These two hall­marks of product assortment and brand identity will be elaborated on further. The impact of product assortment on consumption is particularly inter­ esting when studied through the lens of how consumers make decisions. Several obvious benefits of assortment stand out clearly on cursory exami­ nation. For instance, having a variety of options to choose from can in itself give consumers utility. This stems from the novelty of having a dis­ tinctly varied selection of options to choose from. Product choice also gives consumers the freedom to choose and express their individuality. A greater variety of choice would also generally mean that consumers would be able to make a selection that optimally suits their preferences, as opposed to having a one‐size‐fits‐all product or service. Lastly, product variety gives the consumer the option of seeking variety and diversifying his/her consumption habits. However, there are costs and drawbacks to product assortment as well. Yes, we can have too many choices, which has led to the term “tyranny of 226 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious freedom.” Whilst having variety draws consumers and provides utility in itself, we often fail to account for the difficulty that the subsequent search and selection process has on us. Consumers were preferably attracted to product assortment, but the subsequent difficulty in product selection led to significantly lower satisfaction and purchase rates as compared to situa­ tions with fewer product options. Having more choices also overwhelms our cognitive resources for decision making, which can result in not choos­ ing at all, also known as the paradox of choice. A lower satisfaction with product choice may also arise due to the fact that with a greater variety of products, there is an elevated chance that a better, unselected alternative exists than if there were fewer choices. Consumers are therefore less satisfied with their current choice because of the perceived availability of better alternatives. These findings suggest that an optimal level of product assortment must be found in order to balance the benefits and costs of variety on consumer utility. Research has shown this to be not so simple. Factors such as prod­ uct type, similarity, and manufacturer also moderate variety perception. For example, it was found that when shopping in a mock store, partici­ pants did not perceive a store with 48 items as having significantly more variety than one with 36 items, provided that the total quantity of prod­ ucts in both stores and the presence of consumers’ favorite (and thus most salient) items were held constant. Furthermore, if products are organized in such a way that facilitates consumer processing of product range (e.g., by size or flavor), this contributes to a higher perceived assortment. Lastly, certain product attributes such as product color and shape were found to have a larger impact on consumer perception of variety, presumably as they were more perceptually salient. These studies on the various moderators of assortment perception serve to inform us on the complex relationship between perception and products that underlie consumer psychology. Further research would thus go a long way in helping to develop a clearer view of the connections between consumer and product.

Brand identity The concept of a product and the brand of the product are inseparable, a fact that is possibly even truer today with brands having a multinational presence in product manufacturing and distribution. The proliferation of the Internet has also allowed global transmission of information with both speed and ease, further contributing to the rise of prominence of branding. In this modern context, the concept of a brand is comparably important as the products and services they provide themselves. It is evident that brands A Psychologist in the Marketplace 227 play a role in influencing consumer decision making. The key question to be asked is how exactly is this done? Brands exist in the consumer’s mind, serving to provide a knowledge structure through which consumers can frame information regarding relevant aspects of the product and brand itself. Brands serve as a heuristic through which consumers make inferences of the brand’s products and services based on their perception of the brand. A study found that the more similar a new product was with a current product by the same brand, the greater the transference of affect to that new product. This highlights how brands may serve as a heuristic for consumer judgment of novel products and services. Traditionally, the study of brand identity and how brands gain symbolic meaning has focused on the role of the company. However, contemporary research has steadily grown to support the importance of the culture and consumer in the creation of brand identity as well. The roles of culture and consumer are rooted in the concept of co‐creation, which contends that the understanding of a concept by individuals is fundamentally shaped by the culture from which they come, but at the same time is unique to each individual as viewed through his or her own experiences. A model has been formulated to account for the influences of companies, consumers, and cultures on brand identity. In this model, culture is viewed as the origin and foundation for any meaning assigned to brands. Companies thus co‐create brand identity with culture, and the consumer interprets this brand identity through their individually distinct viewpoints, co‐creating individual brand identity. The relationship between consumer and brand is a complex web that deserves closer examination. Brands are not simply indicators as to prod­ uct quality and variety, but are also crucial to individuals as cultural resources that are components for the creation of self‐concept. As consumers attempt to construct a self‐identity, the brands of products and services that the individual consumes are used to build an identity based on the connotations inherent to the brand identity. Furthermore, consumers of the same brands often form brand communities. These brand communities do not just consume, but also market and co‐create brand identity with the companies and culture as well. Advertising has utilized the effectiveness of generating a particular brand identity that could create an instant and strong association. Some years ago Calvin Klein jeans launched a rather controversial and highly sexual advertising campaign which doubled its revenue. Does it only work for men? Or with some products rather than others? How do you measure the effect: memory for the ad, the brand, or whether people actually buy the product? 228 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Does sex sell? The idea of commercial advertising is pretty simple: People see, listen to or read an advertisement. They recall the brand, its strapline, and the product. They later recognize the product in shops, on the web or elsewhere and buy it. They trust products more that have been advertised. Good ads lead to great sales. Processing goes through various stages: people notice the ad; pay attention to the pictures, the words, and the benefits; understand and comprehend that message, and then integrate it into their knowledge bank, commercial schema, and so on. So ad agencies use drama, humor, sex, and violence to make ads more attention grabbing, interesting, and memorable. They try to elicit emo­ tions and mood states that enhance memory, although recall may depend on that mood state being experienced again when the shopper is buying. People seem to like humor, some like sex, fewer like violence. But the job is selling products. Once the ad is made, the question is where and when to show it. Various factors affect this decision, including costs and (for television) audience. Studies have looked at whether putting an advertisement in a violent or sexual program improves or impairs memory for it. Three groups watched either a violent, sexually explicit or neutral TV program that contained nine standard advertisements. Afterwards they were asked to recall the brands and identify them from pictures of similar brands on supermarket shelves. The next day they were each phoned and again asked to recall the brands. The studies showed that those watching the neutral program remembered most. Irrespective of their sex or age or how much they liked the program, the sex and violent programs seemed to impair memory for the advertised products. It may be that people attend more closely to and become more involved in sex and violence programs, so they inevitably have less attentive capacity for other stimuli like the ads. Also, it is believed that sex and aggression in films stimulate sexual and aggressive thoughts, which further limits inter­ est in and attention paid to the ads. But might sexing up an ad and putting it in a non‐sexy program work? You can get a strong Von Restorff effect of the ad: “Standing out like a sore thumb.” But, paradoxically, that effect is consistently reduced every time the ad is shown. So here is the paradox: The more you see a sexy ad, the less the effect. These insights into branding have broadened our perspective of the relationship between brands and consumers, cultures, and companies. A Psychologist in the Marketplace 229

This field of research is particularly relevant in exploring the growing role of the consumer in the consumption market, and the study of brands and their impact is likewise important with the proliferation of large multinational corporations that are forming an increasing proportion of the market today.

10.8 and Consumer Well‐Being

Apart from considering the mechanisms and influencers of consumer decision making, a key question in the field of consumer psychology concerns the application of this knowledge in the study of consumer well‐ being. Research in this area often focuses on consumer health consumption and behavior, including (but not limited to) tobacco consumption, health risk perception, and self‐image issues. Since the mid‐20th century, there has also been a rise in the number of politically, ethically, and socially conscious consumers. This has led to unprecedented changes in the consumption market and practices, with the advent of consumer‐ motivated and spearheaded campaigns and efforts to influence production and consumption.

Consumer well‐being The application of consumer psychology research is in the field of con­ sumer health behavior and well‐being. The impact of consumption on consumer well‐being is best represented in the area of tobacco consump­ tion. This is an area that has received high levels of media attention over many decades, which in turn has fueled much research, particularly on the impact of tobacco product advertising. A recent study found that advertising plays a significant role in encour­ aging adolescent smoking, which often persists as a habit through an indi­ vidual’s lifetime. This finding has been corroborated by a wealth of research, including longitudinal studies that tracked the change in adoles­ cent smoking intentions and behaviors over a time period. In line with the developmental stages of consumer socialization, adolescent smoking behavior was mediated by the symbolic social implications of smoking in advertising, such as the perception of smoking as normative and the positive imagery of smoking. This is corroborated by the finding that the consumption of popular cigarette brands mattered significantly more to adolescents than to adult smokers, highlighting the priority placed on social brand connotations by adolescent smokers. 230 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious

Tobacco advertising was also found to have implicit effects on children, increasing brand familiarity with repeated presentation in children of pre‐ school age. Advertising claims were perceived as more truthful simply based on their repeated presentation alone, a phenomenon known as the truth effect. This may also in part explain why adolescent smokers were found to have a poor understanding of the health consequences and addic­ tive nature of smoking. It is thus apparent that children and adolescents are particularly vulnerable to the impact of tobacco consumption advertis­ ing. Furthermore, poor adolescent smoker knowledge of the health costs of smoking bolsters the argument for the need for evidence‐based inter­ ventions so as to protect consumer welfare. This poor appreciation of health costs is also reflected by the general lack of understanding by the public of the health risks of potentially reduced‐exposure products (PREPs), which are alternatives to conven­ tional cigarettes. The prevailing view of experts is that PREPs are not necessarily safer than conventional tobacco products. However, it has been found that there is a marked misperception in the public that PREPs are healthier. This issue may be exacerbated by the possibility that the presence of “safer” alternatives leads to the net increase in actual tobacco consumers as some people consider PREPs to be less risky, thus adopting them when they would have abstained entirely from tobacco in their absence. The gap between evidence‐based knowledge and public percep­ tion and behavior thus highlights the need for a greater understanding of public health risk perception.

Health risk perception The previous example of tobacco consumption highlights the implications of a gap between health risk perception and actual risk. Several models have been suggested to account for the link between risk perception and behavior as well. One of the earlier models, the health belief model, focused on explaining and predicting health behavior through the attitudes of individuals. This approach was criticized for failing to account for the gap between risk perception and consequent behavior. The theory of reasoned action attempted to account for this by separating the concept of behavioral action and behavior itself. However, this model was similarly criticized for failing to account for the gap between intention and behavior. The theory of planned behavior posited that an individual’s perceived sense of control over the situation moderates risk perception, intention, and behavior. The cognitive adaptation theory argued that a self‐optimism A Psychologist in the Marketplace 231 bias (and thus an under‐perception of risk) actually leads to better health behavior, as this optimism shields individuals from psychological risk of negative health consequences. Lastly, Menon, Raghubir, and Agrawal (2008) suggested a broader model that incorporates multiple antecedents to health risk perceptions as well as facets of risk perception that moderate consequent behavior. Whilst not without its criticisms, the Menon et al. (2008) model accu­ rately acknowledges the complex, multifaceted process of the translation of health risk perception to behavior. Factors that mediate risk perception in previous models such as the self‐positivity bias, affect, and self‐control are acknowledged together with other factors such as whether acknowl­ edgment of the risk and consequent behavior were coherent with the social goals of the individual. The model also attempts to account for the effect of risk perception on consequent behavior, thereby seeking to address the intention–behavior gap. Menon et al. (2008) identified four relevant risks that work simultane­ ously with health risk to influence behavior, namely performance risk (that treatment is not as optimal as expected), financial risk (that returns on investment are not as expected), physiological risk (that physical harm results from decision), and psychosocial risk (that psychological well‐being and/or social status will be affected by decision). They also recognized that the high stakes nature of health decisions sets health consumption apart from most other general consumption decisions, thereby arguing for the continued research into the domain of consumer psychology in the health domain. The link between health risk perception and health behavior is thus still one that is being explored. Current research has highlighted the complex play of factors that underlie the link between risk perception and behavior. The development of models such as those by Menon et al. (2008) has therefore served to further our understanding of health consumption, a field of consumer psychology with widespread global implications.

Self‐image issues As stated earlier, one of the goals of consumption behavior is to form self‐ identity. This is often done by taking the symbolic connotations of prod­ ucts and services into account, as well as the comparison of oneself with one’s social context such as in‐groups and out‐groups. Whilst this behav­ ior can be beneficial to the individual consumer and even society as a whole, there are also instances where such behavior may prove mala­ daptive to the individual consumer, particularly when such behavior is 232 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious taken to the extreme. Consumption behavior is undertaken to correct dissatisfaction with one’s self‐image, and can be taken overboard to the point of excessive consumption. This excessive consumption in turn can lead to an increased feeling of regret and guilt, and may even reinforce such behavior in a downward spiral for the consumer. Excessive consump­ tion has also been found to manifest differently in the impulse‐buying behavior of both genders, with men buying instrumental and leisure items that reflect the values of independence and an active lifestyle, and women buying symbolic and self‐expressive items that reflect the values of appearance and emotions. Group and societal identification is also a key goal behind consumption behavior and self‐image ideals. However, it may be argued that some values and norms that are perpetrated in the media may be detrimental and undesired, such as the idealization of a thin body appearance for females. Such social ideals have a negative impact on the body image of women, leading to self‐anxiety due to the gap between one’s body (and thus self‐image) and the perceived societal ideal. Significant links have been found between the media portrayal of thin‐ideal women and clinically diagnosable mental health problems such as bulimia nervosa. In light of this research showing how perceived societal values can nega­ tively impact consumer self‐identity and consumption behavior, it is evident that the study of such social trends and the impact of social values on consumer well‐being is a highly important research area of consumer psychology. Cialdini (2001) describes how people perceive social values and approval as important and feel obligated to conform. He used Tupperware parties to explain this technique. These parties involved a Tupperware sales rep­ resentative asking a hostess to gather her friends, and any sales made would result in commission for the hostess. Cialdini suggests that pur­ chases were not made because people particularly wanted any Tupperware, but instead because they felt obliged so that the hostess, whom they liked, would benefit. Cialdini (2001) lists a number of factors that lead to liking. Physical attractiveness plays a role, with research showing that we believe good‐ looking individuals have more desirable traits such as kindness and intel­ ligence. We like those who are similar to us; this seems to be the case whether we are alike in terms of opinions, personality or lifestyle. Cooperating and having to work together to achieve mutual goals also results in liking. We also develop liking for those who compliment us, believing and accepting these compliments, as well as positive feelings toward those who have praised us. A Psychologist in the Marketplace 233

Consumer activism The ethically, politically, and socially awakened consumer is by and large a rather recent phenomenon in the history of consumption. This is fueled in part by the global spread of production and consumption networks, as well as the greater ease of information sharing and community forming through the Internet and new media. As such, consumers cannot be regarded as passive in their consumption practices any longer, but must be conceptualized as interacting together with producers in influencing global production and consumption. The increased awareness by compa­ nies of this shift in consumer trends is evident in the increased spread of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs such as fair trade consump­ tion initiatives and organic food production. CSR encompasses two aims: for companies to be both commercially responsible (in how the business is run, including production and marketing) and socially responsible (responsible to the society that the company is in). This spread of CSR is largely in response to consumer pressure on compa­ nies, which in turn has been argued to have arisen due to a greater con­ sumer sentiment of living in a risk society. A risk society is one in which the production of goods and services comes with secondary costs or risks such as damage to the environment. Proponents of this view argue that consumers thus need to take these risks into account during decision making. Consumer activism is best manifested in the prevention of behavior most relevant to the target industries, sectors, and companies: consumer boycotts. Boycotts are methods through which individual consumers banding together can exert an influence on companies and industries. However, critics argue that the impact of consumer activism is largely exaggerated and is not significant on the market as a whole. This is cor­ roborated by studies that have found that consumer activism and boycott­ ing did not lead to any significant decrease in consumption of products and services from negatively targeted companies, nor in the companies’ stock prices. These studies in themselves do not argue for the pointlessness of consumer activism, but instead encourage caution in the overinterpreta­ tion of consumer trends and behavior. Such findings reinforce the view that comprehensive, evidence‐based studies are required to make sense of current consumer trends. Nevertheless, there have also been successful cases in the past. Greenpeace is an internationally renowned non‐governmental association that serves to protect our environment through various campaigns such as discouraging manufacturing companies from deforestation or the use of toxic chemicals in products. In 2010, Nestlé stopped its purchasing of 234 All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious palm oil that was destroying rainforests in Indonesia. In 2011, the world’s top three sportswear brands, Nike, Adidas, and Puma, agreed to eliminate all discharges of toxic chemicals from their supply chain to the environment by 2020.

10.9 Conclusion

This chapter has examined contemporary developments in the field of consumer psychology, outlining key findings with regard to the individual consumer, the social consumer, the products and services in the market, and finally, ethics and consumer well‐being. The studies presented in this chapter highlight the grand scale of research that has been undertaken, as well as the complexity of some issues such as consumer decision‐making models and contemporary consumer trends. The research touched upon in this chapter also directs us toward acknowledging the necessity of further comprehensive research, particularly in specific areas of the field. To conclude, the rapid development of the field of consumer psychol­ ogy has been and continues to be an exciting one, with great relevance not just to the corporation, but also to each and every consumer in this increas­ ingly globalized world. References

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Note: Page numbers in bold type refer to figures and tables.

9/11 conspiracy theories 91–93, 95 standard TV argument 218 subliminal 23, 88–89, 216–217 abnormality 139 affection 52, 202 4Ds of 122 affordance 59 definition of 120 age vs. normality 121–122 and happiness 19–20 abstinence 41 myths about elderly 25 abuse, domestic 40 aggression 34 accommodation 49 aging 18 acquired immunodeficiency syndrome myths about 25–26 (AIDS) 125 agoraphobia, case study 138 action bias 197 agreeableness 180–181 adaptation, poor 122 Ainsworth, Mary 50 Adler, Alfred 62 alcoholism 41 adolescence adult children of alcoholics myths of 25 (ACOAs) 37–38 reflective stage of 213 alienation 160, 163 adventurous style 133 Allport, Gordon 61 advertising 10 amnesia, myth about 27 and children 213–215 anal stage 105, 107–108 “conspiracy” examples 88–89 analytical stage 212–213 realistic model of 219 anchoring 194, 206, 209 and sex 228–229 anger, myths about 34 and smoking 229–230 anorexia 38–39

All in the Mind: Psychology for the Curious, Third Edition. Adrian Furnham and Dimitrios Tsivrikos. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2017 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 260 Index anterograde amnesia 27 importance of 189 anti‐common sense 67 and individual differences 175–176 antidepressants 42–43 and intelligence 166–167 anti‐psychiatry movement 65, key factors in 171–177 124–125, 139 and monetary advantages 187–188 beliefs of 124 and personality 176, 178–181 anti‐science 66–67 and physical characteristics antisocial tendency 63 168–170 anxiety 158–159, 176 and promotional advantages 188 applications, real‐world 7 and proximity 176–177 archetypes 62–63 and recruitment advantages 188 Argyle, Michael 55 and sales advantages 188 Ariely, Dan 205–207 and similarity 176–177 Aronson, Elliot 56 and situational factors 174–175 arousal, detection of 31–32 and temporal factors 174–175 artificial intelligence 57 and WHR 171–174 Asch, Solomon 55, 223 attribution 54 assertiveness vulnerability 218–219 authority assessment, of individuals 80 bias 194 assimilation 49 figures 222 association obedience to 56 bias 199 autism 39, 50 guilt by 4 infantile 38 astrology 79, 82, 85–86 automaticity 223 asymmetric dominance 220 attachment 48, 50 Bandura, Albert 49 attention deficit/hyperactivity Barnum effect 82–84 disorder (ADHD) 39 Barnum, Phineas T. 82 attitude, and cancer 32 Baron‐Cohen, Simon 50 attraction Bartlett, Sir Frederic 51 law of 177 beauty 166 myths about 33 at work 184 and reciprocity 176 “is good” bias 165 and self‐esteem 176 Beck, Aaron 52 attractiveness 165–166 beginner’s luck 200 at work 181–189 behavior 11, 97 and body weight/BMI 173–174 attitude‐discrepant 190–192 and confidence 184–185 consumer 10 definition of 166 interpersonal (myths about) 33–34 evolutionary psychological maladaptive 120 view 166–170 planned 230–231 and familiarity 177 prediction of 62 general 184 psychoanalytic explanations of 117 and hunger 174–175 psychopathic 132 Index 261

schizophrenic 128 energy 16–17 studies of 4 image 231–232 theory 73 weight 173–174, 185 type A 159 body mass index (BMI) 172–173 unconventional 122 books, self‐help 4, 9 work‐related 142 boredom 163 behavioral economics 203–210 bounded rationality 57 behaviorism/behaviorists 47–49, 54 Bowlby, John 50 beliefs bozo explosion 193 erroneous 73–74 brain 15–16, 43 factors influencing 22 boosters 17–18 believability 12 energy 17 Benson, Nigel 47 hemispheres of 23 Bettelheim, Bruno 50 holonomic model 59 bias 22 maps 58 action 197 myths about 22–25 association 199 types 50 authority 194 brand identity 226–227 “beauty is good” 165 Broadbent, Donald 53 bigness 209 Brown, Roger 53 cognitive 192–202 Bruner, Jerome 51–52 confirmation 200, 209 Buffett, Warren 204 contagion 199 burnout 163–164 déformation professionnelle 202 symptoms of 164 information 197 Bush, George W. 91, 93 in‐group/out‐group 193 business consultants, psychologists as liking 194 146–149 omission 197 outcome 196 cancer, and positive attitude 32 overconfidence 201 case studies self‐serving 201 Celia 138 social comparison 193 Derek 137–138 status quo 197 Elaine 136 story 202 Greg 135–136 survivorship 196 Jane 135 swimmer’s body 200 John 135 weight‐based 186–187 Lewis 136–137 Big Five factors of personality, Nancy 135 definition of 182–183 Peter 136 bigness bias 209 castration complex 105–107, biopsychologists 58–59 109, 113 bipolar disorder 39 catatonics 127 black swan 198 Cattell, Raymond 61 body causal density 8 262 Index celebrities, in advertising 223 common sense 67, 74–79 cerebral cortex 59 dangers of 78–79 change 197–198 definitions of 144 agent 141 and management 141–145 character reading 36, 69 and psychology 6, 78 chauffeur knowledge 202 tests of 75–77, 143–144 cheating 207 communication children and gender 34 and advertising 213–215 word‐of‐mouth 22 of alcoholics 37–38 communities, virtual 224–225 attachment of 50 complex cells 60 consumer socialization of 212–213 comprehension vulnerability 215–217 development of 77 computationalists 57–58 education of 49 computer science 57 and happiness 20 condensation 110–111 myths about 26 conditioned stimulus (CS) 47 psychology of (child confession, to crimes 40 psychology) 63 confidence, and attractiveness rearing of 35 184–185 Chinese room argument 57–58 confirmation bias 200, 209 choice conformity (conforming) 55–56, 210 by elimination 207 conscientiousness 181 paradox of 195, 226 conscious 104 product 225 consciousness, myths about 29–31 theory 65 consistency 221–222 Chomsky, Noam 52 conspiracy theories 86–95 Church–Turing thesis 57 examples of 87–88 clairvoyance 4, 68 targets of 90 Clark, Kenneth 50 conspiracy theorists 91–92 classical conditioning 47 consultants, psychologists as clinical decision making 41 146–149 clinical psychology 120 consumer activism 233–234 clitoris, and phallic stage 106 consumer behavior 10 cognitive balance 54 consumer psychology 211–212, 234 cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) 53 consumers cognitive biases 192–202 decision making by 219–222 cognitive dissonance 52, 56, as individuals 212–213 190–192 social 222–225 theory of 191 consumer socialization, of cognitive distortions see superstitions children 212–213 cognitive therapy 52 consumer typologies 10 cognitivists 51–53 consumer well‐being 229–234 colleagues 141 consumption, and self‐image commitment 221–222 231–232 Index 263 contagion bias 199 disconfirmatory information 79 control discrimination 193 locus of 159 weight‐based 186–187 and psychology 9–12 dishonesty 31–32 thwarting of 12–13 disorganized schizophrenics 127 conviction, unshakeable 52 displacement 101, 103, 110–111 cooperation, in readings 70 dissatisfaction 25 Cooper, David 124 dissociative amnesia 27 coping, with stress 161–162 Dobelli, Rolf 193 corporate social responsibility Dolto, Françoise 64 (CSR) 233 domestic abuse 40 counselor 140 dramatization 111 countertransference 63 of readings 72 cover‐ups 86–95 dreams 62, 109–112 creativity 18 myths about 30–31 criminal profiling 39–40 dreamwork 110 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly 54 mechanisms of 111 cults 94 drives 115 culture 121 drug abuse 39 dualism 18 death 102 Duyser, Diane 199 psychological stages of 25–26 dyslexia, myths about 28 decision fatigue 195 decision making 53, 190, 210, 220 Earhart, Amelia 94–95 by consumers 219–222 eating disorders 38–39 participation in 160 ecological psychology 59 defense mechanisms 99, 102–103 economics, behavioral 203–210 ego 63 economists, vs. psychologists 203 déformation professionnelle bias 202 ecstasy 54 delusion 200–201 educators 214–215 demands, occupational 159–160 effect, law of 48 denial 103 effort justification 198–199 depression 39, 64–65, 125 ego 63, 102–103 case studies of 135–136 egotism, implicit 43 and ECT 42 Ekman, Paul 54 and suicide 37 elaboration, secondary 111 in women 32 Electra complex 105, 108 development, myths about 25–26 electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) developmentalists 49–50 22, 42 diagnosis, by HRCs 146 elimination 207 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Ellis, Albert 64 Mental Disorders (DSM) 138 emotion 54, 194, 202 Diana, Princess of Wales 89 myths about 31–33 disability, and happiness 19 psychology 54 264 Index empathy 50 fearless dominance 132 endowment effect 198–199, 207 feedback, believability of 84–85 energy 16–17 feelings 54 displacement of 101 Festinger, Leon 52 engram 59 fetishes 38 environments 63 financial vulnerability 217–218 epigenetics 48 fishing, psychic 71 epilepsy 27, 58 flattery, in readings 72 episodic memory 53 flow 54 Ericsson, Anders 57 forecast illusion 201 Erikson, Erik 49–50 fortune cookies 79–86 estrogen 172 fortune teller, how to become a ethics 229–234 69–72 ethology 58 Foucault, Michel 124 eudemonia 64 framing 194–195, 205 evolution, and attractiveness 166–168, effect 194 169–170 Frankl, Viktor 64 excuses 198–199 freedom, tyranny of 225–226 existential psychotherapy 64 Freud, Anna 63, 102 ex nihilo 50, 63 Freud, Sigmund 62, 96, 118–119 expectation 207 on anger 34 expected utility theory 203 assumptions of 97–98 expert 141 attitudes toward 98 external circumstances, and the basics 100–101 happiness 32 on childhood experience 41–42 extrasensory perception (ESP) childhood of 96 23, 68 critiques of 112–117 extraversion 61, 178–180 on displacement 101 and graphology 80 on dreams 30, 101, 109–112 eye movements, during dreams 112 and falsifiability 117–118 Eysenck, Hans 61–62 interests of 97 on personality 102–109 facial attractiveness 184–185 psychoanalytic method of 101 facial feedback hypothesis 43 psychodynamic theory of factor analysis 61 101, 211 false beliefs 12, 74, 86, 126 quizzes about 99–100 see also conspiracy theories on sublimation 101 false‐consensus effect 193 Frijda, Nico 54 53 Fromm, Erich 63 falsifiability 117–118 fundamental attribution error 201 familiarity, and attractiveness 177 families 64 gains, and losses 208–209 fatalists 159 gambler’s fallacy 195 fear 48 Gates, Bill 196 Index 265 gaze 55 health risk perception 230–231 gender healthy hatred 63 and communication 34 Heider, Fritz 54–55 and handwriting 81 height 186 and happiness 20 Heinroth, Oskar 59 genes Helmholtz, Hermann von 60 and happiness 32 helplessness 160, 163 and personality 35 heritability 35 genetic epistemology 49 heuristics 190, 220–221 genital stage 106, 109 hindsight 19 Genovese, Kitty 33–34 bias 6 Gestalt school 54–55, 59 Hippocrates 62 Gibson, James Jerome 59, 61 hirability 185 gimmicks, psychic 70–71 hoarding disorder 123 Girard, Jo 194 homeostasis 157 Glasser, William 65–67 homicide 41 goals, happiness 20–21 homosexuality 121–122 Goffman, Erving 62, 124 Horney, Karen 63 graphology 36, 79–82, 85–86 horoscopes 83 Gregory, Richard 60–61 hospital admissions, and lunar groups 150, 193–194 effect 38 educators/legislators 214–215 Hubel, David 60 influence of 222 human error 6 social 223–224 human resource consultants groupthink 193–194 (HRCs) 146–149 Guilford, Joy 58 hunger, and attractiveness guilt, attribution of 56 174–175 Guthrie, Edwin 48 hyperbolic discounting 199 hypnosis 18, 62 hair and memory 27 analysis 83–84 myths about 29–31 color 185 hypnotherapy 62 hallucinations 38 hypochondriasis 38 externally guided 53 hysteria 62 halo effect 200 handshakes 43 id 102, 216 handwriting 36, 80–81 identification 105 and gender 81 IKEA effect 199, 207 happiness 19–21, 54, 152–156 illumination levels, and and external circumstances 32 productivity 149–150 hardiness 161–162 illusion 53, 200–201 Harlow, Harry 50 image 207 Harré, Rom 47 impression 55 Hawthorne effect 149–152 management (IM) 186 266 Index imprinting 59 interpersonal behavior see behavior, impulsive antisociality 132 interpersonal impulsivity 223 interpretation 148 inaction 209 interview, semi‐clinical 49 incentive plan, conditions for introversion 179 success 155 investigator, detached 141 income 185 irrationality 64, 122, 210 indebtedness 221 predictable 205–207 individual differences 150 irrelevant options 206 and attractiveness 175–176 it‐will‐get‐worse‐before‐it‐gets‐better individuals fallacy 197–198 consumers as 212–213 in groups 150–151 Jaks, Dr. Stanley 69 and stress 158–159 James, William 46 uniqueness of 8 Jasper, Herbert 58 inferiority complex 62 jealousy, same‐sex 189 information jobs, and stress 159–160 bias 197 Jobs, Steve 196 disconfirmatory 79 Jung, Carl 62–63 from the grapevine 210 just deserts 56 processing 60 in‐group/out‐group bias 193 Kahneman, Daniel 7, 53, 204, 207 inhibition, reciprocal 48 Kant, Immanuel 59 inkblots 36, 83 Kelly, George 51 insanity 120 Kennedy, John F. 87, 89 as criminal defense 40–41 Key Thinkers in Psychology 47 and sanity 123–125 Klein, Calvin 227 insight 1, 59 Klein, Melanie 63 instinct 59, 97–98 knowledge 201–202 theory of 54 giving impression of 72 instruction 147 Kohlberg, Lawrence 50 instrumentalists 159 Köhler, Wolfgang 59 intellectualization 103 Kuo, Zing‐Yang 48 intelligence 57–58, 61, 186 and attractiveness 166–167 labeling boosting of 25 diagnostic 125 and happiness 20 negative 37 IQ tests 28 Lacan, Jacques 63 myths about 28–29 Laing, R.D. 124 interaction language loss 43 face‐to‐face 62 Lashley, Karl 48 order 62 latency stage 106, 109 International Classification of Diseases law, myths about 39–41 (ICD) 138 leaders, needs of 62 Index 267 learning Marr’s tri‐level hypothesis 60 insightful 59 Martín‐Baró, Ignacio 56 latent 48 masculinity 186 myths about 28–29 Maslow, Abraham 64 and teaching styles 28 mating, and attractiveness 166–168, legislators 214–215 169–170 Lerner, Melvin 56 May, Rollo 64 libido 63, 102 measurement, by HRCs 146–147 lie detection 31–32, 43 media 3 life 102 and intelligence myths 25 types of happy 54 misleading portrayals by 22 liking bias 194 melanoma 8 Lindbergh, Charles 40 memories 52–53 linguistic theory 52 distortion of 14 listening, during readings 71–72 flashbulb 27, 53 Little Albert 48 and hypnosis 27 Loftus, Elizabeth 53 myths about 27–28 lookism 186 recovered 18 Lorenz, Konrad 58–59 selective 22 losses, and gains 208–209 seven sins of 53 lunar effect 38 of traumatic experiences 27 Luria, Alexander 58 men Luria–Nebraska Neuropsychological attraction to women’s Test 58 features 169–170 communication by 34 McClelland, David 62 mental accounting 208 McDougall, William 54 mental health literacy (MHL) McGraw, Dr. Phil 9 134–135 McNaughten rule 40 mental illness 125–134 madness 120 identification of 134–139 magic 74 myths about 37–39 majority influence 56 and violence 22, 39 maladaptive behavior 120 microsociology 62 management midlife crisis, myths of 25 ability test 144–145 Milgram, Stanley 56, 222 and common sense 141–145 military, and psychology 9–10 science 142–143 Miller, George Armitage 52 managers minority influence 56 antisocial (psychopathic) Minsky, Marvin 57 132–133 miracles, performance of 13 competitive, frantic 159 Mischel, Walter 62 support and challenge of 158 models, of stress 157–158 Marr, David 60 monetary advantages, and marriage, and happiness 21 attractiveness 187–188 268 Index money 152–156 needs, hierarchy of 64 as equality 208 neural connections 43 and happiness 20 neuroticism (neuroses) 20, 61, 125, illusion 209 158–159, 180 and performance 153–154 New Age 17–18 as a taboo subject 155–156 Newell, Allen 57 and theft 207 non‐science, distinguished from moods 10, 32–33 science 68–72 moon see lunar effect Noonan, Fred 94–95 moral insanity 132 normality, vs. abnormality 121–122 morality 50, 207 Norman, Donald 59 abnormal 122 numbers 195–196 principle 104 nurture assumption 35 Moscovici, Serge 56 motivation 31, 62, 152–156 obedience 56 myths about 31–33 observation, psychic 71 multiple personality disorder 65 obsessive‐compulsive disorder Munsterberg, Hugo 211 (OCD) 53 myths 15, 45 case study 136–137 about brain and perception 22–25 occupational demands 159–160 about consciousness 29–31 Oedipus complex 105–109 about development and aging Oedipus quiz 106–107 25–26 old age, myths of 25–26 about emotion and motivation omission bias 197 31–33 openness 180 factors influencing belief of 22 operant conditioning chamber 47 about happiness 19–21 optimism, and stress 161 about intelligence and learning oral stage 104–105, 107 28–29 organizational design 151 about interpersonal behavior 33–34 organizations, and stress 159–160 about memory 27–28 Oswald, Lee Harvey 87 about mental illness 37–39 outcome bias 196 about mind and brain 15–18 out‐of‐body experiences (OBEs) about personality 35–37 18, 30 about popular psychology 2, 21–45 overconfidence 210 about psychological treatment bias 201 41–43 over‐determination 111 about psychology and the law overload, and stress 160 39–41 overthinking 198 reasons for 44 truth/falsity of 44–45 Packard, Vance 10 pain 63, 122 naïve realism 22 palmistry 69–71 near‐death experiences 18 panic disorder, case study 137–138 Index 269

Papert, Seymour 57 phenylketonuria (PKU) 35 paradox of choice 195 phobias 38 paranoid schizophrenics 127 phrenology 74 participation, lack of 160 physical characteristics passive aggressive personality and attractiveness 168–170 disorder 123 judgments of 179 Pavlov, Ivan 47 and personality 178 Pearls, Fritz 59 physiognomy 74 pedophilia 40 Piaget, Jean 49, 212–213 Penfield, Wilder 58 Pinker, Steven 50 penis placebo effect 207 envy 106 pleasure 63 and phallic stage 105 principle 102 perception 51, 55, 60–61 Poggio, Tomaso 60 of health risk 230–231 Pollyanna principle 85 myths about 22–25 polygraph 31–32 psychologists 59–61 popular psychology, myths of 21–45 selective 22 Postman, Leo 51 visual 23 post‐traumatic stress disorder perceptual stage 212 (PTSD) 38 performance, and money 153–154 potentially reduced‐exposure products performance‐related pay (PRP) (PREPs) 230 154–155 precognition 68 personal construct theory 51 preconscious 104 personality 61 predictable irrationality 205–207 and attractiveness 176, 178–181 predictions 7–8 development of 49–50, 104–109 preference 52 dynamics of 101 prejudice 50, 186–187, 193 extremes of Freudian types 108 prestige 55 factors 61 Pribam, Karl H. 59 five stages of 104–106 prison experiment 56 and happiness 21 probability 195–196 multiple 37 problem solving 57 myths about 35–37 process 148 and physical characteristics 178 procrastination 201, 206 problems 35–36 productivity, and illumination psychopathic 132 levels 149–150 structure of 102–104 products 225–229 types 62 naming of 11 person‐centered approach 64 projection 103 personologists 61–62 promotional advantages, and pessimism, and stress 161 attractiveness 188 phallic (Oedipal) stage 105–106, propaganda 10 108–109 prospect theory 204–205 270 Index protectionists 215, 218 child 63 proximity 176–177 clinical 120 Prozac 43 cognitive 51 pseudo‐science 3–4, 14 and common sense 6, 78 pseudo‐scientists 17 consumer 211–212, 234 psychiatrists 3, 27, 42, 65, 96, 98, and control 9–12 123–125, 138–139 diminishing of 5 psychiatry, as control method 124 disadvantaged position of 95 psychic, how to become a 69–72, 201 discipline of 46, 65 psychic fraud 12–14 ecological 59 psychic phenomena, appraisal emotion 54 of 68–69 image of 4 psychic powers 68 immediacy of 9 psychoanalysis and the military 9–10 critiques of 116–118 myths about 2, 39–41 definition of 104 “New Look” 52 knowledge of 96–98 personality 61 unconscious fantasy in 116 pop 9 psychoanalysts 62–65 popular 21–45 psychoanalytic method, of Freud 101 pure vs. applied 141 psychoanalytic theory, critiques as science 6, 66 of 113–116 skepticism about 5–9 psychoanalytic therapy 52 thinkers and their ideas on 47–65 psychobabble 1 unscientific attitudes in 5 psychodynamic theory 101 usefulness of 6–7 psychographics 10 uselessness of 7–8 psychokinesis 68 use of term 5 psychological problems, and self‐ work 140–141, 164 esteem 35 The Psychology Book 47 psychologists 3, 7 psychometrics 58 applied 140–141 psychopathologists 65 as business consultants 146–149 psychopathology/psychopathy 40, vs. economists 203 120, 130–134, 139 in media 3, 5 psychopaths organizational 164 adventurous 133 perception 59–61 in business 134 social 54–57 definition of 130 studies of 19 identification of 134–139 types of 11 mischievous 133–134 unscientific attitudes of 5 non‐institutionalized 131 use of term 5 subcriminal (white‐collar) 131 psychology 3 psychoses 125 abnormal 120–123 psychosexual stages 104–106 basics of 1–2 psychosexual theory 104 Index 271 psychotherapies, and childhood Rosenhan, David 65 41–42 Rowe, Dorothy 65 psychotherapists 7 biases of 22 safety in numbers, myths about 33 psychotherapy 42 sales puberty 106, 172 advantages and attractiveness 188 public ignorance, reasons for 3 and sex 228–229 salient effect 202 radical behaviorism 48 Salkovskis, Paul 53 rape 41 samples, biased 22 rapid eye movement (REM) sleep 30, sanity, and insanity 123–125 111–112 Satir, Virginia 64 rationality 53, 72 satisficing 57 rationalization 103 scarcity error 197 reality Schacter, Daniel 53 distortion of 110 schizophrenia 37, 39, 123, 125 principle 102 case studies of 135–136 recidivism 40 classification of 126 reciprocity 221 conspiratorial model of 129–130 and attraction 176 identification of 134–139 recruitment advantages, and medical model of 127–128 attractiveness 188 misconceptions about 126 reflective stage 213 moral–behavioral model of 128 regression 103 psychoanalytic model of rehabilitation 40 128–129 reinforcement 72 social model of 129 principle 48 subtypes of 127 relaxation 31 schizotypy 126 remembering, processes of 51 science 66 replicability 6 as common sense 78 repression 103 distinguished from non‐science research 140 68–72 responses, considered 64 general principles of 4 responsibility, for others 160 psychology as 6, 66 retrograde amnesia 27 vs. superstition 72–74 revenge 110 Searle, John 57–58 risk 53 secondary elaboration 111 Robert, Cavett 223 self‐blame 65 Rogers, Carl 64 self‐control 206 role self‐esteem ambiguity 160 and attraction 176 conflict 159–160 and psychological problems 35 playing 64 self‐fulfilling prophecies 86 Rorschach Inkblot Test 36 self‐help books 4, 9 272 Index self‐image, consumption issues social loafing 193–194 231–232 social norms 55, 206 self‐improvement 17–18 social psychologists 54–57 self‐punishment 40 social relationships 54 self‐serving bias 201 social science 7 self, the 62 social support, lack of 160 and “the other” 63 society, use of psychology to 6–7 self‐understanding 64–65 society of mind theory 57 Seligman, Martin 54 sociopaths 131 53 definition of 130 senility 25 sociopathy 130 sensation 51 something for nothing 206 sense data 53 source traits 61 sensory processing 60 split personality 37 services 225–229 stability 158–159 sex statistics in advertising and sales 228–229 creative use of 69–70 myths of 33 methods in 6, 8 sexual abuse 39 of normality 121 personality problems 35–36 status quo bias 197 Shepard, Roger 53 stereotyping, and attractiveness 167 Sherif, Muzafer 55 stigmatization 37 shock therapy see electroconvulsive stock phrases, psychic 71 therapy (ECT) story bias 202 short‐term memory (STM) 53 strange situation 50 similarity 176–177 stress 33 Simon, Herbert 57 and cancer 32 simple cells 60 as a challenge 161–162 situational factors, and components of 158–162 attractiveness 174–175 coping with 161–162 skepticism 5–9 definition of 156–157 Skinner box 47 and optimism 161 Skinner, Burrhus Frederic 47–48, 52 and over‐/underload 160 sleep 30–31 and pessimism 161 learning 18, 30 symptoms of 162 sleepwalking 31 and ulcers 32 smoking 42 and uncertainty 160 and advertising 229–230 and work 156–164 social comparison bias 193 stroke 43 social conflict 55 students, skepticism of 5–9 social consumers 222–225 subjectivity 6 social groups 63 sublimation 101 social influence 193–194, 223 subliminal advertising/messages 23, social learning theory 49 88–89, 216–217 Index 273 subliminal attention 10 traits, heritable 35 suffering 64, 122 transcendental meditation 31 suicide 39, 41, 64 trauma and depression 37 childhood 41–42 sunk costs 209 memories of 27 fallacy 198 societal 56 superego 63, 104 treatment, myth about 41–43 superstition 199–200 trickery 12–14 vs. science 72–74 excuses for 13–14 survivorship bias 196 medical Barnum 83–84 swimmer’s body bias 200 trieb 115 symbolization 111 Tulving, Endel 53 symptoms, of stress 162 Turing, Alan 57 system 1/system 2 thinking 208 Turing test 57 systems 148–149 Tversky, Amos 204 Szasz, Thomas 124 twins, and personality 35 type A behavior 159 Tarde, Gabriel 56 teachers, role of 9 ulcers, and stress 32 teaching uncertainty, and stress 160 and learning styles 28 unconditioned response (UR) 47 tip about skepticism 9 unconditioned stimulus (US) 47 telepathy 68 unconscious 63, 101, 104 temporal factors, and collective 63 attractiveness 174–175 and dreams 112 testosterone 172 fantasy 116 tests overemphasis on 113 HRC’s use of 146–147 underload, and stress 160 and hunches 28 unhappiness 20–21 theoretician 141 uniqueness, fallacy of 8 theory United States of America (USA) resistance to 100 86–87, 92 of stress 157–158 unpredictability 122 therapists 62–65 usefulness, of psychology 6–7 Thigpen, Corbett 65 thimerosal 38 variables, moderating 8 thinking, system 1 and system 2 208 Verbal Behavior 48 Thorndike, Edward 48 verbal protocol analysis 57 toilet training 107–108 victims, derogation of 192 Tolman, Edward 48 violence, and mental illness toolmaker 141 22, 39 Tourette’s syndrome 39 virtual communities 224–225 training 147 vision 60 professional 141 visual perception 59 274 Index vocabulary 1 women Von Restorff effect 228 communication by 34 vulnerability 214 evolution of attractive features types of 215–219 in 169–170 Vygotsky, Lev 49 word‐of‐mouth communication 22 work waist‐to‐hip ratio (WHR) 171–174 attractiveness at 181–189 Walden Two 48 and psychology 140–141, 164 Watson, John 48 and stress 156–164 Watzlawick, Paul 64–65 (Wm) 52 weight 185 Wundt, Wilhelm 46, 60 and discrimination 186–187 Western Electric Company 149 Zajonc, Robert 52 Will Rogers phenomenon 196 Zeigarnik, Bluma 52 winner’s curse 199 Zimbardo, Philip 56 Winnicot, Donald 63 Zoloft 43 Wolpe, Joseph 48 zone of proximal development 49