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Afghanistan's Religious Landscape: Politicising the Sacred

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Afghanistan's Religious Landscape: Politicising the Sacred NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING CENTRE No. 3 March 2010 Noref Policy Brief Afghanistan’s religious landscape: politicising the sacred Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken Executive Summary Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken Afghanistan’s thirty years of war have seen the gradual and heavy politicisation of religion. A number of new and distinct types of political move- Kaja Borchgrevink is a researcher at the ments – which can be characterised broadly as International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) “fundamentalists”, “Islamists” and “neo-fundamen- in Oslo, where her work focuses on the Afghan talists” – has emerged to challenge traditional peace process after 2001. From 2001 to 2006, expressions of Islam. This has transformed the Borchgrevink worked with civil-society develop- religious landscape in Afghanistan, which is as a ment in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the United result more variegated than ever before. The differ- Nations and the Aga Khan Foundation. Her re- ent attitudes of these new currents to questions of cent work include studies of the role of religious religious authority, political process, and the Afghan actors in Afghan civil society; civil society and statebuilding project need to be carefully distin- peacebuilding in Afghanistan; the Afghan justice guished. More generally, the appearance of such sector and the relationship between modern and movements highlights the way that the role of reli- traditional law; and the transnational aspects of gion, though often overlooked, is central to the religious education in Afghanistan and Pakistan. attempt since the regime-change of late 2001 to build a viable Afghan state. The impact of the new Kristian Berg Harpviken is the Director of actors (including the Taliban itself) is reflected in the the International Peace Research Institute Oslo way that President Hamid Karzai – struggling to (PRIO). Harpviken is a sociologist, whose re- balance the modernised secularists supporting the search interests include the dynamics of civil war statebuilding project and the religious fundamental- (mobilisation, conflict resolution, post-war re- ists opposing it – has allowed several ex-jihadi construction and peacebuilding); migration and Islamist factions into the government. The result of transnational communities; and methodology in this accommodation has been both to sustain the difficult contexts. He has a particular interest former jihadi leaders’ influence and contribute to in Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. He is the the marginalisation of more moderate Islamic forces. author of Social Networks and Migration in War- At the same time, many religious leaders believe time Afghanistan, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). they could contribute positively to the statebuilding agenda by generating support among Afghan people. This complex situation makes an understanding of Afghanistan’s diverse religious landscape and the various positions vis-à-vis the state all the more essential in the context of efforts to develop strategies for peace and reconciliation. Noref Policy Brief No. 3 March 2010 Background1 Traditional Islam Throughout Afghanistan’s three decades of war, Traditionally, Islam in Afghanistan has been an religion has been heavily politicised. In the aftermath amalgamation of formal Islam, Sufism, and customary of 9/11 and the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghan practices (the last category sometimes referred to as Islam was easily confused with political extremism, “folk Islam”). While no fixed hierarchy exists amongst even al-Qaeda-style global terror. For most Afghans, Sunni religious leaders, a broad distinction can be Islam is much more than politics. Religion is part of made between the mullah imam (the local mosque everyday life. Islam is what 99% of all Afghans have leader, who interprets and extends the religion as it is in common. The Sunni Muslims constitute some four- experienced in daily life); and the ulema (high-level fifths of the population and will be the main focus religious scholars, who act as the interpreters and of this analysis. The remaining one-fifth is largely upholders of the religion’s law and scriptural tradition). “twelver” Shia, who will be discussed only briefly here. The religious landscape is diverse. What it means The ulema are formally educated religious leaders to be Muslim and what role religion should have in schooled in madrasas and in the religious faculties of public life are contentious issues. This makes the role universities, and are often organised in loose networks of religion central to the Afghan statebuilding project. around religious leaders, mosques and madrasas themselves. The traditional ulema have not played Many actors have since the regime-change of a directly political role, but have primarily provided November 2001 taken part in the contest over defining practical and spiritual guidance to their followers. the relationship between religion and the state. In Formal Islam is a legal code and the ulema were broad terms, four such actors can be identified: originally established as a class of religious specialists. With the development of Islamic jurisprudence, the • Inside the government, a modern, technocratic elite ulema consolidated their position as interpreters of that is driving the foreign-sponsored statebuilding Sharia (Islamic law). project; it favours a limited role for religion in the public space Sufism – the esoteric tradition in Islam – is also well • Also inside the government, but at odds with established in Afghanistan. It coexists with formal the first group, the still factionalised ex-jihadi Islam, and many of the formally trained traditionalist Islamist political leadership, which promotes and clergy are also attached to a Sufi order. In contrast to protects the Islamic state the formally trained ulema, being a Sufi master (pir) is • Outside and opposing the government, militant hereditary, and the tombs of Sufi masters are important Islamist and fundamentalist groups, including the places of worship and pilgrimage. The Sufis are Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami organised in orders (tariqas), but it is the relationship • A variety of apolitical religious actors, supporting between the pir and the disciple (murid) that is central neither the government nor the militants. to the personal spiritual journey. The phenomenon of “followership” is widespread, particularly among 1 This policy brief combines a number of different primary and the middle class. Two of the main Sufi orders – the secondary sources including interviews with religious actors in Nakshbandiyya and Qadiriyya – are closely linked the Afghanistan, Afghan religious websites, and academic writ- Mujaddedi and Gilani families and their respective ing, as well as “grey” literature available on the topic. It draws political parties. The Sufi leadership sees itself as particularly on the following studies: Kaja Borchgrevink and upholder and protector of Afghan and Islamic values, Kristian Berg Harpviken, “Trans-border Religious Networks: culture and practices. The Case of Religious Education in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, forthcoming, 2010; Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann Chaud- hary, Aziz Hakimi, Kristian Berg Harpviken and Arne Strand, “Reconciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan, An Overview”, Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2009, http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3266-conciliatory-ap- proaches-to-the-insurgency-in.pdf, accessed 26 February 2010; Kaja Borchgrevink, “Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan”, Oslo, PRIO, 2007; and Kristian Berg Harpviken, The Hazara of Afghanistan: The thorny path towards political unity, 1978 – 1992, Oslo, University of Oslo, 1997. - 2 - Afghanistan’s religious landscape: politicising the sacred Religious leaders and statebuilding reinforced by the Afghan jihad (the common shorthand The main religious actors and institutions in term for the resistance to the Soviet-backed communist Afghanistan, the religious leaders, the mosques and regime which had come to power in 1978). The result the madrasas, are not organised in formal structures, was a complete change in the relationship between but form part of looser networks. They are primarily religion and politics in the country, which has now reactive in their mode of operation. These institutions lasted for over thirty years. This transformation can be have central positions in Afghan society, providing summarised as a challenge to traditional expressions theological and spiritual guidance. Their influence lies of Islam from three new and distinct types of political in their moral authority, based on their knowledge and movements: “fundamentalists”, “Islamists” and “neo- interpretation of religious texts, mystical association fundamentalists”.3 and holy lineage, rather than their political associations or military power.2 Several religious actors retain After the communist takeover in 1978, the traditionalist considerable influence on the moral values, social Islamic groups mobilised through the mullah and Sufi practices and political opinions of many Afghans. networks, and joined the religiously-based opposition building up across the border in the Pakistani city of The traditionalist religious leaders who reject the Peshawar. However, the main traditionalist parties - Taliban have, after the regime-change in 2001, the Haraqat-e Inqelab (led by Maulana Mohammad increasingly reverted to their mosques and Nabi), the Afghan National Liberation Front madrasas, quietly fulfilling their duties (ANLF, led by the Sufi-associated
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