Solidarity and Self-Reliance: The Antinomies of North Korean Foreign Policy and Juche Thought, 1953-1967

by James Frederick Person

BA in History and Fine Arts, May 1998, The George Washington University

MA in History, May 2001, Moscow State University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences Of the George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2013

Dissertation directed by

Gregg Andrew Brazinsky Associate Professor of History and International Affairs

Kirk Wayne Larsen Associate Professor of History, Brigham Young University

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of the George Washington University certifies that James Frederick Person has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of March 26, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Solidarity and Self-Reliance: The Antinomies of North Korean Foreign Policy and Juche Thought, 1953-1967

Dissertation Research Committee:

Gregg A. Brazinsky, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Co-Director

Kirk W. Larsen, Associate Professor of History, Brigham Young University, Dissertation Co-Director

Edward McCord, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

Jisoo Kim, Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

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© Copyright 2013 by James F. Person All rights reserved

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Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge numerous individuals, especially Gregg

Brazinsky, Kirk Larsen, and Charles Armstrong, who were extremely patient and generous with their time and advice. The author is also grateful to Jooeun Kim, Jongdae

Shin, Kihljae Ryoo, Jounyung Sun, Jae-kyu Park, Christian Ostermann, Charles Kraus,

Edward McCord, Zhihua Shen, Yafeng Xia, Gary Goldberg, James Hershberg, Hope

Harrison, Hazel Smith, Mitch Lerner, Seukryule Hong, Sangyoon Ma, Bernd Schaefer,

Daqing Yang, Jisoo Kim, and Andrei Lankov. The Department of History, the Sigur

Center for Asian Studies, and the Korea Foundation all generously supported the author with travel grants and language training during his research.

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Abstract of Dissertation

Solidarity and Self-Reliance: The Antinomies of North Korean Foreign Policy and Juche Thought, 1953-1967

This dissertation identifies the pragmatic origins of North Korea’s political ideology, Juche Thought, and the development of its three practical applications (Jaju,

Jarip, Jarip) from 1953 to 1967. During this period, Juche Thought evolved from an amorphous idea of independence and self-reliance, into a complete set of practical policy applications designed to limit the influence of North Korea’s putative allies on political and economic developments. Finally, Juche was transformed into a tool for suppressing pluralism in the DPRK and eliminating foreign influences. This is the first work to fully explicate this transformative process by using newly available evidence from the archives of North Korea’s former communist allies, published North Korean speeches, and the existing literature.

By shedding new light on the evolution of Juche and each of its three practical applications between 1953 and 1967, we can understand why North Korean leaders, driven by their postcolonial revolutionary nationalism, felt they could no longer operate exclusively within the limiting confines of the international socialist system, with its own vertical power structure that placed North Korea in a subservient position to Moscow and

Beijing. An analysis of this critical period also enables us to understand how the DPRK was transformed into a repressive dictatorship, with Kim Il Sung employing Juche as a tool to suppress pluralism inside the DPRK, and to resist socialist imperialist intrusion.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iv

Abstract of Dissertation v

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Juche 24

Chapter Two: Self-Reliance in Politics (Jaju) 86

Chapter Three: Self-Reliance in Economics (Jarip) 127

Chapter Four: Self-Reliance in National Defense (Jawi) 168

Chapter Five: The Monolithic Ideological System (Yuil sasang chaegye) 204

Conclusion 237

Bibliography 246

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Introduction

The year 1967 was a watershed in the political, ideological, and diplomatic history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea).

Following the purge of the so-called Gapsan faction at the May 4-8 Fifteenth Plenum of ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP)’s Fourth Central Committee (CC), North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s authority became unassailable. Kim established Yuil sasang chaegye, the monolithic ideological system, which transformed Juche [Chuch’e] Thought, once a pragmatic political strategy for limiting the influence of Pyongyang’s putative allies on the trajectory of political and economic developments into a tool of suppression to mandate ideological unity inside North Korea. Kim also utilized Juche Thought as an instrument to make the country impervious to foreign influences.

These changes had a genuinely transformative effect on North Korea. With no remaining domestic opposition, Kim Il Sung firmly established a repressive dictatorship and fostered the further development of his cult of personality. Signs of this appeared almost immediately. The appellation suryeong, or supreme leader, a term that had typically been reserved for the late Soviet leaders Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin in the

North Korean press, began to be regularly used for Kim, thus putting him on equal footing with the two legendary figures. In an extreme form of adulation, North Koreans began wearing lapel pins bearing the likeness of their leader. In an effort to make the country impervious to foreign influences and mandate ideological purity in North Korean society, Kim enforced nationwide bans on foreign (particularly Soviet) literature, music,

1 and art.1 Under the banner of Juche Thought, Kim also moved to shift his country’s foreign policy orientation away from Moscow and Beijing and the socialist camp.

Juche’s hegemonic position after 1967 was not inevitable. Before being transformed into a monolithic ideological system in 1967, Juche Thought was not exclusively or even primarily a tool of exclusion and suppression; rather, it was a pragmatic manifestation of Kim Il Sung’s postcolonial desire for sovereignty and independence. The term Juche had long existed in an embryonic form. Korean nationalists had used the term at the start of the twentieth century,2 and as Bruce Cumings notes, “Kim [Il Sung]’s rhetoric rang with synonymous language” from the 1940s. Kim used a variety of terms translating roughly as self-reliance and independence,” including jajuseong (independence), minjok dongnip (national or ethnic independence), and jarip gyeongjae (economic independence).3 After a two-year domestic debate over development strategies (1953-1955), Juche Thought became more salient when Kim Il

Sung delivered a speech in December 1955 criticizing the glorification of foreign cultures and the mechanical replication of foreign political practices. The speech served as an attempt to begin the process of psychological decolonization in Korea. Juche’s further development was influenced by a number of historical contingencies, and between 1955 and 1965, Juche Thought evolved, engendering three practical applications: Jaju (self- reliance in politics), Jarip (self-reliance in economics), and Jawi (self-reliance in national defense). By 1965, Juche had evolved into a complete set of practical policy applications.

1 Seong Hye-rang, Deungnamu jip:Seong Hyerang Jaseojeon (House of Wisteria: The Autobiography of Seong Hyerang) (Seoul: Jisiknara, 2000), pp. 312-314, cited in Jae-Chon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 41 2 See Michael Robinson, “National Identity and the Thought of Sin Ch'ae-ho: Sadaejuüi and Chuch'e in History and Politics.” Journal of Korean Studies (1984): pp.121–142. 3 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 313. 2

Juche Thought was transformed into the dominant discourse only in 1967 after Kim Il

Sung’s efforts to reverse the country’s historic subservience to larger foreign states and create a strong and independent Korean nation repeatedly clashed with the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union and China and domestic challenges to Kim’s national security imperatives. Until this point, Juche Thought coexisted with, and even appropriated, the transnational ideology of international socialism for Kim Il Sung’s postcolonial revolutionary nationalist agenda.4

My dissertation is the first work to fully explicate the formative processes under which Juche Thought and its three practical applications (jaju, jarip, jawi) evolved between 1953 and 1967. By understanding the evolution of Juche and each of its three practical applications between 1953 and 1967, we can understand why North Korean leaders, driven by their postcolonial revolutionary nationalism, felt they could no longer operate exclusively within the limiting confines of the international socialist system, with its own vertical power structure that placed North Korea in a subservient position to

Moscow and Beijing. An analysis of this critical period also enables us to understand how the DPRK was transformed into a repressive dictatorship, with Kim Il Sung employing Juche as a tool to suppress pluralism inside the DPRK, and to resist socialist imperialist intrusion.

The way Kim Il Sung interpreted domestic opposition and his experiences with the Soviet Union and China after the Korean War were greatly influenced by his interpretation of Korea’s historical experiences with imperial China and Japan and also by his own colonial-era dealings with the Soviet Union and Chinese communists. Thus,

4 Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 79. 3

North Korea’s approach to national sovereignty, the formation of Juche Thought, and indeed the country’s representation of its own national identity, were strongly linked to the experiences of Kim Il Sung and his understanding of Korea’s recent history.

Kim Il Sung viewed the world filtered through the lens of the Japanese colonial experience.5 He blamed Korea’s inability to defend its sovereignty from Japan in part on late Joseon (Chosŏn) Dynasty leaders who continued to observe the tributary relationship with a weakened Qing China, which subordinated Korea’s interests to those of the

“Middle Kingdom,” as part of a Sino-Centric tributary system that served as the core organizing principle of East Asian international politics until China was “de-centered” following its defeat in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War. The terms sadae (literally meaning “serving the great” through the political emulation of China) and mohwa

(cultural emulation of China) characterized Korea’s political dependence and cultural deference to imperial China. Officials modeled Korean political institutions on those of a superior foreign society, i.e. China. These terms, particularly sadae, which at one time carried with it the distinction of being part of the civilized, Sino-Centric world, came to be viewed negatively by the end of the nineteenth century. Kim Il Sung and many contemporaries in the North and South blamed these policies of emulation and subservience to a weak foreign power for Korea’s inability to defend its sovereignty from

Japan. They used the expression “sadaejuui,” or the policy of serving the great, as a pejorative to denote “toadyism,” or slavishness.6

5 I am grateful to Kirk Larsen for helping me come up with an effective way of conveying this idea. 6 See Michael Robinson’s seminal article on Sadaejuui and the early use of the term Juche, Michael Robinson, “National Identity and the Thought of Sin Ch’aeho: Sadaejuui and Chuch’e in History and Politics” Journal of Korean Studies (1984), pp. 121-142. 4

Kim’s personal experiences with China and the Soviet Union throughout the colonial era are another key component to the construction of views central to Juche

Thought. Kim Il Sung learned the hard lesson that he could not rely on anyone but himself during his anti-Japanese partisan struggles in Manchuria. Having joined the

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), he was reportedly nearly killed by Chinese communists who accused him of being a Japanese agent in what Chong-Sik Lee calls a “witch hunt.”7

As Hongkoo Han describes, in what has become known as the Minsaengdan (People’s

Livelihood Corps) Incident, “[m]any CCP leaders in the area believed Japan infiltrated into guerrilla base areas to expand anti-revolutionary organizations within the party and the guerrilla units.” Between 1932 and 1935, at least 500 (and possibly up to 2,000)

Korean members of the East Manchurian branch of the CCP were executed by their

Chinese comrades. This incident, notes Han, was a “horrendous memory burned in the minds of Kim Il Sung and other North Korean communist leaders.”8

The Soviet deportation of Far-Eastern Koreans in 1937 likely also left Kim with a deep sense of betrayal. As Japan penetrated further into the Asian mainland, upwards of

175,000 Koreans (37,000 families) living in Vladivostok Oblast (region) and several adjacent territories of the Soviet Far East were rounded up and deported to Central Asia out of fear that Soviet-Koreans would serve as Japanese agents.9 When he eventually fled to Soviet territory in the early 1940s, Kim Il Sung and his comrades in arms were also

7 Chongsik Lee, “Witch Hunt among Guerrillas: The Min-Sheng-T’uan Incident,” China Quarterly Vol. 107 (1966), pp. 107-117. See also Hongkoo Han, Wounded Nationalism: The Minsaengdan Incident and Kim Il Sung in Eastern Manchuria (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1999). 8 Hongkoo Han, “Colonial Origins of Juche: The Minsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of the North Korea-China Relationship” in J.J. Suh ed. Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 34-35 9 Michael Gelb, “An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans,” Russian Review Vol. 54 (1995), pp. 389-412. 5 reportedly treated with suspicion by Soviet officials. These experiences taught Kim that shared ideology notwithstanding, he could not fully rely on his putative allies.

Kim’s lack of tolerance for disagreement inside the Korean Workers’ Party was also formed through his interpretation of factional struggles in the late nineteenth century and in early days of the Korean communist movement in the mid-1930s. This colored his views on pluralism in North Korea. Kim’s autobiography reveals strong views on the factionalism of late Joseon Dynasty leaders who were more concerned with increasing personal power at the expense of rivals than with the strengthening of national power.10

Moreover, Kim believed, as Jae-Cheon Lim observes, that the Korean Communist Party, originally founded in 1925, was disbanded by the Comintern in 1928 “due to the same reason as the collapse of the dynasty,” i.e. due to factional rivalry. This made Kim particularly sensitive to debates in North Korea. He likely viewed any opposition to his development policies, which he designed to strengthen national security, as a repeat of the factional struggles in the late Joseon dynasty and in the early communist movement.

Thus, although Kim came to power through the support of the Soviet Union, he already bore a profound sense of mistrust toward his Soviet and Chinese benefactors and was skeptical of pluralism. His mistrust was reinforced during the Korean War when

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin notified the North Korean leader after the September 15, 1950

Incheon landing that Kim should withdraw his troops from Korean territory, refusing to commit Soviet ground forces as United Nations forces marched north of the 38th parallel on the trail of retreating Korea People’s Army. Although the commitment of Chinese

Peoples’ Volunteers in the late fall of 1950 prevented the annihilation of the DPRK, the

10 See Kim Il Sung, With the Century, Korea Friendship Association (KFA), 2003, www.korea-dpr.com, and Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea (New York: Routledge, 2009) p. 42. 6 high-handed attitude of CPV commander Peng Dehuai in relation to Kim Il Sung and countless disputes over the use of Korean resources, in particular the railway system, only reinforced the North Korean leader’s frustrations with his putative ally.11

After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung was presented with a tabula rasa on which to construct an externally independent and internally interconnected economy, rectifying colonial-era imbalances to industrial development while at the same time develop those industries that made North Korea so utterly dependent on the Soviet Union and China throughout the war. North Korea received massive amounts of aid from “fraternal” communist countries. However, with this aid came foreign interference in North Korean policies. By as early as 1955, when restrictions on Soviet aid to the DPRK put up obstacles to Kim’s vision for establishing an independent national economy, he began to recognize that internationalism would limit Korea’s freedom of action. Kim thus began to

“tailor communist rhetoric to fit the particular case of North Korea” through the application of Juche Thought. As Gi-Wook Shin observes, the transnational ideology of

Marxism-Leninism was “taken as an instrument to be appropriated for the nationalistic cause of the North.”12 Following a series of Soviet and Chinese interventions in North

Korea’s sovereign affairs to impose “de-Stalinization” in the mid-1950s, and two domestic challenges to Kim Il Sung’s national security imperatives (1956 and 1967), Kim introduced yuil sasang chaegye, the monolithic ideological system which institutionalized

Juche Thought as the unitary North Korean ideology. Kim turned his back on socialist internationalism.

11 Zihua Shen, “Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin No. 14/15 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2004), pp. 9-24. 12 Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, p. 23. 7

Few people today question the nationalist credentials of Kim Il Sung’s fellow

Asian revolutionary leaders in the first wave of twentieth century decolonization; Mao

Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. Yet, Kim Il Sung, and particularly his postcolonial nationalism, has long been portrayed in the scholarly literature, and especially in the media and foreign policy community, as anything but his own man.13 Unlike Mao and Ho, Kim Il

Sung came to power under Soviet tutelage. Thus, conventional wisdom depicted the

North Korean leader as little more than a Soviet stooge who gained supreme leadership only because he was installed by Soviet occupation forces.14 Early U.S. government reports produced during the Korean War described North Korea as the Asian corollary to the Central and Eastern European client states with their leaders brought in directly from

Moscow.15 In their two-volume Communism in Korea, Robert Scalapino and Chongsik

Lee go as far as to describe Kim Il Sung as “a puppet of a foreign power to an extent unmatched by any other individual's relationship to a foreign power...”16 The implication is that North Korean policies were slavish imitations of Soviet policies due to a hierarchy in the monolithic communist bloc, in which Korea was lower.

Other works have made more conditional arguments about the role of the Soviet

Red Army and the coercive imposition of external order in North Korea. These works also highlight Kim’s method of consolidating power in North Korea with a focus on his will to power and use of repeated purges to eliminate rival factions. Koon Woo Nam's

13 In an October 2012 article, The New York Times describes the DPRK as “the last Stalinist state on earth” http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html. Describing North Korea on a PBS documentary on the DPRK’s nuclear program, former Special Envoy to North Korea (1998-2000) Wendy Sherman said “It was as Stalinist a country as ever has been.” 14 See for example Robert Scalapino and Chongsik Lee, Communism in Korea, 325-327 15 See for example U.S. Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study of a Soviet Satellite, Report of the Department of State Research Mission to Korea, Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 5600 (May 20, 1951) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, reprint) 16 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, 381. 8

1976 North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-65: A Study of Factionalism and

Political Consolidation, suggests a process of coercive imposition of Soviet order. Nam argues that an indigenous variant of Korean communism, and not the Soviet-imposed brand that Kim Il Sung was alleged to have represented, could have succeeded in Korea after liberation had it been given a chance. However, the Soviets and their puppet (i.e.

Kim Il Sung) had their eyes more on solidifying control over the North than in genuinely appealing to all Koreans. In the decades after the Korean War, however, Kim Il Sung, who was by that time less dependent on Soviet support, began to attack his former masters in the process of aggrandizing his own personal power. Thus, while utterly dependent on the Soviet Union and China for support and aid, Kim’s actions were not always dictated by Moscow or Beijing.

Although Dae Sook Suh's richly documented 1988 biography of Kim Il Sung portrays the North Korean leader as “a potentate manipulated by the Soviet Union to sovietize the northern half of Korea after liberation,” he describes a process of coming to power that was significantly more complex than its portrayal in earlier works. He argues that Kim was not exclusively dependent on Moscow. The North Korean leader’s success in establishing a personal autocracy, Suh argues, can be attributed to four factors; the support of the Soviet Union before the Korean War, the division of Korea, the divided opposition inside the ruling Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim's control of the military and security apparatus. 17 Suh also does not outright dismiss North Korean political practices and economic policies as being mere imitations of Soviet, i.e. Stalinist practices. He

17 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) 104-105) 9 likens the North Korean system more to a monarchy with Kim Il Sung ruling over the country like a personal domain than to a Marxist-Leninist party-state.

If not a puppet, there was still a tendency to portray Kim as a disciple of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Scholars argue that North Korean leader imitated the Kremlin leader’s economic policies, personality cult, and tactics of using of repeated purges to eliminate groups that could have threatened his authority.18 Former Australian diplomat- turned historian Adrian Buzo, writing in the 1990s, argues that “it is hard to imagine the

DPRK as we know it without a Stalinist blueprint.”19 Although Buzo does suggest that

Kim was in part driven by nationalism, he draws parallels between the leadership styles of the late Soviet leader and Kim Il Sung in politics, ideology, economics, and social mobilization. Such similarities included a highly centralized planned economy with over- emphasis on heavy industry. Buzo also suggests that Stalin's utterly un-Marxist

“socialism in one country” was the model for Juche or jarip (self-reliance in economics).20 Other parallels include Kim Il Sung’s “highly interventionist working style” of conducting on-the-spot guidance where he pronounced on every topic under the sun, and the cult of personality, where Kim was (and continues to be as eternal President) showered with compulsory honorifics (Great Leader, Fatherly leader, Sun of the Nation) and a special bold typeface is used in the press and in books for the thoughts and name of the leader (and his successors), and no other.21

18 See for example Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002), Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), and Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). The “Stalinist” moniker is used to this day. 19 Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty, 43 20 As I argue in this dissertation, Kim Il Sung certainly drew inspiration from Stalin’s autarkic policies, though it was more of a case of indigenizing the policy for Korea’s unique postcolonial conditions. 21 Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty, pp. 41-46. 10

With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the opening of the East-Central

European archives, historians have been given access to the diplomatic record of North

Korea’s former communist allies. These materials shed new light not only on North

Korea’s relations with its allies, but also on the inner-workings of the DPRK. The first scholars to use these materials, including Andrei Lankov and Balazs Szalontai, relied on limited collections from Russian and Hungarian archives. They overlook the inherent tendency in these reports to overemphasize the degree of Soviet influence in North Korea.

They thus reinforce the Stalinist narrative and also deny the agency of North Korean leaders.22 Rather than synthesize the newly available diplomatic record of North Korea’s former communist allies to challenge the epistemology, Lankov and Szalontai used the newly available documents to reinforce the standard historical narrative. Indeed, at almost every stage, Szalontai diminishes the uniqueness of Korean policies, developed through the experiences of the country’s leaders. He overstates the influence of Moscow and Beijing, creating the impression that Pyongyang was largely imitative and unoriginal.

This analysis extends to such policies as moving factories inland after the Korean War, away from the indefensible coast where Japanese colonial officials had constructed them for ease of access. Overlooking Korea’s own war-time experiences with American bombers, Szalontai suggests that the decision to relocate factories was inspired by

Chinese actions taken at the same time in the Northeast.23

22 See Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945-1960 (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2002); Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007); and Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 23 Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p. 51. 11

Not every scholar has adopted the Stalinist narrative. The more scholars understood about the fissures emerging in what was once considered a communist monolith (particularly after the Sino-Soviet split), the more they explored what made

North Korea different; i.e. what domestic political factors offer clues on the behavior of the country’s leaders, which are often at odds with others in the socialist camp. Chief among those challenging the narrative is Bruce Cumings. For Cumings, the DPRK reflects mainly indigenous Korean traditions. His monumental two-volume study of the origins of the Korean War, while limited temporally to the period immediately preceding conflict due in large part to the availability of pre-1950 primary source materials, argues that North Korea's political system maintained a form of Japanese wartime corporatism, but is closer to a neo-Confucian kingdom than to Stalin's Russia. 24

Other scholars have made more conditional arguments, suggesting that Stalinism was just one of many influences. Charles Armstrong’s study of state formation from 1945 to the eve of the Korean War examines state-societal relations and argues that the character of the regime was shaped in part by direct Soviet occupation, but also by the legacy of Japanese colonialism, the Korean revolutionary movement, and the influence of the Chinese revolutionary experience. Armstrong makes a compelling case for the North

Korean “indigenization” of these influences.25

In identifying the style of Kim Il Sung’s leadership and the nature of the North

Korean political system, still others have identified more than just remnants of Japanese

24 See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981) and The origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). See also Bruce Cumings, “Corporatism in North Korea” Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 4, 1982-1983, pp. 269-294 25 See Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) 12 wartime corporatism. Literature professor B.R. Myers suggests a more linear historical view. He argues that Kim Il Sung’s leadership was informed by a paranoid, race-based nationalism that was deeply rooted in Japanese fascism.26

The Korean language literature on North Korean history has significantly advanced in recent years. It was not until the 1990s that South Korean scholarship, long constrained by the degree to which scholars could study North Korean materials and offer candid analyses of the DPRK’s political and ideological system free from complication by national security laws, began to enter a more mature stage based on theoretical and empirical research. Kim Gwang-un's study on the Soviet occupation period rejects the theory that North Korea, like Moscow’s Central and Eastern European satellites, took its cues from the Soviet Union in adopting its political institutions. Like Armstrong, Kim argues that a confluence of influences have shaped the North Korean system. He suggests that the North Korean revolution was largely “self-powered,” though the system that emerged was the outcome of “interactions between Kim Il Sung-led communists and the

Soviet occupation forces.”27

The late historian Suh Dongman argued that North Korea did not have a fixed, unchanging, unreformed Stalinist system, but one that gradually developed over the course of the 1950s until it became a “unitary leadership system” (ilwonjeok jido) before

1961. Suh also challenged the suggestion that Kim Il Sung was driven by a lust for power

26 B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House Publishing, 2010). 27 Gwang-un Kim, Bukhan jeongjisa yeongu 1: geondang, geonguk, geongun ui yeoksa (North Korean Political History Research 1: History of the Founding of the Party, State and Army), (Seoul: Seonin, 2003). 13 and adulation from the very early stages of his rule by highlighting diversity in the North

Korean political system until the late 1950s.28

Japanese scholars have also made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the North Korean system. Suzuki Masayuki views the North Korean dictatorship, which he terms the suryongje, or chieftain system, as a symbiosis of Confucianism and socialism.29 Like Armstrong, Haruki Wada argues that several overlapping strata of historical experiences have shaped the North Korean system, though he highlights the anti-Japanese partisan experience of Kim Il Sung and those he maintained in power after three major purges. Over the course of two stages in the 1960s, first in 1961 and later in

1967, North Korea became a “guerrilla band state” in which the policies that guided Kim, the core of this group, and his former comrades-in-arms during their anti-Japanese partisan struggles had been reformulated as governing principles and systems of social organization.30

While acknowledging that the North Korea system evolved through a combination of factors, including the Japanese colonial experience, the Soviet occupation, the Chinese revolutionary experience, and perhaps most importantly, the experiences of

Kim Il Sung in the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement, I argue that Kim’s fervent anticolonial revolutionary nationalism played a much greater role in his leadership style than previously described. North Korean policies were not slavish imitations of others in the name of socialist solidarity or due to any hierarchy in a monolithic communist bloc.

28 Dongman Suh, Bukjoseon sahoejuui cheje seongnipsa, 1945-1961 (The Formation of the North Korean Socialist System: 1945-1961) (Seoul: Seonin, 2005). 29 Masayuki Suzuki, Kim Jong Il kwa suryongje sahoejuui (Kim Jong Il and the Suryongje Society), translated by Yu Yeonggu (Seoul: Chungang Ilbosa, 1994). 30 See Haruki Wada, “The Structure and Political Culture of the Kim Jong Il Regime: Its Novelty and Difficulties,” in Park Jae Kyu ed. North Korea in Transition and Policy Choice: Domestic Structure and External Relations (Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1999). 14

As I argue in this dissertation, much of what happened in North Korea was indigenization, or the appropriation of internationalist policies for a nationalist agenda. However, there was a great deal of pushback on policies the DPRK was encouraged to adopt as Kim perceived Korea’s freedom of action being limited. At the core, therefore, was Kim Il

Sung’s postcolonial revolutionary nationalism. Where these trends come together was the evolution of Juche Thought, which remained a pragmatic strategy for limiting the influence of the DPRK’s putative allies on the trajectory of economic and political developments until Kim ultimately failed to impress upon the Soviet Union and China the reality of North Korean sovereignty and minimize domestic challenges to his perceived national security imperatives.

Only a handful of works have explored Juche. Yet, not enough has been done, in nearly any works, to distinguish pre-1967 Juche, i.e. a set of practical policy applications informed not just by nationalism, but postcolonial revolutionary nationalism formed through the experiences of Kim Il Sung, from post-1967 Juche, which the North Koreans elevated to a philosophy on par with Marxism-Leninism. From the early 1970s, the North

Koreans have presented Juche, which became coterminous with Kimilsungism, as an advancement of Marxism-Leninism, with pseudo-philosophical overtones. Many of the existing treatments of Juche deal primarily with this later manifestation of the idea, i.e. as a philosophy. There has not been a systematic treatment of the evolution of Juche

Thought that focuses on the practical origins of the idea, rooted in Kim Il Sung’s postcolonial revolutionary nationalism. One can easily be left with the impression, therefore, that the North Koreans had always presented Juche as a philosophy.

15

Bruce Cumings identifies elements of “self-reliance and revolutionary nationalism” in Juche, but explains that it is “less an idea than a state of mind.”

Specifically, it is a highly subjective and solipsistic state of mind that “put[s] Korea first in everything.” Cumings claims that the term Juche is “untranslatable,” observing that

“for a foreigner its meaning is ever-receding, into a pool of everything that makes

Koreans Korean, and therefore ultimately inaccessible to the non-Korean. 31 Cumings accurately identifies the deep cultural, historical, and political aspects of Juche, though he does not attempt to trace the evolution of Juche in response to political circumstances after the establishment of the DPRK.

Han S. Park’s North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom strives to map out the evolution of the concept through its many stages, from antihegemonism to nationalist ideology, to “legitimate Weltanschauung with a philosophical structure.”32

Park’s treatment of Juche as a pragmatic concept is less developed than his treatment of

Juche as a philosophy. Thus, despite being perhaps the most in-depth scholarly treatment of Juche to date, Park’s description of the early stages of Juche fails to fully explicate the evolutionary process. While mentioning the existence of “three analytically distinct objectives,” i.e. self-reliance in politics, self-reliance in economics, and self-reliance in national defense, Park does not fully convey the centrality of the three practical applications to Juche, nor does he explain how each emerged. Park also does not highlight, as I will in this dissertation, the year 1967 as a turning point in the evolution of

Juche. As a philosophy, Park likens Juche to a religion with over 2.2 million adherents.33

31 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol II, pp. 312-313. 32 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 26. 33 Ibid, p. 23. 16

Charles Armstrong convincingly attributes nationalism as the heart of Juche, which he suggests, “has its antecedents in the resistance to foreign intrusion and domination going back to the nineteenth century […].” Armstrong has described how

Juche became a key concept for an increasing range of activities from the 1960s as the

DPRK “navigated its way through the treacherous shoals of the Sino-Soviet split.”34

Charles Armstrong has written extensively on how North Korea began to portray Juche as “an original contribution to revolutionary ideology” and as “a model for Third World societies to emulate” after increasingly shifting its foreign policy orientation away from the socialist camp.35

B.R. Myers, on the other hand, has dismissed Juche as a “sham” philosophy.36 He fails to differentiate between the various stages through which the idea evolved, suggesting that Kim Il Sung “saw no urgent need to create an actual ideology” after first using the term in December 1955.37 Myers alleges that Kim did nothing for over a decade until a “self-styled philosopher” named Hwang Jangyeop convinced him that he should be entrusted with the task of transforming Juche into a philosophy. Myers further denies the originality of Juche to Korean leaders. He claims that by the time Hwang started the task of crafting Juche into a philosophy, “there was nothing in Kim’s talk of self-reliance, or of adapting Marxism-Leninism to national conditions, that Mao had not only said more eloquently, but had done a much better job of putting into practice as well.” While Myers has accurately explained that the December 1955 speech in which Kim used the term

34 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Role and Influence of Ideology” (unpublished paper, 2012). 35 See Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” North Korea International Documentation Project Working Paper No. 1 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009). 36 B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters (New York: Melville House Publishing, 2011), p. 47. 37 Ibid, p. 45. 17

Juche was not a declaration of “self-reliance,” he has denied that nationalism played any role in his use of the term then, and at any time since. Myers instead argues that for the

North Koreans, Juche is a “xenophobic, race-based worldview derived largely from fascist Japanese myth.”38 Myers argues that North Korea attaches no particular importance to the notions of autonomy and self-reliance, suggesting that the country takes what it can when foreign aid is available, and manages to do without when it is not available.

South Korean scholar and former minister of unification, Jongseok Lee provides one of the only detailed analyses of Juche that identifies each practical application, i.e. jaju, jarip, and jawi, and even characterizes the year 1967 as a turning point. However,

Lee attributes its early origins as a tool of suppression. Lee suggests that Kim Il Sung employed Juche against rival factions in the mid-1950s and then again in the 1960s until his power was unassailable.39

With the notable exception of Jongseok Lee’s work, the existing scholarly literature does not differentiate between Juche before 1967, i.e. before the establishment of the monolithic ideological system, and after that watershed year. This dissertation is the first scholarly work to trace the evolution of Juche Thought in its formative years and to fully identify the origins of its three practical applications—self-reliance in politics, self-reliance in economics, and self-reliance in national defense—each emerging through historically contingent processes.

The dissertation will be organized chronologically, starting from August 1953 and ending in May 1967. It will trace the historical conditions under which Juche Thought

38 Ibid, p. 47. 39 Lee Jongseok, Joseon Nodongdang Yeongu: Jido Sasang gwa Gujo Byeonhwa reul Joongshim euro (Seoul: Yeoksabipyongsa, 1995) 18 evolved from a practical approach to limiting the influence of foreign powers on the trajectory of economic and political developments to a unitary ideology. In mapping out the evolution of Juche thought, I will identify the political and diplomatic events during this period that led to the development of its three specific applications. Chapter one covers the period August 1953 to December 1955, i.e. from the immediate wake of the

Korean War to Kim’s declaration of Juche Thought. Chapter two covers the year 1956 and the origins of Jaju, self-reliance in politics, after the so-called August factional

Incident. Chapter three covers from the fall of 1956 to early spring 1960, the period during which North Korea launched its highly-successful first Five-year Plan and the

Cheonlima movement. The chapter identifies the conditions under which the principle of

Jarip, or self-reliance in economics emerged. Chapter four describes how the third practical application of Juche, self-reliance in national defense (Jawi) in the turbulent first half of the 1960s. Chapter five, the final chapter in this dissertation, analyses international and domestic conditions that led to the institutionalization of Juche Thought as the monolithic ideological system in May 1967.

Few countries are as difficult to study as North Korea. Because of the country's extraordinarily secretive nature, analyzing its inner-workings and foreign relations has long been a formidable task for scholars. Research on DPRK history within North Korea itself remains completely off limits to foreign scholars. The only North Korean sources available to scholars are public speeches, party organs, and “official” biographies of

North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. The problem is not quantitative, but qualitative.

Western scholars are often reluctant to see these North Korean materials as anything more than hagiography at best, and sanitized propaganda at worst. Memoirs of defectors

19 help fill in gaps in our knowledge of North Korean history; however, with no way to verify the credibility of these accounts, they must be treated with caution. What makes this dissertation possible was the release of the diplomatic record of North Korea's former communist allies following the collapse of East-Central European communist countries.

The diplomatic record of China, Russia, (East) Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland,

Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary pulled back the curtain of secrecy that had long enshrouded North Korea and enhanced our understanding of the secretive country’s inner-workings and foreign relations. One can now examine records of conversations between North Korean officials and their interlocutors from fraternal allied countries, hour-by-hour cable correspondence between Communist leaders, and the journals of ambassadors stationed in Pyongyang. As Project Coordinator of the Woodrow Wilson

International Center for Scholars’ North Korea International Documentation Project, I already have in my possession well over 25,000 pages of diplomatic documents from the period 1953-1967. These include detailed records from the Soviet Communist Party’s

Department for Relations with International Communist Parties from 1953-1957 describing the debates within the Korean Workers’ Party over development strategies, and the events surrounding the so-called “August Factional Incident” of 1956. Albanian,

Bulgarian, and Hungarian Foreign Ministry documents, produced at their embassies in

Pyongyang, map the evolution of Juche thought, in particular the principle of Jaju, or political independence, following the joint Sino-Soviet intervention in September 1956.

The records of conversations between communist heads of state and Kim Il Sung reveal the North Korean leader’s frustrations with Chinese and Soviet officials for attempting to assert their hegemony over the DPRK. Soviet, East German, and Polish documents from

20 the late 1950s detail the Cheonlima Movement and Five-Year Plan, revealing North

Korean frustrations with the curtailment of aid from fraternal communist allies and the origins of Jarip, or economic self-reliance. Chinese and Russian materials from the early

1960s document Pyongyang’s efforts to secure Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and

Mutual Assistance for over a year as instability in South Korea gave rise to security concerns. Chinese documents reveal how these security concerns, particularly after the

May 1961 military coup d'état in South Korea, led to the policy of Jawi, or military self- defense. Hungarian, Czech, East German, and Bulgarian Foreign Ministry documents describe how even after securing treaties with Moscow and Beijing, North Korea still felt threatened, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed to Pyongyang that if push came to shove, Moscow could not be expected to live up to its side of the security bargain.

Finally, newly obtained Romanian Foreign Ministry documents provide details on the policy dispute that emerged in 1966, leading to the purge of the so-called Gapsan faction in May 1967 and the origins of the Kim Il Sung dictatorship.

Through careful analysis and cross-examination with the diplomatic record of

North Korea's former communist allies, this dissertation will also utilize North Korean materials, including Rodong Sinmun (Workers’ Newspaper), the official daily newspaper of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, and Geunloja (The Worker), the

Central Committee’s monthly political and theoretical magazine. I will also use a select number of North Korean documents from 1953-1956 on post-Korean War reconstruction, obtained by the National Institute for Korean History.

While the archives of North Korea’s former communist allies provide unprecedented insight into North Korean political, economic, and national security

21 developments, there are still limitations. First, since the documents are in languages other than Korean, the use of terminology is not always clear. For example, in the wake of the

Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea, we know, thanks to Chinese archival documents, that the KWP CC Standing Committee discussed measures to achieve autonomy in national defense. However, we do not know if they used the term Jarip. The Chinese terms seem to suggest that this term had not yet been used. Until the North Korean record of this meeting of the Standing Committee is revealed, if it ever is, we may never know for certain.

North Korean materials posed another problem in writing this dissertation. While comparing versions of speeches published by the North Korean press with accounts of speeches contemporaneously prepared by foreign diplomats in Pyongyang, it becomes clear that the versions published later had been, in some cases, altered to suit changing political moods and realities in North Korea. Since many of the speeches were first published in the mid-1980s, it is doubtful we will be able to obtain un-doctored versions of the speeches until given full access to the North Korean archives.

Although the bulk of the materials used to write this dissertation are from the archives of third countries, and have some limitations, they offer a unique perspective into the politics, economics, and culture of North Korea during the early Cold War.

Embassies in Pyongyang kept copious, detailed records of political, ideological, and economic conditions inside the DPRK, and sent these reports, many of which were highly critical of their North Korean allies, back to their capitals.

Using these newly available sources, it is now possible to write a more complete analysis of the evolution of North Korea’s Juche Thought and the origins of the Kim Il

22

Sung dictatorship. Scholars now have an opportunity to address simple epistemological questions about North Korea's history: how do we know what we think we know about the North?; Up to the point that these new archival materials became available, how was knowledge about the North Korea produced? Analyses of the newly declassified materials from the archives of North Korea's former communist allies have demonstrated that much of what we thought we knew, has been influenced by Cold War enmity, and unwittingly mirrors North Korea's official propaganda. Yet, because of the scarcity of raw data, most scholarly works on DPRK history replicate these misunderstandings. This dissertation will offer a solid re-interpretation of North Korea’s history from 1953-1967, the most important period in the formation of the political and ideological systems. It is the first work to use such a multitude of newly available materials from the archives of

Pyongyang’s former communist allies, and the first to combine these with available

North Korean materials.

23

Chapter One: Juche

In 1953, North Korean (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) was a country devastated by three years of war, and also still bore the stubborn scars of over thirty-five years of colonial economic development. The reconstruction of the country was a multi-year project that required the full support—financially and technologically—of the socialist camp. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung sought to maximize this assistance to not just reconstruct pre-existing industries, but to completely rectify the colonial-era imbalances to the national economy and replace the country’s poorly integrated industrial structure with complementary industries. Through a short- term dependence on foreign aid, Kim sought to establish an independent national economy.

Two obstacles stood in the way of Kim Il Sung’s ability to achieve this goal. First,

Soviet assistance to North Korea came with restrictions that prevented him from using it for general industrialization. He was limited to reconstruction and to building new industries that would elevate living standards in the country. These restrictions were a reflection of the Soviet “New Course,” which rejected the late Joseph Stalin’s policy of rapid general industrialization, and instead focused on the expansion of light industry and the production of consumer goods. The second obstacle was the fact that there were very acute differences in the North Korean leadership over development strategies. Leading

North Korean officials with ties to Moscow and Beijing opposed Kim’s development strategy and encouraged the mechanical replication of the Soviet “New Course.” Between

1953 and 1955, a debate unfolded in the ruling Korean Workers’ Party over development strategies and visions for the North Korean revolution. While those who encouraged

24 imitating the Soviet New Course ultimately had a very limited impact on the trajectory of economic developments in the country during this period (the restrictions on Soviet aid had a much greater impact), their imitation of foreign ideas and institutions was reminiscent of past practice of glorifying Chinese culture (now replaced by the Soviet

Union) . In December 1955, Kim Il Sung introduced Juche Thought as the cornerstone of

North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies to underscore the need to adopt practices suited to the unique needs and conditions of the Korean peninsula, and not to mechanically imitate ideas and policies suited to the needs of the Soviet Union or any other country. Through Juche Thought, Kim Il Sung also sought to further the process of psychological decolonization in North Korea, where foreign cultures and political practices continued to be glorified.

25

North Korea emerged from the Korean War an economically, and socially fractured country. Three years of near constant American bombing almost completely destroyed the country’s modestly developed industrial sector, devastated cities to rubble, and decimated the countryside. According to North Korean sources, only one building was untouched in the capital of Pyongyang when the armistice was signed on July 27,

1953.40 A Polish war correspondent described the devastation in Pyongyang in the bleakest of terms:

There was a theatre here, a public library there, central post office there (…) a desert of stones and rubble, only showing single contours of shattered ruins which jut out of the ground like extended arms. There was a Central Committee here, newly-built hospital there, new school there, and here there was a kindergarten. This is where the deepest bomb craters are now.41

According to Soviet estimates, the damage inflicted on the country exceeded 430 billion won (170 million USD).42 Incomplete North Korean data shared with communist governments in late 1953 indicated that 600,000 houses, 8,700 factories and enterprises,

5,000 schools, 1,000 hospitals, 263 theaters and cinemas, and thousands of other cultural institutions were destroyed as a result of the U.S. sustained bombing campaign.43 Gross industrial output was reduced by more than 40 percent compared to pre-war levels.44 The metallurgical, chemical, electric, and construction industries were particularly hard hit,

40 Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 8, cited in Charles K. Armstrong, The Koreas (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 60. 41 41 Bronisław Wiernik, Dni i noce Phenianu, in: Trybuna Wolności, RSW Prasa Warsaw, 1951/49 s. 7, cited in unpublished NKIDP Working Paper by Jakub Poproski, “Daily Life in Pyongyang under American Bombs,” p. 1. 42 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (hereafter RGANI), Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 43 “The Political, Economic, and Social-Cultural Situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1954, Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang, undated [1954], Folder: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 44 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 26 their production decreasing by an estimated 66-93 percent in 1953.45 As historian Charles

Armstrong observes, by the end of the war, “North Korea was virtually destroyed as an industrial society.”46

The North Korean agricultural sector fared little better than industry. According to

DPRK numbers, an estimated 30 percent of all homesteads were damaged.47 Animal husbandry was also almost completely destroyed. By 1953, there were acute shortages in the workforce, in draft animals, in synthetic fertilizers, in seed, and even in food for peasants.48

Kim Il Sung publicly outlined his vision for rehabilitating the war-torn economy in a speech marking the “great victory” of the Korean people at a mass rally held in

Pyongyang on July 28, 1953, the day after the signing of the armistice. While much of the speech was devoted to praising the heroic deeds of the Korean people for shattering the myth of American invincibility, he also vividly described the destruction to the country, stressing that no time could be wasted in rebuilding the war-torn nation because of the threat of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. He warned the assembled citizens of

Pyongyang that “the existence in South Korea of the Syngman Rhee clique, which shouts about marching North, leaving the American aggressive armed forces in Korea and the

American imperialist arming of Japan, bring the danger of the possibility of renewed

45 “The Political, Economic, and Social-Cultural Situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1954, Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang, undated [1954], Folder: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 46 Charles K. Armstrong, “The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950-1960” The Asia- Pacific Journal: Japan Focus: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Charles_K_-Armstrong/3460 47 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314. 48 Ibid. 27 disturbances to peace in Korea.”49 He outlined three priorities for national reconstruction: immediately rebuild the national economy; introduce stability in the lives of the masses; and strengthen the nation’s defenses. Reconstruction efforts, would be focused on

“eliminate[ing] the colonial disproportions in industry, leftovers of the Japanese colonial policy conducted toward Korea in the period of occupation,” and building “those branches of industry whose absence became clear in the course of the war.”50 The main direction of restoring the national economy would be rapid industrialization with a focus on heavy industry.

These last points are worth further examination as they drove North Korean development both before the war and throughout the period of post-war reconstruction.

As Kim noted, central to the planning process was a vision for eliminating dependency relationships, a legacy of Japan’s 35-year colonial occupation of Korea which left the northern half of the peninsula moderately industrialized, but reliant on its former colonial ruler for machinery and spare parts. Moreover, many Japanese-built factories were located along the Korean coast, far from natural resources, but convenient for shipment to the Japanese metropole. As economist Joseph Chung describes, “in a classical pattern of colony, Korea acted as a supplier of important raw materials, semi-finished products, and rice, as well as a market for Japan’s manufactured goods.”51 Korea was dependent on

Japan for final processing of goods and for finished products. Korea’s dependence on

Japan was “especially pronounced” according to Chung, in the machine-building

49 “Report No. 4 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the period of 26 June 1953 to 31 July 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, no archival signature. 50 Ibid. 51 Joseph Sang-hoon Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 58. 28

(engineering) industry.52 Northern Korea did have some machine-building factories, which Korea’s Japanese overlords built very late in their colonial rule. During the period of wartime mobilization, Korea was designated an “advanced military supply base

(zenshin heitan kichi), and machine and tool industries were expanded. By 1943, these industries accounted for 6 percent of total industrial production in Korea according to historian Carter Eckert. While small, this figure still signified a 300 percent expansion since 1936.53

The post-war focus on rectifying problems in colonial development was not new.

From the mid-1940s, as Joungwon Kim observes, “the regime emphasized establishing a

“balance” in the economy—that is, to make all sectors of the economy internally interdependent but externally independent.”54 North Korean leaders sought to replace the country’s poorly integrated industrial structure linked to external needs with complementary industries capable not only of extraction, initial processing, and the production of semi-finished goods—the primary emphases of Japan’s industrialization in northern Korea—but also equipped to process finished goods. Kim Il Sung spoke of the need to rectify colonial dependencies and build a self-contained national economy as early as three months after Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. In a speech he delivered on October 18, 1945, days after he was elected First Secretary of the

North Korean Central Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, the precursor of the

Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), Kim declared: “We must strive to become a completely

52 Ibid. 53 Carter Eckert, “Total War, Industrialization, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea,” in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 13. I am grateful to Kirk Larsen for this reference. 54 Joungwon Alexander Kim, “’The Peak of Socialism’ in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans” Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 5 (1965), p. 255. 29 democratic and independent nation which can stand on a footing of equality with our allies in the world. One of the most urgent tasks confronting us today is the rehabilitation and reconstruction of our national economy.”55 Five years later, on the eve of the Korean

War, the KWP’s department of agitation and propaganda produced a document that quoted Kim Il Sung speaking about the necessity to guarantee “the jajuseong

(independence) of our national economy” by using “our own domestic resources and our own strength.”56

The notion of self-reliance and independence had run like a leitmotiv through postcolonial-era discourse in Korea. As Cumings notes, the expressions jaju (self-reliance in politics), dongnip (independence), and jarip (self-reliance in economics) were commonly used by Koreans of all political stripes, “connoting some self-generated, autonomous, independent action.”57 Kim Il Sung understood that political autonomy was contingent upon the country’s ability to establish an independent economic base. The

First One-Year Plan, launched in 1947, aimed to establish the independent national economy Kim first spoke of in 1945. The goal remained the same over the decades. As the reigning figure in the formulation of national policy until his death in 1994, Kim Il

Sung regularly reaffirmed his belief that if Korea remained economically dependent on foreign countries, then it would forever remain politically dependent. “Economic subordination,” he asserted in 1963, “leads to political subordination.”58

The task of constructing an independent national economy was given greater

55 See Kim Il Sung Sonjip, Vol. 1, pp. 11-14, cited in B.C. Koh, “North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 38, No. ¾, p. 296. 56 KWP Agit/Prop Department, “Sae hwangyeong gwa sae jogeon,” pp. 1-3, 6, 16-18, 32-35, cited in Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Vol. II, p. 315. 57 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 295. 58 Rodong Sinmun, April 11, 1963, quoted in Joungwon Alexander Kim, “The ‘Peak of Socialism’ in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans” Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 5, p. 255. 30 urgency by the fact that North Korea was so utterly dependent on Moscow and Beijing for nearly all weaponry and manufactured goods during the war. Moscow provided advanced weaponry and goods. China likewise provided goods (in addition to the

Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers). In return for this support, the country was forced to partially cede part of its sovereignty to its putative allies. Because of the colonial era distortions to the economy, North Korea was both economically and politically subordinate to Moscow and Beijing during the Korean War. One can surmise, given the course of reconstruction, that Kim Il Sung was determined to end this dependency relationship.

Contemporary Polish diplomatic reports of Kim’s July 28, 1953 speech indicate that the North Korean leader called for broadening heavy industry while simultaneously reconstructing and expanding those branches of industry that would contribute to increasing the material prosperity of the North Korean people.59 What this amounted to was a trickle-down approach to the production of consumer goods. Heavy industry would be rapidly expanded, and would then supply light industry and agriculture, which in turn would produce consumer goods. As he explained, “the Korean nation should first of all direct its efforts to rebuild and develop the metal, machine, mining, electro-technical, railway transportation, military, and textile industries.”60 Thus, despite being cognizant of the need to improve living standards after a devastating war, with the notable exception of the textile industry, Kim’s list of priorities revealed an overwhelming preoccupation with heavy industry due to his desire to speedily rectify colonial era distortions to the

59 Masao Okonogi and Dongman Suh have argued that Kim Il Sung did not speak about simultaneous development of heavy industry and consumer goods until he was forced to adopt such a policy in March 1954 under pressure from the Soviet Union and critics within the Korean Workers’ Party. 60 Report No. 4 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the period of 26 June 1953 to 31 July 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. 31 national economy and eliminate, as quickly as possible, the dependency on foreign aid.

The Sixth Plenum of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee

Within days of the armistice, the KWP convened the Sixth Plenum of the second

Central Committee (CC). This was the first Plenum since the merger of the South Korean

Workers’ Party and the North Korean Workers’ Party in 1949 after the leaders of the southern party fled north to escape persecution. Held August 5-9, the Plenum was scene to important decisions on the rehabilitation of the national economy and marked the beginning of what would become a protracted struggle over post-war development strategies.

Contemporary accounts of the plenum from foreign diplomats contain surprisingly little detail about decisions on reconstruction made during the five-day

Plenum, other than the broader outline of decisions. This is not surprising as most diplomats departed from Korea during the war and did not return immediately to

Pyongyang after the signing of the armistice since many embassies were either destroyed or extensively damaged during the war, necessitating their reconstruction. As of early

1955, Romanian diplomats were still working out of temporary facilities, with only a skeletal staff, dramatically limiting their ability to follow and report on all local developments.61 The contrast between the quality of reports from the immediate post-war years and those from the mid-1950s onwards is great, attesting to the limited abilities of diplomats to report fully on political developments in the early post-war period.

Among the details to emerge was that Kim Il Sung delivered a speech entitled

61 “The Political, Economic, and Social-Cultural Situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 1954, Report from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang, undated [1954], Folder: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 32

“Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy” in which he elaborated on plans outlined in broader terms at the mass rally in Pyongyang one week prior. According to versions of the speech later published by North Korea, Kim

Il Sung again spoke about the need to rapidly improve the lives of the North Korean masses through the development of light industry and agriculture. Despite this pledge, the content of his speech again suggested that the elevation of living standards would come a distant second to the reconstruction and expansion of heavy industry.62 Kim’s priority would be the rectification of colonial-era distortions to the national economy in the shortest possible time through the rehabilitation and eventual expansion of heavy industry.

These industries would then produce the materials necessary for expanding light industry, supplying agriculture, and producing consumer goods. As Kim explained:

The havoc wrought by the war upon our economy is beyond description. […] Therefore, overall, simultaneous reconstruction in every branch of the national economy is quite impossible. If we fail to determine correctly which should be given preference in the rehabilitation and construction of industries this will retard the rehabilitation and development of the national economy as a whole and may lead to the waste of a vast amount of funds, materials and labor or to their remaining idle. We must, therefore, start with the building of basic industrial establishments which can facilitate the overall rehabilitation and development of the national economy.63

According to contemporary Soviet records, Kim Il Sung declared that his main task in reviving the national economy was the creation of a base to carry out a comprehensive industrialization of the country with the expectation of “not experiencing economic dependency in the production of weapons.”64 This statement, which was inexplicably removed from versions of the speech later published by North Korea, shows that particular attention would be paid to the construction of those industries that would

62 Kim Il Sung, Works 8, August 1953-June 1954 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981). 63 Ibid. 64 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28. Delo 314. 33 contribute to the strengthening of national defense.65 This seems to have been an expression of Kim Il Sung’s long-term goal. He sought first to expand industry to eradicate colonial-era distortions to the national economy, and then—once sufficiently strong enough—to establish an autonomous arms industry so that Korea would never be dependent on Moscow and Beijing in the production of arms again.

The stress on national defense is less explicit in the 1981 version of the speech published by North Korea. Kim only briefly discussed the need to strengthen national defense through the construction of particular branches of industry:

The development of the machine-building industry constitutes the basic condition for future industrialization and is of great importance for national defense. So, we have to pay particular attention to developing this industry, importing many machine tools from foreign countries on the one hand and, on the other, producing them at home on our own.66

The published version of Kim’s speech reveals his eagerness to rectify colonial- era imbalances and establish economic independence, particularly after having been forced to depend on allies throughout the war because of the limited colonial-era development of the machine building industry, which is crucial to the defense industry.

Kim stressed the need to “eliminat[e] the shortcomings of industry revealed during the war and its colonial one-sidedness, an evil aftermath of the long years of colonial rule by

Japanese imperialism, and to laying the foundations for future industrialization.”67 For one thing, this meant redistributing industries throughout the country and away from the coastline where they were not only far from resources, but also vulnerable to naval and aerial bombardment. The location of many factories, built along the coast for ease of

65 One might surmise that the speech was later redacted to place greater emphasis on more balanced growth after the Three-year Plan was slightly modified to achieve more balanced development. 66 Kim Il Sung, Works 8, August 1953-June 1954 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), p. 17. 67 Ibid. 34 shipping to Japan, made them virtually indefensible from American naval and aerial bombardments during the war. “We should not mechanically restore the destroyed factories on their former sites,” Kim argued, “but should redistribute industry […] we should set up factories in convenient places which have easy access to raw materials and from which products can be readily transported.”68

Reflecting his priorities in heavy industry, particularly the machine-building industries and those that contribute to the strengthening of national defense, Kim spoke little about light industry and agricultural development. These were to be a later priority once heavy industry was reconstructed and expanded. The portion of the speech dedicated to the rehabilitation of light industry was limited to the construction of two textile mills, the restoration of rubber footwear factories, paper mills, and the development of the food industry. By contrast, he described in great detail plans for the reconstruction of heavy industry, particularly on machine-building industries.

On agriculture, Kim Il Sung discussed the need for the state to help the poorest peasants and slash-and-burn peasants by “teaching them to make good use of their land,” moving them to areas where land is more fertile, drawing them into industry, or moving them to state livestock farms. Kim also briefly introduced plans to experiment with the cooperativization (hyeopdonghwa) of agriculture, North Korea’s version of collective farms, from 1954. He did not, however, describe plans for investment in agriculture, other than the resumption of work on an irrigation project in 1955.69 The mechanization of agriculture would remain a task for the future.70

68 Kim Il Sung, “Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy” in Kim Il Sung Works 8, August 1953-June 1954 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981). 69 Okonogi, p. 180. 70 Ibid. 35

The process of rehabilitation would be carried out over three stages: first, there would be a six-month to one-year period of recovery and assessment, followed by a

Three-year Plan for Postwar Reconstruction (1954-1956) designed to restore the economy to pre-war levels while continuing to correct colonial-era imbalances, and finally, a Five-year Plan (1957-1961) for general industrialization and the complete nationalization of means of production to lay the foundations for the socialist transformation of North Korea.71

The plan for economic reconstruction that Kim Il Sung presented at the Sixth

Plenum was consistent with pre-war strategies for rectifying colonial-era distortions to the national economy. Kim’s priority was not to provide immediate relief to the North

Korean population or elevate living standards. The priority was the development of heavy industry, particularly the machine-building industries, to strengthen national security and eliminate the country’s dependency on foreign forces for finished goods. He explained that dividing resources equally between heavy industry and light industry would be wasteful, resulting in no significant development in any sector. Instead, he reasoned that resources should be concentrated on the most important task at hand, and for Kim, that task was rebuilding the country’s industry, and beyond that, establishing economic independence and increasing defense capabilities. It would therefore be impossible to simultaneously develop light industry and elevate standards of living at this stage.72

However, Kim’s speech at the Sixth Plenum only outlined what were his priorities.

There was likely significant debate over the course of the five-day plenum. Kim Il Sung’s

71 Kim Il Sung, “Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy” in Kim Il Sung Works 8, August 1953-June 1954 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981). See also Charles K. Armstrong, “‘Fraternal Socialism’: The International Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-62” Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2005), p.163. 72 Dongman Suh, p. 604. 36 report was not published in the Party organ Rodong Sinmun, until August 30th. Dongman

Suh speculates that it was not published earlier because of the ongoing debate, 73 which continued after the publication of Kim’s report and even after the first Three-year Plan was officially promulgated in April 1954 during the seventh session of the DPRK’s legislative body, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA).74

Kim Il Sung’s methods for constructing a self-contained national economy were, to be sure, influenced by the Soviet Stalinist program of rapid industrialization. Stalin’s own autarkic policies were fashioned at a time when the Soviet Union was underdeveloped and vulnerable.75 Given the fact that northern Korea was liberated and occupied by the Soviet Red Army, there is little doubt that the Stalinist program of rapid industrialization and autarky would have been considered as a model for economic development in the DPRK. However, it would be wrong to suggest that North Korean leaders adopted a system of economic autarky simply because it was imposed upon them.

It was more a case of adapting the Stalinist practice to North Korea’s political culture to serve the country’s postcolonial needs. Stalin developed his policies of rapid industrialization and economic autarky because the Soviet Union was underdeveloped and too weak to compete with the most advanced capitalist states, which he believed to be hostile to the young socialist state. North Korea indigenized Stalin’s development strategy in an effort to rapidly construct a balanced national economy that would not lead to further dependency relationships.76

73 Ibid. 74 Kyung-chan Kim, Human Remolding in North Korea: A Social History of Education (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2005) p. 72. 75 Cumings, Origins of the Korean War Vol. II, p. 325. 76 Charles Armstrong makes a strong case for North Korea’s indigenization of Soviet and Chinese practices in his work on the period 1945-1950. See Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution. 37

‘Fraternal’ Assistance

In his pursuit of establishing an externally independent national economy, Kim Il

Sung was to an astonishing degree dependent on the assistance of fraternal communist allies, particularly the Soviet Union and China. He recognized that North Korea had neither the resources nor the skills necessary to rebuild Korea in the manner he envisioned. His strategy for reconstruction with a focus on the development of heavy industry would not be possible without the massive inflow of aid and advanced machinery from communist allies. Just two days after the armistice was signed, Kim admitted in a speech that the country could rebuild the national economy, improve living conditions, and strengthen the nation’s defenses “only with the great assistance and support granted the DPRK by the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy.”77 Kim expected the support of not just Moscow and Beijing, but also of the entire Socialist camp until North Korea was able to achieve its goals of rectifying colonial-era distortions to its economy, whereupon the DPRK’s dependence would be cut.

This “fraternal assistance” was a critical external factor in allowing North Korea to achieve its goals. A short-term dependency on the “fraternal” communist allies was therefore necessary in order to accomplish his goals. The proper use of this foreign aid was critical to his plan.

On July 31, 1953, Kim Il Sung sent a report to Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev that detailed the levels of destruction in the country along with specific requests for assistance

77 Report No. 4 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the period of 26 June 1953 to 31 July 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. 38 to rebuild North Korea’s industrial economy.78 The report emphasized the need for

“rapidly rebuilding North Korea’s heavy industry base, particularly machine-building.”79

From September 10-29, Kim Il Sung led a delegation to Moscow for discussions and to work out the terms of Soviet aid.80 The Soviet government was very generous to the

North Koreans. It agreed to postpone or cancel all of North Korea’s outstanding debts and granted one billion rubles (250 million USD) in aid. However, the Soviet aid package came with strings attached. The one billion rubles could not be used for general industrialization, as Kim had desired. Most of the 1 billion rubles had been pre-allocated for the reconstruction of factories that had already existed before the war. These included the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex, the Songjin Steel Complex, a nonferrous metallurgical plant in Nampo, the Hungnam fertilizer plant, and the Supung hydroelectric power plant. Most new construction would be focused on projects that would improve the lives of the North Korean masses, including the construction of a meat processing factory, a textile mill, a fish cannery, a hydrochloric acid factory, a paint and varnish factory, a tractor repair facility, and a central radio station. Moscow also offered to provide other materials intended to improve the living standards of the North Korean people, including agricultural machines and implements, chemical fertilizers, breeding cattle, horses, fishing boats, buses, textiles, equipment for hospitals, schools and technical materials for the central scientific-technical library.81

78 Kim Il Sung to Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev, “General Report on Basic Reconstruction of Important Enterprises Relating to Heavy Industry,” 31 July 1953, AVPRF, f. 0102, Op.9, p. 44, d. 8, cited in Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” p.163. 79 Ibid, p.167. 80 Dae-sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p.140. 81 Embassy of the Polish Republic in Korea “Report No. 8 for the period of 1-31 December 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, North Korea International Documentation Project collection. 39

This was not the ideal situation for Kim Il Sung, who had presumably counted on a blank check so that the country could reconstruct its economy and expand industry as it saw fit. The restrictions on Moscow’s aid to the DPRK reflected changes in the focus of

Soviet development. Kim’s plan, which was an adaption of the Stalin-inspired pre-war program for the comprehensive industrialization of the country was no longer to the liking of the new leadership in Moscow.82 When Stalin died in March of 1953, he left the

Soviet Union in a deep state of crisis. Despite the Soviet economy’s rapid recovery from the ravages of World War II to pre-war levels of production, considerable difficulties remained in the production of consumer goods. The agricultural sector, which was woefully primitive, was most in need of attention, barely capable of producing enough basic foodstuffs to sustain the population. The manufacturing sector continued to suffer from the structural weaknesses created by Stalinist industrialization and still lagged behind the West in technology. The production of consumer goods was likewise in an abysmal state. In 1952, Soviet light industry produced just three pairs of socks or stockings for each member of the population and scarcely enough shoes. Goods such as refrigerators and other more lavish consumer durables such as televisions were virtually impossible to come by.83 Yet, the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955), in its third year at the time of Stalin’s death, reflected the former leader’s preoccupation with the development of heavy industry when the collective leadership of Prime Minister Georgii

Malenkov, head of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) Lavrenty

Beria, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and Central Committee Secretary Nikita

Khrushchev assumed the reins of power. Within months of Stalin’s death, Malenkov, the

82 Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” p.167. 83 Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet Production Relations, 1953-1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.1. 40 first among equals in the post-Stalin leadership, began to express concern about the lack of consumer goods for the Soviet masses. Calling into question Stalin’s autarkic priorities,

Malenkov urged the revision of the Five-Year Plan to focus less on capital goods and more on consumer durables. Only three days after Kim Il Sung announced his policy of giving priority to heavy industry at the Sixth KWP CC Plenum in August, Soviet Prime

Minister Georgii Malenkov delivered a speech in which he stressed the importance of developing “light industry or food industries at the same pace as heavy industries.”84

Under what became known as the “New Course,” shifts occurred in the utilization of existing capacities in favor of consumer goods, prices for these goods were reduced, investments in agriculture increased, and pressures to collectivize agriculture were significantly relaxed.85

The Soviet leadership pushed this new program throughout the communist bloc.

In 1953, conditions throughout much of the socialist camp closely resembled those in the

Soviet Union. There were widespread uprisings in East Germany in June 1953 to oppose

Stalin-inspired measures to accelerate comprehensive industrialization and collectivization of agriculture adopted by the German Democratic Republic in July

1952.86 According to Hope Harrison, “[t]hese measures exacerbated economic difficulties and drastically increased the numbers of East German refugees fleeing west.”87 Even before the uprisings, in May 1953, the new Soviet leaders reproached First

Secretary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party, Walter Ulbricht for launching the

84 Okonogi, p.180. 85 M.C. Kaser ed., The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975: Volume III, Institutional Change within a Planned Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp.45-48. 86 Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet East German Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp.21-22. 87 Ibid, p.22. 41 accelerated program when the East German economic situation was still on such shaky ground. Beginning in June 1953, Soviet leaders began to strongly encourage the GDR leadership to make some of the “New Course” changes they had begun to make in the

Soviet Union. In the wake of the uprisings, the GDR leadership announced a series of

“New Course” inspired reforms designed to raise standards of living.

Given the abysmal conditions in North Korea after the war, when Kim Il Sung traveled to Moscow in September 1953 to work out the terms of the one billion rubles in aid, Soviet officials similarly pressured him to rethink the reconstruction priorities announced at the mass rally in Pyongyang and later at the Sixth KWP CC Plenum. The new Soviet leadership admonished the North Korean leader for not adequately considering the revival of agriculture and improvement of living conditions for workers and peasants. Moreover, reflecting Moscow’s renewed interest in intra-bloc economic coordination and developing complementary specialties and economies of scale, the

North Korean leadership was criticized for not exploring “opportunities for economic cooperation with the countries of the socialist camp.”88 Soviet officials also took the opportunity to remind Kim that, due to the division of his country, “serious attention must be paid to the improvement of the material welfare of the people of North Korea

[because] it carries great meaning also for the unification of the country.”89 According to

Soviet records, “the attitudes of the Korean comrades toward the comprehensive industrialization of the country were to a certain extent corrected in practice after Korean leaders (Kim Il Sung, Pak Jeongae, and others) arrived in Moscow in September 1953.”90

As will be described, this is less a case of Kim Il Sung being persuaded while in Moscow

88 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 42 than it was him being forced to adjust policies due to Soviet restrictions on aid and insufficient capital for his ambitious program of industrialization.

Moscow’s efforts to discourage Kim from advancing the heavy-industry focused development strategy certainly frustrated the North Korean leader. Kim had clearly pinned his hopes of restoring the North Korean economy and ultimately establishing external independence and internal interdependence on an abundance of support from fraternal communist countries. The aid from the socialist camp, he likely hoped, would provide breathing space for the North Koreans in which they would carry out reconstruction in the manner Kim saw fit. Unable to predict the deviations in Soviet policy after Stalin’s death, Kim, a victim of circumstances if there ever was one, did not count on opposition to his policies from Moscow.91

Not all aid came with such conditions. North Korean officials were able to get more of an upper hand with their Central and Eastern European allies, and used the aid from these countries to achieve many of their reconstruction goals, particularly in the construction of machine-building factories. From June to November, Minister of

Commerce Ri Juyeon led a ten-person delegation to Central and Eastern Europe to ask for assistance. He successfully signed agreements with East Germany, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Mongolia for financial assistance, in-kind aid, and the use of experts in the reconstruction and expansion of industries. As Balazs Szalontai observes, Kim Il Sung “more or less managed to get his own way while negotiating with the East European regimes. By and large, it was the

91 Soviet officials had actually given the option to use 33 million of the 1 billion rubles in aid to import consumer goods. As Soviet reports describe, the DPRK government used it chiefly to import industrial equipment. See “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314. 43

North Koreans, rather than the East Europeans, who selected the plants to be built.”92

And in many cases, the amount of assistance Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and

Hungary actually provided far exceeded what had been agreed upon with the North

Korean government. For example, according to a Romanian report, Czech specialists were asked to construct an automobile factory. They soon realized, however, that “if tasked to build a truck factory, they also needed a tire factory or a spare parts factory,” doubling the size of the originally agreed upon aid project.93

In November 1953, three months after his trip to Moscow, Kim Il Sung travelled to China to secure additional aid. Historians Yafeng Xia and Zhihua Shen speculate that the almost three month gap between Kim’s trips to Moscow and Beijing are indicative of his desire not to rely on the Chinese too much,.94 This was particularly the case after having transferred part of North Korea’s sovereign authority over to China during the war.

Relations between Pyongyang and Beijing were noticeably strained in the immediate wake of the Korean War. As contemporary Soviet records alarmingly report, in the months after the armistice, Kim Il Sung made little effort to reach out to the headquarters of the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers, located just a few kilometers from Pyongyang.

Moreover, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, reportedly bothered by the Koreans’ lack of appreciation for China’s sacrifices, intentionally avoided North Korean diplomats at receptions in Beijing.95 Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung required additional assistance for the

92 Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism 1953-1964 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2006), p.50. 93 Report on the Political and Economic Situation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Work of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Romania in Pyongyang, 1 April 1954, Romanian Foreign Ministry Archive, Folder 1473. 94 Yafeng Xia and Zhihua Shen, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961” NKIDP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012), p. 6. 95 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28. 44 reconstruction of North Korea. He swallowed his pride and traveled to Beijing from

November12 to 27, where Mao Zedong magnanimously promised 800 million yuan (400 million USD) to the DPRK through 1957. Moreover, Beijing annulled all debts stemming from the assistance given to Korea from June 25, 1950 to December 31, 1953, i.e. during the war. North Korea was also promised textiles, wool, construction materials, agricultural tools, fishing boats, paper and office supplies, and food assistance.96 On top of this, tens of thousands of Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers remained in North Korea after the signing of the armistice and provided free labor.97

When the sixth session of the SPA convened in December 1953, Kim Il Sung was able to report on the successful efforts of the leadership in securing resources from

“fraternal” communist countries for economic reconstruction and the implementation of the as-yet finalized Three-Year Plan. However, he also announced modifications to his pro-industry policies; a necessary consequence of Moscow’s restricted aid package. On

December 20, Kim Il Sung delivered the speech “Noble International Assistance from

Peoples of Fraternal Nations” in which he announced the quantity of aid North Korea received to the full assembly, KWP CC, and foreign diplomatic representatives.98 The numbers revealed a real division of labor, though the lion’s share of aid came from the

Soviet Union and Peoples’ Republic of China, making up approximately two-thirds of the

96 Embassy of the Polish Republic in Korea “Report No. 8 for the period of 1-31 December 1953, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, North Korea International Documentation Project collection. 97 Kim also toured Chinese collective farms. Dongman Suh speculates that Kim may have been influenced by Chinese agriculture policies. In January 1954 he proceeded with cooperativization, though this is something he did mention he would do on a small scale in his August speech to the Sixth Plenum on reconstruction. See Dongman Suh, p. 507. 98 “Report No. 8 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the Period of 1December to 31 December 1953,” Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, no archival signature. 45 total amount.99 This was perhaps the most open the North Koreans were about the amount of assistance the country received from their “fraternal” communist allies.

Foreign diplomats would later complain that the Koreans made conscious efforts to obscure the amount of outside aid the country was receiving.100 This was also the last time the Socialist bloc would show such unity in action. As Charles Armstrong notes,

“The period of post-war reconstruction in North Korea was the first and only time the

Soviet Union, China, and the Soviet-aligned countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia cooperated on a large-scale economic project of this nature. It was the historical high point of ‘international socialist solidarity,’ one that would never be repeated after the

USSR and China fell out in the early 1960s.”101

Yet, given the restrictions on Moscow’s aid, Kim was forced to scale back some of his plans for general industrialization and the construction of machine-building industries in North Korea. He explained that it was not possible yet to produce giant machine-building factories, though it would be possible in the future. One of the most important aspects of post-war reconstruction, he explained, was that they would build many factories, and expand many factories in light industry that could enhance the lives of the people. This shows that Kim Il Sung was already retreating from the heavy industry line.102

For Kim, heavy industry signified much more than a means of production. As noted previously, from as early as 1947 he equated industrial development with political

99 Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism” p. 165. 100 Hungarian Legation in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report, 21 April 1954. Subject: The work of trade unions after the armistice, until the assembling of the first 3-year plan.Hungarian National Archives (MOL), XIX-J-1-k Korea, 1945-1964, 11. doboz, 27/a, 06765/1954. 101 Charles Armstrong, “The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950-1960” 102 “Report No. 8 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the Period of 1December to 31 December 1953,” Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, no archival signature. 46 independence. However, there was even more to his pro-industry policies. Kim also viewed heavy industry as a magnet for his Korean brethren south of the Demilitarized

Zone dividing the two Koreas. Despite North Korea’s unsuccessful bid to unify the

Korean peninsula through military force, the thought of liberating the south continued to dominate the thinking of North Korea’s leaders in the months and years after the war. At least until the early 1960s, unification was still seen as possible and even imminent. A

North Korean report composed in early 1955 which found its way to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang from Soviet-Korean Pak Uiwan, summarized and sought to justify the pro- industry policies launched in August 1953. The report claimed that before liberating the workers and peasants of South Korea, “total victory” had to be achieved in the “peoples’ democratic revolution” in the northern half of the country. An industrialized North Korea, the report reasoned, would serve as a beacon of hope for those Koreans living in the

“feudal” south and draw them, like a magnet, to the KWP. As if to justify the austerity and rigors of North Korean life, the report stressed that sacrifices were necessary.

Indeed, sacrifice had become “a necessary demand for the socio-economic development of North Korea.” Therefore, balanced growth would have to wait. “Without the socialist reconstruction [of the DPRK] it would be impossible to strengthen the democratic basis, which serves as a guarantee of the unification of the homeland.”103

Heavy industry also meant strength and security to Kim. The North Korean report also revealed a real concern that South Korean President Rhee Syngman was formulating plans to invade the North despite the armistice agreement reached in July of 1953. This gave the North Korean leadership more reason to industrialize the northern half of the

103 “The Nature of Our Revolution at the Current Stage and the Primary Tasks of Our Party in the Cause of Socialist Development in North Korea,” RGANI, fond 5, opis 28, delo 314, listi pp.6-8. 47 peninsula.104 As noted, in his speech at the Sixth Plenum of the KWP CC in August 1953,

Kim emphasized national security as a factor in his pro-industry development strategy. A major driving force in the pursuit of industrialization was the ambition of “not experiencing economic dependency in the production of weapons.”105 So profound was

Kim’s fear of a Southern attack and of more devastating air raids that he ordered that many new factories be built underground. According to Soviet sources, in the fall of 1953, ten factories were already operating underground “without proper justification.” An additional eleven underground factories were already under construction, including a large auto parts factory, a machine tool manufacturing factory, diesel plants, textile mills, etc. The majority of these underground plants were unventilated and unheated, a real concern of the Soviets who supplied many of the machines going into these factories, since the conditions “led to premature wear of the equipment.”106

Setbacks to Kim Il Sung’s Pro-Industry Policies

Kim Il Sung’s pro-heavy industry policies designed to establish economic independence (and in turn safeguard political independence) were met with stiff opposition not only from the Soviet Union, but also from forces inside the KWP who advocated for raising living standards and restoring agriculture. Indeed, there were acute differences of opinion on post-war reconstruction. From the Sixth Plenum of the KWP

CC through early 1955, two groups advanced rival policies. On the one hand, Kim Il

Sung continued to promote what Charles Armstrong terms the North Korean leader’s

104 Ibid, pp.l and 8. 105 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314. 106 Ibid. 48

“single-minded (if sometimes Draconian) pro-industrial policies.” 107 On the other hand,

Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans, eager to replicate changes to Moscow’s development strategy, advocated for the adoption of New Course reforms in North Korea.

In the end, yearly plans that comprised the Three-year Plan promoted more balanced growth between light and heavy industry (though agriculture saw little in the way of direct government investment).

Only a handful of documents describe deliberations over the post-war development strategy.108 According to one contemporary Hungarian report, there were

“very sharp debates” inside the KWP on improving living standards after the Korean War.

The report describes one particular debate at a meeting of party and trade union officials at which multiple proposals were advanced on questions related to wages and the state system of rationing goods:

Certain groups said that state rationing should be abolished, and wages be raised to a greater extent. Others advocated an increase in state rationing, without any wage raise. There were some who demanded that the price of consumer goods be reduced to a greater extent, arguing that following the armistice, industry and agriculture would produce far more consumer goods for the workers [than before], and thus one could satisfy demand, and there would be no inflation.109

107 Armstrong, “Fraternal Socialism,” p.161. 108 Unfortunately, the archives of North Korea’s former communist allies reveal very little about the dynamics inside the party throughout this period of debate over the direction of the North Korean revolution. A limited number of speeches and articles published through the organs of the KWP and the Supreme People’s Assembly provide the broader contours of events surrounding shifts in planning, thus filling in some of the gaps in the available documentary evidence. Masao Okonogi and Dongman Suh have greatly added to our knowledge on this debate through their use of these published materials, and I rely extensively on their narratives of 1954. 109 Hungarian Legation in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report, 21 April 1954. Subject: The work of trade unions after the armistice, until the assembling of the first 3-year plan.Hungarian National Archives (MOL), XIX-J-1-k Korea, 1945-1964, 11. doboz, 27/a, 06765/1954. 49

In the end, according to the report, all parties reached a compromise decision to continue state rations and also to reduce the price of certain consumer goods, though only minimally.110

A Soviet report from late 1953 reveals that opposition to Kim Il Sung’s pro- industry development strategy surfaced not only among the KWP leadership, but also among rural party members in the months after the pro-industry policies were implemented. Due to the composition of the party, which was predominantly peasant, there was widespread opposition to Kim Il Sung’s plan to the concentrate resources on the construction of heavy industry, at the expense of investments in agriculture and consumer goods industries. According to a Soviet report produced in the fall of 1953, party members in the provinces expressed hostility toward the plan, stressing the centrality of agriculture and the secondary importance of industry in the DPRK. The report describes incidents of sabotage carried out by party members in an effort to divert funds toward the revival of agriculture, which, without investment from the state, remained in an abysmal state. There were incidents of arson and sabotage of agricultural equipment. By September, the KWP carried out a purge of those who refused to carry out the Party’s pro-industrial policies in rural areas, although, according to the Soviet embassy report, North Korean authorities cautiously avoided calling it a purge. While reporting about these attempts to subvert the pro-industry policies in the KWP, the Soviet embassy criticized the North Korean leadership, noting that “the KWP CC does not attach enough importance to the meaning of building up agriculture for the DPRK,

110 Ibid. 50 having oriented the entire party organization so that the primary emphasis in their work has been only the development of industry.”111

The documentary record of North Korea’s former communist allies unfortunately reveals little more about debates among the members of the KWP’s inner core. Changes to the lineup of the KWP CC and Cabinet of Ministers provide clues however. Kim’s retreat at the sixth session of the SPA strengthened the voice of those who supported New

Course style reforms in the DPRK.112 Chief among those were Soviet-Koreans Pak

Changok, Pak Uiwan, and Kim Seunghwa, and China-returned Korean Choe Changik and Yun Gongheum, all of whom had been elevated to positions of authority in the party and state following the March 1953 purge of southern Korean communist leaders Pak

Heonyeong and Yi Sungyeop. At the March 1954 KWP CC Plenum, positions in the party and cabinet were again re-organized to more accurately reflect the realities of

“fraternal” aid to North Korea.113 Pak Changok became chair of the State Planning

Committee, Choe Changik was named Treasury Minister, Pak Uiwan was Minister of

111 Note from the Political Section of the Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK from the II Quarter of 1953, September 9, 1953, AVPRF, from the collection of the North Korea International Documentation Project. 112 Despite scaling back plans for the construction of machine building factories in December 1953, Kim Il Sung’s heavy industry policy did not completely lose its influence. Officials who supported the scheme penned passionate treatises in defense of concentrating on heavy industry. For example, on Feb. 10, 1954, heavy industry minister Kim Doosam published an article in which he cited Stalin’s economic theory as a “gwijunghan gyosi,” or “important teaching.” This is the one important example of conflicts of opinion regarding post-war reconstruction inside the leadership. Dongman Suh, p. 606. 113 The new economic cabinet: Pak Changok was Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Minister of Agriculture was Kim Il; Choe Changik was Minister of Treasury, Chung Ilyong was Minister of Heavy Industry, Jung Juntaek was Minister of Chemical and Building Materials Industries; Kim Doosam (formerly Minister of Heavy Industry)was the newly established Minister of Electricity; Pak Uiwan was Minister of Light Industry, Yun Gongheum (formerly Treasury Minister) was Minister of Commerce; and Ju Hwangseop was the newly established Minister of Fisheries. Vice Premiers were Choe Changik, Chung Ilyong, Choe Yonggeon, Pak Uiwan, and newly added were Pak Changok and Kim Il. Former Chemical and Building Materials Industry Minister, Paek Hong’gwon, became Vice Chair of the National Planning Committee. Former Minister of Agriculture Pak Moongyu became Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Former Minister of Commerce Ri Juyoen was excluded from the cabinet. While there was a balance of pro- consumer goods and pro-industry advocates in the Cabinet, the more important positions, such as that of Chairman of the State Planning Committee, were occupied by those heavily influenced by Moscow’s New Course reforms. See Dongman Suh, pp.607-608. 51

Light Industry, Yun Gongheum became Minister of Commerce, Kim Seunghwa was named Chair of the National Construction Committee. The economic cabinet was dominated by the advocates for consumer goods and agriculture.114 As former members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans were heavily influenced by the policies of Moscow and Beijing. The Soviet-Koreans in particular, many of whom were first dispatched to

North Korea from the Soviet Union to help establish a proper Soviet-dominated

“Peoples’ Democracy” following Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945, still had Soviet citizenship and maintained close relations with the embassy in Pyongyang where they learned of the latest developments in the socialist camp, including the “New Course” reforms and the emphasis on improving living standards. The China-returned Koreans, too, maintained close contact with the Chinese embassy and direct channels to the leadership in Beijing.

As Masao Okonogi argues, by the time the SPA promulgated the first Three-year

Plan at its seventh session in April 1954, the plan “differed considerably from the policy of giving priority to heavy industry adopted at the Sixth Joint Plenum of the Central

Committee of the party.”115 On April 20, 1954, the first day of the seventh session, State

Planning Committee Chair Pak Changok delivered a speech “On the Three-year, 1954-

1956, Economic Plan of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”116 Pak not only did not mention the priority development of heavy industry in his speech, but actually placed

114 Dongman Suh argued that the Soviet Union made the appointment of Pak Changok to chair of the state planning committee as a condition for aid. This is highly unlikely, however, and is not supported by documentary evidence. Soviet documents do not reveal any direct involvement in North Korean appointments of officials at any point after the Korean War. See Dongman Suh, p.608. 115 Okonogi, p.181. 116 Ibid., p.182. 52 greater emphasis on improving living standards for the North Korean people. He claimed that during the period of the Three-year Plan, North Korea had to “restore levels of industrial and agricultural productions as well as the material welfare of the people to the prewar level and we must exceed that level.”117 However, as Okonogi observes, Pak did not distinguish between heavy industry and light industry. Rather, he asserted that “by expanding the production of consumer goods, industrial production should be increased by 1.5 times by 1956,” the last year of the Three-year Plan. He gave no specific projections for heavy industry, other than to confirm that the government would build factories to produce mining equipment, agricultural machinery, and machine tools. On the other hand, he declared that consumer goods “should exceed twice the prewar 1949 level.”118

The new priorities for development were reflected in the tightly controlled North

Korean press. The day after Pak’s speech, on April 21st, Minju Choson published an article exclaiming that “The Seventh Session…had as important agenda to address a number of problems in relation to improving the levels of people’s material and cultural well-being and to rehabilitating and developing the people’s postwar economy as the basis of the people’s livelihood.” Two days later, on April 23rd, party organ Rodong

Sinmun published an editorial which proclaimed that “meeting the material and cultural needs of our workers is the first duty of our party and government and is the supreme task of party and government activities.” The two articles suggested a significant shift in Party policy.

117 Pak Ch’ang-ok, 1954-1956 nyeon Joseon minju juui inmin gyeongje bokku balcheon samgaenyeon gehoek e daehan bogo [Report on the Three-year Democratic People’s economic development plan of Korea, 1954-1956] (Pyongyang: Korea Workers’ Party Publishing House, 1954), pp. 1-10, quoted in Masao Okonogi, p.182. 118 Ibid. 53

Pak Changok’s speech to the SPA seemed to signal a clear retreat from the heavy industry policy, making no reference to what Kim Il Sung had proposed at the 6th plenum of the KWP CC in August 1953. However, the available documentary evidence from this period unfortunately reveals very little on how, or even if, the Three-year Plan was altered in any significant way as a result of domestic criticism. Indeed, it seems to be the case that the domestic criticism of Kim Il Sung’s priorities for development had little impact on the trajectory of economic developments. The more likely deciding factor was the restricted Soviet aid.

Despite restrictions on Soviet aid, by the fall of 1954, priorities were again shifted, albeit to a policy of more balanced development, as the KWP identified additional sources of capital to finance industrialization. One might surmise, therefore, that the domestic debates over Kim Il Sung’s pro-heavy industry policy had little impact on the eventual shape of the Three-year Plan adopted at the 7th session of the SPA. Rather, it was Soviet discouragement and restrictions on aid that forced Kim Il Sung to accept more balanced growth. According to Charles Armstrong, from 1954-1956, the years of the

Three-year Plan, “North Korea was dependent on fraternal assistance for more than 80 percent of its industrial reconstruction needs.”119 Aid from the Soviet Union, China, and other countries in the socialist camp constituted 31.6 percent of the DPRK’s total budget for 1954.120 As generous as it was, Soviet aid to North Korea had a tremendous impact on the trajectory of industrial development under the Three-year Plan and limited the North

Korean leader’s ability to immediately end the country’s political and economic dependence on foreign powers. Less influenced, however, were Kim’s policies on

119 Charles Armstrong, “The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950-1960” 120 Report on conditions in North Korea 54 agricultural cooperativization, a non-aid-dependent initiative that also generated capital that could be used for industrial expansion.

Cooperativization of Agriculture

At the time of the Sixth KWP CC Plenum in August 1953, Kim Il Sung was almost singularly focused on industrialization as a means of rectifying colonial-era imbalances and breaking North Korea’s dependence on China and the Soviet Union after the war. As mentioned, Kim Il Sung spoke very little about agriculture at the plenum. He declared only that the government would help the poorest of peasants and integrate others who could not be helped into industry. He did not discuss any plans for government investment into agriculture. He announced plans to carry out small-scale experiments with collectivization from early 1954 as a method of pooling resources and minimizing the need for government investment, though initially the cooperatives were to recognize the private ownership of the land and the means of production.121

The KWP CC issued a decree on 14 January 1954 to create three types of experimental cooperative farms.122 The first type, “agricultural mutual-aid teams” was an advanced form of the traditional oxen-sharing and labor exchange practices. By tradition comprised of three to four households, the model mutual-aid teams were to incorporate approximately ten households and operate year-round. Private ownership of land, livestock, and agricultural implements would be maintained. Farmers would till their own

121 Okonogi, p.184. Within a year of Korea’s liberation from Japan in 1945, a law on land reform was proclaimed. The March 5, 1946 law redistributed, free of charge, land formerly owned by the Japanese and Korean landlords to landless peasants or peasants with little land. The law prohibited the new landowners from selling, buying, renting, or mortgaging their land. The decree on cooperativization started the process of reversing this reform though the nationalization of all land. 122 “Decree No. 38 from the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party,” January 14, 1954, from the collection of the North Korea International Documentation Project. 55 land. Livestock and implements could be used collectively, and farmers would be compensated for their use with goods or labor.

The second form of cooperative was the farmland cooperative. Cooperative members would also maintain private ownership of their land, though it would be used collectively. Draft animals and agricultural instruments could be owned privately, or purchased collectively. All work on the cooperative would be conducted collaboratively.

In the third and most advanced form of agricultural cooperative, all land, draft animals, and implements would become communal property. All expenses and profits would be distributed “according to the days and quality of the labor the cooperative members and their family provided.”123 According to the decree, farmers would enter into the each type of experimental cooperative on a voluntary basis, and the experiment would be conducted “at a gradual pace and with experience, avoiding any level of hastiness.”124

Despite the stated goal of gradually carrying out the experiments with agricultural cooperativization, Soviet diplomats describe a different scenario. Their reports claim that the process was carried out hastily and that “excesses were committed.” The principle of peasants joining the cooperatives voluntarily was violated.125

By the fall of 1954, thirty-two percent of all peasants were merged into cooperatives. The majority of farms in North Korea still remained in private hands.126 By early 1954, even before the formal adoption of the Three-year Plan, stagnation in agricultural production led to significant imbalances in development between the industrial and agricultural sectors. With no government investment in agriculture, private

123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 126 Ibid. 56 landowners struggled to recover from the destruction of the war. As Okonogi observes,

“because many fields were destroyed by bombing or left uncultivated due to the shortage of labor and draft animals, total grain production in 1953 was lower than the 1949 prewar level.”127 According to Soviet reports, in 1948 and 1949, North Korea was self-sufficient in grain production. By contrast, despite reductions in population during the war, the

DPRK imported 200,000 tons of grains from the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1953 to cover shortfalls in production, 130,000 tons in 1954, and expected to import an additional

170,000 tons in 1955. This number would actually be much greater in the end. This can be explained in part by the fact that in 1954, agriculture received just 50,000 tons of fertilizer, down from 250,000 tons in 1949.128 In February of 1954, Kim Il Sung expressed concern over the imbalance, observing that “while the industrial sector has been nationalized and developed in accordance with the people’s national economic plan, the agricultural sector alone remained private and failed to reach the production levels expected by the state.”129

To highlight the dangers posed by imbalances in the industrial and agricultural sectors, agricultural economist Kim Hanjoo published an article in the May 1954 edition of Geunloja. The article celebrated the experiences of the Soviet Union in economic reconstruction after the Russian Civil War as a useful guide for North Korea when implementing the Three-year Plan. The author noted that after the Russian Civil War, the

New Economic Plan was started from agriculture. Industry was not nationalized until the

Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1925. The Soviet

127 Okonogi, p.185 128 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 129 Speech at a meeting of peasant activists welcoming large harvests, 16 February 1954, Kim Il Sung, Cheonhu inmin gyeongje bokku palcheon ul wihayeo (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Publishing House, 1956), pp. 105-124, quoted in Okonogi, pp.184-185. 57

Union’s post-World War II reconstruction, moreover, was balanced. It did not start from one area such as agriculture or industry, but focused on heavy industry, and included light industry and agriculture. In support of his third point, Kim Hanjoo quoted Malenkov’s report to the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU and explained that the legislation on

North Korea’s post-war Three-year Plan is similar to the Soviet Union’s post-WWII plan which simultaneously developed heavy industry and light industry and also balanced industry and agriculture. As a cautionary tale, the author described the imbalances that occurred in Eastern European communist countries where industry developed more than

2-4 times the level of pre-war levels in 1952-1953, but agriculture only slightly exceeded pre-war levels. In doing so, he demonstrated the dangers to different sectors of the economy caused by imbalance.130

As the initial experiments with cooperativization were carried out, the party began to explore the possibility of fully cooperativizing agriculture as a remedy to the imbalances in the industrial and agricultural sectors and also as a means to instill revolutionary consciousness among the land-owning peasants. As Okonogi notes, by the fall of 1954, “Kim had become a vigorous proponent of collectivization of agriculture.”131

At the KWP CC Ninth Plenum in November 1954, the Party voted to carry out the full cooperativization of agriculture. The decree of the Ninth Plenum stated that the KWP

CC considered the most important issue of Party policy in the countryside to be “the gradual transition of peasants from scattered individual farming to collective farming, to the socialist development of the countryside.” Kim Il Sung declared that the Party needed

130 See Dongman Suh, p.608. 131 Okonogi, p.185. 58 to shift from experiments with collectivization, to the mass unification of peasant farms into cooperatives.132 The reasons for this were simple. Kim did not want to solve the problem of stagnation in agricultural production by investing the government’s limited resources, which would have meant diverting resources from the industrial sector.133

Moreover, through the cooperatives, the KWP would be able to raise the revolutionary consciousness of the peasantry, which remained the most backward elements in North

Korea. Through cooperatives, they were to be taught to think and act as the proletariat, even though their main productive activity was to remain agriculture.

The decree on agricultural cooperatives called for an increase of 40 percent in the gross harvest of grain over 1949 in the next one or two years; the expansion of arable land through irrigation and reclamation work to 320,000 jeongbo (1 jeongbo=2.45 acres); increasing the number of heads of cattle in cooperatives and peasant farms to 680,000 and the number of pigs to one million by the end of 1955; and the improvement of the work of state farms, machine-rental stations, and purchasing agencies.134 Kim Il Sung declared the goal of uniting approximately 35-40 percent of all farms into cooperatives by the summer of 1956, and within five to six years, complete the process of cooperativizing peasant farms in North Korea.135

The decree stated that joining cooperatives would not be compulsory, but carried out on a voluntary basis. However, as previously noted, according to Soviet reports, this principle was violated even during the experimental phase launched in January 1954, leading to an increase in popular unrest and in the activities of “malicious elements.”

132 Information About the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 133 See Okonogi, p.185. 134 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, 135 Ibid. 59

Soviet diplomats reported that handbills calling for resistance to government measures and condemning government policies were widely distributed throughout the countryside.136

Soviet officials, for their part, actually discouraged the North Korean leadership from carrying out cooperativization on a mass scale. According to one cable from

Moscow to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang:

With regard to the development of agriculture, the Korean comrades ought to be advised to refrain from a mass unification of the peasant farms into cooperatives at the present time and to concentrate their efforts on strengthening the cooperative farms which have been created. The unification of peasant farms into cooperatives ought to subsequently be carried out gradually, providing comprehensive and careful preparation for this matter. Direct the Korean friends' attention to the fact that carelessly created cooperatives not only do not provide an increase in the production of agricultural products but will become a great burden for the state. The unification of 32% of peasant farms into cooperatives which was carried out in 1954 is already requiring large expenditures of aid from the state. Considering that the great bulk of agricultural products in the country is produced by small peasant farms, measures need to be developed and implemented to help the individual working peasant farmers improve [v pod"yeme] their farms.137

Kim Il Sung did not heed the Soviet advice. While Moscow had the ability to influence North Korea’s industrial policies through its aid, Kim would not permit Soviet interference in agricultural policy, which he determined could be developed without significant investment from the state and could also generate additional capital to finance industrialization through tax-in-kind grain deliveries. Moreover, cooperativization would enable the Party to increase revolutionary consciousness among the formerly private farmers.

136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 60

Resurgence of Pro-Industry Policy

In the process of carrying out cooperativization, many officials with stronger ties to rural communities than the imported Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans became more influential in KWP policies. Dongman Suh labeled these officials the

“domestic group,” or “gukne pa”138 A number of these individuals rose in the ranks of the

KWP when positions were re-shuffled at the November KWP CC Plenum to carry out cooperativization. This in turn strengthened Kim’s voice in the party.

Nonetheless, limitations on foreign aid remained an obstacle to Kim’s pro- industry policies. With the support of those newly appointed at the November KWP CC

Plenum, Kim relied on three methods to expand industrialization. First, the KWP launched a campaign to expand industrial production through mass mobilization and by raising worker morale. The party’s ability to implement its policies and mandate grass- roots participation had been greatly enhanced after the Peasant Alliance and Trade Union was brought into line with the KWP in November.139 By the end of 1954, factories all over the nation held rallies where workers pledged to exceed quotas for 1955 and to complete the goals of the Three-year Plan ahead of schedule. The slogan “Completing the

Three-year Plan ahead of Schedule” was also emblazoned across the cover of Rodong

Sinmun every day.140 Second, the cooperativization of all farms would simplify the process of raising additional capital to be generated through surplus tax-in-kind grain deliveries. Third, additional funds were shifted toward industry in the fall of 1954 from

138 Dongman Suh, pp.503-506 139 Among those to directly benefit were Kim Mangeum, Minister of Agriculture and Party Director for Agriculture, Ri Ilgyeong, Director of the KWP Department of Propaganda and Agitation), and Kim Taegeun, Minister of Culture and Propaganda. They were promoted from positions with provincial party committees and People’s Committees. According to Dongman Suh, they became important allies to Kim Il Sung, especially when dealing with the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans. See Suh Dong-man, p.610. 140 Suh, p.612. 61 the budget for price reductions in consumer goods. According to the plan for 1954, the state would provide over 2.75 billion won for price reductions in consumer goods.

Between 850,000 and 900,000 won was actually spent in subsidies, while remaining funds, almost two billion won according to Soviet reports, were spent for capital construction in industry.141

The December 14th edition of Rodong Sinmun carried two articles hinting at the revival of Kim Il Sung’s pro-industry policies. The first was an announcement that the

Cabinet of Ministers had reached an agreement on the plan for reconstruction and development for 1955. Although the specifics of the plan were not explicated in the announcement, the general direction was hinted at in a separate article which claimed that the plan for 1955 was based on Kim Il Sung’s doctrinal teaching from the Sixth Plenum of the KWP CC in August 1953. The plan for 1955 was not based on projections set by the Three-year Plan formally adopted by the SPA in April 1954. Like Kim’s speech at the

Sixth Plenum, the article discussed balanced development by simultaneously developing heavy industry and light industry. Unlike Kim’s 1953 speech, which detailed plans for the development of heavy industry, in particular machine-building industries (at the expense of light industry and agriculture), Soviet aid necessitated that the plan for 1955 preserve more balance between the two industrial sectors.

Nonetheless, heavy industry would still receive the lion’s share of resources.

Estimates from late spring 1955 reveal that total capital investment in the economy and social amenities construction was planned for in the amount of 79 billion won (2.6 billion rubles), of which 37.4 billion won, or 47 percent of the total budget would go toward heavy industry. Agriculture and irrigation construction was slated to receive just 5.6

141 See Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 62 billion won (7 percent), of which 2.2 billion won was to go toward the completion of irrigation projects at Seoncheon and Anju, and the repair of other irrigation facilities damaged by the war. Transportation and communications received 11.3 billion won (14 percent), and social amenities construction 14.1 billion won (18 percent), of which 9 billion won was to go to the construction of housing.142

The December 1954 edition of Inmin published an article by Vice Premier

Cheong Ilyeong who invoked Stalin’s legacy of making the Soviet Union an industrial power. Cheong argued that “the term industrialization has to be understood as developing heavy industry in our nation, it especially has to be understood as developing our own machine-building industry which is the central nerve system of industry.” He also argued that “only heavy industry and the machine-building industry, which is the core of it, can reconstruct industry and agriculture and transportation based on new technology.” After describing the importance of each branch of heavy industry, Cheong argued that the policy of the KWP and government of balanced development in heavy and light industry is only possible by first developing the means of production.143 A remarkably similar argument would be made one month later by Dmitri Trofimovich Shepilov, an ally of

CPSU Secretary Khrushchev in his struggle with Prime Minister Malenkov over the course of Soviet economic development. Shepilov emphasized the role of heavy and defense industries.

142 See Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. The irrigation projects were announced by Pak Changok at the Seventh Session of the SPA in April 1954. See Okonogi, pp.182-183. 143 Dongman Suh, p.611. 63

Famine and Reversals

The combination of adverse weather conditions and the disruption caused by the forced cooperativization resulted in a poor harvest in the fall of 1954 and spring of

1955.144 By spring, more than 30 percent of peasant farmers were unable to feed themselves due to excessive compulsory deliveries and in-kind taxes based on falsified estimates for the 1954 crop. According to Hungarian diplomatic cables, the 1954 crop was estimated at 3 million metric tons. North Korean officials later admitted that less than 2.3 million metric tons had actually been harvested. Soviet diplomats reported that

“when taxing the peasants, [the North Korean government] proceeded from the assumed size of the harvest, as a result of which they took from the peasants not 27 percent of the harvest they had collected, as had been set by law, but 33-35 percent. Another Soviet report put the number at closer to 50 percent.145

Soviet diplomats suggested that the government knew that the figures about the harvest were overstated, but demanded that the prescribed plan be fulfilled at any cost.146

According to information from the DPRK Ministry of the Interior obtained by the Soviet

Embassy, peasants who could not deliver their quota of grains were in some cases arrested or beaten. Ironically, China-returned Korean Choe Changik, Vice Chair of the

Cabinet of Ministers and a noted advocate for increased investment in agriculture and consumer goods, issued an order to arrest non-compliant peasants in North Pyeongan province, where he had been appointed purchasing agent. In other cases, peasants were

144 Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p.64. 145 Record of Conversation with Illarion Dmitrieyevich Pak, Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314, l. 190. 146 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28. Delo 314 64 subjected to humiliation. The purchasing agent in Hwanghae province reportedly led the

“guilty” through the streets of a village with a poster branding them as “wreckers of state purchases.” Such humiliations and beatings, a Soviet report noted, resulted in a number of suicides.147

Other Soviet records suggest that those surrounding Kim Il Sung were so reliably sycophantic toward the North Korean leader that he was insulated from reality and therefore not immediately aware of the extent of difficulties with the harvest and grain purchasing campaign. In a conversation with Soviet diplomats, Soviet-Korean Illarion

Dmitriyevich Pak, Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee, claimed;

An unhealthy atmosphere of sycophancy and servility toward Kim Il Sung exists [among a] majority of senior officials in the Cabinet of Ministers and the KWP CC. Pak said, a negative consequence of this is that big mistakes in work are being concealed. Therefore, Kim Il Sung’s information about the state of affairs in the DPRK is not objective, and is to a considerable degree sugarcoated [priukrashena]. This has an especially obvious effect on the assessment of the 1954 harvest and in carrying out the grain procurement campaign [emphasis in original].148

Whether Kim was aware of the difficulties in the country or not, the grain procurement campaign was creating serious difficulties throughout the country. Due to compulsory deliveries, it was impossible to buy rice in villages by April 1955. The government also issued a ban on the private sale of all grain products in marketplaces to combat speculation.149 There were reports of widespread famine throughout the country, though the province of North Hamgyeong was hardest hit. Hungarian diplomatic cables describe women starving to death while searching for food along the roadside. Hungarian

147 Ibid. 148 Record of Conversation with Illarion Dmitrieyevich Pak, Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314, l. 190. 149 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28. Delo 314 65 diplomats also describe the rural population having to “supplement its food by gathering various kinds of grass, onions and wild plants.”150

Soviet-Korean Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak informed Soviet diplomats that in

Chagang Province, where he served as chairman of the People’s Committee, people were forced to live on only one daily food ration consisting of 600-800 grams for manual laborers and office workers and 300 grams for family members. No other food items were issued on ration cards.151 Despite receiving less themselves, residents of Chagang

Province were also expected to make voluntary food donations to poor peasants.

According to Pak:

Manual laborers and office workers are very discontented with the deduction of one-day’s food ration per month for a so-called fund for peasants suffering from bad harvests. A voluntary character is given to this, but in fact this is being done in a nationwide procedure at the order of the leadership.152

The capital of Pyongyang was not spared from the food shortages. Even ranking members of the KWP felt its impact. While hardly comparable to the suffering of residents in North Hamgyeong province, according to Soviet-Korean Sun Jinhwa, editor of the journal Shin Choson (New Korea), “restrictions on the private sale of grain products significantly affects the majority of the population of the city [of Pyongyang] because the allocated ration is not sufficient and these products are not sold in the market.

As a result it becomes necessary to live on one ration and economize every gram of rice.”

Sun, who was invited to lunch at the home of the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, I.S.

Byakov, explained that he used to invite guests to his own home for meals two to three times a month and was frequently invited to the homes of other Koreans. However, from

150 Embassy of Hungary in North Korea, 10 May 1955, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5 doboz, 5/c, 006048/ 1955. 151 “Record of Conversation with Illarion Dmitrieyevich Pak, Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee,” RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, delo 314, l. 190. 152 Ibid. 66 the spring of 1955, “going out as a guest has completely ceased.” Sun also explained that he was forced to fire his housekeeper because of food shortages.153

The famine forced Kim Il Sung to increase his dependency on outside forces, and also drew unwanted attention to problems in North Korean planning. The DPRK made an emergency appeal to the Soviet Union for 50,000 tons of grain.154 China also delivered food relief to the DPRK in the early spring.

As the government struggled with grain shortages, Soviet-Koreans and Chinese- returned Koreans continued to call for increased measures to raise living standards and investment in agriculture. As Okonogi correctly observes, “the confrontation in economic policies within North Korea closely reflected the power struggle in Moscow between

Malenkov and Khrushchev.” The Soviet leadership remained divided into two groups; one advocating the production of consumer goods and the other a continuation of Stalin’s policy of prioritizing heavy industry. On January 24th, 1955, the Shepilov paper, which made a remarkably similar argument to that of Cheong Ilyeong in December 1954, defined heavy industry as the “foundation of granite for all sectors of the Soviet economy.” Shepilov argued that Malenkov’s pro-consumer goods policy would

“surrender the advantage of forcing forward the development of heavy industry, machine construction, energy, chemical industry, electronics, jet technology, guidance systems, and so forth, to the imperialist world.” This, in turn, would “disarm our people more.”155

Weeks after the publication of the Shepilov paper, Malenkov resigned from the position of Soviet Prime Minister. The defeat of Malenkov’s pro-consumer goods policies had

153 “Record of Conversation with Editor of the journal ‘New Korea,’ Comrade Sun Jinhwa,” March 29, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo. 314, ll. 207-208. 154 “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 155 Pravda, January 24, 1955, quoted in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p.140 67 repercussions throughout the communist bloc. In April 1955, for example, Imre Nagy was dismissed as premier in Hungary.156 This turn of events certainly aided Kim Il Sung in his protracted debate with the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans who advocated the adoption of Soviet New Course reforms. It also demonstrated the degree to which Kim was still dependent on outside forces as long as North Korea required foreign assistance.

As Okonogi argues, within the context of Malenkov-Khrushchev debate over development strategies, the criticism made by Soviet-Koreans and China-returned

Koreans was not simply a domestic debate within the party, but “included the sensitive issue of the legitimacy of North Korean economic policy in relation to that of

Moscow.”157 One can surmise that in the eyes of Kim Il Sung, both Soviet-Koreans and

China-returned Koreans were being overly formalistic in their emulation of policies introduced in the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist bloc. Having spent much of, or even all of their lives outside of Korea (ironically, not unlike Kim Il Sung), they were not cognizant of the uniqueness or historical conditions of Korean industry and agriculture. They also did not fully appreciate the threats to North Korea’s national security. They therefore did not recognize the need to creatively apply Marxist-Leninist principles to the realities on the ground. By promoting Malenkov’s “New Course” reforms in North Korea that included the scaling back of investments in heavy industry and more attention paid to light industry and consumer goods, they were challenging Kim

Il Sung’s national security imperatives and were jeopardizing North Korea’s political and economic independence.

156 Okonogi, p.187. 157 Masao Okonogi, “North Korean Communism: In Search of Its Prototype,” in Dae-Sook Suh ed., Korean Studies: New Pacific Currents (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994) p.187. 68

Throughout the spring of 1955, the KWP CC took measures to resolve problems associated with the grain harvest, particularly the need to train rural officials and increase the revolutionary consciousness among peasants and workers. Moreover, with Kim Il

Sung’s development strategy vindicated after the resignation of Malenkov, the North

Korean leader admonished his Soviet-Korean and China-returned Korean critics for their formalism in mechanically importing Soviet and Chinese policies. At a meeting of the

KWP CC in February 1955, Kim Il Sung, presumably informed of the extent of the food crisis, admitted that the method of purchasing grain from the peasants was incorrect, and that the excessive measures amounted to a major political defeat for the party and government. The KWP CC condemned the measures used to conduct compulsory grain purchases, but shifted the blame to local officials who had reportedly misinformed the government about the actual yield from the 1954 harvest, and also about their methods of purchasing grain from the peasants.158 Moreover, the KWP blamed the low yields in agriculture on the lack of revolutionary consciousness of the peasants. The resolution adopted by the plenum asserted that “the current purchase campaign has shown that the rural Party members, who constitute one-third of the entire Party membership, have a poorly-developed revolutionary class consciousness.” In spite of this:

Party organizations are too poorly pursuing educational work which is directed at exposing ideas [both] harmful to us and current among peasants who are Party members and not Party members, and at increasing their class consciousness. As a result of this, Party members do not clearly understand the nature of the revolution in our country at the current stage, the revolutionary duty of a Party member, the ultimate aim of our Party, and other very important questions, raising their own welfare above the interests of the state.159

158 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28. 159 Ibid. 69

In the wake of the plenum, local officials were ordered to hold meetings with peasants and admit to having “distorted Party and government policy,” condemn the compulsory measures they used to collect grains, and assure the peasants that this would not be repeated in future work. Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak explained to Soviet diplomats that neither KWP CC nor senior government representatives participated in these meetings with peasants.

April 1955 KWP CC Plenum

Kim Il Sung continued to believe that the cause of the poor harvest and difficulties with the grain purchasing campaign, necessary to finance industrialization and the establishment of an independent national economy, was a result of the failure of rural officials to properly educate peasants and raise revolutionary consciousness. He again addressed these issues at the 10th Plenum of the Second KWP CC in April. The official agenda of the Plenum included the issues of further strengthening class education, the need to root out bureaucratism, strengthening economizing procedures and preventing theft and embezzlement, and organizational questions. Kim Il Sung and Chairman of the

State Planning Commission Pak Changok delivered reports on the first three items on the agenda. Kim candidly admitted that the “overwhelming majority of the population was dissatisfied with the economic situation,” and resolved to “increase investments in the rural sector and scale down the agricultural targets for 1955.”160 According to Dongman

Suh, quotas for grain were in fact reduced, though this was not announced externally.161

160 Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p. 68. 161 Dongman Suh, p. 612. 70

Of the 1,200 party members and government officials who attended the Plenum, upwards of one hundred people requested time to speak during debates. In the end, only forty were permitted. As Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak explained to Soviet diplomats, “those

KWP CC members and other Party and government officials who spoke in the debates sharply criticized the shortcomings in the work of individual Party and government bodies, but there was little criticism at the KWP CC and government leadership.”162 The notable exception was a speech Kim Il Sung delivered, in which he directly criticized the work of Pak Changok and Kim Il “for incorrectly estimating the 1954 harvest, which, as has now been established, actually did not exceed 2.3 million tons instead of three million tons.”163

According to accounts of the Plenum shared with Soviet diplomats, on the first day of the four-day Plenum, attendees received a brochure comprised of three sections.

The three subjects covered in the brochure—the character of the Korean revolution, the path to constructing socialism in North Korea, and the situation in South Korea—outlined the points of Kim Il Sung’s speech on the fourth item on the agenda for the plenum; organizational questions. Kim’s final report to the plenum “devoted much attention to the issue of instilling class self-consciousness in Workers’ Party members.” He also discussed the peculiarities of the Korean working class and peasantry, noting that unlike the Russian proletariat and peasantry, which had been “tempered in three revolutions,”

Korean workers and peasants “received ready-made power with the aid of the Soviet

Union. Therefore, the working class and peasantry of Korea were not tempered in revolutionary struggle.” The notable exception, according to Kim, was “a small group of

162 Record of Conversation with Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak, April 5, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 163 Ibid. 71 partisans [who] waged an armed struggle against the Japanese in Korea.” Therefore, the alliance between the working class and peasantry was weak. It was incumbent upon KWP members “to strengthen state power and further develop the revolution in Korea” in order to “instill a class self-consciousness of workers and peasants […].”164Kim’s own exaggerated activities during the Japanese colonial period, to which he referred, were increasingly celebrated as the core of the Korean revolutionary tradition in the weeks and months after the April Plenum. This was a risky course. Kim was a division commander in a Chinese Communist-affiliated guerrilla force fighting against the Japanese in

Manchuria and was, according to B.C. Koh, “totally alien to the Korean Communist and nationalist movements.”165

Kim Il Sung also spoke about the need to elevate the leading role of the Party among the masses and to master Marxist-Leninist theory, “correctly applying its theoretical principles to Korean realities.” He elaborated, explaining that “in the study of

Marxism-Leninism, Party members must not swallow it whole, but learn to apply it to real life. […] It serves no purpose to learn Marxist theory by rote. We must grasp its content and essence and learn how to apply it to suit our realities. This is the main question to be solved in our Party’s educational work.”166 Kim also stressed the importance of learning the history of Korea so that Marxism-Leninism could be correctly applied to the realities of the country.167

Robert Scalapino and Andrei Lankov describe this portion of Kim Il Sung’s speech as the opening salvo in an attack on Soviet-Koreans and China-returned

164 Record of Conversation with Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak, April 5, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 165 B.C. Koh, “Ideology and Political Control in North Korea,” Journal of Politics Vol. 32 (1970). 166 Kim Il Sung, On Juche in Our Revolution, p. 245. 167 Ibid. p 246. 72

Koreans.168 To be sure, Kim was speaking directly to them because of their promotion of the Soviet New Course from the fall of 1953 through early 1955. However, Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans actively participated in the Plenum. As Balazs

Szalontai observes, Soviet-Korean Pak Changok delivered a major economic speech.169

In the absence of supporting evidence, such as records of conversations with Soviet-

Koreans after the Plenum, it is understandable that both Scalapino and Lankov perceived the April Plenum as the starting point of a campaign against those with foreign revolutionary backgrounds, particularly because of the fact that it was also scene of the purge of a small group of China-returned Koreans. These included Pak Ilu, Minister of

Communication and a celebrated military officer who had close personal relations with

Chinese leader Mao Zedong, Pang Hosan, who served as director of the Military

Academy, and a few other individuals. Pak and Pang were accused of engaging in factional activities and in individual heroism. Both were highly critical of Soviet-Koreans, alleging that those who returned from China had limited opportunities for promotion while Soviet-Koreans occupied high-ranking posts. As Kim Il Sung himself pointed out, there were eight China-returned Koreans, five Soviet-Koreans, and four southern Koreans in ranking positions in the government.170 The purge of Pak and Pang hardly represented an attack on all those who had come from China. Moreover, the anti-Soviet attitudes of these two individuals were not shared by all China-returned Koreans.171 Indeed, despite

168 See for example Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (University of Hawaii Press, 2007); and Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea Vol. 1 (Berkeley, University of CA Press, 1972). 169 Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, 68. 170 See Record of Conversation with Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak, April 5, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 171 As will be described, most high-ranking Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans actively collaborated in their efforts to introduce Soviet policies to North Korea, including collective leadership and de-Stalinization. 73 their critical views of those who had come from the Soviet Union, Soviet-Koreans

Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak and Sun Jinhwa, as well as their interlocutors from the Soviet embassy praised Pak Ilu for his military service and believed he should maintain his government posts.172

Curiously, neither Pak nor Sun, the two Soviet-Koreans who met with Soviet embassy staff after the Plenum, attached any importance to this section of Kim’s speech.

Perhaps the most important component of Kim’s concluding speech had to do with inter-

Korean relations and the decision to advance to the stage of constructing the base for socialism in North Korea, even before the unification of the country. According to Sun,

Kim Il Sung declared that North Korea had completed the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist stage of the revolution and was entering into the stage of constructing a base for socialism. The primary path to socialism, Kim claimed, was the industrialization of the

DPRK, including “the founding and development of the heavy industry sector, first and foremost the metallurgical, mining, machine-building, and chemical industries and later the electrification of the country.” In agriculture, Kim called for the completion of cooperativization of all privately owned farms in the next 5-6 years. As for South Korea, he declared that the primary task was to provide support to the people’s democratic movement and for the South Korean people in their “war of liberation from American imperialism and the Syngman Rhee clique.”173

172 See Record of Conversation with Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak, April 5, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, and Record of Conversation with the Editor of the Journal “New Korea.” Sun Jinhwa, April 6, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 173 Record of Conversation with the Editor of the Journal “New Korea.” Sun Jinhwa, April 6, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 74

Moscow Takes Notice

By mid-spring 1955, the famine-like conditions in the country had been alleviated to some degree by the emergency grain shipments from the Soviet Union and also from

China. However, with this aid came unwelcomed attention from Moscow. Around the same time, in April 1955, a critical report “Information about the Situation in the DPRK” was sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

The report detailed the mistakes made in implementing Kim Il Sung’s pro-industry policies, the cooperativization of agriculture, and in taking minimal steps to improve the living standards of the North Korean masses. The report also noted the serious strains in the Sino-DPRK relationship, despite the presence of tens-of-thousands Chinese Peoples’

Volunteers in North Korea aiding in the reconstruction of the country.174 In the wake of the disastrous harvest and with the growing criticism of North Korean policies from

Soviet embassy officials and Soviet-Koreans, including Soviet-Koreans Illarion

Dmitriyevich Pak and Sun Jinhwa who frequently met with embassy staff in the spring of

1955, Moscow began to pay closer attention to developments in the DPRK.

With North Korea now firmly on the Soviet radar, Kim Il Sung was summoned to

Moscow in late April. He and Foreign Minister Nam Il made an unofficial visit in May where he was dressed down for carrying out socialist reforms at too fast of a pace.

Khrushchev admonished the North Korean leader for not carrying out plans that were realistic for a divided country. Unfortunately, the memoranda of conversations held in

Moscow have not yet surfaced. However, Soviet officials allege that Kim Il Sung promised to amend plans upon returning to Pyongyang. Reports from June suggest that

Kim Il Sung, allegedly inspired by his meetings with Soviet officials, ordered that the

174 Information about the Situation in the DPRK, April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 75 pace of agricultural cooperativization be reduced and that early estimates for the first

Five-year Plan (1957-1961), which was already being planned, be re-examined.175

Weeks after Kim’s return to Pyongyang, the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador

Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov arrived in Pyongyang. Ivanov replaced an ambassador who had been, according to Hungarian documents used by historian Balazs Szalontai, perceived as being too sympathetic to the North Koreans.176 In an effort to get a lay of the land in his new position, Ivanov met with colleagues posted to fraternal embassies in Pyongyang.

The records of these conversations reveal the newly appointed ambassador’s hard-nosed realism and lack of sympathy for the North Koreans. During one such meeting with

Hungarian Ambassador Pal Szarvas in July 1955, Ivanov very boldly raised a number of sensitive questions about North Korean policies. He also complained that the North

Koreans had made a number of very “serious mistakes” with regard to improving living conditions, and admonished his colleagues in the diplomatic corps for not discussing these matters with their Korean colleagues. “Had [the diplomatic corps] kept an eye on these issues, the Korean comrades would not have made as series of mistakes, e.g. the abolition of the free market, the grain procurement, and so on.” Ambassador Szarvas explained that while the diplomatic corps had discussed these issues amongst themselves, they “failed to raise the subject collectively in the presence of the competent Korean authorities, because the Korean comrades were very sensitive due to the mistakes they

175 See for example, Report to the CPSU Central Committee, June 7, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314, and Record of Conversation with Chairman of the Chagang Provincial People’s Committee Illarion Dmitriyevich Pak, June 18, 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314 176 See Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956 quoted in Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p.72. 76 had made, and they would not have interpreted the comments in the most appropriate way.”177

The Soviet-Korean Threat

Although they ultimately wielded less influence on the trajectory of economic developments than the limitations on Soviet assistance to North Korea, one can surmise that when Kim Il Sung returned from Moscow in May 1955, he began to view the Soviet-

Koreans as little more than conduits of outside influence. They not only continued to formalistically apply the experiences of foreign countries in North Korea, they also met with Soviet officials and informed them of developments inside the DPRK. For Kim Il

Sung, the imitation of foreign policies by Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans was a symptom and not the disease. The disease—the continued glorification of foreign cultures and replication of foreign political practices—was much larger and much more complicated. This was the problem with education identified early in 1955. Kim Il Sung continued to blame many of the failures in party and state work on the inability to provide proper ideological education and to instill revolutionary optimism among the people. He needed to do more to reassure the North Korean people that while revolution is a long and painful process, encumbered by numerous setbacks and frustrations, the latter are almost always temporary. Instead, Koreans continued to imitate other countries

(replacing China and Japan with the Soviet Union).

Kim Il Sung understood that, as historian Key P. Yang put it, “Kim’s revolution

[was] moving against the great odds of centuries of educational philosophy that

177 Report of the Embassy of Hungary in North Korea, 17 August 1955, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 10. Doboz, 24/b, 008020/1955. 77 traditionally minimized the Korean heritage and culture while glorifying Chinese culture or imitating Japanese culture.”178 For centuries, Koreans had imitated Chinese culture.

Korean history and ideas were diminished. During the period of Japanese colonial era,

Korean history and culture was not just diminished, but there was actually a campaign to wipe out Korean culture and history as part of an assimilation campaign. Many Koreans continued to view their own country as a “backward, hermit kingdom, or as China’s vassal state.”179 With Korea’s liberation came Marxism-Leninism. But in many cases,

North Korea remained utterly dependent on Soviet assistance not just in direct aid for reconstruction, but also in the field of education, where Korean students learned from translations of Soviet textbooks. Korea had arguably replaced its subservience to China and Japan to the Soviet Union. This was exacerbated through the presence of the Soviet-

Koreans who celebrated Soviet practices as being more enlightened.

How could Kim Il Sung increase revolutionary optimism when the Korean people continued to view themselves, as Key P. Yang describes, as “an isolated poverty-stricken, hermit people of the Yi dynasty, and their more recent memories of themselves [was] as an enslaved people who helplessly submitted to the colonial yoke of Japanese imperialism”?180 Unless they were brought under control, Kim feared the Soviet-Koreans would continue to imitate foreign trends and therefore stand in the way of Korea’s political and economic independence. Kim thus turned his attention to limiting their influence. He also needed to prevent Soviet-Koreans, and also China-returned Koreans,

178 Key P. Yang and Chang-Boh Chee, “North Korean Educational System: 1945 to Present,” China Quarterly 125 (1963), p. 130. 179 Ibid. 130. 180 Ibid. 78 from continuing to mechanically replicate policies from the most successful revolutionary state; the Soviet Union.

On October 21st, Kim Il Sung harshly criticized various mistakes in industrial sectors, singling out the work of the National Planning Committee, headed by Soviet-

Korean Pak Changok. He suggested that construction plans were determined while sitting behind a desk without considering objective conditions. Moreover, backing away from the idea of balanced development and no longer heeding the advice he received in

Moscow during meetings with the Soviet leadership, Kim suggested that the National

Planning Committee did not properly distinguish priority construction from non-priority construction. He alleged that the National Planning Committee treated all sectors of industry equally, noting critically that “if [we had] invested in important sectors such as the machine-building industry, many problems could have been solved.”181 He laid out priorities for further development: the building material, chemical, metallurgical, and machine-building industries. 182

One major problem for Kim was that Soviet-Koreans continued to maintain regular contact with the Soviet embassy, where they received regular updates on developments throughout the socialist camp, and where they also discussed North Korean domestic policies. Recognizing that there was little he could do to prevent Soviet-

Koreans from maintaining frequent contact with Moscow’s embassy so long as they maintained their Soviet citizenship, Kim Il Sung insisted that all DPRK officials who came from the USSR had either to select Korean citizenship or relinquish their positions.

After protracted negotiations, on November 29, 1955 the Presidium of the Supreme

181 Dongman Suh, p. 613. 182 Ibid, p. 614. 79

Soviet of the USSR sided with Kim on the matter, and declared that Soviet-Koreans working in the DPRK should either take Korean citizenship or return to the USSR.183

Efforts to highlight mistakes of Soviet-Koreans were intensified in early

December 1955 when prominent North Korean author Han Solya began to criticize several Soviet-Koreans for their supposed favoritism of authors with southern Korean origins and questionable ideological credentials over home-grown North Korean authors.184 During a meeting with Soviet embassy Counselor S.N. Filatov on December

22nd, North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il, himself a Soviet-Korean, explained the essence of Han’s allegations:

Soviet-Koreans working on the ideological front – Gi Seokbok and Chong Yul – having received from the CC an order that after liberation it is necessary to support authors from the south, without even attempting to sort out their position in Korean literature, began to celebrate reactionary authors from the south and criticized local [northern] proletarian authors. After these authors were exposed

as spies, they did not admit their mistakes and even threatened local authors who raised the matter, accusing them of being anti-Soviet.185

Kim Il Sung also directly criticized a number of higher-profile Soviet-Koreans, including Pak Changok, who at one time had also served as head of the KWP Department of Agitation and Propaganda, for supporting reactionary authors from South Korea. Such contrived charges were the opening salvo of a broader assault on the Soviet-Koreans.

183 Memorandum of conversation with North Korean Foreign Minister Nam Il, 6 December 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 4-5. 184 B.R. Myers describes the activities of prominent literary figures in the criticism of Soviet-Koreans, though he provides little context. This serves to reinforce the standard narrative that Kim worked in cooperation with the China-returned Koreans to attack the Soviet-Koreans in order to aggrandize his own authority in the KWP. See Myers, Han Sorya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK (Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Series, 1993), pp.92-94. 185 Memorandum of Conversation with Foreign Minister Comrade Nam Il, 22 December 1955. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, List 96. 80

The December 1955 KWP CC Plenum, the Advent of Juche Thought

At an enlarged presidium meeting on 28 December, Kim unleashed a broader attack on the Soviet-Koreans. This speech marked the beginning of Juche Thought’s evolution as the guiding political ideology of North Korea. In his speech, Kim accused

Soviet-Koreans of being dogmatic and overly formalistic in their emulation of foreign political practices, adhering to Moscow’s line rather than that of the KWP. “When we study the history of the Chinese revolution, or the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism,”

Kim claimed, “it is entirely for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution”:

To make revolution in Korea we must know Korean history and geography as well as the customs of the Korean people. Only then is it possible to educate

our people in a way that suits them and to inspire in them an ardent love for their native place and their native motherland.186

“Yet,” according to Kim, “many of our functionaries are ignorant of our country’s history and so do not strive to discover, inherit and carry forward its fine traditions.” As a result, many of these functionaries, especially those from the Soviet Union, committed egregious errors in ideological work.”187 Kim declared that Marxism-Leninism “is not a dogma, it is a guide to action….” Marxism-Leninism “can display its indestructible vitality only when it is applied creatively to suit the conditions of each country.”

The same applies to the experience of the fraternal parties. It will prove valuable to us only when we study it, grasp its essence and properly apply it to our realities. But if we just gulp it down and spoil our work, it will not only harm our work but also lead to discrediting the valuable experience of the fraternal parties.188

Juche was not a term that Kim Il Sung had invented. The idea had long existed in an embryonic form. As Bruce Cumings observes, “one can find uses of the term Juche in

186 “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in ideological Work,” On Juche in our Revolution I (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975): pp.150-151. 187 Ibid, 188 Ibid, p. 160. 81 the 1940s in North and South.” However, it was Kim’s December 28th speech that gave it such prominence. Juche is a Sino-Korean compound formed from Chinese characters for the words “subject” and “body” [主體] which, when put together, denote the concept of

“self-reliance,” which is how the term is generally translated, though perhaps the compound could best be understood as meaning “master of one’s destiny.” For Kim Il

Sung, Juche meant independence and autonomy from external control or manipulation.

Juche was an antonym of sadaejuui, a policy of “serving the great” observed by Korea’s monarchs under the Sino-centric tributary system.189 Although Juche did not emerge fully formed in December 1955,190 Kim’s speech presented a vision that was “a modal if early variant of third world revolutionary nationalism.”191

Kim’s use of the term Juche in December 1955 served two purposes. First, it was designed to discourage the Soviet-Koreans from mechanically replicating foreign, especially Soviet political practices. Secondly, for the entire North Korean population, it was designed to accelerate the process of psychological decolonization by establishing pride in Korean history and culture and by divesting the minds of the North Korean people of self-negating values that led to the glorification of foreign cultures and imitation of foreign political practices.

A broader attack on the Soviet-Koreans followed in the form of a party decree on

18 January 1956 entitled “About the Future Struggle against Reactionary Bourgeois

189 Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 313. 190 B.R. Myers has suggested that the so-called Juche speech was not a “watershed” in North Korean history. This statement is fairly accurate, since the term did not yet fully carry the weight of “self-reliance” that it would by 1965 following a decade of evolution, during which three practical applications, i.e. self- reliance in politics, self-reliance in economics, and self-reliance in national defense, would develop. See B.R. Myers, "The Watershed that Wasn't: Re-Evaluating Kim Il Sung's 'Juche Speech' of 1955." Acta Koreana 9.1 (January 2006): 89-115. 191 Ibid, p. 313. 82

Ideology in Literature and Art.” The decree leveled specific accusations against individual Soviet-Koreans such as Pak Changok and Pak Yongbin, many of whom were ordered to make humiliating self-criticism and forced to resign from their posts.

Soviet embassy reports from this period are filled with records of meetings with affected Soviet-Koreans. Pak Changok commented to Counselor Filatov that using literature to subdue the Soviet-Koreans seemed ludicrous, since few of the accused had anything to do with propaganda work.192 Others, such as Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers Pak Uiwan, spoke candidly to Soviet officials about the unfair treatment of

Soviet-Koreans. During a meeting with Filatov on January 24th, Pak Uiwan characterized

Kim Il Sung’s December 28 speech as “an attack directed against the group of authorities who came from the Soviet Union.” Nonetheless, Pak had not expected that the Party would issue the decree “About the Future Struggle Against Reactionary Bourgeois

Ideology in Literature and Art,” since, on the basis of that document, “one could say that comrades Pak Changok, Pak Yongbin, Ki Seokbok and others are accused of factionalism and anti-Party activities; of systematically dissenting from Party policies.” While admitting that Pak Changok and others could rightly be accused of committing errors in their earlier work, Pak claimed that “they never carried out factionalist and anti-Party activities and never dissented from Party policies.”

Pak reported to Filatov that the Pyongyang City Committee of the KWP, a local

Party organ, had begun to carry out a campaign against all Soviet-Koreans using Kim Il

Sung’s December 28 speech as its inspiration. Pak emphasized that these actions did not serve to strengthen the Party. On the contrary, “more than ever before, the Soviet-

192 Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK and Member of the Presidium, KWP CC, Pak Changok, 12 March 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy 74- 85. 83

Koreans, Chinese-Koreans, and domestic Koreans, etc., are being separately defined.

Dividing into groups […] does not strengthen the Party, but weakens it. And this all began with the speech of Kim Il Sung at the December Plenum of the CC KWP.”193

Sensing perhaps that he had already achieved his preliminary objectives of educating the Soviet-Koreans that it was improper to mechanically imitate foreign practices, throughout the winter and early spring of 1956, Kim Il Sung took measures partially to reduce criticism and rehabilitate the accused Soviet-Koreans. During a mid-

January meeting of the KWP CC Political Council, Kim reportedly criticized those who were “dizzy with success”—to use Stalin’s term—raising the issue of “the incorrect behavior of individual officials in relation to Soviet-Koreans.” Kim suggested they arrange “a meeting with Soviet-Koreans and calm them” and then “hold a meeting with members of the Central Committee and clarify for them the incorrect behavior of individual officials in relation to the Soviet-Koreans.” As is suggested by the following statement, Kim did not seek to purge the Soviet-Koreans. Rather, he wanted to re-educate them:

We all know that the Koreans who came from the Soviet Union played a great role in our revolution. At the time of greatest need for our people, they selflessly worked in leadership roles, teaching many of us new socialist methods of work. A few comrades did make mistakes in their work, they were criticized, some of

them punished, and now our task is to help them turn over a new leaf and become useful to our Party.194

By provoking attacks against Soviet-Koreans regarding literature and then

193 Ibid. 194 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier Comrade Pak Uiwan, 21 February 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 70-74. Andrei Lankov suggests that the objectives of the campaign against the Soviet-Koreans were limited from the start. “A lesson had been learned: the most prominent Soviet-Korean leaders had been warned off, the lower cadres had again been made to realize that Kim Il Sung was the supreme authority within the Party, and that no foreign protection could save anyone from the Great Leader’s wrath.”Andrei Lankov, Crisis in North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005) p.53. 84 criticizing them in a speech at the 1955 December Plenum for their formalist proclivities,

Kim demoralized many of them, only to partially rehabilitate the group in early 1956.

The attack on Soviet-Koreans, who were rootless in North Korea, was designed to demonstrate that they “enjoyed privileged positions at Kim’s pleasure,” and should therefore never again challenge his policy priorities by mechanically importing foreign practices.195

By the end of 1955, the Three-year Plan was on the verge of being fulfilled. North

Korea had not, however, fully developed an independent national economy. The primary reason for this was the fact that Soviet assistance to North Korea carried restrictions. The aid could not be used for general mobilization, as Kim had desired. On top of these limitations, Kim was challenged within the Party by those, particularly Soviet-Koreans, who sought to imitate Moscow’s New Course economic reforms. While these individuals had very little direct impact on the trajectory of economic developments in the country, their emulation of Moscow was perceived as a continuation of Korea’s subservience to other foreign powers, including Imperial China and then Japan. Kim Il Sung introduced

Juche Thought as the cornerstone of North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies to underline the need for a revolution that was centered on the conditions of the Korean peninsula, and not to the needs of the Soviet Union or any other country. Through Juche,

Kim sought to reverse the trend of imitating foreign countries that had been the practice of past Korean rulers. The identity of the KWP and the DPRK would be authored by the

Korean people themselves, and not by the Soviet Union or any other country.

195 Daesook Suh, p. 156. 85

Chapter Two: Self-Reliance in Politics (Jaju)

Juche Thought did not emerge fully-grown with Kim Il Sung’s December 1955 speech. The idea evolved over the course of a decade, with the ex post facto addition of three practical applications in reaction to events in the DPRK’s domestic politics and foreign relations. The first of these three applications of Juche Thought, Jaju, or self- reliance in politics, developed over the course of the year 1956 and was officially declared in 1957 after the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans pressured Kim Il

Sung to mechanically replicate additional practices of foreign communist parties.

While the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans ultimately had little impact on the trajectory of economic developments in the DPRK between 1953 and 1955

(restrictions on Soviet aid had a much greater impact), the demands of Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans for political reform from early 1956 posed a direct threat to the position of Kim Il Sung. Their inspiration once again came from Moscow, which had unleashed the forces of liberalization through “de-Stalinization” at the Twentieth

Congress of the CPSU in February. Throughout the spring and summer, some of the same individuals who strongly advocated for adopting New Course economic reforms also led the effort to introduce de-Stalinization to the KWP. The Soviet-Koreans and China- returned Koreans had already demonstrated their proclivity for imitating Moscow during the economic debates, and had been cautioned against mechanically applying the experiences of foreign Parties in the December 1955 Juche speech. Therefore, after replicating Soviet criticisms of the cult of personality, Kim purged them as a way to minimize the influence of foreign powers on the trajectory of political developments in the DPRK. After Moscow and Beijing sent a joint Party delegation to Pyongyang to

86 investigate the cult of personality and the purge of the Soviet-Koreans and China- returned Koreans, Kim declared Jaju to be the official policy of the KWP.

The CPSU Twentieth Party Congress and De-Stalinization

By late January 1956, Kim Il Sung had begun scale down the attack on Soviet-

Koreans, believing that he had made his point: do not mechanically replicate the practices of foreign Parties. The message was delivered by promoting Juche Thought in December, and by criticizing and in some cases demoting some of the most outspoken proponents of adopting Soviet economic practices during the Three-year Plan. With their mistakes revealed to them, Kim had hoped to reintegrate the Soviet-Koreans, who had skills and experiences that were useful for the North Korean revolution.

At this same time, in late January 1956, Kim Il Sung decided not to attend the

February 14-25 CPSU Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow.196 According to Political

Council member Pak Jeongae, “despite all of her attempts to convince Com[rade] Kim Il

Sung to attend the Twentieth Party Congress himself, he could not be moved,” reasoning that he would “visit the GDR in the summer of that year and that being out of the country two times in one year is not possible.”197 The Political Council thus decided to send

Kim’s former partisan ally Choe Yonggeon to Moscow instead.198

196 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier Comrade Pak Uiwan, 24 January 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.67-69. 197 Ibid. 198 Choe Yonggeon was a former comrade in arms of Kim Il Sung during his guerrilla days in Manchuria. After failing to convince the chairman of the Democratic Party, Cho Man-sik, to agree to the planned trusteeship over Korea decided upon at the Moscow meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers in December 1945, Cho Man-sik, arguably the most respected political leader in Korea at the time, was forcibly removed as head of the Party and replaced by Choe Yonggeon. Choe Yonggeon was likely a secret member of the Korean Communist Party and later of the KWP, while serving as chairman of the Democratic Party. In 1956 Choe was named to the Central Committee of the KWP, though he was officially still the chairman of the Democratic Party and was technically not a member of the KWP. 87

The Twentieth Party Congress was a watershed moment in the history of the international communist movement. The meeting was scene to Khrushchev’s blistering attack on his predecessor, Joseph Stalin, in the so-called secret speech which was delivered in the absence of foreign delegates (though transcripts of the speech were later distributed). The delegates to the Twentieth Party Congress did hear other speeches criticizing the cult of personality and supporting collective leadership in the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Party leadership also advanced the notion of peaceful coexistence with capitalist nations, a rejection of Stalin’s view that war between the socialist camp and capitalist states was inevitable. Having fought with the United

States just three years before, the Korean delegation must have been astonished by this notion (Kim Il Sung would later openly oppose peaceful coexistence).

Although Kim Il Sung was not physically present at the historic gathering, Soviet embassy documents reveal that the North Korean leader received regular reports from

Moscow throughout the course of the Congress.199 On 18 February he opened a meeting of deputy premiers and members of the CC KWP with what would appear to be an attempt at early damage control by noting:

Recently, in both oral and written propaganda, the question of the role of the individual in the development of the history of mankind has been improperly handled. He [Kim] indicated that in all newspapers and journals his thoughts are referred to far too often, and things that he didn’t even do are attributed to him. This contradicts the theory of Marxism-Leninism, which guides our Party in its development. It leads to the improper training of members of the Party.200

Kim Il Sung then demanded that members of the KWP CC carry out necessary measures on the cult of personality and strive for a correct discussion of the question of

199 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier Comrade Pak Uiwan, 21 February 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.70-74. 200 Ibid. 88

the individual among the masses in the development of society.201

According to Soviet-Korean Pak Uiwan, a few days later, after receiving another report from Moscow, Kim “very thoughtfully and thoroughly […] asked about the speech of N.S. Khrushchev with regards to the cult of personality, about collective leadership, about shortcomings in oganizational-Party and ideological work. He asked for a description of Com[rade] A.I. Mikoyan and Com. Molotov’s speeches. He expressed regret that he himself did not go to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU.”202

Three days after the congress adjourned, Choe Yonggeon, who was still in

Moscow, met with Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov on 28 February to discuss the proceedings:

After exchanging greetings, Choe Yonggeon shared his impressions of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU. He said that the Twentieth Party Congress made a great impression not just on the Korean delegation, but on all delegations. The congress, said Choe, will play a tremendous role in the reconstructive work of fraternal parties, including the Korean Workers’ Party. The experience of the CPSU in this regard will be very useful. The shortcomings that were mentioned during the congress, he said, are entirely applicable to the work of the Korean Workers’ Party.

Molotov agreed that the experience of the CPSU will be helpful also to fraternal parties.

Choe Yonggeon said that all directives given for the CPSU at the Twentieth Party

Congress will be seen as guiding principles that should also serve as a basis for work for the Korean Workers’ Party […].203

Notwithstanding Choe’s apparent enthusiasm for the Twentieth Party Congress in the presence of V.M. Molotov, as an ally of Kim Il Sung he must have recognized the

201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 Reception of the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Choe Yonggeon, 28 February 1956 at 17:00, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 6, Opis 15a, Por.142, Papka 30, List p.1. 89 danger to Kim from the attacks on his Stalin. A highly developed cult of personality had already surrounded the North Korean leader. Choe therefore likely refrained from completely disclosing the contents of the secret speech to the KWP during a report he delivered at the KWP CC Plenum on March 20th.

It became increasingly clear that the North Korean leadership was weary of the breeze of political reform blowing from Moscow. The following month, Soviet

Ambassador V.I. Ivanov reported that judging from a letter the KWP leadership circulated on the topic of the cult of personality, the Koreans did not grasp the true significance of Khrushchev’s speech.204 The letter stated that the cult was a phenomenon unique to the CPSU and was alien to the KWP. It also cited examples of collective leadership from the brief history of Party and from the Korean Communist Party, denying that the KWP CC had ever veered from the path of Marxism-Leninism.205 Contradicting this previous statement, the letter then claimed that the cult of personality had existed, though only in connection with former vice-premier Pak Heonyeong, who had been purged in 1953 for allegedly conspiring to overthrow the government during the Korean

War. Reflecting Kim’s continued uneasiness over the power of Soviet influence in Korea, the letter reiterated his earlier warning against dogmatism, formalism and applying the lessons of foreign parties.206

Having experienced first-hand Moscow’s zealous advocacy of economic reform during the New Course, Kim Il Sung likely predicted a new wave of Soviet evangelism with de-Stalinization. He therefore began sending party members to the Soviet embassy

204 Diary of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Comrade V.I. Ivanov, 18 April 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.137-139. 205 Several Questions in Connection with the Study of the Speech of Comrade Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.137-162. 206 Ibid. 90 to draw distinctions between Stalin and himself. In one such meeting, an individual named Ri Sungwoon claimed that “Kim Il Sung […] is not a dictator, he genuinely respects the Korean people, he possesses the traits of humanism; dissidents, traitors,

Syngman Rhee collaborators, our government gives them freedom and creates for them the conditions for a normal life. The square named after Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang bears his name not at his own initiative.” Ambassador Ivanov noted skeptically that “Ri

Sungwoon could not even explain how that came about.” However, Ri kept insisting that the KWP did not a problem with the cult of personality.”207

KWP Third Party Congress

Two months after the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress, the KWP held its Third

Party Congress, the first such meeting in eight years and the first since the union with the

South Korean Workers’ Party. Emissaries from across the communist world converged on Pyongyang to deliver congratulatory speeches at the largely ceremonial event held

April 23-29. Among the distinguished guests was CPSU representative Leonid I.

Brezhnev, the future general secretary, who spoke of the momentous events that had occurred at the CPSU Congress in February on the cult of personality. Brezhnev also used the occasion to discourage the DPRK from being isolationist in its economic policies. He advised the North Korean leadership to modify its autarkic development strategy and to pay more attention to improving the living conditions of the North Korean people. Thus, according to Soviet reports, he “urge[d] his North Korean hosts to import

207 Diary of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Comrade V.I. Ivanov, 13 April 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 120. 91

Soviet consumer goods instead of machines.”208 It is not clear how the North Koreans received Brezhnev’s address, though one might surmise that it was perceived as being meddlesome.

Kim Il Sung delivered the first of three official reports on behalf of the Central

Committee to announce that the first Five-year Plan would be launched in 1957. With reconstruction efforts and the nationalization of industry nearly complete after the Three- year Plan, some 80 percent of capital investment in industry was to be allocated to expanding the foundation for heavy industry.209 The full-scale cooperativization of agriculture, which began in November 1954, was to be completed within the shortest possible time.

Kim’s report was laced with the customary anti-American vitriol and equally vociferous attacks on “anti-party elements,” i.e. Pak Heonyeong and the purged members of the former South Korean Workers’ Party. Conspicuously absent, however, were references to efforts to diminish his own cult of personality in the DPRK or to collective leadership. Instead, Kim Il Sung continued to describe the personality cult in the DPRK as having been cultivated by Pak Heonyeong.210

Pak Jeongae announced changes to the Central Committee, including the replacement of the Presidium and Political Council with a Standing Committee. The

Standing Committee would now serve as the supreme executive body, making all decisions between meetings of the CC. The CC would consist of 71 permanent members and 45 candidate members. Pak also announced changes to the membership of the CC.

208 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004) p.112. 209 Koon Woo Nam, The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation (University of Alabama Press, 1974), p. 103. 210 RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, l. 156. 92

The new appointments diminished the influence of those Soviet-Koreans and China- returned Koreans who questioned Kim’s development strategy between 1953 and 1955.

In their place, Kim Il Sung elevated those who had supported his position in the debates over development strategies. These included, above all, former partisans. All but four of the eleven full members of the Standing Committee were former partisan allies of Kim Il

Sung. The exceptions were Soviet-Koreans Pak Jeongae and Nam Il and China-returned

Koreans Kim Dubong and Choe Changik.211

As Soviet documents suggest, not all were pleased with the outcome of the

Congress. There were three reasons for this. First, the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned

Koreans were dissatisfied with their loss of stature in the KWP CC Standing Committee.

Second, and perhaps in connection with the loss of stature, they were also dissatisfied with the lack of collective leadership. Finally, they were unhappy with the treatment of the cult of personality, which North Korea clearly struggled with. Rather than stifle any real discussion of the cult of personality in Korea, Kim Il Sung’s efforts to dismiss it as a phenomenon connected to the actions of Pak Heongyeong only led to discontentment.

Scholars have speculated that some Soviet-Koreans may have managed to meet with CPSU representative Brezhnev during the Congress to express their frustrations over problems with the cult in the DPRK, though Andrei Lankov suggests that the KWP leadership made efforts to prevent this from occurring.212 Soviet-Korean and Deputy

Premier Pak Uiwan actually escorted Brezhnev and the entire CPSU delegation during on an excursion to the port city of Heungnam. The Soviet report on the excursion describes the sites seen and facilities visited by the delegation, but not conversations that took place.

211 Ibid. For additional background information on the KWP CC members see; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Part II: The Society, Appendix C, pp. 1351-1380. 212 Lankov, Crisis in North Korea, p. 63 93

In light of the numerous meetings Pak held with Soviet embassy officials in the wake of the KWP Third Party Congress – discussed below – it seems unlikely that he would have allowed this opportunity to pass without informing the powerful visitor of certain irregularities in the KWP leadership, especially in relation to the cult of personality.213

Within weeks of the KWP Third Party Congress, disaffected members of the

KWP began to visit the Soviet embassy to voice their dissatisfaction with the results of the meeting. On May 7th, Minister of Construction Kim Seunghwa, a Soviet-Korean, complained to Ambassador Ivanov:

[t]he spirit of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU was absent in the work of the [KWP] Congress. A lot was said about the collectivity of the leadership and attempts were made to demonstrate that the principles of collective leadership are observed in the work of the CC KWP and the cult of personality is

absent. But this was all very transparent. Really, is there a cult of personality of Pak Heonyeong, in whose direction all criticism is being aimed?214 Kim Seunghwa also complained to Ambassador Ivanov about the diminished status of Soviet-Koreans in the Standing Committee, noting that “not even one Soviet-

Korean remains in the apparatus of the CC.”215 Interestingly, both Nam Il and Pak

Jeongae were Soviet-Koreans, though by this time they were perceived as being so unabashedly pro-Kim Il Sung, and unsupportive of initiatives promoted by fellow Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans, that Kim Seunghwa did even think to mention them.

Three days after Ivanov’s meeting with Kim Seunghwa, Bulgarian Ambassador

Grigorov came to the Soviet embassy to relay his impressions of how the KWP Third

213 From the Diary of the Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK, com. Ivanov V.I. for the period from 18 April to 14 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, p.217. 214 Memorandum of Conversation with Minister of Construction, Kim Seunghwa, 7 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, p.221. 215 Ibid. 94

Party Congress handled the issue of the cult of personality and also to describe his country’s attempts to come to terms with de-Stalinization by removing Vulko

Chervenkov. Grigorov observed that “apparently, in Korea and China these issues are handled differently. He said that members of the Albanian, Hungarian, and Romanian delegations taking part in the Third Party Congress said to him that even before that time it was well known to them that there were serious shortcomings in connection with the cult of personality in the KWP, but this was not reflected at the Congress.” Those who spoke at the Congress, Grigorov reported, “denounced the cult of personality of Pak

Heonyeong in Southern Korea and not in the DPRK.”216

Pak Uiwan, who had met with Brezhnev and the Soviet delegation during the course of the Congress, began to hold regular meetings with Soviet officials, even though, in his own words, the KWP leadership “related negatively to those Soviet-

Koreans who visit the embassy.” In a meeting at his home with Filatov, Pak declared that he did not agree with how the cult of personality was handled or with the changes in the

Party leadership at the Congress, since many of the recent appointees to the CC and

Standing Committee were not qualified to rule.”217

Archival documents seldom record the feelings or motivations of individual actors as plainly as we would like, but it would be reasonable to surmise that many party members shared the disappointment about the outcome of the Third Party Congress that

Pak expressed to Filatov. Pak Uiwan and others felt that the party was committing egregious errors by ignoring trends in the international communist movement by not

216 Memorandum of Conversation with the Bulgarian Ambassador to the DPRK, Comrade Grigorov, 10 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy, p.225. 217 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers, Candidate Member of the Presidium CC KWP, Pak Uiwan, 7 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.108-110. 95 admitting its shortcomings in relation to the cult of personality, collective leadership, and lack of party democracy. Pak stated to Filatov that although the KWP Third Party

Congress was important for the history of the Party, “a lot of mistakes were made.” First,

“there was very little criticism.” Second, Pak felt the KWP had “come out against foreigners”—meaning Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans. Furthermore,

“denying that the CC KWP does not violate the principles of Marxism-Leninism is also wrong. We have, Pak said, a personality cult. We have not always collectively decided issues, we have broken revolutionary legality.” Expressing a desperate desire to salvage the situation within the KWP, even at the cost of outside intervention, Pak declared that he had thought a great deal about the best way “to change the course of ideological work and ha[d] come to the conclusion that outside help is necessary in this matter.” As Filatov recorded in his diary:

He considered that the CC CPSU could, in the necessary manner, assist our leadership to correctly understand Marxism-Leninism and ensure the

adherence of Party democracy. All of this will strengthen our Party and prepare it for carrying out the task of reuniting our country.218

Speaking to Ambassador Ivanov a few days later, Pak again talked about the shortcomings of the Third Party Congress and the changes made to the party leadership.

Interestingly, Pak said that he believed that Kim Il Sung was being led astray by elements hostile to outside influence:

Kim Il Sung has fallen under the influence of several undesirable figures and if this situation is not changed he might fall into an uncomfortable position with the USSR, about which [Pak] wanted to warn him. The propaganda of the DPRK against dogmatism is directed against foreign [propaganda], essentially against Soviet [propaganda]. Under the flag of the development of national traditions, the propaganda of the Soviet Union has been reduced.

218 Ibid.

96

It is possible that Pak simply felt it was politically expedient to avoid criticizing Kim Il

Sung directly in the presence of Soviet officials, and therefore blamed the North Korean leader’s actions on the negative influence of others. Nonetheless, it appears that Pak and like-minded officials considered Kim a strong leader who, though lacking sufficient ideological training, could, with proper guidance, be steered in the right direction.

Therefore, Pak and others had hoped to bring about changes to the trajectory of political developments inside North Korea and asked for Soviet assistance in doing so by pressuring Kim while in Moscow. They requested that the Soviet leadership give Kim guidance during his forthcoming trip to fraternal countries. They apparently considered this the most effective way to correct ideological and economic policies, and to ensure

North Korea’s continued adherence to fraternal socialist norms.

What Pak and others were asking could never have worked, unless they genuinely believed that Kim had come under the influence of nationalist elements hostile to the influence of the DPRK’s putative allies. The idea of asking a foreign nation to directly meddle in the sovereign affairs of the DPRK just months after Kim Il Sung delivered a speech criticizing those Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans for not having Juche seemed risky at best.

The Birth of a Movement

A number of party members besides Pak Uiwan and Kim Seunghwa began open and bold criticism of the KWP leadership for the lack of party democracy and the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung. On top of that, they revived criticism of North Korean economic policies. In early May, North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Ri

97

Sangjo fearlessly challenged the Party leadership during a briefing of DPRK ambassadors to fraternal countries conducted by Foreign Minister Nam Il. Being stationed in Moscow,

Ri was well aware of developments in the Socialist camp. On May 3rd, ambassador to the

GDR Pak Gilryeon praised Ri’s actions during a meeting with Ivanov. “The ambassador of the DPRK to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, spoke out really well, Pak said. He subjected the work of the Ministry to severe criticism. Describing the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and how the USSR is carrying out its struggle against the cult of personality of J.V.

Stalin, Ri Sangjo drew attention to the fact that literature is being produced in the DPRK that devotes much space to the cult of personality.” According to Pak, Nam Il

“corrected” Ri Sangjo, insisting that “we do not have a cult of personality.” Yi retorted and “quoted from a number of publications that in many places were bursting at the seams with the name of Kim Il Sung.”219 Since Ri Sangjo made these comments in the presence of Nam Il, a loyal follower of Kim Il Sung, he clearly knew that Kim Il Sung would learn of them.

In a 7 May meeting with Ivanov, Pak Gilryeon also sharply criticized the KWP

Third Party Congress for not having the spirit of the Twentieth Party Congress of the

CPSU. He also questioned the KWP’s economic and ideological policies. Pak, a Soviet-

Korean, was apparently attempting to encourage Soviet criticism of the KWP leadership during Kim Il Sung’s trip to Moscow in June.220

Pak Gilryeon’s lobbying in Pyongyang was supplemented by Ri Sangjo’s vigorous efforts in Moscow to enlist Soviet support to reform the KWP through criticism.

219 Memorandum of Conversation with the Ambassador of the DPRK to the German Democratic Republic, Pak Gilryeon, 3 May 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy pp.202-203. 220 Memorandum of Conversation with the Ambassador of the DPRK to the German Democratic Republic, Pak Gilryeon, 7 May 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy pp.222-224. 98

After his return to his post, Ri held at least two meetings with CPSU officials: on May

29th with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs N.T. Federenko and on June 16th with

Director of the Far Eastern Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I. Kurdyukov.221

When Federenko asked Ri to share his impressions of conditions in the DPRK, Ri described “severe economic difficulties, a keen shortage of food, housing, a neglect of agriculture, etc.” As regards the Third Party Congress, Ri reported that “the KWP CC leadership thinks that the Congress ‘went well and revealed the complete unity of the

Party […], but this is only the official point of view of the KWP CC leadership.”

Although he noted that as ambassador he should have “strictly limited himself to this information,” Ri went on to inform Federenko that:

there are other opinions and sentiments about this question and as regards his, Ri Sangjo’s opinion, he also thinks that there were substantial shortcomings in the work of the Congress that reflect serious abnormalities in the work of the Workers Party and the DPRK government.

The unfavorable state of affairs is primarily indicated, Ri Sangjo pointed out, by the fact that there was no genuine criticism or self-criticism at the Congress and the Congress did not at all take place in the spirit of the issues raised at the XX CPSU Congress. The KWP CC leadership thinks that the shortcomings in the matter of observing the norms of Party life and in other areas revealed at the XX CPSU Congress and, in particular, in the report of N. S. Khrushchev, “The Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” are characteristic of the CPSU and have no relation to the Korean Workers’ Party. This policy of the CC KWP leadership also determined the entire course of the Congress.

However, Ri informed Federenko, “many Party members, including Congress delegates,

[…] think otherwise but they decided not to say this openly at the Congress.” Noting once again that as the DPRK’s ambassador “he must not speak of these things, especially

221 Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, 29 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 190-196 and Memorandum of a Conversation with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, 16 June 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.238- 241.

99 since he knows the point of view of the KWP CC leadership and knows that one does not win plaudits for such conversation,” he nonetheless continued, explaining that “as a Party member he must talk with us about these issues openly and not conceal his opinions.”

This was especially the case since the KWP CC leadership was already aware of his opinion, as he had “openly stated it and written about it to the KWP CC Presidium.”222

In his meeting with Kurkyukov, ostensibly called to prepare for the arrival of the

North Korean delegation, Ri Sangjo encouraged direct Soviet criticism of KWP internal matters, declaring that “if questions of a military and political nature are discussed along with economic issues in the conversations held between leaders of the Soviet Union and the Korean delegation, then in his personal opinion they ought to be discussed with the involvement of the largest possible number of members of the Korean delegation, for example, with all the members of the Korean Workers’ Party who are in the delegation.”

Ri suggested that if “the discussion is to be held in a narrow circle with only Kim Il Sung,

Pak Jeongae, and Nam Il,” the results will be “less than they ought to be since other leading Party officials will not be informed of the substance of the comments and the advice of the CPSU CC.”223

As the meeting proceeded, Ri spoke more candidly about the shortcomings in the

KWP, stating that “the Korean Workers’ Party and its leadership need serious ideological help from the CC CPSU.”

We expected […] that a study of the materials of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU within the Workers’ Party would serve as an impetus to improving the intra-Party situation and to correcting the existing mistakes of the KWP

222 Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, 29 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.190-196. 223 Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, 29 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.190-196. 100

leadership. However, unfortunately the study of the materials of the Twentieth Party Congress in the KWP was done hastily and without the necessary depth. The shortcomings in the intra-Party life of the KWP were neither criticized at the Congress nor after the Congress. Many members of the Workers’ Party see and understand these shortcomings. They are inwardly dissatisfied with the situation in the Party but decide not to openly criticize these shortcomings, fearing persecution.

Therefore, continued Ri Sangjo, we need help from outside, and it would be best if Com. Khrushchev or Com. Mao Zedong talked with the KWP leadership about this issue. When doing so it is advisable that critical comments by Com. Khrushchev or Com. Mao Zedong become known not only to Kim Il Sung and the people close to him, but to a broader circle of KWP Party officials.224

Like Pak Uiwan, Ri Sangjo nonetheless still supported Kim Il Sung, explaining that Kim

“is a young leader with a good revolutionary past, but he has studied little and does not have sufficient ideological training, and this leads him to mistakes.”225

Thus, through the combination of direct criticism in meetings of the KWP CC and foreign criticism while visiting fraternal countries, members of the KWP CC and key

North Korean diplomats sought to alter the trajectory of political developments inside

North Korea. They once again took their cues from Moscow, and even enlisted

Moscow’s direct support in encouraging Kim Il Sung to adopt the newly emerging trends in the international communist movement.

Kim Il Sung and Soviet Criticism

On June 1, 1956 Kim Il Sung departed for his extended trip to nine fraternal countries, visiting the Soviet Union both on his way to and from Eastern Europe.226 The

224 Ibid. 225 Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR, Ri Sangjo, 29 May 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy, pp.190-196. 226 Lankov, Crisis in North Korea, p.76. 101 delegation returned to Pyongyang over six weeks later on July 19th.227 Given the subsequent actions of Kim’s critics, it seems that their strategy of encouraging fraternal criticism of Kim was unsuccessful. Kim Il Sung and other members of the delegation apparently either received insufficient criticism or, the more likely scenario, were resentful of the advice of the fraternal parties. Sadly, we do not yet have access to the records of conversations between Kim Il Sung and the Soviet leadership during his trip in the summer of 1956, so it is impossible to determine how much criticism Kim Il Sung had been subjected to in Moscow.

Since foreign criticism apparently had little impact on Kim once he returned to

Pyongyang, the advocates for political reform decided to take matters into their own hands. Still believing it was possible to correct the party’s course through the adoption of

Soviet practices on with the cult of personality and collective leadership, they decided to appeal directly to members of the CC and encourage self-criticism during the upcoming

August Plenum. The political reformists were prepared, however, to replace the party leadership if their grievances were not redressed.

Visits to the Soviet embassy by the advocates for reform had diminished in the wake of the decree forcing Soviet-Koreans either to accept Korean citizenship or be stripped of their posts, but their official business regularly brought many of them into contact with Soviet diplomatic staff. Following Kim Il Sung’s return from his month-long trip to Eastern Europe, there was a flurry of activity at both the Soviet and Chinese legations. Over the course of a week, Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans met with diplomats at both embassies on official business that was used as a pretext to discuss

227 Szalontai “You Have No Political Line of Your Own,” p. 91; Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, pp. 92 - 93.

102 matters that were decidedly unofficial business. Records of the Chinese embassy from this period are not yet accessible, but we know that visits were paid to both embassies through memoranda of a conversations between Soviet Charge d’ Affairs A.M. Petrov and PRC Charge d’ Affaires Chao Kexian. The Chinese diplomat reported on his meetings with the Koreans:

[…] During the discussion comrade Chao further mentioned that individual Korean comrades, in their discussions with officials at the Chinese embassy, show interest in how matters stand with the cult of personality in China. In response to my question about how the Chinese comrades answered that question, Chao said that in answering they quote the well-known decree of the CC Chinese Communist Party, published at that time in the newspaper Renmin Ribao.228

In their meetings with Soviet embassy officials, a number of KWP officials revealed their strategy for bringing about political reform in the KWP at the upcoming

August Plenum. The day after Kim Il Sung returned from his trip to Europe, A.M. Petrov met with the head of the Department of Construction Materials under the Cabinet of

Ministers Ri Pilgyu, an prominent China-returned Korean.229 Ri disclosed to Petrov the existence of a plan to criticize Kim in the upcoming plenum:

A group of officials consider it necessary to undertake certain actions against Kim Il Sung and his closest associates at the earliest possible opportunity [...] In the DPRK there are such people who can embark on that course and who are currently making appropriate preparations.

Ri enumerated the group’s charges against the KWP leadership, alluding to the frustration of Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans over the cult of personality and lack of democracy in the Party and Ministries:

The personality cult of Kim Il Sung has acquired an intolerable character. He

228 Memorandum of Conversation with Counselor of the Chinese Embassy, Comrade Chao Ke Xian, 3 August 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.313-314. 229 Memorandum of Conversation with the head of the department of construction materials under the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, Yi Pilgyu, 20 July 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.304- 308. 103

does not tolerate any criticism or self-criticism. The word of Kim Il Sung is law. He has surrounded himself with sycophants and lackeys in the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. It would be enough to say that out of 18 ministers, 9 have a shadowy past. […] The CC is spreading distrust among functionaries. Functionaries follow one another. There is absolutely no trust and friendship among functionaries in the CC KWP and Council of Ministers.

Ri indicated to what extent the opposition was prepared to go to reverse the situation in the KWP and government:

[…] the group sets before itself the task of replacing the present leadership of the CC KWP and government. In his opinion, there are two ways of doing this. The first way is sharp and decisive criticism within the Party and self-criticism. However, Ri said, Kim Il Sung will not likely be in favor of that way and he doubts the success of such an approach. The second way is forcible upheaval. That is a difficult path, Ri said, involving sacrifice.

It is not clear whether Kim Il Sung was to be among the members of the leadership Ri sought to replace since he noted that “Kim Il Sung will not be in favor of that way.” Ri may have anticipated that once Kim learned of the widespread dissatisfaction in the ranks of the Party, he would assist in the removal of unqualified officials. This reinforces the idea that there may have been a genuine belief that Kim Il Sung was under the influence of unsavory characters. While Ri was quite forthcoming in his criticism of Kim Il Sung, he expressed even stronger indignation over the elevation of a number of incompetent

Kim Il Sung supporters, all of whom received their positions outside the norms of Party procedure. Those whom Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans wanted to see replaced apparently included Minister of Education Han Solya, the architect of the literary crisis, who, Ri says, “should be shot;” Presidium member Kim Chang-man, whom Ri describes as a “hateful person;” and Kim Il, a member of the Presidium and a

104

Partisan who “is Kim Il Sung’s protégé.”230

It is notable that Ri did not include Choe Yonggeon, a partisan who became head of the Korean Democratic Party in 1945, only to become a member of the Standing

Committee in 1956 while technically never a KWP member. Ri even went so far as to praise Choe, indicating that “he respectfully displays himself in work.” Choe was in fact the prime example of an appointment made in violation of Party democracy, since he was appointed to the Standing Committee of the KWP directly from his former position as head of the Democratic Party. Ri may have spared Choe any criticism during his discussion with Petrov because he felt Choe had become critical of Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality and might have been open to joining the criticism at the August Plenum.231

It appears that the level of the threat to Kim Il Sung depended upon his actions at the Plenum. If, after all remonstrance’s were aired, Kim refused to make any changes to the leadership of the CC and Council of Ministers, then his critics would exercise their democratic right, enshrined in the charter of the KWP, to vote the him out of power.

Thus, as Balazs Szalontai argues, the opposition was more a “desperate attempt to turn the tide than a serious challenge to Kim’s rule.”232 The ousting of Kim was to be a last resort.

Ri Pilgyu’s visit to the Soviet embassy was the first of four made by reformists from 20-24 July in order to inform Soviet diplomats of their plans. Soviet-Korean Pak

Changok, China-returned Korean Choe Changik, and another Soviet-Korean Kim

Seunghwa, met separately with Soviet embassy officials. The visits to the embassy by Ri

230 Memorandum of Conversation with the head of the department of construction materials under the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, Yi Pilgyu, 20 July 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.304- 308. 231 Ibid. 232 Szalontai, “You Have No Political Line of Your Own,” p.91. 105

Pilgyu, Pak Changok, Choe Changik, and Kim Seunghwa, which were almost certainly coordinated, had the desired effect of informing the embassy of their planned action so as to prevent Soviet interference should the event be misinterpreted, and if possible, to security Soviet complicity. These individuals, especially the Soviet-Koreans, were certainly aware of Ambassador Ivanov’s negative views of the North Korean leadership.

Indeed, Kim Il Sung would later allege that Ivanov was the ringleader in a anti-Party conspiracy.233

The stream of visitors to the Soviet embassy following Kim Il Sung’s return to

Korea also included Foreign Minister Nam Il, a staunch Kim supporter. On 24 July Nam

Il met with Petrov to “seek advice on what position he should take.”234 According to the

Foreign Minister, Pak Changok had informed him that “a group of leading functionaries, including Choe Changik, Kim Seunghwa and a number of others are prepared, in the coming plenum of the Central Committee, to speak out with severe criticism of Kim Il

Sung.” Furthermore,

Pak expressed confidence that if he himself, and also if Choe Changik and Kim Seunghwa speak out with that criticism, then he will receive support from individual members of the Presidium and also from several heads of local Party organizations. Pak said that it would be desirable for Nam Il to join that group and speak out with sharp criticism of Kim Il Sung at the Presidium of the CC KWP and at the Plenum of the CC. The possibility of Choe Yonggeon taking part in the criticism of Kim Il Sung has not been ruled out.

Nam Il had reservations, however, since “serious criticism of Kim Il Sung from Pak

Changok and others would be improper.”235 Nam Il explained:

233 See for example: Memorandum of Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Manush [Myftiu] composed by Albanian Ambassador to the DPRK, Hasan Alimerko, 4 October 1961, AQPPSH, MPP Korese, V. 1961, D4. 234 Memorandum of Conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Nam Il, 24 July 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.301-303. 235 Ibid. 106

Such a sharp discussion of the problem of the personality cult in the Korean context as Pak Changok and others are preparing to make would lead to undesirable consequences. It might undermine the authority of the existing leadership of the Party and government, discredit Kim Il Sung in the eyes of the Party masses and the entire nation, and stimulate considerable discussion within the Party.236 Kim Il Sung was already aware of his critics’ grievances since a number of functionaries had openly criticized the Party leadership following the Third Party

Congress. Moreover, similar issues had been raised during Kim’s trip to Moscow. As

Nam Il explained, Kim Il Sung had already decided to take actions to resolve the problems of the cult of personality and lack of party democracy after his meetings with

Soviet officials. As Nam Il noted, “the observations of the KWP CC about several shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the KWP were correctly and frankly perceived by Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung told Nam Il and several other members of the government delegation that he would take measures in order to completely and fully amend these errors and shortcomings, including the issue of the cult of personality.” In the opinion of

Kim Il Sung, however, “these shortcomings and errors will not be eliminated immediately, not by discussing these issues in a full-scale investigation in the Plenums of the CC or in meetings of Party organs, but little by little without involving the entire

Party in the discussion of these issues.”237 Thus, putting his faith and trust in Kim Il

Sung, Nam Il opted not to join his fellow Soviet-Koreans in criticizing the Party leadership, and urged patience.

Judging from Nam Il’s meeting with Petrov, Soviet diplomats were also apprehensive about the prospective criticism of Kim Il Sung, despite Kim Il Sung’s later allegation of Soviet embassy complicity. Petrov suggested that Nam Il dissuade Pak

236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 107

Changok and other Soviet-Koreans from taking part in the criticism since it might give the impression of a Soviet-orchestrated attack on Kim Il Sung and KWP policies. In all probability, Petrov’s advice was a reflection of the short-lived post-Stalin attempt by

Kremlin leaders to be less intrusive in the affairs of fraternal parties than they had been under Stalin, in an effort to lessen resentment of Moscow and accompanying nationalist sentiment.

On 28 July and 1 August, Petrov received Nam Il and another Soviet-Korean ally of Kim Il Sung, Pak Jeongae.238 Nam Il and Pak Jeongae were sent to the Soviet Embassy to determine the authenticity of rumors that a Soviet official was sent to Pyongyang to investigate Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality. After the meeting, they began to spread the word that the Soviet ambassador explicitly informed them that the Soviet government was opposed to any criticism of Kim Il Sung.239 While his subordinates at the embassy were clearly apprehensive about the planned criticism, no evidence has surfaced that

Ambassador Ivanov explicitly discouraged such action.240

Kim Il Sung thus clearly had advance knowledge of his critics’ plans. If one is to believe the account in his official biography, Kim learned of their intentions when returning to Pyongyang after winding up his “friendship visits” to socialist countries.

“Alighting from the plane with a beaming smile on his face, he was met by high-placed functionaries who had turned out at the airport to welcome him. But as he set his eyes on

Choe Changik, at a glance he perceived something not quite right in his looks, and gazed at him sternly and intently,” penetrating “even to the black-hearted intentions of Choe

238 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p.158. 239 Memorandum of Conversation with ambassador of the Peoples’ Republic of China to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang, 4 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.322-325. 240 Memorandum of Conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Nam Il, 24 July 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.301-303. 108

Changik.”241

A more likely explanation is that Kim Il Sung, aware since early May of criticism of the cult of personality inside the Party following Ambassador Ri Sangjo’s remarks, had received concrete information about their plans for forcing political reform at the upcoming KWP CC Plenum from Nam Il after his meetings with Petrov. On August 31, the last day of the Plenum, a departmental head of the KWP, Ko Hwiman, mentioned to the first secretary of the Soviet embassy, G.Ye. Samsanov, that “the intention of this group to use the forthcoming Plenum for anti-Party attacks against some executives in the

Party and government was known before the Plenum.”242 As Lankov concludes, aware of the impending challenge, “one of Kim Il Sung’s foremost concerns must have been reducing the number of potential troublemakers.”243 A July 29th meeting between Soviet

Ambassador V.I. Ivanov and Pak Uiwan verifies that Kim Il Sung moved in that direction by dispatching one of his critics, Kim Seunghwa, to Moscow for study just two days before the scheduled start of the plenum, explaining that he “was mixed up in some unsavory business and had to leave.”244

As an additional protective measure, Kim Il Sung postponed the opening of the

Plenum for nearly a month, from August 2nd to August 30th.245 Ko Hwiman later explained to First Secretary of the Soviet Foreign Ministry S.P. Lazarev that “having been informed that the attack had to take place at the Central Committee Plenum, the

241 Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung, Biography [II]: From Building Democratic Korea to Chullima Flight (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970), p.551. 242 Memorandum of Conversation between G.Ye. Samsanov and Ko Hui-man, 31 August 1956, AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 12, Delo 6, Papka 68, quoted in Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p.164. 243 Ibid., p. 165. 244 Memorandum of Conversation with the Charge d’ Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, Com. Chao Ke Xian, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.313-314. 245 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p.164. 109 leaders of the Central Committee kept delaying the Plenum to confuse the group. The date was announced only on the eve of the first day of the Plenum, thus disorganizing their actions.”246

Additional Criticism from Moscow

Following up on the criticism Kim received in Moscow, the CPSU CC sent a letter to the KWP CC on August 2nd delivering further criticism of the cult of personality in the DPRK and the lack of collectivity in the party leadership. This blatant example of

Soviet officials treating the North Koreans as their inferiors in the hierarchy of the socialist camp, and passing down instructions on how to properly run the Korean Party must have infuriated Kim Il Sung. This letter, coming at a time when he was making preparations to deal with those who sought to mechanically import the Soviet practice of dealing with the cult of personality, may have even reinforced Kim’s belief of

Moscow’s—or at least the Soviet embassy’s—complicity. Kim Il Sung followed up on the letter after two weeks by informing Ambassador Ivanov on August 13th that the Party and government of the DPRK were making reforms at their own pace. He notified the ambassador that elections to the Supreme People’s Assembly would be held later in the fall of 1956.

Kim Il Sung intensified efforts to further reduce the number of individuals criticizing the policies of the KWP at the upcoming Plenum, even by engaging blackmail.

Pak Uiwan was one of those coerced to support Kim at the plenum through blackmail, according to Ri Sangjo. During a 22 August meeting, “Kim Il Sung told Pak Uiwan that

246 Memorandum of Conversation between S.P. Lazarev and Ko Hui-man, 18 September 1956, AVPRF, Fond 0102, Opis 12, Delo 4, Papka 68, quoted in Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 164-5. 110 he had a significant amount of compromising material against him about squandering state resources. Kim threatened to reveal this material if Pak Uiwan spoke out against the leadership of the KWP with criticism.”247

1956 August Plenum of the KWP CC

The official agenda for the Plenum listed only two items: a report on Kim Il

Sung’s recent trip to fraternal countries and a discussion of the National Health Service.

As one might expect, however, the criticism of the cult of personality and Kim’s own countermeasures dominated the proceedings. The accounts of the Plenum that Kim Il

Sung and Pak Uiwan relayed to the Soviet embassy provide a much more detailed description of the event than has previously been available.248

In a meeting with Ambassador Ivanov on September 1st, Kim Il Sung provided the broader contours of the event, though he focused on what he termed the “anti-Party” activities of his critics. Minister of Trade Yun Kongheum, Kim claimed, “made accusations that the Workers Party rejected the decree of the Twentieth Party Congress, did not follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism,” and preserved “very serious consequences of the personality cult.” Kim reported that Plenum participants were

“outraged by the antagonistic manner of Yun’s speech” and “demanded that he be prevented from speaking.”249

Kim Il Sung also informed Ivanov that four China-returned Koreans— Seo Hwi,

247 Memorandum of Conversation with ambassador of the Peoples’ Republic of China to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang, 4 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.322-325. 248 Memorandum of Conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung, 1 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List 319, and Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier, Pak Ui-wan, 6 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.327-332. 249 Memorandum of Conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung, 1 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List, p.319. 111

Ri Pilgyu, Kim Changil, and Yun Kongheum—had left the plenum and fled to China. He also described in detail the serious measures taken against his critics: Seo Hwi, Yi Pilgyu, and Kim Changil were expelled from the Party in absentia; Choe Changik, who remained at the Plenum, was “removed from the CC Presidium;” and Pak Changok, who also remained, was “removed from the post of Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and removed from the ranks of the CC.”250

Pak Uiwan provided a much more detailed account of the attempt to introduce de-

Stalinization to the KWP at the August Plenum when he met with Ivanov on September

6th. Pak described a carefully orchestrated offensive against the leadership’s critics.251 He alleged that Kim Il Sung’s address to the Plenum touched upon the problem of the personality cult only “in connection with the status of work in the area of propaganda,” and that the audience spontaneously burst into praise throughout the speech “without any reason.” He described the next two speeches, by chairman of the State Planning

Committee, Ri Jongok and secretary of the provincial committee of the Party from the province of Northern Hamgyong, Kim Taekyong, as “sycophantic,” though the latter

“singled out and sharply criticized the work of the Ministry of Trade and the activities of the unions.”

Pak’s account of Yun’s speech is similar to that of Kim Il Sung, especially in his description of Yun’s accusations and the Standing Committee’s hostile reaction.

However, Pak’s account also refers indirectly to Yun’s comments on the lack of party democracy when he complained that “Choe Yonggeon is the leader of another party and

250 Memorandum of Conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung, 1 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List, p.319. 251 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier, Pak Ui-wan, 6 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.327-332. 112 was immediately named to the post of Deputy Chairman of the KWP, a clear violation of party democracy.” In response to this comment, “Choe Yonggeon stood and called Yun a dog and insulted him in every manner.”252

According to Pak, the evening session of August 30th contained more

“sycophantic” speeches by Minister of Finance Ri Juyeon, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Nam Il, and the chairman of the CC of the Union of Democratic Youth, Pak Yong-guk.

Each of these speeches praised the KWP and its leadership while deriding the ‘anti-party’ group. While generally optimistic, Foreign Minister Nam Il’s speech was less flattering of Kim Il Sung than the others, recognizing, according to Pak, “that unfortunately the decree of the March Plenum of the CC, where Kim Il Sung talked about the personality cult, was not brought to the attention of the members of the Party.” Nam Il’s criticism of

Yun Kongheum, however, was as bitter as that of others from the Standing Committee.

Speaking next, Choe Changik, a key critic of the cult of personality, evidently recognized that the plan to introduce de-Stalinization to the KWP had already failed, and therefore chose not to attack the leadership. Instead, according to Pak Uiwan, Choe

“pointed out that the policies of the Party were correct, but that it is necessary to talk about the personality cult, a sore issue for the Party.” Upon completing his speech, however, a number of questions were given to Choe, “from which it became clear that he subscribes to the ideology of the factional group.”253

Choe’s speech was followed by those of Kim Chang-man and the chairman of the

Party committee of Southern Pyeongan, Kim Mangeum, who attacked Yun Kongheum, describing him as “a person who is morally corrupt, who does not eat any other meat than

252 Memorandum of Conversation with Deputy Premier, Pak Ui-wan, 6 September 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.327-332. 253 Ibid. 113 veal”—presumably a mark of extravagance—and who “squanders large sums of money.”

Furthermore, Kim Mangeum called for an investigation into the activities of Yun

Kongheum and Choe Changik, urging that they both be jailed.

Kim Il Sung then spoke again. He recounted the history of the “anti-Party” group, stressing that Choe Changik and Pak Changok were its leaders. Implying that criticism was equal to “plotting,” he accused the group of attempting to overthrow the government and “seize power in their hands.”

Kim was followed by the chairman of the Party Committee of South Hamgyeong province, Hwang Dong-min, who attacked “those who expressed discontent.” The head of the department of propaganda and agitation of the CC KWP, Ri Ilgyeong, in a carefully prepared response to the restrained remarks by Nam Il on the decree of the

March Plenum of the CC and the personality cult, stated that “the Third Party Congress was completely guided by the ideas of the Twentieth Party Congress and that after the

Congress, the CC of the KWP resolved the shortcomings connected with the personality cult.”

Pak Uiwan then provided a detailed account of Choe Yonggeon’s speech that outlined the “concentrated program against the party and government” of Yun

Kongheum, Choe Changik, Pak Changok and others. It should be noted that some members of the opposition group, including Ri Pilgyu considered Choe Yonggeon sympathetic to their cause. However, it appears that Kim Il Sung used Choe Yonggeon as a decoy luring them to confide in him. Choe Yonggeon proceeded to make accusations against other members of the “anti-Party” group such as Seo Hwi, who, being guilty of

‘negativism’ “told two Koreans coming from China that they would work for ten years in

114 the DPRK without getting a higher title than Major-General.”254

In his speech, Pak Changok denied any involvement with the opposition group and expressed his frustration at having been removed from his former position as

Chairman of the State Planning Committee following the December 1955 KWP CC

Plenum, stating that the Plenum “took a very strict and unfair position in relation to him.”

According to Pak Uiwan, Pak Changok was interrupted by calls from the Standing

Committee and the hall and was not permitted to continue speaking.

Pak Uiwan gave little detail about Kim Il Sung’s closing speech other than that he suggested that “organizational measures” be taken against the critics of the cult of personality. After finishing his account of the plenum, however, evidently fearful of further retaliation against the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans beyond the immediate expulsions, and mindful of Kim Il Sung’s earlier blackmail attempt, Pak, a

Soviet-Korean, indicated that he wished to renounce his North Korean citizenship, regain his Soviet citizenship, and be reinstated in the ranks of the CPSU.255

Sometime after the disastrous morning session of August 30, four members of the opposition group – Minister of Trade Yun Kongheum, Chairman of the CC of United

Unions So Hwi, Deputy Minister of Culture Kim Changil, and Head of the Department of

Construction Materials Yi Pilgyu – crossed into China near Dandong, where they were detained by Chinese border guards.256 Word of their flight reached fraternal embassies in

Pyongyang, and on September 4th the Soviet and Chinese ambassadors met to discuss the issue, as well as the results of the Plenum as a whole.

254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 256 “Memorandum of Conversation with Premier Kim Il Sung,” September 1, 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, List, p.319. 115

PRC Ambassador Qiao Xiaoguang described the situation as “an extremely serious event […] concerning the relations between the DPRK and the PRC” and explained that the Korean government had filed a petition demanding the return of “the guilty individuals.” The Chinese government, which had been immediately informed about what had occurred,” announced that “the noted individuals are not simple border crossers and that their forcible return is impossible.” Furthermore, Qiao reported that

“Korean border guards urged the abovementioned individuals to return to the DPRK; however, they all categorically refused.” Ambassador Ivanov, for his part, seems to have attempted both to reassure Qiao that the Soviet Union was not responsible for the actions of the opposition group, and to probe the PRC Ambassador about possible Chinese meddling in the proceedings of the plenum. Ivanov carefully stated that “the issues that arose in the KWP are serious and were not stimulated by any outside factors, Soviet or

Chinese, but were a domestic process taking place within the KWP.”257

Foreign Meddling

The following day, DPRK Ambassador to Moscow Ri Sangjo delivered a letter to

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs N.T. Federenko detailing Kim Il Sung’s abuses and requesting a meeting with either N.S. Khrushchev or A.I. Mikoyan.258 Ri’s goal was to press upon the Soviet leadership the gravity of the situation in the KWP CC, in hopes that the CPSU CC and the CCP CC would directly intervene in KWP affairs to correct what he described as a “difficult situation created as a result of the rash and incorrect

257 “Memorandum of Conversation with ambassador of the Peoples’ Republic of China to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang,” September 4, 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.322-325. 258 "Report by N.T. Fedorenko on a Conversation with Ri Sang-jo, Ambassador of the DPRK to the USSR" September 05, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, Delo 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Listy 224-228. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/113564 116 repression taken by the leadership of the CC KWP against comrades who spoke with criticism.”259 Ri’s furtive appeal for assistance was successful; the Presidium of the

CPSU discussed the situation in North Korea on September 6, 1956.260 Having received a report from Ambassador Ivanov, Soviet leaders decided to consult the North Korean delegates to the Chinese Eighth Party Congress later in the month.

After consultations in Beijing with Chinese officials, even before meeting with the Korean delegates, the CPSU and CCP decided to send a joint party delegation to

Pyongyang.261 Mikoyan had suggested that “we pick a few comrades from our delegation and the Chinese pick a few comrades, and together we will travel to Pyongyang. We will jointly suggest that the Korean Workers’ Party should hold a meeting of the Standing

Committee and invite Kim Il Sung to attend. All three sides will then have a talk together and understand the situation.” It would not be right, Mikoyan stated, to “only listen to the opinions of the fugitives,” i.e. the four China-returned Koreans who fled North Korea during the August Plenum. Mao agreed to this, cautioning quite correctly that Kim Il

Sung would likely perceive the visit as meddling, alleging that Kim might say “in the past you have interfered with Yugoslavia and now you want to interfere with me. In the past during the Yugoslav intervention, there was only the Soviet Union, and now there is also

China.” Mao continued, “Kim Il Sung might say that we are interfering with his affairs” and that “he is afraid that our two parties are digging at his wall.”262 To avoid this,

259 Ibid. 260 "Protocol No. 39, Resolution of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, On the Situation in the Korean Workers' Party" September 06, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, Fond 3, Opis 14, Delo 410, List 3, published in AA. Fursenko ed., Arkhivi Kremlya (Archives of the Kremlin), The Presidium of the CPSU CC, 1954-1964: Resolutions, 1954-1958 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), 421-422. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/114137 261 Ibid. 262 “Conversation between Chairman Mao Zedong and the Soviet Communist Party Delegation,” 18 September 1956, from the personal archive of Zhihua Shen. 117

Mikoyan suggested first consulting Choe Yonggeon, in Beijing for the CCP Eighth

Congress, and then traveling to Pyongyang with him. 263

The joint CPSU-CCP delegation would be headed by Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, the former commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The choice of emissaries must have caused Kim Il Sung considerable anxiety. Mikoyan was widely seen as the

Kremlin’s trouble-shooter and had recently unseated Hungary’s Matyas Rakosi in June.

Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung also had very poor relations because of Peng’s continuous humiliation of Kim Il Sung during the Korean War.

Prior to the departure of the joint-Party delegation, Mao Zedong and Anastas

Mikoyan held several meetings with Choe Yongeon in Beijing. The Chinese records of these conversations reveal what must have been a very uncomfortable exchange of opinions for Choe. In one discussion, Mao harshly criticized North Korean procedures, critically noting “within your party you do not espouse democracy; if anyone mentions different views or opposing views then he is seen as an anti-party element and a traitor, he is then arrested or even killed.” Mao continued, “This is the method of unenlightened emperors, Stalin during his late days was an unenlightened emperor, and you are currently acting similarly.” Justifying the joint Sino-Soviet intervention, Mao declared that Beijing and Moscow had no choice but to send the delegation to investigate because of Korea’s precarious security situation:

We have discussed with comrade Kim Il Sung about the issues of improvement of people’s lives, etc. but he did not do [as we suggested]. The result is serious difficulties and agony for the Korean people. This is a very costly and painful lesson. Towards your back you have China and the Soviet Union, but you are also facing Syngman Rhee, American imperialists and Japan. You are facing enemies, not friends. Therefore the relationship between China and the Soviet Union and you is too close. Your internal issues will affect China and the Soviet

263 Ibid. 118

Union. Therefore as for these issues of yours, we have no choice but to intervene.264

Mao was right to believe that Kim Il Sung would perceive the actions of the joint-Party delegation as meddling. Even before the delegation landed in Pyongyang, the North

Korean leadership would have been justified in alleging interference, as the Chinese leader’s high-handed criticisms and summoning of Choe (not to mention the demand that he accompany the two officials to Pyongyang) reveal a sense of authority in a vertically structured socialist camp, which placed the DPRK at the bottom. As I discuss below, once the delegation departed from Pyongyang, Kim took immediate actions to cover up the intervention, and longer-term actions to convey to his putative allies the reality of

North Korean sovereignty in an effort to discourage them from ever meddling in the sovereign affairs of the DPRK again.

The most important files on the intervention by Mikoyan and Peng have not yet been opened to researchers, so we do not have the records of conversations between the two foreign officials with Kim Il Sung while in Pyongyang. We also do not have any of the speeches delivered at the September Plenum of the KWP CC, called not by the

Koreans, but by Mikoyan and Peng to discuss the cult of personality, the lack of party democracy, and collective leadership in the KWP. The diary of the Soviet ambassador provides fragmentary evidence of this pivotal event that allows us to assess the basis of

Kim’s subsequent accusations of Chinese and Soviet meddling.

For one thing, Mikoyan and Peng had apparently made Kim Il Sung agree to a number of things. This included a promise to publish the decrees of both the August and

September Plenums. Five days after the meeting with Mikoyan and Peng, the Koreans

264 Ibid. 119 had published what Ivanov described as a “pithy summary” of the September Plenum, which discussed only two issues: the Plenum’s success in deciding “organizational matters” and the need to observe Leninist norms and principles in party life.265 Kim Il

Sung explained to Ivanov that details of the difficulties encountered in the decision- making process were “omitted consciously” since the decree on the August Plenum “was not published and in his opinion there is no need to report in the press that these decrees were rash.” Moreover, “the CC KWP has never published its decrees on organizational issues and for this reason it is necessary to start publication with a good decree and not with a bad one.”266 Ivanov encouraged Kim to nonetheless proceed with the publication of the decrees, as he had promised to Mikoyan and Peng. The Korean leader claimed that they would be published, but only in a “separate brochure and distributed for discussion in party organizations.” Furthermore, “the section in which he quotes Mikoyan and Peng

Dehuai will be omitted from his speech.” By this omission, Kim explained, “the aim of not revealing the very fact of the visit of Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to Korea is achieved, not giving the Party masses reason to believe that the decree of the September Plenum was passed under pressure from fraternal parties or that fraternal parties were interfering in our internal affairs.”267 When Ivanov once again pressed Kim to publish the full records of the Plenums one month later, the North Korean leader informed the ambassador that he had not promised Mikoyan and Peng that he would publish the decrees, only that he would consider the matter.268

265 “Memorandum of conversation with the charge d’ affaires of the Chinese embassy in the DPRK, Chao Ke Xian,” RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy, pp.344-346. 266 Ibid. 267 Ibid. 268 Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiao Guang, 5 November 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy, pp.367-369. 120

The actions of Mikoyan and Peng were not limited to calling a Plenum of the

KWP CC Standing Committee, or even to demanding that the records of the meetings be published. As Ivanov’s diary entries reveal, Kim Il Sung had good reason to claim meddling by the fraternal parties. During a meeting with Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai demanded that Pak Ilu, a prominent China-returned Korean and former minister of the interior who was purged at the 1955 April KWP CC Plenum and imprisoned, along with former Korean Peoples’ Army officer Pang Ho-san, be released from prison and sent to

China. Aside from the fact that this was a direct violation of North Korean sovereignty,

Kim Il Sung would have had more reason to be alarmed by this demand. Four members of the KWP had already defected to the PRC in the immediate wake of the August

Plenum, and Beijing had refused to return them. If Kim were to then send Pak and Pang to China, there was a very real possibility that the Chinese leadership could use this group later to challenge Kim’s leadership.

On 5 November, Ivanov was informed by Ambassador Qiao Xiaoguang that “the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party shows great interest” in the measures taken by the Koreans “to carry out the decision of the September Plenum.” Ivanov replied that the CC KWP had reportedly “decided to release Pak Ilu from imprisonment,” though he did not indicate whether Pak would be allowed to depart for China.269

Ivanov and Qiao also discussed the flight of Yun Kongheum, Ri Pilgyu, Seo Hwi and Kim Changil, who were still in China. The Soviet ambassador asked if the four knew that as a result of the Mikoyan-Peng intervention they had been reinstated as members of the KWP, or whether they intended to return to the DPRK. Qiao replied that they are

269 “Memorandum of conversation with the Chinese ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Xiaoguang,” November 5, 1956. RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, Listy, pp.367-369. 121 aware of the decision, but “not wishing to return to the DPRK, they want to ask the government of the DPRK to allow their families to depart to China since they know also that the Korean government is not pressing for their return to the DPRK.” Qiao said further that Yun Kongheum, Seo Hwi, Kim Changil and Ri Pilgyu, in a letter addressed to the CCP CC and CPSU CC, blamed the Korean leadership for destroying a number of notable party actors in the period after liberation and during the war, for leading the country and party with anti-democratic methods, and for incorrectly appointing and cultivating leading cadres. In connection with this, they consider Pak Jeongae, Pak

Keumchul, Kim Chang-man, and Han Song-do as unqualified to occupy leading posts in the party; finally, they charged that the leadership was not carrying out a struggle against the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung.270

In closing, Ivanov informed Qiao Xiaoguang that the Korean leadership had released Ri Sangjo from his duties as ambassador to Moscow, but Ri refused to return to the DPRK and would in all likelihood remain either in the USSR or the PRC.271 Qiao then asked Ivanov how he thought the “Korean friends view the visit of Comrades

Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai to the DPRK.” Ivanov responded that “to judge by the course of the September Plenum, the reaction of the friends should be considered positive, however to confirm this categorically would be premature.” Qiao responded that he too

“has not yet reached a specific conclusion regarding the reaction of the friends to the visit of comrades Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai.”272 As is clear from records of conversations

270Ibid. 271 Ri remained in the USSR, which later rejected Pyongyang’s demands that he be extradited. Bernd Schaefer, “Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict,” p. 27. 272 Ibid. 122

Kim had with other communist officials in later years, the North Korean leader strongly resented the intervention.273

A report by the Deputy Director of the CC CPSU Department for Relations with

International Communist Parties of 15 October further enumerates the demands Mikoyan and Peng had made of Kim Il Sung: to suspend any further attacks on Soviet-Koreans and

China-returned Koreans and to reinstate all those expelled from the Party and CC after the first day of the plenum. However, as the report explains to the CC CPSU, “it is clear that Kim Il Sung essentially rejected the advice concerning the publication of the entire text of the decree of the Plenum of the CC KWP.”274 Kim did, however, reinstate the purged members of the opposition group. Nam Il informed Ambassador Ivanov on 19

November that Pak Changok was named director of construction of the Madong Cement

Factory while Choe Changik was offered the post of director of security for historical monuments of material culture, which he declined in favor of a return to his academic research.275 The reinstatements proved to be temporary, however.

The Great Purge and Declaration of Jaju

Kim Il Sung began to take measures to resist what he undoubtedly must have perceived as Soviet and Chinese imperial intrusion in the future by purging, over the course of the next two years, the conduits of Moscow and Beijing’s influence into the

273 See for example: Memorandum of Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Manush [Myftiu] composed by Albanian Ambassador to the DPRK, Hasan Alimerko, 4 October 1961, AQPPSH, MPP Korese, V. 1961, D4. 274 Letter from Ri Sangjo to the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, 5 October 1956, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 410, Listy, pp.233-295. 275 Memorandum of Conversation with North Korean Foreign Minister, Nam Il, 19 November 1956, RGANI Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 411, List., p.293.

123

DPRK, i.e., the remaining Soviet-Koreans and China-retuned Koreans. Kim was aided in his efforts to minimize the impact of Moscow and Beijing on the trajectory of political developments in the DPRK by events in Poland and Hungary. The anti-communist uprisings in Eastern Europe distracted the Soviet and Chinese Parties, providing the opportunity for Kim Il Sung to reassert his position in the KWP.

In the wake of the 1956 August Plenum, an increasingly xenophobic attitude spread as the remaining Soviet-Koreans, China-returned Koreans, and those who had come in contact with the “August group” were purged in 1957. The KWP established a special committee to investigate the “crimes” of the group, and all those who were connected to it. In the end, according to Soviet estimates, over 3,000 people had been purged. It included most of the remaining members of the KWP CC with Soviet or

Chinese ties, faculty at Kim Il Sung University who allegedly expressed concern about the growing cult of personality, and thousands of local officials.276

Soviet-Korean Pak Ui-wan, who himself was under investigation, described to the new Soviet Ambassador, A.M. Puzanov, in late September 1957 how extensive the campaign against the “August group” had grown. According to Puzanov’s report of the meeting, Pak explained that “harsh methods” were being used in interrogations. “[Pak] cited the example of the issue of chief of construction for repair of the city of Hamheung was examined at a Party meeting for fifteen days. They strenuously sought an answer from him to a single question, what assignment had he received last year from Kim

Seunghwa in connection with the plot. However, the construction chief answered that he had not received any assignment and then committed suicide. Pak Uiwan then said that

st 276 From a conversation with comr. Pimenov 1 Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 15.10.1957. No. 833/156/2421/57/tjn. Polish Foreign Ministry Archive 124 he already knew of eight cases of suicide by people who had been forced to confess to participation in factional activity or to their ties with the factionalists.”

Pak also suggested that individuals were being falsely accused of having ties to the

“August group,” but since such an “abnormal atmosphere” existed in the Party, “no one comes to the defense of these people because of a fear of being counted as participants of the factionalists' group.”277

At the December 1957 KWP CC Plenum, called to hear a report from the delegation to the Moscow Conference held to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, a full report on the activities on the “August group” was delivered. Their actions were conflated to an attempt to carry out a coup d'état, and it was alleged that they had military support in the wings.278 The major development of the

December Plenum was a speech delivered by Kim Il Sung, who had been a member of the delegation to the Moscow Conference. Kim proclaimed Jaju, or self-reliance in politics, to be the official policy of the KWP.279 One can surmise that after having eliminated most Soviet-Korean and China-returned Koreans from leadership positions

(purges would continue through early 1958), and still irked by the joint Sino-Soviet Party intervention in the DPRK’s sovereign affairs, Kim Il Sung was determined to impress upon the Soviets and Chinese, once and for all, the reality of the DPRK’s sovereignty. He was aided by the so-called Moscow Declaration, the report issued at the conference in

Moscow, which claimed that all "Socialist countries base their relations on the principles

277 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 29 September 1957" September 29, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 275-300. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115661 278 Correspondence abstract No. 3336 from Pyongyang on 19.3.58, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. 279 “Sahwejuui jinyeonge tongilgwa gukjaegongsanjuui undonge saeroun dangae” (Unification of the Socialist Camp and the New Stage of the International Communist Movement) Kim Il Sung Works 11 (Pyongyang: Korean Workers’ Party Publishing House, 1981). 125 of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in one another’s affairs.”280 These statements bolstered Kim’s claims to national sovereignty and independence.

The declaration of Jaju was both an ex post facto justification of the purges of

Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans, and more importantly, a reminder to

Moscow and Beijing that the identity of the KWP and the DPRK would be authored by the Korean people themselves, and not by the dominant countries in the international communist movement.

280 Complete text of the Declaration of the Twelve Communist and Workers Parties, Meeting in Moscow, USSR, Nov. 14-16, 1957, on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution (New York: New Century Publishers, December 1957). 126

Chapter Three: Self-Reliance in Economics (Jarip)

After completing its Three-year Plan (1954-1956) for national reconstruction,

North Korea launched its ambitious Five-year Plan (1957-1961) to construct the foundations for socialism. Kim Il Sung had hoped to obtain additional grants and loans from the socialist camp. However, from 1956, Moscow and its European satellites slowly scaled back their assistance to North Korea as the country was drawing up the Five-year

Plan. This was in part because they failed to comprehend Kim’s determination to prevent dependency relationships while at the same time expecting massive amounts of foreign assistance. They grew frustrated with what they perceived as Pyongyang’s increasingly nationalist and isolationist tendencies. Their frustrations were amplified by Pyongyang’s refusal to coordinate production and industrial development with other socialist countries through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON (also CMEA).

Likewise, China’s aid, which during the Three-year Plan had come largely in the form of goods, equipment, and the manual labor of the Chinese Peoples’ Volunteers

(CPV), was significantly reduced. Not only was Beijing aggravated by Kim Il Sung’s policies (Mao harshly criticized Kim in a meeting with Soviet Ambassador to Beijing,

Pavel Yudin, calling the North Korean leader another Tito or Imre Nagy and suggesting that he should be replaced281), the PRC was also experiencing its own economic difficulties, particularly after the launch of the 1958-1961 Great Leap Forward.

Self-reliance in economics (Jarip) became a virtue of necessity after the Soviet

Union and China reduced their assistance to North Korea during the period of the Five-

281 “Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin,” November 1956, From the private archive of Zhihua Shen. 127 year Plan. To compensate for the decline in aid, Kim Il Sung turned inward. Through the mobilization of indigenous human and material resources, North Korea achieved impressive, if lopsided results during the period of the Five-year Plan. This approach, which was both heavily-reliant on mobilization and slogan-oriented, became the hallmark of North Korean economic policies. Kim Il Sung also boldly rejected pressure to coordinate economic activities with other socialist countries through COMECON, fearing that the substantial variance in development between the DPRK and other countries in the

Soviet-bloc common market would mean North Korea would be forced to forego industrialization and forever remain a source of primary commodities and semi-finished goods.

While the theme of constructing an independent national economy had run like a

“leitmotiv” through North Korean economic plans from the 1940s, in the years following the Five-year Plan, it gained salience.282 In April and October 1963, two editorials carried in Rodong Sinmun proclaimed Jarip, or self-reliance in economics, as the official economic policy of the DPRK. As such, Jarip became the second pillar, or practical application, of Juche Thought. Kim described Jarip as “an indispensable requisite for the building of a rich and strong and civilized independent state,” without which, “it would be impossible to guarantee the firm political independence of a country […].” Jarip was not an expression of a desire to be self-sufficient or isolationist. Rather, Kim Il Sung sought to carefully manage North Korea’s interactions with other states. He was somewhat of an anomaly in the socialist camp; even if he was not aware of it, Kim Il

Sung was one of the earliest adherents of Dependency Theory, a theory of capitalist exploitation of underdeveloped countries that advocated rapid industrial development and

282 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 338. 128 import substitution.283 The difference was that Kim sought to protect North Korea not from capitalist exploitation, but from the exploitation of other socialist countries in the

Soviet-bloc common market. As he explained in a speech on Jarip:

We by no means oppose economic cooperation between states or advocate building socialist in isolation. What we do reject is the great-power chauvinist tendency to check the independent and comprehensive development of the economy of other countries and, furthermore, to subordinate their economy to one’s own on the pretext of “economic cooperation” and “international division of labor”. We consider that mutual cooperation should be based on the building of an independent national economy in each country, and that this alone makes possible the steady expansion and development of economic cooperation between states on the principles of complete equality and mutual benefit.284

There are three primary reasons for the greater salience of Jarip, and for its enshrinement as one of the pillars of Juche Thought: First, while Kim Il Sung had preferred to continue receiving assistance from his putative allies, the restrictions placed upon Soviet aid during the Three-year Plan limited the DPRK’s capacity to achieve its goals of expanding heavy industry, reinforcing the belief that economic dependency results in political subordination; Second, the near-constant pressure on North Korea to join COMECON from the late 1950s made Kim Il Sung even more determined to limit foreign influence and redouble efforts to rectify colonial-era distortions and establish an independent national economy; Third, in response to the reduction in foreign assistance during the Five-year Plan, Kim Il Sung launched the the slogan-oriented and mobilization-dependent Cheonlima Movement that successfully fulfilled most goals a year in advance (though North Koreans have a tendency to overstate their individual achievements, much to the consternation of those allies who continued to provide

283 Bruce Cumings describes Kim’s approach as neosocialist corporatism and postcolonial neomercantalism, where national struggle is a substitution for class struggle and “dependent, peripheral socialist nations unite horizontally in common cause.” Cumings, 315-316, 338. 284 Kim Il Sung, “on Socialist Construction in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution” in Kim Il Sung on Juche in Our Revolution, p. 432. 129 support) and did not result in any unwanted increase in foreign influence. The Five-year

Plan provided both the necessity and the opportunity to achieve Jarip.

Completion of the Three-year Plan

Despite domestic political turmoil in 1956, North Korea had successfully completed its first Three-year Plan (1954-1956) for post-war recovery and development.

Goals for industrial production were fulfilled in August 1956, i.e. four and-a-half months ahead of schedule. Targets for agricultural production were also met, but only barely.

According to contemporary Soviet reports, despite poor harvests in some northern provinces, the gross grain harvest throughout the country for 1956 was approximately 2.7 million tons, or roughly equal to 1949 levels. 285

After achieving goals for industry in August, the KWP took measures to elevate living standards. Beginning on November 1, 1956, the wages of factory and office workers were increased by 35 percent. The leadership also introduced new wage scales, according to which the minimum monthly wage was set at 1000 won, whereas previously it had been 600 won. In order to ease the tax liability of both private farmers and those already members of cooperatives, the KWP reduced in-kind tax payments and released peasants from returning grain loans in 1956 and arrears for past years. Yet, as North

Korean officials readily admitted, living standards had not yet returned to pre-war levels.286 Approximately 40 percent of all urban dwellers were dependent on rationed provisions for their subsistence.287

285 “The Situation in the KWP and the DPRK, December 28, 1956, AVPRF, No archival signature. 286 Ibid. 287 Factory and office workers received from 700 to 900 grams of grain a day and students and dependents were given from 400 to 500 grams of grain. Each ration consisted of 50 percent rice and 50 percent other 130

Soviet diplomats reported that the goods issued to urban dwellers through ration cards were far from sufficient for meeting the needs of families in food and clothing. The overwhelming majority of the urban population received almost no meat, fats, and sugar through their ration cards. Despite being surrounded on by water on two sides, the country had difficulties in procuring marine products, and fish was also issued irregularly.288

Conditions remained difficult in the countryside as well, though they were improving. In a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, Kim Il Sung explained that in 1955, of the one million peasant farms in the DPRK, 36 percent of farms did not have enough grain for five or six months; 30 percent did not have surplus grain and only met their own needs, and only the remaining 34 percent of the farms provided a marketable surplus of grain. By the end of the Three-year Plan, conditions had improved, but only slightly. By May 1957, with 78 percent of all farms integrated into cooperatives,

10 percent of farms still could not grow enough grain for two or three months. The remaining farms fully met their needs and provided a marketable surplus of grain.289

Housing continued to be a problem. In the three postwar years, the state built more than 3,500,000 square meters of housing. Nevertheless, about one-third of the urban population continued to live in “half-dugouts” and “flimsy [legkogo tipa] houses made of

cereals.287 Annually, workers were rationed three kilograms of vegetable oil, seven liters of soy sauce, seven kilograms of doenjang (fermented soybean paste), and twelve kilograms of salt. Manufactured goods were similarly rationed to urban populations. Factory and office workers received annual rations of cotton (15 to 28 meters), socks (3 to 12 pairs), soap (2 to 12 bars), and gomusin (Korean rubber shoes) (2 to 6 pairs). Ibid. 288 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 9 April 1957" April 09, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 1-15.. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115599. 289 Ibid. 131 stalks of sorghum and clay.” In the winter months, the urban population experienced an acute need for fuel, and public buildings, including schools, were almost unheated.290

Despite the fact that living standards had not yet been restored to prewar levels, the DPRK, with enormous amounts of aid from its socialist allies, was on the road to recovering industry and agriculture from the devastation of three years of war. With the completion of the Three-year Plan, North Korea had restored agricultural production, and in the case of industry, surpassed 1949 levels of production.291

The Five-year Plan, 1957-1961

At the KWP Third Party Congress in April 1956, Kim Il Sung declared that North

Korea would construct the foundations for socialism during a Five-year Plan. By that summer, he had already been aware that North Korea would receive less assistance from the socialist camp than it had in during the period of post-war reconstruction. Kim returned from a June-July trip to raise funds for the Five-year Plan with promises for only a fraction of the funds necessary to carry out the Five-year Plan. In December 1956, therefore, the KWP CC Plenum decreed that a significant portion of the funding required for the Five-year Plan would be derived from domestic sources.292 This was an important step in the process of Jarip’s transformation from recurring theme to official DPRK policy.

The Five-year Plan was gradually developed over the course of 1957, setting the goal of thoroughly eradicating all remnants of colonial-era imbalances in industry and of completing agricultural cooperativization in the shortest possible time. Heavy industry

290 Ibid. 291 “The Situation in the KWP and the DPRK, December 28, 1956, AVPRF, No archival signature. 292 PRC Foreign Ministry Archive (PRCFMA) no. 106-01129-01, p. 21, cited in Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, p. 15. 132 remained the primary focus, particularly machine-building industries. The metallurgical, chemical and construction material industries were also to be further developed, while at the same time broadening the energy base and developing the extraction industry.293 A parallel goal, if possible, was the resolution to continued problems with food, housing, and other essentials.

Despite the disappointing first round of fundraising efforts in the summer of 1956,

Kim Il Sung still hoped to receive additional aid from the USSR and the PRC. Foreign aid remained a critical external component in Kim’s plan to establish an independent national economy. However, North Korea’s relations with both Moscow and Beijing were strained in the wake of events of August and September 1956. This impacted, to an extent, the amount of support North Korea received from its putative allies, though both countries had earlier planned to gradually phase out aid to the DPRK in the late 1950s to early 1960s.294

In early 1957, the Soviet Union had already committed its support to a number of smaller projects, some of which were carried over from the Three-year Plan, while others were connected to goals under the Five-year Plan. These included an agreement to expand the production capacity for nitrogen fertilizer at the Heungnam Chemical Works

293 Correspondence abstract No. 3336 from Pyongyang on 19.3.58, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, No archival signature. 294 Central and Eastern European countries also began to scale back on support to the DPRK. Some gave excuses when presented with North Korean requests for additional aid. For example, when DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il passed the government’s requests to the Czechoslovak ambassador to Pyongyang, the latter expressed doubt about the ability to meet the requests inasmuch as, “ the Czechoslovak Republic itself has certain difficulties.” "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 2 May 1957" May 02, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 36-43. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115608 133 and a pledge to supply annually 30,000 tons of coke to fuel industrial furnaces.295

Moscow also delivered 40,000 tons of grains in 1957 and permitted North Korea to use

50 million rubles ($12.5 million) in credits ahead of schedule.296 The Soviet government did not fulfill all of Pyongyang’s requests for 1957 however. The head of a Soviet trade delegation informed Kim Il Sung in April that Moscow could not supply some items the

DPRK had requested: “In view of the limited nature of export resources for some goods it has not proven possible to completely grant [North Korea’s] request.”297 The trade delegation officials also encouraged the North Koreans to plan better and develop longer-

298 term requests for aid and trade, covering periods of three to five years.

In July 1957, Vice Premier Kim Il travelled to Moscow for consultations on the

Five-year Plan. He remained there for nearly six weeks to work out schedules for Soviet loans and for trade with the USSR. During Kim Il Sung’s trip to Moscow the previous

July, the Soviet leadership had promised 300 million rubles ($75 million), a “paltry” amount for a Five-year Plan.299 The Soviet leadership again did not fulfill all of North

Korea’s needs in 1957. A request for an extension on a 240 million ruble ($60 million)

295 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 9 April 1957" April 09, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 1-15. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115599 296 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 17 April 1957" April 17, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 16-35. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115605. Also see Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961,” NKIDP Working Paper No. 4, (2012), pp. 15-16. 297 In trade, North Korea had offered to deliver goods estimated to be worth 21 million rubles to the Soviet Union in 1957: zinc concentrate - 7,000 tons; silver, five tons; crude copper, 50 tons; lead, 1,340 tons; tungsten steel - 60 tons; rolled ferrous metals, 10,000 tons; cast iron - 1,000 tons; ammonium sulfate - 20,000 tons; cement - 50,000 tons; ferrophosphorus - 3,000 tons; acetylene black - 350 tons; apples - 1,000 tons; and silk fiber - 500,000 meters. The Soviet trade representative at the embassy initially refused to agree to Kim Il Sung’s offer to send these items, as some of the items were of lower quality than what was readily available in the Soviet Union. See "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 17 April 1957" April 17, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 16-35. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115605 298 Ibid. 299 This amount is small when compared to the amount of one billion rubles given during the Three-year Plan. Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, 149. 134 loan, set to mature in 1961 or 1962, was rejected. A record of a meeting of the CPSU

Central Committee Presidium reveals a high level of frustration with their North Korean allies in the summer of 1957. Anastas Mikoyan described the North Korean Five-year

Plan as unrealistic and unachievable, advising his colleagues that the Soviet Union should

“tell [the North Koreans] frankly that they need to pay back the debt and interest.”

Khrushchev added to Mikoyan’s criticism of the North Koreans, noting that Kim Il Sung should clear off his debts, “otherwise, we will not give him a new loan.”300

Yet, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang improved, particularly after

Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, who according to the North Koreans had encouraged the activities of the “August group,” was replaced in April 1957. Moscow’s new envoy, A.M.

Puzanov, demonstrated much more patience and understanding with his Korean colleagues, if not too much. Kim Il Sung spent nearly twenty days in Moscow in

November 1957 along with representatives of the KWP and government while attending the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution. In 1958, North Korea extracted a major concession from the Soviet Union in the form of an agreement to “develop a plan of scientific research work to organize the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.”301 On March 17, 1959, the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed a new economic agreement, according to which Moscow would provide Pyongyang with industrial equipment and technical aid valued at 500 million rubles ($125 million). Soviet leaders also pledged to help North Korea construct a power plant and other factories, including a chemical factory and flax and woolen mills. Moscow also agreed to expand

300 Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (hereafter AVPRF), f. 0102, op. 13, papka 5, pp. 275-300, cited in Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,” p. 17. 301 "From the Journal of Gromyko, Record of a Conversation with Ambassador Ri Sin-Pal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" April 28, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 14, delo 4, p. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/116019 135 the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex.302 While Soviet-DPRK relations rebounded after the events of August and September 1956, Moscow’s aid to Pyongyang was still far less than it had been during the Three-year Plan.

The People’s Republic of China had been less forthcoming with aid to the

DPRK.303 In the fall of 1956 when North Korea asked for grain assistance in the amount of 200,000 tons, Beijing initially offered less than half of the amount requested; 90,000 tons. After further negotiations, the Chinese leadership begrudgingly raised the amount to

150,000 tons. The following spring, Kim Il Sung proposed sending a representative to

Beijing for consultation on the Five-year Plan. The Chinese informed the Korean leadership that the earliest possible date for such a meeting was July. In an early-April conversation between Ambassador Puzanov and Qiao Xiaoguang, Chinese ambassador to

North Korea, about Kim Il Sung’s plan to send a delegation to Beijing and Moscow for consultations on the Five-year Plan, the Chinese envoy immediately informed Puzanov that “Considering certain difficulties the PRC will hardly be able to give additional aid to the DPRK in the development of the economy.”304 This was more likely a reflection of

China’s frustration with Kim Il Sung and the North Korean leadership after the events of

1956 than it was China’s actual inability to provide North Korea with continued assistance, particularly when one considers the fact that China later supplied aid (albeit in

302 Ibid. 303 According to Soviet reports, personal contacts between Party and government leaders were rarely maintained. Kim Il Sung declined to travel to Beijing to attend the Eight CCP Congress. Kim Il Sung also did not attend festive meetings and receptions at the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang during national holidays, although he did visit the Soviet embassy for comparable events associated with the national holidays of the Soviet Union. “The Korean friends,” one Soviet diplomat noted, “are rarely encountered with officials of the Chinese Embassy and do not consult with them enough about questions of government and Party policy.” 304 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 10 April 1957" April 10, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 1-15. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115600 136 more limited amounts than in the immediate post-war period) to the DPRK even during the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-1961). Chinese leaders also dragged their feet in making important decisions related to aid and trade. Three months after North Korea had submitted a request for an additional 50 million yuan in aid, Kim Il Sung was informed that his request had been refused and that the Chinese leadership was not prepared to coordinate in drafting the Five-year Plan. The North Koreans cancelled the scheduled July trip of Deputy Premier Kim Il to Beijing.305

Several issues factored into the worsening of relations between Pyongyang and

Beijing. First, China had refused to return the four KWP CC members who had escaped across the border during the August Plenum. This was a particularly sensitive subject for the North Korean leadership. Moreover, as Puzanov observed in a report, “the refusal of the Chinese friends to grant new economic aid to the DPRK contributed to some deepening of the abnormalities in Chinese-Korean relations. No response to a request of the Chinese leadership by Kim Il Sung to grant additional free aid or credits in 1957 in the amount of 50 million yuan was given for three months and then a refusal followed.”306

For its part, North Korea further raised Chinese ire by proposing in November

1956 to bring the question of Korea’s unification to the United Nation. According to a memo sent to Beijing by the DPRK government, the UN could oversee the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula and oversee peaceful unification. With tens of thousands of CPV troops still stationed in North Korea, China rejected the scheme,

305 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 16 May 1957" May 16, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 44-113. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115613 306 Ibid. 137 noting that China considered the UN a belligerent party, thereby disqualifying it from administering an impartial resolution to the Korean issue.307 It was in this context that

Mao met with Soviet ambassador Yudin on November 30th and suggested that Kim should be replaced, lest he withdraw from the socialist camp. As stated in chapter two,

Mao alleged that “Kim wants to drive the CPV army out of Korea. He might follow J.B.

Tito’s road, or even Imre Nagy’s steps.” Mao even suggested that China should take advantage of the CPV army’s presence in Korea “to help Kim Il Sung correct his mistakes.”308

From mid-1957, the North Koreans began to express their desire for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Korea. Despite benefiting tremendously from the presence of tens-of-thousands of CPV engaged in reconstruction, North Korean leaders were growing increasingly uncomfortable with the presence of a foreign army, which they began to view as an occupation army. In a conversation with Puzanov, DPRK

Foreign Minister Nam Il suggested that the Soviet Union could raise the issue of unilateral withdrawal of troops from the Korean peninsula in an upcoming session at the

United Nations on Korea. The Soviet ambassador further reported that “the Korean friends have a desire for units of the Chinese troops to be withdrawn from the DPRK and stationed in China along the border with the DPRK.”309

After some delay, Beijing signaled its willingness to discuss trade with North

Korea. Shen and Xia attribute this to Mao’s belief that he had inherited Stalin’s mantle as

307 See Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,” p. 14. 308 “Mao Zedong’s Conversation with P. Yudin,” November 30, 1956, from the personal collection of Zhihua Shen, cited in Ibid. 309 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 4 June 1957" June 04, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 114-130. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115623 138 the head of the socialist camp and therefore needed to demonstrate magnanimity to his

North Koreans subordinates.310 Kim Il then travelled to Beijing in September, where he held twenty days of discussions with his Chinese counterparts on the Five-year Plan. The

North Koreans did not discuss loans with the Chinese in Beijing, rather, they focused on the delivery of goods, particularly cotton, coke, and supplies for the Korean metallurgical industry.

Relations began to slowly improve following negotiations on the Five-year Plan in September and early October 1957, though China’s aid, as noted above, was rather limited. In November, when both Mao and Kim Il Sung were in Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution, Mao apologized to Kim Il Sung for the

PRC’s behavior in sending Peng Dehuai to Pyongyang in September 1956. Mao recognized that the visit could be assessed as interference in the internal affairs of the

KWP. Therefore, he noted:

[W]e have decided not to resort to such actions any more. There can be shortcomings and mistakes in work in every Party, which they have to correct themselves. You had high-handed methods, you are correcting them, we had shortcomings in the CCP, we criticized ourselves, we were criticized, [and] we also are correcting the shortcomings. The main thing is that there be friendly relations and complete mutual understanding between our Parties.311

Kim welcomed Mao’s apology for interfering in North Korean affairs, which set the tone for friendly discussions on another matter of concern to both China and North

Korea: the continued presence of CPV in Korea four years after the armistice. In their second conversation in Moscow, the two leaders discussed the withdrawal of the CPV from North Korea. Kim Il Sung reasoned that if China were to withdraw its troops from

310 Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,” pp. 16-17. 311 "From the Journal of A. M. Puzanov, Record of a Conversation with Kim Il Sung" November 12, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, Delo 5. https://cwihp- live.secondstory.net/document/115932 139 the peninsula, the United States might do the same in South Korea. Otherwise,

Washington’s imperialist intentions would be exposed to the world.312 Shortly after returning to Pyongyang, Kim sent two telegrams to Beijing. In the first, he informed Mao that the KWP CC had agreed to the withdrawal of the CPV. In the second telegram, he proposed two methods and asked for the opinion of the PRC leadership. One option was for the DPRK government to issue a statement calling for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Korean peninsula. The Chinese government would then express its support for Pyongyang’s proposal. The other method was for the Chinese government to issue a statement proposing the withdrawal of foreign troops from the peninsula, and the North Korean government would support the proposal. The Chinese leadership agreed to adopt the first measure.313 In February 1958, Zhou Enlai travelled to

Pyongyang to work out the terms of the withdrawal, which was completed by November.

In November and again in December, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing for the first time since 1954 (although he made almost annual trips to Moscow).314 While in China, the North Korean leader was taken on tours of People’s Communes and of factories.

Relations continued to improve with Beijing after Kim Il Sung’s trip to Beijing, though not to the extent suggested by Shen and Xia.315 Conversations with Central and Eastern

European diplomats reveal that North Koreans continued to have reservations about

312 Conversation between Premier Zhou and Soviet Ambassador Yudin, January 8, 1958. Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive. Full record information unavailable. 313 "Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Soviet Ambassador Yudin (Excerpt)" January 08, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRCFMA 109-00828-01. pp. 4-7. https://cwihp- live.secondstory.net/document/114173 314 Kim Il Sung also travelled to Vietnam, stopping over in Beijing a second time en route to Pyongyang. 315 Shen and Xia argue that Kim Il Sung was won over during his trip to China by promises of aid, including supplies of cotton and coke. Kim’s conversations with foreign diplomats after his trip suggest that while the North Korean leader was certainly pleased with the additional assistance, there were still issues of trust. Moreover, Kim was not completely convinced that China’s policies, particularly in agriculture, were applicable to Korea. As I will discuss, after a brief experiment with communal dining halls in cooperatives, Kim rejected the communes as unsuitable for Korean conditions. 140

Beijing’s policies, though the DPRK certainly indigenized some Chinese strategies for mass mobilization, and even experimented, if only briefly, with massive communes, as I will discuss below.

Thus, relations with Moscow and Beijing improved after the events of 1956.

These incremental improvements in relations did not fully transfer to increased, sustainable economic assistance, which North Korea desperately needed to carry out the ambitious goals of the Five-year Plan. Thus, while in 1954, i.e. the first year of the Three- year Plan, foreign aid to the DPRK accounted for 33.4 percent of total state revenues, by

1958, the year the Five-year Plan was formally adopted, the amount of foreign aid dropped to 4.5 percent.316 As Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate toward the end of the 1950s, Moscow and Beijing began to compete for Pyongyang’s loyalties. North

Korea officially maintained a policy of equidistance between its quarrelling allies, though

Kim continued to pay lip service to Moscow’s leadership of the socialist camp. The

DPRK even supported the Soviet position on the 1958 Taiwan Straights crisis. Kim’s sympathies increasingly shifted toward China however. In 1960, Rodong Sinmun republished a Chinese article “Long Live Leninism—In Commemoration of Lenin’s 90th

Birth” which challenged Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence and his views on the nature of imperialism and socialist revolution. While in Beijing on a secret visit, Kim informed Mao that the KWP supported the Chinese line on Khrushchev’s revisionism, suggesting that the DPRK had rejected the Soviet leader’s position on not directly opposing U.S. imperialists as early as 1955.317

316 Kyung-chan Kim and Dong-kyu Kim, Human Remolding in North Korea: A Social History of Education (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2005), p. 107. 317 “Minutes of Mao Zedong’s Conversation with Kim Il Sung,” 21 May 1960, cited in Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, p. 28. 141

Shortly after his secret trip to Beijing, Kim traveled to Moscow for meetings with

Khrushchev. When the Kremlin leader raised the issue of the Chinese article being re- published in Rodong Sinmun, Kim alleged that it was re-published only because “a good part of it dealt with revisionism that has not been mentioned in the Korean press for quite a while.” Moreover, as Puzanov explained to the Czechoslovak ambassador, “Kim Il

Sung did not know that it was actually a disguised attack against the CPSU.” Kim chalked its re-publication up to inexperience and lower levels of ideological sophistication.318 Aware that Kim was being courted by Mao (Khrushchev informed Kim that Moscow was aware of his secret trip to the PRC two weeks before), Khrushchev sought to win over the North Korean leadership by revealing documents allegedly demonstrating that Beijing was behind the actions of the “August group.”319 Moreover,

Khrushchev delivered to Kim what he considered to be incontrovertible proof of Mao’s duplicity; the memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin and Mao Zedong on November 30, 1956 in which Mao compared the North Korean leader to Hungary’s Imre Nagy and to Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito, suggesting that he should be replaced before he steers the DPRK away from the socialist camp. According to Puzanov’s account of the encounter:

Kim Il Sung was extremely indignant at Mao Zedong's statements. In the course of reading the information he said several times, “This is a lie. This didn't happen. How could Mao Zedong not only say but even think such a thing about me,” etc. Kim Il Sung was very disturbed and at first was even taken aback and sat silent for some time, and smoked unusually much. It was the first time I had occasion to observe Kim Il Sung in such a condition. Usually it is hard to upset his equilibrium. Outwardly, he always remains calm.[…] Kim Il Sung exclaimed, “how could Mao Zedong not only say, but even think that I could be a traitor, that I could be in collusion with Syngman Rhee? This is a right-out lie and

318 "Record of Conversation between the Czech Ambassador in the DPRK with the Soviet Ambassador" July 26, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Central Archive, Prague, File A. Novotny, foreign affairs, DPRK. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113700 319 Ibid. 142

slander! The Chinese leaders are behaving hypocritically: they say one thing to your face and another behind your back. The CPSU and Soviet Government leaders act entirely differently. Cde. N. S. Khrushchev speaks frankly to us about our shortcomings and mistakes in a Party-like, comradely manner. He vigorously and consistently supports the correct policy of the KWP CC and DPRK government.

The transcript of Mao’s conversation with Yudin likely reinforced Kim’s distrust of the

Chinese leadership, though Khrushchev’s strategy to drive a wedge between Pyongyang and Beijing was only effective in the short term. Kim pragmatically sought to maintain his policy of equidistance, fearing that by closely allying with one or the other, their political influence would grow inside the DPRK, and Pyongyang would limit its options for trade and assistance.

To an extent—though not to the degree that some scholars have suggested—Kim consciously benefited from the two powers competing for Pyongyang’s allegiances.320

Pyongyang did not necessarily have the ability to play Moscow and Beijing off one another. Rather, North Korea maintained a cautious policy of equidistance so as not to allow either side in the emerging Sino-Soviet competition to gain too much influence over the trajectory of political and economic developments in the country. This did not prevent the two communist powers from competing for North Korea’s support. Moscow intensified its competition with Beijing for North Korea’s allegiance in the late 1950s and into the early 1960s, taking advantage of the disastrous Great Leap Forward in China by providing additional assistance. For example, in June 1959, North Korea requested a five- year extension of a 123 million ruble (USD 30.75 million) loan which was set to mature in 1960. Khrushchev approved the DPRK request. Soviet generosity was not limitless,

320 See for example, Nobuo Shimotomai, ""Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972" in The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), pp. 122-151. 143 even in the competition for North Korea’s loyalty. Moscow turned down additional requests for aid submitted through Ambassador Puzanov in late 1959.321 In 1960, however, as the Sino-Soviet competition intensified, the DPRK and the USSR signed a long term trade agreement covering 1961 to 1965. According to the stipulations of the agreement, over a five year period trade between the two countries would be worth 900 million Rubles; 450 million rubles each for exports and imports. This constituted an increase of 80% in terms of total value compared to trade with the Soviet Union over the previous five years.322 Moreover, in August of the same year, the Soviet leadership released North Korea from repaying loans of 760 million rubles.323 For its part, China also attempted to win over the DPRK, despite its own economic difficulties. In the fall of

1960, the Beijing extended a line of credit to Pyongyang totaling 420 million rubles.324

In a meeting with the ambassadors of the socialist camp in Pyongyang, Puzanov argued that the Koreans should continue receiving aid in 1961, despite the fact that other countries may be more deserving. The Czechoslovak ambassador to Pyongyang reported that Puzanov reasoned: “why should we lose the influence we have gained in the

DPRK?” The report then explained that “C[omrade] Puzanov is convinced that Korean comrades basically follow experiences of the Soviet Union; apparently, he meant his remark as an indication of superior Soviet influence over Chinese.”325 As the

321 AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 14, p. 6, l. 117-44, 154-85; AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 16, p. 6, l. 28-61, 72-122, cited in Shen and Xia, “China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea,” p. 27. 322 Information on Trade between [North] Korea and the Soviet Union and Six Countries of Eastern Europe, 8/19/1963, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, 106-00720-01, Page 164 – 185. 323 JOURNAL of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for the period 24 August through 9 September 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 324 "Chinese Policy toward the DPRK and behavior of the Chinese Ambassador in Pyongyang" March 16, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/bc-0030/1961 5.d. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/113388. 325 “Special political report No. 5 Some misguided trends in the political development of the DPRK.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, File No. 003727/61-7, March 27, 1961. 144

Czechoslovak ambassador recalled in his report, “[b]ased on a conversation of c[omrade]

Puzanov with c[omrade] Kim Il Sung about poor deliveries from the PRC, it appears that

Korean comrades are well aware of economic difficulties of the PRC and what causes them, which of course is working against the efforts of Chinese comrades to exert political and economic influence over the DPRK.”326

COMECON

For all of Moscow’s efforts to secure Pyongyang’s allegiance in the emerging

Sino-Soviet competition, there was one issue that would remain a constant source of tension between Soviet and North Korean officials from the late 1950s; the determination to integrate North Korea into COMECON to coordinate industrial development and production. This issue, perhaps more than anything, drove North Korea toward economic autarky and the adoption of Jarip as official policy.

The late 1950s saw greater emphasis on international economic integration and national specialization in the socialist camp, coordinated through COMECON. Although the DPRK acquired observer status in 1957, it never fully integrated into COMECON.

The trend toward economic integration and coordination came into direct conflict with

Pyongyang’s aspiration for economic establishing an independent national economy after rectifying colonial-era imbalances. During the process of post-war reconstruction, North

Korean requests revealed a desire for more than the restoration of those industries built by the Japanese as well as the facilities constructed by the Koreans after liberation and before the start of the Korean War. They wanted to expand the heavy industry base so that the country would not only be a source of primary commodities and semi-finished

326 Ibid. 145 goods, but also a producer of finished goods. In many cases, however, the industries that

North Korean leaders wanted to construct in the DPRK were already highly developed in other socialist countries. The Soviet leadership perceived this as a nationalist or isolationist policy. Yet, as previously noted, the need to establish an independent national economy had been a recurring theme since before the Korean War. Bruce Cumings’ work with the so-called “captured documents” revealed that as early as the late 1940s Kim Il

Sung spoke about the need “to build our own democratic homeland independently using our own strength and our own assets” to guarantee “the jajuseong of our national economy.” Whether he was aware of it or not, Kim Il Sung applied many of the recommended policies advanced by adherents of Dependency Theory, including rapid industrialization and import substitution.327

Ambassador Puzanov tried to convince his North Korean interlocutors of the need to better coordinate with the Socialist camp for industrial development and production.

On April 11, 1957, within days of arriving in Pyongyang as the new Soviet envoy,

Puzanov held a meeting with the Deputy Chairmen of the Cabinet of Ministers, Kim Il and Hong Myeong-hui, in which he encouraged the North Korean leadership to better coordinate with other socialist countries:

As regards the development of the DPRK economy, then it seems to me that one ought to proceed not from the position of the creation of a closed economy but from the economic advisability of creating and developing individual sectors on the basis of local natural historical and climate conditions. Here it is necessary to take into account the need to strengthen economic ties with the countries of the socialist camp and the developing division of labor among them.328

327 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 315, 335. 328 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 11 April 1957" April 11, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 1-15. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115601 146

In December 1957, during a joint Soviet-North Korean session on questions of scientific-technical cooperation, Soviet officials advised their North Korean colleagues against further developing the machine-building industry in the DPRK, and to instead focus efforts on the construction of factories that produced spare parts for the already developed machine-building industry in other socialist countries. They explained that conditions in the DPRK were not suitable for complicated or precision machines. The

Soviets had supplied technological documentation for forty-five spare parts factories in early 1956, but as one Soviet diplomat informed his Polish counterpart, but to their frustration, the North Koreans had done nothing with them.329

While in Moscow attending the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU in 1959,

Khrushchev directly criticized North Korea’s goals for the Five-year Plan as unrealistic in a conversation with Kim Il Sung. According to a report of the conversation prepared by a

Soviet diplomat:

Comrade Khrushchev did not agree with this plan, and made clear that these plans were not realistic, because they lacked an economic base. One could not base such a huge plan only on the dynamism and enthusiasm of the workers, Comrade Khrushchev said. He censured the Korean comrades for taking no account of the possibility of cooperation with the other fraternal countries [meaning through COMECON], and for wanting to produce everything by themselves. … Comrade Khrushchev’s opinion was disregarded, and Kim Il Sung maintained that they were able to fulfill the plan. Khrushchev told him that they [the Soviet leaders] also wished to fulfill their Seven-year Plan in five years, but if that was not possible, one had to acknowledge it.330

For all their talk of being head of the anti-imperialist camp, Soviet leaders could not understand Kim Il Sung’s postcolonial rationale for not wanting to join an organization that would limit its freedom of action. It was not for lack of effort by the

329 From a conversation with Botsin, the deputy director of the economic office at the Emb[assy] of the USSR on 30.XI.1957, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. 330Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 16 December 1959, KTS, 11. Doboz, 24/b, 001660/1960, cited in Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p. 137. 147

North Korean. North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol tried to clarify North

Korea’s position in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky. He noted:

Now our party has adopted a dictum: to build socialism based on self-reliance. We know that already some people are inclined to accuse us of nationalism and even of opposition to the international division of labor. But this is not correct, says Pak Seongcheol, for we cannot tell [orientirovat] our people all our lives, until we build communism, that the Soviet Union and the PRC will help us, will give us everything. We already have many [people with] parasitic attitudes, [who say] that it is time to work a little less, make lesser aims, ask for more technologies from the Soviet friends, that is – that the Soviet Union and the PRC take on greater responsibilities in the construction of communism in the DPRK. This is also wrong. Here is where we took the dictum of “self-reliance.” And some people are already trying to connect this dictum with the [allegation] that [we] ignore the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and do not want to take COMECON into account. […]331

Kim Il Sung was hyper-vigilant about safeguarding the sovereign prerogatives of

North Korea. This superseded all concerns about intra-bloc cooperation, particularly when it came to Soviet pressure to coordinate economic activities and develop complementary specialties though COMECON. Kim was opposed to ceding the country’s sovereignty to any multi-lateral institutions dominated by larger powers. He viewed the notion of pooled sovereignty as a threat to North Korea, which as a result of

Japanese colonial practices, the Korean War, and restrictions on Soviet aid during the

Three-year Plan, remained far less developed than its counterparts in Central and Eastern

Europe. If North Korea were to enter into COMECON, Kim believed, the country would be forced to forego further industrialization and focus its efforts on extractive and initial processing industries, and become dependent on outside powers for importing advanced machinery and finished goods. Kim perceived this as an attempt, to borrow an expression from Ha-Joon Chang, to “kick away the ladder” so that North Korea would forever

331 "Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol" August 26, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 18, papka 93, delo 5, listy 28-29. https://cwihp- live.secondstory.net/document/110486 148 remain an underdeveloped and dependent country.332 As Kim later boasted to a South

Korean delegation of the North-South Coordinating Committee in November 1972, he refused Nikita Khrushchev’s suggestion that North Korea coordinate its activities with

COMECON because there was such a discrepancy between the Soviet Union and North

Korea in terms of economic capability. Kim likened Korea to being in kindergarten, while the Soviet Union was in graduate school. If North Korean had joined COMECON,

“the discrepancy would only expand and North Korea’s participation in COMECON would leave North Korea with a lot of empty holes, where the Russians would be digging all the natural resources in exchange for finished products that the Soviet Union would be providing North Korea.” Kim therefore declined Khrushchev’s suggestion, saying “we are going to remain kindergarten kids and you may go and advance as graduate students.

That is the way we will feel safe.”333 Thus, Kim Il Sung’s quest for autonomy was a pragmatic plan for strengthening Korea.

Carrying out the Five-Year Plan

Kim Il Sung certainly must have been disappointed by the aid and trade packages given by Moscow and Beijing at the start of the Five-year Plan. He had counted on the initially large amounts of foreign assistance to minimize future dependence on aid. He used this aid to finance imports of capital goods that would create the material basis for a self-reliant industrial complex. Thus, foreign assistance was a necessary condition for several years as North Korea rectified colonial-era imbalances in growth and established

332 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder, Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: Anthem Press, 2003). 333 Lee Dongbok, former Chief of Staff to Korean Central Intelligence Agency director Lee Hurak who was present at the November 1972 meeting described the exchange at the 2010 North Korea International Documentation Project critical oral history conference “The Rise and Fall of Détente on the Korean Peninsula: 1970-1974.” Christian Ostermann and James Person ed., The Rise and Fall of Détente on the Korean Peninsula: 1970-1974 (Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011) 28-29. 149 an independent national economy. He did not expect it to be drawn down so quickly, however, despite the difficulties he first encountered in securing promises of support for the Five-year Plan during his trip throughout the socialist camp in June and July 1956.

The lessons of the negotiations over the Five-year Plan likely reinforced a lesson Kim had learned during his partisan activities; the idea of being master of one’s own destiny and of not being able to rely on others.

Following negotiations in Moscow and Beijing, the First Conference of the KWP discussed the North Korean Five-year Plan in March 1958.334 According to Party bylaws, conferences could be called between congresses to decide pressing matters of policy and strategy and also to make significant changes to the composition of the CC.335 The First

Conference was a turning point in the establishment of Jarip as a pillar of Juche, though it would increase in significance still. Kim delivered the concluding speech at the conference in which he briefly outlined Party’s position of Jarip. He explained that through the Five-year Plan, the Party would “completely liquidate colonial lopsidedness in industry and build an independent, self-supporting economy…” This, Kim noted,

“means building a country in which we can earn our own living, that is, a country which can support itself.”336 He did not describe the conditions under which the Five-year Plan would be carried out, i.e. with reduced assistance, but outlined and justified decisions on priorities for development. The Five-year Plan was formally adopted three months later at the Third Session of the SPA in June 1958.

334 See Report from Comrade Sluczanski based on a Telegram from Comrade Siedlecki regarding the Agenda of the March Conference" March 19, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/110340 335 Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 220. 336 Kim Il Sung, “For the Successful Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan” in Kim Il Sung On Juche in our Revolution (Brooklyn, NY: Guardian Associates, 1977), p. 172 150

Despite the setbacks, North Koreans were generally very optimistic about the

Five-Year Plan. Following the KWP First Conference, in April 1958 DPRK Ambassador to Moscow Ri Sinpal shared his impressions with M.V. Zimyanin, Chief of the Soviet

Foreign Ministry’s Far East Department. Ri described the achievements of the DPRK in the development of industry and agriculture, noting that “the DPRK now already holds one of the first places in Asia in per capita production and by the end of the Five-year plan it might surpass Japan in many types of industrial and agricultural production.”337

On November 20, Kim Il Sung even more optimistically declared that the DPRK would catch up with Japan in per capita output even before the completion of the Five-year Plan, in 1959.338

The goals of the Five-Year Plan were ambitious. The plan stipulated that industrial output would grow 142.7 percent from 1956 through 1961 with an average annual growth rate of 19.3 percent, of which heavy industry would grow by 19.9 percent and light industry by 18.7 percent on average each year. Agricultural output would rise by 70.5 percent, including 33.1 percent growth in grain.339 The overall sum of investment in major construction during the Five-year Plan would amount to 146.5 million won.

While not insignificant, the amount of foreign aid North Korea received from the

Soviet Union and China was less than expected. The limited aid North Korea received would be used to acquire the capital goods necessary to construct the material basis of a self-reliant industrial complex. To compensate for the decline in outside assistance, Kim

337 "From the Journal of M.V. Zimyanin, Record of Conversation with DPRK Ambassador in the USSR Cde. Ri Sin-pal" April 04, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 14, Delo 5. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115931 338 Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p. 122. Szalontai observes that Kim’s declaration was strikingly similar to Mao’s pledge to catch up with and outstrip Britain in fifteen years. 339 "Li Fuchun’s Report on Sino-Korean Trade Negotiations" September 30, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Planning Commission Archives. https://cwihp- live.secondstory.net/document/114171 151

Il Sung turned to the North Korea people. He successfully mobilized indigenous human and material resources to fulfill the goals of the first Five-year Plan.340 Kim’s approach, which was both slogan-oriented and heavily reliant on mobilization, became the hallmark of North Korean economic policies.

By the end of 1956, Kim had already been aware that North Korea would receive less assistance for the Five-year Plan. In late December, the North Korean leader visited the Kangson steel mill. According to North Korean legend, Kim first met with the steel mill’s managers and informed them of the Party’s increased demands on the steel industry. When the managers expressed doubt that they had the capability to produce an additional 10,000 tons of steel per year in excess of the mill’s rated maximum of 60,000 tons per year, Kim asked to speak directly with the workers. The North Korea premier reportedly assembled the workers and delivered a candid and rousing speech in which he claimed that he could not rely on anyone other than them. He encouraged them to think of creative ways of increasing production, noting that “In implementing the plan for 1957 we need lots of funds and materials, but we lack everything.” He then described the precarious position in which the country had been placed: “people in some country try to impose their factionalism upon us. People in another country try to get control of us in cooperation with those people. The factionalists in our country depend on their masters for support.” Moreover, “Rhee Syngman’s South Korea attempts to attack the North with the help of the United States.” He asked the workers then: “Whom shall we trust? There is none other than you whom we can trust.” According to the legend, the assembled workers, so moved by their leader’s speech, tried to assuage Kim of his concerns, promising to produce not 10,000, but 20-30,000 additional tons of steel.

340 Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 80. 152

Kim’s visit to the Kangson Steel Mill was not to learn from the masses, but rather to educate the masses on Party policy and to impart in them the leader’s belief in voluntarism as a driving force of change. He went to inspire them to over-fulfill production targets, notwithstanding the absence of the appropriate means of production.

Kim’s partisan activities taught him that ideology was superior to materialism. His voluntarism supplanted the Marxist theory that material conditions are the fundamental determinant of social development and human action. The North Koreans thus reverse

Marx’s historical materialism. As Charles Armstrong argues, “rather than superstructural transformation resulting from changes in relations of production, in North Korea’s official ideology “thought revolution’ is the first step in transforming individuals and society, out of which comes ‘correct’ political organization, and finally increased economic production.”341

Even before the Korean War, Kim had transformed the KWP into a mass party which enabled him to disseminate his voluntaristic message. In the wake of the 1955 spring famine, when both industry and agriculture lacked in means of production, Kim focused on education and the need to increase “revolutionary optimism” as the key to increased production not just in agriculture, but also in industry. The cooperativization of agriculture was in part a method to educate and to strengthen the role of the Party among the peasantry. With both industry and agriculture brought completely under the complete authority of the Party by 1958, the channels through which the Party would disseminate

Kim’s vision were fully developed. He continued to focus on education through intense guidance programs (jipchung jido) that brought him and leading cadres to all corners of the country.

341 Armstrong, The Koreas, pp. 68-69. 153

Parallels can be drawn between the “mass line” techniques of Kim Il Sung and

Mao. However, unlike Mao, Kim placed more emphasis on leading, as opposed to learning from, the masses. It was a very top-down process. As Bruce Cumings has argued,

Kim’s mass line was less “from the masses to the masses” than it was “to the masses, from the masses, and to the masses.”342 Cumings suggests that Kim Il Sung never, from the beginning, “trucked with Maoist ideas about the spontaneity and creativity of the masses, the peasantry, or proletariat as the epistemological source of good ideas.” Kim’s use of the Maoist mass line techniques of leadership was “not a reflex of a radical epistemology, but for implementation of what the Party wanted.”343 The North Korean leader’s style was very top-down.

The Party’s intense guidance programs were designed to lead by example. As Dae

Sook Suh notes, Kim personally traveled throughout the country and conducted on-the- spot guidance (hyeonji jido). He visited factories, cooperatives, schools, and military bases. He attended provincial party conferences in Gangwondo and Yanggando. He participated in meetings of mass organizations such as the League of Socialist Working

Youth, the Democratic Women’s Union, the Union of Agricultural Working People, and the General Federation of Trade Unions. At each location and in every meeting, Kim spoke about working not for money or reward, but for love of country. What Kim demanded, according to Suh, was “maximum effort with minimum reward.”344

At the same time, Kim dispatched leading cadres to spread the Party’s vision. He urged all leading cadres to emulate his example in conducting on-the-spot guidance. He instructed leading cadres to “go to the masses” not necessarily to learn firsthand what the

342 Bruce Cumings, “Kim’s Korean Communism,” Problems of Communism (March/April 1974), 28-29. 343 Bruce Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, p. 297. 344 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 163-164. 154 masses do, think, and want, but more to inspire and motivate them through exemplary behavior and superior practical guidance. As Kim explained to Puzanov in early April

1957:

I thought over how to raise the authority of the Presidium members and came to the conclusion that Presidium members need to go to the local level more often and explain Party and government policy to the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, consult with them, and hear out their comments and suggestions. We are doing this and this will bring us good results.345

Rank and file workers also played a role in Kim’s top-down strategy of leading by example. Exceptional accomplishments by individual workers, peasants, or soldiers were singled out, profusely rewarded, and widely celebrated. Chief among these were Chin

Ung-weon, the steel working in the Kangson steel mill, who, as North Korean legend has it, was so moved by Kim Il Sung’s visit and frank discussion with the workers in

December 1956 that he organized workers into groups to surpass the production quotas assigned to them. Then there was the worker who allegedly did the backbreaking task of filling 580 sandbags, each weighing seventy kilograms, for twenty-nine hours straight in order to speed up the construction of a dam on a river. The dam, which was scheduled to be built in forty days, was completed in five. Other heroes of labor included Ku Cha-seon, a worker of a zinc mine, Sin Gu-heon, a worker of a machine-building plant; and Jeon

Ha-seon, from an agricultural cooperative near the city of Kaesong, were invited to speak during a meeting of the SPA in June 1958.346

345 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 9 April 1957" April 09, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 1-15.. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/115599 346 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for 9 June 1958" June 09, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 14, delo 6, p. https://cwihp- live.secondstory.net/document/116147 155

It was during the June 1958 meeting of the SPA that Kim officially launched the so-called Cheonlima Movement to organize and guide the revolutionary spirit of the masses to the highest possible levels in order to fulfill the Five-year Plan and accelerate the construction of socialism in the DPRK.347 The Cheonlima Movement got its name from a mythical winged horse which could travel 1,000 li, or 400 km in one day.

Although it was officially launched in 1958, the North Koreans trace the movement’s origins back to Kim’s visit to the Kangson Steel Mill in late December 1956. The goal of the Cheonlima Movement was to exhort workers to over-fulfill production quotas and promote the idea of harmonious participation for the greater good of society. The North

Korea people were being remolded as communists and mobilized to constructive action with no expectation of reward.

There had been earlier examples of this in other socialist countries, including the so-called Stakhanovite movement in the Soviet Union which began during the Soviet second Five-year Plan in 1935. The Stakhanovite movement was named after Aleksei

Stakhanov who over-fulfilled his quota by fourteen times, mining 102 tons of coal in less than six hours. Workers in all sectors were encouraged to match, and even surpass

Stakhanov’s achievement.

The September 1958 KWP CC plenum adopted what had been called the “Red

Letter,” which called upon Party members and all workers to fulfill all goals for the Five- year Plan ahead of schedule. The “Red Letter” also inspired the creation of the

Cheonlima Work Team movement (Cheonlima Jageoppan undong). Under the slogan of

“one for all and all for one” those in work teams not only worked together, but also

347Phillip Park, Self-Reliance or Self-Destruction? Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Development Strategy of Self-Reliance "Juche" (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 30. 156 studied together in evening sessions, ate together, and lived together. The Cheonlima

Work team movement, which introduced an even higher form of competition to increase production ahead of schedule, were organized in factories, construction sites, and in agricultural cooperatives. By the end of 1958, notes Ilpyong Kim, “the workteam had

[…] become the organizational foundation for the mass line policy of the Cheonlima movement throughout the country.”348

The “Red Letter” was distributed and discussed at all levels, leading, according to

Soviet reports, to “the wide-scale launching of a creative initiative and innovation” and to an intensification of the Cheonlima Movement.349 To be sure, the Cheonlima Movement brought out the ingenuity in many workers. According to another North Korean legend

(partially substantiated by contemporary Soviet diplomatic cables), workers developed a tractor of its own, aptly named the Cheonlima tractor, by using incomplete technical diagrams provided by the Soviets and through reverse engineering. To fully mechanize, and hence modernize North Korean agriculture, Kim estimated that the country would need between 30-35,000 tractors. The existence of small reserves of foreign currency and the limitations in the ability of the Soviets and other countries in the socialist camp to export the required number of tractors limited the number purchased per year to between two and three thousand. This led to significant delays in the mechanization of agriculture.

At some point in 1958, Kim Il Sung reportedly visited the Kiyang Farm Machine Plant, the predecessor of the Kumsong Tractor Factory, and gave the workers there the task of turning out tractors through their own efforts. According to the North Korean version, they didn’t even have blueprints, and simply “took a tractor apart and started modeling

348 Ilpyong Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, p. 83. 349 The “Chollima” Movement of Accelerated Development of Socialism in the DPRK (a brief memo), September 9, 1960, AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29. 157 after its accessories in the spirit of self-reliance.”350 Soviet records explain that the workers had received partial blueprints for the Soviet VTZ-28 tractor. According to the

Soviet report, “the lack of completely finished Soviet technical documentation could not fail to be reflected in the organization of the production and quality of these machines.”

Indeed, when the first tractors were assembled one month later, they only moved in reverse. After working out this critical flaw, the factory produced 102 tractors in 1959.

However, according to the conclusion of Korean specialists, “these machines ha[d] considerable differences among themselves, and represented a sort of new type of tractor of vehicle, since because of imperfections of the technical documentation which, as has already been pointed out, were prepared from sketches and drawings made from parts, all the assemblies could not be interchangeable and required the manufacture of custom-built parts in each individual case.” After receiving the complete technical documentation and drawings for the VTZ-28 tractor from Moscow in 1959, many of the problems with the

Cheonlima tractor were worked out, and they began to produce on a larger scale.351

Decentralization: Local Autonomy

At the same time Kim launched the Cheonlima Movement, he also initiated a push for local autonomy through decentralization. This was another measure to achieve self-reliance in economics. In order to carry out more balanced growth throughout the country, as envisioned by the Five-year Plan, the June 1958 KWP CC Plenum encouraged the development of consumer goods industries. Local industries, which were located close to resources used in production, were immediately developed and merged

350 Translations on North Korea, No. 620, October 10, 1978 (U.S. Joint Publication Research Service) p. 17. 351 "Changes in the Direction of Development of the DPRK Machinebuilding Industry," July 5, 1960, AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29. 158 into production cooperatives. More than one thousand new local industries were reportedly constructed within a period of two to three months.352 Authority over local industry was transferred from provincial (do) to municipal (si) and county (kun) levels in order to more effectively utilize local resources. According to Phillip Park, “local industries became an integral and substantial part of the entire industrial sector and their share of gross industrial output increased from 12.8 per cent in 1956 to 31.9 per cent in

1960. In the production of consumer goods, the share of local industries increased from

28 per cent in 1958 to 39 per cent in 1960.”353

The development of local industries was useful for another important reason.

They invested in the countryside so that state expenditures—derived in part from foreign aid though primarily through savings generated from the agricultural tax-in-kind—could go toward the development of heavy industry and the construction of a self-reliant industrial complex. Local industry invested in local infrastructure development and also directly contributed to the agricultural economy through the direct purchase of goods from agricultural cooperatives. The contribution of local industry to state revenues in

1958, the year of the reform, was already 9.2 percent by the end of the year. In 1959, the contributions of local industry had already risen to 16.5% of state revenues.354

The management of agriculture was also decentralized. The process of coooperativizing agriculture was completed in August 1958, with 13,309 cooperatives, each averaging 79 households with 134 jeongbo of land. On October 11, 1958, the government of the DPRK adopted resolution No. 125 which amalgamated cooperatives into 3,843 larger units, averaging 275 households and 456 jeongbo. Administrative

352 Phillip Park, Self-Reliance or Self-Destruction, p. 32. 353 Ibid., p. 32. 354 Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, p. 123. 159 districts were also redrawn so that the ri or village, the lowest-level administrative unit, was identical with the cooperative farm.355 With the larger administrative units, the government could more efficiently stimulate local autonomy and utilize resources. The campaign of joining cooperatives was completed in under a month. The process started on October 15 and was completed within just sixteen days, well ahead of the November

20 deadline.356

North Koreans did not create massive communes like in China. As Kim Il Sung explained to Puzanov in 1960, during his visit to the PRC in November 1958, he was taken on a tour of one commune. “Of course,” he remarked, “they chose one of the best.”

Mao Zedong suggested to Kim that North Korea should also set up communes according to the Chinese example. When Kim returned to North Korea, he ordered one newly amalgamated cooperative to introduce communal meals in a dining hall, as was done in

China. According to Kim though, “it did not work.” While visiting that village, he allegedly gathered elders and asked their opinion. “They told him the problem is that everybody eats three times as much regardless of accomplished work. Before, all ate in moderation.”357 After this experience, Puzanov reported, “the Korean comrades abandoned the idea of introducing communes and rather took steps at the beginning of the year to eliminate egalitarianism and to improve compensation for work in agriculture according to the amount and difficulty of work.”358

355 Charles K. Armstrong, The Koreas, 65. 356 Note K. 2421/34/58, 5 December 1958, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive, No. 756/64/2421/587/tjn 357 "Record of Conversation between the Czech Ambassador in the DPRK with the Soviet Ambassador" July 26, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Central Archive, Prague, File A. Novotny, foreign affairs, DPRK. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113700 358 Record of a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, c. Puzanov on June 23,1960, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, No. 003923/60-7 160

An additional round of measures to decentralize management was carried out in

August 1959. Throughout the summer, Kim Il Sung and other members of the leadership conducted on-the-spot guidance throughout the country. After returning to Pyongyang, an enlarged plenum of the KWP CC was called to discuss a number of problems that had become apparent in on-the-spot guidance: making the management of the economy more efficient; the further decentralization of management; the reduction of jobs in the administration; and the moving of a number of experienced cadres and experts to the appropriate levels of management of the economy and directly to production. The enlarged plenum passed a decree that dissolved, merged, and reorganized several departments and broadened the authority of the Provincial (do) and Municipal (si)

People’s Committees in the management of industry.359

Two additional policies for the decentralization of management that emerged out of the Cheonlima Movement were the so-called Cheongsan-ri Method and Daean System.

Once the goals of the Five-year Plan were fulfilled, the Party took decentralization to another level in both agriculture and industry. Recognizing that bureaucratic behavior in management had not been fully eradicated (following a campaign first launched in April

1955), and that production plans were largely being drafted behind a desk without a full appreciation of real conditions, the Party developed more inclusive, systemic methods of

359 Following the above-mentioned resolutions by the broadened Presidium of the CC KWP and the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK issued several decrees on 31 August 1959, on the basis of which it is decided to: 1. Join together the Ministries of Electrical Energy, Coal Industry and Chemical Industry, and to create a Ministry of Energy and Chemical Industry. 2. The Ministry of Procurement was folded into the Ministry of Internal Trade. 3. The Ministry of the Fishing Industry was merged into the Ministry of Light Industry. 4. The Ministry of Justice was dissolved, and its functions related to directing the courts and issues of arbitration were transferred to the Supreme Court of the DPRK. 5. The Ministry of Administration and Ministry of Labor were dissolved. The Central Committee of the United Trade Unions of Korea took over the functions of the Ministry of Labor. 6. The Ministry of Construction of the Cities and the Local Economy was dissolved. See "A Document from E. Sagala, the 2nd Secretary of the PRL Embassy, regarding the Administrative Restructuring of the DPRK Government." September 04, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/113699 161 management that emphasized mass involvement. The system maintained its top-down structure, however, with Party officials still there to disseminate knowledge more than to learn from the masses. That is, Cheongsan-ri and Daean continued to abide by the Kimist principle of “to the masses, from the masses, to the masses.”360 Moreover, there was a major emphasis on material incentive through profit-sharing systems. The adoption of the

Cheongsan-ri and Daean methods further belies the notion that North Korea was largely imitating Chinese practices with people’s communes.

Cheongsan-ri method

From February to October 1960, Kim Il Sung travelled to Cheongsan-ri agricultural cooperative in Kangso County in the outskirts of Pyongyang a total of thirty- eight times to conduct on-the-spot guidance. During his frequent visits to the cooperative, he reportedly studied methods of management and identified many shortcomings that were caused by ignoring specific conditions and by planning agricultural production bureaucratically, i.e. from behind a desk in an office, quite removed from the fields and farmers.361 As a result, land was also poorly utilized. Moreover, there was little incentive for those living on cooperatives to over-fulfill quotas. Kim devised a method that was more inclusive, involving both higher level cadres and farmers, with an emphasis not on means of production, but on political work and mass mobilization. The so-called

Chongsan-ri method still had a distinctively top-down emphasis. As Kim Il Sung described it:

360 Bruce Cumings, “Kim’s Korean Communism,” Problems of Communism (March/April 1974), 28-29. 361 Record of a visit of the DPRK Ambassador c. [Pak Ik-chan] with c. a Novotný in the Prague Castle on April 19, 1961 162

The essentials of the Chongsan-ri method are that the higher organ helps the lower, the superior assists his inferiors and always goes down to work places to have a good grasp of the actual conditions there and to find correct solutions to problems. This method gives priority to political work or work with people in all activities, giving full play to the conscious enthusiasm and create initiative of the masses so as to ensure the fulfillment of the revolutionary tasks.362

During his frequent trips to the Cheongsan-ri cooperative, Kim Il Sung also seemed to have recognized the need for incentives. The Cheongsan-ri method included material incentives for increased production through the establishment of an independent accounting system under which members of work-teams divided amongst themselves whatever they produced in excess of their assigned quotas.363

Daean System

Starting in late 1961, a management system based on the Cheongsan-ri method was also introduced to industries. In December of that year, Kim Il Sung conducted on- the-spot guidance at the Daean electric machine plant where he reportedly held discussions with workers and made recommendations (which of course could not be ignored) on management that became known as the Daean method. Kim recommended eliminating the system of one-man management. In its place, a committee, headed by a party official, but including members elected from the ranks of managers, workers, engineers, and union leaders, would oversee the operations of industrial sites. While the focus remained on political work, technocrats, including engineers and technical staff, received more responsibility. Likewise, workers were given incentives to fulfill quotas.

Independent accounting systems similar to those set up in cooperatives were established

362 Cited in Phillip Park, Self-Reliance or Self-Destruction, p. 32, no source given. 363 See Ibid., 33. 163 in factories, allowing work teams to keep the surplus revenue after expenses were deducted. The revenues were distributed to each according to his contribution.364

The goals of the five year plan were achieved over one year ahead of schedule, at the end of 1959. This was achieved despite the reduced assistance from Moscow and

Beijing. North Korea built the foundations for socialism by fully nationalizing industry and agriculture. The production of consumer goods was also increased under the Five- year Plan through the expansion of local industries. By 1960, North Korea was certainly in a better position to claim that balanced growth had been achieved. Most importantly perhaps, the Party continued to rectify many of the colonial-era distortions that made the economy externally dependent through the construction of an autarkic industrial complex.

The Five-year Plan could not be considered a complete success, however. There were serious disproportions in the development of individual sectors in industry. Between

1957 and 1959 the average annual growth rate of industrial production was three times the rate of development of electrical power and almost 1.5 times that of the fuel and metallurgical industries. There were also disproportions between the development of the metallurgical and mining industries.

Growth rates were also considered too high to be sustainable. A Soviet report from 1960 made this point, noting that “whereas in the reconstruction period [1953-1956] a high growth rate of industrial production was justifiable and was explained chiefly by putting enterprises which were being repaired into operation, the preservation of extraordinarily high industrial growth rates in the future might cause excessive strain and lead to a still greater disproportion in the economy.”

364 Phillip Park, Self-Reliance or Self-Destruction?, p. 34. 164

The effects of the Cheonlima Movement are more difficult to assess, however. On the one hand, it enabled the Party to achieve its goals ahead of schedule. It also allowed

Kim to disseminate his voluntaristic message to the North Korean masses. However, the masses were exhausted after being asked to perform superhuman tasks year-on-end with no reward. According to one Soviet report, “a great overextension in the work of manual laborers, office workers, and students is evident in the DPRK, whose work day is often not 8, but 10-12 hours, frequently including days off.”365 Perhaps in recognition of the tremendous pressures placed on workers during the Five-year Plan, the Party designated

1960 a “buffer year,” during which production goals were reduced by almost fifty percent.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, the KWP had planned to reduce growth rates and to improve the quality of consumer goods produced in the country. The focus, at long last, was to be on improving the lives of the North Korean masses. However, as will be explained, events outside the country dictated otherwise.

Establishing Jarip A June 12, 1963 Rodong Sinmun editorial entitled “Self-Reliance and

Independent National Economic Construction” described in rich detail North Korea’s policy of Jarip, or self-reliance in economics. The editorial echoed Kim’s dictum that economic dependence leads to political subordination. This is particularly the case in postcolonial states, such as the DPRK, where industry was weak as a result of colonial- era distortions that led to external dependencies. Each country, the editorial argued,

“must develop its economy in a many-sided way; each country must grow into an

365 The “Cheonlima” Movement of Accelerated Development of Socialism in the DPRK (a brief memo), September 9, 1960, AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29. 165 independent economic unit which is run with its own technique, natural resources, raw and other materials and by its own efforts and personnel.”

The editorial directly criticized the Soviets (though not by name) for attempting to keep North Korea as a dependent, stating:

Some people, who while talking about independence, equality and non-interference in internal affairs, disapprove of independent national construction and are in fact denying the sovereignty and equality of other countries.366

Another editorial, published in Rodong Sinmun in October of the same year even more forcefully made North Korea’s case for its policy of Jarip:

Persons doggedly oppose and obstruct the line of self-reliance and of building an independent economy in the socialist countries. They brand the construction of an independent national economy as a “nationalistic tendency” or a “closed economy” and accuse it of being a “politically dangerous and economically harmful” line […] [They] allege that a comprehensive economy developed in a many-sided way can be built only in big countries. This means in the final analysis that the other countries should develop only a few limited branches of economy and always have a one-sided economy.

The North Korean fear of pooled sovereignty, which limits one’s freedom of action, is apparent in the following statement in the October editorial:

Those who oppose building of an independent economy advocate, instead, the establishment of an “integrated economy” of the socialist countries […]. The enforcement of an “integrated economy” will reduce in the long run the economy of each socialist country to an appendage of the economy of one or two countries, and subordinate it to the interests of the development of the economy of one or two countries. […]. Then the differences in the level of development of the socialist countries will not be eliminated, but rather widened, and the dependency of a backward country on the developed will remain unchanged.367

Kim Il Sung had long argued that economic dependence leads to political subordination. The Three-year and Five-year plans were designed to establish a centrally- planned, independent national economy that would diminish any risk of long-term dependence, and thus political subordination to other countries or to international systems

366 Rodong Sinmun, “Self-Reliance and Independent National Economic Construction,” June 12, 1963, p. 8. 367 Rodong Sinmun, October 28, 1963, in Foreign Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS): North Korea, October 30, 1963, p. CGG19. 166 that could limit Korea’s freedom of action. The presence of foreign aid was a critical element that would enable North Korea to achieve its goal of establishing an independent national economy during the period of reconstruction and development, foreign aid was a critical. When that aid was reduced during the Five-year Plan, Kim Il Sung mobilized indigenous human and material resources to fulfill the plan. Yet, North Korea was not as yet as strong as Kim Il Sung had wanted it to be. So when North Korea was encouraged to join COMECON throughout the period of the Five-year Plan, Kim refused, believing that it would lead to exploitation or to a new dependency relationship. Although Kim had delivered speeches on economic independence earlier, such as at the First Party

Conference in March 1958, the policy of Jarip was given greater salience after the goals of the Five-year Plan were fulfilled through the mobilization of indigenous human and material resources. The Five-year Plan provided North Korea with both the necessity and opportunity to achieve Jarip.

167

Chapter Four: Self-Reliance in National Defense (Jawi)

The last pillar of Juche Thought, Jawi, or self-reliance in national defense, evolved in the first half of the 1960s in response to a worsening security environment. By

1965, North Korea faced security challenges, real and perceived, on no fewer than five fronts: an anti-communist military junta ruled South Korea from 1961; the bourgeoning

Sino-Soviet split increasingly destabilized the socialist camp; Pyongyang’s relations deteriorated with Moscow; the United States dramatically escalated the number of troops sent to Vietnam; South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, creating the possibility of a US-ROK-Japan triangular alliance.

To meet the emerging security challenges, and to establish an autonomous defense capability, North Korea extended the practice of Juche to national defense. By the middle of 1961, the KWP established four military guidelines (sadae kunsanoseon): arm the entire population; fortify the entire country; train the entire army as a “cadre army”; and modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the principle of self-reliance in national defense. In December of 1962, the KWP formally adopted a policy of simultaneously develop heavy industry and defense industries. From early 1963, the

DPRK actively sought to acquire the technology to develop a nuclear deterrent. The establishment of Jawi had a transformative effect on North Korea’s development strategy and foreign relations.

168

“The World Was Going our Way”368

The North Korean leadership greeted the 1960s with optimism. The goals of the

Five-year Plan were successfully completed over one year ahead of schedule. The average annual growth of industrial production from 1957 through 1959 was 44.6% according to Soviet embassy estimates.369 As Armstrong suggests, “[e]ven if one accounts for probable exaggerations in the official DPRK estimates, North Korea’s economic growth in this period was one of the highest in the world.”370 Industrial production in 1959 exceeded the level envisioned for 1961 in the Five-year Plan by 15 percent.371 At the KWP Fourth Congress, Kim Il Sung enthusiastically declared that

“under the tested leadership of the Party, the working people of our country, displaying a high degree of revolutionary enthusiasm, indomitable fighting spirit and inexhaustible creative ability, surmounted all difficulties and obstacles, guaranteed a sweeping victory of the socialist revolution in towns and in the countryside and brought about radical changes in the development of our economy and culture.”372 Much of this was attributable to the Party’s ability to mobilize indigenous human and material resources under the Cheonlima Movement.

368 This quote is taken from the title of Christopher Andrew’s book on the Vasily Mitrokhin archive, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 369 Concerning the state of and the further direction of economic development in the Korean People's Democratic Republic, AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29 370 Armstrong, The Koreas, p. 64. Taking into account statistical inflation, economist Joseph S. Chung attempted to recalculate industrial growth and estimated a rate of 36 percent, which is still impressive. Chung places the official index at 45.2 percent, 0.6 percent higher than that in Soviet records. Joseseph S. Chung, The North Korean Economy: Structure and Development (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), p. 76. 371 Concerning the state of and the further direction of economic development in the Korean People's Democratic Republic, AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29 372 Kim Il Sung, On Juche in Our Revolution, p. 208. 169

While mobilization drives under the Cheonlima Movement had an undeniable impact on quality of life (people worked in excess of 10-12 hours a day), there were quantifiable improvements to living standards during the Five-year Plan. Wages rose by

43 percent across the board in 1959. The real wages of manual laborers and office workers had finally reached prewar levels. Moreover, approximately 11,800,000 square meters of housing were built in cities and worker's settlements throughout the country.373

The material welfare of the rural population also improved during the Five-year

Plan. According to Soviet embassy reports, in 1958, each peasant household allegedly received an average of 1,742 kilograms of grain and 434 kilograms of potatoes. In

February 1959, with extra capital generated through the expansion of local consumer goods industries, the state reduced the agricultural tax in kind for rice to between 11 and

14 percent instead of the flat rate of 27 percent.374

Living conditions had improved on other fronts as well. Citizens of the DPRK enjoyed free medical services and free education. From the fall of 1958, school attendance was compulsory for a minimum of seven years. The number of educational institutions dramatically expanded during the Five-year Plan. By 1960, there were thirty- seven institutions of higher education in the DPRK (by contrast, according to Soviet reports, there was not a single institution of higher education in northern Korea in 1945) and about 8,000 schools and various vocational institutes, in which 2.5 million students were enrolled. That constituted, according to Soviet estimates, nearly one in four people.375

373 The Economy of the DPRK, (a brief memorandum), AVPRF, F.0102 Op. 16. P. 87. D. 29 374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. 170

Problems remained, however. Soviet embassy officials described difficulties with food and clothing. As before, the government continued to ration grain. Meat products were neither rationed nor were they even available for purchase. Other consumer goods, though available for purchase, were of such poor quality that they were of little use.

Moreover, prices for consumer goods, despite their poor quality, remained high.376

Seven-year Plan

The North Korean leadership, cognizant of the tremendous strains caused by mobilization drives, designated 1960 a “buffer year” during which the pace of development would be reduced from an annual increase in gross industrial output of 19 percent to 12.5 percent.377 The buffer year would be used in part to rectify issues in food, clothing, and housing, and also to further improve conditions in agriculture. Moreover, the buffer year would enable a number of industrial sectors which lagged in meeting their targets for the Five-year Plan, including the mining and energy production industries, to catch up before the country launched its ambitious Seven-year Plan (1961-1967).

Following the buffer year, North Korea intended to advance socialist construction under a second Five-year Plan. This was extended by two years to achieve longer-term state goals. For the first half of the Seven-year Plan, Kim Il Sung proposed modifying the pro-industrial policies which had been the main thrust of North Korean development since 1953, to light industry and the production of consumer goods to further elevate living standards in the DPRK. According to Kim’s explanation, “[r]ight now in the first two or three years of the seven-year plan we are planning to mainly complete the mechanization of agriculture and direct efforts at the development of light industry and

376 Ibid. 377 Ibid. 171 sectors of heavy industry which supply light industry with raw material.”378 Due to the chronic inability to grow enough cotton, the Party also sought to increase production of synthetic fibers during the first half of the Seven-year Plan. This included the production of Vinylon, a fiber derived from anthracite developed by Ri Sung gi, a Japanese-trained

Korean chemist who defected from South Korea during the Korean War. Small enterprises would also be constructed for the production of nylon and plastic.379 The tasks of what was originally to be the second Five-year Plan were to be carried out after the first three years. The second half of the Seven-year Plan would fortify the material and technical basis of socialism through the expansion of heavy industry.380 “In this event”

Kim Il Sung predicted in a conversation with Puzanov, “one can decidedly say the DPRK will be turned into an industrial country.”381

The shift in production during the first half of the Seven-year Plan was not primarily to make the North Korean masses more prosperous. Indeed, Kim seemed more conscious of the potential for improved living standards as a magnet to South Koreans than he was concerned about rewarding North Korean masses for the mobilization drives and years of privation. As Kim explained to Puzanov, “[t]he pace of development of the country should be high so as to increasingly influence the people of South Korea in order that the DPRK increasingly become an attractive force for the South Korean

378 Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for the period 24 August through 9 September 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 379 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for the period 1 through 11 June 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 380 Documents of the Fourth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 164-165, cited in Kim and Kim, Human Remolding in North Korea, p. 101. 381 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 21 April 1960, [Source: AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 172 population.”382 Even the decision to draft a Seven-year Plan, as opposed to a second Five- year Plan, as originally proposed, was made with the possible impact on South Korea in mind. As Puzanov reported, the decision was made to “show the population of South

Korea what successes the workers of the northern part of Korea will achieve in seven years.”383

The April 19 Revolution

In early 1960, conditions on the divided peninsula also appeared favorable to

North Korea for another reason. Allegations of electoral fraud surrounding the March 15,

1960 re-election of Syngman Rhee to the presidency in South Korea led to massive student-led demonstrations throughout the country. The demonstrations erupted in major cities such as Seoul, Busan, and Daegu, demanding that the octogenarian Rhee resign.

The leadership in Pyongyang immediately began to take stock of the widening protest movement and assessed the strength of the “revolutionary forces” in South Korea. From

Kim Il Sung’s conversations with Puzanov, however, it is clear that the KWP did not initially anticipate that the demonstrations would lead to the collapse of the First

Republic and to the resignation of Syngman Rhee. It was only after the events of April 19,

1960 that Pyongyang realized that Rhee’s resignation was within the realm of possibilities.384

North Korea understood what is often called the “April 19 Revolution” or “sa il gu hyeokmyeong,” as an implosion of social contradictions under America’s imperialist

382 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 21 April 1960, [Source: AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 383 Ibid. 384 See for example the entries in Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for the period 16 February through 24, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.72-122, and Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for the period 12 April through 27 April 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 173 rule and interpreted the fall of the Rhee administration as the first victory in the anti-

American struggle in South Korea.385 The North Korean leadership believed that the economic development of the DPRK and the broader socialist camp contributed to the unrest in South Korea, and the KWP called on the North Korean population to step up efforts to construct a socialist society and aid the cause in the South. However, North

Korea also maintained that despite the transition from Syngman Rhee to the Jang Myeon administration, there could be no real change in South Korea without the withdrawal of

US forces from the Peninsula.386

North Korean officials suggested that the April 19 Revolution did not develop into an actual revolution because there was no party in Seoul to take the lead and because of defects in the workers and peasants movements.387 Nevertheless, they did find encouraging signs in South Korea. Pyongyang, for example, had new confidence in the

South Korean student movement and believed that students would make up for the deficiencies of the workers and peasants. North Korea attempted to take advantage of the situation and identified various progressive organizations in South Korea and attempted to establish contacts with these groups in order to facilitate Korea’s peaceful reunification.

On April 21, 1960, days after the resignation of Rhee, the KWP CC issued an appeal for a

385 See the Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for the period 12 April through 27 April 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163.

386 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for March 23, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.72-122, Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for April 12 and 26, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163, Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for May 2, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.164-183, and Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 24 July 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 7, p.16-42. 387 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 5 October 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 7, p.130-150. 174 joint conference to be attended by all North and South Korean parties and social organizations.388

The North Korean leadership identified weaknesses in its own ability to influence

South Korean politics. Realizing that its underground organizations did not play an active role in the course of the April 19 Revolution, North Korea set out to change how it targeted the south. For example, Puzanov’s diary reveals that the KWP established a

Central Bureau for South Korean Issues to administer policies toward the South. The

Central Bureau was to resurrect underground party cells in South Korea and distribute propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone related to Korea’s peaceful unification.389 By

July of 1960, Kim Il Sung already boasted of having channels of communication with

South Korea’s progressive parties such as the Social Mass Party (Sah-heo dang-jung dang) and the Korean Socialist Party, and on having an influence on them. He estimated that “possibly up to 35 deputies from newly-organized parties who are associated with and under the influence of the KWP CC will be elected to the new National

Assembly.”390 North Korea also established a Communist University (Gongsan daehak), another example of how Pyongyang was actively preparing for unification and vigorous

North-South exchanges. The university was to train “unification personnel” from among the 100,000 demobilized members of the Korean People’s Army with southern Korean origins, who would be dispatched to the South once cultural and economic exchanges

388 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 21 April 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 389 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 25 July 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 7, p.16-42. 390 Ibid. 175 between the two Koreas resumed, which Kim predicted would happen after two-to-three years.391

During a trip by Kim Il Sung to Moscow in June 1960, Khrushchev advised Kim to practice a somewhat more flexible policy towards South Korea, suggesting that he

“learn more from the German comrades' experiences and follow the concept of a confederation vis-a-vis South Korea.”392 Kim Il Sung apparently heeded Khrushchev’s advice. Two months later, the North Korean leader suggested the establishment of a

Korean confederation in a speech commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan, on August 15, 1960. The confederation system would allow for both regimes to temporarily maintain their social systems as they transitioned to a unified system of government.393 The confederation strategy proposed by North Korea was a reflection of how Pyongyang perceived the political and economic gaps between the

North and South, Pyongyang’s general sense of superiority over Seoul, and South

Korea’s general mistrust of the North. Present at Kim’s speech were representatives from

South Korean student groups, labor unions, and progressive political parties. Kim revealed to Puzanov that they were secretly brought to the DPRK for the holiday, which was also celebrated in the Republic of Korea (ROK).394

Kim Il Sung’s conversations with Puzanov reveal a degree of confidence that reunification was not only possible, but imminent under the right conditions. Moreover, because of North Korea’s relative political and economic stability, Kim believed

391 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 21 April 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163. 392 “Note about a Conversation in the Soviet Embassy with Comrade Pusanov,” 30 August 1960, SAPMO- BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137. 393 See “New East German and Soviet Evidence on North Korean Support to South Korean Political Parties and Labor Unions,” NKIDP eDossier no. 8 (June 2012). 394 Ibid. 176 reunification could be achieved on North Korean terms. The greatest obstacle to immediate reunification was the continued presence of U.S. forces in the ROK. However,

Kim’s optimism was short lived.

The May 16, 1961 Park Chung Hee Coup d'état and the Birth of Jawi

All of this changed on May 16, 1961 when Park Chung Hee led a military coup d'état against the democratically elected government of South Korea, headed by President

Yun Po Sun and Prime Minister Jang Myeon, in power for less than a year after Syngman

Rhee was forced from office after the April 19 revolution. Initially, there was confusion about the nature of the rebellion. North Korean officials scrambled to gather information on the coup leaders. According to early reports, a portion of those who had participated in the coup were considered progressives. Moreover, Park Chung Hee himself was once a member of South Korea’s progressive Workers’ Party, and his older brother was killed for revolutionary activities. His sister-in-law, who had also been a member of the

Workers’ Party, still lived in the Park household. Moreover, according to initial reports,

Park was never trusted by the U.S. military or Jang Myeon. These early analyses greatly pleased the North Korean leadership. According to Vice Premier Kim Il, Pyongyang was even preparing to release a statement in support of the coup.395

Much of Pyongyang’s information was colored by intelligence reports from early

1961 indicating that the ROK army’s Sojang (young officers) faction wanted to seize power out of dissatisfaction with the government. In the immediate wake of the coup, therefore, North Korea believed the coup was progressive, aimed at overthrowing the

South Korean “puppet government” that was supported by the United States. In a briefing

395 Situation of the military coup in South Korea, 16 May 1961, PRCFMA 106-00581-03 177 to ambassadors from socialist countries on the evening of the 16th, Vice Premier Kim Il explained that “there is a 90% possibility that this was not masterminded behind the scenes by the American imperialists.”396

Over the course of the next two days, Pyongyang received additional information, and Park Chung Hee made statements which left little doubt about his anti-communist convictions. The clearest possible message of Park’s anti-communism came from the execution of Hwang Tae-seong, a friend of Park’s late elder brother whom Kim Il Sung dispatched to Seoul in the immediate wake of the coup to meet with its leaders and to propose inter-Korean dialogue.397 At a meeting of the KWP CC Standing Committee, the highest body of the CC, Party leaders declared the coup to be “reactionary, and deliberately engineered by the American imperialists.”398 This was a complete reversal of

North Korea’s immediate assessment. The Standing Committee came to the conclusion that the coup was orchestrated by Washington because of the growing influence of the

KWP in South Korea, and the increasing prospects for reunification:

[S]ince last April, the people’s struggle had been growing by the day, the struggle for peaceful reunification gathering more and more steam. Under these circumstances, the American imperialists saw that if things went on this way the people would overthrow Jang as well, and that people in favor of South-North negotiations and peaceful reunification might rise up and take power. So in advance they engineered a so-called “military coup”, with the purpose of suppressing the South Korean people’s struggle and strengthening fascist rule. The gang that carried out this military coup is the most reactionary; from the start, they propagated “destroying communism” and Advance on the North Reunification. But they are as yet unable to carry out an immediate offensive,

396 Ibid. 397 Shin Jongdae, “North Korea’s Perception toward the May 16 Coup d’état in South Korea and its Changes of Policies,” unpublished paper presented at the conference “North Korea’s Cold War,” Ohio State University, Mershon Center, February 27, 2012, pp. 9-15. 398 Contents of the [North] Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting, May 18, 1961, PRCFMA 106-00581-03

178

because they have just begun and it will take a while to sort out their internal affairs.399

On 18 May, therefore, the KWP CC Standing Committee took immediate steps to drastically militarize the state. These were the first steps in the direction of extending the practices of Juche to national defense, by establishing self-reliance in national defense

(Jawi). Specifically, according to Chinese reports of the meeting, the Standing

Committee decided to “enhance our vigilance, concentrate forces on strengthening national defense, and delay the original Seven-Year Plan until 1963. Otherwise economic construction and the national defense industry would be held up In the period from this year until 1963, [we] should slow down development of the national economic plan, maintaining the same level as in the 1960 buffer year […].”400 From this statement, it is clear that the North Korean leadership recognized that in light of the existential threat posed by the avowedly anti-communist military junta just across the DMZ, the Seven- year Plan would need to be drastically altered, and indeed, possibly even postponed. As will be discussed below, the leadership ultimately decided to proceed as planned with the launch of the Seven-year Plan in 1961. However, it ultimately had to be extended by three years, becoming a de facto Ten-year Plan because most goals in industrial production could not be fulfilled by 1967.

In addition to initially suggesting that the start of the Seven-year Plan be postponed, the Standing Committee made other recommendations in the May 18th meeting:

399 Contents of the [North] Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting, May 18, 1961, PRCFMA 106-00581-03 400 Ibid. 179

[w]e should […] concentrate on strengthening national defense and strengthening defensive fortifications. We must make great efforts to enlist soldiers and mobilize youth to join the army. We should reduce the number of workers in the industrial sector and reassign them to the national defense industry and defensive fortifications. We must strengthen worker and peasant Red Guard troops [chi wei dui]. We must mobilize greater numbers of women to shoulder the work in the civilian sector of the economy. Housing construction should be more or less halted, and reasonable adjustments carried out under the existing conditions. The planned construction of harbors should also be halted. No large ships should be built, just some small ones that allow for fishing. However, the coal industry, mining industry, metals industry, etc. should continue running. The people’s living [conditions] should also maintain their current levels.401

These orders reveal just how transformative an effect the Park Chung Hee coup had on

North Korean economic and military planning. What had started out as a very promising decade was quickly derailed, impacting the ability of the KWP to further improve living standards by addressing the three big issues of food, clothing, and housing, and also to fulfill the goals of the Seven-year Plan in all industries. Indeed, perhaps the only industries that would not be affected were the extraction and metallurgical industries.402

Scalapino and Lee have discounted the notion that North Korean leaders perceived any real threat from South Korea and the United States during this period.

They argue that the North Koreans would have been aware that neither Seoul nor

Washington was engaged in war preparations at the time.403 The record of the May 18 meeting of the Standing Committee, which was only recently declassified by the Chinese

401 Ibid. 402 The Standing Committee also made some unusually frank statements about preparedness: “We must be doubly vigilant, continue to increase production and practice frugality, and prevent extravagant eating or drinking. But being vigilant is not to say that war will break out today or tomorrow; we must guard against rumors and troubling the people’s minds. Before this transmission, the authorities also said not to be afraid, we often stress raising vigilance and are emphasizing it more this time in accordance with the circumstances; the entire socialist camp is also stronger than it was before the war. In the past, during wartime, we sometimes misled Party members about the real situation: the enemy was in fact already approaching Pyongyang, but we still claimed that we had several hundred planes, so everything would be alright—and as a result, we suffered setbacks. Now we must make the situation clear to all Party members, and have Party members and the people take the initiative to mobilize and strengthen vigilance against enemies.” 403 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 595. 180

Foreign Ministry Archive, and the actions taken to establish self-reliance in national defense in the immediate wake of the coup suggests otherwise.

North Korea began to take measures to strengthen national defenses without delay.

A month after the coup, on June 19, a North Korean diplomat in Budapest reported to the

Hungarian Foreign Ministry that Pyongyang had issued an order for the army to enhance vigilance and reduce the number of workers in industry and reassign them to the national defense industry and defensive fortifications to prepare for an emergency situation.404

It is not clear from the Chinese report on the May 18 meeting of the Standing

Committee whether the term Jawi was actually used. What is clear, however, is that the

Party leadership recognized the need to take immediate action to enhance indigenous defense capabilities. This was the first major step in the direction of establishing self- reliance in national defense. However, Pyongyang still attached importance to its military alliances with Moscow and Beijing. While Kim did not want foreign troops in North

Korea, he enjoyed the deterring effects of his alliances with Moscow and Beijing. Most importantly, through these alliances, Kim was able to gain access to advanced weaponry, particularly from Moscow. North Korea sought to cement these relationships in the months after the South Korean coup.

Soviet-DPRK and Sino-DPRK Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

Assistance

In late June 1961, Kim ll Sung travelled to Moscow where he signed a Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, committing

404 Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 22 June 1961, “Visit of Comrade Paek Chong-won.” XIX- J-1-j Korea (Top Secret Documents), 1945-64, 3, doboz, 4/af, 003159/7/1961. 181

Moscow to the defense of Pyongyang in the event of an attack.405 The road to getting this agreement with the Soviet Union was long and not without challenges. In fact, the North

Korean leadership had been trying to get such an agreement from the Soviets for over two years. A few months after the withdrawal in October 1958 of the Chinese People’s

Volunteer Army (which had entered North Korea in late 1950 during the Korean War),

Kim Il Sung traveled to Moscow in late January 1959 to attend the CPSU Twenty-first

Congress. While in Moscow, he proposed signing a mutual cooperation treaty with the

Soviet Union, the DPRK’s chief supplier not only of machinery, also of advanced weaponry. Though Khrushchev acceded to his request, and agreed to visit Pyongyang later that year to sign the agreement, for over two years, the Kremlin leader found reasons to postpone his trip to the North Korean capital. Khrushchev was scheduled to travel to

Pyongyang in the fall of 1959, but cancelled, suggesting that it would be inadvisable to sign such an agreement with North Korea in the wake of his trip to Washington.

Khrushchev evidently felt improved relations with the United States, and the enhanced prospects for his policy of peaceful coexistence, made such an agreement unnecessary at that time.406 The trip was re-scheduled for September of 1960. During a meeting in

March of that year, Khrushchev provided security reassurances to Kim Il Sung, who despite improved conditions on the peninsula following the April revolution in South

Korea, still felt threatened because of the size of the ROK military and the continued presence of U.S. forces:

405 The decision to sign the agreement at that time does not appear to have been in response to the coup on South Korea. Kim Il Sung’s trip was scheduled the week prior to the coup during the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier, Alexei Kosygin. 406 See "Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People’s Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary" March 16, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j- Korea-5/ca-003645/1961 5.d. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113387 182

N. S. Khrushchev. When we discussed the issue of your invitation to our delegation to visit the DRPK, we agreed with you that we would sign a treaty during this visit which would, in our opinion, exert a restraining influence on the militarist circles in South Korea. Last year we agreed with you for certain reasons not to sign such a treaty at that time.

I think that I could make a visit to you in September of this year and then conclude a treaty. Then you could reduce your army. The signing of a treaty between the USSR and DPRK would balance the forces of the South and North.

[…]

When we sign the treaty with you then no Syngman Rhee will dare attack. I think that we will manage to make such a visit to you in September and then we will sign the treaty.407

Khrushchev’s trip to Pyongyang was again postponed however, since he was allegedly too busy preparing for the CPSU Twenty-second Congress later in October.

In 1961, Khrushchev again explained that it would be difficult to travel to North

Korea. After two previous cancellations, however, he had become aware that Kim Il Sung was growing impatient and believed the cancellations to be connected to the Kremlin leader’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States, fearing that such an agreement with the DPRK would damage prospects for improved relations with

Washington. In a meeting with Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Kim

Gwanghyeop in March 1961, Khrushchev made a ham-handed effort to explain his actions:

We have formed the impression that C[omra]de. Kim Il Sung is tying the postponement of my visit to the DPRK with the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Aid, as if this treaty would not promote the strengthening of our relations with the US and might be considered as a step against Kennedy. This is not at all so.

If I had an opportunity to go then we would sign such a Treaty. This, on the other hand, would promote the improvement of relations with the US. America has a

407 Memorandum of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung, June 17, 1960, from the personal archive of V.P. Tkachenko, citied in Koreiskii Poluostrov i interesi Rossii [The Korean Peninsula and Russia's Interests] (Mosow, Vostochnaya Literatura, 2000) pp. 19-20. 183

treaty with South Korea, and we will have such a treaty with you. The Americans have a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and we have such a treaty with the People's Republic of China.

If we can come to an agreement with the US then these treaties might be abrogated. But since they have such treaties then we will also have them. I would like the Korean comrades to understand this, and C[omra]de. Kim Il Sung, too. Or perhaps C[omra]de. Kim Il Sung seems to be meeting us halfway and thinks that the conclusion of the treaty would harm us.408

In May, Khrushchev dispatched First Deputy Premier Alexei Kosygin to Pyongyang, who in turn invited Kim Il Sung to visit Moscow yet again to sign the agreement. In late

June, barely six weeks after the Park Chung Hee coup, Kim departed for the Soviet capital. During his visit, he and Khrushchev finally signed the agreement.

While Kim Il Sung must have been relieved to finally have a treaty with Moscow, particularly after the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea, the difficulties he encountered in getting the Soviet leadership to sign it likely left him with doubts about

Moscow’s commitment to North Korea’s security. Just as Khrushchev failed to comprehend Kim’s concerns about joining COMECON because of differences in the level of development of socialist countries, he also misunderstood the reality of North

Korea’s security concerns. The continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea continued to trouble the North Korean leaders, even after the April 19, 1960 revolution that resulted in the resignation of Syngman Rhee. As Kim’s conversations with Puzanov reveal, North Koreans were eager to see the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula.

This was in part because they stood in the way of re-unification, but also because of the threat they presented to the DPRK.409

408 Memorandum of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Kim Gwanghyeop, March 1961, cited in Ibid, pp. 20-21. 409 Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for March 23, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.72-122, Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for April 12 and 26, 184

China, on the other hand, was more than willing to sign such an agreement with

North Korea. Two days before Kim and the North Korean delegation departed for

Moscow, Beijing offered to enter into a security alliance with Pyongyang. The PRC’s ambassador to the DPRK, Qiao Shaoguan, met with North Korean Foreign Minister Pak

Seongcheol and delivered a draft of the treaty. The following day, Kim met with

Ambassador Qiao and made arrangements to stop in Beijing en-route from Moscow to

Pyongyang to sign the agreement.410 Curiously, Kim did not notify Moscow of this until almost the end of his stay in the Soviet Union, and after he had already signed the treaty with the Khrushchev.411 The fact that Kim received a similar, if more generous, agreement from Beijing suggests that the competition between the two communist powers for North Korea’s allegiance was ongoing. Moreover, that Kim felt the need to sight an agreement with China almost behind the backs of the Soviets indicates two things. First, the North Korean leadership sought to maintain a balance between the

Soviet Union and China, lest one side wield too much of an influence of the DPRK.

Second, Kim did not put much faith in Moscow’s commitment to North Korean security, despite the existence of the treaty. Within a year, the second point would be confirmed.

One might surmise that the two treaties North Korea signed with Moscow and

Beijing, when combined, provided some sense of assurance to Kim Il Sung and the North

Korean leadership. While documentation is not available on the internal KWP decision- making process since the May 18th meeting of the Standing Committee recommended postponing the start of the Seven-year Plan by three years, by the time the KWP held its

1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.147-163, Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov for May 2, 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 6, p.164-183, and Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 24 July 1960, AVPRF fond 0102, opus 16, delo 7, p.16-42. 410 Shimotomai, “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing,” p. 135. 411 Ibid. 185

Fourth Congress, in September 1961, the KWP decided to proceed as planned and launch the Seven-year Plan from 1961. Kim Il Sung’s speech to the Congress did not provide any insight into the decision, though it did reveal that the priorities would remain heavy industry and not, as the KWP had originally planned, light industry and consumer goods.

412 As a result of security threat from across the DMZ, the country could no longer afford to concentrate on elevating the living standards of the North Korean masses and the quality of consumer goods. This suggests that after Park Chung Hee seized power, the

North Korean leadership no longer believed that re-unification was imminent since the plan to focus on consumer goods had largely been designed to use living standards in the

DPRK as a magnet for South Korean workers.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The North Korean leadership believed that their suspicions about Moscow’s commitment to the DPRK’s security were confirmed in October 1962 when Khrushchev

“betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis.”413 What the North Koreans viewed as

Soviet capitulation in the face of pressure from the Kennedy Administration demonstrated that Khrushchev was more concerned about peaceful coexistence, and being, in the words of Kim Il Sung, “buddy-buddy with Eisenhower and Kennedy” than he was in aiding smaller socialist countries that, in the eyes of the North Koreans, were vulnerable to being picked off, one by one, by the United States.414 During a tense

412 Dae-sook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 169. 413 Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 January 1965, MOL, XIX-J- 1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965, 414 Record of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky about the negotiations between the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin, and the governing body of the Korean Workers Party, 16 February 1965, Czech Foreign Ministry Archive. 186 exchange a few years after the crisis, Vice Premier Kim Il explained to Alexei Kosygin that as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the North Korean leadership felt that it “could not count that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of

Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.”415

The North Korean leadership did not immediately express its disappointment with

Moscow. In the immediate wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, on November 1, Kim Il

Sung actually conveyed his support for the Soviet response, noting “I know […] that in some circles the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev is looked upon as a concession to the

Americans, but I personally believe in this complicated situation the Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev made the sole correct decision, and this decision speaks not to the weakness of the Soviet Union, but to its strength and to the wisdom of its government.”

Kim then added, “the socialist camp does not need war right now.”416 Kim’s expression of support for the Kremlin leader’s decision contradicted the views laid out in an October

29 editorial in Rodong Sinmun which criticized Khrushchev for capitulating to the United

States.417 Kim would later reveal that he too believed that Moscow abandoned Havana and caved to Washington, but in early November, he still desired the advanced weapon systems that only the Soviets could supply.418 He informed Soviet Ambassador

Moskovsky that “when Kennedy made noise about Cuban affairs,” the KWP CC’s

Military Council met to discuss the nation’s defenses. “We came to the conclusion,” Kim reported, “that our border along the 38th parallel is firmly defended,” however, “the

415 Ibid. 416 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung, November 1, 1962, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 18, papka 93, delo 5, listy 135-138. 417 Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook (Seoul: East Gate, 2002), p. 948. 418 Record of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky about the negotiations between the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin, and the governing body of the Korean Workers Party, 16 February 1965, Czech Foreign Ministry Archive. 187 defense of the coastline and air defense are in much poorer shape.” They were particularly concerned about the coastline from the cities of Wonsan to Cheongjin.

Moreover, major cities, such as Pyongyang and Hamheung, were poorly protected from air raids. Kim reported that the Military Council had “made an appropriate decision regarding further strengthening of the DPRK’s defense and improving battle readiness of the forces, but taking into consideration the presence of new American equipment in

South Korea, probably our decisions will not be sufficient.” The North Korean leader therefore requested permission to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss military aid.419 Two weeks later, on November 14, Moskovsky informed Kim that Moscow was prepared to receive the military delegation. Kim requested that the Soviet Union deliver—“free of charge”—over 100 million rubles in military aid to North Korea.

Specifically, to enhance coastal defenses, he asked for submarines. For air defenses, Kim requested an unspecified number of MIG-21s and twelve surface-to-air missile batteries.420 Kim played up the threat to North Korea, remarking “I know that [First

Secretary Khrushchev and Second Secretary Frol Kozlov] are no less concerned than I about the defense of the Far Eastern forward post…it provides a convenient platform for the enemy’s landing.”421 Yet, Kim Gwanghyeop’s November 29 to December 5 visit to

Moscow ended in failure. Moscow would sell the weapons to Pyongyang, but not give them for free or even on credit.422

419 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung, November 14, 1962, AVPRF, F. 0102, Op. 18, papka 93, delo 5, listy 152-154. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid. 422 See, for example, Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era, 192. 188

Establishing Jawi

This certainly reinforced Pyongyang’s mistrust of Moscow. As the Soviet foreign ministry accurately perceived, “[a]s the events which followed the return of a DPRK military delegation from a visit to Moscow in December 1962 headed by Deputy

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Kim Gwanghyeop showed, the Chinese leadership used this and began to expand military cooperation with the DPRK.”423 For a period of about two years, from late 1962 to the fall of 1964, North Korea drew closer to the PRC than at any point in the history of the Sino-DPRK relationship.424 During this period,

Beijing sent numerous military delegations to Pyongyang, delivered arms, and hosted

North Korean officers in Chinese military academies. The two countries also held joint military maneuvers.425 However, it would be wrong to assume that Kim simply became frustrated with Moscow for not supplying military assistance in December, and therefore turned to China to receive that military assistance.426 For one thing, the North Koreans were undoubtedly aware that Beijing could not provide weapons equal in quality to those produced by the Soviets. Moreover, it would have been out of character for the North

Korean leadership—even when abandoning its cautious policy of equidistance—to enter into a dependency relationship with China, especially when it would mean that North

423 "Some New Aspects of Sino-Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 424 Japanese scholar Nobuou Shimotomai argues that the precipitating cause for Pyongyang’s dramatic shift toward Beijing was a series of territorial concessions to North Korea during Sino-DPRK border negotiations in October 1962. See Shimotomai, “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing,” pp. 138-139. 425 See "Some New Aspects of Sino-Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 426 The prevailing narrative is that North Korea skillfully played Moscow and Beijing off one another to extract concessions. See, for example Nobuo Shimotomai, “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972” 189

Korea would be dependent for its national security. Kim Il Sung had learned the valuable lessons about depending on others for survival during his partisan activities and also during the Korean War.427 Therefore, while simultaneously receiving Chinese military support, Pyongyang began to take immediate measures to establish Jawi.428

Moscow’s refusal to bolster North Korean defenses by providing additional assistance in December 1962, combined with the fear of dependency on China, forced

North Korea to become self-reliant in national defense. Jawi became a virtue of necessity.

North Korea escalated its efforts to fortify defenses without delay. One week after the delegation returned from Moscow, the Fifth Plenum of the Fourth KWP CC formally adopted what it referred to as the equal emphasis policy, initially proposed during the

May 18, 1961 meeting of the Standing Committee, which called for simultaneous development of heavy industry and defense capabilities. Most plans to improve living standards in the DPRK were sidelined. The Plenum declared Four Military Guidelines

(sadae gunsanoseon): to arm the entire population; to fortify the entire country; to train the entire army as a “cadre army”; and to modernize weaponry, doctrine, and tactics

427 Han Hongkoo’s essay on the Minsaengdan Incident describes the origins of Kim Il Sung’s distrust toward the Chinese Communist Party after the execution of countless Korean communists who had join the ranks of the CCP during the period of Japanese colonial rule. See Hongkoo Han, “The Colonial Origins of Juche: The Minsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of the North Korea-China Relationship” in Jae Jung Suh ed. Origins of North Korea’s Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 33-62. Kim Il Sung delivered numerous speeches decrying North Korea’s dependency on the Soviet Union and the PRC during the Korean War. In his speech to the Sixth Plenum of the KWP CC in August 1953, for example, he spoke about the need to develop the ability to build arms. While this segment of the speech appears in contemporary Soviet accounts, it was removed from version of the speech later published by North Korea. See “Information about the Situation in the DPRK,” April 1955, RGANI, Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 314. 428 As North Korean officials would later describe to Soviet embassy staff, during the two-year period of enhanced military and political cooperation with the PRC, they did in fact become uncomfortable with China’s domineering influence. For example, they were increasingly frustrated by the exhibition of great Han nationalism and also by what they perceived as efforts to re-assert China’s traditional hegemony over Korea by compelling the DPRK to follow Beijing’s “general line.” See "Some New Aspects of Sino- Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 190 under the principle of self-reliance in national defense.429 The Party also revived the wartime Military Committee (gunsa wiweonhoe).430 It is worth noting that the North

Korean leadership did not inform foreign embassies of the December Plenum, which had been a standard practice.431

The Hungarian ambassador to the DPRK reported that by February 1963, just two months after the Plenum, “large-scale work [was] going on throughout the country; not only entrenchments but also air-raid shelters for the population [were] being built in the mountains.” Moskovsky explained to his Hungarian counterpart that the construction of air-raid shelters in the mountains was likely related to a theory about Korea’s geographical conditions that Kim Il Sung had shared with him. Kim had allegedly claimed that Korea’s mountainous terrain gave it a certain advantage in the event of nuclear war, since the mountains “ward off the explosions to a substantial extent, and a lot of such bombs would be needed to wreak large-scale destruction in the country.”

Three months later, a North Korean political officer accompanying a Hungarian diplomat on a tour of a war museum in Pyongyang which preserved a series of tunnels built during the Korean War elaborated on Kim Il Sung’s theory. According to the Hungarian diplomat’s report on the excursion, the political officer declared that “not even a hydrogen bomb could do damage to such fortifications that had been hollowed into rocks.” The diplomat explained that although the caverns might indeed save those who stayed there at the moment of the explosion, everything on the surface would be

429 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, February 15, 1963, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 6. Doboz, 5/d. 0011/RT/1963. 430 As Daesook Suh writes, the Supreme People’s Assembly had established the Military Committee during the Korean War. The Party revived it under the auspices of the Central Committee in 1962. See Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, 215. 431 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol, December 29, 1962, AVPRF, F. 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 4, listy 3-5. 191 destroyed. Moreover, those in the caverns would not be able to surface for many years because of radioactive pollution. In response, the North Korean political officer replied that “people staying in the caverns would be provided with everything that they needed, and the Americans could not devastate the entire country anyway.” Therefore “on the order of Comrade Kim Il Sung, we built a network of caverns of this type in the entire country.”432

In addition to building up defensive fortifications and constructing air-raid shelters throughout the country, from December 1962 North Korea expanded its military and internal security forces. In 1960, there were 320,000 soldiers in the Korean Peoples’

Army and an additional 60,000 internal security forces.433 By January1965, that number had increased to 700,000 soldiers and 200,000 internal security forces.434 Moreover,

Worker-Peasant Red Guard units (Ronong jeogwidae), organized in every factory and cooperative farm, were given intense military training. These units, which by 1966 had over 1.5 million members, would serve as reservists in wartime, but provide police functions in peacetime.435 The budget for national defense had also increased substantially. In 1956, the share of national defense to the total national budget was

432 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry May 27, 1963, MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 5. doboz, 5/f, 1/25/17-1/1963. 433 Memorandum of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung, June 17, 1960, from the personal archive of V.P. Tkachenko, citied in Koreiskii Poluostrov i interesi Rossii [The Korean Peninsula and Russia's Interests] (Mosow, Vostochnaya Literatura, 2000) pp. 19-20 434 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, January 8, 1965, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. 435 See Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 214, and also Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.064, February 16, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang, 1967. 192 approximately 4.3 percent.436 By 1965, that rose to over 30 percent, representing 1.2 billion won.437

The North Korean leadership publicly pursued an approach to establishing self- reliance in national defense that was in part informed by Kim Il Sung’s partisan activities, and also in part inspired by the Chinese practice of “people’s war. They diminished the importance of modern weapons, including nuclear weapons, citing Korea’s unique geography and the ability to dig tunnels. Despite the public campaign which sought to diminish the importance of nuclear weapons, Kim Il Sung was in fact very cognizant of the effects of nuclear weapons, and started, from early 1963, to pursue a nuclear deterrent for North Korea. Kim Il Sung was of course aware of the impact of nuclear weapons.

Two bombs dropped on Japan ended what years of partisan struggle failed to achieve; the defeat of imperial Japan.

This public ruse contradicted a decision to be more vigilant and forthcoming made in the wake of the 1961 South Korean military coup, when the KWP standing committee admitted that the effort to deceive the public during the Korean War led to setbacks:

In the past, during wartime, we sometimes misled Party members about the real situation: the enemy was in fact already approaching Pyongyang, but we still claimed that we had several hundred planes, so everything would be alright—and as a result, we suffered setbacks. Now we must make the situation clear to all Party members, and have Party members and the people take the initiative to mobilize and strengthen vigilance against enemies.438

436 Joseph Chung, “Seven Year Plan” 437 Record of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovskyi about the negotiations between the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin, and the governing body of the Korean Workers Party, which took place at the USSR Embassy in the DPRK on February 16, 1965, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Fond 02/1, folder 96/101, pgs. 1-26 438 Contents of the [North] Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting, May 18, 1961, PRCFMA 106-00581-03 193

The decision to mislead the public was likely made after the DPRK failed to obtain additional military support from the Soviet Union in December 1962. Indeed, at the May

18, 1961 meeting, the decision to be more forthright with the public was made on the premise that “the entire socialist camp is also stronger than it was before the war.”439 The

North Koreans therefore counted on Socialist solidarity. When this failed to materialize, the public campaign to mislead the public about the effectiveness of people’s war was launched, while simultaneously pursuing other options.

North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent became clear because of the sudden and keen interest they evinced in nuclear technology from the spring of 1963. In the early

1960s, Soviet specialists were in the DPRK conducting tests on uranium ore found on the northern half of the peninsula. Alarm bells went off in the Soviet embassy when North

Korean officials suddenly began to make inquiries about how they might develop the mining of uranium ore on a broad scale. The Soviet specialists explained that such an operation would be very costly. Moreover, they informed the North Koreans that Korean uranium ore was “not rich” and “very scarce.” This did not deter those making the inquiries, who only days later reportedly asked about Korea’s prospects for building their own atomic bomb. Attempting to discourage his interlocutors, the specialist insisted that

“the economy of the DPRK cannot cope with the creation of nuclear weapons.” Again undeterred, the North Korean retorted that “it would cost much less in the DPRK than in other countries. If we tell our workers, he declared, that we are taking up such a task, they will agree to work free of charge for several years.” The Soviet embassy informed the specialists to avoid all further discussions about uranium and weapons with North

Koreans.

439 Ibid. 194

As the Sino-Soviet split intensified, Moscow’s fear, as becomes clear in the

Soviet diplomatic cables, was not that Pyongyang sought to develop a weapon of its own, but that they would share information received from the Soviet specialists, and even any uranium ore mined by the North Koreans, with the Chinese. Moskovksy even suggested that the Soviets were abetting the Chinese by sending uranium experts to North Korea, explaining “I think that by sending specialists to the DPRK from the Soviet Union we are helping China, and at the time of the current struggle against the Chinese splitters, one should not do this.”

The view that North Korea was seeking technology on nuclear weapons on behalf of China was a belief shared by other embassies. According to the East German ambassador, “the Koreans, apparently on Chinese instructions, are asking whether they could obtain any kind of information about nuclear weapons and the atomic industry from German universities and research institutes. […].”440

The most important step in establishing Jawi as the pillar of Juche Thought occurred in the fall of 1963. October 5, Kim Il Sung delivered a speech at the seventh commencement of Kim Il Sung Military University at which he officially declared Jawi.

He began by noting that until that point, “[o]ur Party’s present slogan is Juche in ideology, independence in politics and self-support in economy.” Next, he declared, “we must carry through the Party’s military policy of self-defense,” or Jawi. The key to Jawi,

Kim argued was “not whether an army has good weapons or not but whether it is a revolutionary army or not.” By revolutionary army, the North Korean leader meant that officers and soldiers needed to be built up politically and ideologically:

440 Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and the German Ambassador, August 26, 1963, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 19, papka 97, delo 5, list 93. 195

We must equip our officers and men with a revolutionary idea that they can defeat a formidable enemy even with outmoded weapons, with a revolutionary idea that they should not just count on powerful arms like nuclear weapons but should rely on the strength of the entire people, organize and unit them and fight together with them. We should equip them with the spirit of unity between officers and men and between army and people.

It should come as no surprise that the example Kim upheld for this politically and ideologically equipped revolutionary army was the revolutionary tradition of the anti-

Japanese guerrillas:

It must develop into a revolutionary army inheriting the revolutionary spirit of the anti-Japanese guerrillas; at the start, they had not even a rifle, but snatched enemy weapons with which they waged a long, arduous struggle against Japanese imperialism, a strong enemy.

Kim Il Sung then elaborated on the four military guidelines announced at the

December 1962 KWP CC Plenum. He explained that in an emergency, the country could not just depend on the People’s Army, therefore “the entire people must arm themselves.”

If this is to be done, it is necessary for the People’s Army to be a cadre army to lead the entire people. Further, he declared that the whole country had to be fortified. “We have not nuclear bomb” Kim observed, [h]owever, we can stand against any enemy who has atom bombs.” He elaborated on his theory about caves, suggesting “if you dig into the earth you can protect yourselves from nuclear attack.” Korea’s many high hills give the country a distinct advantage, he argued, so “we must make tunnels everywhere. We must fortify the whole of the country—not only the frontline but also the rear, the second and third lines—and reinforce the air and maritime defenses. We must also build many underground plants.” Once all the people were armed, the People’s Army was turned into a cadre army, and the whole nation was fortified, Kim said the country would resemble a hedgehog:

196

When it draws its head and curls itself up, its whole body is covered with thorny bristles. Because of this strong “armament” no animal dares to attack it. The same is true of us. Once we arm the entire people and fortify the whole country no enemy, however strong, will dare to attack us. Even the Yankees.

Finally, foreshadowing the military first policy (songun jeongchi) Kim’s eventual successor would develop in the mid-1990s, the North Korean leader declared that in case of war, every branch of the national economy had to serve military efforts. It was therefore necessary for every factory to develop the ability to produce weapons for national defense, cutting foreign dependency and making the nation self-reliant in national defense.441

Soviet-DPRK Rift

The events of late 1962 also led to a major shift in North Korea’s foreign policy orientation. Despite long-standing disagreements between Moscow and Pyongyang over

North Korea’s autarkic development strategy, relations remained cordial through the end of 1962 when Moscow refused to give the DPRK assistance. At the core of the rift with

Moscow were fundamentally different views, particularly over the notion of peaceful coexistence. The North Korean leadership found the idea of peaceful coexistence with the

United States, which had leveled the country during the Korean War, utterly objectionable. Kim spoke about this as early as August 1960 in a talk with soldiers of the

109th Army unit of the Korean People’s Army: “Some people insist that we peacefully coexist with the Yankees. How can we do so, without opposing US imperialism?”442

Moreover, in the early 1960s, Kim could not yet conceive of peacefully coexisting with the South Korean military junta of Park Chung Hee. From late 1962, therefore, North

441 Kim Il Sung, On Juche in Our Revolution, pp. 321-334. 442 Ibid, p. 203. 197

Korea abandoned its policy of equidistance and sided with the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet split, expressing opposition to Khrushchev’s purported revisionism, particularly his policy of peaceful coexistence. On January 8, 1963 Geunloja published an editorial supporting the PRC’s attack on Soviet “revisionism.”443 Members of the North Korean leadership openly criticized Khrushchev’s “revisionism,” and the press frequently re- published polemical articles against the Soviet Union from Renmin Ribao and the journal

Hongqi.444 Pyongyang openly supported Beijing in advocating for a far more militant policy of anti-imperialist struggle.

The Soviet-North Korean rift lasted through the end of 1964. As North Korean officials would later describe in conversations with Soviet embassy staff, they were increasingly frustrated by the exhibition of great Han nationalism and also by what they perceived as efforts to re-assert China’s traditional hegemony over Korea by compelling the DPRK to follow Beijing’s “general line.”445 Ever conscious of its own status as a divided country, Pyongyang also began to question China’s “divisive” policies on another divided nation; Vietnam. Although Kim Il Sung held the Soviets in contempt for betraying North Vietnam by not responding quickly or forcefully enough to the Gulf of

Tonkin Resolution, he believed China’s efforts to block Soviet assistance to Vietnam

(which China diminished as insufficient) as aiding nobody but the United States, which from 1964 dramatically began to escalate its presence in the region.446 Moreover, North

Korean officials allegedly feared that China’s actions could lead to renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. As a Soviet report from 1965 explained, “the Korean leadership

443 Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook, p. 948. 444 "Some New Aspects of Sino-Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid. 198 cannot fail to understand that a further aggravation of the situation in Vietnam, which the

Chinese leaders are aiming at, might entail complications at the line of demarcation between the DPRK and South Korea.”447 Based on conversations with North Korean officials, another Soviet official described how the DPRK became suspicious of China’s policies toward assisting Vietnam, reporting that: [e]vents in Vietnam have exerted a great sobering influence on the Korean leadership: as an example of this, the Koreans were convinced that Mao Zedong and his group were ready to support not only the interests of the Vietnamese but also of the Korean people for the sake of their great power, nationalistic purposes. The Chinese side has repeatedly tried to push the Koreans to aggravate the situation in South Korea 'to help Vietnam', without taking into account the real situation and the consequences."448

North Korea began to warm up to the prospect of improving relations with

Moscow following Khrushchev’s involuntary departure, in October 1964, from the leadership of the CPSU and USSR. October 17, North Korea expressed its hope of recovering the traditional solidarity between the DPRK and the Soviet Union following the emergence of a new triumvirate of Leonid Brezhnev, Aleksey Kosygin, and Nikolay

Podgorny. Then on December 3rd, Rodong Sinmun published an editorial that indirectly criticized China for pressuring the DPRK to conform to its dogma.449

In January 1965, North Korean Vice Premier Kim Il went to Moscow where he met with Kosygin. The two held very frank talks in which Kim Il revealed North Korea’s thinking on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the actions Pyongyang was forced to take in

447 "Some New Aspects of Sino-Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 448 Soviet Foreign Ministry DVO [Far East Department] memo about Sino-Korean relations, March 7, 1967, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 5-12 449 Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook, p. 948. 199 light of the perceived betrayal to the smaller countries in the socialist camp. Kim Il accused the Soviets of having betrayed the Cubans, and two years later the (North)

Vietnamese by not responding fittingly to the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident.450 He also stated, very clearly, that as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the North Korean leadership felt that it “could not count that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship,

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.”451 Kim Il also explained that after having been forced to become self-reliant in national defense, the country had been kept in a state of mobilization, which had drastic effects on the North Korean economy. North Korea was

“compelled”, Kim Il explained, “to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of

200,000. These huge armed forces constituted enormous expenses for the national economy of the DPRK, and this is why neither industry nor agriculture had made headway.”452

The next month, in February 1965, while returning from a trip to Hanoi and then

Beijing, Kosygin visited the DPRK where he met twice with Kim Il Sung. The North

Korean leader echoed many of the comments which Kim Il had made in Moscow the previous month. Kosygin defended Moscow’s response to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and, turning Pyongyang’s own rhetoric on Kim, admonished the North Korean leader for not doing enough in the anti-imperialist struggle. Kosygin charged that editorials

450 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 January 1965, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. 451 Ibid. 452 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, January 8, 1965, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. 200 condemning American aggression in Vietnam were far less effective than Soviet direct assistance.453

During their second conversation, Kim elaborated on the tremendous economic difficulties the DPRK faced as a result of having been forced to establish Jawi. Kim Il

Sung elaborated on the tremendous economic cost to Kosygin:

We had to look for financing exclusively within our own country, and we could get it only at the expense of other sectors. I am sure I don’t have to tell you how large amounts of money it involved. That is why we are currently falling behind in completing the 7-year plan by one year, and we still need 3 to 5 years in order to fulfill the seven year plan at least in basic parameters. However, 4 years and 2 months have passed and we have fulfilled less than half of the 7-year Plan’s goals.454

The February 1965 Kosygin visit became an important catalyst of the favorable change in Pyongyang’s attitude toward Moscow. Within three months of the visit,

Moscow gave Pyongyang, free of charge, over 150 million in military equipment. Kim Il

Sung was even so bold as to ask that the amount be increased, so he could “increase two- fold the number of surface-to-air anti-aircraft batteries and 57 mm howitzers.455

Even though Soviet military assistance to North Korea resumed, Jawi had become the third and final pillar of Juche Thought. While the country would continue accept military assistance from other countries, it would limit its dependence on outside powers

453 Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, February 19, 1965, MOL, archival signature not available. Also, as newly released documents from Vietnam have revealed, between 1967 and 1969, North Korea dispatched a total of 87 North Korean Air Force personnel to North Vietnam, during which time the North Koreans lost 14 men and claimed to have shot down 26 American aircraft. See North Korea International Documentation Project e-Dossier No. 2, “North Korean Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,” (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010) http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korean-pilots-the-skies-over-vietnam 454 Record of a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky about the negotiations between the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin, and the governing body of the Korean Workers Party, which took place at the USSR Embassy in the DPRK on February 16, 1965, Czech Foreign Min istry Archive, archival signature not available. 455 Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov and the North Korean Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kim Byeongchaek, May 21, 1965, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 21, papka 105, delo 32, list 21. 201 for its national security. The North Korean leadership was of course cognizant of the fact that they still needed outside assistance to obtain advanced weapons (despite the public campaign to diminish the need for advanced weapons). In a 1966 conversation between

North Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol and Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, Pak explained:

[G]reat attention is paid in the DPRK to strengthening the defense capability of the country, and this causes delays in the implementation of the 7-year plan of economic development. The implementation of the 7-year plan is lagging behind by two years. The Korean Workers' Party put forward the slogan “arm the entire people,” “turn the country into an impregnable fortress.” These are not simply words – we are forced to direct substantial funds into the strengthening of the country's defense.

Of course, said comrade Pak Seong-cheol, we would not be able to handle the task of strengthening the self-defense capability of our country by ourselves, and we asked for help. The Soviet Union met our wishes [poshel nam na vstrechu] and provided good military and economic aid.456

At least in the presence of foreign officials, therefore, North Korean leaders recognized their continued need for assistance.

North Korea continued emphasize the need arm the entire nation, but as Soviet military assistance to the DPRK increased from 1965, Pyongyang was less dismissive of advanced weapons. According to the observations of Soviet military specialists, “the

Korean military is beginning to understand [advanced weaponry’s] importance in modern warfare during the process of training to master the new equipment. This is one of the main reasons for sending Korean servicemen to train in the Soviet Union.”457 The emphasis remained on developing autonomous defense capabilities.

456 "Record of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol" April 09, 1966, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 22, papka 107, delo 4, listy 1-5. http://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/110504. 457 “Sino-Korean Relations in 1966 (memo),” December 2, 1966, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49. While North Korean officers were being sent to Moscow for training, they were being withdrawn 202

The country remained in an uninterrupted state of mobilization as its international security further deteriorated from 1965. On June 22, 1965, the Republic of Korea and

Japan, both powerful allies of the United States, normalized relations. As if the prospects of a triple alliance between the U.S., the ROK, and Japan weren’t enough, Washington was even promoting an Asian counterpart to the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), a so-called Northeast Asian Treaty Organization.458 As Chinese politics continued to radicalize during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976),

Sino-DPRK deteriorated dramatically to the point where there were armed skirmishes along the shared border in the vicinity of Baekdu Mountain.

As will be described in the next chapter, challenges to Kim Il Sung’s policies, at a time of heightened international tensions, led to the transformation of Juche and its three practical applications, Jaju, Jarip, and Jawi, from a set of practical policy applications to tools of domestic suppression and foreign exclusion.

from China as methods of waging people’s war became less important. As the report describes, “all the Korean servicemen studying in Chinese military schools are being recalled. There is information that the Chinese leadership has allegedly repeatedly suggested to the Koreans that they again send their military specialists for training but the Korean leadership is refraining from this.” 458 See Wada Haruki, “Envisioning a Northeast Asian community: regional and domestic factors to consider” in Edward Friedman and Sung Chull Kim ed. Regional Co-operation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia: The Impact of Domestic Forces (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 40. As Wada explains, once the ROK and Japan normalized relations, the idea of establishing NEATO “disappeared.” 203

Chapter Five: The Monolithic Ideological System (Yuil sasang chaegye)

By 1965, Juche Thought became a complete set of practical policy applications with three pillars; self-reliance in politics (jaju), self-reliance in economics (jarip), and self-reliance in national defense (jawi). These principles continued to guide North Korean policies as the country maintained the equal emphasis approach to economic development—simultaneous development of heavy industry and national defenses— adopted at the 1962 KWP CC Plenum. North Korean leaders also pragmatically advocated independence and neutrality in the ongoing Sino-Soviet split.

Challenges to North Korea’s security continued to emerge throughout the decade.

The greatest security challenge emerged in 1966 with China’s launch of the Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, after which Sino-DPRK relations deteriorated rapidly.

By the end of 1966, North Korea’s security situation was more unfavorable than at any point since the Korean War. It was precisely at this time that leading officials in the KWP

CC Political Committee began to express discontent with the equal emphasis approach to the development of the economy and national defense and the cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung. In many ways, the actions of these individuals paralleled those of the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans from 1953-1956, though in the case of

1966 and 1967, the critics did not enjoy foreign support. In fact, they were from Kim Il

Sung’s inner core. Viewing the criticism as a threat, and determined to prevent such challenges to his national security imperatives in the future, Kim Il Sung purged the individuals, collectively known in North Korea as the “Anti-Party Anti-Revolutionary

Factional Element” (pan dang pan hyeongmyeong jongpa bunja), or Gapsan faction in the English-language historiography, and took measures to transform Juche Thought into

204 a Monolithic Ideological System that would suppress pluralism in the party and make the country impervious to foreign influences.

Juche Thought and North Korean Neutrality

In April 1965, Kim Il Sung made his first and only trip outside the socialist camp when he travelled to Indonesia.459 On April 14th, the North Korean leader delivered a lecture at the Ali Arkhan Academy of Social Sciences in which he outlined, for the first time, Juche Thought and all three of its practical applications, including the latest incarnation of the idea, Jawi. In previous speeches, Kim only spoke of Jaju and Jarip. He declared “Juche in ideology, independence [Jaju] in politics, self-sustenance [Jarip] in the economy and self-defence [sic] [Jawi] in national defense—this is the stand our Party has consistently adhered to.”460 The lecture in Indonesia, therefore, marked the full evolution of Juche Thought as a complete set of practical policy applications. The lecture was also significant as a declaration of North Korea’s independence.

Frustrated with the actions of both the Soviet Union and China over the previous half-decade (if not decade-and-a-half), the Kim Il Sung sought to distance the DPRK from its putative allies. Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence and refusal to fulfill a North Korean request to bolster its defenses in December 1962 led to a two year rift between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. During that period, as North Korea drew closer to the PRC than at any point in the history of Sino-DPRK relations, China cast a long shadow on North Korea, and Chinese leaders pressed their Korean counterparts to adopt

459 Kim was accompanied by his son and eventual successor, Kim Jong Il. The trip coincided with ceremonies commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, a conference that Kim did not attend in 1955. 460 Kim Il Sung, Juche in Our Revolution, 428-429. 205 their hostile anti-Soviet rhetoric and accept strict Chinese oversight on the use of loans.

As East German diplomats speculated, these measures were perceived by the North

Koreans as being overly intrusive and as displays of big power chauvinism.461 Daesook

Suh accurately describes Kim’s speech in Indonesia as having been designed to sever the

“hierarchical relationship” Korea had maintained with Moscow and Beijing.462

Juche Thought grew in salience following Kim’s return from Indonesia as part of the official line of the KWP, which alleged to follow neither Moscow nor Beijing. Kim intensified efforts to maintain some distance from the Soviet Union and China. Although by 1965 relations with Moscow were once again cordial, and Moscow pledged over 150 million rubles in military aid and signed a new long-term trade agreement with the DPRK,

Kim remained distrustful. Chinese leaders, by contrast, went into a self-imposed isolation starting in 1966 with the start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Initially, this made the North Korean leader’s job of minimizing China’s impact easier, though this changed as the CCP later strove to impose the Cultural Revolution on North Korea as well.

461 When he met Kim Il Sung in November 1957, Mao Zedong had apologized for an earlier display of China’s big power chauvinism in the wake of the 1956 August Plenum. This second incident with Beijing only reinforced Pyongyang’s mistrust. “On some changes of positions of the leadership of the Korean Workers Party and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” July 12, 1965, SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30 462 Suh also describes the trip to Indonesia as an effort to build relations with developing nations. Kim Il Sung had actually met with the leaders of several African and Asian leaders in Indonesia for the tenth anniversary of the Bandung Conference. This was part of a larger strategy started in the early 1960s in which Kim Il Sung began to reach out to the developing world. This was in part to minimize the DPRK’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union and China, though, as Charles Armstrong has argued, “economic relations with China and the Soviet-bloc states remained far more important to the DPRK until the very end of the Soviet Union.” Throughout the 1960s, the DPRK cultivated relations with some two dozen new governments in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Kim Il Sung dispatched trade delegations, sent congratulatory messages, established trade and consular relations, and normalized relations with developing Asian and African countries including Algeria, Yemen, Mali, Togo, Nigeria, Burma, Indonesia, and the UAR. Charles Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” NKIDP Working Paper No. 1 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009), p. 6. Also see Shimotomai, “Kim Il Sung’s Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing,” p. 137; and George Ginsburgs and Roy U.T. Kim ed., Calendar of Diplomatic Affairs Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: 1945-1975. 206

The KWP further asserted its independence by refusing to re-print Soviet and

Chinese polemical articles in the North Korean press, as doing so would suggest agreement with one side or the other. Just a few years before, in 1963, the DPRK’s press regularly re-published Chinese polemical articles. North Korean citizens were thus largely kept in the dark on the issues dividing the communist bloc. According to East

German embassy reports, the only articles that addressed the issues at the heart of the

Sino-Soviet split were polemics of the Japanese Communist Party or Indonesian

Communist Party. Even these articles, East German diplomats noted, “were conducted with much restraint and without naming names.” From the context, however, it would have been clear to those familiar with international developments—though likely not the

North Korean population—that these articles “still contained attacks against the CPSU and Soviet Union,” and also “could as well have been directed to the address of the

Chinese leadership.”463

As part of his new policy of independence, Kim Il Sung regularly stressed the need to overcome the ideological differences and restore unity to the socialist camp.

Continued division, Kim argued, aided the United States. In a conversation with the new

Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, A.I. Gorchakov,464 Kim remarked “[i]f the 13 socialist countries stick firmly together, then this is a fist able to defeat imperialism. However, if this fist has one sick finger, it will be weakened.”465 Moreover, the North Korean leader strongly encouraged reaching out to developing African and Asian countries, suggesting

463 On some changes of positions of the leadership of the Korean Workers Party and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, July 12, 1965, SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30. 464 Ambassador V.P. Moskovsky requested a re-assignment from Pyongyang, which was granted on May 12, 1965. 465 Note about the Introductory Visit of the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Gorchakov, on June 10, 1965, SAMPO, no archival signature. 207 that the thirteen-fingered fist could be further strengthened by joining forces with the

Third World to resist U.S. involvement in regional conflicts.466

Security Challenges

As noted in the previous chapter, North Korea faced a number of security challenges by the middle of the decade. In June 1965, the Republic of Korea and Japan, both strong military allies of the United States, normalized relations, thus creating the prospect of a united hostile bloc at North Korea’s doorstep. The American presence in

Indochina also dramatically increased after the US Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution in August 1964, authorizing the use of military force without a declaration of war. By the end of 1965, there were 189,000 American troops stationed in Vietnam. At the end of the following year, that number had doubled.467 Additionally, Park Chung Hee committed two South Korean divisions to support U.S. operations in Vietnam in 1965.

North Korea’s security continued to deteriorate from 1966. Ironically, the greatest perceived threat to the DPRK came from neither Washington nor Seoul, but from its formerly close ally, Beijing. From May 1966, the CCP launched the radical Great

Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a social-political movement to root out revisionism and traditional elements of Chinese culture and to replace that by imposing Maoist orthodoxy on the Party. Once the Cultural Revolution was launched, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing rapidly deteriorated for two reasons. First, the North Korean leadership was encouraged by China to imitate the Cultural Revolution, but refused. They even perceived the PRC’s attempt to impose a revolutionary movement as foreign meddling,

466 Ibid. See also "Some New Aspects of Sino-Korean Relations in the First Half of 1965," June 4, 1965, AVPRF. f. 0102. op. 21, p. 106, d. 20, pp. 14-27. 467 "Years of Escalation: 1965-68," U.S. History Online Textbook, accessed February 17, 2013, http://www.ushistory.org/us/55b.asp. 208 and criticized the Chinese in private discussions with Soviet officials for their “big power chauvinism.”468 Second, The Chinese were angered by improvements in Soviet-DPRK relations. The Chinese and the Albanians—Albania was perhaps the only socialist country outside of China to support the Cultural Revolution—poured scorn on Kim Il

Sung for allegedly straddling the fence in the Sino-Soviet split.469 The Chinese Red

Guards, a radical mass paramilitary group, took actions of their own to spread the revolution to North Korea (though Kim Il Sung believed it to have been done with the support of the CCP) by placing loudspeakers along the 1,300 kilometer border between the two states. As Kim Il Sung later explained to Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, “they broadcast propaganda against our country day and night. The population along the border could not sleep. My son [Kim Jong Il] visited a village along the border at the time.

When he came back he said, “Dad, I could not sleep a single night.”470 The radical Red

Guards regularly denounced Kim and spread rumors that he had been overthrown by pro-

Chinese forces in the KWP. The deterioration in relations was serious enough that ambassadors were recalled from both Beijing and Pyongyang.471

Kim Il Sung perceived a real threat from the Cultural Revolution, which he described in a conversation with a Soviet diplomat as “'great madness [obaldenie] which has nothing in common with either culture or revolution"472 The real threat to North

Korea’s security came from the fact that Chinese provocations were not limited to

468 “Sino-Korean Relations in 1966 (memo),” December 2, 1966, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49. 469 Ibid. 470 “Memorandum on the Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov,” October 30, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, From the personal collection of former Bulgarian diplomat Georgi Mitov. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/114533. 471 Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 192. 472 “Attitudes in the DPRK toward the So-Called Cultural Revolution in China,” March 7, 1967 AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13-23. 209 slanderous statements in newspapers or delivered over loudspeakers along the border.

Relations between the two countries deteriorated to the point where there were armed clashes on the border in the vicinity of Baekdu Mountain.473 Moreover, on one occasion,

Chinese troops invaded North Korean territory and occupied a village. These came about after China asserted claims to Korean territory, despite the fact that the two countries had signed border agreements in 1962 and 1964. Kim later recounted the incident involving

Chinese troops entering Korean territory to Zhivkov:

I gave instructions to our people to let them in and not to shoot at them straight away. But, if they tried to advance further into our territory and carry out actions – our people were to block their way and capture at least five of them alive. The Chinese soldiers, however, penetrated into our territory and after that withdrew, without undertaking any action.474

As the Sino-DPRK split was first evolving, Kim Il Sung took steps to minimize the influence of China in the DPRK. In October 1966, the few remaining China-returned

Koreans were removed from leadership positions in the KWP. These included KWP CC

Standing Committee (renamed the Political Committee) member Kim Chang-man and candidate member Ha Ang-cheon, who from late 1962 to 1964 had allegedly advocated strongly for building ties with Beijing, while simultaneously slandering Moscow.475

Additionally, as Soviet diplomats reported, "[t]he Korean leadership has recently taken a number of steps to keep the country's population from being influenced by

Chinese propaganda. Sino-Korean cultural exchanges have been reduced to zero. […].

473 “Memorandum on the Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov,” October 30, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, From the personal collection of former Bulgarian diplomat Georgi Mitov. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/114533.

474 "Memorandum on the Conversation between Kim Il Sung and Todor Zhivkov" October 30, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, From the personal collection of former Bulgarian diplomat Georgi Mitov. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/114533. 475 “Sino-Korean Relations in 1966 (memo),” December 2, 1966, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49. See also Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 221. 210

Almost no materials from China are published in the Korean press. The 30-minute

Korean language program of news from China on the radio rebroadcasting network has been halted.” 476 Yet, the North Korean leadership did not directly criticize, nor allow direct criticism of the Cultural Revolution and its effects on Sino-DPRK relations.

“Knowing the Chinese leaders well,” on Soviet diplomat reported, “the Korean leadership evidently thinks that no criticism, either open or disguised, will have an effect on them. The Korean leadership sees the solution to the situation which has developed, as

Kim Il Sung said in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, ‘leave the Chinese alone,’ then ‘they will fight amongst themselves and find the correct solution.’”477

To meet these security challenges, the DPRK remained in a state of constant mobilization as it continued to enhance its autonomous defense capabilities under Jawi.

In addition to continued efforts to reinforce fortifications and dig tunnels, the North

Koreans maintained a professional army of 700,000 and over 200,000 internal security forces at an enormous cost to economic growth.478 Moreover, in connection with the four military guidelines (sadae kunsanoseon) declared at the 1962 December KWP CC

Plenum, the DPRK also organized “Worker-Peasant Red Guard” units (Ronong jeogwidae) with over 1.5 million members from every factory and cooperative farm.479

This civilian army, which in wartime would serve as reservists, was given upwards of

476 Excerpts from a 30 December 1966 memo of the Soviet Embassy to the DPRK (A. Borunkov) about Embassy measures against Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda in the DPRK, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 50-56 477 “Sino-Korean Relations in 1966 (memo),” December 2, 1966, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49 478 Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, January 8, 1965, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1965, 73. doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. 479 The North Korean Red Guard Units are not to be confused with the Chinese Red Guards, which appeared during the Cultural Revolution. 211 five hundred hours of military drills and lessons in military maneuvers.480 As contemporary Romanian reports noted, “[t]he military instruction and the building of physical endurance for the red guards comprising workers and peasants, present in all productive and non-productive units, are taking place intensely and regularly.”481 Further,

“military mass training establishes the regimentation of almost all people and is aimed at keeping the population under rigorous military discipline.”482

In addition to these indigenous efforts to establish self-reliance in national defense to meet the growing security challenges, Moscow resumed its military assistance to

Pyongyang in 1965. The Soviet military assistance was significant, giving North Korea access to more advanced weapons. Although Kim Il Sung publicly diminished the importance of advanced weapons possessed by the United States (and shared with South

Korea) as useless when deployed against a revolutionary army, privately, the North

Korean leadership clearly appreciated the value of these weapons. As Soviet military specialists reported in 1966, “the Korean military is beginning to understand its importance in modern warfare during the process of training to master the new equipment.”483 This still did not diminish the full-scale mobilization of North Korean society. The emphasis remained on Jawi. One could argue that Pyongyang was not willing to again depend on a foreign power, which had previously demonstrated its unreliability, for national defense issues.

480 Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 214. 481 Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.064, TOP SECRET, February 16, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 482 Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.108, March 28, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 483 “Sino-Korean Relations in 1966 (memo),” December 2, 1966, AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 22, p. 109, d. 22, pp. 38-49. See also Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 221. 212

In connection with the policy of Jawi, the equal emphasis policy, first proposed in the wake of the 1961 military coup in South Korea and formally adopted at the 1962

December KWP CC Plenum. According to this policy, heavy industry and national defense would be developed simultaneously, though it had become increasingly clearer that defense would receive the lion’s share of state funding. This was done at the expense of additional investment in light industry, consumer goods, and agriculture.484 Romanian diplomats commented on this, noting that the North Koreans were “focusing on strengthening the capacity and preparing industrial factories to continue production in warfare conditions and to defend themselves. To this end, [the North Koreans] are promoting the generalization at the national level of the experience of several factories, which during the last war continued to produce while also contributing to defense.”485

Several exhibitions held under the theme of “Fighting and Producing during Warfare,” which reportedly attracted wide public attention in the DPRK, were organized in the port city of Nampo.486

Juche Thought and North Korea’s Declaration of Independence

According to a report of the Czechoslovak ambassador to Pyongyang, at some point in the summer of 1966, as relations between China and the DPRK were rapidly deteriorating following the launch of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong allegedly sent

Kim Il Sung a letter asking the Korean leader to clarify his position on the Sino-Soviet

484 Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.064, TOP SECRET, February 16, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 485 Ibid. 486 Ibid. 213 split.487 Perhaps in response to this letter, in August 1966, North Korea published an editorial in Rodong Sinmun reminding all of North Korea’s independent line and non- involvement in the Sino-Soviet split (while simultaneously impressing upon both Beijing and Moscow the reality of North Korea’s sovereignty). The editorial, entitled “Let us

Defend Independence,” expounded on Juche Thought as a complete set of practical policy applications. It also explicated each pillar of Juche Thought and further established eight “creeds” for firmly establishing Juche Thought in Party life:

1) Oppose flunkeyism and think for oneself; 2) Rely on one’s own strength; 3) Treat Marxism-Leninism as a guiding principle; 4) Do not mechanically copy the experiences of other nations and apply them to Korea; 5) Have national pride; 6) Maintain self-reliance in economics with the foreign assistance of their own choice; 7) Respect independence (jajuseong); 8) Strengthen anti-imperial struggle on the basis of jajuseong.488

The Second Party Conference As the souring of relations between Pyongyang and Beijing developed into a full- fledged Sino-DPRK split during the Cultural Revolution, Kim reinforced the message of independence and neutrality in the other major dispute dividing the socialist camp; the

Sino-Soviet split. He did this at the October 1966 Second Party Conference, held at a time when North Korea’s status quo was in more peril than at any point since the Korean

War. The conference was called to officially extend the Seven-year Plan, to address

North Korea’s precarious situation in foreign relations and national security, and to make changes and appointments to the Central Committee.

487 March 7, 1967 Soviet Embassy in the DPRK, (A. Borunkov) prepared a memo about "Attitudes in the DPRK Toward the So-Called 'Cultural Revolution' in China" AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13- 23. 488 Rodong Sinmun, August 12, 1966. Both Daesook Suh and Jae-Cheon Lim describe the contents of the article. See Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 204-205; and Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, p. 62. 214

The first item on the agenda was the Seven-year Plan. Vice Premier Kim Il delivered a report in which he announced that it would be extended by three years until

1970. This was the first plan that failed to meet its deadline.489 Kim Il alleged that the extension was necessary because of the need to shift expenditures to national defense industries as a result of the hostile international environment.490 The Vice Premier and other North Korean officials had made similar comments as early as 1965. Both Kim Il and Kim Il Sung described the tremendous cost of maintaining an army of 700,000 in meetings with Kosygin in January and then February 1965. In April 1966, Foreign

Minister Pak Seongcheol suggested to Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko that they were at least two years behind schedule in achieving the goals of the Seven-year Plan as a result of military expenses.491 The equal emphasis policy of simultaneously developing heavy industry and national defense had a tremendous impact on the national economy.

In his speech covering foreign relations and the situation in the international communist movement, Kim Il Sung clarified the KWP’s neutral position on the Sino-

Soviet split and further confirmed Juche Thought—now a fully developed set of practical policy applications—as the official political line guiding North Korean politics and foreign relations. After a two year rift with Moscow, during which relations with Beijing were strong, followed by a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and split with the PRC,

Kim broke his silence domestically on North Korea’s relations with its putative allies. He stressed the KWP’s independence from both the Soviet Union and China, and declared

489 Charles Armstrong, The Koreas, p. 70. 490 Joseph Chung suggests that the another reason for the failure to achieve the goals of the Seven-year Plan on time were connected to the declining efficiency of the centrally planned system, which was better suited for reconstruction, but not as the mathematical and physical complexity of planning and choice- making multiplies when the economy becomes more advanced. See Joseph Chung, “North Korea's "Seven Year Plan" (1961-70): Economic Performance and Reforms,” Asian Survey (Jun., 1972), pp. 534-535. 491 Record of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol, April 9, 1966, AVPRF, fond 0102, opis 22, papka 107, delo 4, listy 1-5. 215 neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split, both points he previously emphasized in his speech in

Indonesia, but only briefly in North Korea in the August Rodong Sinmun editorial. 492

Kim proclaimed the KWP’s opposition to both “contemporary revisionism” and “left opportunism.” He reinforced the idea that the KWP would never “dance to someone else’s tune” and “advised” all fraternal Parties to strictly follow an independent policy.

According to a Soviet Foreign Ministry report on the Party Conference, Kim “forcefully stressed the independence of his positions; the Korean leadership thereby demonstrates its non-involvement with any of the sides in the disagreements which exist in the international Communist movement, and strives to maintain normal relations with both the PRC and the USSR."493

Kim was careful not to raise the ire of either Moscow or Beijing. He cautiously avoided attacking countries or parties by name in his speech. Without specifically naming the CCP or the Albanian Party of Labor, which had accused the North Korean leader of

“fence straddling” in the Sino-Soviet split, Kim retorted that “Those who slander us are themselves sitting on a wobbly fence.”494 Kim also delivered his attack on China’s left opportunism without naming the country. Due to restrictions on information in the North

Korean press, it is unlikely the population of North Korea, and even lower-level KWP members, would have been aware of Beijing and Tirana’s attacks on Kim, nor to whom their leader was referring in his rebuke of left opportunism. Therefore, as Kim explained

492 Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 221. 493 “DVO [Far East Department] memo about Sino-Korean relations,” March 7, 1967 AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 5-12. 494 Ibid. 216 to the Soviet ambassador on October 21st, “it was later explained to KWP members in lectures and conversations to whom the accusation of left opportunism was directed.”495

In light of the multiple threats to North Korea’s security, Kim Il Sung also spoke about the need for the Party to intensify efforts to achieve self-reliance in national defense:

Under these circumstances, we must continue to press forward with the economic construction of socialism and, at the same time, build up our defenses more energetically. We must make our defensive might invincible and make preparations to deal with any surprise attack by the enemy. It is true that this will require the allocation of a great deal of manpower and materials to national defense, and it will inevitably delay the economic development of our country to a certain extent. But we should direct greater efforts to the strengthening of our defense power to perfect the country’s defences, even if it calls for some readjustment of the development rate of the national economy.496

The Second Party Conference was also scene to a shift in the composition of the

KWP leadership, leading to the rise of Kim Il Sung’s former comrades-in-arms. Although a number of former partisans had entered the KWP CC in the 1961 KWP Fourth

Congress,497 the CC and the Political Council were fundamentally transformed after the

Second Party Conference, becoming dominated by former anti-Japanese partisans and those closely connected to Kim Il Sung, including by birth. All members of the Political

Committee without partisan backgrounds, including Nam Il, Kim Changman, Pak

Jeongae, Jeong Ilyeong, and Ri Jongok, were removed from their posts.498 Daesook Suh argues that the emphasis on military buildup in the DPRK from 1962 to 1966 brought the partisans and “partisan-related people” to political prominence at the Second Party

495 “Attitudes in the DPRK Toward the So-Called 'Cultural Revolution' in China,” March 7,1967 AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13-23. 496 Kim Il Sung, Works 20, November 1965-December 1966 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), pp. 353-354. 497 See Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 168-175. 498 Ibid., 221. 217

Conference.499 With the KWP CC now dominated by partisans, the military buildup of

North Korea was intensified.

Arguably the most important change to the Party leadership was with the promotion of Kim’s younger brother, Kim Yeongjoo, who rose from relative obscurity to be promoted to the rank of candidate member of the Political Council and one of the secretaries of the Central Committee (the structure of the Political Council was changed at the Second Conference so that the CC was headed by a general secretary, which was

Kim Il Sung, with Party secretaries). The younger Kim also took over the duties of the powerful organization department from Ri Hyosoon.500 The reason for Kim Yeongjoo’s meteoric rise was the fact that he was being groomed to succeed his elder brother.501 This caused a great deal of resentment among other officials who had more esteemed careers as anti-imperial revolutionaries. Kim Yeongjoo, by contrast, was not engaged in any anti- imperial activities.502

Challenge of the Gapsan Faction

At a time when North Korea was faced with tremendous security challenges, particularly from the radical Cultural Revolution threatening to spill over its 1,300 kilometer border with China, several senior members of the KWP CC began to challenge party policies, including the equal emphasis policy of simultaneously expanding industry

499 Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, p. 223. 500 Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203, June 13, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 501 Kim Yeongjoo, who suffered a neurological disorder, stepped down from his positions in the KWP in the early 1970s, leaving the path open to his nephew, Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il, to succeed. See Hwang Jang Yop, “Kim Jong Il Secures Position as Successor,” Daily NK, accessed March 3, 2013, http://www.dailynk.com/english/sub_list.php?cataId=nk02400 502 Another major development of the Second Party Conference was change in strategies for achieving the reunification of the Korean peninsula. Kim Il Sung declared that the most pressing national task consisted in the implementation of the fatherland’s unification during the current generation. 218 and building up national defenses (though the latter was clearly the priority), the promotion of certain individuals to the KWP CC, and the expansion of Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality. The criticism was similar to that made by the Soviet-Koreans and China- returned Koreans from 1953 to 1956, except the members of the so-called Gapsan group had been close allies of Kim Il Sung. These critics included Pak Geumcheol, the fourth ranking member of the KWP CC’s Political Committee (though arguably the second most important); Ri Hyosoon, the fifth ranking member of the KWP CC Political Committee in charge of the South Korean liaison bureau, and until the Second Conference, also the director of the organization department (Kim Il Sung’s younger brother, Kim Yeongjoo was appointed to the position at the conference); Kim Doman, Secretary of the Central

Committee and Head of the Propaganda Section of the Central Committee; and others, including Ko Hyeok, chairman of the culture and arts section of the CC as well as Vice

Premier. These officials had rich anti-colonial backgrounds, though none of them were actually military men. Instead, they served in the Gapsan Operations Committee, an underground organization for national liberation formed in in the mid-1930s that provided logistical and intelligence support to anti-Japanese partisans, in particular to

Kim Il Sung.

Very little is known about the activities and eventual purge of this group, referred to in the English-language historiography as the Gapsan Faction, named after the region in South Hamgyeong province where they had operated during the colonial period (in

North Korea the group is referred to as the “Anti-Party Anti-Revolutionary Factional

Element,” or pan dang pan hyeongmyeong jongpa bunja).503 Daesook Suh and Jae-Cheon

503 See Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 227-230; and Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, pp. 37-42. 219

Lim provide the broader contours of the events surrounding their May 1967 purge, along with more details about the reasons for their ouster.504 Newly obtained documents form

Romanian and formerly East German archives unfortunately reveal very little about the activities leading up to the purge, but reveal even more details about the transformative effects of this group’s political demise on the political and ideological history of the

DPRK.

In the wake of the Second Party Conference, Pak and Ri began to criticize the continued mobilization of the nation and focus on national defense which had begun in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962. Despite the challenges to the nation from the Cultural Revolution and from the increased presence of U.S. forces in the region, the two advocated more investment in light industry and the production of consumer goods to elevate standards of living in the DPRK. To be sure, this was a very sensitive subject. After nearly fifteen years of ambitious back-to-back economic plans and near constant mobilization, the DPRK was transformed from a country that was devastated by the Korean War to one that was moderately industrialized. It remained far more developed than South Korea until the early 1970s. However, the North Korean people still did not enjoy a quality of life commensurate to the labor they had invested in recovery and industrialization. While there had been plans to focus on improving the living standards of the North Korean people at the start of the Seven-year Plan, those plans were largely scrapped after the 1961 military coup in South Korea. In a form of economic populism, Pak Geumcheol and others gave voice to the frustrations of the

North Korean people by suggesting that it was finally time to focus on elevating living standards in the DPRK.

504 Ibid. 220

There are two possible reasons Pak Geumcheol, Ri Hyosoon, and others made these suggestions. First, while the threat from the Cultural Revolution was real, Ri, who was in charge of the South Korean Liaison Bureau in the CC, recognized that Park Chung

Hee was not an immediate threat and was not ready to march North, as North Korean propaganda had increasingly alleged. Moreover, with the United States more and more involved in Vietnam, the prospects of Washington opening up a second front in Asia were slim. For this reason, perhaps, Pak and Ri may have felt safe in advocating for a reduction in expenditures on national defense to improve living standards.

A second possible reason for emphasizing the importance of bettering the lives of the North Korean masses was connected to Pak’s desire to succeed Kim Il Sung—already in his mid-fifties—instead of the North Korean leader’s younger brother, Kim Yeongjoo.

By endearing himself to the North Korean people by serving as their advocate, Pak may have hoped to create a groundswell of support.

Connected to Pak Geumcheol’s efforts to position himself as the champion of the

North Korean masses, therefore, was his criticism of the expanding cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung. Indeed, this may have been the real source of Pak’s grievances with the KWP leadership. At the heart of his criticism, one might surmise, was frustration over two things. First, with the cult of personality, everyone but Kim Il Sung was being written out of the history of the anti-colonial struggle. This must have greatly frustrated

Pak, who had spent many years in prison after being captured by the Japanese in connection with his efforts to support Kim Il Sung and his comrades-in-arms. This was a position shared by observers in the diplomatic community with some familiarity of the history of Korea’s partisan movement. In a conversation with his Romanian colleague in

221

Pyongyangthe charge d’affaires of the Chinese Embassy (the highest Chinese official in

North Korea after the ambassador was recalled) exclaimed that ‘It is perfectly reasonable for Pak Geumcheol, the only leader from the current structure who during the harshest years of anti-Japanese fighting operated and endured with great heroism inside Korea, not to accept that all the credit for the revolutionary and socialist construction in the DPRK goes to Kim Il Sung, who spent the entire period of the revolution in China and in the

Soviet Union, in much milder conditions.”505 Second, as noted, the elevation of the North

Korean leader’s younger brother Kim Yeongjoo to the position of secretary of the powerful organizational department suggested that he was being groomed as political successor. Yet, Kim Yeongjoo’s revolutionary credentials were questionable, to say the least. While his elder brother led a partisan division before fleeing to the Soviet Union in the early 1940s, the junior Kim, who was never a partisan, remained in Manchuria peacefully living out his life. Pak considered himself to be a much more qualified successor.

Pak Geumcheol, Ri Hyosoon, and Kim Doman, who was in charge of the KWP

CC Propaganda Section, were well-positioned to take measures to both diminish the cult of personality and to elevate Pak as a rival to Kim Yeongjoo for the succession of the leadership. In the wake of the Second Party Conference therefore, the three took steps to reduce the cult of personality. According to contemporary diplomatic sources, their efforts worked. Romanian diplomats reported that after the conference, Kim Il Sung’s cult had noticeably diminished.506 This was the first time there had been any perceptible

505 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.247,” July 28, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 506 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203,” June 13, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 222 decline in Kim’s cult since the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956. With the onset of the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, moreover, Soviet leaders had even come to terms with the existence of the Kim cult, and stopped criticizing Pyongyang, perhaps in an effort to win the allegiances of the North Koreans. For example, in early 1962, when meeting with Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Frol Kozlov prior to being dispatched to Pyongyang to succeed Ambassador A.M. Puzanov, the Kremlin leaders instructed Ambassador Moskovsky that “it was necessary to do everything possible to win c[omrade] Kim Il Sung over and to strengthen his party line among vacillators.”

Recognizing that the North Korean leader held different views on Khrushchev’s attack on former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s cult of personality, Khrushchev instructed

Moskovsky to “assure c[omrade] Kim Il Sung that attacks on Stalin's personality cult have nothing to do with c[omrade] Kim Il Sung, that he can ‘sleep well and not suffer over it.’” While escorting Moskovsy out of Khrushchev’s office, Kozlov made additional excuses for the North Koreans, telling him that “the personality cult exists in the DPRK but the personality cult of c[omrade] Kim Il Sung cannot be equaled to that of Stalin. A personality cult is not based on the number of pictures painted or how many times a leader is referred to. C[omrade] Kim Il Sung knows the situation and is in contact with the people.”507

While the Soviet leadership may have come to terms with Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality, Pak Geumcheol and others had not, especially since they were slowly being written out of history. The available documentary evidence does not shed light on the

507 “Notes from a Conversation between Comrade Durcak of the Czech Embassy in the DPRK with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Moskovskii, on 28.VIII.1962.” August 28, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, State Central Archive, Prague, File A. Novotny, foreign affairs, DPRK. https://cwihp-live.secondstory.net/document/113713 223 tactics used by Pak Geumcheol, Ri Hyosoon, and Kim Doman to reduce the cult of Kim

Il Sung in the wake of the conference, though, as noted, diplomats stationed in

Pyongyang clearly recognized the impact.508 More evidence exists on the measures Pak took to enshrine his own place in North Korean history, and possibly to even position himself as a rival candidate to Kim Yeongjoo as future leader of the DPRK. As chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Kim Doman led efforts to create a cult of personality surrounding Pak Geumcheol. He reportedly commissioned a director to make a film, “An Act of Sincerity” (Ilpyeon dansim), celebrating the colonial-era activities of

Pak and his wife.509 Also, in a manner similar to Kim Il Sung described in chapter one,

Pak’s supporters started quoting from him in speeches and in conversations, referring to

Pak’s “teachings” or gyosi. Kim Doman also had the birthplace of Pak Geumcheol rebuilt, just as Kim Il Sung’s birthplace, Mangyeongdae, had been rebuilt and preserved.510 There is little doubt that Kim Il Sung would have perceived these actions as a challenge to his authority.511

In March 1967, Kim Il Sung delivered a speech entitled “On Improving Party

Work and Implementing the Decisions of the Party Conference” in which he warned Pak and his colleagues against engaging in activities of “individual heroism.” This warning came within the context of one of Kim’s earliest appeals to enshrine Juche Thought and establish a Monolithic Ideological System (yuil sasang chaegye) in North Korea. With the international communist movement hopelessly divided between “right-revisionism”

508 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203,” June 13, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 509 Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, p. 39. 510 Kim Il Sung, Works 21, January-December 1967 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), pp. 118-119. Jae-Cheon Lim also writes about Pak’s teachings being repeated, though he translates gyosi as “words.” Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, p. 39. 511 Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, p. 39. 224 and “left-opportunism,” Kim sought to firmly enshrine what he considered North Korea’s own unique revolutionary world outlook, based on Juche Thought. Unless this system was fully established, Kim warned, “it is not possible to ensure the unity of ideology and will.”512 Moreover, the Party would not be turned into a “militant organization” that would be capable of “lead[ing] the revolution and construction with success.” After discussing past episodes of disunity in the KWP’s history at a time when “Juche was not firmly established,” he criticized Pak Geumcheol, though not by name, for his recent actions (including the reconstruction of his birthplace), describing them as “wrong practices which do not follow the Party’s monolithic ideological system.”513

Kim then delivered an even sterner warning to Pak and any other who challenged the position of the KWP:

You must not overlook even the least practices which run counter to our Party’s idea. It is all right if the cadre whom the Party trusts behaves modestly, sincerely supports our Party and works faithfully for the Party. On the other hand, if he pretends to support the Party outwardly but has an ulterior motive and tries to make himself prominent and win over people to his side, such actions must not be permitted. In the past the Korean Communist Party was dissolved and a large stain was left in the history of our communist movement because of the factionalists who liked to appear fashionable. We have wiped out the factionalists and achieved the unity of the Party. If we are to maintain this unity firmly, we must not tolerate the slightest tendencies towards nepotism, parochialism or factionalism within the Party and must promptly deal with any manifestations of “individual heroism.”514

Kim Il Sung also placed great emphasis in his speech on accepting the orders of the Party and the leader unconditionally.

Kim Il Sung never clearly defined what the Monolithic Ideological System was or how it should function. Given the context of criticism over the equal emphasis policy, the

512 Kim Il Sung, Works 21, January-December 1967 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), p. 116. 513 Ibid., 118-119. 514 Ibid., 119. 225 speech was presumably an attack on pluralism in the Party. The Monolithic Ideological

System, therefore, would suppress policy debates within the KWP, particularly when

Kim Il Sung believed the alternative—reducing expenditures on national defense as suggested by Pak Geumcheol and others—would have left the country in a weakened and dependent position at a time of great international peril. The experiences of the 1953-

1956 debates inside the Party likely reinforced the desire to eliminate debate so that Kim could carry out the policies he considered necessary for the greater good of the country.

It seemed only a matter of time before Pak Geumcheol, Ri Hyosoon, Kim Doman, and others were purged. According to diplomatic reports, they stopped making public appearances in April.515 They were not officially purged from the Party until May, during the Fifteenth Plenum of the Fourth KWP CC. Labeled the Anti-Party Anti-Revolutionary

Factional Element, Pak was sent to a rural factory to work, while the others, including Ri

Hyosoon, Kim Doman, and Ko Hyeok, were charged with more serious crimes, such as thwarting the revolutionary movement in South Korea.516

Sadly, we do not have any details of the proceedings of the May KWP CC

Plenum. The diplomatic community was not informed of any details of the event or of the charges against Pak Geumcheol, Ri Hyosoon, and others. The diplomatic record of North

Korea’s former allies from this period are full of meetings between officials of various embassies, all grasping for straws as they tried to comprehend how two members of the

KWP CC Political Council, one of whom had been described as Kim Il Sung’s “right-

515 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203,” June 13, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 516 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.279,” August 3, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 226 hand man,” could have been charged with anti-Party activities.517 In a meeting among

Romanian and Hungarian diplomats in Pyongyang, the Hungarian diplomat reported, with great frustration, “the North Koreans avoid directly answering any questions about the reasons for the purge of these officials. They only say that while they can tolerate deviations from the party line, they can’t tolerate a lack of respect for the leader - Kim Il

Sung.”518

One can surmise that Kim Il Sung perceived the Gapsan faction’s criticism of the equal emphasis policy and actions in connection with the cult of personality as not just a challenge to him personally, but also to his national security imperatives. From the contents of editorials published in Rodong Sinmun in the weeks after the purge, it was

Pak Geumcheol’s criticism of the equal emphasis policy that was perceived as the greatest threat. Pak’s economic populism likely struck a chord with many people in the country after the Party had failed to deliver on its promise to dramatically improve living standards since the end of the Korean War. Conditions had improved, to be sure, but life in the DPRK was still encumbered by many hardships as the people were driven to contribute more and more in one unrelenting campaign after another to industrialize the country and then to strengthen national defenses. Yet, this criticism came at a time of increased challenges to the nation’s security.

In the weeks after the May KWP CC Plenum, the Party attempted to justify the equal emphasis strategy. On July 5th, Rodong Sinmun carried an editorial describing “the parallel development of economy and defense” as “the embodiment of the Juche position

517 In a meeting with Romanian embassy officials, a Chinese diplomat described Pak Geumcheol as Kim Il Sung’s “right hand man.” See “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.208, June 15, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 518 “Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203,”June 13, 1967, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond Political Affairs, Telegrams from Pyongyang. 227 of our Party which has shouldered the full responsibility for the implementation of the

Korean revolution. […] This line and the policy of the Party is embodying Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideas.” In the typical language of Juche Thought, the editorial further described the policy as “the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of our country and the exclusive guiding compass of the Korean revolution. It is the ideological, theoretical, and practical weapon enabling us in the absolutely correct manner to resolve the questions posed by our revolution and our build-up.”519

Less than two weeks later, on July 18th, Rodong Sinmun carried another editorial entitled “The Correctness of our Party Course of Parallel Implementation of the Build-Up of Economy and Defense.” This second piece further justified the policy, arguing that

“[t]he development of the situation in recent years clearly demonstrated the correctness, the wisdom, and the prescience of our Party. It secured the parallel development of economy and defense in order to timely strengthen the power of our military.” This editorial also used much of the language of Juche, addressing the need to have Jawi, as well as Jarip and Jaju:

If you do not secure nowadays a comprehensive strengthening of the country's economic power, the military course of our party cannot be fully implemented. Neither can the modernization of the army, the arming of the entire people, and the turning of the country into a fortress. It is also impossible to secure the monolithically solidified defense ability of the country.

As we understand economic construction, it means the build-up of an independent socialist economy. If you are dependent on others economically, then the option and principle of self-defense is the same as moot than the opportunity to secure for itself political independence.

519 “Information about the Central Committee Plenum of the Korean Workers Party between 28 June and 3 July 1967,” SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. 228

If you are lagging behind others economically, then you cannot annihilate the bowing before the great powers. You cannot guarantee the work towards the implementation of Juche to the fullest extent.520

As noted above, in many respects, the points of contention were similar to those of the period 1953 to 1956, when the Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans were purged for “factional” activities after a prolonged debate over development strategies and the cult of personality. Kim Il Sung was determined to prevent this from ever reoccurring.

Establishing the Monolithic Ideological System (Yuil sasang chaegye)

The May KWP CC Plenum was a watershed moment in North Korea’s political, ideological, and diplomatic history. The purge of the so-called Gapsan faction eliminated the last obstacle to the establishment of the Kim Il Sung dictatorship. It enabled Kim, now surrounded completely by military men fiercely loyal to him, to suppress pluralism in the Party. He would ultimately accomplish this over the course of 1967 through the institutionalization of Juche Thought and by making it inseparable from the person of the leader and the rule of the Party through the Monolithic Ideological System.

Following the purge, measures were taken to dramatically increase Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality, with an emphasis on the leader’s “proven infallibility” in guiding the people, the Party, and the state from the days of partisan struggle to the present.

According to a cable from the East German embassy in Pyongyang, “the role of anti-

Japanese partisans in Korea’s recent history and Kim Il Sung’s role as their sole leader

520 “Information about the Central Committee Plenum of the Korean Workers Party between 28 June and 3 July 1967,” SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A2/20/251.

229 have been elevated to a legendary level.” 521 Some of the more visible signs of the expanding cult following the May KWP CC Plenum were the mandatory signs of veneration, including the lapel pins with portraits of Kim Il Sung. Kim also gained the title of suryeong, often translated as “great leader,” a term that until 1967 had largely been reserved for Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.

The cult of personality was also extended to Kim Il Sung’s ancestors. For example, according to East German embassy reports, an article about Kim’s mother appeared in 1967, stating “there exists no such mother with such a son in the entire world.” According to the same report, when the Cambodian Foreign Minister travelled to the DPRK in 1967, “it was suggested […] to lay down wreaths in Mangyeongdae at the graves of Kim Il Sung’s parents and grandparents.

The East German embassy reported on other extreme forms of veneration, including the preservation of locations where Kim Il Sung had allegedly been during the colonial period. As the report notes, “This cult results in such grotesque phenomena like the dotting of fireplaces, tree stumps and the like, with glass and aluminum covers in remembrance of Kim Il Sung in the forests of former operation areas of the [anti-

Japanese] partisans.”522

With the expansion of the cult of personality, Kim Il Sung was also celebrated as a leading theoretician. The memoirs of Hwang Jangyeop, one-time Chancellor of Kim Il

Sung University and secretary of the KWP CC who defected to South Korea in 1997, describe Kim’s efforts to create an independent theoretical position from the Soviet

521 Information about some new aspects on KWP positions concerning issues of domestic and foreign policy,” August 18, 1967, SAMPO, no archival signature. 522 Ibid. 230

Union and China in May 1967.523 Kim delivered a speech on May 25 in which he discussed the transition from capitalism to socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

According to Hwang, this speech was in response to an article that he had published on a similar topic in a special commemorative publication on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of his university. Kim alleged that Hwang, without mentioning him by name, did not resolve the theoretical problem on the transition period and the dictatorship of the proletariat “from the Party’s Juche viewpoint.” Instead, Hwang’s study was “dogmatic,”

“tended toward flunkeyism,” and “attempt[ed] to follow the thinking of other countries.”524 Kim’s speech, later dubbed the “May 25 Instruction,” was transformed into a tool to mandate ideological purity in the Party and in North Korean society. The Party’s so-called Juche viewpoint became the new orthodoxy. East German diplomats recognized this trend in the country, reporting in August 1967 that:

In the context of a growing cult of personality, and the replacement of Marxism- Leninism through the “Ideology of Kim Il Sung” as the party’s guiding principle unrivaled by any other valid ideology, there are increasing indications made towards the absolute imperative and validity of the so-called Juche precept. This is tantamount to further implementation and solidification of the special nationalist and centrist position of the KWP.525

Hwang Jangyeop later described the May 25 Instruction as “a turning point in

North Korean history that pushed society in a unique, “extreme left” direction.”526 To be sure, the May 25 Instruction had a transformative effect on North Korea. Seong Hyerang,

523 Hwang Jang Yop, “To Make Things Worse, Father-in-Law Gets Caught” Daily NK, accessed March 3, 2013, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02400&num=6624 524 Kim Il Sung, Works 21: January-December 1967 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), p. 222. 525 “Information about some new aspects on KWP positions concerning issues of domestic and foreign policy,” August 18, 1967, SAMPO, no archival signature. 526 Hwang Jang Yop, “To Make Things Worse, Father-in-Law Gets Caught” Daily NK, accessed March 3, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02400&num=6624 231 the sister of future North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s mistress, described the impact of the May 25 Instruction in her memoir:

The North Korean people say that it was good to live in the North until the 1960s. Exactly speaking, before the May-25 instruction, the North was the people’s socialist state. However, after the instruction, a leftist wave, including class struggle, proletariat dictatorship, the cult of suryeong and the revolutionization of the intellectuals, ran rampant throughout the society.

The people looked at each other without saying anything.

What I did not understand was the censorship of books.

From the May-25 instruction, the nationwide censorship continued until the mid- 1970s. It was a tremendously large campaign in which all of the books around the corners of houses and working places were inspected page by page.

The criteria of the censorship were the cult of the Great leader, anti-Japanese revolutionary activities, and class revolution. Censored pages were erased with blank ink or torn apart.

A mountainous heap of books were piled in every working place to be sent to paper factories. Most of the books were classics.

The areas of music and painting were the same. Foreign music, including Soviet music, was forbidden. Classical music books were burned…since then, oil paintings have disappeared from the North.527

As is apparent from the last of Seong’s statements about foreign music, including

Soviet music, being confiscated, the KWP took a dramatic anti-foreign turn as the country became more and more radicalized. The Monolithic Ideological System became a tool for making the country more impervious to all outside influences.

The expanding cult of personality was not limited to the domestic audience. The

North Koreans also began to promote Kim Il Sung as an exemplary leader to be emulated, and Juche as the model ideology to be adopted, by countries in the developing world.

“Increasingly,” East German diplomats noted, “[Kim] is built up as an international

527 Seong Hye-rang, Deungnamu jip:Seong Hyerang Jaseojeon (House of Wisteria: The Autobiography of Seong Hyerang) (Seoul: Jisiknara, 2000), 312-314, cited in Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, p. 41. 232 leader due to his permanent leadership in conjunction with the victory against the

Japanese imperialists and the United States, the strongest imperialist power; as well as through his success in the economic development of a former dependent colony.” The diplomat accurately noted that “Such argumentation is directed especially towards the national liberation movement.”528

As historian Bernd Schaefer has argued, the Cultural Revolution in China actually provided Kim Il Sung with an opportunity to portray and promote himself as a model for other postcolonial leaders.529 With China engaged in what Kim himself described as

“incredible madness,” Mao’s stature in the developing world was diminished.530 The

North Koreans began to describe Mao—at least in private meetings—as “an old fool who has gone out of his mind.”531 As historian Charles Armstrong has described, Kim sought to step into the shoes of a model anticolonial leader, with a development strategy, based on Juche Thought, that would minimize dependency relationships and lead to economic prosperity. 532 As North Korean propaganda suggested, North Korea had much to be proud of. The country had risen from the ashes of the Korean War like a phoenix, reborn as a moderately developed, industrial nation. The North Korean economy was still performing better than that of South Korea (despite the failure to achieve the goals of the

Seven-year Plan on time or to considerably improve living conditions), demonstrating,

528 “Information about some new aspects on KWP positions concerning issues of domestic and foreign policy,” August 18, 1967, SAMPO, no archival signature. 529 See Bernd Schaefer, “North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 44 (Washington: Cold War International History Project, 2004), pp. 40-41. 530 DVO [Far East Department] memo about Sino-Korean relations, March 7, 1967 AVPRF, f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 5-12. 531 "Attitudes in the DPRK Toward the So-Called 'Cultural Revolution' in China," March 7, 1967, AVPRF f. 0102, op. 23, p. 112, d. 24, pp. 13-23. 532 Juche Thought began to be promoted to developing nations as a model for development. This trend intensified in the 1970s, as Charles Armstrong describes, when Juche study groups would be established around the world. See Charles K. Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations,” NKIDP Working Paper No. 1 (Washington: North Korea International Documentation Project, 2009). 233

Kim believed, the superiority of socialism over capitalism. The contrasts between the two

Koreas were plain for everyone to see.

Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance, and Self- Defense More Thoroughly in all Branches of State Activity

The Monolithic Ideological System based on the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung and the centrality of Juche as the unitary ideology was fully developed when the North

Korean delivered a speech entitled “Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of

Independence, Self-Sustenance, and Self-Defense More Thoroughly in all Branches of

State Activity” to the Supreme People’s Assembly on December 16th, 1967. In the speech,

Kim presented the ten-point platform (gonghwaguk 10 daejeonggang) for the state in establishing the monolithic ideological system. This required applying the principles of

Juche to all fields of governance, including politics, economics, and national defense, and also national reunification, international trade, science and technology, and international affairs.533

533 The ten-point platform of the Monolithic Ideological System included the following applications of Juche: First. The Government of the Republic will thoroughly implement the line of independence, self- sustenance and self-defence to consolidate the political Jajusong of the country, strengthen the foundations of an independent national economy capable of ensuring the complete reunification, independence and prosperity of our nation, and increase the defence capabilities of the country so as to protect its security on the basis of our own forces, by establishing our Party’s idea of Juche in all fields. […] Second. In order to end the present misfortunes of our people caused by the artificial division of our territory and nation as soon as possible, liberate the people in south Korea and reunify our country, the Government of the Republic will firmly equip the people in the northern half of the Republic will firmly equip the people in the northern half of the Republic both morally and materially to support the south Korean people in their sacred anti-US struggle for national salvation and to deal readily with the great revolutionary event. […] Third. The Government of the Republic, under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, will carry on a vigorous campaign to revolutionize and working-classize the peasants, intellectuals and all other members of society by further stepping up the ideological and cultural revolutions and enhancing the leading role of the working class. […] Fourth. The Government of the Republic will see to it that officials of the state and economic bodies eliminate bureaucracy and establish a revolutionary mass viewpoint so as to improve the 234

By December 1967, Juche Thought had been transformed from a set of practical policy applications into a unitary ideology that served as the basis for the Kim Il Sung dictatorship. The Kim Il Sung cult of personality grew unabated, extending back several generations until the mythology of the revolutionary family was the dominant national narrative. Over the following eight years, between 1968 and 1974, Juche underwent a further, more fundamental transformation. The very practical origins of Juche would be almost completely obfuscated as it began to develop philosophical and even semi- religious elements. This process of transformation was started as a result of an intense competition to succeed Kim Il Sung. The rivals were Kim Yeongjoo, Kim Il Sung’s younger brother, and Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung’s son. As they tried to outdo one another in elevating the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung, Juche became much more than Kim Il

functions and role of the people’s power and mobilize the masses for revolution and construction. […] Fifth. The Government of the Republic will consolidate the foundations of the independent national economy of the country, further improve the people’s standard of living and fulfill the solemn duty of freeing the working people from tiring labor by keeping the policy of the Workers’ Party of Korea for socialist industrialization and by striving to carry out the technical revolution in all fields of our national economy. […]. Sixth. The Government of the Republic, firmly following the Juche idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea, will continue to work determinedly to improve the development of the country’s science and technology and build a socialist culture. […] Seventh. The Government of the Republic will do all in its power to increase the defense capabilities of our country and build up the nationwide, all-people defense system, so as to meet the prevailing situation. […] Eighth. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while continuing to hold fast to the line of building an independent national economy by enlisting its own potentials and domestic resources to the fullest under the banner of self-reliance, will also establish economic relations and develop trade with other countries, based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, complete equality and mutual benefit. […] Ninth. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will actively fight to defend the interests and national rights of all the Korean compatriots abroad. […] Tenth. Ever since the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, we have consistently affirmed that we shall promote friendly relations with all countries which oppose imperialist aggression, respect the freedom and independence of our people and desire to establish diplomatic relations with our country on equal footing, and in future, we shall continue to hold fast to this principle in our foreign policy. “Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance, and Self-Defence More Thoroughly in all Branches of State Activity” Association for the Study of Songun Politics UK, http://www.uk-songun.com/index.php?p=1_368 235

Sung had ever purported it to be.534 In 1972, Juche replaced even Marxism-Leninism, and was written into the North Korean constitution as the guiding national ideology.

When Kim Jong Il was designated successor in early 1974, he re-wrote the ten- point platform of the monolithic ideological system. Each principle had a complex set of sub-principles for the uncompromising struggle against all impure elements in North

Korean society. A monolithic guidance system (yuiljeok jido chaeje), overseen by Kim

Jong Il himself (who became known as the “Party Center”), became a powerful weapon in regulating the daily lives of the North Korean people. This system of repression lasted until the 1990s when North Korean institutions neared collapse during the famine.”535

534 Scholars Han S. Park, Jae-Cheon Lim, and Hyung-chan Kim have all written about the evolution of Juche. Han S. Park’s work dedicates a great deal of space to the later stages of Juche’s development. Another scholar who examines Juche, B.R. Myers, makes the critical error of not recognizing the various stages of Juche’s evolution, and focuses on the latter stages of the idea’s evolution. See Han S. Park, North Korea, The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, pp. 58-66; Hyung-chan Kim, Human Remolding in North Korea, A Social History of Education (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2005), pp72-186; and B.R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why it Matters (New York: Melville House, 2011). 535 See Jae-Cheon Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, pp. 65-70. 236

Conclusion

This dissertation attempts to identify the pragmatic origins of Juche Thought and its three practical applications (Jaju, Jarip, Jarip) from 1953 to 1967. During this period,

Juche Thought evolved from an amorphous idea of independence and self-reliance, into a complete set of practical policy applications for North Korea, and finally into a tool for suppressing pluralism in the DPRK and eliminating foreign influences. This is the first work to fully explicate this transformative process by using newly available evidence from the archives of North Korea’s former communist allies, published North Korean speeches, and the existing literature.

None of these ideas were original to Kim Il Sung. They had been part of the leitmotiv in postcolonial discourse in Korea, both in northern and southern Korea.

However, Kim Il Sung can be credited with transforming these ideas into a complete set of practical policy applications and to giving them such saliency.

The history of Juche’s early evolution in many ways reads like a history of the

North Korean political economy because it emerged in the midst of a debate over post- war development strategies and one of its practical applications, Jarip, set the course for economic development in the country. Moreover, a debate over the policy of Jawi (self- reliance in national defense) and the ratio of investment in heavy industry and national defense versus light industry and agriculture ultimately led to the institutionalization of

Juche as the monolithic ideological system in 1967. The North Korean political economy therefore features largely in the narrative.

237

Juche Thought

Juche Thought was first introduced as a guiding principle in December 1955.

Juche Thought initially served two functions. First, it was used to discourage formalism, i.e. the mechanical replication of foreign political practices, particularly from other socialist countries. The second function of Juche Thought was psychological decolonization; i.e. the process of divesting the minds of the North Korean people of self- negating values that led to the imitation of foreign—especially Soviet—practices.

The attack on formalism was preceded by a prolonged debate over development strategies and the proper use of post-Korean War aid from the socialist camp. On one side of the debate was Kim Il Sung, who did not wish to simply reconstruct the factories destroyed during the war, but advocated for a policy of general industrialization in an effort to rectify colonial-era distortions to the national economy and to strengthen national security. Kim Il Sung sought to maximize the use of the massive amounts of aid given to North Korea after the war to replace the country’s poorly integrated industrial structure with complementary industries. Through a short-term dependence on foreign aid, Kim sought to establish an independent national economy and prevent future dependency relationships. Opposing Kim were Soviet-Koreans, China-returned Koreans, and many local officials, who considered the restoration and expansion of light industry, consumer goods, and agriculture to be the priority for reconstruction in order to rapidly elevate standards of living. The latter position was inspired by the Soviet New Course; the short-lived post-Stalin policy of increasing the production of consumer goods and further developing light industry and agriculture. While the protestations of the Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans had little impact on the trajectory of economic

238 developments, their actions nonetheless must have frustrated the North Korean leader as they served as sources of outside influence. In December 1955, over two years after the debate over post-war development strategies began, Kim Il Sung used the term Juche in a speech that admonished his opponents for formalistically imitating the policies of larger socialist countries without knowledge of Korean history and customs. The speech gave the term Juche its full political potential as a recipe for independence and the indigenization of political practices, including Marxism-Leninism, to fit the needs of

North Korea.

Kim Il Sung perceived the emulation of the Soviet New Course as part of a broader problem that was a remnant of Korea’s history of glorifying the cultures, traditions, and political practices of more advanced countries, including China, Japan, and from 1945, the Soviet Union. Kim Il Sung therefore used Juche Thought as a tool for psychological decolonization. As an antonym of sadae, the practice of “serving the great,” Juche was designed to establish pride in Korean history and culture, and prevent the further imitation of foreign political practices.

Jaju

The first practical application of Juche Thought, Jaju, or self-reliance in politics, developed in response to events in 1956 and was formally announced in December 1957.

Despite having introduced Juche in December 1955 as a way of discouraging Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans from mechanically replicating the political practices of other socialist countries, it was only a matter of months before they once again took inspiration from events unfolding in Moscow to call for political reform in the

239

DPRK. Following the February 1956 Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union, scene to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s famed “secret speech” that launched the policy of “de-Stalinization,” Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans campaigned to limit the cult of personality in North Korea. They did so by directly criticizing the practices of Kim Il Sung and other leading KWP officials, and by encouraging foreign leaders to challenge the North Korean leader directly in meetings during the summer of 1956. When Kim Il Sung failed to respond to these pressures, and even dismissed the idea that the DPRK had a problem with the cult of personality, Soviet-

Koreans and China-returned Koreans attempted to force change by raising the matters in a meeting of the KWP CC in August 1956. This political challenge, while never perilous for Kim Il Sung, was greater than the previous economic challenge, and demonstrated that these critics would continue to act as conduits of foreign influence as long as they remained in the Party. The chief critics were immediately purged from the KWP after the

August Plenum and four individuals fled to China. The following month, the Soviet

Union and China dispatched a joint party delegation to Pyongyang to investigate the actions of Kim Il Sung. The joint Sino-Soviet delegation directly interfered in North

Korean politics by ordering the North Koreans to publish accounts of the meetings, demanding the reinstatement of those purged, and the release of individuals from prison.

These actions greatly disturbed Kim Il Sung, demonstrating the tremendous impact of

North Korea’s putative allies over the trajectory of political developments. Over the course of the next year, he purged most Soviet-Koreans and China-returned Koreans while Moscow and Beijing were distracted by anti-communist uprisings in Central and

Eastern Europe. Then, after Moscow issued a statement on sovereign equality and respect

240 for the internal affairs of all countries of the socialist camp in November 1957, Kim Il

Sung declared Jaju to be the official policy of the KWP. This measure was designed to impress upon Moscow and Beijing the reality of North Korea’s sovereignty and to minimize their impact on the trajectory of political developments.

Jarip

The second practical application of Juche Thought, Jarip, or self-reliance in economics, was developed as a virtue of necessity. In economics, North Korea was utterly dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and other countries in the socialist camp in the years after the Korean War. The foreign aid from the socialist camp was a necessary critical factor in the DPRK’s ability to fully rectify colonial-era distortions to its economy so it could develop an independent national economy. Kim Il Sung’s development strategy called for maximizing the use of this foreign aid in the short term to prevent future dependency relationships in the future. However, limitations on Soviet aid during the immediate post-war period, which mandated that aid be used primarily for restoration of pre-existing heavy industrial facilities and then the expansion of light industry, limited his ability to achieve this goal of creating an independent national economy.

North Korea was forced to develop self-reliance in economics for two reasons.

First, by the time the DPRK was launching its Five-year Plan in 1957, socialist countries had begun to reduce their aid. This was in part a result of disagreements over the use of aid, but also due to worsening relations after the political events of 1956, especially the events of August and September. The second, and perhaps greater reason, was that North

Korea had come under increasing pressure from the Soviet Union and other socialist

241 countries to coordinate production and industrial development through Council for

Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Since the DPRK had not yet rectified colonial-era distortions to its economy, Kim Il Sung resisted this pressure, recognizing that the country would forever remain dependent on foreign countries for finished goods while North Korea would be a source of raw materials. Just as Joseph Stalin adopted the autarkic policy of socialism in one country when the Soviet Union was isolated, weak, and vulnerable in the 1920s, Kim Il Sung adopted autarky to prevent the exploitation of

North Korean resources. This made Kim an early advocate of the Dependency Theory, even if he himself had not been aware of it. One key difference, though, was the fact that

Dependency Theory sought to minimize capitalist exploitation. Kim Il Sung was opposed to the exploitation of more advanced socialist countries.

The North Korean leadership mobilized indigenous human and material resources to compensate for the reduction in outside aid and to minimize outside influence. This was achieved through mass campaigns, such as the Cheonlima Movement, which promoted Kim Il Sung’s voluntaristic vision for achieving the goals of the North Korean revolution, which demanded maximum sacrifice for minimal reward. Through these measures, despite reductions in foreign aid, North Korea achieved the goals of its Five- year Plan well over one year ahead of schedule.

Jawi

The development of the third practical application of Juche Thought, Jawi, or self-reliance in national defense, was also a virtue of necessity. While the 1960s started very positively for the DPRK, the nation’s security was precarious from 1961 following

242 the May coup d'état that brought to power a military junta in South Korea. Despite signing a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with both the Soviet

Union in July 1961 (and another with China one week later), North Korea became suspicious of Moscow following the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which he viewed as capitulation to the United States. Kim Il Sung believed his suspicions about

Moscow’s security commitment to its allies confirmed when the Soviets refused to supply the DPRK with 100 million rubles worth of military equipment in December 1962.

Over the next two years, North Korea grew closer to China than at any point in the history of the Sino-DPRK relationship, though Kim Il Sung recognized that the PRC was incapable of replacing Moscow as a source of advanced weaponry. Therefore, from

December 1962, North Korea developed autonomous defense capabilities by adopting a so-called equal emphasis policy, whereby heavy industry and defense capabilities would be developed simultaneously, at the expense of consumer goods and light industry.

Starting in early 1963, North Korea also began to explore the possibility of developing a nuclear deterrent. By 1965, the share of national defense to the total national budget was approximately 30 percent, up from 4.3 percent in 1956. Even after relations with Moscow improved in late 1964, and the Soviets resumed providing North Korea with military assistance, Pyongyang never abandoned its policy of self-reliance in national defense, refusing to fully entrust national security to a foreign nation.

Yuil sasang

By 1965, Juche had developed into a complete set of practical policy applications for North Korea. Without two years, however, it was transformed into a monolithic

243 ideological system, which functioned as a tool for suppressing pluralism in the KWP and for making the DPRK impervious from foreign influences. The precipitating cause for the transformation of what had started as a very pragmatic reaction to events was another domestic dispute over development strategies. At a time when North Korea’s international security remained precarious, and had worsened after the launch of China’s

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966, members of Kim Il Sung’s inner-circle challenged the continued emphasis on simultaneously developing heavy industry and national defenses. These individuals, including Pak Geumcheol who had been among the most influential officials in the DPRK, engaged in economic populism by delivering speeches declaring the need to drastically improve living standards. While I don’t wish to rule out the possibility that Pak believed this was necessary, one possible motivation for this challenge, as I proposed, was the desire to challenge the position of Kim Yeongjoo,

Kim Il Sung’s younger brother and presumed successor. By creating a groundswell of support through his advocacy of improving living standards, Pak may have hoped to become successor.

Kim Il Sung undoubtedly perceived this challenge to his national security imperatives as a threat, particularly as Sino-DPRK relations deteriorated further as the

Cultural Revolution expanded. In May 1967, Pak and his associates were purged from the

KWP. From this period, Juche was slowly transformed into a monolithic ideological system, becoming a tool for suppressing pluralism inside the DPRK. The cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung was expanded to members of his family, including his ancestors, and extreme forms of veneration, including the displaying of lapel pins bearing his image, became mandatory. Moreover, the KWP took a number of measures to

244 eliminate foreign influences, including the banning of books and music from the Soviet

Union and other countries as Juche, or “Kimilsungism” as it would later be called, became the unitary ideology in the DPRK.

This dissertation is the first work to fully explicate the process of Juche’s evolution from its advent in North Korea in 1953 to its institutionalization and transformation into the monolithic ideological system in 1967. This dissertation endeavors to demonstrate the very pragmatic, if reactive, nature of North Korean policies during this period, which I believe to be the most formative period in the history of the party-state.

245

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