DOCSLIB.ORG

PARK JIN HYOK, Also Known As ("Aka") "Jin Hyok Park," Aka "Pak Jin Hek," Case Fl·J 18 - 1 4 79

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PARK JIN HYOK, Also Known As ( AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the RLED Central District of California CLERK U.S. DIS RICT United States ofAmerica JUN - 8 ?018 [ --- .. ~- ·~".... ~-~,..,. v. CENT\:y'\ l i\:,: ffl1G1 OF__ CAUFORN! BY .·-. ....-~- - ____D=E--..... PARK JIN HYOK, also known as ("aka") "Jin Hyok Park," aka "Pak Jin Hek," Case fl·J 18 - 1 4 79 Defendant. CRIMINAL COMPLAINT I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best ofmy knowledge and belief. Beginning no later than September 2, 2014 and continuing through at least August 3, 2017, in the county ofLos Angeles in the Central District of California, the defendant violated: Code Section Offense Description 18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy 18 u.s.c. § 1349 Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud This criminal complaint is based on these facts: Please see attached affidavit. IBJ Continued on the attached sheet. Isl Complainant's signature Nathan P. Shields, Special Agent, FBI Printed name and title Sworn to before ~e and signed in my presence. Date: ROZELLA A OLIVER Judge's signature City and state: Los Angeles, California Hon. Rozella A. Oliver, U.S. Magistrate Judge Printed name and title -:"'~~ ,4G'L--- A-SA AUSAs: Stephanie S. Christensen, x3756; Anthony J. Lewis, x1786; & Anil J. Antony, x6579 REC: Detention Contents I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1 II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT ......................................................................1 III. SUMMARY................................................................................................3 IV. TERMINOLOGY.......................................................................................7 V. INFRASTRUCTURE ..............................................................................13 A. North Korean Computer Networks .............................................13 B. The “Brambul” Worm ...................................................................14 C. Use of a Proxy Service ..................................................................16 D. Dynamic DNS (DDNS) .................................................................17 VI. TARGETING TECHNIQUES USED .....................................................19 A. Reconnaissance.............................................................................19 B. Spear-Phishing .............................................................................20 VII. THE ATTACK ON SPE ..........................................................................23 A. Initiation of Overt Contact and Email Communications ...........24 B. Analysis of Malware and Infected Computers and Technical Details of the Intrusion ................................................................28 C. Theft of SPE’s Data and Distribution by Email and a Social Media Account Created by the Subjects ......................................29 D. The SPE Movie “The Interview” ..................................................30 E. Social Media Accounts Were Used to Post Links to Malware on Other Social Media Accounts Related to “The Interview” ..........33 F. “Andoson David,” “Watson Henny” and Related Accounts .........37 1. “Andoson David” ................................................................37 2. “Watson Henny” and “John Mogabe” ................................39 3. “Yardgen” ...........................................................................42 G. Malware Used in Successful Breach of SPE Network ................45 H. Targeting Movie Theater Chain ..................................................50 I. Intrusion at Mammoth Screen ....................................................52 i VIII. INTRUSIONS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS .................................53 A. Background Regarding Bangladesh Bank Cyber-Heist .............56 B. Malicious Accounts Used .............................................................59 1. [email protected] ..................................................59 2. [email protected] ...........................................................59 3. [email protected] ....................................................61 4. [email protected] ......................................................61 C. Results of Forensic Analysis ........................................................62 D. Comparison of Malware Used and Other Targeted Banks ........66 1. Families of Malware..........................................................67 2. Use of NESTEGG ..............................................................70 3. Secure Delete Function: Connections Between Intrusions at Bank Victims and SPE ..................................................72 4. FakeTLS Data Table .........................................................77 5. DNS Function ....................................................................82 6. Intrusion at the African Bank: Connections to Bangladesh Bank ...............................................................85 7. Watering Hole Campaign Targeting Financial Institutions ........................................................................88 IX. TARGETING OF OTHER VICTIMS .....................................................95 A. Initial Discovery of Defense Contractor Targeting .....................95 B. Connections Between Accounts Used to Target Defense Contractors, and with Accounts Used to Target SPE .................97 1. Connection to [email protected] ...................100 2. Connection to @erica_333u ..............................................101 3. Connection to [email protected] ............................102 C. Targeting of South Korean Entities ..........................................105 X. WANNACRY GLOBAL RANSOMWARE ............................................106 A. WannaCry Ransomware Attacks ...............................................106 ii B. Similarities in the Three Versions of WannaCry ......................111 C. Links Between WannaCry and Other Intrusions Described Above ...........................................................................................118 D. Evidence Shows Subjects Were Following Exploit Development...............................................................................125 XI. THE “KIM HYON WOO” PERSONA ...................................................126 A. tty198410@gmail.com.................................................................127 B. hyon_u@hotmail.com..................................................................128 C. [email protected] ...............................................................129 D. [email protected] ....................................................................131 E. @hyon_u ......................................................................................132 F. Brambul Collector Accounts ......................................................132 XII. PARK JIN HYOK ..................................................................................133 A. PARK’s Work for Chosun Expo, a DPRK Government Front Company .....................................................................................136 1. Chosun Expo ....................................................................136 2. PARK JIN HYOK’s Work in Dalian, China ...................142 B. The Chosun Expo Accounts .......................................................147 1. [email protected] ...................................................149 2. [email protected] ..............................................152 3. [email protected] ..............................................156 4. [email protected] ................................................159 5. [email protected] .................................................164 6. Access to Chosun Expo Accounts by North Korean IP Addresses .........................................................................166 7. Summary of Connections Between “Kim Hyon Woo” Persona and Chosun Expo Accounts Connected to PARK................................................................................169 XIII. CONCLUSION......................................................................................171 iii A F F I D A V I T I, Nathan P. Shields, being duly sworn, declare and state as follows: I. INTRODUCTION 1. I am a Special Agent (“SA”) with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and have been so employed since 2011. I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office, where I conduct investigations related to computer intrusions and national security. During my career as an FBI SA, I have participated in numerous computer crime investigations. In addition, I have received both formal and informal training from the FBI and other institutions regarding computer- related investigations and computer technology. Prior to becoming a Special Agent with the FBI, I was employed for eleven years as a Software Engineer where I worked on software projects at NASA’s Johnson Space Center that supported the International Space Station and Space Shuttle mission simulators. I received a bachelor’s degree in Aerospace Engineering with a minor in Computer Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. As a federal agent, I am authorized to investigate violations of the laws of the United States and have experience doing so. I am a law enforcement officer with authority to apply for and execute warrants issued under the authority of the United States. II. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT 2. This affidavit is made in support of a criminal
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Hebrew Alphabet
    BBH2 Textbook Supplement Chapter 1 – The Hebrew Alphabet 1 The following comments explain, provide mnemonics for, answer questions that students have raised about, and otherwise supplement the second edition of Basics of Biblical Hebrew by Pratico and Van Pelt. Chapter 1 – The Hebrew Alphabet 1.1 The consonants For begadkephat letters (§1.5), the pronunciation in §1.1 is the pronunciation with the Dagesh Lene (§1.5), even though the Dagesh Lene is not shown in §1.1. .Kaf” has an “off” sound“ כ The name It looks like open mouth coughing or a cup of coffee on its side. .Qof” is pronounced with either an “oh” sound or an “oo” sound“ ק The name It has a circle (like the letter “o” inside it). Also, it is transliterated with the letter q, and it looks like a backwards q. here are different wa s of spellin the na es of letters. lef leph leˉ There are many different ways to write the consonants. See below (page 3) for a table of examples. See my chapter 1 overheads for suggested letter shapes, stroke order, and the keys to distinguishing similar-looking letters. ”.having its dot on the left: “Sin is never ri ht ׂש Mnemonic for Sin ׁש and Shin ׂש Order of Sin ׁש before Shin ׂש Our textbook and Biblical Hebrew lexicons put Sin Some alphabet songs on YouTube reverse the order of Sin and Shin. Modern Hebrew dictionaries, the acrostic poems in the Bible, and ancient abecedaries (inscriptions in which someone wrote the alphabet) all treat Sin and Shin as the same letter.
    [Show full text]
  • Xbt.Doc.248.2.Pdf
    MAY 25, 2018 United States District Court Southern District of Florida Miami Division CASE NO. 1:17-CV-60426-UU ALEKSEJ GUBAREV, XBT HOLDING S.A., AND WEBZILLA, INC., PLAINTIFFS, VS BUZZFEED, INC. AND BEN SMITH, DEFENDANTS Expert report of Anthony J. Ferrante FTI Consulting, Inc. 4827-3935-4214v.1 0100812-000009 Table of Contents Table of Contents .............................................................................................................................................. 1 Qualifications ..................................................................................................................................................... 2 Scope of Assignment ......................................................................................................................................... 3 Glossary of Important Terms ............................................................................................................................. 4 Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 7 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 Technical Investigation ................................................................................................................................ 8 Investigative Findings .......................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Persistent Threats
    THREAT RESEARCH Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats Introduction As the name “Advanced” suggests, APT (advanced persistent threat) is one of the most sophisticated and organized forms of network attacks that keep cybersecurity professionals up at night. Unlike many hit & run traditional cyberattacks, an APT is carried out over a prolonged period of time by skilled threat actors who strategize multi-staged campaigns against their targets, employing clandestine tools & techniques such as Remote Administration Tools (RAT), Toolkits, Backdoor Trojans, Social Engineering, DNS Tunneling etc. These experienced cybercriminals are mostly backed & well-funded by nation states and corporation-backed organizations to specifi cally target high value organizations with the following objectives in mind: a Theft of Intellectual Property & classifi ed data i.e. Cyber Espionage a Access to critical & sensitive communications a Access to credentials of critical systems a Sabotage or exfi ltration of databases a Theft of Personal Identifi able Information (PII) a Access to critical infrastructure to perform internal reconnaissance To achieve the above goals, APT Groups use novel techniques to obfuscate their actions and easily bypass traditional security barriers that are not advancing at the same rate as the sophisticated attack patterns of cybercriminals. To understand the evolved behavioral pattern of APT Groups in the year 2020, a review of their latest activities revealed interesting developments and a few groundbreaking events¹: a Southeast Asia
    [Show full text]
  • LAZARUS UNDER the HOOD Executive Summary
    LAZARUS UNDER THE HOOD Executive Summary The Lazarus Group’s activity spans multiple years, going back as far as 2009. Its malware has been found in many serious cyberattacks, such as the massive data leak and file wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014; the cyberespionage campaign in South Korea, dubbed Operation Troy, in 2013; and Operation DarkSeoul, which attacked South Korean media and financial companies in 2013. There have been several attempts to attribute one of the biggest cyberheists, in Bangladesh in 2016, to Lazarus Group. Researchers discovered a similarity between the backdoor used in Bangladesh and code in one of the Lazarus wiper tools. This was the first attempt to link the attack back to Lazarus. However, as new facts emerged in the media, claiming that there were at least three independent attackers in Bangladesh, any certainty about who exactly attacked the banks systems, and was behind one of the biggest ever bank heists in history, vanished. The only thing that was certain was that Lazarus malware was used in Bangladesh. However, considering that we had previously found Lazarus in dozens of different countries, including multiple infections in Bangladesh, this was not very convincing evidence and many security researchers expressed skepticism abound this attribution link. This paper is the result of forensic investigations by Kaspersky Lab at banks in two countries far apart. It reveals new modules used by Lazarus group and strongly links the tools used to attack systems supporting SWIFT to the Lazarus Group’s arsenal of lateral movement tools. Considering that Lazarus Group is still active in various cyberespionage and cybersabotage activities, we have segregated its subdivision focusing on attacks on banks and financial manipulations into a separate group which we call Bluenoroff (after one of the tools they used).
    [Show full text]
  • Democratic People's Republic of Korea INDIVIDUALS
    CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:21/01/2021 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Democratic People's Republic of Korea INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: AN 1: JONG 2: HYUK 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. Title: Diplomat DOB: 14/03/1970. a.k.a: AN, Jong, Hyok Nationality: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Passport Details: 563410155 Address: Egypt.Position: Diplomat DPRK Embassy Egypt Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):DPR0001 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifiying Information):Associations with Green Pine Corporation and DPRK Embassy Egypt (UK Statement of Reasons):Representative of Saeng Pil Trading Corporation, an alias of Green Pine Associated Corporation, and DPRK diplomat in Egypt.Green Pine has been designated by the UN for activities including breach of the UN arms embargo.An Jong Hyuk was authorised to conduct all types of business on behalf of Saeng Pil, including signing and implementing contracts and banking business.The company specialises in the construction of naval vessels and the design, fabrication and installation of electronic communication and marine navigation equipment. (Gender):Male Listed on: 22/01/2018 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 Group ID: 13590. 2. Name 6: BONG 1: PAEK 2: SE 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: 21/03/1938. Nationality: Democratic People's Republic of Korea Position: Former Chairman of the Second Economic Committee,Former member of the National Defense Commission,Former Vice Director of Munitions Industry Department (MID) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):DPR0251 (UN Ref): KPi.048 (Further Identifiying Information):Paek Se Bong is a former Chairman of the Second Economic Committee, a former member of the National Defense Commission, and a former Vice Director of Munitions Industry Department (MID) Listed on: 05/06/2017 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 Group ID: 13478.
    [Show full text]
  • A Statistical Model for Hangeul-Hanja Conversion in Terminology Domain
    A Statistical Model for Hangeul-Hanja Conversion in Terminology Domain Jin-Xia HUANG, Sun-Mee BAE, Key-Sun CHOI Department of Computer Science Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology/KORTERM/BOLA 373-1 Guseong-dong, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, 305-701 {hgh, sbae, kschoi}@world.kaist.ac.kr and without-space formats even after part of Abstract speech (POS) tagging, because the space using is Sino-Korean words, which are historically very flexible in Korean language. For example, borrowed from Chinese language, could be “ ¨ © (Hanja bienhuan) (Hanja conversion)” ¨ © represented with both Hanja (Chinese could be in both “ ¨¦© ” and “ ” characters) and Hangeul (Korean characters) writing formats. It means a compound word writings. Previous Korean Input Method tokenization should be included as a pre- Editors (IMEs) provide only a simple processing in Hangeul-Hanja conversion. dictionary-based approach for Hangeul-Hanja Automatic Hangeul-Hanja conversion also suffers conversion. This paper presents a sentence- from another problem, that there are no enough based statistical model for Hangeul-Hanja Hanja corpora for statistical approach. In modern conversion, with word tokenization included Korean language, only few sino-Korean words are as a hidden process. As a result, we reach written in Hanja writing generally, and the same 91.4% of character accuracy and 81.4% of sino-Korean word with the same meaning could be word accuracy in terminology domain, when in either Hangeul or Hanja writing even in the only very limited Hanja data is available. same text. This paper presents a sentence-based statistical 1 Introduction model for Hangeul-Hanja conversion. The model includes a transfer model (TM) and a language More than one half of the Korean words are model (LM), in which word tokenization is Sino-Korean words (Chang, 1996).
    [Show full text]
  • International Post Adoption Services | Korea Service Descriptions
    1605 Eustis Street 80 0 -952-9302 Saint Paul, MN 55108 651-646-7771 chlss.org/post-adoption International Post Adoption Services | Korea Service Descriptions Important: CH/LSS and our Korean partnership agencies receive heightened service requests over the summer months, and you may experience a longer wait time for your case to be assigned. Thank you for your understanding. A $35 Registration Fee is due at time of service request Additional forms specific to your Korean agency will be required. Your post adoption worker will provide them to you. Birth Family Search - Korean and U.S. File Review are included *See age restrictions below If you are unsure about proceeding with a search, consider starting with a file review. An adopted adult, age 19+ or parents of adopted minors (13+) can initiate a search for birth parents. Prior to starting your search, your post adoption worker will speak with you in detail about your motivations to search, the range of possible outcomes, and access to support systems during the search and outreach journey. Correspondence (through email) will be exchanged at no extra cost up to 1 year from the time of first contact with birth mother or father (translation available through volunteer translators). Correspondence fees (page 2) apply after 1st year of letter exchange. ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................………..$350 Use “Domestic” Search Service Request when all parties live in US and Korean agency is not involved..….…..….Domestic Service fees apply US and/or Korean file review and other special requests *See age restrictions below An adopted adult, age 19+ or parents of adopted minors (age 13+) can request that their US and/or Korean agency adoption file be checked for updates.
    [Show full text]
  • Council Decision (Cfsp)
    L 246/12 EN Offi cial Jour nal of the European Union 30.7.2020 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Whereas: (1) On 17 May 2019 the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 (1). (2) Targeted restrictive measures against cyber-attacks with a significant effect which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States are among the measures included in the Union’s framework for a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber-activities (the cyber diplomacy toolbox) and are a vital instrument to deter and respond to such activities. Restrictive measures can also be applied in response to cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States or international organisations, where deemed necessary to achieve common foreign and security policy objectives set out in the relevant provisions of Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. (3) On 16 April 2018 the Council adopted conclusions in which it firmly condemned the malicious use of information and communications technologies, including in the cyber-attacks publicly known as ‘WannaCry’ and ‘NotPetya’, which caused significant damage and economic loss in the Union and beyond. On 4 October 2018 the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) expressed serious concerns in a joint statement about an attempted cyber-attack to undermine the integrity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands, an aggressive act which demonstrated contempt for the solemn purpose of the OPCW.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Under Japanese Occupation
    1 “BECOMING JAPANESE:” IDENTITY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION GRADES: 9-12 AUTHOR: Katherine Murphy TOPIC/THEME: Japanese Occupation, World War II, Korean Culture, Identity TIME REQUIRED: Two 60-minute periods BACKGROUND: The lesson is based on the impact of the Japanese occupation of Korea during World War II on Korean culture and identity. In particular, the lesson focuses on the Japanese campaign in 1940 to encourage Koreans to abandon their Korean names and adopt Japanese names. This campaign was known as “sōshi-kaimei." The purpose of this campaign, along with campaigns requiring Koreans to recite an oath to the Japanese Emperor and bow at Shinto shrines, were to make the Korean people “Japanese” and hopefully, loyal subjects of the Japanese Empire by abandoning their Korean identity and loyalties. These cultural policies and campaigns were key to the Japanese war effort during World War II. The lesson draws from the students’ lives as well as two books: Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood by Richard E. Kim and Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea 1910-1945 by Hildi Kang. CURRICULUM CONNECTION: The lesson is intended to use the major themes from the summer reading book Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood to introduce students to one of the five essential questions of the World History II course: How is identity constructed? How does identity impact human experience? In first investigating the origin of their own names and the meaning of Korean names, students can begin to explore the question “How is identity constructed?’ In examining how and why the Japanese sought to change the Korean people’s names, religion, etc during World War II, students will understand how global events such as World War II can impact an individual.
    [Show full text]
  • Proposal for a Korean Script Root Zone LGR 1 General Information
    (internal doc. #: klgp220_101f_proposal_korean_lgr-25jan18-en_v103.doc) Proposal for a Korean Script Root Zone LGR LGR Version 1.0 Date: 2018-01-25 Document version: 1.03 Authors: Korean Script Generation Panel 1 General Information/ Overview/ Abstract The purpose of this document is to give an overview of the proposed Korean Script LGR in the XML format and the rationale behind the design decisions taken. It includes a discussion of relevant features of the script, the communities or languages using it, the process and methodology used and information on the contributors. The formal specification of the LGR can be found in the accompanying XML document below: • proposal-korean-lgr-25jan18-en.xml Labels for testing can be found in the accompanying text document below: • korean-test-labels-25jan18-en.txt In Section 3, we will see the background on Korean script (Hangul + Hanja) and principal language using it, i.e., Korean language. The overall development process and methodology will be reviewed in Section 4. The repertoire and variant groups in K-LGR will be discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 7, Whole Label Evaluation Rules (WLE) will be described and then contributors for K-LGR are shown in Section 8. Several appendices are included with separate files. proposal-korean-lgr-25jan18-en 1 / 73 1/17 2 Script for which the LGR is proposed ISO 15924 Code: Kore ISO 15924 Key Number: 287 (= 286 + 500) ISO 15924 English Name: Korean (alias for Hangul + Han) Native name of the script: 한글 + 한자 Maximal Starting Repertoire (MSR) version: MSR-2 [241] Note.
    [Show full text]
  • 5892 Cisco Category: Standards Track August 2010 ISSN: 2070-1721
    Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Faltstrom, Ed. Request for Comments: 5892 Cisco Category: Standards Track August 2010 ISSN: 2070-1721 The Unicode Code Points and Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA) Abstract This document specifies rules for deciding whether a code point, considered in isolation or in context, is a candidate for inclusion in an Internationalized Domain Name (IDN). It is part of the specification of Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications 2008 (IDNA2008). Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5892. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
    [Show full text]
  • Society's Genome.Indb
    Society’s Genome Genetic Diversity’s Role in Digital Preservation By Nathan Thompson with Bob Cone and John Kranz Copyright © 2016 by Spectra Logic Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including storage and retrieval systems—except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews—without permission in writing from Spectra Logic Corporation. All product names, logos, and brands mentioned in this book are the property of their respective owners. Neither the authors nor publisher claim any right of ownership to such names, logos, and brands. Cover design by Kristen Coats Back cover image: Detail of “Ptolemy World Map,” from Ptolemy’s the Geography, redrawn by Francesco di Antonio del Chierco (15th century). Housed in the British Library, London. Image retrieved from https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PtolemyWorldMap.jpg. Published by Spectra Logic Corporation 6285 Lookout Road Boulder, Colorado 80301-3580 Tel.: 1.800.833.1132 Fax: 1.303.939.8844 www.spectralogic.com ISBN: 978-0-9975644-0-2 Second Printing Printed and bound in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is printed on acid-free paper. “We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth that still fills me with astonishment.” —Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene Chapter 6 Wolves at the Door Just a few years after the 9/11 attacks, the digital world began showing signs of sudden, profound change.
    [Show full text]